las cajitas de fósforo: the solanda housing...
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LasCajitasdeFósforo:TheSolandaHousingProject
ValeriaVidal1+FrancisGoyes2 1MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology-MIT,SIGUS,Cambridge,MA,[email protected] 2MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology-MIT,CenterforAdvancedUrbanism,SIGUS,Cambridge,MA,[email protected] KEYIMAGE
Photo credit: Gabriel Muñoz Moreno
ABSTRACTIn1980,theEcuadoriangovernmentlauncheditsfirsteffortattheprovisionoflarge-scaleaffordablehousingwiththeSolandaHousingProjectinthecountry’scapitalcityofQuito.Consistingof6,211housingunits,Solandaisthelargestaffordablehousingprojectinthecountry’shistory.TheunprecedentedinitiativebroughtforthfourmaininnovationstotheprovisionofaffordablehousinginEcuador:introductionofincrementalhousingmodels,public-privatepartnerships,comprehensivecommunitydevelopmentprograms,andinstitutionalreformsforhousingregulations. Inadditiontoanalyzingthesefourinnovations,thispaperevaluatesthesuccessesandfailuresoftheSolandaHousingProjectthroughthefourmainstakeholders’pointofview:MunicipalityofQuito,EcuadorianHousingBank,UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),andFoundationMarianadeJesús.Additionally,weincludefindings
fromstructuredlongitudinalinterviewswithfamiliesthathavelivedinSolandaandhavecontributedtoitsevolutionforthepast35years.Intheanalysisoftheprojectthroughthesefiveperspectives,weprovideaglimpseattherichhistoryanddevelopmentofSolanda. Bycontemplatingtheinnovationsofthisseminalproject,weintendtodrawlessonsforthefutureofaffordablehousingprovisioninEcuador.Asanincrementalhousingexperiment,theevolutionofSolandaisalsoacelebrationofwhatpeoplearecapableofdesigning,financingandbuilding.OurresearchdoesnotonlyaimtoevaluatetheSolandaproject,butalsolearnfromtheexperienceoffamiliesforthepast35yearstoidentifypositiveandnegativepoliciesthatadvanceordeteraffordablehousingstrategiestoday.
KEYWORDS incremental,large-scale,affordablehousing,housingpolicies,Quito,Ecuador AUTHORBIOGRAPHY: ValeriaVidalisasummerfellowatDalbergGlobalDevelopmentAdvisorsbasedinNewYorkCityandaresearchassistantattheSpecialInterestGroupofUrbanSettlementduringtheschoolyear.ShehasworkedforHarvardLawSchool,theUnitedNationsandthePrimeMinisterofPeruduringthelastfewyears.Additionally,ValeriahasexperienceacrossdifferentsectorsofdevelopmentinLatinAmerica,AsiaandAfrica. FrancisGoyesisanarchitectfromQuito,Ecuador.SheiscurrentlyworkingfortheMunicipalityofQuitoforthedevelopmentofaninformalhousingregularizationpolicy.DuringtheacademicyearsheisaresearchassistantatMIT’sCenterforAdvancedUrbanismandtheResilientCityHousingInitiative,specificallyfocusingonappliedresearchforaffordablehousingprojectsandpolicyinLatinAmerica.ShehascollaboratedinavarietyofprojectsinMexico,Ecuador,Guyana,Jordan,India,andtheUnitedStates.
Introduction
TheSolandaHousingProjectwastheEcuadoriangovernment’sfirsteffortto
constructlow-incomehousingwithcostrecovery.Itwasdesignedtobeanintegrated
shelterandurbanprojectcomprisingofaninitial4,500low-costhousingunits(ultimately
6,211werebuilt),complimentarybasicandsocialinfrastructure,employmentprograms
foreconomicproductivity,andthecreationofcommunityorganizations.Theprojectwas
developedon1,581,33m²oflandthathadpreviouslyservedasthehaciendaofoneofthe
city’swealthiestfamilies.1
Theprojectwasexecutedthroughapartnershipbetweenfivemainstakeholders:
theMunicipalityofQuito,BancoEcuatorianodelaVivienda-BEV(EcuadorHousingBank),
JuntaNacionaldelaVivienda–JNV(NationalHousingBoard),FundaciónMarianadeJesús
–FMJ,andtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment-USAID.Thehousing
unitsweredesignedtobeaffordabletofamiliesbelowthemedianincomeatthetime 1 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 1.
