labrel - iii (digest pool)

Labor RelationsThursday July 10, 2014

1. DABUET vs ROCHE, Gr. No. L-45402, April 30, 1987

2. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA BANDOLINO-LMLC vsNLRC, G.R. No. 125195 July 17, 1997

3. CLLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION vs NLRC,

G.R. No. L-67158, May 30, 1988

4. ME-SHURN CORP vs ME-SHURN WORKERS UNION,

G.R. No. 156292, January 11, 2005

5. BATAAN SHIPYARD and ENGINEERING CO vs NLRC ,

G.R. No. 78604, May 9, 1988

6. MABEZA vs NLRC, Gr. No. 118506, April 18, 1997

7. MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION vs NLRC, G.R. No. 76989September 29, 1987

LEGIM DISCIPULO: Anne Co & Meiki Merlin Labor Relations Case Digest

jell merlinTypewritten Text


jell merlinTypewritten Text8. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD. EMPLOYEES ASSOC.-ATU vs THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTDGr. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971 9. CRUZ vs PAFLU, Gr. No. L-26519, October 29, 1971



DABUET vs ROCHE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.G.R. No. L-45402, 30 April 1987

Facts: Individual petitioners who were an officers of the RocheProducts Labor Union, the labor organization existing in the firm, andwith whom the respondent company had a collective bargainingagreement which was due for re-negotiation that month, wrote therespondent company expressing the grievances of the union andseeking a formal conference with management regarding theprevious dismissal of the union's president and vice-president. A meeting was, accordingly, arranged and set. At saidmeeting, instead of discussing the problems affecting the laborunion and management, Mr. Eric Mentha, the company's generalmanager, allegedly berated the petitioners for writing said letter andcalled the letter and the person who prepared it as "stupid." Feeling that he was the one alluded to, since he hadprepared the letter, counsel for the labor union filed a case for graveslander against Mr. Mentha. The company and Mentha, in turn, filed a complaint forperjury against petitioners alleging that their affidavit containedfalse statements. The respondent company construed the execution bypetitioners of the affidavit as an act of breach of trust andconfidence and inimical to the interest of the company, for whichthey were suspended. The respondent company filed with the NLRC a petition forclearance to terminate their employment. The petitioners filed an opposition and, at the same time,filed charges of unfair labor practice, union busting, and harassmentagainst the company, Eric Mentha, and Reynaldo Formeloza, thecompany's Finance/Administrative Manager.

Issue:Whether or not the respondent company, in terminating

the employment of the petitioners without just and lawful cause,committed an unfair labor practice. YES!

Held: The respondent company had committed unfair laborpractice in dismissing the petitioners without just and valid cause. Respondent company's act in dismissing the petitioners,who then constituted the remaining and entire officialdom of theRoche Products Labor Union, after the union's president and vice-president had been earlier dismiss and when the collectivebargaining agreement in the company was about to be renegotiated,was an unfair labor practice under Sec. 4(a) (1) of the IndustrialPeace Act. Their dismissal, under the circumstances, amounted tointerference with, and restraint or coercion of, the petitioners in theexercise of their right to engage in concerted activities for theirmutual aid and protection. As the respondent company was guilty of unfair laborpractice, reinstatement of the dismissed employees should follow asa matter of right. It is an established rule that an employer whocommits an unfair labor practice may be required to reinstate, withfull back wages, the workers affected by such act, the amount not toexceed back wages for three (3) years.

