lal bahadur shashtri

Why has history forgotten this giant?: Rediff.com news

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Seven miles from Kashi in UttarPradesh [ Images ] is Mughalsarai. A hundred years ago, Lal Bahadur, India's second prime minister, was born there on October 2, 1904, the same day as India's greatest statesman Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, born 35 years before Shastriji. Though his parents Sharada Prasad and Ramdulari Devi were Srivastavas, Shastri dropped his caste identity in his early years. In 1921, inspired by Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Gandhi, he cut short his studies to join India's freedom movement. Later he joined the Kashi Vidyapeeth and earned the epithet 'Shastri' by obtaining a degree on philosophy. He won the hearts of Indians when he showed exemplary courage in taking quick decisions as prime minister June 1964 to January 1966) during the India-Pakistan war in 1965. His leadership in war was an answer to that most often asked question at that time: 'After Nehru, who?'

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But his untimely death on January 10, 1966 in Tashkent, in suspicious circumstances, deprived him the chance for history to sit in judgement. In a haphazardly taken decision, the central government has formed a committee to celebrate Shastri's life and work in the year of his centenary. In an ongoing series rediff.com salutes the 'gentle giant' who led India through the critical years after succeeding Nehru. Has the nation forgotten Shastri? Is Shastri, who epitomised honesty and sincerity in public life, relevant today? Anil Shastri, one of the late prime minister's six children and member of the Congress party, recounts memories of his father in a conversation with Senior Editor Sheela Bhatt. On the Congress treatment of Shastri I don't think India has forgotten Lal Bahadur Shastri. Whatever he did is remembered even today. I must say since Sonia Gandhi [ Images ] has taken charge Shastriji's portraits are displayed in all the annual sessions of the party. Many people have observed that there was a conspiracy to underplay Shastri's legacy within the Congress. This serious charge is untrue for the simple reason that due to his untimely death his contribution to the nation was confined to those 18 to 19 months when he was PM. Nehru ruled the country for 17 years, Indira Gandhi [ Images ] for 16 years and Rajiv Gandhi [ Images ] for 5 years. Obviously the Nehru-Gandhi contribution is unparalleled because nobody got this opportunity. And remember Shastriji considered him as a protg of Pandit Nehru [ Images ]. He was never outside the sphere of the Nehru ideology which is the Congress ideology. Our nation is going to celebrate his birth centenary throughout the year. The committee is formed under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [ Images ]. Even in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, celebrations have been organised on a big scale. E Ahmed, minister of state for external affairs, was in Tashkent to participate in the celebrations.



Shastriji who represented a certain value system is more relevant today than before because a majority of us today have no value systems. I feel difficult to contest elections. I feel a little out of place but for my lineage I have survived in politics. His father I still miss him although I was just 16 years old when he died. If he would have lived 10 more years he would have done much more for the country. He was down to earth. A real son of the soil. His grounding was from the grassroots level. He was a practical man too. He strongly believed the laws of the land should be changed because the British formed them to rule over India. He did make an attempt by constituting the administrative reforms commission and made Morarji Desai its chairman. But after he died the idea was shelved. The most cherished memory I have is the verses of Guru Nanak, which were displayed on his table. As Nehru kept Robert Frost's lines -- 'Miles to go before I sleep', on his desk, my father kept Nanak's quotes in Gurmukhi. When translated into English they mean -- 'O Nanak! Be tiny like the grass, for other plants will whither away, but grass will remain ever green.' When under the PL 480 programme, America was going to send inferior quality of wheat to India, he opposed it. He asked the nation to go hungry once a day than accept poor quality food from US. Before making this announcement he asked my mother not to cook evening meals. He himself followed what he recommended. The 1965 war with Pakistan He appeared very modest but was a man of steel. He had the ability to take quick decisions. It was demonstrated on August 31, 1965. On that day he came home for an early dinner. One of his secretaries told him that the three chiefs of the defence services had come to see him. He immediately left for his office next door at 10, Janpath.http://news.rediff.com/special/2004/oct/06/spec1.htm (3 of 5)8/6/2009 6:12:23 PM