($233permonth)butbeyondthecapacityoffamiliesearningbelowthe35thpercentile.2
Thereweresixdifferentlow-costincrementalhousingdesignmodels,whichwerechosen
byrecipientfamiliesonaneeds-basis.
Thirty-fiveyearslater,weevaluatethesuccessandfailuresofEcuador’sfirsteffort
attheprovisionofaffordablehousingthattranscendgoesbeyondthestandardevaluation
ofprogressofthebuiltenvironment.Assuch,Solandaservesasacasestudyfor
understandingthesuccessesandfailuresofsiteandservicesprojects,constrictedtothe
underlyingpoliticalandsocio-economicfactorsofitscontext.
MainText Solanda’sFourInnovations
Introductionofofficialincrementalhousingmodel
WhilearchitecturaldesignsfortheSolandahousingunitsexistedasearlyas1980,
modelswerealteredduetotheriseinconstructionmaterialsandlaborcostscausedby
monetaryinflation.3Ultimately,sixdifferenthousingmodelswithvaryingflexibilityfor
incrementalgrowthwerebuiltonlotsizesrangingfrom60m2to123m2:4
1.SanitaryUnit-mostbasichousingmodel,with10m2ofconstructionconsistingof
abathroomandkitchenona60m2lot.
2.Piso-TechoUnit(floor-roof)-builtonlotsrangingfrom60m2to80m2;includeda
bathroom,kitchen,andmulti-purposespacewithnoexteriorwallsbutcovered
withacementroof.
3+4.BasicUnit-includedpriorcomponents,withtheadditionofexteriorwalls
madefrombricks.Thisunitcamewithtworoofvariations:concreteslaband
corrugatedplasticroof.
5.Tri-familyUnit-threeapartments,oneonthefirstfloorwiththeopportunityfor
acommercialstore,asecondfloorapartment,andacontiguoustwo-floor
apartment.Thismodelwasbuiltonthecornersofsquarestopromote
commercialactivity.
2 GAO/NSIAD, The Solanda Housing Guaranty Project in Ecuador (1986), 7. 3 GAO/NSIAD, The Solanda Housing Guaranty Project in Ecuador (1986), 11. 4 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), Annex C, 5.
6.BridgeUnit-leastpopularmodel,createdoverpedestrianwalkwaysand
includedabathroom,kitchenandmulti-purposeroom.5
In2005,over98%ofallthehousingunitshadexpandedbyatleastonefloor,58%
ofhouseholdshadaddedtwofloors,and25%hadaddedthreefloors.6Theestimated
constructedareaincreasedfrom223,259m2to601,416m2,representingatotalbuildoutof
169%.Furthermore,althoughonlythe‘Tri-FamilyUnit’modelwasdesignedfor
commercialactivity,itisestimatedthatover40%ofbuildingshaveabusinessthatiseither
ranbythehomeownersorrented.7Finally,over20%offamiliesrentbetweenoneandfour
roomstothirdparties,significantlyincreasingaffordablerentalunitsintheneighborhood
andcontributingtothemarketsupplyofhousinginQuito.8
Public-PrivatePartnership
TheSolandaProjectwasdesignedwiththeparticipationoffiveinstitutions:the
BancoEcuatorianodeVivienda-BEV(EcuadorianHousingBank),JuntaNacionaldela
Vivienda-JNV(NationalHousingBoard),MunicipalityofQuito,UnitedStatesAgencyfor
InternationalDevelopment-USAID,andtheprivatelyownedFoundationMarianadeJesús
-FMJ.Eachorganizationwaschargedwithfulfillingaseparaterole.TheMunicipalityof
Quitopresidedoverbasicserviceprovision,BEVwasresponsibleforcreatingcost-
recoverypolicies,JNVproducedconstructionmaterials,constructedthehousingunits,
basic,andsocialinfrastructure,USAIDmanagedcontractsforhousing,communityfacilities
andpublictransportation,andFMJdonatedthelandfortheprojectanddevelopedproject’s
socialinfrastructureandprograms.9
Throughthiscollaboration,theprojectaimedtoexertpolitical,procedural,and
institutionalchangesatnationalandlocallevels.Thepartnershipintendedtoimprove
urbandevelopmentintegrationacrosspublicandprivatesectors,withcoordination
improvingtechnicalandfinancialaspectsofprojectdevelopmentthatwouldhave
otherwisebeenimpossible.AsgovernmentalorganizationsreceivedadvicefromUSAID
5 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), Annex C, 6-7. 6 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 4. 7 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 5. 8 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 10. 9 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 28.
