lauren schmidt- turkey paper final

The Turkish Experience: Addressing Market Failure in the International Provision of Refugee Protection

Lauren Schmidt

Independent Study, Prof. John Gould

October 14th, 2015

L. Schmidt, “The Turkish Experience...” 1

Carsten Koall/Getty Images

Table of Contents

1. An Introduction to the Syrian Refugee Crisis ..........................................................................3

2. Conceptualizing Failures of the International Response ............................................................4

3. Addressing Failures in the Refugee Provision Market................................................................7

4. Turkey: An Illustrative Case Study ........................................................................................12

4. Moving Forward: Reconciling “Role Conflict’ .......................................................................23

5. Bibliography .............................................................................................................................27


An Introduction to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Since the conflict began in 2011, more than half of Syria’s citizens have been displaced

by violence and instability. The global community has struggled to accommodate the 4 million

refugees, largely failing to offer durable solution for the vulnerable incoming population

(Albayrak, para. 4). Due to the perceived costs of providing the good, its in-excludable benefits,

and the lack of an overarching international power to ensure others also contribute, many states

have oriented policies towards minimal provision. This collective strategy has resulted in a

tremendous under-provision of refugee support which not only harms the vulnerable forced

migrants but their host nations as well. By analyzing the ways in which current policies and

initiatives fail to realize a state’s current domestic, regional, international and ideological goals in the

framework of Korany and Dessouki’s ‘role theory’, insight into how current responses might be

improved to encourage a most efficient humanitarian response can be gained. Such an understanding

has the ability to ensure current structures are empowering affected populations with the agency to

rise above the difficulties of their current situation while minimizing the cost of distributing aid for

host communities.

When addressing market failure in the provision of refugee services, analyzing the

policies and initiatives of Turkey is crucial. Sharing a 560-mile border, the state has absorbed

over half Syria’s refugees and is, consequently, host to more asylum seekers than any other

country in the world (McClatchy, para. 1). The ability of Turkey’s current asylum to achieve its

domestic, regional, international, and ideological aspirations will be evaluated utilizing the ‘role

theory’ framework, and ways to achieve any unrealized aims and address the collective action

problem through an increase in refugee provision will be explored.


Conceptualizing Failures of the International Response

The Collective Action Problem of Refugee Protection

When seeking to understand the reasons for shortages in the international supply of

protection for Syrian refugees, it is critical to first contextualize refugee provision as a public

good. Since the late 1960’s, political scientists have utilized public goods analysis as primary

means of interpreting global issues (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 2). This framework

characterizes an international public good as any good which is ‘non-excludable’; meaning no

country can be excluded from benefitting from another’s contribution, and ‘non-rival’; meaning

one state’s consumption of the good does not reduce the amount available for the consumption of

others (3). When applied to the provision of refuge and services for asylum seekers, the benefits

of increased national security, transnational stability, and peace of mind- that the displaced

population has reached safety- can be understood as public goods (Hatton 607).

Despite such benefits to be gained, ‘market-failure’ remains endemic to international

refugee protection as it occurs in an environment with no hegemon or overarching governmental

institution with the ability to ensure all states contribute to a public good (Thielemann, “Burden-

Sharing...” 4). The absence of a coercive power forces states to rely on strategic interactions to

achieve socially optimal outcomes. As actors know that others may enter into agreements they

have no intention of keeping, and that imperfect information of a situation leads to pervasive

uncertainty and risk, states are often deterred from contributing to the public good themselves

(Kohane 160-162). Because it is not possible to exclude others from the benefits of the good,

states are further enticed to under-provide themselves and free-ride (obtaining the benefit without

effort or cost) upon the contributions of others (Stein 123). An attempt of states to pursue short-

term strategies which avoid the negative externalities of providing the public good themselves


while maximizing the positive consequences of others doing so, facilitates a collective action

problem, in which “the [long-term] outcomes of individual decisions will be collectively

inefficient” (Feiock 398).

Although theories on collective action have primarily been employed to describe the

under-provision of defense, it can be translated to the refugee context. States have immense

discretion in how they address asylum seekers within their borders; They can recognize their

asylum claims and grant official status, give them some other protection status (i.e. that of a

recognized ‘guest’), or reject the asylum claim altogether and send them back to their home

country (repatriation) (“International Trade...” 11). Emerging as the dominant power after WWII

and the Vietnam War, the United States was able to orchestrate the resettlement of hundreds of

thousands of refugees and ensure the various host nations officially recognize their status

(“International Trade...” 8). As the political hegemony of the United Stated has declined in

recent years, there no longer exists an entity capable of orchestrating the international protection

of refugees and distributing consequences to states who choose to free-ride. Consequently,

offering minimal protection and repatriation has become an increasingly attractive and viable

option for many actors. The inequitable distribution of the impure public good has begun to

stabilize over time, “with states accepting or unable to change the pattern of burden-

distribution” (2).

Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good: Identifying Private Benefits

Closer inspection, however, reveals this understanding of the collective action problem to

be insufficient as refugee provision is not a purely public good. The supplying of care yields

additional benefits which are enjoyed almost exclusively by the donor state, including: increased

regional security, enhanced international and domestic status, and the achievement of its


ideological goals (“International Trade...” 12). As the security and stability achieved by the

provision of refugee services typically prove “more limited in reach than global public goods

suggests, [it] should be interpreted as a predominantly regional good” (Thielemann, “Burden-

Sharing...” 4-5). A raise in international and domestic status resulting from a demonstrated

commitment to humanitarian efforts is another benefit exclusive to the donor state. Additionally,

as the state’s actions recognize democracy and human rights, it will gain from the achievement of

its ideological goals (“International Trade...” 12). Because these outputs are ‘partially-rival’--

offering “excludable benefits which are not shared equally among contributors” or non-

contributors-- the provision of refugee services is most aptly described as an impure public good

(Roper and Barria, “Burden Sharing...” 623).

Current research suggests the recognition of these private benefits serve as incentives for

individual states to contribute to a refugee crisis (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 7). Numerous

studies by Roper and Barria reveal donor countries are likely to spend significantly more on

emergencies that are geographically closer, illuminating that states perceive the disproportionate

gains in stability. Additionally, the literature suggests state’s are more likely to donate upon the

condition their nationals are placed in key positions of humanitarian programs and donations are

made public, meaning countries recognize the private socio-political benefits to having their

contributions made visible to domestic and international observers (“Burden Sharing...” 624).

Furthermore, a perception of ideological gains is made evident as those with a higher record of

political rights and civil liberties are significantly more likely to contribute (626). As these

observations suggest:

“[A] country’s contributions to the provision of refugee protection... will be

positively related to the proportion of excludable benefits accruing to that country.


The greater the proportion of private benefits to overall benefits, the greater the

incentive for individual states to contribute to the provision of an international

collective good” (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 8).

Although these private benefits ensure refugee protection will be provided to a greater extent

than is expected given the ‘exploitation model’ of purely public goods, the problems of collective

action-- mainly, under-provision and inequitable distribution-- remain as countries continue to

perceive the good’s non-excludable benefits. As a result, the various means through which the

collective action problem can be mitigated should be explored.

Addressing Failures in the Refugee Provision Market

Analyzing Methods of Improvement

There exists a myriad of ways in which the collective suboptimality of individual

behavior care can be addressed. The primary modes remain the creation of international

institutions, the harmonization of international asylum policy, and increased specialization in the

provision of refugee services. International institutions are defined as a set of “implicit or explicit

principals, norms, rules, and decision making procedures” around which actors expectations can

converge (Koehane 141). These institutions can be likened to contractual agreements, which

increase cooperation in addressing international issues by minimizing the risk of other’s free-

riding. They establish mutual expectations for actors by introducing a finite set of rules, create

disincentives for deception, and increase the quantity and quality of communication between

participating nations (Kohane 160-162).

To mitigate the market failures in refugee provision, some international institutions--

most notably the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)-- aim to


orchestrate “private and public intermediary actors on a voluntary basis, by providing them

ideational and material support” (Abbott 1). The gains from mutual cooperation are made

possible by the institution’s ability to reduce the uncertainty of other actors, and increase security

by minimizing the deflection of asylum applicants from one destination to another (Hatton 606).

Also “Membership in institutions can provide all states a form of prestige which allows them to

influence policy and shape norms of international behavior” (Roper and Barria, “Donor

Fatigue...” 12). The limited political agency of the UNHCR and similar transnational

organizations incentivized collaboration as participants receive tremendous economic and

political benefits at low sovereignty costs (Abbott 3). Institutions can also serve to lower the

professional and financial burden on the host country. The most prominent example of financial

burden-sharing is the EU’s European Refugee Fund which seeks to ensure each Member State

donates an equal amount of resources to the crisis, irrespective of how many refugees the are

physically faced with (“International Trade...” 18).

