large retail malls to prevent and respond to terririst attack (50)

8/12/2019 Large Retail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terririst Attack (50)

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The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S.

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: An Assessment of the Preparedness of LargeRetail Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terrorist

Attack

Author(s): Robert C. Davis ; Christopher Ortiz ; RobertRowe ; Joseph Broz ; George Rigakos ; Pam

Collins

Document No.: 216641

Date Received: December 2006

Award Number: 2003-IJ-CX-1017

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice.

To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-funded grant final report available electronically in addition totraditional paper copies.

Opinions or points of view expressed are thoseof the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect

the offic ial posit ion or polic ies of the U.S.Department of Justice.


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AnAssessmentofthePreparednessofLargeRetailMallstoPreventandRespondtoTerroristAttack

RobertC.DavisPoliceFoundationChristopherOrtizVeraInstituteofJusticeRobertRoweAmericanSocietyforIndustrialSecurityJosephBrozMidwestInstituteforResearchGeorgeRigakosCarltonUniversityPamCollinsUniversityofEasternKentuckyJanuary20,2006

final%20report%2dedited[1] ii

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s)

and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
http://www.neevia.com/


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TableofContentsFigures................................................................................................................................ ivTables................................................................................................................................. iv1. Introduction................................................................................................................. 1

Background........................................................................................................... 2PrivateSecurityinaPost-9/11World..................................................................3NewStandardsforIndustryResponsibility.......................................................... 4PurposesofThisReport.......................................................................................5

2. SurveyofStateHomelandSecurityAdvisors............................................................7PerceptionsofPreparedness.................................................................................8LinksBetweenPrivateSecurityinMallsandPublic-SectorResponders..........11PrivateSecurityRegulation................................................................................12

3. SurveyofMallSecurityDirectors............................................................................14HiringStandards................................................................................................. 14Training.............................................................................................................. 15ChangesinHiringStandards,Training,andSpendingon

SecuritySince9/11...................................................................................... 16PreventionStrategies..........................................................................................17EmergencyPreparedness.................................................................................... 20CoordinationWiththePublicSector.................................................................. 20OpinionsAboutTerroristThreat........................................................................22

4. ResultsofSiteVisitstoMalls...................................................................................25SpendingonSecurity.......................................................................................... 25RiskAssessment................................................................................................. 26PreventionStrategies..........................................................................................26TrainingPrograms..............................................................................................27EmergencyResponsePlans................................................................................28RelationshipWithLocalLawEnforcement.......................................................29Assessment......................................................................................................... 29TheSpecialCaseofIsraeliMalls.......................................................................30

5. AnalysisofStateStatutesRegulatingPrivateSecurity............................................33SummaryResults................................................................................................ 34ChangesSince9/11............................................................................................35

6. ConclusionsandRecommendations.........................................................................37StepstoTake...................................................................................................... 38

final%20report%2dedited[1] iii




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AppendicesAppendixADetailsofMallSecurityDirectorSurveyResultsAppendixBCatalogofRegulationsbyState

FiguresFigure1. Mapofstatesurveyrespondents......................................................................7Figure2. Numberofadvisorscharacterizingrelationsbetween mallsecurityandfirst

respondersasgoodorverygood...................................................................11Figure3. Adequacyofstatelawsgoverningprivatesecurity(N=29)..........................12Figure4. SecurityDirectorratingofsecuritythreats....................................................22Figure5. Mostlikelyformofattack.............................................................................23

TablesTable1. Mostcommonreasonsforpositiveratings onpreparedness..........................8Table2. Qualitiesofbest-preparedmalls......................................................................9Table3. Measuresretailmallscouldtaketobecomebetterprepared.........................10Table4. Whatisthebiggestobstacletofullerpreparedness?.....................................10Table5. Suggestionsforadditionalstateregulation.................................................... 13Table6. Hiringstandardsformallsecuritystaff.........................................................14Table7. Backgroundchecksformallsecuritystaff....................................................15Table8. Antiterrorismtraining....................................................................................16Table9. Changesinhiringstandards,training,andsecurity

spendingsince9/11........................................................................................ 17Table10. Typesofactions,characteristicsprofiledbysecuritystaff............................18Table11. Policyonhandlingsuspiciousbehavior/persons...........................................18Table12. Changesinpatrolandsurveillancestrategiessince9/11...............................19Table13. Technologicalsecuritymeasures...................................................................19Table14. Partnersinpreparednessexercises.................................................................20Table15. StateDHSinvolvementinsecurityplanning.................................................21Table16. Lawenforcementinvolvementinsecurityplanning.....................................21Table17. AssistancesoughtfromDHS......................................................................... 22Table18. Additionalsecuritymeasuresconsideredcritical..........................................23Table19. Statestatutesregulatingprivatesecurity.......................................................34Table20. Post-9/11changesinstateprivatesecuritystatutes.......................................35

final%20report%2dedited[1] iv




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1. IntroductionSincetheeventsofSeptember11,2001,securityconcernshavefigured

prominentlyinthenationalagenda.Governmentofficialsandthepublicnowrecognizeawiderarrayofpotentialterroristtargetsextendingbeyondmilitaryinstallations. Thesesofttargets,orareaswithpublicaccess,includetransithubs,schools,andmassprivatespaceslikeamusementparksandsportsarenas.

Onetypeofsofttargetthathasreceivedtoolittleattentionistheretailmall.Withalltheothersofttargetsthatexist(e.g.,transitsystems,schools,hospitals,etc.),whyshouldcitizensbeconcernedaboutattacksagainstshoppingmalls? Onereasonisthatthenatureofmallsmakesthemveryvulnerable:therearemultipleentrancesandexits,andtheyareopentothepublic.Largenumbersofpeoplecomeandgo,makingiteasyforpotentialterroriststoblendinunnoticed.Manyofthevisitorscarrylargeparcelsthatcouldhideabomborotherweapon.Therearemultiplewaystoattackamall,rangingfromautomaticweaponstocarbombstobombsplacedinsidethemall,eventoanattackusingabiologicalorchemicalagent.

Moreover,theconsequencesofanattackcouldbequiteserious.Inthecaseofanattackusingabiologicalorchemicalagent,orabombblastresultinginstructuralcollapse,thecasualtiescouldbeveryhigh.Anattackcouldalsoproduceinsuranceandjoblosses.Acoordinatedseriesofattacksagainstmallswouldalmostcertainlyresultinlong-termlostbusinessandseriousregionalornationaleconomicconsequences,aswesawintheairlineindustryfollowing9/11.

Infact,mallsandtheretailsectoringeneralhavebeenattackedinvariouspartsoftheworldforthepastseveraldecades.IsraelhasexperiencedorthwartedattacksagainstmallsontenoccasionssincethestartoftheIntifadaintheWestBankinthemid-1990s.CountriesasdisparateasTurkeyandFinlandhavehadattacksagainstmallsinrecentyears.EnglandsufferedattacksagainstretailstoresbytheIrishRepublicanArmyasfarbackasthe1970s.1

IntheUnitedStates,mallshavebeentargetedaswell.Justafewweekspriortothedraftingofthisreport,amanwalkedintoamallinTacoma,Washington,andopenedfirewithapairofassaultrifles.Aftershootingsixpeople,oneofthemcritically,thegunmanduckedintoamusicstoreandtookfourhostages.Afterhissurrendertoauthorities,thepolicesearchedhiscarandapartmentandfoundarecipeformakingthedeadlypoisonricinaswellasbomb-makingplansandmaterials.Thegunmantoldauthoritiesthathehadbeenhumiliatedduringatroubledchildhoodandthatrecentproblemsmadehimwanttobeheard.2

1DanBilefskyandAnnZimmerman,etal,CanShoppersBeKeptSafe?BombThreatAgainstIkeaInEuropeSpursStores,MallsToReassessSecurityMeasures,TheWallStreetJournal,5December2002.2SuspectinTacomamallshootingsentangrytextmessagesbeforerampage. MinneapolisStarTribune,November21,2005.final%20report%2dedited[1] 1




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Lastyear,theFBIarrestedamanonchargesthatheintendedtoblowupaColumbus,Ohio,shoppingcenter.Theman,aSomaliimmigrantwhoallegedlytraveledtoEthiopiatoobtainterroristtraining,wasafriendofamanconvictedofconspiringtoblowuptheBrooklynBridge.TheColumbussuspectisawaitingtrialinfederalcourt.

Thisreport

takes

aclose

look

at

the

state

of

security

in

large

U.S.

shopping

malls.

Howhavethingschangedsince9/11,andisthestateofsecuritytodaymeetingthestandardsthattheindustry,government,andcourtshavedefined?Background

Expertsagreethatprivatizationofpolicingisagrowingtrendworldwide.Thistrendwasfirstwidelynotedasaresultofa1971RandCorporationstudycommissionedbytheNationalInstituteofJusticeintheUnitedStates.3 Severalyearslater,StenningandShearing4notedthataquietrevolutiontowardsprivatesecurityhadoccurredinCanada.South5documentedasimilarphenomenoninbothwesternandeasternEuropeancountries.AnupdateoftheRandassessmentin1985concludedthatprivatesecurityout-spentpubliclawenforcementby73%andemployedtwoandone-halftimesasmany6persons. ExpertsseemtoagreethatprivatesecurityismoreextensiveintheUnitedStatesamongstwesternnationsthanvirtuallyanywhereelse,7butitseemsclearthatprivatizationofpoliceservicesisaglobalphenomenonthatneedstoberecognizedandconsidered.

Asthestatestraditionalmonopolyonpolicingdissipates,manyfunctionsthatwereoncetheexclusivedomainofpublicpoliceforcesarenowbeingperformedbyprivateagencies.Inaddition,wholenewareasofactivitiesservicesthatdidnotexistorwerenotwidelyavailablecannowbepurchased.Whilethestateremainsasignificantplayerinthedeliveryandregulationofpolicing,itisnolongertheonlyinstitutionthataimstosafeguard

the

security

of

citizens.

There

are

now

arange

of

private

security

organizations

thatinclude,forexample,privatesecurityfirms,insurancecompanies,forensicaccountants,andin-housecorporatesecurity.