consultantsnationalinstitutionalcapacitywasheightened,includingstrengtheningpolicies
foraffordablehousingunitsforlow-incomefamiliesandoverhaulingtechnological
deficienciesingovernmentalprocesses.10
Comprehensivecommunitydevelopment
TheintegratedapproachoftheSolandaProjectcomprisedcommunitydevelopment
programsandsocialinfrastructuretobedevelopedandmanagedbybothpublicand
privateorganizations.Includedinthecommunitydevelopmentprogramswerethecreation
ofneighborhoodassociationsaswellassupportforlocalbusinesscreation.11FJMwas
primarilyinchargeofpromotingandmanagingsuchprogramsuntil1998,whenthese
programsweretransferredtoalocalchurchwithinSolanda.12
PlannedsocialinfrastructureforSolandaconsistedofaday-carecenter,
kindergarten,primaryschool,recreationalfacilities,commercialcenter,andacommunity
spaceforevery1,100families.13Largercommunityfacilitiesincludedahealthclinic,boys’
highschool,culturalcenter,sportsareas,administrativecenter,andlargercommunity-
ownedenterprises.14Asof2005thereweremorethan18daycarecenters,kindergartens
andprimaryschools,eighthighschools,oneadulteducationcenter,twochurches,four
communitycenters,fourhealthcenters,apoliceoffice,afirestation,andapostoffice.15
Publicandrecreationalspacesnowincludealinearnaturepark,neighborhoodstadium,
numerousfootballfields,andrecreationalspaces..
Amajorcommercialstreet,‘LaJota’,organicallydevelopedononeofthemajor
arteriesdividingthesuper-blocks,withstoresrangingfromclothingsupplytobanking
officesandpopularfastfoodchainsopenedpastmidnight.Currently,rentingacommercial
spacein‘LaJota’cancostupto$1,000permonth.Therearetwolargesupermarketchain
storeswithinSolandaandoneofQuito’slargestwholesalemarketsisadjacenttothe
project.ThroughinterviewswithSolandahouseholdswelearnedthataconcernishowthe
10 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 37. 11 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 31. 12 Charlie Garcia (project manager for Foundation Mariana de Jesús) in discussion with the authors, May 14, 2016. 13 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 32. 14 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 32. 15 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 2.
presenceofthesupermarketsdrivesbusinessawayfromsmallfamily-ownedstoresin
Solanda.
Institutionalreformsofhousingregulations
Initially,theplanforSolandadesignedbyFMJcalledforcompleteaffordable
housingunitsonlotsover100m2.16Throughnegotiations,USAIDwasabletoconvinceFMJ
andotherpartneringinstitutionstoacceptlowerstandardsforbothhousingandbasic
infrastructure.17Bymodifyingexistingzoninglawstoallowforsmallerlotsizesand
varyingincrementalhousingmodels,6,211unitswerecreatedinsteadofthe4,500that
werefirstplannedforacomparableinvestment.18
Thereductionoflotsizesisinpartthereasonforthetremendousbuildoutin
Solandaduringthelastthirty-fiveyears.Thishasledtostreetlightpolesabsorbedby
houseexpansions,upwardself-builtfloorsofadjacenthouseswithincentimetersof
distancefromeachother,andentirewebsofelectricallinesrunningarray.Additionally,
reducedparkingsuggestedbyUSAIDhascausedsignificantissues,asover40%ofSolanda
residentshaveavehicleandtherearenotenoughspaces,leadingmanyhouseholdsto
encroachoninternalblockgardens.19
LessonsLearned
Thirty-fiveyearsaftertheimplementationoftheSolandaproject,weconducted
interviewswithrepresentativesofthefivemainstakeholderstoreflectonsuccessesand
failuresfromtheirpointsofviews.TheMunicipalityofQuitoseesSolandaasapositive
exampleofintegratedurbanplanninginresponsetoaffordablehousingdeficitinthecity.