Although the UNHCR, European Refugee Fund and other international institutions have

the power to improve the market-incentives to contribute to the public good, their minimal

coercive power demonstrates that institutionalized cooperation may “decline quite apart from the

real intentions or objectives of the policy makers involved” and fail to solve the collective action

problem (Kohane 163). The UNHCR’s limited capacity to influence local policies in a way

which would facilitate a more efficient use of its resources severely limits its competency as the

sole provider of the public good. Similarly, the European Refugee Fund is unable to punish those

who fail to contribute resources and is thus perpetually insufficient in its efforts to compensate

those nations which are bearing the financial cost of the crisis (“International Trade...” 18). As

this analysis demonstrates, difficulties coordinating and dividing up specific contributions and


offering real punishments for failing to provide prove tremendous challenges to achieving a

collectively optimal outcome through the formation of international organizations (Feiock

406-7).

The reformation of forced migration policy between nations is an alternative way in

which the transnational community seeks to address the unequal distributions in the cost of

providing the public good (“International Trade...” 14). History has proven the that

harmonization of policy is a similarly feeble endeavor in addressing the collective action

problems present in the global provision of refugee services. Although numerous examples of

international policy harmonization have been enacted to bind states into providing the public

good-- most notably the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 UN Declaration on Territorial

Asylum-- none have proven tremendously effective. There is no overarching power to enforce

adherence to such agreements (20). Also, harmonization of asylum policies between nations can

prove harmful as they curtail a state from choosing their most efficient means of crisis response

(financial, physical, etc.) based upon existing resources. Therefore “policy harmonizing is... more

likely to undermine than to facilitate opportunities for implicit burden-sharing in this

area” (20-21).

As the formidable shortcomings of forming international institutions and harmonizing

asylum policy demonstrate, a third option must be considered when aiming to improve the

collective action problems of refugee protection. A focus on the ways in which specialization in

the market can lower the costs of providing the public good- and, thus, the incentive to free-ride-

offers a new way of addressing market failure. Because nations are not likely to incur the same

costs of production for any particular contribution, specialization in refugee care can

significantly reduce the costs of participating by allowing states to choose their preferred means


of providing the public good (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 7). The two primary means of

provision are reactive contributions (provision of protection opportunities after persons have

been displaced) and proactive contributions (engagement in unilateral and multilateral peace-

keeping operations aimed at preventing refugee flows before they occur). It is reasonable to

assume countries have a comparative advantage in one of the two areas; States boasting well

established asylum infrastructure will find reactive measures easier, while those with large

armies and experience intervening abroad will find proactive action easier (10). It is important to

note that the building of individual capacity may create disincentives for other actors to provide,

furthering the collective action problem.

Additionally, some states possess a political comparative advantage as determined by a

country’s domestic political environment. In any political system, policy-makers are constrained

by the preferences of their constituents, particularly their attitudes towards the refugees and the

source country itself (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 11). According to Hatton, research

demonstrates:

“[A]ttitudes towards asylum seekers are shaped partly by political and religious

perspectives by feelings of personal or cultural insecurity... (and also) fears about

personal safety or crime, threats to security, and challenges to the majority

culture...” (Hatton 623).

It follows that host nations which identify closely with the political, ideological, religious,

linguistic and cultural characteristics of the incoming population are less likely to perceive the

influx as a direct threat to their way of life, and will incur a lower political cost when providing

support. In such circumstances, it is possible for the provision of refugee services to become a

private good as domestic audiences applaud the state’s recognition and protection of the rights of


those with whom they closely identify. Ultimately, the “economic and political sources of

comparative advantage... provide incentives for specialization and trade in contributions to

international collective goods” (Thielemann, “Burden-Sharing...” 11).

By first reorienting international focus to highlight the private gains to providing the

public good, states may become more willing to engage in initiatives which force countries to

increase and equalize their contributions. As the “legitimacy of the international institution does

not emerge from any waiving of national interest, but from an interest developed in the

institutions themselves”, international regimes and will prove much more sustainable if they

appear to facilitate the comparative advantage of the state (Stein 138). Similarly, if the policy

initiatives instituted appear to encourage-- rather than dictate-- public good contributions in a

manner which aligns with existing comparative advantage, a nation’s perceived cost of provision

will appear lower (Roper and Barria, “Donor Fatigue...” 5).

Utilizing ‘Role Theory’ as a Framework to Identify Private Benefits

The socio-political framework of Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Dessouki’s ‘role theory’ can

be utilized as a primary means of ascertaining the ways in which contributions to international

refugee protection can achieve private benefits for a state. ‘Role theory’ seeks to understand the

ways in which a country conceptualizes its function within the global environment and considers

how such constructs might influence behavior by analyzing its ‘foreign policy output’-- which

consists of an actor’s ‘role conception’ (specific aspirations of the country as defined by its

unique national identity, regional interests and international goals) and ‘role performance’ (what

the state’s policies and initiatives actually achieve) (27). Korany and Dessouki point out that a

state’s insufficient understanding of the consequences of various policies and initiatives will lead


to ‘role conflict’: the failure of outcome (‘role performance’) to realize aspirations (‘role

conception’) (28).