Theseprivatesecurityagencieshavemovedbeyondsimplyprotectingprivateproperty.Theyareactivelyengagedinmaintainingorder,investigatingcrimes,andmakingarrestsinpublicspaces.Inotherwords,theyareperformingmanyactivitiesthatwereonceexclusivelyperformedbypublicpoliceforces.

3JamesS.KakalikandSorrelWildhorn,PrivatesecurityintheUnitedStates(SantaMonica,CA:RandCorporation,1971).

4PhilipStenningandCliffordShearing,TheQuietRevolution:TheNature,Development,GeneralLegalImplicationsofPrivateSecurityinCanada,CriminalLawQuarterly22(1980):220-48.5NigelSouth,PrivatizingPolicingintheEuropeanMarket:SomeIssuesforTheory,Policy,andResearch,EuropeanSociologicalReview10,no.3(1994):219-233.6WilliamC.CunninghamandToddH.Taylor,TheHallcrestReport:PrivateSecurityandPoliceinAmerica(Portland,OR:ChancellorPress1985).7SouthAfricaandRussiahavehigherlevels. SeeJaapdeWard(1999). Theprivatesecurityindustryininternationalperspective EuropeanJournalofCriminologyPolicyandResearch,7:2,168.final%20report%2dedited[1] 2




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Thelinebetweenwhatispublicandprivatepropertyandwhoisresponsibleforpolicingpublicandprivatespaceisbecomingblurred.TherehasbeenanincreaseinwhatStenningandShearinghavetermedmassprivatepropertyshoppingmalls,gatedcommunities,andthelike.8 Thesearelargetractsofpublic-access,privately-ownedspacewhichhavetraditionallyfallenoutsideofthedomainofpublicpolice.

Inpolicingmassprivatepropertyandinothersituationsaswell,publicpoliceandprivatesecurityagenciesoftendevelopcooperativerelationshipswithoneanother.Thiscooperationcontributestotheblurringoftherelationshipbetweenpublicandprivatesectors.Themovementofretiringpoliceofficerstotheprivatesecuritysectoroftenfacilitatescooperation.Manyexecutivesthatheadupprivatesecuritycompanies,forensicaccountingteams,orsecurityconsultingfirmswereformerpublicpoliceofficers.

Insomeplaces,publicandprivatesecurityofficersexchangeinformationaboutpeopleandeventsinagivenjurisdiction.Informally,policeofficersandprivatesecurityguardsoftenshareinformationabouteventsinaparticularareaoraboutwantedpersons.For

example,

Rigakos

9reported

that

police

officers

in

Toronto

made

local

mall

or

housingsecurityofficersawareofwantedpersons,therebyturningsecurityofficersintoanextrapairofeyesandears.Similarly,Davis10reportedextensivecooperationbetweenpublicandprivatesecurityinoneofNewYorkCitysbusinessimprovementdistricts.

Inseveralcities,policeandsecurityfirmshaveformedformalcooperativeassociationstomeetanddiscusstopicssuchasbombthreats,executiveprotection,andburglaryinvestigation.AccordingtoPancake,inAmarillo,Texas,thepoliceandaprivatesecuritycompanyworkedoutanagreementunderwhichtheprivatecompany assumedresponsibilityforrespondingtoalarmcalls.11 Withinthesameperiod,Amarillopolicealsohiredprivatesecurityofficerstopatrolthedowntowncoreduringpeakhoursintandemwiththepolice. InNewYork,thepolicebriefkeyprivatesecuritychiefsmonthlyonterrorismissues.PrivateSecurityinaPost-9/11World

Forthemostpart,mallsandothersofttargetsthatarepartofourhomelandsecurityconcernsareprotected,notbypublicpolice,butbyprivatesecurity.Thus,theeventsof9/11thrustprivatesecurityofficersintoanewandimportantrole.Recognizingthisreality,severalstatesincludingCalifornia,Illinois,andMichigantookstepstomorecloselyregulatetheindustryintheyearfollowing9/11/2001.128PhilipStenningandCliffordShearing,TheQuietRevolution:TheNature,Development,GeneralLegalImplicationsofPrivateSecurityinCanada,CriminalLawQuarterly22(1980):220-48.9GeorgeRigakos(2002). Thenewparapolice:Riskmarketsandcommodifiedsocialcontrol. Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.10RobertC.Davis,SarahDadush,JennyIrish,Dr.ArturoAlvaradoandDianeDavis,ThePublicAccountabilityofPrivatesecurity:LessonsfromNewYork,Johannesburg,andMexicoCity(NewYork,NY:VeraInstituteofJustice,2000).11Pancake,D.(1983). Thenewprofessionals:Cooperationbetweenpolicedepartmentsandprovatesecurity. ThePoliceChief,50,34-36.12RobertSalladay,DavisSignsBillstoGiveSecurityaBoost;PrivateGuardsmustCompleteCriminalChecks,TheSanFranciscoChronicle,16September2002,p.A.16.final%20report%2dedited[1] 3




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Howhastheindustryitselfrespondedtotheincreasedresponsibility? Mediareportsafter9/11suggestedthatlittlehadchanged. Anearly2003USATodaystorycharacterizedprivatesecurityashomelanddefensesweaklink.13 Althoughafewstateshadintroducedorraisedhiringortrainingstandards,theUSATodaystoryshowedthat

most

states

still

do

not

impose

minimum

training

standards

or

even

require

backgroundchecks.Moreover,eveninstatesthatdidrequiretrainingprograms,therewaslittleefforttomonitorthecontentorqualityoftheprograms.

Severalnewspaperarticlesandlimitedsurveyshavereinforcedthenotionthatsecurityintheretailsectordidnotundergosignificantchangeafter9/11. A2003surveybytheCouncilonCompetitivenessof230corporateexecutivesfromcompanieswithgrossrevenuesof$50millionormorefoundthatonlyhalfoftheexecutiveshadmadechangestosecurityinresponsetoterrorismconcerns.14AsurveyconductedinthreelargestatesfortheServiceEmployeesInternationalUnionsimilarlyfoundthatfourintenofficersreportednonewsecuritymeasuresattheirworkplaces.Sevenintenoftheofficers

reported

that

bomb

threat

drills

or

natural

disaster

drills

were

never

conducted

at

theirbuildings.15NewStandardsforIndustryResponsibility

Recognizingtheimportanceofsecurityintheretailsector,the9/11Commissiondeterminedthatbusinesseshaveadutytocareaboutthesecurityoftheircustomers.TheCommissionendorsedtheNationalFirePreventionAssociationstandard(NFPA1600)fordisasterandemergencymanagementpreparednessintheprivatesector.AccordingtotheCommission,Webelievethatcompliancewiththestandardshoulddefinethestandardofcareowedbyacompanytoitsemployeesandthepublicforlegalpurposes.16

TheNFPA1600standardspecifiesthatemergencymanagementprogramsshouldaddressthefourphasesofemergencymanagementandrecovery,whichinclude:(a)mitigation,oreffortstoeliminateorreducetheriskofadisasteroremergency,(b)preparedness,oractivitiesandprogramsintendedtosupportrecoveryfromdisaster,(c)response,oractivitiestoaddressimmediateandshort-termeffectsofadisaster,and(d)recovery,oractivitiesandprogramsdesignedtoreturnconditionstonormal

TheNFPAstandardlistsanumberofelementsthatcompaniesoughttoadoptinordertoeffectivelyimplementthefourphasesofemergencymanagementandrecovery.Includedamongthoseelementsare:13MimiHall,PrivateSecurityGuards:HomelandDefense'sWeakLink,USAToday,23January2003,p.A.01.14SherryL.Harowitz,TheNewCenturions,SecurityManagementOnline,January2003.15PeterD.HartResearchAssociates,APost-September11ReportonSurveysofSecurityOfficersinCalifornia,Texas,andFlorida(Washington,D.C.:PreparedfortheServiceEmployeesInternationalUnion(SEIU),2002).16The9/11commissionreport. www.gpoaccess.gov/911/final%20report%2dedited[1] 4


http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/


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RiskassessmentIdentificationofpotentialhazardsandthelikelihoodoftheiroccurrence

HazardmitigationBasedontheresultsoftheriskassessment,effortstominimizelikelyhazards

EmergencyresponseplanAssignmentofresponsibilitiestoorganizationsandindividualsforcarryingoutspecificactionsduringanemergencyordisaster

EmergencycommunicationprotocolsDeterminingcommunicationneedsandcapabilitiesofvariousorganizationsandpersonnelandensuringinteroperability

TrainingofstaffinemergencyproceduresEducationofstaffontheelementsoftheemergencymanagementprogramandperiodictestingandexercises

MutualaidAgreementswithotherentitiesfortheirparticipationinemergencyresponseplansCourtdecisionshavereinforcedtheresponsibilityoftheprivatesectortotake

reasonablestepstoguardagainstterroristattack.ANewYorkdistrictcourtrulingin2003deniedamotiontodismissasuitagainsttheairlinesbyfamiliesofthe9/11victims.Thejudgesrulingwasbasedontheconceptthatitwasforeseeablethataplanewhosepassengershavebeennegligentlyscreenedatcheck-incouldbesubjecttoterroristattack.Inanotherrecentruling,aNewYorkStatejuryfoundthattheagencythatownedtheWorldTradeCenterwasnegligentfornotdoingenoughtothwartthedeadly1993terroristbombingbeneaththetwintowers,arulingthatmayopenthedoortomorelitigation.Infact,thejurorsfoundthatthePortAuthoritywasactuallytwiceasliableforthebombingastheactualterrorists! Jurorssaidtheywereswayedbya1985reportwrittenbythePortAuthoritysownsecurityofficials,whowarnedthattheundergroundparkinggaragewasalikelyattacksite.PurposesofThisReport

ThePoliceFoundation,incooperationwiththeVeraInstituteofJustice,theASISInternationalFoundation,andtheMidwestResearchInstitute,incooperationwithresearchersattheUniversityofEasternKentuckyandCarltonUniversityundertookanassessmentofthelevelofsecurityinlargeindoorshoppingmallsaswellastheassociatedissuesoftrainingandlegislationofprivatesecurityforces.Thecoreissueweaddressinthisreportisthedegreetowhichmallshavebecomebetterpreparedtorespondtoterroristattacksintheaftermathof9/11.

