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On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of OriginaRegistration, Land Registration Commission (now known as the National Land Titlesand Deeds Registration Administration), submitted a report to the court a quo statingthat Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already covered by homestead patentsissued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. Herecommended that the decision of 5 August 1981, and the order of 6 October 1981 beset aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition was raised by

the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that the decision of 5August 1981 should be implemented because it had long become final and executory.

After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on 25 March 1985 settingaside the decision dated 5 August 1981 and the order dated 6 October 1981 for theissuance of decrees. 4 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was deniedby respondent judge on 6 August 1985 for lack of merit. 5

Petitioners filed a petition forcertiorariand mandamus with this Court which in turnreferred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 6

On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered judgment, 7 dismissing thepetition and stating, among others, thus

In resum, prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, therespondent Judge has still the power and control over the decision herendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a registration or cadastralcase takes place only after the expiration of the one-year period after entryof the final decree of registration (Afalla vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622;

Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil. 256; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil. 113). When therespondent Judge amended his decision after the report of the respondentofficials of the Land Registration office had shown that homestead patentshad already been issued on some of the lots, respondents cannot befaulted because land already granted by homestead patent can no longerbe the subject of another registration (Manalo vs. Lukban, et al., 48 Phil.973).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We resolve to DISMISS thepetition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in itsResolution dated 10 March 1987. 8Hence, this recourse.

Several issues are raised by petitioners in this petition. The more important issuesbefore the Court are: (a) whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue thedecision of 25 March 1985 which set aside the lower court's earlier decision of 5

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August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981; (b) whether or not the respondentsActing Land Registration Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division ofOriginal Registration, Land Registration Commission, have no alternative but to issuethe decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order forissuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do so being purely ministerial;(c) whether or not "the law of the case" is the decision in Government of the PhilippineIslands v. Abran,supra, which held that the lands adjudicated to Consolacion Gomez

were not public lands, and therefore they could not have been acquired by holders ofhomestead titles as against petitioners herein.

It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final andexecutory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having become final, itmay no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim onsection 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after

judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order tothe Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration

and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation tosection 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory undersection 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being thelaw, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearlyacted without jurisdiction.

Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication ofland in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the senseof incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final

decree of registration. 9 This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a finaldecree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA)and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, thetitle is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continuesto be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. 10

Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez should have beensubmitted to the court a quobefore its decision became final. But were we to sustainthis argument, we would be pressuring respondent land registration officials to submita report or study even if haphazardly prepared just to beat the reglementary deadlinefor the finality of the court decision. As said by this Court in De los Reyes vs. de Villa: 11

Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must bestated in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title andmust contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requirestechnical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parceof land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limitsof such portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court.In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys

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become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardlybe done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the Chief Surveyorof the General Land Registration Office with such duties (AdministrativeCode, section 177).

Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited tothe period before the court's decision becomes final, but may extend even after its

finality but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree.

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue thedecree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the ordersof the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court andwith the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, ifthey are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of thedecree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, asofficials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of thecourt. 12 They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinaryand cadastral land registration proceedings ." 13

The foregoing observations resolve the first two (2) issues raised by petitioners.

Petitioners next contend that "the law of the case" is found in Government of thePhilippine Islands vs. Abran, et al., supra, where it was decided by this Court that thelands of Consolacion M. Gomez, from whom petitioners derive their ownership over thelots in question, were not public lands. A reading of the pertinent and dispositiveportions of the aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots earlier covered by

homestead patents were not included among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M.Gomez. The decision states:

With respect to the portions of land covered by homestead certificates oftitle, we are of opinion thatsuch certificates are sufficient to prevent the titleto such portion from going to appellants aforesaid, for they carry with them

preponderating evidence that the respective homesteaders held adversepossession of such portions, dating back to 1919 or 1920, accordingly tothe evidence, and the said appellants failed to object to that possession intime. (Emphasis supplied)

Wherefore modifying the judgment appealed from, it is hereby ordered thatthe lots respectively claimed by Agustin V. Gomez, Consolacion M.Gomez, and Julian Macaraeg, be registered in their name, with theexclusion of the portions covered by the homestead certificates ... (Emphasis supplied.) 14

The report of respondent land registration officials states that the holders of thehomestead patents registered the lots in question in the years 1928 and 1929. The

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decision in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran was promulgated on 31December 1931. Hence, the subject lots are specifically excluded from thoseadjudicated by the aforesaid decision to Consolacion M. Gomez.

It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the LandRegistration Act, becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and mayno longer be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in cadastral

proceeding. 15

The aforecited case ofGovernment vs. Abran, therefore, is not "the law of the case",for the lots in question were not private lands of Consolacion M. Gomez whenhomestead patents were issued over them in 1928-1929. There is sufficient proof toshow that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already titled lands way back in 1928and 1929 as shown by Annexes "A", "B", "C", and "D" of respondents' Memorandum. 16

Lastly, petitioners claim that if the decision of 5 August 1981 of the lower court issustained, the homestead title holders may still vindicate their rights by filing aseparate civil action for cancellation of titles and for reconveyance in a court of ordinarycivil jurisdiction. Conversely, the same recourse may be resorted to by petitioners."(T)he true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to land judiciallysettled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true owner of the parcel ofland granted as free patent and described in the Torrens title and that the defendantand his predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the parcel of land andknew that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest have been in possession thereofbe established, then the court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without orderingthe cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant,

the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been foundto be the true owner thereof." 17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appealsis AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.

LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

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TINGA, J .:

The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or lachesmay bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case. It is a hardly novelissue, yet petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule ina manner that would unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and instead affirm theassailed rulings of the courts below.