When applied to the provision of refugee services, an observation of the international

market-failure shows that the public nature of the good causes many states to assume a ‘role

performance’ which minimizes the states commitment to its refugees. However, closer inspection

reveals that under-provision fails to fully actualize the social, economic, and political ‘role

conceptions’ of the state. By illuminating the ways in which reorienting policies and initiatives to

increase contributions to the good of refugee support can help actualize the country’s private

interest, a state may be able to reform its ‘role performance’ in a way which simultaneously

reconciles such ‘role conflict’ and minimizes the collective action problem.

Turkey: An Illustrative Case Study

A case study of Turkey’s response to the Syrian crisis will contextualize the theoretical

explanations for market failure in international provision of refugee services and illustrate how

the state’s current policies aimed at under-providing the good not only contributes to the global

collective action problem, but also results in a ‘role performance’ which does not actualize the

states ‘role conception’. An analysis of the unforeseen private benefits-- including: furthered

domestic agendas, increased regional security, enhanced international status and the achievement

of ideological goals-- Turkey’s stands to gain from raising its commitment to the issue can

inspire a process of specialization and policy reformation which will not only serve the state, but

its vulnerable refugee population as well.


‘Role Orientation’: the Private Interests of Turkey

It is crucial to first understand Turkey’s national, regional and international goals when

ascertaining the ways in which an increase in its support for the refugee crisis can help achieve

them. As Korany and Dessouki argue, the state’s goals or ‘role orientation’ “refers to the way the

state’s... elite perceive the world and their country’s (pragmatic or idealogical) role in it” (39).

This perception is described to be stable, yet in a state of constant evolution based upon new

information and shifting power dynamics (40). By investigating the roots of Turkish national

identity, insight into its current domestic, regional, international and ideological goals can be

gained.

The cultivation of a uniquely “Turkish” identity can be traced back to the foundation of

the modern Republic of Turkey by president Mustafa Kemal Ataürk. Inheriting a politically and

economically vulnerable new nation, born of the Ottoman Empire’s ashes, Atatürk’s primary

concern was engendering the territory with a nationalist sentiment around which legitimate

cultural, economic and political systems might be fostered (Finkel 25). Atatürk’s approach to

nation-building is embodied in his popular mantra: “Happy is the one who says ‘I am a

Turk’” (8-11). Such sentiment can be interpreted to mean that-- despite not consisting of a

distinct ethnic group-- Turkish nationalism is a construction validated by a shared religion,

language and commitment to modern values. Although he embraced the merits of an

overwhelmingly Muslim, Turkic-speaking population when fostering a strong sense of

community, Atatürk sought to emphasize a socially cohesive state through its determinedly

modern orientation. His bold decisions, including: moving the capital from Istanbul to Ankara,

making men wear a Western-styled hat instead of the fez, adopting a Western democratic model

of governance, replacing Arabic script with the Latin alphabet as the mode of communicating


Turkish, and encouraging women to become more involved in public life, changed the

atmosphere of the country and effectively gave Turks a shared experience which was completely

their own (Finkel 29).

Turkey’s identity can be further explored to understand the state’s domestic goals of

maintaining a secular, yet Muslim, identity and its internal legitimacy. Turkey is distinct in that it

is both a Muslim-majority country and an avowed secular state, subsequently representing the

“unique marriage of firmly-rooted Muslim and religious cultural commitments with Western

governmental institutions and social practices” (Cyr 222-223). Guaranteed by Article 24 of the

1982 constitution, constituents maintain freedom of religion as long as it does not threaten the

integrity and secular character of the state (Finkel 138). The state’s unique ability to uphold a

separation of mosque and state has become a point of national pride and its perpetuation and can

thus be presumed a domestic aspiration of the government.

Although a deep-rooted commitment to combining Islam and democratic governance

persists, Turkey suffers from internal disagreement regarding the practicality of such an identity.

Accusations of the state carrying out an Islamist agenda have heightened since the rise of the

socially conservative Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) to power in 2001 (Finkel 73, 138).