Theinvestigationweconductedwentwellbeyondearliersurveysconductedafter9/11.Itincludedsurveyswithstatehomelandsecurityadvisorstogettheirviewsonmallpreparednessaswellassurveyswiththesecuritydirectorsofthenationslargestindoorretailmalls.Weconductedsitevisitstotenmallstogaingreaterinsightintohowtheyaredealingwithsecuritypreparednessandresponsetodisasters.Weconductedastate-by-stateanalysisoflegislationregulatingthehiringandtrainingofprivatesecurity.

Thedetailedassessmentthatresultedfromourworkindicateswhatmallsaredoingintheareasofriskassessments,preventivemeasures,emergencypreparednessplans,training,andcoordinationwithstateandlocalgovernment.Thecomprehensivepicturethatemergesofthestateofsecurityinlargeretailmallssuggeststhattherearefinal%20report%2dedited[1] 5




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gapsinpreparednessandthatstatehomelandsecurityofficialsandlocalpoliceaswellasmallownersandsecuritystaffhavearoletoplayinfillingthosegaps.

Thepresentationofdatafromourworkbeginswithresultsofthesurveythatweconductedwithstatehomelandsecuritydirectors.Wethenpresentresultsofthesurveyofmall

security

directors

and

insights

we

gained

in

site

visits

to

malls

both

in

this

country

andinIsrael.Finally,wediscussstatelegislationintheareaofprivatesecurityandchangesinstateandfederalstatutessince9/11.Weconcludewithadiscussionofwhatwelearnedfromourworkandourthoughtsaboutwhatstepsmightbetakentoincreasethesafetyofmallcustomers.

final%20report%2dedited[1] 6




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2. SurveyofStateHomelandSecurityAdvisorsWeundertookasurveyofstatehomelandsecurityadvisorstofindout(a)how

closelytheywereinvolvedwithsecurityinshoppingmalls,(b)howcloselymallsworkedwithlocalfirstresponders,and(c)howpreparedtheythoughtmallsweretorespondtoterroristattack.Thesurveyconsistedofbothforced-choiceandopen-endedquestions.

WewereaidedindistributingthesurveybytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity.DHSagreedtodistributethesurveytohomelandadvisorsinall50statesandPuertoRico,andtotaskthemwithcompletingit.Theinitiale-mailfromDHSwasfollowedbytwoadditionale-mails,andthenphonecallsbyprojectstafftostateadvisorswhohadnotresponded.Atotalof33responseswereobtained.Figure1depictsthestatesthatcompletedsurveysandshowsgooddispersionacrossallregionsofthecountry.

Figure1.Mapofstatesurveyrespondents





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PerceptionsofPreparednessThefirstsectionofthesurveyaskedrespondentstogivetheiropiniononissues

surroundingtheabilityoflargeretailmallstopreparefor,andrespondto,terroristattack.Includedinthissectionwerequestionsabouttheperceivedlevelofpreparednessofretailmalls,theindustrysabilitytoprepare,impedimentstopreparation,andtheavailabilityoffundingandtraining.

Overall,therespondentswerefairlyoptimisticabouttheabilityoflargeretailmallsintheirstatetorespondtoterroristattack.Eighteenpercentofrespondentsreportedthattheabilityoftheretailmallsintheirstatetorespondtothethreatofterrorismwasverygood,27%thoughtitwasgood,andanadditional24%believedthatitwasatleastfair.Table1presentsthereasonsbehindtheirassessments.Mostrespondentswhoreportedapositiveassessment(verygood,good,orfair)believedeitherthatmallscooperatedwellwithlocallawenforcementorthattheyhaddevelopedemergencyplans.OthersfeltpositivebecausesomemallsintheirstateshadreceivedfundingtoupgradesecuritythroughthefederalBufferZoneProtectionProgram,avehiclethatprovidesupto$50,000forimprovingsecurityatcriticalinfrastructuresites.

Table1.Mostcommonreasonsforpositiveratingsonpreparedness

Respondentsansweringverygood,good,orfair

Reason (n=24)Cooperationbetweenmallsandfirstresponders 9Developmentofemergencypreparednessplans 9ParticipateinBufferZoneProtectionProgram 4Otherreasonscited 2

Oneinthreestateadvisorsratedpreparednessaspoor.Themostcommonreasonsgivenfortheseassessmentswereinadequatetraining,inadequateequipment,oranopinionthatmallsecuritywouldbeirrelevantintheeventofanattack,sincetheresponsibilityforresponsewouldbeuptolawenforcement.Onestateadvisorcomplained:

Theabilityoflargeretailmallstorespondtoaterroristattackdependsinlargepartonthequalityoftrainingprovidedtheprivatesecurityguardswhowouldbethefirstrespondersintheeventofanattack.Unfortunately,[this]isoneofthefewstatesinthenationthathasnoregulatoryboardprovidingoversightoftheprivatesecurityguards.Respondentswereaskediftheywereawareofanylargemallsintheirstatethat

havedoneagoodjobofpreparingforthethreatofaterroristattack,andwhatmadethemfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 8




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successful.Amongthe19stateadvisorswhowereabletoidentifyanexceptionalmall,themostfrequentelementidentifiedwiththemallssuccesswassuperiorsecuritystaff(seeTable2).Otherreasonswhymallswerethoughttobebetterpreparedincludedanemphasisonpreparednessplanningandtraining,agoodworkingrelationshipbetweenlocallawenforcementandmallmanagement/security,participationintheBufferZoneProtection

Program,

and

advanced

closed

circuit

television

systems

(CCTV).

One

state

advisornoted:

WehavethreemallsinthestatethatarecurrentlyparticipatingintheDHSBufferZoneProtectionPlaninitiative.Byactuallysittingdownatthetableandworkingwiththeotherkeystakeholdersfromthelocallawenforcement,fire,EMS,andEMAcommunities,thesemallsaremuchfurtherdowntheroadinidentifying,understanding,andacquiringthephysicalsecurityresourcesandtrainingthatbetterpreparethemtointerdictand/orrespondtoaterroristevent

Table2.Qualitiesofbest-preparedmallsResponses

Reason (n=19)Superiorsecuritystaff 7Emphasison 6planning/trainingGoodworkingrelationshipwithlocallawenforcement 4ParticipationinDHSBufferZoneProtectionProgram 1AdvancedCCTVsystem 1

Whenaskedwhattheybelievedtobethemostimportantmeasuresretailmallscouldtakeinordertobetterprepareagainstterroristattacks,mostrespondentsendorsedimprovedtrainingforsecuritystaffandemergencyresponders(seeTable3).Otherresponsesincludeddevelopmentofemergencypreparednessplans,morevisiblesecurity,bettercoordinationwithlocallawenforcement,enhancedtechnology,andhigherstandardsforsecurityofficers.Somestateadvisorsincorporatedmultipleideasintotheiranswers:

Outsidebudgetandpersonneladditions,formaltraininginareassuchasterrorism

awareness

and

hazard

mitigation

would

be

helpful.

Additionally,

weencourageincreasedcommunicationandpartnershipswiththelocalfirstresponders(police,fire,EMS)toestablishmechanismsforinformationsharingandcollaborationtopreventaterroristattack,andtoprepareafullycoordinatedresponsetooneshouldtheneedarise.





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Table3. Measuresretailmallscouldtaketobecomebetterprepared

ResponsesTypeofaction (n=34)

Training 15Additionalplanning 6Increasevisibilityofsecuritystaff 5Partnerwithlocallawenforcement 4Increasetechnology 3Increasesecurityofficerstandards 1

Respondentswerethenaskedwhattheybelievedwasthebiggestimpedimenttofullerpreparedness.Amajorityofrespondentsidentifiedcostorlackoffundingasthemostsignificantissue(seeTable4),andrespondentsindicatedthatstateswereoflittlehelpwiththisproblem.Onlyfiverespondentssaidthatfundingforimprovedsecuritywasavailablethroughtheirstate.17

Thenextmostcommonimpedimenttobetterpreparednessnamedbythestateadvisorswasfearofdisruptingmallbusinessandfrighteningcustomers.Onerespondentstated,Hardeningopenenvironmentsimpliesrestrictionsandlimitationsthatimpedetrafficflowandimposeunaccustomedcontrolsonmallvisitors. Otherstateadvisorsfeltthatmallownerslackedawarenessorconcernaboutthethreatposedbyterrorism,thattrainingprogramswereinadequate,thatmallsecurityandfirstrespondershadfailedtocoordinateeffectively,orthatstateregulationoftheindustrywasdeficient.

Table4.Whatisthebiggestobstacletofullerpreparedness?Responses

Obstacle (n=29)Cost/funding 18Disruptmallbusiness 4Lackofthreatawareness 3Trainingsub-par 2Lackofcoordinationwithfirstresponders 1Inadequateregulation 1

Thisquestionwasfollowedbyaquestionaskingwhetherornotrespondentsbelievedthattheretailmallindustrywaspreparedtotakeadditionalsecuritymeasures.Twooutof threestateadvisorsdidnotbelievethattheindustrywaspreparedtotake

Infact,itisverylikelythatthesefiverespondentswerereferringtotheBufferZoneProtectionprogram,whichprovidedfederalfundingforsecurityenhancementsforcriticalinfrastructuresitesrecommendedbythestates.final%20report%2dedited[1] 10

17




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thesesteps,primarilybecauseofreluctancetospendmoneyonadditionalsecuritystafforothermeasuresthatcouldimprovepreparationandresponsetoterroristacts.LinksBetweenPrivateSecurityinMallsandPublic-SectorResponders

Respondentswereaskedtheiropinionsaboutthelevelofcooperationbetweenmallsecurityandlocalfirstresponders.Thestatehomelandsecurityadvisorswereverypositiveabouttheserelationships.Twenty-six,orroughlythreeoutoffour,respondentscharacterizedrelationsbetweenmallsecurityandpublicpoliceasgoodorverygood,whiletheremaindercharacterizedrelationsasfair(seeFigure2).Asimilarnumber(23)ofthestateadvisorscharacterizedrelationsbetweenmallsecurityandemergencyservices(fireandEMT)asgoodorverygood.

