CHAPTER SIX But let us observe30 also that the lack of self-restraint related to spirit- 25 edness is less shameful than that pertaining to desires. For spiritedness seems to hear reason in some way, but to mishear it, like swift servants who run off before they hear what is said in its entirety and then err in carrying out the command, or as dogs bark if there is merely a knock at the door, before examining whether it is a friend. So spiritedness, be- 30 cause ofits heated and swift nature, hears something, and though it does not hear an order, it sets off after revenge. For speech or imagination has made clear that there is a hubristic insult or slight; and spiritedness, as if it inferred from a syllogism that one ought to wage war against such a thing, immediately becomes harsh. But as for desire, if reason or sense percep- 35 tion merely says that something is pleasant, it sets off after enjoyment. As a result, spiritedness follows reason in a way, but desire does not. De- 1149b sire, then, is more shameful. For someone who lacks self-restraint when it comes to spiritedness is in a way conquered by reason, whereas the other person is conquered by desire and not by reason. Further, there is greater sympathy [or forgiveness] for someone who follows the natural longings, since there is more sympathy also for those who follow such desires as are common to all and insofar as they are com-mon. Spiritedness and harshness are more natural than are the desires for what is excessive, that is, the unnecessary desires-just like the person who defended himself for striking his father by saying, ''And he struck his father, and his father struck his;' and, pointing to his own son, said, "and 10 he will strike me, when he becomes a man: it runs in our family!" And the man who was being dragged by his son bade him stop by the doors, for he himself dragged his own father only that far. Further, those who hatch plots are more unjust [than are those who act from spiritedness]. The man characterized by spiritedness, then, is not a plotter, nor is spiritedness itself; rather, it is open, whereas desire is 1s 30 Or, "contemplate:' BOOK 7, CHAPTER 6 just as they assert of Aphrodite: "a weaver of wiles, Cyprus-born;'31 and as Homer says of her embroidered girdle, "its alluring words, which stole the mind even of one who is most sensible.'m As a result, if in fact this lack of self-restraint is more unjust and more shameful than that bound up with spiritedness, it is also lack of self-restraint unqualifiedly and, in a way, vice as well. 20 Further, no one acts hubristically while feeling pain, but everyone who does something in anger, does so while feeling pain, whereas the hubris-tic person acts with pleasure. If, then, those things are more unjust, at which it is especially just to be angry, so also is the lack of self-restraint connected with desire, for in spiritedness there is no hubris. It is clear, then, that the lack of self-restraint pertaining to desire is more shame-25 ful than that pertaining to spiritedness, and that there is in fact a self-restraint and lack of self-restraint pertaining to bodily desires and plea-sures. But one must grasp the distinctions among these very desires and plea-sures. For, just as was said at the beginning, some are human and natu-ral in both kind and magnitude, but others are brutish, and some arise 30 through defects and diseases. Of these, it is only with the first ones that moderation and licentiousness are concerned. Hence too we do not say ofbrute animals that they are either moderate or licentious, except meta-phorically, and only if some one kind of animal differs as a whole from an-other in hubris, destructiveness, and voraciousness. For they do not pos-35 sess choice or calculation but do depart from the natural, just as madmen 1150a do among human beings. But brutishness is a lesser thing than vice, even though it is more frightening, for the better part [of the soul] has not been ruined in the case of a brute animal, as it has been in a human being who is vicious; rather, the brute animal does not have that better part. It is similar, then, to comparing an inanimate thing to an animate one, as to which is worse: baseness that does not possess its own starting point [or 5 principle] is always less harmful than that which does possess it, and intel-lect is such a starting point. It is akin, then, to comparing injustice itself to an unjust human being, for there is a way in which each is worse than the other: a bad human being could produce ten thousand times more bad things than could a brute animal. 31 The author ofthis line is unknown. 