Lack of Situational Awareness and Resulting Consequential Impacts Throughout the Response to Hurricane Katrina

August 2005

By

By: Joanne Robery – De Souza

Submitted as Research paper for MSEM course “Emergency Management Operations”

Massachusetts Maritime AcademyBuzzards Bay, MA 27 December 2016

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Introduction.

Hurricane Katrina has been classified as one of the most catastrophic disasters to ever

have impacted the United States when it struck the Gulf Coast as a Category 5 on Monday,

August 29, 2005. This introductory will cover the entirety of timeline events during the

unfolding of Hurricane Katrina enabling topic support on the issue of lacking situational

awareness and its consequential impacts before, during, and after the disaster.

On Tuesday August 23, 2005 at approximately 4:00 PM, Tropical Depression 12

developed 200 miles “southeast of Nassau in the Bahamas” (Committee on Homeland Security

& Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.67). By Thursday, August 25, the tropical storm elevated into

a hurricane that was named “Katrina”. While Katrina was still 15 miles off the east coast of

Florida, reports produced by the National Hurricane Center (“NHC”) predicted Katrina would

make landfall “between Mobile, Alabama, and Grand Isle, Louisiana” (Committee on Homeland

Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.67) and strengthen as it neared the Gulf of Mexico.

Katrina hit Florida that same Thursday as a Category 1 hurricane.

By Friday August 25, Katrina’s direction was westward and had advanced into a

Category 2 hurricane. On the afternoon of the 25th, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and

Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour both declared a State of Emergency and activated the

National Guard for each of their states. The NHC issued another forecast detailing the direction

of Katrina’s westward track and predicted development into a Category 4 hurricane hitting the

Louisiana-Mississippi area by Monday, August 29th.

Hurricane Katrina had developed into a Category 3 hurricane with a report by the NHC

that predicted direct impact on New Orleans by Saturday, August 27. Around 6:00 AM, FEMA

implemented a 24-hour watch operation from headquarters in Washington DC to track the storm.

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Around approximately 7:30 AM, The National Weather Service (“NWS”) held teleconferences

with Louisiana state and local officials to inform them that Katrina is predicted to directly hit the

metropolitan New Orleans area. The Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan was implemented

and evacuation operations began an hour after the NWS brief urging citizens, especially those in

coastal areas, to evacuate.

During the afternoon of the 27th, Governor Blanco requests a federal disaster declaration

for Louisiana for assistance under the Stafford Act which was immediately granted by President

Bush. During a press conference with Governor Blanco, New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin

declared a state of disaster issuing a voluntary evacuation and stated that the Superdome would

open at approximately 8:00 AM the following Sunday for shelter.

Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Center (“EOC”) located in Baton Rouge implemented

24-hour operations by 2:00 PM. Around 7:00 PM, NWS issued warnings to the City of New

Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness that levees throughout New Orleans could be

overtopped. Thirty minutes later, NHC Director Max Mayfield briefed Governor Blanco,

Barbour, and Mayor Nagin about Katrina’s possible impact. Mississippi issues mandatory

evacuations for three coastal counties closest to the hurricane impact zone, Hancock, Harrison,

and Jackson. By 10:00 PM, the NHC issued the “first official storm-surge for Katrina, predicting

surge flooding of 15 to 20 feet above normal tides and locally as high as 25 feet (Committee on

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.68).

President Bush declared federal emergency declarations for Mississippi, Alabama and

Florida on Sunday, August 28. By this time, Hurricane Katrina’s strength has increased

exponentially with an advisory report from the NHC stating that Katrina reached Category 5

strength with winds of 160 mph. At 8:00 AM as planned, the Superdome was opened on the 28th

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as a shelter for special needs populations who could not evacuate. By 9:30 AM, Mayor Nagin

ordered the evacuation of Orleans Parish.

Around 11:00 AM during a teleconference that was held with “the President, DHS

headquarters, FEMA headquarters, FEMA’s regional offices, and representatives from

Louisiana, and Mississippi” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006,

pg.68) during which the National Hurricane Director Max Mayfield stated that the levees could

potentially overtop. By 12:00 PM, the Superdome opened as a last resort refuge. At

approximately 4:00 PM, the first forecast regarding the levees in New Orleans was released

warning people that levees could be overtopped.

Monday, August 29, around approximately 12:47 AM, DHS sent an email detailing the

storms potential impact to the White House’s Homeland Security Operations Center (“HSOC”).

