law oriented behaviour structure of legal norms

RECHTSTHEORIE 29 (1998), S. 387 - 424Duncker & Humblot, 12165 Berlin

LAW-ORIENTED BEHAVIOUR AND THE STRUCTUREOF LEGAL NORMS

By Athanasios Gromitsaris, Jena

I. Introduction

For a very long time légal positivists hâve theorised about thé form ofthé légal norm. As early as thé late eighteenth century, Jeremy Benthamhad developed a theory on norm individuation; it offers a means of sing-ling out that which is to count as "a law", a légal norm. On thé one hand,Lon Fuller challenged thé idea that individual légal norms or rules couldserve as an appropriate focus in légal philosophy. He is not interested inwhat he once described as thé intramural squabbling of thé légal positiv-ists on thé form of thé légal norm. He sees their approach as stérile, for itis not thé products (légal norms, légal rules) of légal processes that laybare thé distinctive features of thé law but rather, thé processes them-selves.1 On thé other hand, A. M. Honoré, abandoning reconstruction andreductivism and letting thé Benthamite program f ail away, tried to turn towhat he called "real laws".2 He embarked on an enterprise constituting "aminor pièce of descriptive sociology"3 and tried to describe "real laws", asopposed to thé laws which thé theorist remodels in thé shape of his thé-ories. He turned to laws and rules as they exist in professional discourseand argument but he had no appropriate sociological theory of descrip-tion. He remained if not chez Hart, then at least du côté de chez Hart. Inthé following it is "légal processes" and "real laws" that are in thé focusof our analysis. We use Max Weber's theory and sociology of law which isa combination of a textual with a contextual approach to law in order tofind out which are thé basic prerequisites of a non-positivistic descriptionof law-oriented behaviour.

1 Fuller, 1981, p. 243; see thé book review by Paulson, 1984.2 Honoré, 1977.3 Honoré, 1977, p. 99. Hart saw his theory as "an essay in descriptive sociology":

Hart, 1961, p. iv.

26 RECHTSTHEOBIE, 3 - 4/98

388 Athanasios Gromitsaris

II. Three Ways of Thinking About Law

[130]

Max Weber contrasts thé sociological study of law with two other waysof thinking about légal norms and institutions: (1) The political andmoral attitude toward law and (2) thé dogmatic jurisprudence.4

1. The Political and Moral Attitude Toward Law

This attitude is distinguished by thé fact that it employs a criterion ofan extra-légal sort in terms of which thé moral goodness of spécifie légalnorms may be assessed.5 On thé one hand thé normative force of thé eva-luative standards does not dépend upon their being rules of law. On théother hand thé légal order contains within itself in certain circumstancesa requirement that its component rules be justifiable from a moral pointof view. But even if a légal order contains norms with an explicitly ethi-cal content judges view them as evaluative standards which they mustrespect solely because they are légal norms.6 From thé standpoint ofpositive law, thé currently normativ ascription of légal responsibility canbe modified only within thé institutional framework of légal policy déci-sion effecting a change in thé law, not, however, within thé institutionalframework of morality.7 As thé judge is not permitted to rely on his per-sonal view of what is morally right and wrong, his moral judgments hâveto be supported by a reasoning that proves thé presumed validity of théevaluative standard. Therefore, to describe thé judge's attitude towardthé validity of moral judgements and thé validity of légal norms, oneneeds thé distinction between légal and extra légal standards of évalua-tion which Weber's conception of thé political and moral attitude towardlaw implies.8

Furthermore, as Nicholas Rescher emphasizes, we hâve to distinguishbetween moral norms and ideals. The latter "reach out beyond thé vianegativa of those 'thou shalt not' commandments, toward thé amplerdemands of a utopian order of things".9 Surely, idealization strives to

•* By using thé "paradigm of thé game scat", Weber distinguishes between (a)"Skatjurisprudenz", (b) "Skatpolitik" or "skatsittliche Normen" and (c) "Skat-erkenntnis" or "Skaterfahrung". Weber, 1988a, p. 337 et sequ. On this point seeKrawietz, 1993, p. 48. See further Kronman, 1983, p. 7.

5 Weber, 1988a, p. 345: "(M)an kann von ethischen Prinzipien aus seine (des"Paragraphen") normative 'Berechtigung', () seinen Wert oder Unwert () oder seinen'Nutzen' oder 'Schaden' fur (bestimmte) Interessen diskutieren.

6 See Art. 6 of thé German Constitution: "Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder sinddas natùrliche Recht der Eltern und die zuvôrderst ihnen obliegende Pflicht."