The three chiefs visited him to inform him that the Pakistan army [ Images ] had crossed the international border with 100 battle tanks in the Chamb sector of Jammu. They told him that in a short span of time the Pakistan army would cut off Kashmir [ Images ] from the rest of India. Without losing time he asked for the opening of a new front including Lahore [ Images ]. Retaliate with full force, he said. What I remember is that the historic meeting lasted less than five minutes. Arjan Singh, the then chief of the air force was present. He is the only surviving member from that meeting. He told them, "Be prepared for war." He called Defence Minister Y B Chavan and informed him of the decision. He responded positively and expressed his support. He didn't wait for international reactions. The next day, newspapers reported that the Indian army [ Images ] was marching towards Lahore. It was a big morale booster for the country. During those tense days, in his address to the nation from Red Fort [ Images ] on Independence day, he said: "Hathiyaron ka jawab hathiyaron se denge. (Force will be met with force.) Hamara desh rahega to hamara tiranga rahega. (Our flag will survive only if our country does)" On Shastri and the Nehru-Gandhi family Pandit Nehru was very found of him. Shastriji was around 15 years younger but he trusted him fully. In 1956, when a train accident killed 144 passengers near Ariyalur in Tamil Nadu, Shastriji resigned. Panditji refused to accept the resignation but he prevailed upon Panditji to accept it. On the following day in Parliament, Nehru said no one could wish for a better comrade than Lal Bahadur. A man of the highest integrity and devoted to ideas is called Lal Bahadur, said Nehru. Once he was sent to Kashmir by Nehru to help resolve the theft in the Hazaratbal shrine. Nehru asked him whether he had enough woollens for the trip. "Are you aware Kashmir must be having snowfall at this time?" asked Nehru. Shastri showed him the jacket he was wearing and Nehru immediately gave his own mink overcoat. My father was short in stature so he told Nehru the coat was quite long. But Nehru said woollen overcoats were always longer. That no one would know it was a borrowed one.



On his return from Kashmir when father went to him to return the overcoat, Nehru asked him to keep it. The next day newspapers reported: Nehru's Mantle Falls on Shastri. Shastriji and Indiraji also enjoyed a close relationship. She had the highest personal regard for him. After Nehru's death in 1964, the Congress chose him as a consensus candidate. He did make an attempt to persuade Indira Gandhi to take over as prime minister. He went to see her and asked her to become prime minister. She put her foot down and said no. "You become PM and I'll totally support you," she said. When he was PM he would drop by at 1, Safdarjung Road (Indira Gandhi's home) without intimation just to chat with her. Image: Uday Kuckian Part II: The politician who made no moneySheela Bhatt Emailthis Save toMy Page Ask Users Write aComment

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The politician who made no money: Rediff.com news

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HomeHeadlinesOpinionFeaturesBuzzHi Guest Sign In | Create a Rediffmail account October 06, 2004

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Part I: Why has history forgotten this giant?

Kuldip Nayar was Lal BahadurShastri's press advisor from 1960 to 1964 and travelled with him extensively. He provides an insight into the former prime minister's life. Shastri and the Congress Shastri has been forgotten by the nation. He has been pushed into the background. I have no doubt that there was a Congress conspiracy to underplay Shastri after his death. The Congress is the party that should have put him to the fore but I remember visiting a Congress meeting where Shastri's portrait was not even displayed with respect. He simply didn't fit in. Mrs Gandhi was strongly against the Congress old guard. When he died there was a strong resistance against his cremation in the area where Gandhi and Nehru had been laid to rest. Most Congressmen wanted his body taken to Allahabad. When Mrs Lalita Shastri said she would go public only then did the Congressmen relent.

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They even protested against inscribing the slogan -- Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan on his samadhi. Then again, only when Mrs Shastri threatened to go on a hunger strike was it was allowed. After leaving the Press Information Bureau I became a reporter. Wherever I went to meet Congress leaders, I was labelled as 'Shastri ka aadmi' [Shastri's man]. Now, a committee has been set up by the Congress-led government to celebrate his birth centenary but it seems like an afterthought. I think after the death of Shastri, the Congress did not know where to fit him. When Mrs Gandhi succeeded him, the Congress didn't know where to put his legacy in the scheme of things then. Shastri stands for austerity. Shastri stands for simplicity and consensus. Shastri represents an ideology that was right of Centre but not left of Centre. After all, he is the man who said we need the five-year plan but let us have a one year holiday from plan. I remember vividly a small incident that brought out the stark difference between the two (Shastri and Indira Gandhi [ Images ]) leaders. During Shastri's tenure his home in Janpath was upgraded quite a bit to suit the status of a PM. After his death, while searching for a suitable home Mrs Gandhi went to see Shastri's home. She entered the home, had a round inside and said, "middle class!" The making of Shastri Shastri was selected by veteran Congress leaders K Kamaraj, Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy [ Images ] and S Nijalingappa to lead the nation. Moments after Nehru's death I asked him who should become PM, he said it should be the unanimous decision of the Congress. He gave two names in order. First, Jayaprakash Narayan and second, Indira Gandhi. He told me he wanted a unanimous decision over the selection. "But if there is a contest (which Morarji Desai contemplated) then I can defeat Morarji Desai but not Indira Gandhi," he told me.