The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas(Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofDumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of FirstInstance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered a DecisionAdicionalin ExpedienteCadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan yOtros.1In the decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots,together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who hadestablished their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereofsince time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree ofregistration.2Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which wasadjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married to Fausto Estoras) and EngraciaCalingacion, both residents of Sibulan, Negros Oriental.3

Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventuallyacquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her undivided one-half (1/2) share over LotNo. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half

(1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by the SpousesAbierra through various purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between theyears 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of

Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra.4

In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and the fact that the Abierra spouseshave been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the 1977sale, no decree of registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite therendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision

and the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. Therecords do not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the Director ofLands, though it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a fewmonths before the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines inDecember of 1941.

No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), althoughit entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and simultaneously deputized the City

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Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear whenever the case was set for hearing and inall subsequent proceedings.5

Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received herdocumentary evidence. No evidence was apparently presented by the OSG. On 26

April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision6finding merit in the petition for revival ofjudgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the

Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the correspondingdecree of confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision.1avvphi1.net

The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that theright of action to revive judgment had already prescribed. The OSG further argued thatat the very least, Nillas should have established that a request for issuance of a decreeof registration before the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The appealwas denied by the appellate court in its Decision7dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision,the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules ofCourt, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion,refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land registrationcases. The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have been especially onerous torequire Nillas to first request the LRA to comply with the 1941 decision considering thatit had been established that the original records in the 1941 case had already beendestroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.

In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of theCourt of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to land registrationcases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action

upon judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of actionaccrues.8Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureestablishes that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motionwithin five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced byaction before it is barred by statute of limitations.9It bears noting that the Republicdoes not challenge the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of therights of the original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish that the property isinalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State.

The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court ofAppeals10and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro.11Shipside was cited since in that case, theCourt dismissed the action instituted by the Government seeking the revival of

judgment that declared a title null and void because the judgment sought to be revivedhad become final more than 25 years before the action for revival was filedIn Shipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. Onthe other hand, Heirs of Lopezinvolved the double registration of the same parcel ofland, and the subsequent action by one set of applicants for the issuance of the decreeof registration in their favor seven (7) years after the judgment had become final. The

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Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set in, it in view of thepetitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years.

Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general butdefinite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lowercourts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to adecision in a land registration case."12

The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana vMenla,13decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that a decisionrendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of registration remainedunissued after 26 years was already "final and enforceable." The Court, throughJustice Labrador, explained:

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the assignment [oferror], except insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registrationcase has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years,except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for thistheory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may beenforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action(Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is notapplicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is sobecause a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that issecured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the samewithin a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decisionunenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose is

to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, theownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After theownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no furtherproceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse orlosing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires tooust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings toplace the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land

registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes finawithout any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. xx x

x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the courtmay order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is merelydeclaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced againstthe adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial dutyboth of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court

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or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor hasbeen filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land isordered to be registered.14

The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision ina land registration case was reiterated five (5) years afterSta. Ana, in Heirs oCristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al.

15In that case, it was similarly argued

that a prayer for the issuance of a decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a1938 decision was, among others, barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting theargument, the Court was content in restating with approval the above-cited excerptsfrom Sta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the Court some years later in Rodiv. Benedicto.16These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., andPoras

17and Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente,18respectively, that the right of theapplicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession ofthe land never prescribes.19

Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules onprescription and laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Apartfrom the three (3) cases mentioned earlier, the Sta. Anadoctrine was reiterated inanother three (3) more cases later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20Cacho vCourt of Appeals,21and Paderes v. Court ofAppeals.22The doctrine ofstaredecisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any compellingargument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy employed by the Republic inits present petition is to feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and educedit never existed at all. Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides forthe five (5)-year prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is applicable to land

registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and wheneverpracticable and convenient.23The Republic further observes that Presidential Decree(PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the provisionsof Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to land registrationproceedings.

We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the principleenunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the current arguments of theRepublic.

Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to otheror extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedurebut by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlikein ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of landregistration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land,consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiata status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating suchownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty

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exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and theLRA to issue, the decree of registration.

The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does notcontain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it isprecisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of

judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reasonbeing there is no need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order toobtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable toland registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:

SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment directingthe registration of title to land has become final, the court shall, within fifteen days fromentry of judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue thecorresponding decree of registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shallsend, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and ofthe order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree ofregistration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision has notbeen amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, theCommissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as theoriginal and duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title. The originalcertificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree ofregistration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the LandRegistration Commission. The original of the original certificate of title shall also besigned by the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the owners duplicate

certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the property issituated for entry in his registration book.

The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of thejudgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever isimposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a preconditionto the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on theland court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner toissue in turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is totransmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the LandRegistration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree ofregistration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligationsare ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generallybeyond discretion of amendment or review.

The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuanceof the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of theland. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. Theultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive

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determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of anadditional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case hadattained finality would simply frustrate such goal.

Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from thetime decisions in land registration cases become final iscomplete in itself and doesnot need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be

executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have beenno need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of

judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure andproceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. Theprimary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty toissue the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that bodythat there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court thatremains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of thedecree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating

judicial recourse if a significant number of years has passed since the promulgation ofthe land court's unimplemented decision or order, as in this case. Even thoughprescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a

judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of thejudgment or order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other thanprescription or laches that might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration.

What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Eventhough the Court applied the doctrines of prescription and laches in those cases, itshould be observed that neither case was intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrinenor did they make any express declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases weregoverned by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general situation thatmarked both Sta. Ana and the present case.

The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from anoriginal action for land registration, but from a successful motion by the Republicseeking the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to a private landowner. While

one might argue that such motion still arose in a land registration case, we note thatthe pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of the order ofcancellation was made in the course of dispensing with an argument which wasultimately peripheral to that case. Indeed, the portion ofShipsidedealing with the issueof prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of CiviProcedure relating to prescription, followed by an observation that the judgment soughtto be revived attained finality 25 years earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was notaddressed, and perhaps with good reason, as the significantly more extensiverationale provided by the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the fact that the

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State no longer held interest in the subject property, having divested the same to theBases Conversion Development Authority prior to the filing of the action forrevival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the applicability of the rules ofprescription.

Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on stillanother point, relating to its pronouncements relating to the proper execution of the

certification of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In contrast, Shipside has notsince been utilized by the Court to employ the rules on prescription and laches on finaldecisions in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that since Shipside waspromulgated in 2001, the Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta.Ana asrecently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case.

We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even moreunconventional than that in Shipside. The property involved therein was the subject oftwo separate applications for registration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959, theother by a different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to obtain a decreeof registration, this accomplished as early as 1968.24On the other hand, the petitionerswere able to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time theproperty had already been registered in the name of the other claimant, thusobstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues ofprescription and laches arose because the petitioners filed their action to enforce the1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the competing title only in 1987, two (2)years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the Rules of CivilProcedure. The Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delayin filing the action for the execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the

petition on that score.

Heirs of Lopeznoted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued todifferent persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date mustprevail x x x," and indeed even if the petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain acertificate of title pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not havestood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches of thepetitioners with their pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protecttheir interests over the property, marked by their inability to oppose the otherapplication for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within the five(5) -year reglementary period.

Still, a close examination ofHeirs of Lopezreveals an unusual dilemma that negatesits application as precedent to the case at bar, or to detract from Sta. Ana as a generarule for that matter. The execution of the judgment sought for belated enforcementin Heirs of Lopezwould have entailed the disturbance of a different final judgmentwhich had already been executed and which was shielded by the legal protectionafforded by a Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not have been a"ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to effectuate the judgment in

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favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that their right ofownership as confirmed by the judgment in their favor was indubitable, considering theearlier decree of registration over the same property accorded to a different party.The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general presumption that the final judgment, withwhich the corresponding decree of registration is homologous by legal design, has notbeen disturbed by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumptionobtains in this case as well. Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no

impediment to the continued application ofSta. Ana as precedent.25

We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viabilityofShipside orHeirs of Lopezconcerning the applicability of the rules of prescription orlaches in land registration cases. Suffice it to say, those cases do not operate todetract from the continued good standing ofSta. Ana as a general precedent thatneither prescription nor laches bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a landregistration case, especially when the said judgment has not been reversed ormodified, whether deliberately or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This

qualifier stands not so much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it doesas an exercise in stating the obvious.

Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941 Decisionconstituted res judicatathat barred subsequent attacks to the adjudicates title over thesubject property. The Republic submits that said decision would operate as res

judicata only after the decree of registration was issued, which did not happen in thiscase. We doubt that a final decisions status asres judicata is the impelling ground forits very own execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense oras a factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty terminology aside,

the Republics arguments on this point do not dissuade from our central holding thatthe 1941 Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree ofregistration notwithstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or her predecessors-in-interestin seeking its effectuation and the reasons for such delay, following the prostractedfailure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration.In this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights ofthe original adjudicates her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to thedecree of registration albeit still in the names of the original prevailing parties who areher predecessors-in interest. Both the trial court and the

Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does notoffer any compelling argument to dispute such proof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25660 February 23, 1990

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LEOPOLDOVENCILAO, MAURORENOBLAS, TELESFOROBALONDIA, FELIXABANDULA, FAUSTOGABAISEN, ISIDOROELIVERA, RAYMUNDOBONGATO, MARTINROLLO

N, EUSTAQUIO MEDANA, DOROTEO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAURA,MACARIO GEPALAGO, GREGORIO ITAOC, ALEJANDRO RENOBLAS, SIMEON

BARBARONA, GREGORIO RENOBLAS, FRANCISCO ASOY, TEOFILAGUJELING, FABIAN VILLAME, VICENTE OMUSORA, PEDRO BALORIA,

GREGORIO ITAOC, TERESITA ITAOC, FAUSTINO ITAOC, FORTUNATO ITAOC,FLORENTINA GEMENTIZA, RESTITUTA OMUSORA, ZOILA OMUSORA, FELISA

OMUSORA, ROBERTO HAGANAS, FELISA HAGANAS, FERMIN HAGANAS,VICTORIANO HAGANAS, JULIA SEVILLA, ROMAN MATELA, MARCELA

MATELA, DELFIN MATELA, PELAGIO MATELA, ROBERTA MATELA, PROCOPIOCABANAS and SERAFINA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellants,

vs.TEODORO VANO, JOSE REYES, ROSARIO REYES, SALUD OGILVE BELTRAN,AMALIA R. OGILVE, FLORA VDA. DE COROMINAS, JESUSA REYES, LOURDES

COROMINAS MUNOZ, JUAN COROMINAS, LOURDES C. SAMSON CEBALLOS,SOLEDAD C. SAMSON RAMA, DOLORES V. GARCES FALCON, JAIME GARCES,JOAQUIN REYES, and PEDRO RE R. LUSPO, defendants- appellees.

G.R. No. L-32065 February 23,1990

LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCOPAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA,

GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTOGABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, SIMEON

BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINAGEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS,

PASTOR ASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners,vs.

HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol,Branch 1, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-33677 February 23, 1990

LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO

PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON, GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA,GREGORIO ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO

GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, SIMEONBARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX ABANDOLA, SATURNINA

GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS NAGANAS,PASTOR ASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners,

vs.HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol,

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Branch 1, The Provincial Sheriff, Province of Bohol, and MARIANO OGILVE, et.al., respondents.

Lord Marapao and Lorenzo A. Lopena for petitioners.

Roque R. Luspo for respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J .:

On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of these three cases,considering that they involve the same parties and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L-25660---this is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol (nowRegional Trial Court) 1 dated May 12,1964 dismissing the cases of some of theplaintiffs-appellants and its order dated August 25, 1965 denying the motion forreconsideration and the motion to declare the defendants- appellees in default; (2)

G.R. No. L32065---this is a petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of FirstInstance of Bohol dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of its prior order datedMay 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt; (3) G.R. No. L-33677--- this is apetition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition of the order of the Court of FirstInstance of Bohol dated June 2, 1971 directing the demolition of the houses of thepetitioners.