32 Homer, Iliad 14.214, 217. BOOK 7, CHAPTER 7 [149 CHAPTER SEVEN But as for the pleasures, pains, desires, and aversions that arise through 10 touch and taste-which both licentiousness and moderation were earlier defined as being concerned with-it is possible for someone to be such as to be defeated by those that the majority of people33 are stronger than; and it is possible to be such as to overpower those by which the major-ity are defeated. In these cases, one person lacks self-restraint concerning pleasures, another is self-restrained, one person is soft when it comes to pains, another steadfast. But the characteristic belonging to most people is in between these, even if people incline more toward the worse char- 1s acteristics. Now, some pleasures are necessary, others not, and the former are nec-essary only up to a certain point (those that are excessive are not neces-sary, and neither are the deficient ones); and what concerns desires and pains is similar. Given all this, the person who pursues the excessive plea-sures, in an excessive way or through choice, doing so for the sake of the 20 pleasures themselves and for nothing else that results from them, is licen-tious . For this person necessarily feels no regret and so is incurable, since the person without regret is incurable. But he who falls short is the oppo-site, he who is in the middle, moderate. And similar is the case of some-one who avoids the bodily pains not because he is defeated by them but through choice. Now, among those who do not choose, one type is led by pleasure, an- 25 other by avoiding the pain arising from desire, and so they differ from each other. It would seem to everyone to be worse if someone should do something shameful, though he felt no desire for it or only a mild one, than if he should so act because of a strong desire, just as it would seem to be worse if someone should strike another without being angry at him than if he did so in anger. For what would such a person do, were he in the 30 grip of a passion? Hence the licentious person is worse than the one lack-ing self-restraint. So, of the characteristics mentioned, the one is rather a form of softness, whereas the other person is licentious. He who lacks self-restraint lies opposite the self-restrained person, the steadfast opposite the soft. For being steadfast consists in holding out against something, whereas self-restraint consists in overpowering it; and 35 33 Or, "the many" (hoi polloi), here and in the next clause. BOOK 7, CHAPTER 7 holding out is different from overpowering, just as not being defeated is different from winning. Hence self-restraint is also more choiceworthy 1150b than steadfastness. But the person who falls short in relation to what the majority34 strain against and are capable of-he is soft and delicate. For such delicacy is in fact a sort of softness: for example, he who lets his cloak drag, so that he not suffer the pain of lifting it up, and who, though he imitates someone sickly, does not suppose that he himself is wretched, similar though he is to the wretched. The case is similar also as regards self-restraint and lack of self-restraint. For if someone is defeated by strong and excessive pleasures or pains, that is not to be wondered at. Rather, he is apt to receive sympathy if he at least strains against them, just as Theodectes's Philoctetes did when struck by 10 the viper, or Cercyon in the Alope of Carcinus, and just like those who, though they attempt to restrain their laughter, burst out laughing all at once, such as happened to Xenophantes. 35 But it is to be wondered at if somebody is defeated by and unable to strain against those pleasures and pains that the majority are able to hold out against, when this is not due 15 to the nature of one's stock36 or to illness -like the softness of the Scyth-ian kings due to their stock, and as the female is distinguished from the male. And someone fond of amusement is held to be licentious but is ac-tually soft; for play is relaxation, if in fact it is recreation [or rest], and the person fond of amusement is among those who are excessive when it comes to this. One part of the lack of self-restraint is impetuosity, another weakness; 20 some people deliberate but then do not abide by their deliberations on account of the relevant passion, while others, because they do not delib-erate, are led by the passion. For just as those who anticipate being tick-led are unaffected by being tickled, so too some who perceive and see in advance what is coming, and so rouse themselves and their calculation in 34 Or, "the many," as in the preceding note. 35 Theodectes (ca. 375-334), author and orator, was born in Lycia but probably lived mostly at Athens, where he is said to have studied with Plato and Aristotle, among oth-ers. His Philoctetes does not survive. Carcinus, son of the tragedian Carcinus, is said to have authored I 6 o plays; Aristotle mentions him also in the Poetics ( 14 54 b2 3) and Rhet-oric (x4oobxo, 1417bio). According to the scholiast, quoted by Burnet, when Cercyon learned of his daughter's marriage, he asked her whom she had married, saying that "if you should tell me this, I would not be altogether pained" -yet he found the pain of living too great once he heard her answer and so chose to die. The Xenophantes here mentioned may have been a musician in the court of Alexander (see Seneca, de Ira 2.2). 