From 6:10 AM until 7:00 AM, Hurricane Katrina’s eye “makes landfall at Buras on the

Louisiana coast between Grand Isle and the mouth of the Mississippi River.” (Committee on

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69). Water from levees on the east bank of

the river ran over the levees on the west side that caused flooding throughout neighborhoods in

Plaquemines Parish. Catastrophic flooding was evident as Katrina made her way across

southeast Louisiana. Levees became overtopped in east Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes

alongside “breaking of the Industrial Canal levees, and breaks in the 17 th Street and London

Avenue Canal floodwalls” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006,

pg.69). During this time, the roof of the Superdome started leaking, the air conditioner was

damaged, and plumbing was destroyed in all levels but the first floor.

Katrina made landfall in Mississippi on the 29th around approximately 10:00 AM with a

storm surge of 20 feet. By the afternoon, New Orleans and Mississippi area first responders had

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lost their communication systems. Around the same time, Search and Rescue missions began

and incorporated the “U.S. Coast Guard, New Orleans Police and Fire Departments, the

Louisiana National Guard, and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries” (Committee

on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69). The evening of the 29 th, FEMA

Director Brown promised 500 buses to Governor Blanco to be delivered on August 30th.

On Tuesday, August 30, the New Orleans Convention Center was opened as a refuge for

the public. By 10:30 AM, the decision for the U.S. Northern Command was given to move assets

to the Gulf Coast in order for military assistance to be provided. At approximately 4:00 PM,

“U.S. Army Lieutenant General Russel Honoré is designated Commander of Joint Task Force

Katrina” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69). At this point

in time, conditions inside the stadium worsened due to the large crowd, no air circulation, and

poor sanitation. Hurricane Katrina was declared an “incident of national significance”

(Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69) by DHS Secretary

Michael Chertoff. Chertoff then designated Michael Brown “as the Principal Federal Official

(PFO) to manage the response and recovery operations for Hurricane Katrina” (Committee on

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69).

On Wednesday, August 31, Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida and Alabama are declared a

public health emergency by Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Secretary Michael Leavitt.

Around 1:30 AM the same morning, FEMA assigned Department of Transportation (“DOT”) to

ship school buses to New Orleans in response to an Executive Order issued by Governor Blanco.

Around 2:30 PM, Governor Blanco and President Bush discussed “the need for military

assistance and the Governor’s command of the Louisiana National Guard in a Unified-command-

structure” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69).

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By 10:00 AM Thursday, September 1, buses were evacuating the public from the

Superdome. That evening, Colonel Terry Ebbert (New Orleans Director of Homeland Security &

Public Safety) requested the evacuation of the Convention Center with efforts from the Louisiana

National Guard.

On Friday, September 2nd, President Bush made a first visit to the states impacted by

Katrina and met with the governors of Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi and “Mayor Nagin in

New Orleans” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69). During

President Bush’s meeting with Governor Blanco they discussed “command and control for the

military response” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69).

The White House sent Governor Blanco a proposal to appoint “a dual-status commander who

would be an active-duty military officer and who would exercise command and control on behalf

of the governor over National Guard forces and on behalf of the President over federal active

duty forces” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.69).

On Saturday, September 3, Governor Blanco declined the dual-status proposal to retain

command and control of the National Guard in Louisiana. An additional 7,200 troops are ordered

to the Gulf Coast by the President to help with response efforts. Both evacuations of the

Superdome and the Convention Center are completed this same day.

Response Problem.

Situational awareness is the necessary and required responsibility of all emergency

managers or agencies/entities directly involved and engaged with the emergency management

components (protection, prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation). They

must be able to identify, process and understand crucial pieces of information in regards to what

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is happening around them to successfully accomplish objectives and goals pertinent to the

overall mission.

Lack of situational awareness during Hurricane Katrina impacted all aspects of the

response resulting in catastrophic consequences. Lack of planning and initiative for credible

information lead to a lack of situational awareness. Numerous consequences arose from this

including; stalled response and resource/personnel allocation and delivery; confusion with

regards to responsibility, operations and mission objectives/goals; poor coordination among

stakeholders; poor communications leading to failure of critical information sharing. Albeit, the

worst consequence due to lack of situational awareness was the overall failure in response to

Katrina.