Probably he was right. However, the question didn't arise because Kamaraj was asked to talk to members informally. Shastri was made PM but Morarjibhai never accepted the decision. After Shastri became PM he had to face the war with Pakistan. When the Chamb border was attacked Shastri was asked to take a tough decision whether to cross the international border. The army chief said it would be difficult to hold on for long at Chamb. Shastri gave the order saying -- before they can capture Chamb you should capture Lahore [ Images ]. After the war was over, I asked Indira Gandhi if Nehru would have allowed the crossing of the international border. Mrs Gandhi said, 'Whatever the generals would have advised him he would have followed." But I wonder. A slight man made of steel After the war, Shastri's name was all over. Before the war many people laughed at him for his softness but not after the war. He came out as a tough hero. His toughness was evident at Tashkent. When Russian Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin (left: Shastri with Kosygin and Indian's then external affairs minister Swaran Singh) wanted Shastri to sign the agreement for peace with General Ayub Khan of Pakistan after the 1965 war, Shastri insisted on adding the assurance, "never again will weapons be used to sort out problems between India and Pakistan." Ayub was maintaining a vague stance by quoting UN resolutions. "Then you will have to find another PM," said Shastri during the arguments. In the final agreement General Ayub Khan had not mentioned those words but Shastri continued to press for it. Ayub finally wrote it at the very last moment. General Ayub's handwritten assurance is still preserved in the Indian archives. Shastri was a slight person but with a strong mind.



Also read: Kuldip Nayar on the Tashkent summit Shastri can't be revived If the Congress wants to celebrate Shastri, it will have to re-emphasis the honesty of Shastri. He stood for the small men of India. But the Congress has changed completely. Since Mrs Gandhi said that corruption is a world phenomenon, Congressmen are not losing sleep over it. Neither can I imagine Shastri imposing the Emergency. All those Congressmen seen active during the Emergency are part of this government. Ambika Soni is a confidante of Sonia Gandhi [ Images ], Pranab Mukherjee [ Images ], Arjun Singh [ Images ], Kamal Nath all were part of the establishment then. How can these leaders bring in the values of Shastri? The Nehru-Gandhi dynasty culture has also played a role in minimising Shastri's legacy. When Shastri was made a minister without portfolio in the Nehru's Cabinet, he was uncomfortable. Once in a huff he told me, "I shall quit and retire to Allahabad." While cajoling him not to entertain an such idea I said, "Nehru has you in his mind." Shastri said, "Unke dimag main to unki putri hai. (He has his daughter in his mind as successor.)" As soon as Shastri died the dynasty culture returned to the Congress. Shastri's message of life was that if he could become PM anybody could because he was a common man. As the Bible says the meekest shall inherit the earth, he proved it. In 1942 (during the Quit India Movement), when he was in a jail, his daughter was ill and he was released on parole. But he could not save her life because doctors had recommended costly drugs. Shastri never made money. In 1963, on the day when he was dropped under the Kamaraj plan I went to meet him. He was sitting in his home without a light. "Why are you sitting in the dark?" I asked. He said, "From today all expenses will be borne by me." He



told me as a MP and minister he didn't earn enough to save for his rainy day. On that evening, I told him to turn a columnist to earn some money. So he wrote a column on Lala Lajpat Rai. That was the first syndicated column in India. I syndicated it to four newspapers and collected Rs 500 from each. Quite a hefty sum! The second column was on Nehru but before he could write more he was recalled to the Cabinet. I don't see the revival of the values Shastri stood for. A day before his first press conference after becoming PM I asked him what will be your message tomorrow? He said: "I'll tell them that during my tenure there will not be any increase in food price and as PM of India I would ask members of the Planning Commission to have one more column in their charts to show me how many jobs will be created after spending thousands of crores of rupees." He was a man concerned about the common man of India. Can these values return to this country? I don't think so. As told to Senior Editor Sheela Bhatt Image: Uday KuckianKuldip Nayar Emailthis Save toMy Page Ask Users Write aComment