Figure2.Numberofadvisorscharacterizingrelationsbetweenmallsecurityandfirstrespondersasgoodorverygood

30

28

26

24

22

20

18

16

14

12

10Police Fire

Follow-upquestionsaskedrespondentswhethermallsecuritystaffconductedjointtrainingexerciseswithfirstresponders.Fifteen,orslightlylessthanhalf,ofthestatehomelandsecurityadvisorsaffirmedthattheywereawareofjointexercisesbetweensecuritystaffinsomemallsandlocalpolice.Thirteenaffirmedjointexerciseswithfireand/orEMTstaff.

Cooperationwithpublicofficialsprovedtobeanimportantstimulusforthedevelopmentofemergencypreparednessplans.Respondentswereaskedwhethertheyknewifmallshaddevelopedemergencyresponseplansthatspecifiedwhattodointheeventofterroristattackorothercatastrophicsituation.Sixteen,orslightlyunderhalf,ofthestateadvisorsrespondedintheaffirmative.NearlyalltheadvisorswhowereawareofemergencyresponseplansstatedthatthepublicsectorwasinvolvedintheirdevelopmentthroughtheBufferZoneProtectionProgramorthroughstateorlocalemergencyplanningefforts.Accordingtoonerespondent:final%20report%2dedited[1] 11




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Localpoliceandemergencyserviceshavedevelopedresponseplansspecifictoaterroristattackatthemall.Thereiscoordinationtodevelopsimilarmatrixesforelevatedthreatlevelsecurityandpreventionmeasures.Bothmallofficialsandlocalfirstrespondersareactiveindeveloping

these

plans

due

to

the

clear

incentives

of

the

Buffer

Zone

ProtectionPlan.

PrivateSecurityRegulationStateadvisorswereaskedtheiropinionsregardingtheadequacyofstate

regulationconcerningprivatesecurity.Threeinfiverespondentsthatgaveananswertothisquestionbelievedthatthelegislationwaspoor,whilelessthanoneinfourcharacterizedtheirstateslegislationasgoodorverygood(seeFigure3).

Figure3.Adequacyofstatelawsgoverningprivatesecurity(N=29)20

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Poor Fair Good VeryGood

Of29advisorsanswering,19ortwooutofthreefeltthatadditionalstateregulationwouldhelptheindustry.Themostfrequentsuggestionswereforcreationofminimumtrainingstandardsandhiringstandards(seeTable5).Accordingtoonestateadvisor:

Somespecificmeasureswouldbetoupdatelawsasnecessaryforthescreeningofsecuritypersonnelandthemandateofappropriatetrainingpertainingtoprecursorincidentrecognitionandbasicresponsestoterrorattacks.Thislegislationshouldbedevelopedwithrecognizedsecurityprofessionalorganizationstoimprovesecuritystandardswithintheindustry.





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Table5.SuggestionsforadditionalstateregulationResponses

Suggestedmeasure (n=21)Minimumtrainingstandards 16Hiringstandards 4Othermeasurescited 1

RespondentswerethenaskediftheythoughtthereshouldbeuniformnationalstandardsregulatingtheprivatesecurityindustryintheUnitedStates.Twenty,ornearlytwooutof three,stateadvisorsrespondedaffirmatively.





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3. SurveyofMallSecurityDirectorsWesentletterswithsurveysattachedto1,372securitydirectorsofenclosedretail

mallsacrossthecountryhavingatleast250,000squarefeet.TheletterswerewrittenonASISletterhead.Theresponserateforthefirstwavewasdisappointing:wereceivedjust32completedsurveys.Severalsecuritydirectorscalledandtoldusthattheyhadbeeninstructedbytheirparentorganizationsnottocooperatewiththesurvey.TheselargemallownersweremembersoftheSecurityCommitteeoftheInternationalCouncilofShoppingCenters.Severalweekslater,afollow-upletterwassentout,thistimeonNationalInstituteofJusticeletterhead.Thesecondlettergotasomewhatbetterresponse,foratotalof120completedsurveys.Thisiscertainlylowerthantheratewehadhopedfor,butbetterthanwemighthaveexpected,giventhecircumstances.Wedidnotobservesignificantdifferencesinresponserateseitherbysizeofmallorregionofthecountry(EastCoast,South,Midwest,West,orWestCoast).

Themediannumberofsecurityemployeesatthemallsrespondingtothesurveywas5full-timeand5part-timestaff.Themedianstartinghourlyrateforofficerswas$8.50,andtheaverageforallsecuritystaffwas$9.50.HiringStandards

Webeganthesurveybyaskingmallsecuritydirectorsaboutqualificationsforhiringnewemployees.Nearlyhalfofrespondentssaidtheyhadeducationstandards,mostoftenahighschooldiplomaorGED;veryfewmallsrequiredadvancededucationofnewhires(seeTable6).Aboutoneinthreerespondentssaidthattheyhadexperiencerequirementsincludingpriorlawenforcement,military,orsecurityexperienceand/orstatecertification.Lessthanoneintenindicatedthattheyhadagerequirements,andaboutthesameproportionsaidtheyhadotherrequirements,includingavaliddriverslicenseorcleandrivingrecord.

Table6.HiringstandardsformallsecuritystaffMinimumqualificationsintermsofeducationand

experienceforsecuritystaff Responses(n=276) PercentEducation/skills 133 48.2

Highschool 86 31.1GED 35 12.7Somecollege 7 2.5Verbal/writtenskills(English) 3 1.1A.A.

or

B.A.

in

criminal

justice

2

0.8

Experience/Training 88 31.8

Securityexperience 24 8.7Statecertification/license/training 16 5.8Generalexperience 10 3.6Noexperience/qualifications 10 3.6Lawenforcementexperience 6 2.2In-housetraining 6 2.2





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Minimumqualificationsintermsofeducationandexperienceforsecuritystaff Responses(n=276) Percent

Militaryexperience 5 1.8Off-dutypoliceofficer/deputy/somepoliceofficertraining 3 1.0Peaceofficer 2 0.7Correctionsexperience 2 0.7Other 4 1.6

Agerequirements 22 7.9Atleast18yearsofage 12 4.3Atleast21yearsofage 10 3.6

Otheremploymentrequirements 33 12.0Cleanrecord 13 4.7Validdriverslicense 7 2.5Drugtest 4 1.4Other

9

3.4

Wealsoaskedrespondentswhethertheyrequiredbackgroundchecksonnewemployees.Nearlyallrespondentssaidtheyrequiredcriminalbackgroundchecks,whileslightlymorethanhalfrequireddrugtestsaswell(seeTable7).

Table7.BackgroundchecksformallsecuritystaffTypeofbackgroundcheckconductedon

newemployees Responses(n=118) PercentCriminalbackgroundchecksonly 48 40.7Drugtestsonly 1 0.8Bothbackgroundchecksanddrugtests 65 55.1Neitherbackgroundchecksnordrugtests 4 3.4

TrainingParticipantswereaskedhowmanyhoursoftrainingnewemployeesreceive.

Trainingaveragedaboutaweek(mean=45.1hours;median=40hours).Thevastmajorityofnewemployeetrainingwaseitherdonein-house(50%)orbytheparentsecuritycompanyorganization(31%).Localgovernmententities(police,fire,orstate/countyofficials)togetherconductedtrainingat17%ofthesites(seeTable1inAppendixAforfurtherdetail).

Whenaskedifemployeesreceivespecialtrainingonpreventingandrespondingtoterrorism,justoverhalf(52%)ofthesecuritydirectorsrespondedaffirmatively.Whenaskedtoindicatewhichareasareincorporatedintotheirantiterrorismtraining,thedirectorsmostcommonlycitedworkingwithfirstresponders(46%).Another43%mentionedsecuringthesceneafteranattack,41%identifiedaccesscontrol,40%saidrespondingtochangesinnationalalertlevels,and34%indicatedidentifyingterroristsfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 15




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(seeTable8).Otherareasidentifiedbysmallernumbersofsecuritydirectorsincludedtraininginweaponsofmassdestruction(WMDs)andevacuationprocedures.

Table8.AntiterrorismtrainingAreasincludedinthemalls

antiterrorismtrainingWorkingwithfirstrespondersSecuringthesceneafteranattackAccesscontrolRespondingtochangesinnationalalertlevelIdentifyingterroristsWMDOther

Responses(n=120)

5552494841414

Percent45.843.340.840.034.23.311.7

Antiterrorismtrainingwasprovidedin-houseaccordingto28%ofsecuritydirectors.Theremaindersaidthatthetrainingwasconductedbyavarietyofsources,mostcommonly lawenforcementorfirepersonnel,trainersfromparentsecurityorganizations,consultants,orhomelandsecurity(forabreakdown,seeTable2inAppendixA).Justoveroneinthreerespondents(38%)believedthattheirmallsantiterrorismtrainingwasadequate.Exactlyhalfbelieveditwasinadequate,andtherestwerenotsure.

Figure4:Is your antiterrorism training program adequate?

AdequateInadequateUnsure

ChangesinHiringStandards,Training,andSpendingonSecuritySince9/11Weaskedthesecuritydirectorshowmuchhadchangedsince9/11/2001.Itturned

outthatremarkablylittlehadchanged(seeTable9).Only6%ofrespondentssaidthathiringstandardsweremorestringentsince9/11andjustoneintensaidthatadditionalbackgroundverificationwasbeingrequiredsince9/11.Thosewhodidhaveadditionalfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 16




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requirementsindicatedthattheynowconductedmorethoroughchecksorrandrugchecks(seeTable3inAppendixA).