This problem is evident throughout all phases of Hurricane Katrina. The problem of

lacking situational awareness for Federal Governmental agencies and entities will be broken

down in this paper discussed below.

Impacts from Lack of Situational Awareness – Federal Government.

Homeland Security Operations Center:

Within the Department of Homeland Security is the Homeland Security Operations

Center (“HSOC”) that was created to serve as “the nation’s nerve center for information sharing

and domestic incident management” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs

2006, pg.303). By this time, DHS was still a newly created department and Hurricane Katrina

was the first test for the HSOC. The HSOC failed in its handling of the Hurricane Katrina

situation. This failure was due to an overall lack of situational awareness about Katrina’s storm

movement alongside initiative to compile and prioritize information.

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Since Hurricane Katrina was declared an incident of national significance, the HSOC was

tasked with writing and issuing Situational Reports (“sitreps”) at 5:00 AM and 5:00 PM

containing information vital to the comprehension of the incident. In addition to sitreps, HSOC

was tasked with issuing ‘Spot Reports’ on breaking news in between the sitrep distribution

period. The HSOC collected components of information directly from FEMA and other

government agencies and entities to compile information and form reports. Customers that read

the sitrep and Spot Reports included the White House alongside DHS leadership.

HSOC failed in its mission of obtaining and recognizing critical information and reports.

Throughout the day on the 29th, reports were created by the National Weather Service (“NWS”),

White House Homeland Security Council, Louisiana State Police Emergency Operations Center,

alongside other agencies that described devastating effects of Katrina. Out of fifteen reports, only

seven were received by the HSOC with most these reports issued by the NWS. “These reports

contained some of the earliest indications of levee breaches and catastrophic flooding and were

readily available, NWS’s parent agency, the National Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

maintains a desk in the HSOC” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs

2006, pg.307).

Another example of the complete lack of situational awareness was HSOC’s being

completely unaware about the situation at the Convention Center in New Orleans. Media reports

went out Wednesday (August 31) night and video reports were aired Thursday (September 1)

morning of the thousands at the Convention Center and the horrific conditions they were in.

“HSOC reports do not even mention the situation until Friday [September 2] morning”

(Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.311). There was even

confusion among DHS leadership mixing up the Superdome with the Convention Center.

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“Skepticism toward media reports in a crisis makes sense, but these were backed up by

video, and media-based reports to DHS leadership and the White House could have

included appropriate caveats. Instead, DHS and the HSOC did not forward media reports,

which left the country’s leadership woefully uninformed” (Committee on Homeland

Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.311).

HSOC also lacked initiative to ensure that the informational sources they were retrieving

information from was credible. A lot of reliance regarding the situation in New Orleans was

based upon Media reports from which information was derived. HSOC took this information as

automatically credible to compile their reports. Media personnel could access only certain areas

(such those areas not as devastated as others due to flooding) creating an illusion further

supporting the perspective that the situation was not as catastrophic as it realistically was.

Failure to obtain relevant, credible, and real time situational information had direct

impacts on the reports sent out by HSOC. Governmental, state, and local agencies/emergency

managers reading these reports would think the situation in New Orleans was not as dire as it

really was. “The 5.pm. sitrep [sent out by HSOC] reflected few of the facts – and none of the

urgency – conveyed by these reports” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental

Affairs 2006, pg.307).

The impact of poor reports jeopardized adequate response measures that could have been

coordinated and implemented faster in an organized manner to the areas in New Orleans

devastated most. Thus, faster implementation of response operations could have saved more

lives.

DHS Leadership:

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After the 5:00 P.M. sitrep, informational reports were continuously being produced and

issued on the 29th detailing the increasing devastation in New Orleans including the levee

breaches and flooding. Compiling this information, HSOC created and distributed three Spot

Reports via email to those on their email distribution list. Please note that the Spot Reports

created after the 5:00 PM sitrep by HSOC described more accurately the damages occurring in

New Orleans.

Two issues arose with distribution by email; the first being the email distribution list. Not

all pertinent stakeholders were on the distribution list and therefore did not have direct access to

these Spot Reports. The second issue was timeliness of when these reports were accessed. Due

to this, situational awareness was solely dependent upon the timeliness of when the person would

access and read their email. “Though the three Spot Reports listed above were widely distributed

by email, few DHS witnesses recalled seeing them” (Committee on Homeland Security &

Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.309). Further complicating matters, HSOC “made no effort to

ensure that DHS leadership or the White House actually reviewed and understood the messages,

or that they received this critical information” (Committee on Homeland Security &

Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.309).