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rediff.com Special: Kuldip Nayar remembers the Tashkent summit

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July 14, 2001 The Rediff Special/ Kuldip Nayar NEWSLINKS US EDITION COLUMNISTS DIARY SPECIALS INTERVIEWS CAPITAL BUZZ REDIFF POLL THE STATES ELECTIONS ARCHIVES SEARCH REDIFFSearch the Internet

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Kuldip Nayar, the veteran journalist and MP, worked closely with Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. He shares his memories of the Indo-Pak summit in Tashkent in January 1966 with Sheela Bhatt.

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Lal Bahadur Shastri always believed we must have goodrelations with Pakistan. Besides, he believed they were our own people; after all, we are from the same stock, spoke the same language, etc. Shortly, after he became prime minister, India and Pakistan clashed in Kutch. Shastri was always inclined towards peace, so he agreed to participate in the arbitration announced by then British prime minister Harold Wilson. At the same time, he issued a stern warning to Pakistan: "If you still want to fight, I shall hit you badly."

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then Pakistan's foreign minister, had been told if Pakistan attacked India, it could win the war. Later, India would start building many more armament factories and become stronger. Bhutto sent infiltrators into Indian territory. Field Marshall Ayub Khan, who was then Pakistan's president, did not know about Bhutto's plan. After the 1971 war, when I met Ayub Khan, I asked if I could speak to him about the 1965 war. He said, "Why talk to me? Talk to Bhutto. It was Bhutto's war." It was sensational. The Pakistani plan was to cut off the road which connectshttp://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/14spec.htm (1 of 4)8/6/2009 6:13:34 PM


India and the Kashmir Valley. I remember the army chief called Shastri at midnight. He sought an appointment. At that midnight meeting, army officers spread maps and showed Shastri how the Pakistani pressure was building up. They sought permission to relieve the pressure. The prime minister asked, "Why don't you do that?" The commanders replied, "We should start another front to attract their forces on this side. This means we will have to move towards Lahore. But, that's an international border." "The other is also an international border (Kashmir where the infiltrators had sneaked in)," Shastri said. "Cross it!" After Independence, this was the first time India had crossed an international border and the rest is history. We won the war. We hit their weaponry badly. After the war, Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet premier, wrote to Shastri, 'Have pulao and the kababs of Tashkent.' Russia provided a forum. In a way, it was not a tripartite discussion. I was then heading the United News of India. Before that I was Shastri's press officer, so I was quite close to him. Before leaving for Tashkent, Shastri hosted a small meeting of editors. He explained the background to the Tashkent talks and the agenda. He said the USSR is our friend and the issue is pending before the UN Security Council. All the editors agreed, but there was a major issue important to India. We had won two posts. Haji Pir and Tithwa. Our army had captured these posts which were part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. The editors argued that these two posts were very important because they overlooked Indian territory. Shastri said, "Yes, you have a point. I shall try." He wanted to talk to Pakistan because he had already shown India's superiority. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who was then in the Jan Sangh, opposed the Tashkent talks.

Two plane loads of Indians went to Tashkent. Pakistan was enemy country sowe flew over Iran to get there. Along with Shastri, there were Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh, Defence Minister Y B Chavan, General P P Kumaramangalam, deputy chief of the army staff, many diplomats and journalists. Shastri and Ayub Khan were given dachas almost 12 km away from the hotel where the respective delegations stayed. On the first day, they met alone. They agreed to the exchange of territory. Then, Shastri said, "We won't return Haji Pir and Tithwa which was won in the war." Pakistan said, "It's the result of aggression." Shastri wanted a promise from Ayub Khan that Pakistan would never use forcehttp://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/14spec.htm (2 of 4)8/6/2009 6:13:34 PM


in the future. So the talks did not proceed. Kosygin was trying his best. But the difficult person was Bhutto. At one stage, Kosygin turned to Bhutto and asked, "Do you want to destroy your country?" Bhutto replied, "This would amount to surrender." The talks used to be held late at night. At one point, Kosygin told Shastri, "You will have to give up Haji Pir and Tithwa." Shastri said, "In that case, you will have to talk to some other prime minister." The Soviets said the issue would go to the Security Council. Shastri said, "We may return them, but they must say specifically that whatever differences we have should not be sorted through war At the Tashkent summit: Y B Chavan, or violence, but only through Swaran Singh, Shastri, Ayub Khan negotiations." Ayub Khan agreed, and Kosygin but Bhutto opposed this. Our Pakistani friends were packing their luggage. They were told it was all over. Then Kosygin intervened and a formula was reached. Pakistan would say it would never resort to arms and India would return Haji Pir and Tithwa. When the last meeting took place Shastri did not find the specific reference to arms. Shastri showed his displeasure. Ayub Khan, at that very moment, wrote in his handwriting, "Without resort to arms." That document is still in the ministry of external affairs' archives.