Table9.Changesinhiringstandards,training,andsecurityspendingsince9/11

Change Responses(n=120) PercentHiringstandardsYes 7 5.8No 113 94.2BackgroundchecksYes 13 10.8No 107 89.2TrainingYes 38 32.2No 71 60.2Dontknow 9 7.6SecurityspendingYes 19 15.8No 101 84.2

Similarly,just16%ofthesecuritydirectorssaidthattheirbudgetshadincreasedbeyondtherateofinflationsince2001.Thosewhoindicatedanincreaseinexpendituressaidthattheincreasedfundshadbeenspentonnewtechnology(bettercommunicationorCCTVsystems),increasedmanpower,developingemergencyresponseplans,orperformingriskassessments(seeTables4through4dinAppendixA).

PreventionStrategiesThenextsectionofthesurveyaskedrespondentsaboutprotectivemeasuresthey

mayhavetakentoreducethelikelihoodofaterroristattack.Theseincludedthedevelopmentofsecuritygoalsandobjectives,humansurveillancestrategies,accesscontrol,andtechnology.Slightlyoveroneinthree(37%)ofthesecuritydirectorssaidthattheyhaddevelopedasetofgoalsandobjectiveswithrespecttoprotectionfromterroristattack.Oneinfoursaidthattheyhadspecificperformancemeasurestodefinewhethertheyweremeetingthosegoals.

Patrol strategies. Fewmalls(34%)everusedundercoverstaffaspartoftheirsurveillancestrategy,andmostofthesedidsoonlyoccasionally.Butabouthalf(49%)oftherespondentssaidthattheirstaffwereinstructedtobeonthelookoutforunusualbehaviorordressofmallclients.Thekindsofthingssecuritystaffwereinstructedtolookforincludedgenerallysuspiciousbehavior,takingphotosornotesofthefacilities,





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suspiciousclothing(extrabulky),andlargeorotherwiseunusualpackages(seeTable10).

Table10.Typesofactions,characteristicsprofiledbysecuritystaff

Characteristic Responses(n=94) PercentageSuspiciousbehavior(ingeneral) 18 19.5Takingphotographs/videos/notes 16 17.0Unusual/suspiciousclothing 16 17.0Carryinglarge/suspiciouspackages 11 11.7Loitering 7 7.5Unusualinterest/curiosity 5 5.3Suspiciousappearance(ingeneral) 4 4.2Suspiciousvehicles 3 3.2Foreignersactingsuspicious 3 3.2Largegroups/gangs 2 2.1Youngeradults 2 2.1Abandonedpackages 2 2.1Other 5 5.5

Almostallrespondentssaidthattheirmallshadwell-definedpoliciesonwhattodowhensecurityguardsencounteredasuspiciousperson.Inmostcases,theencouragedresponsewastocontinuesurveillanceand/orreporttoasupervisororlawenforcement,ifrequired(seeTable11).Aboutoneintenrespondentssaidthattheirpolicywastohavestaffapproachandtalktothesuspiciousindividualtogainbetterinformationonwhattheyweredoing.

Table11.Policyonhandlingsuspiciousbehavior/persons

Whattheofficershoulddo Responses(n=89) PercentageReportbehavior(tosupervisor/dispatch/otherofficers) 30 33.7Continuesurveillance 27 30.3Informpolice(ifrequired) 16 18.0Approach(non-threatening) 10 11.2Other 6 6.6

Nearlytwointhree(63%)securitydirectorssaidthattheirpatrolandsurveillancestrategieshadchangedsince9/11.Themostfrequentchangesweretoincreasethevisibilityofsecurityofficers,instructofficerstobealertforsuspiciousindividuals,andpaymoreattentiontocarsanddeliverytruckscomingintothemall(seeTable12).





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Table12.Changesinpatrolandsurveillancestrategiessince9/11

Patrolandsurveillancestrategies Responses(n=32) PercentageMorepatrols/strategies/visibility 12 37.5Heightenedawareness/alertness 8 25.0Moreattentiontovehicles/parking/firelanes 4 12.5Moreattentiontodeliveries/truckdrivers 2 6.3Other 6 18.6

Access control. Weaskedrespondentswhethertheyhadplanstorestrictaccesstosensitiveareasofthemallincaseofachangeinthenationalthreatadvisorysystemoraspecificthreat.Sixintenansweredaffirmatively.Nearlythesameproportion(56%)saidthattheyhaddevelopedorreviewedplanstokeeppotentialwrong-doersfrombreachingsensitiveareassince9/11.

Technology.Weaskedthesecuritydirectorsaboutwhethertheyemployedtechnologytomaketheirmallsmoresecure.HalfofthesecuritydirectorssaidthattheirmallhadaCCTVsystem(seeTable13).Thevastmajorityofthesesystems(81%)wereusedtomonitoreventsinrealtime.Threeintenmallshadinstalledbollards,orpassivebarriers,topreventvehiclesfrombreachingtheentrance.Fifteenpercentofmallsreportedemployingexplosivedetectiontechnologyorbomb-sniffingdogs,whileoneintenhadinstalledtechnologytocleantheairinsidethemallofsmokeorothercontaminants.Verysmallpercentagesofmallshadinstalledwindowfilmorexplosive-resistanttrashcans(4%)orequipmenttodetectbiologicalorchemicalagents(1%).

Table13.Technologicalsecuritymeasures

Securitymeasure Responses(n=120) PercentageSurveillancecamerasYes 60 50.0No 60 50.0PassivebarriersYes 36 30.0No 84 70.0Explosivedetectiondevices/caninesYes 18 15.0No 102 85.0AirdecontaminationtechnologyYes 12 10.0No 108 90.0Windowfilm/explosive-resistanttrashcansYes 5 4.2No 115 95.8DetectionofbiologicalorchemicalagentsYes 1 0.8No 119 99.2





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EmergencyPreparednessThreeoutoffour(73%)securitydirectorsreportedthattheyhaddeveloped

writtenprotocolsforsecuritystafftofollowintheeventofadisaster.Thesameproportionreportedthattheseplansincludedcoordinationandcommunicationwithlocallawenforcement,fire,andmedicalfirstresponders.Amuchsmallernumber(3in10)hadheldexercisestorehearseemergencyprotocolswithfirstresponders.Mostcommonly,theexerciseswereheldwithlocalpoliceorfiredepartments.OthermallsconductedexerciseswithEMTs,RedCross,theFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA),orFBIstaff(seeTable14).CoordinationWiththePublicSector

Mallsecuritydirectorsindicatedalowlevelofsupportfromtheirstatehomelandsecurityadvisors.Just3%saidthattheirstateadvisorswereveryinvolvedwithsecurityplanning,whilefully78%saidthattheiradvisorswerenotatallinvolved(seeTable15).ThemajorimpetusforinvolvementofthestateadvisorsinmallsecurityhasbeentheBufferZoneProtectionProgram(BZPP).Ninepercentofsurveyrespondentssaidthattheirmallhadbeendesignatedasacriticalassetunderthatprogram,andanother7%believedthattheywouldreceivesuchdesignation.SecuritydirectorsindicatedthatfundsreceivedthroughtheBZPPwouldbeusedtoinstallorupgradeCCTVsystems,installbollards,orimprovetrainingofsecurityofficers(foracompletebreakdown,seeTable5inAppendixA).

Table14.PartnersinpreparednessexercisesAgenciesparticipatinginmallsrehearsalofemergencyprotocols Responses(n=90) Percentage

Policedepartment 28 31.1Firedepartment 27 30.0EMS 10 11.1County/cityagencies 5 5.6RedCross 2 2.2FBI 2 2.2FEMA 2 2.2Other 14 15.4





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Table15.StateDHSinvolvementinsecurityplanningInvolvementofstatehomelandsecurity

advisorinplanning,reviewing,orapprovingmallsecuritymeasures Responses(n=117) Percentage

Veryinvolved 3 2.6Somewhatinvolved 23 19.7Notatallinvolved 91 77.8

Surveyrespondentsreportedthattheirlocalpoliceweremoreinvolvedwithsecurityintheirmallsthanwerethestatehomelandsecurityadvisors.AsTable16shows,twointhreemallsecuritydirectorscharacterizedtheirlocalpoliceasbeingatleastsomewhatinvolvedintheirsecurityplanning.Nearlyhalf(44%)ofmallsecuritydirectorsstatedthatlawenforcementofficialsregularlysharedkeyintelligencewiththem,andanother34%saidthatinformationwassometimesshared.Aboutoneinthree(36%)securitydirectorssaidthattheirrelationswithlocallawenforcementhadbecomeclosersince9/11.

Table16.LawenforcementinvolvementinsecurityplanningInvolvementoflocalandstatelaw

enforcementinplanning,reviewing,orapprovingmallsecuritymeasures Responses(n=117) Percentage

Veryinvolved 21 17.6Somewhatinvolved 57 47.9Notatallinvolved 41 34.5

Byalargemajority(63%),mallsecurityofficialswouldwelcomegreaterinvolvementoftheirstateDHSandlawenforcementofficialsinsecurityplanning.(Infact,80%hadinvitedlocalpolicetopatrolorsetupaministationinthemall.) Surveyrespondentsfeltthatpublicofficialscouldassistthemsharingmorekeyintelligence(40%),byconductingriskassessmentsordevelopingemergencymanagementplans(33%),orhelpingtotrainsecurityofficers(27%).

Nearlythreeinfourmallsecuritydirectors(72%)alsofeltthattherewerespecificthingsthatthefederalDHScoulddotomakemallssafer.Whatmostrespondentswantedwashelpwithtrainingandbettersharingofthreatintelligence.Otherssoughtmorefunding

for

equipment

or

help

with

developing

emergency

plans

(see

Table

17).