However,theybelievethesuccessofSolandawasduetoaveryspecificpoliticalcontext
thatcouldnotbeeasilyreplicatedinthepresenttime,asin1993theEcuadorianState
shiftedfromdirectlysupplyinghousingtoprovidingfinancingmechanismsforlow-income
familiesseekingtobuyahouse.20TheMunicipalitycitedthatmoreattentionhadtobepaid
16 Charlie Garcia (project manager for Foundation Mariana de Jesús) in discussion with the authors, December 2015. 17 PADCO, Inc., The Solanda Project Evaluation and Lucha de los Pobres: A Comparison of Formal and Informal Community Development (1989), 37. 18 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 1. 19 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 10. 20 Guzmán, Alberto, Breves reseñas de las últimas décadas de las políticas de vivienda de Ecuador (2007).
totheincrementalexpansionofhousessoastopreventprecariousinfrastructurefrom
builtout.21
AninterviewwithaformerrepresentativeoftheEcuadorianHousingBankatthe
timeoftheSolandaprojectandconsultationswithhomeownershaveprovedthatthe
financingconditionsprovidedwereoverallpositiveforlow-incomefamilies.22Anintegral
elementofsuccessforcurrentdebt-freeownerswasadebt-forgivenessprogram
introducedbythen-PresidentRodrigoBorja.Thisprogramgavetheoptiontohomeowners
topayaconsiderableone-timepaymentfortheforgivenessoftherestoftheloanowned.23
InthecaseofFundaciónMarianadeJesús,long-termsustainabilityofthesocial
programswithinSolandaremainsakeyissue.WhileFMJwasinitiallyresponsibleforthe
creationandprovisionofsuchprograms,alocalchurchhasnowtakenonthetasksto
upholdthecommunity’ssocialneeds,whichhaveevolvedsincethestartoftheproject.The
transitionfromFMJtoalocalchurchisworthhighlightingasapossibleapproachtosocial
programs’sustainabilityinsimilarprojects.24
Frominterviewswithoriginalhouseowners,wecanconcludethattheirgeneral
consensusisthattheSolandaProjectwasandcontinuestobeasuccess.Nevertheless,
therearesomereservationsabouttwoissuesthathaveresultedfrombothhumanand
economicgrowthinthecommunityinthepastfewyears.Thefirstistheconversionofthe
smallsquaregardensinthemiddleofthehousingblocksintoparkinglots.Thesespaces
havebeenadaptedbyhouseholdsastheireconomicmeanshaveincreasedtoamiddle-
incomeclassthatvaluesprivateownershipofcars
Secondly,manycommunitymembersmentionedtheissueofinsecuritywhichin
theirviewispromptedbytheinfluxofrentersfromboththecityanditssurroundings.Itis
perceivedthatnewresidentsaretoblameforrobberiesandincreaseddrugusewithin
Solanda.Thesetypeofchangeswithinacommunitycanpotentiallydisruptcommunity
cohesionandtrust,asisthecaseinSolanda.Whilemanyoriginalhomeownersexpanded
theirhousestoprovideaspacefortheirchildren’sfuturefamilies,therewereothercases
wherefamiliesdecidedtomovetoanotherpartofthecityandrentthehouse.Residents 21 Rosa Elena Donoso (advisor to Quito’s Secretaría de Territorio, Hábitat, y Vivienda) in discussion with the authors, May 2016. 22 Arq. José Ordoñez Villacreses (Instituto Metropolitano de Planificación Urbana) in discussion with the authors, December 2015. 23 Charlie Garcia (project manager for Foundation Mariana de Jesús) in discussion with the authors, December 2015. 24 Charlie Garcia (project manager for Foundation Mariana de Jesús) in discussion with the authors, May 2016.
alsobelieveSolandahasbecomeadesirablelocationtolivein,creatinganopportunityfor
familiestomakeprofitfromrentingapartmentsaswellasspaceforcommercialactivities.
WeforecastthattherealestatemarketinSolandawillonlyincreaseinthefutureduetothe
creationofasubwaystationinthecenteroftheneighborhoodthatwillimprove
accessibilitytoandfromtheNorthofQuito.