After the settlement, Shastri met Indian journalists. Shastri explained theclauses of the agreement reached with Pakistan. Some journalists inquired about the two posts. He said, "Yes, but we have got this assurance." At that point, one journalist alleged, "You have sold the country." The press conference became quite bitter. Others joined in the criticism. I pacified them. I went back to the hotel and retired early. I was dreaming about Shastri's death when someone knocked at the door. "Your prime minister is dying," a fat lady said. I rushed to Shastri's dacha. As soon as I entered, I saw Kosygin speak to somebody. In a large room, a small man's body was lying, crumbled. I could see he had struggled with the thermos. We were informed that Shastri came in at 9.30 pm and called for a doctor. Later, Dr Chugh, his personal doctor, said, "Shastriji did not give me time." Later, we discovered that Shastri spoke to his family in Delhi every day. That evening, he had called Delhi and asked for Ammaji, his wife Lalita. His daughterhttp://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/14spec.htm (3 of 4)8/6/2009 6:13:34 PM


came on the line. It is said his daughter said, "Amma won't come on the line. You have given away Haji Pir and Tithwa." It is said she was very upset. Of course, former defence minister V K Krishna Menon and Vajpayee also criticized him. He then asked his daughter to send him all the newspapers to Afghanistan where he would halt for some time. It is said he tried to reach Delhi again, but Ammaji never came on line. It was around midnight. I used the hotline on which Kumarmangalam was speaking to someone in Delhi. When he hung up, I called the UNI office in Delhi. I dictated my biggest scoop, "Shastri dead." The journalist at the other end asked, "How is it possible sir? I am subbing his speech." Late that night, Ayub Khan came to the dacha. He prayed. He told me, "If this man had lived, there was a possibility of India and Pakistan coming together to live in peace." India honoured the Tashkent accord. But Pakistan never implemented it. Bhutto was against it. There was a political tussle within Pakistan. And Tashkent failed. 'I have been betrayed.' Thirty-five years after Shastri's death, his family breaks its silence. Pick up the next copy of India Abroad for a world exclusive! Part II: The Errors of Simla Part III: When Rajiv met Zia The Rediff Specials

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rediff.com Special: J N Dixit on the Simla Summit


July 15, 2001 The Rediff Special/ J N Dixit NEWSLINKS US EDITION COLUMNISTS DIARY SPECIALS INTERVIEWS CAPITAL BUZZ REDIFF POLL THE STATES ELECTIONS ARCHIVES SEARCH REDIFFSearch the Internet

India Pak Peace

The Errors of SimlaJyotindra Nath 'Mani' Dixit, the former foreign secretary, shares his memories of the Indo-Pak summit in Simla in 1972 with Sheela Bhatt.

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Mohammed Ali Jinnah had tried to take over Jammu andKashmir. Though he did not succeed, his actions affected the relationship between India and Pakistan. Even after his death and that of prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan, the relations between the two nations did not stabilise. Jawaharlal Nehru did try for normalcy. He signed an agreement with Pakistan's prime minister Mohammad Ali Bogda. With the World Bank's help, we signed an Indus water treaty with Ayub Khan. That was some marginal development. But Pakistan's hostility did not go away and this resulted in the 1965 war. Pakistan did not succeed in its objectives, which was primarily aiming Kashmir. The interesting thing is Pakistan did not feel it was militarily defeated in 1965. America and the Soviet Union persuaded India to sign the Tashkent agreement. India had not won the war decisively, and was in difficulty. Recent SpecialsTrouble in Tashkent A Solution for Siachen When India and Pakistan almost made peace War in cyberspace Ram, Jesus, Allah Much hype, small gains Born to run Weak, distressed, accident-prone 'We will open our cards in court My Flag, My Country Escape from Kathmandu Man on the Moon MORE SPECIALS...