7 Krawietz, 1992, p. 52.s Kronman, 1983, p. 10.9 Rescher, 1987, p. 122.

Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 389

outrun thé limits of practicable achievability and enables us to pressbeyond thé confines of institutional practice. Ideals, regardless of theirimpracticability, can yield benefits as by-products of thé idealizationprocess. Still, they function "as simply one component within a System"and can be pursued only "within thé limits of thé possible in a complexand no doubt imperfect world". Accordingly, unrealism in thé pursuit ofideals blocks thé way to other desiderata. As far as thé connection of lawand morality is concerned, thé view, that thé "claim to correctness is anecessary élément of thé concept of law"10 has - as Eugenio Bulyginpoints out - to pay more attention to thé distinction between prescrip-tions, directives and norms on thé one hand and descriptive statementsabout norms on thé other.11

Given thé moral pluralism prevailing in modem societies, it is not thébusiness of modem démocratie states to deal in suprême values. Giventhat neutrality, it is not always easy to know what right and wrong are.Any group will always argue that its own moral codes and enforcementpolicies or experiments are worthy of support by thé state and thé mostbénéficiai to mankind. Even if it would be possible to establish a consen-sus by means of a rational discourse, which in turn is understood interms of a non-institutionalized process of reasoned conceptualizationand argument (Habermas), nobody can tell what thé state of affairs andthé structure of action after this consensus will be. Who will regulate thérelation between thé validity of thé idéal discourse and thé validity ofreal laws?

2. The Dogmatic Jurisprudence

Légal scholars need not take an evaluative attitude toward thé légalnorm whose correct légal meaning they are expounding.12 A légal scholaremploys thé norm as an evaluative standard by using it to assess thébehaviour of various actors in thé légal System including thé behaviourof those responsible for applying thé norm in question. The value judge-ments of thé légal scholar are based upon his conception of thé correctmeaning of a légal norm which he treats as a standard for assessing thé

10 Alexy, 1989, p. 177.11 Bulygin, 1993, p. 24: "Die Aufgabe des Richters ist, den Angeklagten entweder

zu verurteilen oder freizusprechen. Ob er dabei das Recht richtig oder falsch inter-pretiert hat, wird aus seinem Urteil hervorgehen; es ist nient seine Sache, darilber inseinem Urteil zu reden.

12 Weber, 1988a, p. 348: "(D)ie Frage nach dem, was in concrète 'juristische Wahr-heit' ist, d. h. gedanklich nach 'wissenschaftlichen' Grundsatzen aïs solche 'gelten'sotte oder hàtte 'gelten' sollen, ist logisch gànzlich verschieden von der: was de factoempirisch in einem konkreten Fall oder in einer Vielheit von Fàllen aïs kausale'Folge' des 'Geltens' eines bestimmten 'Paragraphen' eingetreten ist."

26*


II. Three Ways of Thinking About Law

[130]

Max Weber contrasts thé sociological study of law with two other waysof thinking about légal norms and institutions: (1) The political andmoral attitude toward law and (2) thé dogmatic jurisprudence.4

1. The Political and Moral Attitude Toward Law

This attitude is distinguished by thé fact that it employs a criterion ofan extra-légal sort in terms of which thé moral goodness of spécifie légalnorms may be assessed.5 On thé one hand thé normative force of thé eva-luative standards does not dépend upon their being rules of law. On théother hand thé légal order contains within itself in certain circumstancesa requirement that its component rules be justifiable from a moral pointof view. But even if a légal order contains norms with an explicitly ethi-cal content judges view them as evaluative standards which they mustrespect solely because they are légal norms.6 From thé standpoint ofpositive law, thé currently normativ ascription of légal responsibility canbe modified only within thé institutional framework of légal policy déci-sion effecting a change in thé law, not, however, within thé institutionalframework of morality.7 As thé judge is not permitted to rely on his per-sonal view of what is morally right and wrong, his moral judgments hâveto be supported by a reasoning that proves thé presumed validity of théevaluative standard. Therefore, to describe thé judge's attitude towardthé validity of moral judgements and thé validity of légal norms, oneneeds thé distinction between légal and extra légal standards of évalua-tion which Weber's conception of thé political and moral attitude towardlaw implies.8

Furthermore, as Nicholas Rescher emphasizes, we hâve to distinguishbetween moral norms and ideals. The latter "reach out beyond thé vianegativa of those 'thou shalt not' commandments, toward thé amplerdemands of a utopian order of things".9 Surely, idealization strives to

4 By using thé "paradigm of thé game scat", Weber distinguishes between (a)"Skatjurisprudenz", (b) "Skatpolitik" or "skatsittliche Normen" and (c) "Skat-erkenntnis" or "Skaterfahrung". Weber, 1988 a, p. 337 et sequ. On this point seeKrawietz, 1993, p. 48. See further Kronman, 1983, p. 7.