Lastly,USAIDbelievesthatoneofSolanda’sgreatestfailureswasnotbeingableto
reachthelowestincomegroupsduetothefluctuatinglevelsofinflationEcuadorwhich
reached48%by1983.25AlthoughdemocracyreturnedtoEcuadorin1979afteraperiodof
dictatorship,corruptionwithinthegovernmentwasresponsibleforallottingsomeofthe
housestofriendsandfamilyofofficialsinvolvedintheprojectinsteadoftolow-income
families.Inaddition,Solandadidnotbecometheprecedentforfurtheraffordablehousing
projectsinEcuador,asUSAIDhadhoped.
Conclusion Thirty-fiveyearslater,wecansuccinctlyidentifyandanalyzethesuccessesand
failuresofanintegratedaffordablehousingandurbandevelopmentprojectinthecityof
Quito.Theprovisionofincrementalhousingmodelsallowedfor6,211housestobebuilt,
insteadoftheoriginallyplanned4,500(38%more).Families’expansionoftheirhouseshas
madeSolandathehomeofmorethan80,000people,vastlysurpassingtheoriginal
populationof18,000residents.Thus,theincrementalstrategyemployedcontinuesto
provideaffordablehousingforhomeownersandrentersalikeintheneighborhood.
ThesmalllotsizesinSolandaandthelackofenforcementofhousingregulationsat
thetimeofexpansionhavecreatedaprecariouslivingsituationthatcouldbedevastating
whereanaturaldisastertooccur.Wehypothesizethatbuildoutwouldhavebeenlessacute
iflotsizeshadreflectedfamilygrowthtrendsatthetime.Manyfamiliesaccuratelyreferto
housesinSolandaas“cajitasdefósforos”(matchstickhouses)duetotheirsmallsize.
Furthermore,infrastructureissuesresidentsfacecouldhavebeenavoidedhadthe
programprovidedprofessionaltechnicalassistancefromengineersandarchitectsfor
incrementalexpansionsorbyincludingamonitoringandevaluationstageintheyears
whenexpansionoccurred.
25 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015.
ComprehensivebasicandsocialinfrastructurehasmadeSolandaintoan
independentmicro-habitatwithinQuito.Familiesrarelyhavetheneedtoleavetheir
neighborhood,astheyhaveattheirdisposaloneofthelargestmarketsinthecity,
supermarkets,anassortmentofcommercialstores,cornerdelicatessens,policestations,
schools,andparks.Assuch,ownershipofahouseinSolandahasincreasedtheoverall
economicdevelopmentoffamilies,specificallyduetohousingtenurecomplementedwith
comprehensivesocialinfrastructure.26
InSolanda,wecanobservetherolethatpolicyinterventionscanhavetoadvanceor
deteraffordablehousingstrategies.Theincrementalmodelallowedlow-income
householdstopurchaselandinalocationthatcontinuestoincreaseinvalue.Public-private
partnershipssuccessfullyexecutedanintegratedurbanshelterprojectthatthirty-five
yearslateristhrivingwitheconomicdevelopmentandisconnectedtothesurroundingcity
throughbus-rapidtransitandwillsoonhaveasubwaystation.Furthermore,duetothe
government’sdebt-forgivenessprogram,familiesinSolandaaredebt-free.
TheSolandaIntegratedShelterandUrbanDevelopmentProjectintroducedtothe
cityofQuitoanewcomprehensivewayofdesigningandcreatingsustainablecommunities
thatsupplementedthestandardconstructionofhouses.Asdiscussedthroughoutthis
paper,thereareseverallessonslearnedfromthisprojectthatcanserveas
recommendationstotakeintoconsiderationforthefutureorimplementationtoproject
evenafter30years.Disseminatingthelessonslearnedfromthisprojectcancontributeto
theunderstandingofthecapabilitiesofpeopleandtheirprocessofdesigning,financing
andexpandingtheirhouses.
FinalThoughts
Aninsightthatresonatedfromtheconferenceandtheworkthatwedowasthelack
ofinvestmentthatthereisfromgovernmentstoperformorincludelongitudinalstudiesin
theirsocialhousingprojects.Post-evaluationworkisquitelimitedandevenifperformed
byacademiaortheprivatesectordoesnothaveasadirectinfluenceandimpactasifitwas
withinthepublicsector.Fromtheconversationswithotherpractitionersthatattendedthe
conference,thereseemstobeaconcernofthefailureofgovernmenttobetterunderstand
theneedsandusesofspaceofpeoplethroughouttime.Investmentonethnographic
26 RTI International, LAC Housing and Urban Upgrading Assistance Retrospective (2005), 1.
researchofcommunitiesbeforetheprojectsseemsobviousbutisyetfarfromreality.The
lackofunderstandingoftheusersthenlimitsthemgovernmentbodiesinbettershaping
theprojectdesignanddeliverythatwillsupporttheseprogramstobecomebetterforthe
targetgroup.