DHS witnesses including those personnel on the email distribution list for the Spot

Reports stated that they did not know the catastrophic situation in New Orleans or that the levees

had been breached on the Monday Katrina struck until the following Tuesday morning.

Concurrently,

“DHS witnesses suggested that the reports of flooding [that were] received during the day were

‘typical,’ ‘expected,’ ‘standard,’ and the ‘normal typical hurricane background stuff’”

(Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.310). Thus, DHS also was

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not concerned with the seriousness of the situation and further dismissed the reports that were

received and of which contained accurate information.

Lacking concern and situational awareness on the part of DHS personnel impacted

response operations directly. Had DHS leadership known earlier that Monday, immediate

measures could have been taken to begin planning for and coordinating response operations by

necessary governmental agencies. Concurrently, had DHS comprehended and paid attention to

the catastrophic events described in accurate reports that they in fact received and read,

governmental agencies would have acted and responded instead of remaining complacent.

However, due to the late access of information and lack of concern, no planning took place

resulting in the ultimate failure to respond adequately the day Hurricane Katrina hit.

Federal Emergency Management Agency:

FEMA failed to provide DHS and the HSOC with critical information in a timely

manner. The HSOC relied heavily upon FEMA for information to compile reports while DHS

required accurate, timely situational information to coordinate correct and necessary response

procedures. The following excerpt describes clearly the lack of initiative on FEMA PFO Michael

Brown’s part:

“Though Brown testified that he provided reports to the White House at several points

during the day of landfall, he did not call Secretary Chertoff because in his view ‘It

would have wasted my time’. He appears not to have communicated with the HSOC at all

about conditions on the ground. It appears also that several significant e-mails were not

forwarded to the HSOC.” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs

2006, pg.312)

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Due to FEMA being uncooperative (on PFO Michael Brown’s part) to supply the HSOC

with necessary information from the situation on the ground during Hurricane Katrina, the

HSOC could not compile accurate information to form reports. The whole element of

information sharing creates a kind of ripple effect. Poor/uncooperative communication efforts

lead to lack of accurate information, inaccurate information leads to poor reports, poor reports

result in uninformed Governmental and State agencies. Uninformed Government and State

leadership ends up in slow response/operation efforts.

Addressing Lack of Situational Awareness During Response.

The problem of lacking situational awareness and preparedness on the part of the Federal

Government was not directly evident as the disaster was unfolding. Although the accrual,

compiling, production, and dissemination of situational information was practiced all throughout

Hurricane Katrina, gaps in situational awareness on the part of HSOC, DHS Leadership, and

FEMA (among other agencies/entities) was not completely comprehended until After Action

Reports and reviews of the response to Hurricane Katrina were completed.

The Federal Government was unprepared for the catastrophic disaster that Hurricane

Katrina was as there was no plan in place to deal with all the complexities that were brought

about. Pieces of the puzzle as to why there was such failure in response to Katrina came to light

through these After Action Reports linking such failures and mistakes to many government

agencies/entities. All of them shared a piece of the puzzle. From the realization of these mistakes

came lessons learned that have been documented and recommendations created that may be

practiced and implemented in response to future disasters.

Report Recommendations.

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Core Recommendation #4 is derived from the Committee on Homeland Security &

Governmental Affairs National Level report “Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared”.

The overall mission of Core Recommendation #4 is to “build a true, Government-wide

Operations Center to provide enhanced situational awareness and manage interagency

coordination in a disaster” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006,

pg.612). First addressed is the problem of how HSOC failed in its attempts to maintain

situational awareness and ensure DHS leadership had access to accurate and credible information

throughout Katrina.

During federal government response to incidents of national significance, many of these

agencies/entities who share a role in managing emergencies run into the issue of duplicated

responsibilities and efforts. “Currently multiplicity of interagency coordinating structures with

overlapping missions attempt to facilitate an integrated federal response” (Committee on

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.612).

To limit confusion and reduce duplicated response efforts, the first recommendation

introduces three governmental structures be consolidated into one agency; the Homeland

Security Operations Center (“HSOC”), the National Response Coordination Center (“NRCC”),

and the Interagency Incident Management Group (“IIMG”) joined together to form a new

National Operations Center (“NOC”).