5 Weber, 1988a, p. 345: "(M)an kann von ethischen Prinzipien aus seine (des"Paragraphen") normative 'Berechtigung', () seinen Wert oder Unwert () oder seinen'Nutzen' oder 'Schaden' fur (bestimmte) Interessen diskutieren.

6 See Art. 6 of thé German Constitution: "Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder sinddas naturliche Recht der Eltern und die zuvôrderst ihnen obliegende Pflicht."

7 Krawietz, 1992, p. 52.s Kronman, 1983, p. 10.9 Rescher, 1987, p. 122.

[131] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 389

outrun thé limits of practicable achievability and enables us to pressbeyond thé confines of institutional practice. Ideals, regardless of theirimpracticability, can yield benefits as by-products of thé idealizationprocess. Still, they function "as simply one component within a System"and can be pursued only "within thé limits of thé possible in a complexand no doubt imperfect world". Accordingly, unrealism in thé pursuit ofideals blocks thé way to other desiderata. As far as thé connection of lawand morality is concerned, thé view, that thé "daim to correctness is anecessary élément of thé concept of law"10 has - as Eugenio Bulyginpoints out - to pay more attention to thé distinction between prescrip-tions, directives and norms on thé one hand and descriptive statementsabout norms on thé other.11

Given thé moral pluralism prevailing in modem societies, it is not thébusiness of modem démocratie states to deal in suprême values. Giventhat neutrality, it is not always easy to know what right and wrong are.Any group will always argue that its own moral codes and enforcementpolicies or experiments are worthy of support by thé state and thé mostbénéficiai to mankind. Even if it would be possible to establish a consen-sus by means of a rational discourse, which in turn is understood interms of a non-institutionalized process of reasoned conceptualizationand argument (Habermas), nobody can tell what thé state of affairs andthé structure of action after this consensus will be. Who will regulate thérelation between thé validity of thé idéal discourse and thé validity ofreal laws?

2. The Dogmatic Jurisprudence

Légal scholars need not take an evaluative attitude toward thé légalnorm whose correct légal meaning they are expounding.12 A légal scholaremploys thé norm as an evaluative standard by using it to assess thébehaviour of varions actors in thé légal System including thé behaviourof those responsible for applying thé norm in question. The value judge-ments of thé légal scholar are based upon his conception of thé correctmeaning of a légal norm which he treats as a standard for assessing thé

10 Alexy, 1989, p. 177.11 Bulygin, 1993, p. 24: "Die Aufgabe des Richters ist, den Angeklagten entweder

zu verurteilen oder freizusprechen. Ob er dabei das Recht richtig oder falsch inter-pretiert hat, wird aus seinem Urteil hervorgehen; es ist nicht seine Sache, daruber inseinem Urteil zu reden.

12 Weber, 1988a, p. 348: "(D)ie Frage nach dem, was in concreto 'juristische Wahr-heit' ist, d. h. gedanklich nach 'wissenschaftlichen' Grundsàtzen aïs solche 'gelten'sotte oder hdtte 'gelten' sollen, ist logisch gànzlich verschieden von der: was de factoempirisch in einem konkreten Fall oder in einer Vielheit von Fâllen aïs kausale'Folge' des 'Geltens' eines bestimmten 'Paragraphen' eingetreten ist."

26'

390 Athanasios Gromitsaris [132]

correctness13 of thé norm's application in various cases and contexts.This does not imply that jurists hâve to be formalists and légal positiv-ists. On thé contrary, they are obliged to hâve a contextual approach tothé légal norms they deal with in thé application and singularizationprocess. Before continuing, we should emphasize that thé doctrinal atti-tude toward law is not restricted to légal scholars in law faculties.Judges and légal practitioners base their arguments on légal dogmaticsas well.14 But this does not mean that thé dogmatic jurisprudence is inpossession of thé sole right to expound thé correct légal meaning ofnorms, or that we should défend thé idea of a "unity of rationality" andof a "unity of argumentation".15 Rather, we hâve to differentiate thérationality of thé légal institutions from thé rationality of thé sciences.16

According to Schelsky's concept of a légal institutional rationality,17

based on législation, légal administration and jurisdiction, thé corréla-tion between légal science and juridical institutional practices cannotbring about a rational unity of dogmatic jurisprudence and thé practicalinstitutions of légal life. Légal science is an institution itself that inter-acts with ist various environments. Thus, thé falsification of thé correctlégal meaning of a norm takes place not only in thé scientific communityof thé dogmatic jurisprudence, but also in thé juridical institutions.Furthermore, institutional practices produce their own criteria of "cor-rectness" which are confirmed or changed in thé light of subséquentdécisions and practices.