On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to manifest whether or notthey are still interested in prosecuting these cases, or supervening events havetranspired which render these cases moot and academic or otherwise substantiallyaffect the same. On March 25, 1988, the petitioners filed an ex parte manifestation thatthey are still very much interested in the just prosecution of these cases.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

G.R. No. 25660

On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration ofthe parcels of land allegedly inherited by them from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration

Case No. 76, L.R.C. Record No. N-4251. On July 26,1951, administratrix BernardinaVda. de Luspo filed an amended application for registration. After hearing, the landwas registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400 (pp. 84-85, Record on

Appeal; p. 7, Rollo).

On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real properties with damagesand preliminary injunction, Civil Case No. 1533, (pp. 2-19, Record n Appeal; p. 7Rollo) was filed by plaintiffs-appellants before the Court of First Instance of Bohol. Itwas alleged that they are the lawful owners of their respective parcels of land includingthe improvements thereon either by purchase or inheritance and have been in

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possession publicly, continuously, peacefully and adversely under the concept ofowners for more than thirty (30) years tacked with the possession of theirpredecessors-in-interest. However, those parcels of land were included in the parcelsof land applied for registration by the heirs of Juan Reyes, either by mistake or fraudand with the intention of depriving them of their rights of ownership and possessionwithout their knowledge, not until the last part of 1960 when the defendants-appellees,through their agents, attempted to enter those parcels of land claiming that they now

belong to the heirs of Juan Reyes. To the complaint, the defendants-appellees movedto dismiss on two grounds (pp. 19-22, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) forlack of cause of action and (2) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment.

On July 20, 1963, the court a quo issued an order denying defendants-appelleesmotion to dismiss (pp. 29-30, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on themotion to set aside such order (pp. 31-32, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), on May 12,1964, the same court issued another order reversing itself partially (p. 56, Record on

Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs Alejandro RenoblasFausto Cabaisan, Fabian Villame, Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc,Fortunato Ita-oc, Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas,Victorians Haganas, Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Roberto Matela,Procopio Cabaas and Vicente Amosora are hereby dismissed on theground of res adjudicata with these plaintiffs paying proportionatelyeighteenth forty one (18/41) of the costs, but the petition to dismiss thecase of the rest of the plaintiffs is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

On May 28,1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were dismissed filed a motionfor reconsideration (pp. 57- 58, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, theplaintiffs-appellants whose cases were not dismissed filed a motion to declare thedefendants-appellees in default for failure to file their answer with the time prescribedby law (pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On the other hand, defendants-appellees filed their opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that thecomplaint as regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be likewise dismissed (pp. 75-80, Record on Appeal; p. 7 Rollo).

On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in connection therewith (pp. 82-98, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) denying all motions.

The case is now before Us with the following as assignments of errors (p. 3, Brief forthe Plaintiffs-Appellants; p. 9, Rollo), to wit:

I

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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASES OF THEPLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WHOSE NAMES ARE ALREADYMENTIONED ABOVE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THEIR CASES

ARE BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT OF RES ADJUDICATA.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THEPLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS WHOSE CASES ARE NOT DISMISSED TODECLARE THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES IN DEFAULT FOR HAVINGFAILED TO FILE THEIR ANSWER WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BYLAW.

On August 12, 1966, a resolution was issued by this Court dismissing the appeal asregards the second issue because the order appealed from was merely interlocutory,hence, not appealable (pp. 35-38, Rollo).

On August 17, 1988, petitioners Alex Abandula, Mauro Renoblas, Simeon Barbarona,Fabian Villame, Macario Gepalago, Eustaquio Medana, Julia Sevilla, Gregorio Itaoc,Francisco Asoy and Martin Rollon filed a motion to withdraw their appeal on the groundthat they are now the absolute owners and possessors of their respective parcels ofland subject of Civil Case No. 1533.

The appeal is not impressed with merit.

The plaintiffs-appellants claim that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees that they (plaintiffs-appellants) were notified of the date of the trial on themerits of the application for registration nor were they given copies of the decision ofthe trial court. Likewise, they contend that res judicata is not applicable in an action forreconveyance.

The allegations that no evidence was presented by the defendants-appellees thatplaintiffs-appellants were notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the applicationfor registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the trial court are newissues. It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question will beentertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below and it is within the

issues made by the parties in their pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789,July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532). The other contention that res judicata is not applicablein an action for reconveyance is not plausible. The principle ofres judicata applies toall cases and proceedings, including land registration and cadastral proceedings(Republic vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 65; Paz vsInandan 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303).

It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a courthaving jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a

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subsequent case between the same parties and their successors in interest litigatingupon the same thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may be. In order,therefore, that there may be res judicata, the following requisites must be present: (a)The former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having

jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on themerits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity ofparties, of subject matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281;

Ramos vs. Pablo, G.R. No. 53692, Nov. 26,1986, 146 SCRA 24).

The underlying philosophy of the doctrine ofres judicata is that parties should not bepermitted to litigate the same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been

judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as itremains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity withthem in law or estate (Sy Kao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61752, Sept.28,1984,132 SCRA 302). The doctrine ofres judicata is an old axiom of law, dictatedby wisdom and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it is to the

interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties andtheir privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sifinis litium (Carandang vs. Venturanza, G.R. No. L41940, Nov. 21,1984,133 SCRA344). To ignore the principle ofres judicata would be to open the door to endlesslitigations by continuous determination of issues without end (Catholic Vicar Apostolicof the Mountain Province vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 80294- 95, Sept. 21,1988, 165 SCRA 515).

Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or when notified he doesnot want to participate and only after the property has been adjudicated to another and

the corresponding title has been issued files an action for reconveyance, to give duecourse to the action is to nullify registration proceedings and defeat the purpose of thelaw.

In dismissing the cases of some of the petitioners, the court a quo meticulouslydiscussed the presence of all the elements ofres judicata (pp. 36-38; pp. 42-54Record on Appeal; p. 7; Rollo):

There is no question that in that Registration Proceedings, LRC Record No.N-4251, Land Registration Case No. N-76, the Court of First Instance of the

province of Bohol had jurisdiction of the subject matter, that said court hadrendered a judgment on the merit that was terminated in the Court of

Appeals since December, 1958, and that decision is now final with adecree of registration over the parcels of land described in the applicationissued to the applicants.

The subject matter (the parcels of land) now claimed by the plaintiffs in thiscase at bar are the same, or at least part of the parcels already adjudicatedregistration in that registration case to the persons, some of them are made

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defendants in this case before us. The cause of action between the twocases are the same, ownership of these parcels of land, though the formsof action are different, one is an ordinary Land Registration and the other isreconveyance.

'It is settled that notwithstanding the difference in the form oftwo actions, the doctrine ofres adjudicata will apply where it

appears that the parties in effect were litigating for the samething. A party can not, by varying the form of action, escape theeffects ofres adjudicata (Aguirre vs. Atienza, L-10665, Aug. 301958; Geronimo vs. Nava No. L-1 21 1 1, Jan. 31, 1959;Labarro vs. Labateria et al., 28 O.G. 4479).

'Well settled is the rule that a party can not by varying the formof action, or adopting a different method of presenting his case,escape the operation of the principle that one and the samecause of action shall not be twice litigated between the sameparties or their privies. (Francisco vs. Blas, et al., No. L-5078;Cayco, et al., vs. Cruz, et al., No. L-1 2663, Aug. 21, 1959).

'Accordingly, a final judgment in an ordinary civil actiondetermining the ownership of certain lands is res adjudicata in aregistration proceeding where the parties and property are thesame as in the former case (Paz vs. Inandan 75 Phil. 608;Penaloza vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303).'

xxx xxx xxxBut are there identities of parties in this case before us and the formerregistration proceedings? Identity of parties means that the parties in thesecond case must be the same parties in the first case, or at least, must besuccessors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of theformer action or proceeding, or when the parties in the subsequent caseare heirs (Chua Tan vs. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Martinez vs. Franco, 51Phil. 487-1 Romero vs. Franco, 54 Phil. 744; Valdez, et a]. vs. Penida No.L- 3467, July 30, 1951).

xxx xxx xxx

Returning our attention to the case at bar, and with in mind the principlesofres adjudicata above-quoted, we noticed that many of the plaintiffs werenot oppositors in the former registration case, but many are children of theformer oppositors. In such a case we have to determine the case of everyplaintiff, if the former decision in the land registration case is conclusive andbinding upon him.

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xxx xxx xxx

The defendants had proven that the adjoining owners and claimants of theparcels of land object of registration proceeding had been notified when theland was surveyed. These persons notified according to the surveyor'scertificate, Exhibit "B" were as follows: Cipriano Samoya, Fausto Baguisin,Silveria Pahado, Enojario Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas, Heirs of Gregorio

Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura,Marcelina Asilon, Gregorio Baguinang, et al., Nicolas Omosura, SimonLagrimas, et al., Martin Quinalayo, Gorgonio Baquinang, Demetrio AsolanCatalino Orellena, Heirs of Catalina Palves, Manuel Mondano, AngelMondano, Victoriano Balolo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici Bayson,Felomino Ruiz, Apolonio Horbeda, and Mun. of Calape.

The following persons were notified by the Chief of the Land RegistrationOffice of the initial hearing (Exhibit "J") of the registration proceedingsenjoining them to appear on June 16,1952, at 8:30 a.m., before the Courtof First Instance of Bohol to show cause why the prayer of said applicationshould not be granted: the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, theDirector of Public Works and the Director of Forestry, Manila; the ProvincialGovernor, the Provincial Fiscal and the District Engineer, TagbilaranBohol; the Municipal Mayor, Gorgonio Baguinang, Demetrio Azocan,Catalino Orellena, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano, Victoriano BolaloEugenio del Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Filomeno Ruiz, Apolonio Horbodathe Heirs of Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano Toloy,Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilom, Gregorio Baguinang, Nicolas

Omosura, Simon Lagrimas and Martin Quinalayo, Calape, Bohol; the heirsof Catalino Polvos, Fausto Baguisin, Cipriano Samoya, Silveria Pohado,Enojario, Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas and Leoncio Barbarona, AntequeraBohol.

And after the application had been filed and published in accordance withlaw the following persons represented by Atty. Conrado D. Marapao filedopposition to that registration proceeding: Felipe Cubido, Simon Lagrimas,Simeon Villame, Felix Lacorte, Victor Omosura, Germana Gahil, AnastacioOrillosa, Enerio Omosura, Valeriano Tuloy, Cipriano Sanoya, PabloDumadag, Andres Reimbuncia, Roman Reimbuncia, Celedonio CabanasMoises Cabanas, Calixto Gohiting, Gervasio Sevilla, Pedro Omosura,Daniel Itaoc, Luis Omosura, Bartolome Omusura, Nicasio Omosura, CalixtoSevilla, Teodora Omosura, Jose Sabari, Silverio Lacorte, Silverio Tuloy,Gertrudes Sevilla, Teodora Sevilla, Magno Orillosa, Gervacia SevillaMarcos Hagonas, Eleuterio Pandas, Pablo Omosura, Fabian Villame,Teodoro Omosura, Magdalina Asilom, Mauricio Matela, Marciano Ordada,Eusebio Omosura, and Gregorio Repelle, (Exhibit "E"), Atty. Juna V

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Balmaseda in representation of the Bureau of Lands, and Asst. FiscalNorberto M. Gallardo in representation of the Municipality of Calape.