Many citizens believe the threat of Islam is overshadowing the once secular Turkish identity, as

“Turk” is now reserved for someone who is born into the Muslim faith and whose native tongue

is Turkish, a narrow categorization which implies there are Turkish citizens who are not really

“Turks”. Currently, the population of non-Muslim citizens is on the decline, minorities making

up less than 250,000 of the 75 million Turkish citizens (10). The most notable of such minority

groups may be the Kurds, a people whose struggle for political recognition and rejection of the

AKP’s growing authoritarianism continues to generate significant domestic challenges


(107-122). Turkey’s inability to integrate traditionally disempowered groups is exacerbated by

tremendous regional economic inequality. A stark disparity in development between the Western

and Mediterranean coast and the Eastern Central Anatolia and Black Sea regions afflicts the

country, generating disillusionment regarding the intentions and capabilities of those in power

(48). As the uprisings and demonstrations of disempowered groups proliferates, the Turkish

government is continually trying to find ways to maintain its legitimacy and quell dissent.

Turkey hopes the realization of such political and cultural tranquility will allow it assume

a larger role as the enforcer of regional stability. The dominance of Atatürk’s primary policy

principle: “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” emphasizes the state’s goal of serving as a role

model for other actors in an unstable region (“Synopsis...”, para. 15). Although ambitions of

leading by example continue, recent turmoil in the region-- proliferated by the Arab Spring and

the emergence of Daesh-- has caused policy orientation to become more regionally assertive

Turkey’s “own security and stability can only be achieved through the security and stability of

the region” (para. 4-5). Despite still being primarily interested in reaching diplomatic solutions,

the country is increasingly pursuing an eradication of “traditional security threats such as

terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cross-border organized crime and illegal

immigration” by any means necessary (para. 2). The country’s increased willingness to intervene

in regional matters illuminates its goals of being the primary agent of regional stability.

Internationally, Turkey hopes its role in facilitating regional success will serve as a means

of the asserting its international relevance. In demonstrating its close cultural ties with the region

and an eagerness to work through multilateral fora (such as the UNHCR and NATO) in the

resolution of various conflicts, the country aims to garner favor with the Western community,

particularly with the European Union (EU) (“Synopsis...”, para. 12). Turkey has pursued EU


membership in recent decades and , upon finally earning candidate status in 2004, began the

“complex process of harmonizing its laws and procedures to European norms” (Finkel 89).

Although adopting European norms has proven difficult for the heavy-handed AKP, Turkey sees

increased political clout, and enormous economic opportunities to be gained form such a deal. As

roughly half of Turkey’s trade and FDI is from the EU, a seat at the table would allow policy

makers to influence the Customs Union decisions which already deeply affect its economy (92).

Backed by the U.S., liberal Turks see the EU as “providing a framework for the country to

contain the excess of ultranationalist or doctrinaire Islamist politics” (95). Turkey believes

recognition would allow its country “to reach the highest level of contemporary

citizenship” (“Synopsis...”, para. 9). The appeal of EU membership would not only realize

economic and political goals, but cultural aspirations as well. With roughly 5 million ethnic

Turks presently residing in Europe, and many Turks of Europeans origin themselves (over

500,000 Turks were expatriated from Greece as part of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and

300,000 Bulgarian Turks fled to Turkey in 1989 to avoid a program of forced assimilation), most

citizens self-identify as European, rather than Arab, and view membership as a means of cultural

reconciliation (Finkel 97).

In addition to asserting domestic legitimacy, achieving regional stability, and gaining the

respect of Western powers, Turkey aims to propagate its ideological goals as well. In addition to

continuing to enjoy its unique secular, yet Muslim, system, Turkey claims want to assert itself as

an agent of peace. Furthermore, the nation “hopes to recognize the human rights of all both

within and outside its borders” (Schmidt).


‘Role Performance’: the Manifestations of Asylum Policy and Initiatives

Upon understanding the ‘role orientation’ of the state, a depiction of Turkey’s current

asylum policies and initiatives will prove useful when assessing their ability to actualize the

goals of the state. In regards to international policy, Turkey is a fellow signatory of the “1951

United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” which recognizes a refugee as

any individual who:

"owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,

nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside

the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling

to avail himself of the protection of that country or return there because there is a

fear of persecution..." (“Refugees and Displaced Persons...”, para. 2).

States are obliged to assure no refugee in search of asylum is “penalized, expelled, or refouled,

that every refugee enjoys the full complement of rights and benefits to which he or she is entitled

as a refugee; and that the human rights of every refugee are guaranteed”, the rights to health and

livelihood significant among them (Goodwin-Gill, 2014, para. 8).