3. The Sociology of Law

According to Max Weber, one can investigate thé légal order from asociological point of view without judging thé moral quality of thé lawor seeking to expound thé correct meaning of légal norms in a légal dog-matic sensé. A sociological theory of law seeks to describe how thé behav-iour of individuals is influenced by their own normative commitments to

13 Weber, 1976, p. 181: "(W)elcher normative Sinn einem aïs Rechtsnorm auftre-tenden sprachlichen Gebilde logisch ricfttzgerweise zukommen sollte".

« Schelsky, 1959, p. 113, speaks of "verwissenschaftlichte Praxis".is According to Habermas, 1981, pp. 62 - 63 and 339 - 340: "juristische Argumen-

tation (musse) in allen ihren institutionellen Auspragungen aïs Sonderfall des prak-tischen Diskurses begriffen werden" (pp. 62 f.), and further: "die Einheit der Ratio-nalitàt (sei) in der Mannigfaltigkeit der eigensinnig rationalisierten Wertsphàrengesichert" (p. 339).

16 This is clearly expressed in one of Cari Schmitt's first books, Schmitt, 1969,p. 4: "Das in der Praxis aïs geltend anzunehmende Merkmal der Richtigkeit einerEntscheidung und das, was die juristische Verarbeitung des Rechtsstoftes aïs'geltendes Recht' herausarbeitet, stehen sich aïs zwei Geltungen gegenuber." Seefurther ibid., p. 98." Schelsky, 1980, p. 53. On this point Krawietz, 1984 and Werner, 1995, pp. 129,

144.


thé law and by their beliefs regarding thé similar commitments ofothers.18 It gives an account of thé identification and misidentification ofthé relevant normative expectancies in légal processes and of thé consé-quent commitment of individuals to action and law-oriented behaviour.From this point of view illégal behaviour is a légal phenomenon, and thégap between thé applied and thé formai law (law which is "corrupted"by real-world interests) disappears.19 There are countries where formailitigation is used to perpetuate and obscure rather than résolve disputes;jural-bureaucratic maneuvers is used to keep conflicts open but bureau-cratically tied up until an extrajudicial, political, and politic solutioncan be secured. Thus, illégal appropriation is a basic means of landacquisition, and illegality is a common mode of social organisation. Illé-gal résidence becomes a common and reliable way for some catégories ofpeople to win légal access to land and housing that would otherwise bebeyond their means. Usurpation initiâtes settlement and précipitâtes thélégitimation of thé land claims. Executive or législative institutions ofgovernment usually will hâve to intervene to déclare thé judicial Systemcheckmated, to legalize usurpation and thereby insinuate illégal andextralegal practices into thé law.20

According to Weber's classical example, so long as a thief conceals hisactivity because he believes he is violating binding légal rules, his con-duct constitutes a légal phenomenon; efforts to break thé law and actionsundertaken because of a misunderstanding as to what thé law requiresare legally relevant as well.21 But while thé sociologist of law does nottreat thé value-commitments of law-oriented behaviour as normative cri-teria in his own investigation, he must be able to understand thé norma-tive commitments of those whose behaviour he is studying. His attitudeis characterized by a "combination of empathy and detachment". To beable to know, what is accepted and valid as law, an outside observermust understand thé behaviour of thé members of thé community. This

18 Weber, 1988 a, p. 350: "Das 'empirische Sein' des Redits aïs Maxime-bildenden'Wissens' konkreter Menschen nannten wir hier die empirische 'Rechtsordnung'."

19 Weber, 1976, p. 17: "Zwischen Geltung und Nichtgeltung einer bestimmtenOrdnung besteht also fur die Soziologie nicht, wie fur die Jurisprudenz (nach derenunvermeidlichem Zweck) absolute Alternative. Sondern es bestehen fltissige Ueber-gànge zwischen beiden Fâllen, und es kônnen () einander widersprechende Ordnun-gen nebeneinander 'gelten', jede () in einem Umfang, aïs die Chance besteht, daB dasHandeln tatsachlich an ihr orientiert wird."