Plaintiffs Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio Renoblas are children of plaintiffAlejandro Renoblas. Plaintiff Telesforo Balanda is son-in-law of Alejandrobeing the husband of Juliana Renoblas, daughter of Alejandro. Plaintiff

Alejandro Renoblas was not one of the oppositors in the registration

proceedings, but he was notified of the initial healing of that registrationcase and by the surveyor that surveyed the land object of registration(Exhibit J-Movant). Therefore, the decision of the land registrationproceeding is binding upon him and his case is dismissed on the groundofres adjudicata with costs.

xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiff Fausto Cabaisan was notifed by the surveyor and that notice of theinitial hearing. And though he was not an oppositor, the former landregistration proceeding is binding on him. Therefore, this case is dismissedin so far as Fausto Cabaisan is concerned with costs.

xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiffs Gregorio Ita-oc, Teresita Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc and Fortunate Ita-oc are children of Daniel Ita-oc, one of the oppositors in the registrationproceedings. They claim parcel No. 10 described in paragraph 2 of thecomplaint. Gregorio Ita-oc testified that his land was inherited by said

plaintiffs' mother from her father, Pio Sevilla. The evidence on record(Exhibits J-3, J- 4, J-5). However (sic), shows that the land is declared inthe name of Daniel Ita-oc, a former oppositor in the registration caseHence, these plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Daniel Ita-oc, andtherefore, are bound by the decision in that registration case. Their case,therefore, is dismissed, with costs.

"Plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas andVictoriano Haganas are children of Marcos Haganas, a former oppositor inthe registration case. Marcos testified that his claim before was only two

hectares, while the claim of his children is seven hectares, which comefrom his wife, not from him. These plaintiffs claim two parcels, one underTax Declaration No. R-4452, and Tax Declaration No. R-8456. It appearsthat Tax Declaration No. R-4452 (Exhibit M) is in the name of MarcosHaganas and the land described under Tax Declaration No. R-8456 wasbought by the spouses Marcos Haganas and Tomasa Sevilla fromGertrudis Sevilla in 1956 (Exhibit M-3), who was an oppositor in theregistration proceeding. Therefore, plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, FelisaHaganas, Fermin Haganas, and Victoriano Haganas are successors-in-

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interest to properties in which the decision in the registration case isconclusive and binding to their predecessors-in-interest. Hence, their casehere is dismissed with costs.

Plaintiff Julia Sevilla is the wife of Marcelo Matela, who was the oppositor inthe registration proceedings. Plaintiffs Roman Matela, Marcela MatelaDelfin Matela, and Roberta Matela are their children. She has no son by the

name of Pelagic. Julia testified that the land now claimed by her childrencame from her father Pio Sevilla. The land that was claimed by MauricioMatela as oppositor was in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5099. Thisis the same land now claimed by plaintiffs Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela,Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and Roberta Matela (Exhibit 0-4). Theseplaintiffs are successors-in-interest of Mauricio Matela, who is bound by thedecision in that land proceeding wherein he was the oppositor. Therefore,the case of these plaintiffs are dismissed with costs.

Plaintiff Procopia Cabanas was the wife of Andres Reambonanciaoppositor in the land registration proceedings. She claims parcel No. 20described in paragraph 2 of the complaint bearing Tax Declaration No. R-8121. It appears that this land is declared in the name of AndresReambonancia (Exhibit N-3) who, as oppositor in the land registrationcase, is bound by the decision of that case. Therefore, the case of plaintiffProcopia Cabanas as successor-in-interest to Andres Reambonancia, ishereby dismissed, with costs.

Plaintiff Vicente Amosora is the son of Enerio Amosora and Florencia Gahil

both oppositors in the former registration case. The land claimed by plaintiffVicente Amosora is described as parcel No. 24 of paragraph 2 of thecomplaint under Tax Declaration No. R-6107, under the name of his fatherEnerio Amosora. Since Enerio Amosora was an oppositor in the formerland registration of which this land was a part, the decision of that landregistration case is conclusive and binding not only to Enerio Amosora, butalso to his successor-in-interest, plaintiff Vicente Amosora, whose casetherefore, is dismissed with costs.

G.R. No. L-32065

Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo, Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. 3561 was issued in the name of Pedro R. Luspo and Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. 3562 was issued in the name of several persons (p. 36, Rollo).

A writ of possession dated November 6, 1959, a first alias writ of possession datedJanuary 6, 1961, and a second alias writ of possession dated July 2, 1966 were issuedby the trial court against the petitioners. A sample of the guerilla-like, hide and seektactics employed by the petitioners was proved by the official report of the deputy

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sheriff dated January 21 1960. Another evidence of petitioners' refusal to sign and tovacate was a certification dated July 22, 1966 and the Sheriffs return dated October25, 1966.

On March 29, 1967, a petition for contempt was filed by Mariano Ogilve, who is one ofthe registered owners of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No3562, against the petitioners for refusing to vacate the land occupied by them and for

refusing to sign the Sheriffs return.

On May 6, 1969, the court a quo issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of whichreads (p. 47, Rollo):

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, make it of record thatProcopia Reambonansa voluntarily left the land and dropped out from thecase; the charge of contempt against Alejandro Renoblas (who died) isdismissed and each of the remaining 22 respondents are hereby foundguilty of contempt under Sec. 3-b of Rule 71 and are hereby sentencedeach to pay a fine of One Hundred Pesos, authorizing the ConstabularyDetachment at or near Candungao Calape Bohol to collect the same and totransmit the money to the Clerk of this Court, with subsidiary imprisonmentin case of insolvency at the rate of one day for every P2.50 or fraction of aday, the said Constabulary Detachment to effect the commitment if any ofthem is unable to pay the fine. The fingerprints of each of these 22respondents shall also be taken by the constabulary and filed with therecord of this case.