It is crucial to note that Turkey is one of the few nations which defies the international

standards by maintaining a “geographic limitation” on asylum seekers, meaning the state is only

obliged to grant European forced migrants official refugee status, while asylum seekers from

other areas will only be accommodated until they can be repatriated or resettled in a third country

(Özden 5). Turkey has actively pursued such policy with the recent plight, officially recognizing

Syrian refugees as “guests” (Yeginsu & Shoumali, para. 10). As “guests”, the refugees are denied

the right to work and many are unable to attend local universities or legally obtain quality

housing (Yinanc, para. 3). The AKP maintains this is necessary to manage an escalating security


dilemma in a world of limited resources, one official explaining that, “Turkey must protect its

own people. If the government offers all these things, the refugees will continue to rush in. What,

then, will be left for us?” (Schmidt). A major consequence of denying Syrians the basic rights,

such as that to work, is that many are being employed without permits and are forced to work in

exploitative conditions at the hands of ‘opportunistic’ businessmen. One shopkeeper in Istanbul--

who employed ten refugees at about half the wage of Turkish workers-- epitomized the

sentiments of many local employers in saying, “Everybody wins here. I get to lower the cost of

business and [the refugees] get a job. I am not keeping them here, it is obvious they wouldn’t

stay if they had a better offer” (Schmidt). In addition to creating the circumstances which allow

such violations to happen, authorities seldom respond to exploitation reports (Özden 7-8).

In addition to implementing policies in discordance with international law, the Turkish

government has taken steps to limit the presence of international institutions within its borders.

The state “aims to prevent the interference of UNHCR or other international bodies in Turkish

control over the Syrian refugees”, for fear such interventions might jeopardize the nation’s

sovereignty (Özden 5). To ensure the refugee population within its borders is manageable,

Turkey’s asylum seekers must to go through a lengthy and bureaucratic registration process

called “refugee status determination” (RSD) before being transferred to ‘satellite cities’ (Biehl

66). The government’s twenty-three settlements offer various services, such as basic healthcare,

primary education and opportunities to local universities, and were designed to “monitor

mobility and contain any influence these populations might have upon Turkey’s

citizens” (Schmidt).

In accordance with an extremely centralized approach, the AKP does not allow any

independent observers, journalists, NGO’s, or other relief organizations into the government-run


camps. The only exception has been the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, an organization

many criticize as being ideologically and financially intertwined with the current government

(Özden 9). A few non-governmental organizations-- most notably: the International Rescue

Committee (IRC), the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC),

the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS), the Association for Solidarity with Refugees, Refugee

Advocacy and Support Program (RASP), and Sohram-- have been permitted to provide aid

outside the camps within strict governmental limitations (Albayrak, para. 10).

Reacting to the increasing costs of an exponentially growing refugee population, the

Turkish government has recently renounced its famed “open border policy”, which ensured that

there were at least two-border points where the prosecuted could seek security within its borders

(Yeginsu & Shoumali, para. 2). The complete sealing of the border came after multiple reports on

the conditions surfaced which divulged that the Turkish patrols had resorted to practices of

physically barring refugees from entering the country using live fire as a barricade and beating or

shooting those trying to cross irregularly as a means of dealing with the over-capacity (“Turkey:

Border Abuses...”, para. 1). The Turkish government has also begun establishing camps on the

Syrian side of the border, in hopes of “significantly reduc[ing] the number of refugees exploiting

Turkish hospitality by stopping them before they ever get to the border” (Schmidt).

‘Role Conflict’: Shortcomings of the Current Approach

An evaluation of Turkey’s ‘role performance’ suggests that the state’s current policies

severely conflict with the ultimate aspirations of the state. The state’s orientation towards

providing minimal legal and resource support for refugees not only contributes to a collective

action problem, but presents ‘role conflict’ (discord between the government’s capabilities and its


aims) as it severely conflicts with the ultimate domestic, regional, international, and ideological

aspirations of the state.

In regards to domestic goals of maintaining domestic tranquility and asserting the

legitimacy of the government, Turkish asylum policies prove inadequate. Discontent with

Turkey’s present policies are wide-spread in the Southeastern regions which host the ‘satellite

cities’. The various services provided within the camps have strained relations the host

communities and the government (Özden 8). This hostility can be attribute to the fact that these

communities usually consist of local minorities who are also struggling, yet have note received

the same support from their own government.