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l%20report%2dedited[1] 22

Figure 1: Rating of Security Threats

Table17.AssistancesoughtfromDHSHowDHScouldhelpmake

largeretailmallssaferProvideorassistwithtraining/education/seminars/drillsMorecommunication/information/contact/updatesMorefundingfortraining/equipmentHelpwithdevelopingprocedures/policies/plans/strategiesSetminimumsecuritystandards/training

Responses(n=78)242413125

Percentage30.830.816.715.46.4

OpinionsAboutTerroristThreatThefinalsectionofthequestionnaireaskedsecuritydirectorsabouttheirthoughts

onthedangerposedbyterrorismandanyadditionalstepstheybelievednecessarytoadequatelyprotecttheirmalls.Theywereaskedtorateterrorismandfiveothersecurityconcerns(shoplifting,vandalism,burglary,kidsloitering,androbbery)intermsofimportanceindailysecuritywork.Theresults,presentedinFigure5,indicatethatterrorismwasrankedfirstby27%ofrespondents,slightlylessthanthe30%whorankedkidsloiteringasfirst.Interestingly,terrorismwasalsothesecurityconcernmostoftenratedasleastimportant.Oneinthreerespondentsratedterrorismlastfarmorethanratedanyotherconcernlast.Thissuggestsabipolarreactiontotheterroristthreat:itwaseitheraseriousconcernorwasviewedasaproblemconfinedtocertaincitiesandnotonehighontheprioritylistofmallsintheheartland.

Figure5.SecurityDirectorratingofsecuritythreats

fina

VandalismBurglary

RobberyShoplifting

TerrorismKids loitering

0 10 20 30 40 50




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Figure 2: Most Likely Form of Attack

Securitydirectorsbelievedthat,ifaterroristattackcame,itwouldmostlikelytaketheformofabombblastintheinteriorofamall(seeFigure6).Smallnumbersofrespondentsalsofearedacarbomb,attackwithsmallarms,orabiologicalorchemicalattack.

Figure6.

Most

likely

form

of

attack

0

Bio/chemattack

Carbomb

Firearms

Bombinterior

20 40 60 80 100

Slightlymorethanoneinthreesecuritydirectors(38%)believedthatimplementingadditionalsecuritymeasureswascritical.Themostcommonmeasuressoughtinvolvednewequipmenttobettermonitorthemallortoprotectitfromcarbombs(seeTable18).Somerespondentsalsothoughtmorefundsfortrainingwereimportant.Just16%ofsecuritydirectorswhoarticulatedcriticalmeasuressaidthatthoseneedswerebeingaddressed,andthree-quartersoftheserespondentssaidthiswasduetolackoffunds.

Table18.AdditionalsecuritymeasuresconsideredcriticalCriticalmeasures Responses(n=43) Percentage

Securityequipment/surveillance/barriers/detection 23 53.5Moreandimprovedtraining 11 25.6Funding 3 7.0





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Communication 2 4.7Morepersonnel 2 4.7Domesticterrorism 1 2.3Increasedpayandbenefits 1 2.3





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4. ResultsofSiteVisitstoMallsInthissection,wediscusstheresultsofourvisitstoeightU.S.mallsandtwomallsinIsrael.TheeightU.S.mallsweredoublethenumbercalledforinourproject

workplan. Wefeltitwasimportanttoexpandthenumberofsitevisits,inpartbecausewehadalowsurveyresponseratebutmoreimportantlybecausethesitevisitsprovidedanopportunitytogatherfarmorecomprehensiveinformationthanwecouldhopetogainthroughasurvey.Forexample,inthesurveywecouldonlyaskwhethermallshadanemergencyresponseplan.Inthesitevisits,wecouldtrytoascertainhowspecifictheplanwasandwhetheritwasrehearsedbystaff.Wecannotclaimthattheeightmallswevisitedwererepresentativeoftheindustrysincethenumberissmalland,aswiththesurvey,weranintooppositionfromsomeofthelargemallowners.However,themallswevisitedweregeographicallydiverse,spreadacrossCalifornia,Texas,Wisconsin,andUtah.Theywerediverseaswellintermsofownershipandhowsecuritywasprovided(locallyorthroughnationalcompanies).

Ateachsite,wespoketothemallsecuritydirector,localpolice,andlocalfireofficials.Wedonotdivulgetheidentitiesofthemallsherebothtoavertthepossibilityofdisclosingconfidentialsecurityinformationandalsotoprotecttheidentitiesofthesecuritydirectors,someofwhomspoketousinspiteofcontraindicationsfromtheirparentcompanies.SpendingonSecurity

Oneofthemostconsistentandstrikingfindingsduringthesitevisitswasthatmallswevisitedhavenotmadeanysignificantinvestmentinincreasedsecurityfollowing9/11.WiththeexceptionofsitesthatreceivedfederaldollarsthroughtheBufferZoneProtectionProgram,wedidnotobserveanyincreasesinspendingbeyondinflationoverthepastfouryears.(Infact,onemallhaddramaticallycutitssecuritybudget.) Theprivatesectorgenerallyhasnotinvestedinimprovingsecurityeithertoprotectagainstemergencysituationssuchasaterroristattackortoprotectagainstpettycrimescommittedinmalls.

TheBufferZoneProtectionProgramwastheonlysignificantsourceoffundingforupgradingsecuritythatweobservedduringsitevisits.Accesstoprogramfundsappearedlargelytobeafunctionoftheprioritiesofeachstateshomelandsecurityadvisor.Weobservedthat,insitesthathadreceivedBZPPfunds,locallawenforcement,workingwiththestatehomelandsecurityoffices,tooktheinitiativeandcontactedareamallstoconductariskassessment.OtherstatesappearednottoplacemallshighontheirpriorityliststoreceiveBZPPfunds.18OnemallownereagertoparticipateintheBZPPhadbeenunabletoinitiateariskassessmentforhismallsintwostates,thefirststepingettingBZPPfunds.BZPPgrantdecisionsweremadebyDHS,butinformedbyrecommendationsofstatehomelandsecurity

advisors.final%20report%2dedited[1] 2518




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BZPPfundswereusedtoenhancevideosurveillancesystemsintwoofthefourmallsthathadreceivedgrants.Intwoofthesites,BZPPmoneywasusedtohelpimproveregionalresponsetodisasters.Forexample,onejurisdictionusedBZPPmallfundstohelpfundamobilecommandvehicleforthelocalpolicethatwouldassistinrespondingto

terrorism

or

other

disaster

at

the

facility.

The

vehicle

has

the

ability

to

access

the

mall

videosurveillancesystemfromaremotelocationintheeventofadisaster.RiskAssessment

Riskassessments,whenconducted,havelargelybeendrivenbytheBZPPapplicationprocess.Thisprocedure,codifiedbytheDHSandgenerallyimplementedbystateorlocalhomelandsecurityofficials,isquasi-quantitativeandemploysstandardriskassessmenttechniquesdevelopedbythemilitary.Itdeterminesprobabilitiesandpotentiallossesfordifferenttypesofhazardsoccurringatvariouslocationswithinfacilities.Infiveoftheeightmalls,ariskassessmenthadbeenconductedattheinstigationofthestatehomelandsecurityadvisor.(Followingtheassessment,fourofthefivemallshadbeendesignatedasBZPPsites;onehadnot.) Forexample,theriskassessmentatonemalldeterminedthatthemajorriskpotentiallyimpactinglivesandpropertywouldbeabombblastinthemallsfoodcourt.Suchablast,itwasdetermined,wouldproducethemostcasualtiesandpotentiallyharmthestructuralintegrityofthatpartofthemall.Thisknowledgewasincorporatedintoexercisesforsecuritystaff.

ThethreemallsnotconsideredforBZPPstatushadnotundertakenriskassessmentsontheirown,evenonaninformalbasis. Insomecases,mallssimplywerenotatthetopofthelistoflocalcriticalsites.Butinonemallwevisited,thesecuritydirectortoldusthatlocallawenforcementhadofferedtoconductariskassessment,butthatmallownershaddeclined,worriedaboutpotentialliabilityiftheyfailedtoimplement

precautionary

measures

following

arisk

assessment.

Without

undergoing

someformofriskassessmentprocess,itisdifficultformallmanagerstoarriveatanunderstandingaboutwhatelementsshouldbeprotectedandwhichstrategiesshouldbeemployedforpreventionofspecificassets.PreventionTactics

Weobservedbothhumanandtechnologicaldeterrentstrategies.Onemallwevisitedhadinstalledbollards,orbarriers,toprotectagainstthepossibilityofacarbombbeingdetonatedinsidethemall.Severalothersecuritydirectorssaidthatbollardswouldbeagoodidea,butthattheircompanydidnothaveplanstoimplementthem.Mostmallshadpoliciesdesignedtomonitorandrestrictdeliveriestostores.Deliverytruckswerecheckedcomingin,andnonroutinedeliverieswerecheckedoutbeforeallowingthedriverstoproceed.Afewmallsrestricteddeliveriestooff-hourswhenstoreswereclosedorthemallwaslesspopulated.Othersecuritydirectorssaidthattheywouldmovetosuchaplanifthenationalalertlevelwentuporifaspecificthreatagainstthemallwasuncovered.

Singlingoutandobserving mallvisitorswasanimportantpartofhumanpreventiontactics. But,accordingtopolicies,profilingwasbasednotonethnicitybutonfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 26




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dressorpatternsofbehavior(referbacktoTable10).Commonactivitiesprohibitedwerephotographyandlargegroupgatherings.Inonemallthatwevisited,securitystaffhad,infact,observedagroupofmiddleeasternmenphotographingsensitivelocationsinsidethemall:Thegroupwasconfrontedbysecuritystaffandfledbeforepolicearrived.Othertypesofbehavioralprofilingwerelesswell-definedandcoveredcharacteristicssuchasobvious

bulges

under

clothing,

carrying

large

backpacks,

wearing

heavy

coats,

unwillingnesstomakeeyecontact,frequentingthesameareaofthemallrepeatedly,orsittinginoneplacetoolong.Whensecuritystaffencounteredpersonsactingsuspiciously,accordingtothedefinitionsofaparticularmall,thestaffwereinstructedtoobserveorengagethesuspectsin conversation.Ifthesecurityguardscuriositywasnotsatisfied,heorshewastheninstructedtocallthelocalpolice.Wealsoaskedsecuritydirectorsaboutwhethertheyemployedundercoverofficersintheirpreventionstrategies.Asingledirectorrespondedaffirmatively,andeventhen,onlyatcertaintimes,suchasholidays.Thethinkingseemedtobethatofficersweremostvaluablewhenconductingvisiblepatrols.

Deterrencemost

often

relied

on

CCTV

systems.