36 Genos: class, kind, race. BOOK 7, CHAPTER 8 advance, are not defeated by the relevant passion, whether it is pleasant or 25 painful. And it is especially the keen and the melancholic37 whose lack of self-restraint is of the impetuous sort; for neither the former, on account of their swiftness, nor the latter, on account of the intensity of their pas-sion, stick with reason, they being apt to follow imagination instead. CHAPTER EIGHT The licentious person, as was said, is not characterized by regret, for he 30 abides by his choice. But every person lacking self-restraint is apt to feel regret. Hence the perplexity at issue is not in fact as we encountered it;38 rather, the licentious person is incurable, the person lacking self-restraint curable. For corruption seems to be like such diseases as dropsy and con-sumption; whereas lack of self-restraint is like epileptic seizures, the for-mer defective39 condition being continuous, the latter not continuous. And in general, the genus to which lack of self-restraint belongs is dif- 35 ferent from that to which vice belongs; for vice escapes the notice of one who has it, whereas lack of self-restraint does not escape the notice of those lacking self-restraint. Among people lacking self-restraint, those apt 1151a to be impulsive40 are better than those who are in possession of an argu-ment [logos] but do not abide by it. For these latter are defeated by a lesser passion than that which overwhelms the impulsive and are not without a prior deliberation, as are the impulsive. The person lacking self-restraint in this latter sense is similar to those who get drunk quickly and on little wine, that is, on less wine than do most people. It is manifest, then, that lack of self-restraint is not vice (but perhaps it is in a certain way): lack of self-restraint is contrary to one's choice, vice in accord with one's choice. Nevertheless, they are similar, at least when it comes to actions, just as in Demodocus's saying about the Milesians-"Milesians are not stupid, but they do the things stupid people do "41 -and 37 Or, "excitable"; those with an excess of black bile and so given to agitation or un-ease. 38 Consider n46a3r-b2. 39 The word (poneria) is elsewhere translated as "wickedness:' 40 Ekstatikoi: the same word was translated as "one who departs" (from one's calcula-tion) at II4sbrr-12; here the word seems roughly equivalent to the "keen and the mel-ancholic." 41 Originally from the small island of Leros, lying just opposite Miletus, Demodocus is today best known for the comic lines here quoted. 152] BOOK 7, CHAPTER 9 10 those lacking self-restraint are not unjust, though they will commit in-justices. The person lacking self-restraint is such as to pursue the bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to correct reason, without his having been persuaded to do so, whereas the licentious person has been so persuaded, on account of his being the sort of person to pursue them. Given this, it is the person lacking self-restraint who can easily be per-15 suaded otherwise, the licentious not. For virtue preserves and corruption destroys the principle; and in actions, that for the sake of which one acts is the principle, just as the given hypotheses are in mathematics. So in nei-ther case is reason [or argument] such as to teach the principles, but vir-tue-either natural or habitual-is apt to teach one to hold the correct 20 opinion 42 about the principle in question. Such a person, then, is moder-ate; his contrary, licentious. There is also a sort of person who is apt, on account of his passion, to depart43 from correct reason, a person whom passion overpowers, such that he does not act in accord with correct reason. Yet the passion in ques-tion does not overpower him so that he becomes the sort of person to be persuaded that he ought to pursue pleasures of this kind without re-straint. This is the person lacking self-restraint, who is better than the li-25 centious and is not unqualifiedly base: what is best in him, the principle, is preserved. Another sort is his contrary, [that is, the self-restrained per-son,] who is apt to abide by and not depart from correct reason, at least not on account of passion. So it is manifest from these considerations that the one characteristic is serious, the other base.