Despite the services offered, the government’s twenty-three settlements are nowhere near

adequate to handle the magnitude of the issue, and, consequently, many Syrians have begun

“fleeing into virtually every corner of the country, most notably the cities” (Schmidt). As urban

refugees are accorded no official status, and international organizations operating within the area

remain limited in their ability to provide social and financial support, many asylum seekers are

forced to beg along the city streets. As the burden to provide for the refugees falls upon the

people, many citizens have begun to question the government’s legitimacy, expressing a

“complete lack of faith in the AKP’s ability to handle the problem” (Schmidt). Additionally,

denying the right to work is generating a loss for the state’s economy as they forgo opportunities

to harness the influx of human capital.

Furthermore, the decision to establish refugee settlements on the Syrian side of the border

proves very troublesome for Turkey’s goals of establishing regional stability. Enacted against the

cries of prominent state and independent actors-- including Amnesty International and UNHCR--

who reasoned such camps to be tremendously problematic because they are established in zones


with very limited military support (essentially making them “open targets” for a terrorist attack),

these settlements endanger both the refugees and also the many Turkish officials working there.

Recent deaths of Turkish humanitarian workers and military personnel working in these

settlements has fueled tensions along the Syrian-Turkish border (Yinanc, para. 15). Additionally,

the state’s under-provision of the refugee services good has exasperated relations with the state’s

Greek and Bulgarian neighbors as “refugees failing to find legal protection and social support

within Turkey come to their doors” (Schmidt). As one Syrian Refugee, Imad Habbab, explained:

“We come to Turkey in search of a better life, but when our only options are stay

in a government camp and remain reliant upon the small aid they give us or move

to the city and work at exploited wages or beg, what can we do? This is no life.

We are forced to press onward, up to Europe” (Schmidt).

In addition to posing threats to regional goals, Turkey’s mode of accommodating the

refugee population proves damaging to its aspirations of garnering international respect. The

state’s refusal to lift geographic limitations to refugee protection has been condemned by

Western powers as it ignores the standards set by the Geneva Convention. Although the state has

hoped to demonstrate its prowess through independent policies, the abundance of domestic and

regional issues continue to leave the EU and other international actors unimpressed.

Although Turkey is willing to accept aid, the lack of donor transparency and inability for

donors to access the camps renders many who have the power to help unwilling to take the risk.

Additionally, the government’s refusal to grant refugees official status creates incentives for

international organizations operating within the country to under-provide. As one humanitarian

worker put it, “Since many of the refugees we are supposed to be serving aren’t officially

recognized, no one is following up with the work we are doing here. There are really no


incentives for our organization to provide efficient services or increase its programs.” (Schmidt).

Eight out of fifteen humanitarian workers interviewed reported that they perceived corruption to

be a natural part of humanitarian business in Turkey, seven of the eight believing the lack of

accountability to be the main cause (Schmidt). Having only accrued a meager $264 million in

international donations, such policies have forced the majority of the financial burden upon the

state, much to the dismay of the local taxpayers (Albayrak, para. 5). Andrew Gardner, a

researcher on Turkey for Amnesty International, said that the international response has been

disappointingly low, but “Turkey needs to do more to request and facilitate it” (“Turkey: Border

Abuses...”, para. 3). The AKP’s severe limiting of international involvement in favor of

sovereignty has further earned the country an reputation of being unwilling to cooperate with

international institutions in most of the Western world’s minds.

It should be noted that the Turkish government has indeed been internationally applauded

for “prioritizing human solidarity over national and personal fears... [T]here is an unflinching

recognition on the part of the Turkish officials that helping these refugees is a moral imperative,

even if it is difficult, costly, unpopular, and risky” (Groody, para.15). Although international

admiration still exists, Turkey’s continued attempt to provide most of the financial and human

capital needed to combat the crisis has fallen drastically short and encouraged desperate actions

(such as brutal border tactics, inefficient satellite cities, camps in Syria, etc.). These actions

continue to be well-documented in international media, consequently undermining the positive

work Turkey is doing in service of the refugees. Ultimately, the adoption of these policies serves

to undermine the ideological commitments to peace, human rights and democracy claimed by the

state.


Moving Forward: Reconciling ‘Role Conflict’

Reforming Policy: Actualizing Private Interest

Having demonstrated the pitfalls of current ‘role performance’, it is imperative Turkey

reform its policies and initiatives in a way which better reflects the interests of the republic and

addresses the collective action problem. As this evaluation will demonstrate, the state can reduce

its ‘role conflict’ and gain many private benefits by increasing the scale of refugee services its

offers.

