LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES (LNR) – SYLLABUSPrepared by Atty. Jose Y. Dalisay III/ November 2013

PART TWOJ URISDICTION

DENR SECRETARY:

Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 79684, February 19, 1991)

Case Title : DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (formerly Ministry of Natural Resources), petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division) and B.A. GONZALES SURVEYING CO., INC., respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for certiorari, to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Kalalo, J.Syllabi Class : Administrative Law|Lands of the public domain|Case at bar|Rule that findings of fact of quasi-agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality|Proper remedy of private respondent Syllabi:1. Administrative Law; Lands of the public domain; Case at bar; Petitioner Director of Lands is the official vested with direct and executive control of the disposition of the lands of the public domain.-The question on the necessity of either or both projects must be better addressed to the sound discretion of the proper administrative officials who admittedly have the competence and technical expertise on the matters. In the case at bar, the petitioner Director of Lands is “the official vested with direct and executive control of the disposition of the lands of the public domain.” Specifically, Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that “x x x [T]he Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale, or any form of concession or disposition and management of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources).”2. Administrative Law; Rule that findings of fact of quasi-agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality; Findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because their

jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are accorded not only respect but also finality.-We likewise take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on this doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court has consistently held that “acts of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the parameters of its own compe-tence,” unless “there be a clear showing of arbitrary action or palpable and serious error.” In similar vein, we reiterated recently the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, in the present case cadastral surveys and mappings and land registration, are accorded not only respect but more often than not even finality.3. Administrative Law; Rule that findings of fact of quasi-agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality; Proper remedy of private respondent; The proper remedy of private respondent would be to pursue promptly its appeals to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources rather than seek judicial relief.-x x x “the proper remedy of the private respondent would be to pursue promptly its appeals with the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources as regards its cancelled and questioned contracts rather than seek judicial imprimatur to its improper interference with administrative prerogatives and thus provide a convenient cover-up for its breaches of its own contractual obligations.4. Administrative Law; Rule that findings of fact of quasi-agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality; Respondent court committed a reversible error in stopping the implementation of the results of the bidding for the cadas-tral survey projects conducted by the Director of Lands.-x x x “the respondent court committed a reversible error in stopping the implementation of the results of the bidding for the cadastral survey projects conducted by the Director of Lands. The said injunction issued by the respondent court constitutes a violation of the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and defeats the very purpose thereof, which is, “not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the controversy by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.”

Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 79684

Counsel: Ramon A. Gonzales

Ponente: SARMIENTO

Dispositive Portion:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the injunction issued is hereby lifted; the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 1987, as well as its Resolution dated August 27, 1987, is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. With costs against the private respondent.

G.R. No. 79684             February 19, 1991

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (formerly Ministry of Natural Resources), petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division) and B.A. GONZALES SURVEYING CO., INC., respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated April 3, 1987 of the respondent court, 1 as well as its resolution dated August 27, 1987 denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The restraining order promulgated by this Court on November 3, 1986 restraining the public respondents from issuing any award to the private respondents as the winning bidders in that public bidding held on October 24, 1986 or in any manner implementing by the public and private respondents the results thereof, is hereby converted into a preliminary injunction and upon the filing by the petitioner and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P30,000.00, the preliminary injunction shall remain permanent until the Minister of Natural Resources shall have acted, as he is hereby directed to act, on the appeals of the petitioner from the Orders of respondent Director of Lands dated June 20, 1977 (Numancia project) and April 14, 1983 (Valderama project). With costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

The facts are undisputed.