All

but

one

mall

we

visited

had

someformofCCTVsysteminplace.Thesystemsvariedintheirsophistication:someweremonitoredconstantly,whileothersrecordedeventsforsecuritystafftorefertoaftertheeventhadoccurred.Visiblesecuritypatrolsalsoweredesignedtoactasadeterrent,withpatrolsoftenincreasedatholidaysandotherpeakusagetimes.TrainingPrograms

Allofthemallswevisitedhadimplementedsomeformofantiterrorismtrainingforsecuritystaff.Weencounteredmanyvarietiesoftrainingprograms.Somemallsthathadcontractedwithanationalsecurityfirmhadgenericcompanyprograms,somehadtrainingprogramsdevelopedbystategovernment,andsomeusedtheprogrampromulgated

by

DHS.

In

the

case

of

contracted

mall

security,

training

is

often

viewed

as

akeycompetitiveadvantageofonecontractoroveranother,anditwasmarketedassuch.

Theformatoftheterrorismpreparednesstrainingprogramsvaried.Mostconsistedofaclassroomformatusuallyfourhoursinlength,sometaughtbyoutsideexpertsandothersbymallsecuritydirectorstrainedbyexperts.Onemallhadatext-basedapproach,wheresecuritystaffwererequiredtolearnfromprintedmaterialsandthentakeatesttoindicatemastery.Contentappearedtovarybutmostlyfocusedonidentifyingpotentialterrorists;spottingsuspiciouspackages;andresponsetoanattack,includingsecuringthesceneandworkingwithfirstresponders.Mallsgenerallydidnothavewaystoevaluatewhetherinformationimpartedinterroristtrainingprogramswasretained

for

long

or

affected

the

way

security

staff

approached

their

jobs.

Thehighrateofturnoveramongmallsecuritystafflessenedthelong-termutility

oftraining.Wagesintheindustryaregenerallylow($8to$11/hour)withlittleroomforadvancement.Mostsecuritydirectorssaidthattheyexperienced100%turnoverwithinayear.Whensecuritypersonnelleaveamall,theinvestmentintrainingleaveswiththem;theeffectofthehighturnoveristhat,atanygiventime,thesecuritystaffincludesagood





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numberofnewrecruitswhoareinexperiencedandhavenotreceivedanythingbeyondbasictraining.EmergencyResponsePlans

Allmallswevisitedhadwrittenprocedurestofollowintheeventofathreattothemall,orinanactualemergency.Typicalprotocolsfollowingathreattothemallincludedlimitingaccesstocriticalareasofthemall,increasingsecuritystaffpresence,andkeepingaclosereyeonparkinglotsandmallentrances.AnumberofmallshadstandardizedproceduresforsecuritypersonnelintheeventofachangeintheDHSThreatAdvisorySystem.Detailsweresimilartostepstakeninresponsetoaspecificthreatagainstthemall,includingstepped-uppatrolsandrestrictedtruckaccess.

Foremergencies,writtenprocedurescoveredevacuations(intheeventoffire,gasleakorsuspectedbomb),emergencycommunications,small-armsattacks,basicfirst-aidandtriage,aswellasthenormalproceduresforhandlinglostchildren,misplacedproperty,andsoforth.Inemergencies,protocolformostmallscalledforcontactingemergencyservices,contactingdesignatedemergencymanagementstaffinthemall(mallowner,securitydirector),providingfirstaidforanyinjuries,evacuatingpeople,and/orsealingoffanareaofthemall.Someplansweremorespecific,includinghavingsecuritystaffmeetatdesignatedlocations,settingupfirstaidandcommandareas,orevacuatingthroughspecificroutes.

Noneofthemallswevisitedhaddevelopedwaystocoordinatewithfirstrespondersintheeventofanemergency.Theonlymeansofcommunicatingwithfirstresponderswasbyphone.Thegeneralplaninallcaseswasthat,oncefirstrespondersarrivedonthescene,theywouldtakechargeandmallstaffwouldfollowanyinstructionstheywereissuedbypoliceorfireofficials.Innoneofthemallswevisitedwasitclearwho

would

be

responsible

for

briefing

first

responders

or

how

mall

security

evacuation

planswouldbecoordinatedgivenlawenforcementsneedtoretainandintervieweyewitnesses.Onelawenforcementofficialwasbluntinhisassessment:Wedonttakemallsecurityintoaccount.Theyarepoorlytrainedandnotprofessional.

Anemergencyresponseplanmustbewellunderstoodbystaffinordertobeeffective.Wedonotknowfromourvisitstheextenttowhichsecuritystaffhadinternalizedtheseplans.Itwasnotencouragingthat,inonemall,thesecuritydirectorsaidthathewouldrefertohiscompanysmanualintheeventofanemergency.Twoofthemallsweobservedcarriedoutexercisestorehearseresponsetoemergencies.Inone,therehearsalswerelimitedtofindingsimulatedbombsandtakingappropriateaction.Inthe

other,

exercises

also

included

asimulated

response

to

abomb

detonation

and

was

quitesophisticated,includingevacuatingpeople,settinguptriageandpressareas,anddesignatingahelicopterlandingarea.

Themostsignificantgapinemergencypreparednesswasthelackofcoordinationbetweenmallsecurityandthesecuritystaffofthelargemallanchorstores.Inonemall,securitycouldcommunicatewithtenantsbyradio;butinallothermalls,thesolemeansofcommunicationbetweenmallsecurityandtenantswasbyphone.Inonlyonemallfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 28




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weretenantsinvolvedinthemallsoverallemergencyresponseplans.Usually,thedecisiontoevacuateanchorstoresandtheresponsibilitytooverseetheevacuationwasuptostoresecurityorstoremanagement.Inseveralmalls,securitydirectorsexplicitlytoldusthatrelationswithsecuritystaffinanchorstoreswereminimalor,inonecase,evenhostile.RelationshipWithLocalLawEnforcement

Wefoundwidevariationinhowlocallawenforcementandregionalterrorismtaskforceshadbeeninvolvedinmallsecurity.Weobservedmallsthathadacloserelationshipwithlocallawenforcement.Theserelationshipsweresometimesdrivenbystatehomelandsecurityplansthatincludedmallsinriskassessmentsofcriticalinfrastructure. Inothercases,theyweredrivenbymallsecuritydirectorsdrawnfromtheranksofthelocalpolice,whostillhadpersonaltiestomembersofthepoliceforce. Instillothercases,theyweredrivenbythepresenceofpoliceofficersstationedinthemall.Suchmallsparticipatedinriskassessments,andtheirsecuritydirectorsfeltthatthepoliceweregenerousinsharinginformation.

Ontheotherhand,wealsoobservedmallsthathadlittlerelationshipwithlocallawenforcement.Thesemallsweregenerallynotprivytopoliceintelligencedataanddidnotparticipateinriskassessmentsoremergencyplans.Forexample,inadiscussionwithlocalfirstrespondersatonelocation,bothpoliceandfireofficialsacknowledgedthat,althoughtheyprobablyshouldhaveestablishedcontactpeopleinmajorstoresinthelocalmall,mappedoutexitroutes,andcreatedanevacuationplan,theyhadnoplanstodoso.Duringourdiscussion,theyalsodiscoveredthattheydidnotevenhavefloorplansforthemalltorefertoincaseofanemergency.

Wedidnotfindanymallsamongtheeightwevisitedthatconductedjointexercises

with

local

first

responders

and

law

enforcement.

There

seemed

to

be

two

reasonsforthis:sometimeslocallawenforcementdidnotconsidermallsahighprioritytargetandhaddecidedtoexpendtheireffortsonothertypesoffacilities.Butmoreoften,itwasthemallsthatresistedbecausetheycouldnotfindaconvenienttimeordidnotwanttoalarmthepublic.Thissituationrepresentsalargedisconnectinresponsetoemergencies.Mostmallsecurityforceshaveconceptualizedtheirroleinemergenciesasaninitialtriageforcethatwillrapidlyhandoffactualsituationstofirstresponders,yettheyhavenotpracticedthishand-offinajointexercise.Assessment

Wedidnotencounteranyactiveprogramstoevaluatewhatguardsderivedfromterrorismtraining,orifterrorismpreventionandresponsewasactuallyincorporatedintodailyworkroutines.Similarly,wedidnotobserveinanymallsstandardsforevaluatingwhethertheirpreparednessplansortheirresponsetoasimulatedemergencywereadequate.(Ofcourse,thispointislargelymootsincefewmallsconductemergencypreparednessexercises.) Withnotabletoporliveexercisesandnoclearstandardsforevaluation,itisimpossibletosayhowwellstaffwouldrespondintheeventofadisaster.





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TheSpecialCaseofIsraeliMallsIsraelistheworldleaderinexperience-basedexpertisewithantiterrorismefforts

inretailmalls.Intheyearssince9/11,manylawenforcementagenciesintheUnitedStateshaveattendedpresentationsgivenbyIsraelisecuritydirectorsaspartofcomprehensiveantiterrortraininginitiativessponsoredbytheJusticeDepartmentandotherfederalagencies.TheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmenthasoftensentofficerstoIsraeltobetraindinantiterrortactics.

TheterrorismthreatinIsraelisqualitativelydifferentthanthethreatthatU.S.citizensfacetoday.Therefore,antiterrorismeffortsinIsraelimallsdonotrepresentafairstandardforU.S.malls.Still,itisusefultoobserveIsraelimallsasanexemplarofwhatcanbedonewhenmotivationandfundsareathighlevels.InNovemberof2005,researchersconductedsitevisitstotwoofthelargestmallsinIsrael,theAzrieliCenterandtheJerusalemMall.Ateachsite,wemetwiththemallsecurityrepresentatives.Asexpected,wefoundvastdifferencesbetweenU.S.andIsraelimalls.Someofthemostnotabledifferencesarediscussedbelow.