It is so ordered.On June 4, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforestatedresolution whereas Ogilve filed an opposition thereto.

On February 14, 1970, the motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 18, 1970,another motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners on the ground of pendencyof the action for reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1533 and their appeal in G.R. No. L-25660. On May 14, 1970, the court a quo ordered the proper officers to actuallyexecute the resolution dated May 6, 1969.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners raise the following issues:

I

THAT THE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OFPOSSESSION WITHOUT ANY COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT FOR FORCIBLEENTRY AND DETAINER, NOR FOR RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND

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POSSESSION OF THE PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION AGAINST THE HEREINPETITIONERS.

II

THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A WRIT OFPOSSESSION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, WHO WERE NOT PARTIES

TO THE REGISTRATION PROCEEDING AND WHO WERE NOT DEFEATEDOPPOSITORS OF THE SAID APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors inthe said land registration case, as their names do not appear in the amendedapplication for registration; that they have occupied the subject parcels of land for morethan thirty (30) years which began long before the filing of the application forregistration; and that after the hearing of the registration case, they continued in

possession of the said land.

In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering itsregistration in his name necessarily carried with it the delivery of possession which isan inherent element of the right of ownership. The issuance of the writ of possessionis, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generallyaccepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests (Romasanta et. al. vs.Platon, 34 O.G. No. 76; Abulocion et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et. al., 100 Phil. 554 [1956]).

A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been

defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adverselyoccupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up tothe issuance of the final decree (Demorar vs. Ibaez, et al., 97 Phil 72 [1955]).

The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of the said land for morethan thirty (30) years which began long before the filing of the application forregistration and continued in possession after the hearing of the registration case,worked against them. It was a virtual admission of their lack of defense. Thus, the writsof possession were properly issued against them.

However, We do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that petitioners are guiltyof contempt. Under Section 8 (d) of Rule 19, Rules of Court, if the judgment be for thedelivery of the possession of real property, the writ of execution must require the sheriffor other officer to whom it must be directed to deliver the possession of the property,describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means that the sheriff must dispossessor eject the losing party from the premises and deliver the possession thereof to thewinning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing party entersor attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts ofownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the person

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adjudged to be entitled thereto, then and only then may the loser be charged with andpunished for contempt (Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, et. al., 85 Phil. 459).

According to this section, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, tocarry out the mandates of the judgment in question, and in fact, it was he himself, andhe alone, who was ordered by the trial judge who rendered that judgment, to place therespondents in possession of the land. The petitioners in this case had nothing to dowith that delivery of possession, and consequently, their refusal to effectuate the writ of

possession, is entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could not hinder, andmuch less prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to comply withhis duty. It was solely due to the latter's fault, and not to the disobedience of thepetitioners' that the judgment was not duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff couldeven have availed himself of the public force, had it been necessary to resort thereto(see United States v. Ramayrat 22 Phil. 183).

G.R. No. L-33677

On March 22,1971, Mariano Ogilve filed a Motion for a Writ of Demolition which wasgranted by the trial court on April 5, 1971 (pp. 42-43, Rollo) against those who wereadjudged guilty of contempt. On April 29, 1971, the petitioners filed an urgent motionfor reconsideration of said order. On June 2, 1971, the trial court issued another order,the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 48, Rollo):

WHEREFORE, in the absence of writ of preliminary injunction DeputyProvincial Sheriff Pedro Aparece must not only take P.C. soldiers with himbut also carpenters to effect the demolition, the carpenters being at theexpense of the Luspo.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition.

The issue here is whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of hisjurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and thus excluded the herein petitionersfrom the use and enjoyment of their right to which they are entitled when he(respondent judge) issued the order of demolition on April 5, 1971 and again on June2, 1971 (p. 107, Rollo).

On July 14, 1971, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (p. 51, Rollo).

The petition is not impressed with merit.

The petitioners allege that the respondent-judge cannot issue a writ of demolitionpending the resolution of G.R. No. L-32065.

We rule that the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 was not a bar to the issuance of the writof demolition. It is significant to note that the subject matter of the petition in G.R. No.

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L-32065 is the order dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of the prior orderdated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt and not the writs of possessionthemselves. Thus, the respondent Judge correctly issued the writs of demolition.In Meralco vs. Mencias, 107 Phil 1071, We held:

[I]f the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding impliesthe delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein

(Demorar vs. Ibanez, 97 Phil. 72; Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario,et al., 11 Phil. 391; Manlapas vs. Llorente 48 Phil. 298), a writ of demolitionmust, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but acomplement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would beineffective.

xxx xxx xxx

[The issuance of the writ of demolition] is reasonably necessary to dojustice to petitioner who is being deprived of the possession of the lots inquestion, by reason of the continued refusal of respondent ...... to removehis house thereon and restore possession of the promises to petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In G.R. No. L-25660, the appeal is DENIED and the orders of the Court of FirstInstance dated May 12, 1964 and August 25, 1965 are AFFIRMED; the motion towithdraw the appeal of some of the plaintiffs-appellants is GRANTED;

2) In G.R. No. L-32065, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the Court ofFirst Instance dated May 14, 1970 is SET ASIDE; and

3) In G.R. No. L-33677, the petition is DISMISSED and the order of the Court of FirstInstance dated June 2, 1971 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order isLIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 123346 March 31, 2009

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, Petitioners,vs.

CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATION, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 134385 March 31, 2009

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ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI-CULTURE, INC., Petitioner,vs.

HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HISSURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMAAND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS

LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; AND THEREGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA, J .:

In the Courts Resolution dated 14 December 2007,1the Court constituted a SpeciaDivision of the Court of Appeals to hear the instant case on remand. The SpeciaDivision was composed of three Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, withJustice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as SeniorMember; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member. We instructedthe Special Division to proceed as follows:

The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedingsand submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions withinthree (3) months from finality of this Resolution.