The petitioners Director of Lands and the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources entered into a contract on June 30,1973 with the private respondent B.A. Gonzalez Surveying Company for which the latter was bound to execute a public land subdivision mapping (Plsm) of the alienable and disposable lands in the Municipality of Valderama, Antique, Blk. I-IIII, L.C. No. 819, for and in consideration of the amount of P183,818.00. 2

On January 28, 1974, the private respondent was likewise contracted by the petitioners to do the photo-cadastral mapping (Pcadm) of Project PCADM-493-D in Numancia, Aklan, for the sum of P130,000.00. 3

However, despite written demands from the Bureau of Lands to the private respondent to commence the Numancia, Aklan Pcadm project, the latter failed to do so; consequently, in an order dated February 7, 1977, the former cancelled the contract with regard to the said project and declared the performance bond No. BCICI-3323 as forfeited. 4

On a motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent, the Director of Lands reinstated the said contract on June 20, 1977 without however granting the company's request for a price adjustment, which denial the private respondent seasonably appealed to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. This appeal is pending.

On April 14, 1983, the Director of Lands likewise scrapped the Valderama Plsm contract because of the non-completion of the project despite the grant of repeated extensions totalling 1,200 days. 5

Similarly, the private respondent appealed the cancellation of the said contract to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, where the appeal also still remains pending.

Meanwhile, without both appeals being resolved, the Director of Lands conducted a public bidding for the cadastral survey of several municipalities including the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and the Municipality of Valderama, Antique. In the said bidding, Armando Villamayor and Cristina Matuod were declared as the successful bidders for the Numancia and Valderama projects, respectively.

Thereupon, the private respondent filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 10421, alleging that the Director of Lands acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in awarding the said cadastral survey projects to other persons while the appeals of the private respondent remain pending.

As adverted to at the outset, the respondent Court of Appeals in its decision dated April 3, 1 987 granted the said petition and denied in a resolution dated August 27, 1987 the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The petitioners assign the following errors 6 allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals:

I

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PUBLIC LAND SUBDIVISION MAPPING (PLSM) AND PHOTO-CADASTRAL MAPPING (PCADM), ON ONE HAND, AND A REGULAR CADASTRAL SURVEY, ON THE OTHER, "HAVE THE SAME PURPOSE OF REGISTERING TITLES AND AS SUCH, ONE MAY SUBSTITUTE FOR THE OTHER (Decision, p. 4, Annex "C").

II

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE OPINION OF THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS ON A MATTER WITHIN HIS EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AS WELL AS NLRC RULES AND REGULATIONS, TO THE

EFFECT THAT GRAPHICAL TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS, AS THOSE PRODUCED FROM A PLSM OR PCADM, CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF LAND REGISTRATION.

III

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ENJOINING THE AWARD OF THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF VALDERAMA AND NUMANCIA TO THE WINNING BIDDERS WHICH IS A SURVEY ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE MAPPING SURVEY CONTRACTS OF THE COMPANY WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

IV

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT THE COMPANY'S MAPPING SURVEY CONTRACTS, WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN CANCELLED, CONSTITUTE A BAR TO THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF VALDERAMA AND NUMANCIA, THEREBY PRE-EMPTING THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN DETERMINING THE MERITS OF THE COMPANY'S APPEALS.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The four errors assigned by the Solicitor General appearing for the public officials-petitioners may be integrated into the sole issue as to whether or not the respondent court erred in holding that the Director of Lands acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the award of the cadastral survey projects to new contractors involving lands subject to prior mapping projects with another contractor (the private respondent) whose contracts are involved in a pending appeal to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources.

The respondent court, in sustaining the private respondent, asseverated that while cadastral survey on one hand, and the Pcadm and the Plsm projects on the other, are classified differently, i.e., the former being numerical cadastre and the latter as graphical, both projects nonetheless "have the same purpose of registering titles and as such, one may substitute for the other. Accordingly, allowing the award of the cadastral survey projects to other contractors will render unnecessary the pending mapping survey contracts of the government with the petitioner (private respondent herein), as if the same were already awarded to others." 7

We do not think so. Given the premises that both projects, mapping and cadastral survey, have the same purpose of registering titles and that one may substitute for the other, do not justify the sweeping conclusion that the undertaking of one would render the other unnecessary.