The crisis in East Pakistan was a qualitatively different proposition. First of all, Pakistan thought that Chinese and American support would ensure the failure of the liberation struggle. President Yahya Khan thought if India launched a military operation in the east, he could do something in Kashmir and take it away. That is why he carried out a surprise, but it was no surprise to us.

We defeated them for the first and perhaps only time on both, the eastern and western fronts. We help the liberation of Bangladesh and captured large areas of Sind and southern Punjab. They didn't succeed in Kashmir, and we took 93,000 prisoners of war. For the first time, Pakistan could not escape accepting the fact that it was



politically throttled and militarily defeated. The result was the erosion and then, fading away of the Yahya Khan regime. The defeat also convinced Pakistan it must have conversations with India. Why we agreed to negotiations in Simla is worth analyzing. We had no political and military objectives, we had no desire to capture West Pakistan nor did we want to capture Pakistan occupied Kashmir.

The military regime in Pakistan had disappeared and a civilian -- Zulfikar AliBhutto -- had taken over, so we were at ease talking to him. Holding onto another nation's territory is a politically and financially expensive proposition. You have to appoint a military governor and you have to permanently station your troops. The population will be hostile. The age of aggressive imperialism is over. It is not in our tradition, so we decided to talk. Remember Simla occurred after a series of meetings in Dhaka. P N Haksar, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's principal secretary, and Foreign Secretary T N Kaul had detailed discussion with Mujibur Rahman in Dhaka. Indira Gandhi conveyed to Mujib that India want normalcy in the sub-continent. Mujib, I suspect, had some informal contact with Bhutto when he was released in January 1972. Bhutto asked Mujib to help in the release of the Pakistani POWs and, if possible, not initiate war crime trials. I was then director of the War desk at the ministry of external affairs. I was the first acting ambassador to Bangladesh. My frank analysis is Mujib was not keen on independence. He wanted to be prime minister of the whole of Pakistan. It is only because of the obstinate stand of the military regime and Bhutto that he was compelled to declare independence. He was willing to negotiate even then. It was the Awami League's youth wing who remained firm. He was not an active participant in the freedom struggle, as he was in prison. India told him if you don't want to release the POWs, Bangladesh could keep them. Mujib was not prepared for that because he could not afford it. Bhutto was a clever man, he anticipated the pressure on us. At Simla we had many objectives. First, we wanted to stabilise the relationship and tell Pakistan: The war is over, you provoked it, we were compelled to respond, but that does not mean we have any ambitions, territorial or otherwise. Second, we want the Kashmir issue to be resolved to the maximum extent. Third, we wanted Bhutto to recognise Bangladesh. Not only had Pakistan not recognised Bangladesh, Islamabad was obstructing Dhaka getting UN membership.



Four, we wanted him to take back non-Biharis and non-Bengalis from Bangladesh. This was a demand on Bangladesh's behalf. All these was discussed first in Dhaka, then in Delhi and Murree in Pakistan. P N Haksar, D P Dhar, chairman of the policy planning committee, and T N Kaul were involved in the negotiations. Swaran Singh was our foreign minister, Jagjivan Ram the defence minister. In January 1972 I was appointed acting ambassador to Bangladesh. I was in Simla for the first day-and-a-half. K P S Menon Jr, who later became foreign secretary, was also involved in the negotiations. India's strength was that we had won the war, but importantly, we had gone through internal discussions to decide what we want to achieve. It was decided if Pakistan agreed to the new border and recognised Bangladesh, we would release the POWs. We also told Pakistan if they recognised Bangladesh, we would persuade Bangladesh not to initiate a war crimes trial. Mrs Gandhi went to Simla with Sardar Swaran Singh, Haksar, Dhar and Kaul. There was a business-like atmosphere in Simla. The chemistry of cooperation was absent between the two leaders. Mrs Gandhi was not there to forget and forgive. Bhutto's stand was, "Whatever you say is right, but I was not responsible." He was a clever man. The discussions were very difficult. Bhutto kept harping, "Look, I am in a weak position. I have just taken over. If you make very harsh demands and if I concede them I may not survive back home. Already, there is a lot of anger and frustration in Pakistan. We don't want an extremist Muslim or military government to come back. So please help me stabilise myself in office."