In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the SpecialDivision is directed to make the following determinations based on the evidencealready on record and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings

before it, to wit:i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title toOCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?

ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, asrecounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence? Assuming they are,are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and

Araneta?

iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palmaand the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they are, dothese orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of theDimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?

iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriationproceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, andif so what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government

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and whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by theGovernment through expropriation.

v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of theconflicting claims of title should prevail.

WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the

Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII ofthis Resolution.

SO ORDERED.2

The Special Division proceeded to conduct hearings in accordance with theResolution. The parties to these cases, namely CLT Realty Development Corporation(CLT), Manotok Realty Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (the Manotoks), the Heirsof Jose B. Dimson (Heirs of Dimson), and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.(Araneta), were directed by the Special Division to present their respective evidence to

the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Special Division rendered a 70-pageReport3(Report) on 26 November 2008. The Special Division submitted the sealedReport to this Court.

Before taking action on the Report itself, we dispose of a preliminary matter. OnFebruary 17, 2009, the Manotoks filed a motion beseeching that copies of the report befurnished the parties "so that they may submit their comments and objections thereonin accord with the principle contained in Sec. 10, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court." Wedeny the motion.

It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to the Court of Appealsfor reception of evidence was strictly in accordance with Rule 32. Notably, Section 1 ofsaid Rule authorizes the referral of the case to a commissioner "by written consent ofboth parties," whereas in the cases at bar, the Court did not endeavor to secure theconsent of the parties before effectuating the remand to the Court of Appeals.Nonetheless, our earlier advertence to Rule 32 remains proper even if the adoptedprocedure does not hew strictly to that Rule, owing to our power under Section 6, Rule135 to adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which appears conformableto the spirit of the Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary processes and other means

necessary to carry our jurisdiction into effect.

Moreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report would not serve anyuseful purpose. It would only delay the promulgation of the Courts action on theSealed Report and the adjudication of these cases. In any event, the presentResolution quotes extensively from the sealed Report and discusses its othersubstantive segments which are not quoted.

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The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of the issues referredto the Special Division. It is a more than adequate basis for this Court to make thefollowing final dispositions in these cases.

I.

We adopt the succeeding recital of operative antecedents made by the Special

Division in its Report.

THE PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS

DIMSON v. ARANETACA-G.R. CV. NO. 41883 & CA-G.R. SP No. 34819[SC-G.R. No. 134385]

On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed with the then Court of First Instance ["CFI"] ofRizal a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against ARANETA. On 7

May 1980, DIMSON amended his complaint and included Virgilio L. Enriquez["ENRIQUEZ"] as his co-plaintiff.

In said Amended Complaint, DIMSON claimed that he is the absolute owner of a 50-hectare land located in Bo. Potrero, Malabon, Metro Manila covered by TCT No. R-15169, [Lot 25-A-2] of the Caloocan Registry of Deeds. Allegedly, DIMSON hadtransferred the subject property to ENRIQUEZ by way of an absolute and irrevocablesale on 14 November 1979. Unfortunately though, DIMSON and ENRIQUEZdiscovered that the subject property was being occupied by ARANETA wherein an"agricultural school house" is erected and that despite repeated demands, the latterrefused to vacate the parcel of land and remove the improvements thereon.

ARANETA, for its part, refuted said allegations and countered that it is the absoluteowner of the land being claimed by DIMSON and that the real properties in the AranetaCompound are "properly documented and validly titled." It maintained that it had beenin possession of the subject parcel of land since 1974. For this reason, the claims ofDIMSON and ENRIQUEZ were allegedly barred by prescription.

During the trial, counsel for ARANETA marked in evidence, among others

certifications from the Land Registration Commission attesting that TCTs Nos. 13574and 26538, covering the disputed property, are in the names of ARANETA and JoseRato, respectively. ARANETA also offered TCT No. 7784 in evidence to prove that it isthe registered owner of the land described therein.

On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision upholding the title of DIMSONover the disputed property xxx

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Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, which was later consolidated with CA-GR. SP No. 34819 in viewof the inter-related issues of the two cases.

In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883sustained the RTC Decision in favor of DIMSON finding that the title of ARANETA tothe disputed land in a nullity. In CA-GR. SP No. 34819, the Court of Appeals likewise

invalidated the titles of ARANETA, relying on the Supreme Court ruling in MetropolitanWaterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals, which declared null and voidthe certificates of title derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 may 1917. It was alsoheld that ARANETA failed to sufficiently show that the Order sought to be nullified wasobtained through extrinsic fraud that would warrant the annulment thereof.

Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion for Reconsideration And/Or New Trialespousing therein as basis for its entreaty the various letters from different governmentagencies and Department order No. 137 of the Department of Justice, among others.

On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of ARANETA were denied by the Court ofAppeals. Nonetheless, the Court ordered DIMSON to maintain status quo until thefinality of the aforesaid judgment.

Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition before the Supreme Court. Refuting thefactual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, ARANETA contended thatthere in only one OCT 994 covering the Maysilo Estate issued on 3 May 1917 pursuantto the Decree No. 36455 issued by the Court of Land Registration on 19 April 1917 andadded that there were subsequent certifications issued by the government officials

notably from the LRS, the DOJ Committee Report and the Senate Committees JointReport which attested that there is only one OCT 994, that which had been issued on 3May 1917.1avvphi1

CLT v. MANOTOK

CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255[SC-G.R. No. 123346]

On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the Regional Trial Court ["RTC"] A COMPLAINT

FOR Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession andDamages against the MANOTOKS and the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila DistrictII (Calookan City, Metro Manila) ["CALOOCAN RD"].

In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the registered owner of Lot 26 of the MaysiloEstate located in Caloocan City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-177013, a derivative title of OCT No. 994. As a basis of its proprietary claim, CLTaverred that on 10 December 1988, it had acquired Lot 26 from its former registeredowner, Estelita I. Hipolito ["HIPOLITO"], by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate

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Mor