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA BANDOLINO-LMLC vs NLRCG.R. No. 125195, 17 July 1997

Facts: Petitioners are former employees of private respondentBandolino Shoe Corporation and members of petitioner union,Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Bandolino-LMLC. Private respondentsGerman Alcantara, Aida Alcantara, and Mimi Alcantara are theowners and officers of Bandolino Shoe Corporation. Petitioners Marcial Franco, Johnny Florencio, and RomeoReyes were directed to take a two-week leave because of a strike atthe Shoemart, Bandolino's biggest customer. Apparently, the strike adversely affected privaterespondents' business. Petitioners were told by management that,should the circumstances improve, they would be recalled to workafter two weeks. Petitioner Marcial Franco and his wife were called to thepersonnel manager's office and told that Ligaya Franco had beendismissed. Marcial Franco pleaded with German Alcantara not toterminate his wife from employment, but his entreaties wererejected, allegedly because of his refusal to divulge the names of theorganizers and members of the petitioner union. Three otherrelatives, namely Emma Brozo, Adoracion Brozo, and Aurea Bonon,were subsequently dismissed. The other petitioners were likewise informed by thepersonnel manager of the termination of their employment andasked to turn in their identification cards. The petitioners tried to return to work after two weeks onbut they were refused entry into the company premises. Themanagement refused to allow them to return to work allegedly toprevent any untoward incident between the petitioner union andthe Bandolino Shoes Independent Labor Union. Petitioners filed a notice of strike. A conciliationconference was held but it was unsuccessful. Although petitionersdid not strike, they stage a picket for one hour each on twosuccessive Saturdays to protest their dismissal. Petitioners filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment,overtime pay, and holiday pay. At the initial conference, the labor arbiter issued a returnto work order to the private respondents based on the privaterespondents' claim that they had not dismissed petitioners. Butpetitioners were not allowed to work by private respondents. The Labor Arbiter decided the case in favor of petitioners.He found that petitioners had been illegally dismissed because oftheir union activities and that private respondents had committedunfair labor practice. Although private respondents claimed to havemerely placed petitioners on "rotation" because of the Shoermartstrike, the labor arbiter found that even after the end of the strike,petitioners were still not allowed to return to work. Referring toprivate respondents' position paper, the labor arbiter found thatprivate respondents had imposed illegal conditions on petitionersreinstatement by requiring them to forego their intended strike,withdraw their petition for certification election, and insteadrecognize the existing union. On the basis and noting that during thehearings private respondents' counsel subjected the petitioners to abarrage of questioning regarding their union activities, the laborarbiter concluded that private respondents were guilty of unfairlabor practice for having restrained the petitioners' exercise of theright to self-organization

Issue:Whether or not there was an unfair labor practice. YES!


Held: Even disregarding evidence of the illegal conditionsimposed by private respondents for petitioners' return to work,there was substantial evidence remaining in the record to sustain thelabor arbiter's decision that private respondents were guilty of ULP.There was evidence to the effect that Marcial Franco had been askedto disclose the names of the members of the union and that themanagement had shown interest in the unionizing activities of thepetitioners. This evidence has remained unchallenged. What is more,it appears that only alleged members of the petitioner union wereput on "rotation". The labor arbiter's observation during the hearingthat the private respondents had shown hostility towards petitionersfor their union activities is a determination of fact which is based onthe totality of private respondents' conduct, indicating anti-unionbias. Nor is it disputed that private respondents opposed petitioners'petition for certification election when this matter should be thesole concern of the workers. Private respondents' interest beliestheir claim that they were not aware of petitioners' organizationaland union activities prior to the union's registration. An employermay be guilty of ULP in interfering with the right to self-organizationeven before the union has been registered. We therefore proceed to petitioners' prayer for monetaryawards. Petitioners do not dispute the NLRC's finding that, except forJaime Sibug, the rest of petitioners are piece-rate workers.Consequently, all petitioners are entitled to minimum wage and13th-month pay, but only Jaime Sibug is entitled to an additionalaward of holiday pay. All of the petitioners are entitled to salarydifferentials, as found by the labor arbiter, and to 13th-month pay, asruled by the NLRC. Pursuant to Art. 279 of the Labor Code, asamended by Republic Act No. 6715, and our ruling in Bustamante v.National Labor Relations Commission, the petitioners are entitled tofull backwages from the time their compensation was withheld up tothe time of their actual reinstatement or, where reinstatement is nolonger possible, to full backwages up to the time of finality of thisdecision.

CLLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION vs NLRCG.R. Nos. L-67158, 67159, 67160, 67161 and 67172, 30 May 1988

Facts: Petitioner union is a local chapter of the Central LuzonLabor Congress (CLLC), a legitimate labor federation duly registeredwith the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), while theindividual petitioners are former employees of private respondentwho were officers and members of the petitioner union. Private respondent is a corporation engaged in packing andcrating, general hauling, warehousing, sea van and freightforwarding. The majority of the rank and file employees ofrespondent firm organized the e.g. Gochangco Workers Union as anaffiliate of the CLLC. The union filed a petition for certification election and theMOLE Region 111 office set the hearing for the petition. The CLLCnational president wrote the general manager of respondent firminforming him of the organization of the union and requesting for alabor management conference to normalize employer-employeerelations.

The union sent a written notice to respondent firmrequesting permission for certain member officers and members ofthe union to attend the hearing of the petition for certificationelection but the management refused to acknowledge receipt of saidnotice. Private respondent preventively suspended the unionofficers and members who attended the hearing on the commonground alleged by private respondent for its action was"abandonment of work." On the same date, all the gate passes of allthe above-mentioned employees to Clark Air Base were confiscatedby a Base guard. Claiming that private respondent instigated theconfiscation of their gate passes to prevent them from performingtheir duties and that respondent firm did not pay them theirovertime pay, 13th month pay and other benefits, petitioner unionand its members filed a complaint for constructive lockout and unfairlabor practice against private respondent. Private respondent filed an application for clearance todismiss petitioners. After hearing, Labor Arbiter rendered a decision grantingthe instant complaint of complainants and denying the respondent'sapplication for clearance.

Issue:Whether or not the respondent company is guilty of unfair

labor practice. YES!

Held: We are convinced that the respondent company is indeedguilty of an unfair labor practice. It is no coincidence that at the timesaid respondent issued its suspension and termination orders, thepetitioners were in the midst of a certification election preliminaryto a labor management conference, purportedly, "to normalizeemployer-employee relations." It was within the legal right of thepetitioners to do so, the exercise of which was their sole prerogative,and in which management may not as a rule interfere. In thisconnection, the respondent company deserves our strongestcondemnation for ignoring the petitioners' request for permissionfor some time out to attend to the hearing of their petition beforethe med-arbiter. It is not only an act of arrogance, but a brazeninterference as well with the employees right to self-organization,contrary to the prohibition of the Labor Code against unfair laborpractices. But as if to add insult to injury, the company suspendedthe petitioners on the ground of "abandonment of work" onFebruary 27, 1980, the date on which, apparently, the pre-electionconference had been scheduled. (The petitioners sought permissionon February 26, 1980 while the suspension order was issued onFebruary 28, 1980.) What unfolds here is a clear effort bymanagement to punish the petitioners for their union activities. As a consequence of such a suspension, the Clark Air Baseguards confiscated the employees' gate passes, and banned themfrom the base premises. We cannot be befooled by the company'spretenses that "[t]he subsequent confiscation by the Americans ofthe complainants' passes is beyond the powers of management." Tostart with, those passes would not have been confiscated had notmanagement ordered the suspension.In the absence of such asuspension order, there was no ground to seize such gate passes.Base guards, by themselves, cannot bar legitimate employeeswithout the 'proper sanction of such employees' employers. In finding the petitioners' suspension illegal, with morereason do we hold their subsequent dismissal to be illegal. We arenot persuaded by the respondent firm's argument that final


termination should be effected as the contract has expired." Whatimpresses us is the Solicitor General's submission that thepetitioners were regular employees and as such, their tenure did notend with the expiration of the contract. As regular employees, the petitioners' tenure are secure,and their dismissal must be premised on a just cause. There is nomerit in the claim that the petitioners' terms were coterminous withthe duration of the contract. There is nothing in the records thatwould show that the petitioners were parties to that contract. Itappears furthermore that the petitioners were in the employ of therespondent company long before that contract was concluded. Theywere not contract workers whose work terms are tied to theagreement, but were, rather, regular employees of their employerwho entered into that contract. But even if dismissal were warranted, the samenonetheless faces our disapproval in the absence of a properclearance then required under the Labor Code. It is true that effortswere undertaken to seek such a clearance, yet there is no showingthat it was issued. That still taints the dismissal with the vice ofillegality. In any event, we have held that unfair labor practice casesare not, in view of the public interest involved, subject tocompromises.