The question on the necessity of either or both projects must be better addressed to the sound discretion of the proper administrative officials who admittedly have the competence and technical expertise on the matters. In the case at bar, the petitioner Director of Lands is "the official vested with direct and executive control of the disposition of the lands of the public domain." 8 Specifically, Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that . . . [T]he Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale, or any form of concession or disposition and management of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources)."

We likewise take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on this doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court has consistently held that "acts of an administrative agency must not casually be over-turned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the parameters of its own competence," 9 unless "there be a clear showing of arbitrary action or palpable and serious error." 10 In similar vein, we reiterated recently the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, in the present case cadastral surveys and mappings and land registration, are accorded not only respect but more often than not even finality. 11

On the other hand, the private respondent claims that his case is an exception and invokes Leongson vs. Court of Appeals12 which states that "once the actuation of an administrative official or administrative board or agency is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of the law, then, it is incumbent on the court's of justice to set matters right, with the Tribunal having the last say on the matter."

But ironically, it is precisely the "command of the law" that the Director of Lands sought to implement when the respondent court enjoined the former from pushing through with the award of the cadastral survey projects. We have quoted earlier the provisions of Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 [The Public Land Law], which explicitly empower and command the Director of Lands to have the direct executive control of the survey and classification, inter alia, of lands of the public domain. Moreover, in the same law, in Section 6 thereof, "[T]he Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources) shall prepare and issue such forms, instructions, rules, and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions."

Aside from these "command(s) of the law" giving to the Director of Lands the "direct executive control" of the subject matter of the controversy in this case, the Land Registration Commission (LRC) requires in its Circulars 13Nos. 371 (1980), 394 (1981), and 32 (1983) the full and complete technical description of lands prior to their registration. The said requirement can only be accomplished through the conduct of a regular cadastral survey which, as aforesaid, is under the direct executive control of the Director of Lands.

Moreover, the respondent court admits that mapping projects and cadastral surveys are classified differently. That is correct because indeed there exists real distinctions between these mapping and cadastral survey projects. Due to these distinctions, the mapping or graphical survey would apply more to pre-cadastral operations and the numerical one to the regular cadastral survey proper. These distinctions may be more easily appreciated by a scrutiny of the respective program of activities in each of these three technical endeavors.

I. Photo-Cadastral Mapping Project (Pcadm)

1. sub-lot identification and delineation of tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or corn (photo-sketching for land reform);

2. project controls of secondary precision only;

3. establishment of photo control points for every photograph by tertiary traverse from control stations;

4. monumenting of lots claimed as private or public lands and sketching on photo-maps;

5. numerical survey of the  residential, commercial and industrial lots in the poblacion and barrios, preparation of cadastral maps from sketches on maps, and mapping by ground method of covered areas;

6. establishment of political boundary monuments of secondary survey controls;

7. preparation of the complete mapping returns.

I-A. Public Land Subdivision Mapping Project (Plsm)

1. sub-lot identification and delineation and tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or corn (sketching for land reform) and sketching of lots claimed as private or public lands;

2. project controls of tertiary precision only;

3. Monumenting of corners of lots claimed as private or public lands;

4. Numerical survey of the residential lots in the poblacion and barrios;

5. Establishment of political boundary monuments by tertiary survey controls;

6. The preparation of the complete mapping returns.

II. Scope of Work –– Cadastral Survey Project

1. Sketching by transit and stadia or any acceptable method of lots claimed as private or public lands;

2. Project controls shall be of primary precision;

3. Monumenting of corners of lots claimed as private, government or public land;

4. Numerical survey of all lots including parcels covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) whether or not previously subjected to PMS;

5. Survey of foreshore areas as a strip indicating on the cadastral map areas covered by existing lease applications;

6. Establishment of political boundary monuments and survey thereof by secondary control;

7. Accomplishment of land use maps, questionnaire for land use inventory and land use summary report;

8. Preparation and submittal of the complete survey returns of the cases submitted for verification and approval;

9. Preparation of overlays on drafting film of CMs containing OLT areas and list of claimants thereof.

An analysis of above list depicts that the greater bulk of the activities in Plsm and Pcadm projects is sketching; whereas, in a regular cadastral survey, the entire area of the municipality is subjected to a numerical survey. While Plsm and Pcadm projects lead to the preparation of mere graphical sketches or maps, a cadastral surveyresults in the preparation of complete survey returns and technical descriptions of individual lots necessary for registration purposes. 14