Security strategy. MallsecurityplansinIsraelplacethemallatthecenterofthreeconcentriccircles.Intheoutermostcirclearerovingpatrolsofoneortwosecurityofficersandvehicleinspectionpoints.Bollardsandretractablebarriersareusedtokeepvehiclesfrombeingdriventhroughthecheckpoints.Allvehiclesenteringmallparkingareasaresubjectedtoasearchofthepassengerandtrunkcompartments.Inaddition,driversareassertivelyquestionedbysecurityofficersinanefforttodeterminewhethertheyposeapossiblesecuritythreat.UnlikeU.S.malls,ethnicprofilingisanintegralpartofthescreeningprocess.Onceinsidetheoutermostperimeter,allpedestriansattemptingtoenterthemallhavetheirbagssearchedandmustbescannedbyametaldetector.Screeningsareconductedbyrelativelylow-paid,unarmedsecuritystaff,buttheyaremonitored

by

ahighly

trained

guard

armed

with

asubmachine

gun.

Inside

the

mall

(the

innermostcircle),oneortwoarmedsecurityofficerspatrolandobservevisitors.

Theintentoftheconcentriccircleapproachistointerceptterroristsbeforetheyactuallygetinsidethemall.Thisapproachhasworkedextremelywell.Israelhashadtenattacksagainstmallsinrecentyears,severalofwhichinvolvedsuicidebomberswhoinflictedfatalities.However,noneoftheattackerspenetratedtotheinteriorofthemallwheretheycouldhavedonefarmoreseriousdamage.

Securitychiefsofbothmallsacknowledgedthatevenstringentsecuritymeasuresmightnotbeenoughtostopadeterminedattack.Therefore,theysay,deterrenceanddisplacement

is

abig

part

of

their

strategy.

One

security

director

believed

that

visible

securitymeasureswereresponsibleforthetherehavingbeenrelativelyfewattacksagainstmalls,butmanyagainstbuses.

Spending on security.Israelimallsspendmillionsofdollarseachyearonsecurity.Accordingtooneofthesecuritydirectors,approximately40%oftheoperationalbudgetofIsraelimallsisdevotedtosecurity.(Hecontrastedthiswith3%to5%intheU.S.) Severalfactorsdrivethiscost.Whenstringentgovernmentalregulationandfinal%20report%2dedited[1] 30




35/50

licensingrequirementswereadopted,mallswereforcedtoprovidecomprehensivesecurityservices.Initially,governmentaloversightandinspectionsforcedtheimmediateclosingofsomemallsnotincompliance,therebycreatingafinancialincentivetocomply.Moreover,weweretoldthat,inIsrael,securityexpendituresarelookeduponasaninvestment.DuringtheIntifada,forexample,Israelimallsprovidedasanctuaryforpeople

frightened

of

suicide

bombers.

This

was

good

for

the

country,

but

also

good

for

mallbusinesses.

Government involvement in mall security.TheIsraeliGovernmentheavilyregulatesprivatesecuritysystemsinretailmalls.Theregulationprocessconsistsofstringentlicensingprocedurescarriedoutatthelocallevelandoverseenbylocalpolicecommanders.Theregulationstructuremandatesminimumnumbersofsecurityguards,vehiclecheckpoints,andbarricades.Thedistrictpolicealsolicenseandapproveallarmedsecuritycandidatesandlicenseallunarmedsecurityofficers.Compliancewiththeseregulationsisensuredbyfrequenton-siteinspections.Typically,thedistrictpolicewillinspecteachmallonceortwiceamonth.Inaddition,theywillobservemanyofthedrills

being

conducted

by

the

mall

security

staff.

Each

mall

is

required

to

re-apply

for

licensingeveryyear.

Accordingtothesecuritydirectorsthatwespokewith,locallawenforcementandemergencyservicerepresentativesoftenconductjointexerciseswithmallsecurity.Theexercisesincludecomprehensivedrillsattendedbythedistrictfirebrigade,ambulancesystem,andtheentirepolicedistrict.Inaddition,thereisopenintelligencesharingbetweenmallsecurityandlocallawenforcement.Inonemall,policebriefedthemallsecuritychiefweekly.Intheother,thelocalpolicedistrictheldmonthlymeetingsduringwhichantiterrorismintelligencewassharedanddiscussedwithkeyindividualsinthecommunity,includingmallsecuritydirectors.Oneofthemallswevisitedprovidesthelocalpolicedistrictwithanon-sitesubstation.Thisallowsasubsetofofficerstobecomeknowledgeableaboutmalloperationsandphysicallayout.Italsoallowstheseofficerstogettoknowthemallssecuritystaff.Finally,mallsecurityandlocallawenforcementshareinteroperablecommunicationsystems.Intheeventofanemergency,eachunitcouldcommunicatewithoneanotheroverasharedradio-communicationsband.

Risk assessment.Israelimallsarerequiredundergovernmentalregulationstructurestoconductperiodicriskassessments.Accordingtomallrepresentativesthatwespokewith,theriskassessmentsareconductedbybothin-houseandoutsidesecurityexperts.Thein-houseassessmentsareconductedonacontinualbasisaspartofeverydaysecuritypractices.Outsidesecurityassessmentsareconductedperiodicallybyindependentexpertscontractedbythemalls.Oncetheplaniscompletedandreviewedbydistrictpolice,anoperatinglicenseisgranted.

Emergency response plans.BothoftheIsraelimallswevisitedhadcomprehensiveresponseplansforvariousemergencies,requiredbythegovernmentinorderforthemalltoobtainalicensetoconductbusiness. Eachsecurityofficerisgivenadutyundertheplan,andasubsetofofficersisassignedtoanemergencyresponseteam.Plansincludepreventingoutsidersfromgainingaccesstothemallaswellaspossiblefinal%20report%2dedited[1] 31




36/50

evacuationadecisionthat,unlikewhatweobservedinU.S.malls,isentirelyuptothesecuritydirector.Animmediatereactionsquadmeetsinaspecialcontrolroomtomonitoranddirectsecurityactionsuntilthepolicearrive.

Emergencyplanstargetthefirst20minutesafteracriticalincident.Theplansinclude

designated

places

to

meet

and

how

to

brief

police

officers

as

they

arrive.

Once

on

thescene,thepolicetakecommandoftheemergency.

Training programs.Mallsprovidemonthlytrainingforallofficersthatisalmostentirelyfocusedonrecognizingandrespondingtoterrorthreats.Trainingishighlyrepetitive,bothtoengraintheproceduresinthemindsoftheofficersandtocounteracttheeffectsofhighsecuritystaffturnover,aproblemasacuteinIsraelasitisintheU.S.OneadvantagethatIsraelhasisthat,whileturnoverishigh,manysecurityofficerscometothejobwithrecentmilitarytrainingasaresultofthecountryspolicyofcompulsorymilitaryservice.

Accordingto

the

security

officers

we

talked

with,

the

malls

usually

conduct

about

50drillspermonth.Theserangefromminorproceduraldrillstocovertdrillsduringwhichfalsebombsareplantedandattemptsaremadetobringthemintothemall.Majorexercisesarecarriedoutincooperationwiththepolice,whoevaluatetheadequacyoftheresponsebymallsecurity.Whensecurityofficersfailtodetectplantedthreats,theyareretrained.Iftheyfailasecondtime,theyarefired.Inaddition,asystemofpositiveincentivesisalsoutilized.Ifasecurityofficerdetectsaproblemduringadrillandactsaccordingly,thatofficerwillreceiveamonetarybonus.Rollcallsoftenfocusontheassessmentofrecentdrills.Successesandfailuresarediscussedandalternativeresponsesareexplored.





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5. AnalysisofStateStatutesRegulatingPrivateSecurity

Arecentstudy,WatchingtheWatchmen:StateRegulationofPrivateSecurity,19concludedthattherehasbeenatrendtowardanincreaseinstatutoryregulationforthehiringofprivatesecurityofficersbutminimalchangestostateregulationsregardingtrainingforsuchstaffbetween1982and1998.Thestudyfoundthatthenumberofstatesrequiringbackgroundcriminalchecksforprospectiveemployeesincreasedfrom13to20overthe16yearsthatstatutesweretracked.Thestudyfoundlittlechange,however,instateregulationsregardingprivatesecurityofficertraining:justoneadditionalstateaddedsucharegulationbetween1982and1998.

Tradeorganizationshavepromotedtheadoptionofstandardsforhiringandtrainingofprivatesecurityofficers.Recently,ASISInternational20publishedguidelinesthatsetforthminimumcriteriathatregulatingbodiesandcompaniesintheUnitedStatescanusetoassistinrecommendinglegislationandpoliciesfortheselectionandtrainingofprivatesecurityofficers.Theguidelinescontaintemplatesforstatestouseindevelopingorenhancingtheirlegislationregardingprivatesecurityofficers.

Still,priorto9/11,theprivatesecurityindustryintheU.S.wasnotsubjecttoextensiveregulationbythegovernment.Therewerenofederallawsgoverningtheindustry.Stateregulationwasspottyatbest,enforcementofregulationswasweak,andmoststateshadnorequirementsregardinghiringandtraining.

Theeventsof9/11/2001highlightedtheimportantroleofprivatesecurityindetectinganddeterringdomesticterrorismatcriticalinfrastructuresites.Thissectionexamineswhethergovernmentstandardsforprivatesecurityhaveincreasedinthe3yearssince9/11.

StaffoftheJusticeandSafetyCenteratEasternKentuckyUniversityanalyzedstatutesinthe50statesplustheDistrictofColumbiaregardingregulationofprivatesecuritytodeterminehowlegislationmayhavechangedsince9/11.ThiscontentanalysisusedWestlawAcademicUniversetoreviewstatutesinsixareas:

Requirementsforbackgroundchecksofprospectivesecurityofficers Educationorexperiencerequirements Trainingrequirements Oversightofthequalityorcontentoftrainingprograms Statutesgrantingsecurityofficersthepowertodetainandsearchsuspects

19Hemmens,C.,Maahs,J.,Scarborough,K.E.,Collins,P.A.,(2001)WatchingtheWatchmen:State

RegulationofPrivateSecurity1982-1998.SecurityJournal,Vol.14,No.4,pp17-28.20ASISInternational(2004).PrivateSecurityOfficerSelectionandTrainingGuideline,2004.http://

www.asisonline.org


This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has notbeen published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are tho

large retail malls to prevent and respond to terririst attack (50)

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