law and economics-charles w. upton hicks-kaldor optimality
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![Page 1: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Hicks-Kaldor Optimality](https://reader038.vdocument.in/reader038/viewer/2022103123/56649d395503460f94a13d47/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton
Hicks-Kaldor Optimality
![Page 2: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Hicks-Kaldor Optimality](https://reader038.vdocument.in/reader038/viewer/2022103123/56649d395503460f94a13d47/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Optimality
• Pareto Optimality. A change is good if– At least one party is made better off– No party is made worse off.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Hicks-Kaldor Optimality
![Page 4: Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Hicks-Kaldor Optimality](https://reader038.vdocument.in/reader038/viewer/2022103123/56649d395503460f94a13d47/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Optimality
• Pareto Optimality. A change is good if– At least one party is made better off– No party is made worse off.
• Hicks Kaldor Optimality. A change is good if– The gains to the winners exceed the losses to
the losers.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Optimality
• Pareto Optimality. A change is good if– At least one party is made better off– No party is made worse off.
• Hicks Kaldor Optimality. A change is good if– The gains to the winners exceed the losses to
the losers.
The winners could compensate the losers and
make this a Pareto Optimum Change
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
An Example
• John works for Sam for 40 hours. – He loses leisure worth $200 – He grows crops which Sam sells for 300.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
An Example
• John works for Sam for 40 hours. – He loses leisure worth $200 – He grows crops which Sam sells for $300.– If John gets paid $200-$300, it is Pareto
Optimal for him to work for Sam.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
An Example
• John works for Sam for 40 hours.
• Suppose John doesn't get paid.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
An Example
• John works for Sam for 40 hours.
• Suppose John doesn't get paid. – That is not Pareto Optimal.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
An Example
• John works for Sam for 40 hours.
• Suppose John doesn't get paid. – That is not Pareto Optimal. – It is Hicks Kaldor Optimal. A payment of
$200-$300 would have left both better off.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Lake Restful
• The town of Lake Restful decides to make some lake improvements, which are worth $10 per resident. The cost per resident is only $5.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Lake Restful
• The town of Lake Restful decides to make some lake improvements, which are worth $10 per resident. The cost per resident is only $5.
• Lake Restful levies a cigarette tax. Since only 1/4 of the residents smoke, the smokers end up paying $20 each.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Lake Restful
• The town of Lake Restful decides to make some lake improvements, which are worth $10 per resident. The cost per resident is only $5.
• Lake Restful levies a cigarette tax. Since only 1/4 of the residents smoke, the smokers end up paying $20 each.
The non-smokers get $10 of benefits, and the Smokers get
$10 of net costs
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Lake Restful
• The town of Lake Restful decides to make some lake improvements, which are worth $10 per resident. The cost per resident is only $5.
• Lake Restful levies a cigarette tax. Since only 1/4 of the residents smoke, the smokers end up paying $20 each.
The non-smokers get $10 of benefits, and the Smokers get
$10 of net costs
Not Pareto Optimal
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Lake Restful
• The town of Lake Restful decides to make some lake improvements, which are worth $10 per resident. The cost per resident is only $5.
• Lake Restful levies a cigarette tax. Since only 1/4 of the residents smoke, the smokers end up paying $20 each.
The non-smokers get $10 of benefits, and the Smokers get
$10 of net costs
Not Pareto Optimal
Hicks-Kaldor Optimal
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Acme Paper Mill
• Acme Paper Mill, located along Lake Restful, is allowed to operate and discharge $100 of pollutants into the water.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Acme Paper Mill
• Acme Paper Mill, located along Lake Restful, is allowed to operate and discharge $100 of pollutants into the water.
• It would cost $200 to clean up the mess.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Acme Paper Mill
• Acme Paper Mill, located along Lake Restful, is allowed to operate and discharge $100 of pollutants into the water.
• It would cost $200 to clean up the mess.
• Acme is allowed to begin operations without paying compensation to the residents.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Acme Paper Mill
• Acme Paper Mill, located along Lake Restful, is allowed to operate and discharge $100 of pollutants into the water.
• It would cost $200 to clean up the mess.
• Acme is allowed to begin operations without paying compensation to the residents.
Not Pareto Optimal
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Acme Paper Mill
• Acme Paper Mill, located along Lake Restful, is allowed to operate and discharge $100 of pollutants into the water.
• It would cost $200 to clean up the mess.
• Acme is allowed to begin operations without paying compensation to the residents.
Not Pareto Optimal
Hicks-Kaldor Optimal
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
The Stop Sign
• Cars go through the intersection at Third and Main without any stop sign
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
The Stop Sign
• Cars go through the intersection at Third and Main without any stop sign
• There are accidents. The town installs a stop sign.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
The Stop Sign
• Cars go through the intersection at Third and Main without any stop sign
• There are accidents. The town installs a stop sign.
• While most benefit, the few coming from Third are inconvenienced, and on balance are net losers.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
The Stop Sign
• Cars go through the intersection at Third and Main without any stop sign
• There are accidents. The town installs a stop sign.
• While most benefit, the few coming from Third are inconvenienced, and on balance are net losers.
Not Pareto Optimal
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
The Stop Sign
• Cars go through the intersection at Third and Main without any stop sign
• There are accidents. The town installs a stop sign.
• While most benefit, the few coming from Third are inconvenienced, and on balance are net losers.
Not Pareto Optimal
Hicks-Kaldor Optimal
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
The Defense
• This is the test used.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
The Defense
• This is the test used.
• The transactions cost of ensuring that every stop sign installed is Pareto Optimum is enormous.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
The Defense
• This is the test used.
• The transactions cost of ensuring that every stop sign installed is Pareto Optimum is enormous.
• While we lose from particular stop signs, we are almost certainly net beneficiaries of stop signs.
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Three Options
• Installing stop signs without paying compensation.
• Installing stop signs and paying compensation (and bearing the transactions costs).
• Not installing stop signs at all
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
Three Options
• Installing stop signs without paying compensation.
• Installing stop signs and paying compensation (and bearing the transactions costs).
• Not installing stop signs at all
Option One is Probably Better for us than Two or
Three
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Hicks Kaldor Optimality
End
©2004 Charles W. Upton