q. Coca-cola Bottlers Phils. vs. City of ManilaFacts:

Mayor of Manila approved Tax Ordinance No. 7988which amended certain sections of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 insofar as the tax rates applicable to certain establishments are concern. Pursuant to the said Tax Ordinance, Coca-cola filed a petition before the DOJ alleging that the tax ordinance goes beyond the limitation on the taxing power of the City since it impose an additional business tax on businesses and that it was not published. DOJ Sec. declared the said ordinance as null and void and without legal effect. Despite the fact that the said Ordinance was declared null and void and the directive of the Bureau of Local Govt. Finance (BLGF) that City of Manila shall not enforce the said ordinance, the latter continue to assess Coca-cola’s business tax. Thus, Coca-cola filed a complaint with the RTC. RTC ruled in favor of Coca-cola.

During the pendency of the case, City Mayor approved another Tax Ordinance (Tax Ordinance 8011) which amended Tax Ordinance No. 7988 which was earlier declared null and void and legally not existing. Coca-cola filed a complaint before the RTC but the case was dismissed, hence this petition was elevated.

Issue:Whether or not Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and

Tax Ordinance No. 8011 valid.

Held:No.Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was not published in

full for 3 consecutive days in a newspaper of gen. circulation as provided for under sec. 188 of the LGC:

"Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. – Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation; Provided, however, that in provinces, cities, and municipalities where there are no newspapers or local circulations the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places." (R.A. No. 7160) (stress supplied)

Upon the other hand, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, insofar as pertinent, mandates:

"Art. 277. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. – (a) within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation provided that in

provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.

If the tax ordinances or revenue measure contains penal provisions as authorized under Art. 279 of this Rule, the gist of such tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinance or measure shall be made in accessible and conspicuous public places in all municipalities and cities of the province to which the sanggunian enacting the ordinance or revenue measure belongs.

It is clear from the above-quoted provisions of R.A. No. 7160 and its implementing rules that the requirement of publication is MANDATORY and leaves no choice.

On the other hand, Ordinance No. 8011, subject herein, is also null and void, it being a mere amendatory ordinance of Ordinance No. 7988 which, as earlier stated, had been nullified by this Department. An invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance does not, in legal contemplation, exist. Where a statute which has been amended is invalid, nothing, in effect, has been amended.

r. Jardine Davies Insurance Brokers Inc. vs. AliposaFacts:

Pursuant to LGC, Sanggunian Bayan of Makati enacted Mun. Ordinance No. 92-072, which provides for the schedule of real estate, business and franchise taxes in the Mun. of Makati at rates higher than those in Metro Manila Revenue Code. The said ordinance was declared void and without legal effect as Makati did not comment on the appeal filed by Phil. Racing Club Inc. Despite that fact, Makati continued to implement the ordinance and pursuant to the latter, Jardine’s taxes was assessed and billed. Jardine did not protest the assessment and in fact paid it so a receipt was issued in favor of the latter. Consequently, Jardine wrote to Mun. Tres. requesting that Makati should compute the former’s tax in accordance with Metro Manila Revenue Code and not under Makati’s Ordinance, which was already declared by DOJ as null and void, and that Makati should refund of its overpayment. Makati denied the request. Hence, Jardine filed a complaint before RTC. Makati opposed the complaint and filed a motion to dismiss. RTC ruled in favor of Makati holding that Jardine’s cause of action had prescribed and that Jardine is barred from claiming a refund. Jardine filed

motion for reconsideration but it was denied, hence, this petition for review on certiorari was elevated.

Issue: Whether or not RTC is correct in holding that

Jardine’s cause of action had prescribed and is barred to claim the refund.

Held:Yes.Cause of action of Jardine was proscribed

from filing its complaint with the RTC of Makati for the reason that petitioner failed to appeal to the Secretary of Justice within 30 days from the effectivity date of the ordinance as mandated by Section 187 of the Local Government Code which reads:

Sec. 187-Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings.- The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal:Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

Failure of a taxpayer to interpose the requisite appeal to the Secretary of Justice is fatal to its complaint for a refund:

Clearly, the law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof. In case the Secretary decides the appeal, a period also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to seek relief in court. These three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court. Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. For this reason

the courts construe these provisions of statutes as mandatory.