The NOC would be located within the Department of Homeland Security and should

include all pertinent and relevant federal government agencies. The Operations Center should

have the mission of compiling and processing information ensuring situational awareness

throughout the government providing “operational coordination through agency mission

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assignments and the NRP’s Emergency Support Function (‘ESF’) process” (Committee on

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.612).

Information sharing should be implemented whereby relevant federal, state, and local

government command centers send critical information to the NOC creating a “common

operating picture not just for DHS, but for the entire federal government, as well as states and

local jurisdictions involved in an incident” (Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental

Affairs 2006, pg.612).

The NOC should provide a clearly defined emergency management communication

system operating both ways between states and the federal government. “DHS should work with

the NOC to develop protocols for disseminating information on the status of relief efforts to

decision makers, responders, the private sector, and affected individuals” (Committee on

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.612).

The second recommendation offered is to replace the IIMG with permanent policy staff

“composed of detailees from relevant federal agencies” (Committee on Homeland Security &

Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.612) to conduct planning and help resolve conflicts among

different federal agencies/entities. Conflicts that remain unresolved would be forwarded to

higher-ups for resolution. From here, the NOC’s analytic team would sift through information to

determine which pieces would “become part of the common operating picture” (Committee on

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.612).

The third recommendation is focused on the improved performance in preparation for

future disasters. Strict protocols and procedures should be established by the NOC ensuring

reports sent out are received and reviewed by the relevant customer(s) within a timely manner.

When potential for a major disaster is recognized, plans should be implemented by the NOC for

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“obtaining post-disaster situational awareness, including identifying sources of information and

data particular to the region in which the disaster may occur” and when required, bringing on

individuals who have knowledge and are familiar about that specific region.

Personal Recommendations.

After extensive research on the federal government’s lack of situational awareness in

response to Hurricane Katrina, I have formed some of my own recommendations that may be

implemented for overall improvement for future disasters.

1.) An Emergency Operations Plan should be created and practiced by the HSOC to increase

capacity and capability dealing with tracking and compilation of the complex, continuous

inward/outward flow of information and data that comes with large catastrophic incidents

such as Hurricane Katrina.

2.) Federal Government agencies (such as HSOC, DHS, FEMA) responsible for the compilation

and dissemination of critical, time-sensitive information prior to, during, and after an incident

of national significance should identify and monitor local sources of information.

3.) During times of Crisis, the HSOC should work to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of the

“Spot Reports” sent out in between the 5:00 PM and 5:00 AM Situational Reports.

4.) FEMA must work to cooperate with HSOC alongside other government agencies and

personnel to ensure the accurate and timely sharing of critical information to create

situational awareness among relevant leadership.

5.) Attention to detail should be paid to Situational Reports as they are written. Situational

Reports should not only convey facts of the situation but represent the entire scope of the

events and impact endured from the incident. If relevant, urgency must be intertwined within

the language of the document to convey the seriousness of a situation.

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Conclusion.

Lacking situational awareness on the part of the Federal Government directly impacted

all aspects of the response to Hurricane Katrina. The lack of planning on the Government’s part

lead to gaps in response efforts. There was also no initiative to seek and confirm credible sources

that further complicated the process resulting in poor situational awareness due to inaccurate

information.

Confusion among DHS leadership, the White House, HSOC, FEMA and other pertinent

government agencies/entities in regards to accurate information and responsibilities exacerbated

efforts that could have been more productive had the initial response been handled more

carefully from the get-go. The consequences from lack of situational awareness on the Federal

Government’s part lead to a trickle-down effect whereby State and local responders and other

relevant entities/personnel were directly impacted. One stone cast into the water creates

continuous ripples emanating from the main source that do not stop until they reach solid land.

Therefore, the ripples (response efforts of state/local entities/personnel) which emanate from the

main source of where the rock landed (Federal Government’s response efforts) cannot be directly

quantified. Once the ripples strike land however, the impacts from the ripples hitting the

shoreline may be studied and evaluations may be formed (mistakes identified/lessons

learned/recommendations).

“It may never be known for certain how the lack of awareness contributed to the overall

failure of the federal government to respond adequately in a timely manner” (Committee on

Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 2006, pg.303).

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References:

Special Report of the Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (2006). 109th Congress 2nd Session. Special Report 109-322. “Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared”. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Retrieved from: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt322/pdf/CRPT-109srpt322.pdf

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