20 Holston, 1991, pp. 695, 697, 702, 722. There are similar expériences in Greecewith an extrême form of "parallel economy" called "para-oikonomia". Papayanna-kis, 1989, p. 147: "En fait, elle (thé parallel economy) comprend des activités illé-gales et poursuivies, d'autres qui ne le sont jamais, d'autres qui tout simplement nesont pas déclarées illégales, d'autres enfin qui sont poursuivies sans être punies etenfin toutes celles qui, légales ou pas, sont légalisées a posteriori et souvent con-sidérées légitimes! "

21 Weber, 1976, p. 16.


understanding is always based, as Aulis Aarnio emphasizes, partially onthé internai view, and this means that "one can never be a 'pure'external observer".22

III. Légal Theory as a Multi-Level-Approach to Law

Légal knowledge remains highly dépendent on theory. The problem is,what kind of theory? We cannot make out a case for a général theory oflaw that is other than supported and tested by confirmed observations.General theory of law should be regarded as an intégration of légaltheory and sociology of law which can take into account thé way légalpractitioners, légal scholars and social action in général describe andprésent themselves.23

1. The Standpoint of Légal Practitioners

Légal practitioners usually say they know more than anybody elseabout thé reality of law, because they know more about their own jobsthan dogmaticians or scholars of sociology of law could ever describe.Thus, thé best thing légal scholars and theorists should do is to helpthem résolve thé practical problems of their professional routine or toget out of their way. Of course, thé people who are closest to thé workreally do know it better; but what they don't know is how to describe it.Because this is another type of work. Practitioners operate with only apartial model in mind about why they are doing whatever it is they aredoing, and what causes and principles lie behind it. When they describetheir work they often leave out thé fact that their description tailorsitself to fit their professional ideology and ambitions.24 Further, thisbest-practices-approach cannot address légal activities which thé practi-tioners ignore or are not ready to acknowledge. Therefore, a sociologicaltheory of légal practical institutions and law-oriented behaviour tries tocast new light on uncontroversial facts by means of exposing establishedbehavioural possibilities to a comparison with other functionally équiva-lent possibilities. Under such conditions descriptions of what practi-tioners actually do can induce a positively evaluated innovation in théobserved behavioural structure. Légal practitioners might then - theore-tically - make a décision with regard to thé question as to whether anexternal inducement of "new" problem solving stratégies is to be consid-ered as more of a nuisance than anything else, or as a positive new addi-tion to and change of thé structure.

22 Aarnio, 1992, pp. 10, 11.23 On thé concept of thé "multi-level approach" see Krawietz, 1993, pp. 102,104.24 Schelsky, 1959, p. 137.

1 1 :t!i | Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 393

2. The Epistemological Status of thé Sociological Theory of Law

When empirical research focuses on thé applicability of socially recog-nized sanctions in thé event of disappointment of normative expecta-tions, or when it turns out to be a sociology of thé légal professions andof thé possibilities of access to law, instead of setting its sights on théexpectation-governed character of human behaviour independently ofstate intervention and coercion, it limits itself to thé sectional study ofthé pathology of légal expectations, ignoring thé actual ongoing regulat-ing and problem-solving activities. Systems theory seeks to résolve thisproblem by obtaining an access to law as it présents itself. This is anapproach that takes profit of empirical research but can also go beyondits restricted possibilities.25

Nevertheless, thé question - what's a légal System? - cannot beanswered with a single concept: autopoiesis. The answer lies in a sériesof conceptual distinctions produced in thé processes of a second orderfeedback that characterize thé relations between général Systems theoryand middle range théories.28 On thé other hand, général Systems theorymay take advantage of thé plurality of middle range théories; it may usetheir results in order to establish a plurality of conflicting generaliza-tions that may subsequently be capable of respecification by means ofmiddle range théories. This seems to be a reasonable "empirical" way offinding out what thé boundaries and structural constraints of légal com-munication are. The indeterminacy of thé theory with respect to explic-able facts does not necessarily imply a useless redundancy within thétheory itself. It rather implies a kind of theoretic multiplicity. The multi-plicity of théories explaining thé "same facts" does not reduce theirexplanatory value. Différence between théories hinges on what theycannot describe rather than on what they consider to be their commonobject of observation.27

Systems theory présents itself in thé rôle of thé external observer, whoreveals and construes thé paradoxes that block and entangle thé self-description of thé légal System. Systems theory is an observer, and itdoesn't claim for itself an exceptional position, with priviledged accessto law-oriented behaviour. It does not introduce a différence between

25 See on this point Intzessiloglou, 1993, p. 255 et sequ. who - unlike Luhmann -regards thé "model-system of Law merely (as) a concept, an analytical instrumentthat thé () theoretician of Law can use in order to ascertain thé absence or thé pré-sence and thé degree of constitution, intégration, compétition and complementarityof légal Systems coexisting within thé same social environment".