A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames. In the instant case, it is our view that the failure of petitioners to appeal to the Secretary of Justice within 30 days as required by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160 is fatal to their cause.s. City of Olongapo vs. StallholdersFacts:

Olongapo City enacted Ordinance No. 14, fixing the monthly rental fees for different stall in the new public market. Stallholders questioned the validity of the ordinance by filing an appeal to DOJ Sec, which was made pursuant to Sec. 187 of LGC. DOJ upheld the validity of the ordinance. Stallholders moved for reconsideration but DOJ Sec. refrained from taking an action on the ground of the pendency of the case filed in court questioning the validity of sec. 187. Consequently, stallholders filed before the RTC an action to declare Olongapo Ordinance No. 14 void and writ of prohibition. Olongapo moved for the dismissal. RTC dismissed the complaint. Stallholders appealed to the CA which rendered that no genuine triable issue exists that requires trial on merits, however, insofar as the market rental rates is concern CA remanded the case to RTC. Hence, this petition was elevated since according to Olongapo, RTC’s function is limited to review of evidence adduced before Sec of Justice.

Issue:Whether or not CA correctly remanded the case

to RTC.

Held:Yes.The circumstances under which respondents

sought relief from the RTC. Perhaps doubting his jurisdiction to entertain stallholders' appeal as a result of the filing , the Justice Secretary issued a Memorandum directing the Chief State Counsel to refrain from acting on or accepting appeals filed under Section 187 of the Local Government Code and to "inform the Stallholders to file their appeal directly with the courts." The Chief State Counsel, complying with the

Memorandum, advised in his letter to stallholders to "file their appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction," the "appeal" referring to an action to question the validity of the subject ordinance. The Memorandum and the accompanying letter thus amounted to an abdication by the Secretary of Justice of his jurisdiction over the appeal, as conferred by Section 187.

Accordingly, the action before the RTC cannot be deemed to be anything but an original action, and the function of the trial court cannot be limited to reviewing the evidence adduced before the Secretary of Justice.

It is precisely the accuracy of these documents that stallholders are disputing. Consequently, respondents may examine the officials who executed said documents. They may present their own evidence, both documentary and testimonial, to prove that the figures in the documents are inaccurate. All these require a trial so that the parties may properly ventilate their respective causes. (Hindi ko ulit na gets!)

t. Albon vs. FernandoFacts:

Pursuant to Ordinance No. 59 of Marikina, City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision like other infrastructure projects relating to roads, streets and sidewalks. Albon filed with the RTC a taxpayer’s suit contending that it is unlawful and unconstitutional to use govt. equipment and property, and to disburse public funds in a private property like the Greenheights Subdivision being a violation of constitution and secs. 335 and 336 of LGC. RTC dismissed the petition. Upon appeal, CA sustained the ruling of RTC that the Ordinance was valid following the White Plains Association decision:

When [a strip of land] was withdrawn from the commerce of man as the open space required by law to be devoted for the use of the general public, its ownership was automatically vested in the [LGU] and/or the Republic of the Philippines, without need of paying any compensation to [the developer], although it is still registered in the latter’s name. Its donation by the owner/developer is a mere formality. Hence, this case was elevated.

Issue:Whether or not RTC and CA is correct in relying

to the White Plains Association case its decision.

Held:

No.The ruling in the 1991 White Plains

Association decision relied on by both the trial and appellate courts was modified by this Court in 1998 in White Plains Association v. Court of Appeals. Citing Young v. City of Manila,this Court held in its 1998 decision that subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation.

The word "street," in its correct and ordinary usage, includes not only the roadway used for carriages and vehicular traffic generally but also the portion used for pedestrian travel. The part of the street set aside for the use of pedestrians is known as a sidewalk.

Moreover, under subdivision laws, lots allotted by subdivision developers as road lots include roads, sidewalks, alleys and planting strips. Thus, what is true for subdivision roads or streets applies to subdivision sidewalks as well. Ownership of the sidewalks in a private subdivision belongs to the subdivision owner/developer until it is either transferred to the government by way of donation or acquired by the government through expropriation.

Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money or property shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. This is in consonance with the fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes.

Therefore, the use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes Section 335 of RA 7160. This conclusion finds further support from the language of Section 17 of RA 7160 which mandates LGUs to efficiently and effectively provide basic services and facilities. The law speaks of infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the LGU and "which are funded out of municipal funds."It particularly refers to "municipal roads and bridges" and "similar facilities."

The test of validity of a public expenditure: it is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.27 Incidental advantage to the public or to the State resulting from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business does not justify their aid by the use of public money.