Critically, to proactively counter Turkey’s developmental disparity and growing unrest

among the Southeastern regions of the country, Turkey should adopt a non-discriminatory policy

in regards to aid recipients. This policy would allow international aid flowing in to serve both

local and refugee populations as needed, mitigating the grounds for contention between the two

groups and fostering a sense of governmental responsibility and regional interest for those

currently dissatisfied with the AKP. The economic burden the influx has placed upon local

communities can be further mitigated through the re-imagination of employment policy. Turkey

should stipulate all international organizations operating within the country employ a certain

percentage of Turkish nationals. The increase of jobs in traditionally disenfranchised areas and

development of professional expertise are additional private benefits to be gained from

increasing the provision of refugee services. It is reasonable to assume slight shifts in policy

might cultivate a domestically stable nation more able to achieve substantial increases in regional

peace.

State’s ‘role orientation’ towards being an enforcer of regional stability can also be

improved by increasing the state’s contribution to the refugee provision. The removal of the

settlements in Syrian would serve to decrease border tensions and reduce Turkish casualties. Also


the reinstitution of Turkey’s “open-border” policy would facilitate a safer, more humane, and

better regulated way for those fleeing tragedy to reach asylum. Additionally, by offering official

status to refugees the state could more effectively regulate and coordinate the refugees migrating

to Greece and Bulgaria, thus reducing tensions with their neighbors. As these benefits

demonstrate, Turkey can legitimize its claims of being an agent of peace to the regional

community by contributing to the good of refugee services.

Turkey’s international aspirations of gaining the EU and other Western actors’ respect,

exhibiting a willingness to work through multinational flora and showing an ability to respond

responsibly to a complex issue can also be better recognized through a reformation of current

‘role performance’. The current situation demonstrates that Turkey is incapable of handling this

project alone and should open both its bank accounts to foreign aid and its camps to international

expertise. As many agencies have claimed an unwillingness to send aid to virtually unregulated

camps, allowing agencies to collaborate in relief efforts would allow the Turkish government to

take a more administrative role which aims at improving the overwhelmed security apparatus.

Additionally, allowing international actors to collaborate within the camps is crucial to national

interest as it demonstrates a willingness to cooperate with multinational institutions and non-

governmental organizations. Turkey can still achieve the global acclaim it sought through its

previous policies by “earmarking” its independent donations to the international organizations

“Earmarking” would allow Turkey to not only retain control over how and where their resources

will go, but also to highlight their important contributions to the cause (Roper and Barria,

“Burden Sharing...” 624). As one local official explained, “Taking these steps will not only

combat security issues and relieve the Turkish people, but will highlight Turkey’s strategic


importance for the West as a rational partner within a hostile region, committed to the alleviation

of suffering” (Schmidt).

In addition, the brutal border tactics, employment exploitation, and the restriction of

refugee mobility must be repealed so as to actualize Turkey’s ideological aspirations of ensuring

human rights, peace, and democracy. As many of the refugees are also practitioners of Islam,

Turkey retains a political comparative advantage to accepting the refugee population, when

compared to their European counterparts. Though some have voiced concerns that the refugees

population also includes individuals of other backgrounds-- such as: Kurds, Yazidis and

Christians-- which could poses a treat to Turkey’s unique secular, yet Muslim, system, an

embrace of competing religious and political ideologies would serve to highlight the state’s

strength being able to transcend the traditional confines of nationalism while maintaining its

unique identity. (Groody, para. 3).

Although Turkey’s commitment to the Syrian refugee crisis thus far should not be

undervalued, the proposed policy changes will better streamline these efforts in the service of

Turkey’s immediate domestic, regional, international, and ideological goals. A responsible and

collaborative response to such a high-profile issue proves undoubtedly in Turkey’s best interest,

as it will improve Turkey’s image as a capable ally, strong leader, and champion of human rights

in the global context.

Concluding remarks As Syria’s conflict and consequent refugee population continues to proliferate, it is

imperative the global community improve upon the current provision of protection. As an

analysis of the market reveals, the public nature of the refugee protection good has created

tremendous deficiencies in the current supply of support as most states seek to undersupply


themselves and free-ride upon the provision of others. However, as the Turkish case study

demonstrates, illuminating the private benefits to be gained through providing refugee support

can lower the perceived costs of provision and increase incentives for actors to raise their

individual contributions. Although the benefits illustrated by the example remain specific to

Turkey, other important actors may have similarly unrealized gains to increasing provision. The

identification of such benefits through Korany and Dessouki’s ‘role theory’ framework, various

states may choose to increase their contributions to the provision of refugee care and, thus,

generate large-scale improvements in minimizing the current collective action problem. As we

move forward, an improved response to the Syrian crisis will create the international

infrastructure, policies, and institutions necessary to alleviate the suffering of and create

opportunities for refugees in the future.


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