People often ask why did we give back the territory we won? Holding foreignterritory is expensive militarily. It would also have not been acceptable to the international community. The 93,000 POWs lived in pucca housing. Our troops guarding them lived in tents. For a year they lived in tents. Under the Geneva Convention you have to give certain facilities to POWs. It affected the morale of our soldiers. They thought we defeated the Pakistanis, but they are living comfortably while we are in slums. There was the tension of keeping 93,000 hostile soldiers. It was a complex predicament and we wanted to get rid of them. We talked about Kashmir in Simla; we wanted to settle it once and all. Till the last day we kept saying the military commanders would draw a new line. It would not be called a cease-fire line, but the Line of Control. It would be thehttp://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/15spec.htm (3 of 5)8/6/2009 6:15:12 PM


first step towards making it an international boundary. Kashmir would not be considered a dispute. We discussed this at a formal meeting too. Bhutto said, "I have no problem. I will do it, but please don't put it in the agreement, formally." Mrs Gandhi insisted upon this, but internal differences surfaced in our delegation. Jagjivan Ram, Dhar and Kaul wanted Bhutto to put this in the agreement, but Swaran Singh and Haksar cited history. If you put this in the agreement, they said, it would be in the manner of an imposed clause. The last time such an agreement was signed was after the first world war. After Hitler came to power he said this is an imposed agreement, it has no validity, he violated it and there was war. This was the argument Mrs Gandhi was given. They said, "If Bhutto says he will do it, then don't insist on including it (Bhuttos promise on Kashmir to India) in the agreement." My personal view is we should have insisted that Bhutto's promise on Kashmir be included in the Simla agreement. I don't know what was working in their minds, what the compulsions were. On the last night, at the meeting with Mrs Gandhi, Bhutto agreed he would formally declare the Line of Control as an acceptable boundary in four years' time. This too was not put on record. The Simla agreement just said Kashmir is an issue which should be discussed, and has to be resolved peacefully and bilaterally. We made another mistake by writing 'other means;' we agreed to solve it 'by other means.' Till the last day it was certain the meeting would be a failure. There was great anxiety. The mood was tense. If the talks failed, it would mean we would have to keep 93.000 POWs and Pakistan territory. The overriding feeling was that it is okay, if he is giving us this assurance on Kashmir, maybe it will lead to a durable peace. The agreement was signed on the very last day. From July 1972 to 1974, Bhutto did take steps confirming his promise to Mrs Gandhi. The level of violence on the border was not high. He merged the northern areas into the Pakistan federation. He created a separate Kashmir ministry. Of course, he started the nuclear weapons programme, saying Pakistan would never again be defeated in war. By 1974, Mrs Gandhi was in trouble because of the Navnirman agitation. Bhutto had become very strong by then. Even the military was subject to his influence. The Emergency made Mrs Gandhi unpopular. She had to concentrate on internal problems. Bhutto was a political opportunist. He saw Mrs Gandhi was weak and reduced by 50% the value of the Simla agreement by 1976. He said, "Kashmir is a dispute." He didn't fulfill the other parts of the agreement.



The value judgement of Simla that we didn't take advantage of our position is in the light of much later developments. It did improve our credibility. Henry Kissinger, who was our greatest critic during the Bangladesh war, signed an agreement with us on economic cooperation. The Simla agreement provided the framework of some peace for a decade-and-a-half. Part I: Trouble in Tashkent Part III: When Rajiv met Zia The Rediff Specials



rediff.com Special: Former foreign secretary Romesh Bhandari recalls the Rajiv-Zia talks


July 16, 2001 The Rediff Special/Romesh Bhandari NEWSLINKS US EDITION COLUMNISTS DIARY SPECIALS INTERVIEWS CAPITAL BUZZ REDIFF POLL THE STATES ELECTIONS ARCHIVES SEARCH REDIFFSearch the Internet

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Former foreign secretary Romesh Bhandari was born and educated in Lahore. He joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1950. During his tenure, Pakistan President Zia-ul Haq visited New Delhi. He recalls the encounter between then premier Rajiv Gandhi and General Zia:

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President Zia and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met inMoscow in February 1985 at the funeral of the late Soviet president Yuri Andropov. During their talks, both men agreed they should do something to establish good relations between their countries. Rajiv proposed to send me to Pakistan. Zia happily agreed because his foreign minister Shabzada Yakub Khan and foreign secretary Niaz Naik were pro-India.