ME-SHURN CORP vs ME-SHURN WORKERS UNION G.R. No. 156292, January 11, 2005

Facts: The regular rank and file employees of Me-ShurnCorporation organized Me-Shurn Workers Union-FSM, an affiliate ofthe February Six Movement (FSM). Respondent union had a pending application forregistration with the BLR. 10 days later, petitioner corporationstarted placing on forced leave all the rank and file employees whowere members of the unions bargaining unit. Respondent union filed a Petition for Certification Electionwith the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE. The corporation filed acomment stating that it would temporarily lay off employees andcease operations, on account of its alleged inability to meet theexport quota required by the Board of Investment. While the Petition was pending, 184 union membersallegedly submitted a retraction/withdrawal thereof. The med-arbiter dismissed the Petition. DOLE Undersecretary granted theunions appeal and ordered the holding of a certification electionamong the rank and file employees of the corporation. Respondent union filed a Notice of Strike against petitionercorporation on the ground of unfair labor practice (illegal lockoutand union busting). - Chou Fang Kuen (alias Sammy Chou, the otherpetitioner herein) and Raquel Lamayra (the Filipino administrativemanager of the corporation) imposed a precondition for theresumption of operation and the rehiring of laid off workers. Heallegedly required the remaining union officers to sign an Agreementcontaining a guarantee that upon their return to work, no union orlabor organization would be organized. Instead, the union officerswere to serve as mediators between labor and management. The union reorganized and elected a new set of officers.Respondent Rosalina Cruz was elected president. Thereafter, it filedtwo Complaints charging petitioner corporation with unfair labor

practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and deficiency inseparation pay, for which they prayed for damages and attorneysfees. The corporation countered that because of economicreversals, it was compelled to close and cease its operations toprevent serious business losses; that under Article 283 of the LaborCode, it had the right to do so; that in August 1998, it had paid its342 laid off employees separation pay and benefits in the totalamount of P1,682,863.88; and that by virtue of these payments, thecases had already become moot and academic. It also averred thatits resumption of operations in September 1998 had beenannounced and posted at the Bataan Export Processing Zone, andthat some of the former employees had reapplied.

ISSUE: 1. WON the dismissal of the employees of petitioner MeshurnCorporation is for an authorized cause.2. WON the respondents can maintain a suit against petitioners.

HELD1. NO. The reason invoked by petitioners to justify the cessationof corporate operations was alleged business losses. Yet, other than generally referring to the financial crisis in1998 and to their supposed difficulty in obtaining an export quota,interestingly, they never presented any report on the financialoperations of the corporation during the period before its shutdown.Neither did they submit any credible evidence to substantiate theirallegation of business losses. - Basic is the rule in termination casesthat the employer bears the burden of showing that the dismissalwas for a just or authorized cause. Otherwise, the dismissal isdeemed unjustified. Apropos this responsibility, petitioner corporation shouldhave presented clear and convincing evidence of imminenteconomic or business reversals as a form of affirmative defense inthe proceedings before the labor arbiter or, under justifiablecircumstances, even on appeal with the NLRC.