26 Opp/Hummell, 1973, pp. 13 - 26.27 Atlan, 1991, p. 140: Every theory "est capable de construire un monde qui est le

même - celui des faits que nous observons - mais qui est différent en ce qui concernece que nous n'observons pas".


analytical and real facts. It refers - throught its constructs - directly towhat is reality for it.28 Science meets itself rather than thé outsideworld.29 The position of «an observer at ail initiated» - to use a phraseof Henry James (The Awkward Age) - is abandoned in favour of thérestricted point of view. Surely, Systems theory is not to be confirmed inthé classical way. We hâve been taught that a hypothesis is scientific tothé extend to which it entails empirically testable conséquences. Butwhether it passes thé test of observation or of experiment in thé marketof scientific réfutations is essential in order to détermine not its scienti-fic character but its truth value. A hypothesis may be false yet scientific,or true yet unscientific; it may be logically impossible yet empiricallypossible. Whether an observer makes a mistake or not has nothing to dowith thé reality of his opérations; it simply présupposes thé existence ofa second observer evaluating thé methods and skills of thé first. On thélevel of perception thé distinction between reality and illusion is not pos-sible. Neither thé content nor thé validity sources of knowledge stemfrom individual consciousness. Truth is based on external sélection30 andis not relative: to put an end to a disagreement about thé meaning of aword, somebody has to look it up in a dictionary. Truth tolérâtes no rela-tivity despite thé variety of opinions. The truth value of an assertiondoes not dépend on thé will or thé interest of any participant. Such athing would mean that every observer's relative truth would be cancel-ling out everybody else's.

Furthermore, we hâve been conditioned to accept that a theory is scien-tific if it entails empirically testable conséquences. The main difficulty isdetermining what is to be meant by "testable". It has been equated withconfirmable, or having possible examples, and with refutable, or havingpossible counter examples. Systems theory is so général as to be unable toyield any prédictions, not even when enriched with empirical data. Thereis a "sous-détermination de la théorie par les faits".31 Systems theorydécides about and conditions its own applicability. Consequently thé con-cepts of degrees of confirmation and testability are pointless with regardto this theory.32 Any real System that happens to conform to thé theory

28 Luhmann, 1990, pp. 92, 698 et sequ.; on this point see Nassehi, 1992.29 "Nous n'avons aucune communication à l'estre" Montaigne writes in his Apolo-

gie de Raimond Sebond, 1985, p. 586.so Luhmann /De Giorgi, 1993, p. 123: "Si parla di verità solo quando la selezione

dell'informazione non viene imputata a nessuno dei partecipanti () ciô non tocca ilfatto che nei sistemi psichici le opinioni necessariamente si differenzino." Atlan,1991, p. speaks of "dédoublement du jugement": "Le jugement de vérité impliquetoujours une procédure de vérification () un jugement sur le caractère vrai ou fauxdu jugement."

si Atlan, 1991, p. 130 et sequ.32 On this point and on what follows Bunge, 1977, pp. 33, 35 et sequ.

li.r/l Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 395

will qualify as a real System. And those concrète System that do not fit thédescription just do not qualify. Despite this, Systems theory is corrigible,if not exactly refutable in thé light of empirical research.

The application of Systems theory to spécifie situations requires somespécifie, substantive knowledge of thé latter; only this can provide a suit-able interprétation and sélection of an équivalent form of thé theory inquestion. The complexity of thé observed System cannot be reduced to ahomogeneous corpus of empirical data. Without concrète items of spé-cifie information one would be unable to pose thé problem, and hence tosolve it. The point is that concrète items of spécifie information areunobtainable without thé help of observations supported by spécifie thé-ories. That means that every application of Systems theory calls for théformation of new théories or thé use of already existing various spécifiethéories, which contribute to thé formation of a spécifie model of théSystem of interest. The model is of course to be built with thé concepts ofthé Systems theory, if it is to be coupled to thé latter.33 In other words,Systems theory becomes a spécifie theory of thé standard type whenenriched with spécifie information concerning thé System to which it isto be applied. And this spécifie theory is subject to thé canons of empiri-cal testability, that is to say, it is corrigible if we can find possible coun-ter examples. Systems theory is confirmable in a sui generis way. It isconfirmed by fitting whole familles of théories and by helping in thé for-mation of spécifie middle range théories that are testable in thé classicalway. That means that several points of view could be combined with sev-eral perceptions of thé self-présentation of thé object. Consequently Sys-tems theory is scientific if it is compatible with thé bulk of scientificknowledge and if - jointly with subsidiary hypothèses and observer-dependent empirical data - it entails middle range théories that in turnentail corrigible and testable conséquences.34 Middle range théories hâvea scientific character because they can be falsified by other research.Systems theory is scientific if, enriched with suitable subsidiary assump-tions "it becomes empirically testable either directly or vicariously, i.e.through some (spécifie) theory".35 This resuit is of décisive importancefor thé formation of a général theory of law.