But even granting arguendo that the Plsm and Pcadm projects on the one hand, and the cadastral survey on the other, are similar activities, there is no legal bar for the private respondent, assuming that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources resolves the appeals in its favor, to finish the mapping projects and then demand the corresponding remuneration from the Director of Lands. In the same way, compensation would be due to the winning bidders in question once their own cadastral survey projects would have been accomplished. In case the Director of Lands fails to pay upon fulfillment of the said contracts, then any contractor may validly resort to judicial action to enforce its legitimate demands.

Meanwhile, the proper remedy of the private respondent would be to pursue promptly its appeals with the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources as regards its cancelled and questioned contracts rather than seek judicial imprimatur to its improper interference with administrative prerogatives and thus provide a convenient cover-up for its breaches of its own contractual obligations.

Notwithstanding the private respondent's dubious attitude in not participating in the bidding in question, he could have also appealed the conduct of the said bidding to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources as was the case in his Plsm and Pcadm contracts with the government and asserted therein that the same would be prejudicial to his interests.

In sum, the respondent court committed a reversible error in stopping the implementation of the results of the bidding for the cadastral survey projects conducted by the Director of Lands. The said injunction issued by the respondent court constitutes a violation of the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and defeats the very purpose thereof, which is, "not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the controversy by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts." 15

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the injunction issued is hereby lifted; the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 1987, as well as its Resolution dated August 27, 1987, is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. With costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Kalalo, Felipe, J., ponente; Nocon, Rodolfo, and Tensuan, Ricardo, JJ., concurring.

2 Annex "A", Original Record, 10.

3 Annex "D", Original Record, 15.

4 Id., 16.

5 Rollo, Annex "A", 53.

6 Rollo, 17.

7 Rollo, 74.

8 Garcia v. Aportadera, G.R. No. L-34122, August 29, 1988, 164 SCRA 705, 710.

9 Reyes v. Cañeba, G.R. No. 82218, March 17, 1988.

10 Beautifont Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 481, citingPangasinan Transportation vs. Public Utility Commission, 70 Phil. 221 and Heacock vs. NLU, 95 Phil. 553.

11 Alejandro v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 84572-73, NovembFFer 27, 1990,

12 G.R. No. L-32255, January 30, 1973,49 SCRA 212.

13 Rollo, 86-88.

14 Id., 210-212, "The Office Memorandum of the Committee on Award and Enforcement of Survey Contracts, Bureau of Lands, dated April 20, 1987 (Annex "F", Id.)."

15 Supra, 12.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES:

Leonardo A. Paat, et al. vs Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 111107, January 10, 1997).

Case Title : LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.Syllabi Class : Administrative Law|Statutes|Remedial Law|Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies|Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction|Due Process|Statutory Construction|Replevin|Certiorari 

Syllabi:1. Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.-—This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.2. Same; Certiorari; Courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.-—Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads: SECTION 8. REVIEW—All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.3. Remedial Law; Replevin; Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same

has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.-—It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. “To detain” is defined as to mean “to hold or keep in custody,” and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property. Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.4. Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondent’s right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.-—From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to

the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents’ right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.5. Same; Same; When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.-—With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code” and inserted the words “shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.” When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.6. Statutes; Statutory Construction; Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.-—The Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.” In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.7. Same; Same; Due Process; Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.-—To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petiioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right

to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan.8. Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.-—Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.9. Same; Same; A party cannot, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.-—It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.10. Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exceptions.-—However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a

case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 111107

Counsel: Pedro R. Perez, Jr.

Ponente: TORRES, JR.

Dispositive Portion:WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997

LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN,respondents.

 

TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative

forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?

Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.