Furthermore,itisimportantthatwerefrainfromviewinghousinginavacuum.Like
aconferencespeakersaid,“low-costhousingrequiresno-costtransport”aswellasother
publicservicesandsocialinfrastructure.Despiteitsmultiplesetbacksandfailures,
Solanda’sabilitytointegratetothegreatercitythroughlow-costbus-rapidtransitand
otherpublictransportationwasessentialtoitscontinuedsuccess.Hadweevaluatedthe
project5oreven10yearsafteritscompletion,wewouldnothavefoundittobeas
burstingwithlifeasitis35yearslater.Acityanditscomponentsarelivingorganismsthat
transformwithtime,anditisthereforeessentialtore-thinkthetimelineofevaluationsfor
pastaffordablehousingprojects.
Acknowledgements Firstandforemost,wewouldliketothankProfessorReinhardGoethertforthe
supportandadvicehehasgivenusthroughoutthisprocess.Thisresearchwouldhave
neveroccurredhaditnotbeenforhim.WewouldliketothanktheMassachusettsInstitute
ofTechnologyandtheSchoolofArchitectureandPlanningfortheirsupport,aswellasthe
KellyDouglasTravelGrant.
Wearegratefulforallthesupportwe’vereceivedinQuito,includingCharlyGarcía
andtheFundaciónMarianadeJesús,RobertoCarrión,Arq.JoséOrdoñezVillacresesfrom
theInstitutoMetropolitanodePlanificaciónUrbana,PhD.RosaElenaDonosofromthe
SecretaríadeTerritorio,HábitatyVivienda,andtheMinisteriodeDesarrollorUrbanoy
ViviendadelEcuador.
SpecialthankstoEarlKesslerforhissupportandinvaluableinformation.
Finally,ourgreatestthankyoutothefamiliesofSolanda,thatwelcomedusintotheir
neighborhoodandtheirhomes.Thisresearchisdedicatedtothem.
References CharlieGarcia(projectmanagerforFoundationMarianadeJesús)indiscussionwiththe
authors,May2016.
GAO/NSAID.TheSolandaHousingGuarantyProjectinEcuador.UnitedStatesGeneral
AccountingOffice,1986.
Guzmán,Alberto,Brevesreseñasdelasúltimasdécadasdelaspolíticasdeviviendade
Ecuador,ContratoSocialporlaViviendaDigna,2007.
JoséOrdoñezVillacreses(InstitutoMetropolitanodePlanificaciónUrbana)indiscussionwiththeauthors,December2015.
PADCO,Inc.TheSolandaProjectEvaluationandLuchadelosPobres:AComparisonof
FormalandInformalCommunityDevelopment.PADCO,Inc,1989.
RTIInternational.LACHousingandUrbanUpgradingAssistanceRetrospective:Honduras
andEcuador,1980-2005.RTIInternational,2005.
RosaElenaDonoso(advisortoQuito’sSecretaríadeTerritorio,Hábitat,yVivienda)indiscussionwiththeauthors,May2016.
GraphicWork,Images EconomicActivity
‘LaJota’–Solanda’smajorcommercialstreet
PhotoCredit:GabrielMuñozMoreno
ParkstoParking
Conversionofinternalblockgardenstoparkinglots
Photocredit:GabrielMuñozMoreno
Over-expansion
‘Bridge-Unit’
expandedtofourfloors
Photocredit:FrancisGoyes
Buildout
BuildoutofhousesinSolanda,observeelectriccabledisarray
Photocredit:FrancisGoyes
‘Basic-Unit’inoriginalstate
Photocredit:FrancisGoyes
Initialstate
Solandapriortoincrementalbuildingin1980s
Photocredit:EarlKessler
Solandahousingmodels
Graphiccredit:FrancisGoyes
Graphiccredit:FrancisGoyes
Superblockdesign
Graphiccredit:FrancisGoyes
SolandainQuito
Photo credit: Google Earth, 2016
Solanda Model
Photo credit: Fundación Mariana de Jesús