At thé level of thé binary code: légal/illégal, no sélection, décision ordéfinition are ever possible. Without spécial programs and criteria ofsélection, such as norms, régulations, value-commitments, directives andcontracts, thé rigid disjunction between légal and illégal behaviour

33 Bunge, ibid.; Marin, 1990: "La pensée complexe ne résoud pas d'elle même lesproblèmes, mais elle constitue une aide à la stratégie qui peut les résoudre."

34 See Merton, 1957, pp. 5 - 10; Bunge, 1977, p. 35 et sequ.35 Bunge, 1977, p. 35.

Athanasios Gromitsaris [138]

remains a blind distinction. It has thé meaning that in thé modem func-tionally differentiated society science, religion, politics, morality or éco-nomies cannot replace légal decision-making. But it says nothing aboutthé institutionalization and boundary maintenance of thé processes thatproduce, change and reproduce normative expectational structures at thélevel of programs. The need for an intégration of middle range théoriesinto thé systems-theory-approach to law results from thé necessity todescribe how law-oriented behaviour can be identified in concrète insti-tutional settings. As law is, primarily, not thé product of thé décisions ofa state légal staff but is a System of human expérience, actions andnorms, it is activities and opérations that actualize and modify institu-tionally established expectational structures that should be thé object oflégal theory and sociology of law. Interprétation of behaviour by meansof thé code légal/illégal always takes place within a "frame" of institu-tionalized expectations. We hâve to turn to a sociological understandingof norms and activities not only at thé level of Systems theory but also atthé level of middle range théories. The latter can help détermine andreconstruct thé meaning that actors (decision-making units, corporategroups or individuals) assign to their action and expérience.36

This leads us to thé conclusion that thé access to légal order can onlybe obtained by a multi-level-approach to law-oriented behaviour. In thissensé Systems theory is only a part of thé général theory of law (légaltheory) which comprises ail thé théories that describe or explain thésocial realities and thé normative meaning of thé légal phenomena.Accordingly, thé sociology of organizations, thé institutional theory oflaw, thé cost-benefit analysis of law or risk analysis are part of a socio-logical conception of law that is able to investigate thé relations betweenthé textual and contextual understanding of thé social dimension of law.

VI. From 'Real Laws' to 'Real Rules'

Max Weber rejects thé view that defines légal norms as norms that aresanctioned in a particular way.37 The sanctions that accompany légalnorms can be physical, psychological or économie in character. He alsorejects thé view that defines law in terms of thé types of conduct it seeksto regulate, because ail aspects of human behaviour can become object oflégal régulation.38 He finally rejects a third way of defining law in termsof thé procédure by which légal norms are established. The existence of

36 "The meaning thé subjects assign to thé situation they are in and thé behaviorthey are carrying out plays a greater rôle in determining thé generalizability of anexperiment's outcome than does thé sample's démographie representativeness or thésetting's surface realism": Berkowitz /Donnerstein, 1982, p. 249.

37 Weber, 1976, p. 18.

I K l i l l Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 397

. 1 scparate, spocijjli/ .i 'd enforcement staff has thé meaning that normativestandards for thé évaluation of conduct can be accompanied by rules(Hart's secondary rules) regulating thé sanctioning process by whichInfractions of first-order rules applying directly to conduct are identified.•mil punished. The existence of binding norms at thé sanctioning leveli l r . i i n r . u i s h e s thé law from other normative orders.39

However, thé significance of second-order rules should not be over-omphasized. The 'foundations' of Weber's theory of law are not found in"Kconomy and Society" and therefore, not in his "Sociology of Law"oither. Rather, thé foundations are found in his critique of Stammaler'slogal theory, published in 1907 and in his essay about thé catégories ofthé interprétative sociology, published in 1913. There Weber establisheshis sociological theory of norms and an expectational approach to lawand social action in général.40 It is thé simultaneous diversification ofdifférent mechanisms for thé formation, innovation and institutionaliza-tion of behavioural expectations rather than thé potential for collective,organized reaction in thé form of sanction that is of primary importancefor thé légal ordering of life. According to Weber's concept of "Einver-stândnis" (common understanding),41 social communication opérâtes onthé basis of expectational structures, not by any prior establishment ofrules, even if rules can be inferred from thé way people speak and act.This is a crucial aspect not only of markets and languages but also oflaw-oriented behaviour.