2. YES. The DOLE would not have entertained the Petition if theunion were not a legitimate labor organization within the meaning ofthe Labor Code. Under this Code, in an unorganized establishment,only a legitimate union may file a petition for certification election. Hence, while it is not clear from the record whetherrespondent union is a legitimate organization, we are not readilyinclined to believe otherwise, especially in the light of the pro-laborpolicies enshrined in the Constitution and the Labor Code. Verily, the union has the requisite personality to sue in itsown name in order to challenge the unfair labor practice committedby petitioners against it and its members. It would be an unwarranted impairment of the right toself-organization through formation of labor associations ifthereafter such collective entities would be barred from institutingaction in their representative capacity. Finally, in view of the discriminatory acts committed bypetitioners against respondent union prior to the holding of thecertification election-- acts that included their immediate grant ofexclusive recognition to another union as a bargaining agent despitethe pending Petition for certification election -- the results of thatelection cannot be said to constitute a repudiation by the affectedemployees of the unions right to represent them in the presentcase.


BATAAN SHIPYARD and ENGINEERING CO vs NLRC G.R. No. 78604, May 9, 1988

Facts: The National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) is a labororganization in petitioner Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc.The Company has thousand employees in its payroll and more than ahundred of them belong to the said labor organization. Sometime before 1984, the Company filed with the NLRCan application for the retrenchment of 285 of its employees on theground that the firm had been incurring heavy losses. In themeantime, some employees who had been on sick leave earlier wereconsidered retrenched. All of those so retrenched happen to beofficers and members of the NAFLU.

Issue: Whether the Company is guilty of discriminatory acts in the selectionof employees to be retrenched.

Held: YES. The retrenchment undertaken by the Company isvalid. However, the manner in which this is exercised should not betainted with abuse of discretion. Labor is a person's means oflivelihood. He cannot be deprived of his labor or work without dueprocess of law. The retrenchment of employees who belong to aparticular union, with no satisfactory justification why saidemployees were singled out, constitutes ULP. In this case, the Company had indeed beendiscriminatory in selecting the employees who were to beretrenched. All of the retrenched employees are officers andmembers of the NAFLU. It leads Us to conclude that the firm hadbeen discriminating against membership in the NAFLU, an act whichamounts to interference in the employees' exercise of their right ofself-organization. This interference is considered an act of ULP

MABEZA vs NLRC Gr. No. 118506, April 18, 1997

Facts: Petitioner Norma Mabeza contends that she and her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme in Baguio City were asked by thehotel's management to sign an instrument wherein it states thatthey are in compliance with minimum wage and other laborstandard provisions of law. Petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the CityProsecutor's Office to swear to the truth of her statement. Herrefusal displeased the employer. Thereafter, she was ordered to turn over the keys to herliving quarters and to remove her belongings from the hotel.Subsequently, she as charged with of abandonment of job andstealing of company property; finally she was dismissed for loss ofconfidence.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal constitutes ULP?

Held: YES. The act of compelling employees to sign an

instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standardsprovisions of law when he might have not, together with the act ofterminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with theemployer's scheme constitutes unfair labor practice. The first actclearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers to seek better termsand conditions of employment through concerted action. In notgiving positive testimony in favor of her employer, petitioner hadreserved not only her right to dispute the claim and proffer evidencein support thereof but also to work for better terms and conditionsof employment.


MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION vs NLRC G.R. No. 76989, September 29, 1987

Facts: Private respondent Beloncio, an employee of ManilaMandarin Hotel since 1976 and at the time of her dismissal, assistanthead waitress at the hotel's coffee shop, was expelled from thepetitioner Manila Mandarin Employees Union for acts allegedlyinimical to the interests of the union. The union demanded thedismissal from employment of Beloncio on the basis of the unionsecurity clause of their collective bargaining agreement and theHotel acceded by placing Beloncio on forced leave. Two days before the effective date of her forced leave,Beloncio filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegaldismissal against herein petitioner-union and Manila Mandarin HotelInc. before the NLRC, Arbitration Branch. Petitioner-union filed a motion to dismiss on grounds thatthe complainant had no cause of action against it and the NLRC hadno jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. This motionwas denied by the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter held that the union was guilty of unfairlabor practice when it demanded the separation of Beloncio. TheUnion then appealed to the respondent NLRC which modified theLabor Arbiter's decision

Issue/s:1. whether or not nlrc has jurisdiction over the case.2. Whether or not the respondent nlrc seriously erred inholding petitioner liable for the payment of private respondent'ssalary and fringe benefits, and award of 10% attorney's fees, afterfinding as unmeritorious her pretended claims or complaints forunfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and damages.