I went to Pakistan and Zia's visit was finalised. In the middle of December, Zia came on a working visit. He and Rajiv agreed for a step-by-step approach. The compulsions of that meeting were by and large the same. Zia realised that as long as both countries remained hostile development would be elusive.

Remittances from the Gulf had started declining, so Zia had economic compulsions. Zia, being a military man, realised there could be no military solution. India had a clear advantage in conventional warfare. He knew he could not fight a war and get Kashmir. The best way was dialogue. There was also an agreement that ruled out the use of force.



There was no euphoria when Rajiv and Zia met. Because, people did not trust Pakistan. They had heard so often that peace would arrive, but it always remained far away. There was a feeling in India that many within the Pakistan armed forces wanted to take revenge for Bangladesh. So there was no hype. The talk took place in the Yellow Room of Rashtrapati Bhavan. Zia stayed over that night at Rashtrapati Bhavan. Zia was the most courteous and polite leader I have ever met. He would always come right out to the car to see off his visitor. There was good personal chemistry between Rajiv and Zia. There was no tension. No one was present when they spoke to each other for over two hours. We were in the committee room. Both came out, sat with us and told us what they had agreed upon. Rajiv took me aside and said, "Zia was pushing and pushing me to commit myself to a visit to Pakistan." Nothing came out on Kashmir. We know the stated positions. Zia was very keen that Rajiv should visit Pakistan. Rajiv said we would do it step by step; let the finance and foreign secretaries visit first. Rajiv had a very mature view on Indo-Pak relations. But he was influenced by others. People told him Zia should not be trusted. Initially it prejudiced his approach. But later, people like us said, "Zia is saying something, test him out." Zia's cricket diplomacy was part of getting credibility because, after all, he was a military man. To follow up on the Rajiv-Zia talks, then finance minister V P Singh went to Pakistan. He had a productive dialogue with his counterpart, the pragmatic economist Maqbool Haque. Later, I went for the foreign secretary-level talks .The day I landed in Rawalpindi the political forces had started their game. The Muslim League passed a resolution that economic exchanges between India and Pakistan were detrimental to Pakistan, and the Kashmir issue could be solved only on the basis of the United Nations resolution. I was naturally very upset. My first meeting was with then prime minister Mohammad Junejo, who was from the League. I told him, "I better pack up and go home." To which his answer was, "This was a political resolution and if President Ziahttp://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/16spec.htm (2 of 4)8/6/2009 6:15:20 PM


has said he wants better relations with India, we are committed to it." Next, I met the president. We had a one-on-one. Our talk went on for over an hour. I mentioned the League's resolution. He agreed that was a problem and asked me to continue our efforts. At that point, we wanted Zia to show some gesture that could be interpreted as a friendly one. I can't tell you what we wanted. That's too loaded. I'll reveal that in my memoir. I told Zia if I go back empty-handed Rajiv would believe Zia was sincere, but not the people of India. Three days later, when I was in Karachi I was whisked away in a car and told the president would like to talk to me. Zia told me, "I have done the best I can. Please go back, rest assured." Subsequently, the third step -- a meeting of sub-groups -- got stalled. Forces in Pakistan that were against the normalisation of relations overwhelmed Zia's desire. Rajiv said he and Zia had come to some agreement over Kashmir. It could have solved the issue, but unfortunately Zia died in the 1988 plane crash and the hope of an Indo-Pak agreement got crushed. That solution was to keep talking on the border issue. In the meantime we would go ahead with our economical and cultural discussions, almost freezing the Kashmir issue and allowing a better life to Kashmiris. I firmly believe it is in the interest of the armed forces of Pakistan to keep the Kashmir issue alive. Only thus can they remain a determining factor in Pakistan. If there is peace there will be no need for the type of military establishment they have now. They would need an army the size of Bangladesh, which has a border problem but no fear of aggression from India. Today, Pakistan is on the verge of bankruptcy. There is resentment against the dominance of the Punjabis from Sindhis and Baluchis. Therefore, there is much greater hope that Pervez Musharraf would agree to keep Kashmir on the backburner to keep Pakistan united. With international emphasis on democracy, the armed forces realise that in the long run they will have to function under a democratic set-up. Under such circumstances, the hope to solve Kashmir increases -- but only in a long run. Tomorrow: The Lahore Declaration Part 1: Trouble in Tashkent Part 2: The errors of Simlahttp://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/16spec.htm (3 of 4)8/6/2009 6:15:20 PM


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