The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, 1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. 2Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan 4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, 5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. 6Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. 7 Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. 8 Hence, this present petition, 9 with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, 10 the prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.

Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can

still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. 11 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause ofaction. 12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 13 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, 14 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, 16 (5) when there is irreparable injury, 17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, 18 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 19 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, 20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, 21 (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 22

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, 23 private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should be considered as an appeal to theSecretary. 24

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 25 In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy

Executive Secretary, 26 which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, 27 this Court held:

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. 28 One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. 29 In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 30 Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, 31 as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco, 32 we ruled that :

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:

Sec. 68. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments,implements and tools  illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include "conveyances" that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private

respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasis ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. 33 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 34 In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:

But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to present situations and realities" and in view of the "urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country," that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:

"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;"

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only "conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the "court" in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section

68-A would have no Purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra. 35

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part, viz.:

. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . 36

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:

. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further amended by Executive Order No. 277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor liable. . . 37

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277)

Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove  timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or

from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall bepunished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code  . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. 38

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. 39 "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep in custody," 40 and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. 41 Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property. 42 Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:

Sec. 8. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo p. 235.

2 Rollo pp. 241-242.

3 Rollo p. 239.

4 Baggayan died during the pendency of Civil Case 4031, he was succeeded in office by Petitioner Leonardo Paat.

5 Presided by Judge Ricardo A. Baculi.

6 Rollo pp. 251-252.

7 Rollo pp. 274-275.

8 Rollo pp. 36-46 penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurred by Justices Luis A. Javellana and Jorge S. Imperial.

9 Rollo pp. 14-35.

10 Rollo pp. 117-119.

11 National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987; Atlas Consolidated Mining Company vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. L -15809, August 30, 1961; Aboitiz v. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. L-29466, May 18, 1978; Pestenas v. Dyogi, G.R. No. L-25786, February 27, 1978.

12 Soto v. Jareno, G.R. No. 38962, September 15, 1986; Hodges v. Mun. Board, L-18276, January 12, 1967; Abe-Abe v. Manta, L-4827, May 31, 1979; Gone v. District Engineer, L-22782, August 29, 1975.

13 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991.

14 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, L-76633, October 18, 1988.

15 Industrial Power Sales, Inc. V. Sinsuat, L-29171, April 15, 1988.

16 Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, L-12944, March 30, 1959.

17 De Lara v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-21653, May 31, 1965.

18 Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 13000, September 25, 1959; Bartulata v. Peralta, G.R. No. 23155, September 9, 1974.

19 Cipriano v. Marcelino, G.R. No. L-27793, February 28, 1972.

20 Alzate v. Aldana, G.R. No. 14407, February 29, 1960.

21 Soto v. Jareno, supra.

22 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, supra.

23 Rollo pp. 236-240.

24 Rollo p. 239.

25 Vidad v. RTC, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993.

26 G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990.

27 G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995.

28 Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. V. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995.

29 Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, supra.

30 Ibid.

31 Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968, August 23, 1995.

32 G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.

33 Lopez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992.

34 De Guia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992.

35 Rollo pp. 170-171; Memorandum pp. 12-13.

36 Rollo p. 242.

37 Ibid.

38 Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994.

39 American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 66, p. 850, footnote 57; I. Tanenbaum Son and Company vs. C. Ludwig Baumann and Company, 261 NY 85, 184 NE 503, 86 ALR 102.

40 Ibid., footnote 59; Anderson vs. Hapler, 34 III 436; Wails vs. Farrington, 27 Okla 754, 116 P 428.

41 Id., footnote 60 ; Haythorn vs. Rushforth, 19 NJL 160.

42 Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.

Case Title : FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.Syllabi Class : Criminal Law|Administrative Law|Revised Forestry Code|Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure|Actions|Replevin|Constitutional Law|State Immunity|Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Syllabi:1. Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and pun-ishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code.-This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.

2. Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure; Actions; Replevin;  It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before a seizure could be effected where the vehicle owner and his driver immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin.-Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.3. Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure; Actions; Replevin; Where there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure of the vehicles used in transporting illegally cut timber was in accordance with law, the seized vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis, hence they could not be subject to an action for replevin.-Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.4. Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; A property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit.-Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further: “. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin . . .”5. Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; State Immunity; A suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its

purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable—thus, a suit against officers who represent the DENR is a suit against the State and cannot prosper without the States consent.-Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.6. Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss, otherwise such ground for dismissal would be deemed waived.-Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it.

Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 115634

Counsel: Fiel Marmita, Plaridel Bohol

Ponente: QUISUMBING

Dispositive Portion:ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are

ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.

G.R. No. 115634             April 27, 2000

FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision1 dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied petitioners' (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ of replevin.2

The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:

On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:

1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas.

2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. . . .3

Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan.4 Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts.5 Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.6

On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.7

On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143, was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.8

In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.9

Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992. 10 Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court. 11

Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court. 12 In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition. 13

On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277. 14

Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to

render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners' failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of petitioners' counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis. 15

Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners' claim that private respondents' complaint for replevin is a suit against the State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government. Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the property of another. 16

Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings. 17 Their petition was found without merit. 18

Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors: 19

(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;

(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS  IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND

(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.

In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:

(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.

(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.

We will now resolve both issues.

The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78 states:

Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents

as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.

This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.

The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as follows:

Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. — In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

Sec. 89. Arrest;  Institution of criminal actions. — A forest officer or employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense. . . [Emphasis supplied.]

Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:

Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. — All conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.

Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. — The Secretary or his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR areauthorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn oversaid forest products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the

conveyance shall be deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]

Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.

Note further that petitioners' failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise. 20

In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriff's Return, and wait for the judge's instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.

Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further:

. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin. . . 21

On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?

Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. 22 And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. 23However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. 24 In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in

question are clearly official in nature. 25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State's consent.

Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor General's line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. 26 If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it. 27

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. 1âwphi1 Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.

Costs against private respondents.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 22-27.

2 CA, Records, p. 43.

3 Rollo, p. 23.

4 Id. at 23.

5 Id. at 74.

6 Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land; or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . .

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found [Emphasis supplied.]

7 Rollo, p. 70.

8 Id. at 23, 78.

9 Id. at 75, 85.

10 CA Records, p. 43.

11 Supra, note 4.

12 Id. at 18-19.

13 Id. at 21.

14 Id. at 26-A.

15 Id. at 25-27.

16 Id. at 27.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Id. at 6.

20 Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614, 621 (1991).

21 Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, July 28, 1999, citing Pacis v. Hon. Averia, 18 SCRA 907 (1966).

22 CONST., Art. XVI, sec. 3.

23 De Leon, The Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 2nd ed., 1994, pp. 228-229.

24 Philippine Racing Club, Inc., et al. v. Bonifacio, et al., 109 Phil. 233, 241 (1960).

25 Sanders v. Veridiano II, 162 SCRA 88, 96 (1988).

26 Sec. 1, Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court.

Sec. 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;

(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;

(c) That venue is improperly laid;

(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;

(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished,

(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and

(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

27 Soto v. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116, 119 (1986). See also Section I (j), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court.

Case Title : FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.Syllabi Class : Criminal Law|Administrative Law|Revised Forestry Code|Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure|Actions|Replevin|Constitutional Law|State Immunity|Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Syllabi:1. Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and pun-ishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code.-This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons

responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.2. Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure; Actions; Replevin;  It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before a seizure could be effected where the vehicle owner and his driver immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin.-Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.3. Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure; Actions; Replevin; Where there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure of the vehicles used in transporting illegally cut timber was in accordance with law, the seized vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis, hence they could not be subject to an action for replevin.-Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.4. Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; A property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit.-Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further: “. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin . . .”

5. Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; State Immunity; A suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable—thus, a suit against officers who represent the DENR is a suit against the State and cannot prosper without the States consent.-Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.6. Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss, otherwise such ground for dismissal would be deemed waived.-Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it.

Division: SECOND DIVISION

Ponente: QUISUMBING

Dispositive Portion:ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate

number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised Forestry Code.