Held: 1. The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRCconclusion that the dispute is not purely intra-union but involves aninterpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)provisions and whether or not there was an illegal dismissal. Underthe CBA, membership in the union may be lost through expulsiononly if there is non-payment of dues or a member organizes, joins,or forms another labor organization. It is a well-settled principle thatfindings of facts quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which haveacquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specificmatters, are generally accorded not only respect but at times evenfinality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.

2. No. As provided for in the collective bargaining agreementbetween the petitioner-the Union and the Manila Mandarin Hotel"the Union shall hold the Company free and blameless from any andall liabilities that may arise" should the employee question thedismissal, as has happened in the case at bar.

The collective bargaining agreement in this case contains aunion security clause a closed-shop agreement. A closed-shopagreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself tohire only members of the contracting union who must continue toremain members in good standing to keep their jobs. It is "the mostprized achievement of unionism." It adds membership andcompulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise ofemployment in the closed-shop, it welds group solidarity. It is a veryeffective form of union security agreement. This Court has held that a closed-shop is a valid form ofunion security, and such a provision in a collective bargainingagreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association

guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court stresses, however, that union security clausesare also governed by law and by principles of justice, fair play, andlegality. Union security clauses cannot be used by union officialsagainst an employer, much less their own members, except with ahigh sense of responsibility, fairness, prudence, and judiciousness. A union member may not be expelled from her union, andconsequently from her job, for personal or impetuous reasons or forcauses foreign to the closed-shop agreement and in a mannercharacterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality.


CASE DIGEST LABOR RELATIONS

meikimouse

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD. EMPLOYEES ASSOC.-ATU vs

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD

Gr. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971

Facts:

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees

Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees

Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-

NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of

the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs

with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance

Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje

and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer

of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and

the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such

acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him,

tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with

the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions

(NATU), to no avail. The Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of

1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their

Legal Department. Enaje was hired as personnel manager of the

Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating

panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the

Unions.

Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies;

negotiations were conducted on the Unions proposals, but these

were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result

of which the Unions filed a notice of strike for deadlock on

collective bargaining. The issue was dropped subsequently. But, the

parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory

result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases.

Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors

without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations

were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike

was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the

Unions.

On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting

manager and president, sent to each of the strikers a

letter containing delightful consequences if any of them would like

to come back to work voluntarily.

Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a

few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it

was called off on May 31, 1958, some management men tried to

break thru the Unions picket lines, succeeded in penetrating the

picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries

to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance

offered by some picketers.

Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use

of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal

charges against the strikers with the City Fiscals Office of Manila.

Another letter was sent by the company to the individual

strikers stating that they could report for work if there were no

criminal charges pending against them.

However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies

required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscals

Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management

committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia.

The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending

criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal

charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were

readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required

to secure clearances from the fiscals office.

Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured

clearances from the fiscals office, the Companies readmitted only

some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and

members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the

ground that they committed acts inimical to the interest of the

respondents, without however stating the specific acts allegedly

committed.

Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified

months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June

2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act

1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been

readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices

given to them.

CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice

against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint

specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the

members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted

action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to

abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of

comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and,

subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work

on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2)

discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards

readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union

membership and degree of participation in the strike.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent company is guilty of ULP

Held:

Yes. The act of an employer in notifying absent employees

individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at

collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day

and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in

has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active

interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing

with the employees individually instead of through their collective

bargaining representatives. Although the union is on strike, the

employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the

employees bargaining representative.

Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their

homes, with the employer or his representative urging the

employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes

unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair

labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted

activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free

from the employers molestation.


meikimouse

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and

attempted to bribe the strikers with comfortable cots, free

coffee and occasional movies, overtime pay for work performed

in excess of eight hours, and arrangements for their families, so

they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty

of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair

labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an

employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually,

when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus

offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the

consequences of returning to work would be.

ULP also: Hiring of Enage and Garcia with attractive

compensations; respondents reclassified 87 employees as

supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect

compelling these employees to resign from their unions;

respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M.

Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted

by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the

three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one

gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the

picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life

Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the

strike-breakers; respondents brought against the picketers criminal

charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three

only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions,

the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of

first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding,

obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies gates,

entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and

vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies buildings.

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the

issuance of the letters yield the clear inference that the said letters

formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy

unionism within them.

II. The respondents did not merely discriminate against all

the strikers in general. They separated the active from the less active

unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket

lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused

readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the

competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed

against them.

It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to

exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in the

readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents

delegated the power to readmit to a committee.

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows

that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to

defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier

mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on

June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they

first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except three,

were able to secure and subsequently present the required

clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back.

Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of

the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.

CRUZ vs PAFLU

Gr. No. L-26519, October 29, 1971

Facts:

Sps. TAN own a business venture where they own a

Quality Container Factory they employed hired hand in the

manufacture and sale of tin cans. On January 1961, their

workers formed a union. On Feb 28, 1961 the factory received from

the complaining union a notice of its existence w/ an attached set of

CBA proposal after a series of unreasonable delay in discussing or

negotiating with complainant the possibility of entering into a CB-

contract, a management-inspired petition was filed with the court.

The Complainant Union proposed to continue the

negotiations to possibly finalize a CB-Contract with the

management. The Factory was however sold after a month to

respondent Carlos Cruz.

Carlos Cruz however avers that the existence of PAFLU was

not declared by Mrs. Tan prior to the sale although the court stated

that the sale in all phases is seemingly without flaw.

Issue: Whether or not there is unfair labor practice because of the

sale.

Held:

Yes. The sale of the Quality Container Factory was

designed to avoid bargaining collectively with it as the duly chosen

representative of such employees and thus constituted unfair labor

practice. The court ascertained what could be the possible motive of

the sale.

Evidence strongly insinuated that the company supported

a stand apparently adverse to the sentiments of the workers.

Evidence further hinted that during the pendency of

protest in the said certification case, the company financed the

presentation of witnesses to testify against the union. The labor

dispute was indeed at its height, still mounting, at the same time

when the alleged sale was made. There was no other excuse that

the Court could exhaust under the prevailing conditions. The sale

was executed not for any other cause but to rid the company of the

curricular labor problems. All phases of evidence pointed to it."

It was not surprising therefore that the conclusion reached

by it was that the transaction was tainted by bad faith and that there

was an unfair labor practice. The court also held that a buyer should

not be allowed to reap and enjoy all the profits of a sale without the

corresponding responsibilities that are attached to the industrial

enterprise, specially so when the sale was executed under dubious

circumstances.

Carlos Cruz, was not at all free from the attending faults.

As was discussed earlier, Mrs. Tan made a disclosure that he was

made aware of the current labor problems. It cannot be reasoned

out that there was a failure, much less can it be said that he is a

buyer in good faith as far as the workers are concerned. Let all the

party respondents be liable, therefore.

It is thus apparent that as noted at the outset the decision

now on review must be affirmed. The conclusion reached by

respondent Court finds support in the law. It would be a frustration

of the statutory scheme in the Industrial Peace Act instituting a


meikimouse

regime of free collective bargaining to hold otherwise. The choice as

to the bargaining representative of the employee belongs to them

alone. The language of the Act: "The labor organization designated

or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority

of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall

be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for

the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,

wages, hours of employment, or another conditions of

employment.

labrel - iii (digest pool)

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