1. Action-Norms and Reaction-Norms

In defining law as he does, Weber views law-oriented behaviour as asocial action, oriented not simply to thé anticipated conduct of othersbut also to thé probability that violation of some particular norms willbring about a social situation in which crédit and discrédit or rights andduties will hâve to be attributed ex post according to already establishedbinding norms that tolerate no ambiguity. In other words, law oriented

38 For example, thé internai affairs of thé household or religious behaviour: Weber,1976, pp. 212 - 233. Even thé main légal distinction between is and ought seems tobe thé resuit of seemingly extra-légal divination practices: Weber, 1976, pp. 262, 317.

39 Weber, 1976, p. 18. On this point Kronman, 1983, pp. 30 - 31; see further thédistinction between "gesellschaftsbezogenes" and "gesellschaftsgeregeltes Han-deln" Weber, 1988b, pp. 445, 447.

40 On this point Krawietz, 1989. According to Krawietz, Weber's expectationalapproach lies entirely within thé intellectual tradition of German theory and sociol-ogy of law ranging over Ihering and Theodor Geiger to Helmut Schelsky and Luh-mann. On thé development and methodological shifts of German public law tradi-tion which has had a significant influence - at least via Georg Jellinek - uponWeber's work, see Pauly, 1993.

« Weber, 1988b, p. 456.


behaviour forces a system of social action to achieve reflexion and expli-citly confirm or modify its expectational structure. According to a legal-istic view, disputes require access to a forum external to thé originalsocial setting of thé dispute in order to become legally relevant, Accord-ing to Weber's concept of law, as defined above, individual parties find avariety of solutions out of or away from thé governance structures of théstate. Weber's view of law includes a 'légal order' that falls outside "théprovince of thé state".42 We hâve to deny that law only exists when andwhere légal coercion is guaranteed by thé political authority. Most dis-putes that under current state rules could be brought to a court areresolved by avoidance and selfhelp away from thé auspices of thé légalcentralism by devising private orderings. Nevertheless, thèse solutionsacquire a légal character when found at thé level of reflexive regulatedprocesses determining ex post compliance, violation and violated rules.This doesn't exclude an additional access to state decision-makingbureaucracy which then attributes right and wrong anew, in accordancewith state law. Therefore, in accordance with Max Weber and TheodorGeiger, we think it appropriate to distinguish between action norms andreaction norms and between norm-sentences and rules.

As Theodor Geiger puts it, "action norms" and "reaction norms" (orprimary and secondary norms) may, but need not be, coupled with oneanother.43 A purely state concept of law is customarily understood toreflect thé view that only behavioural expectations expressed tay thé bu-raucratic décision units or somehow derived therefrom are worthy oflégal character. Légal norms are thus considered to be a médium of poli-tical action. But thé légal order is not inextricably interwoven with théstate. We can conceive of law as consisting primarily of clusters of nor-mative expectations, by means of which persons order their conduct andonly secondarily of norms for state décision making developed by thécourts and législation. The formai structures of thé state such as théjudiciary, thé législature, thé executive and thé administrative agencyproduce and enforce only a part of thé bulk of valid légal expectations.They claim to hâve a jurisdiction extending to ail thé inhabitants of théterritory of a politically organized régional society.

2. Norm-Sentences and Expectations of Conduct

We follow Weber and Geiger in resisting thé tendency to identifynorm-sentence and rule. Norm-sentences are "linguistically formulated

42 Krawietz, 1994, p. 48. Evan, 1976, p. 171. Evan bases his distinction betweenpublic and private légal Systems on Weber and Ehrlich.

43 Geiger, 1987, p. 105.

Ml Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 399

norms" (verbal norms, norms expressed in words) that sustain a"demand expectation", an "expectation of conduct" specified for a cer-tain situation and, by way of support from thé respective system-bearinggroup, directed to thé "conduct" of thé respective norm addressees.44 Bycontrast, a rule is thé actual process of selecting norm-oriented behaviourand of confirming or innovating thé normative expectational structureused to sélect norm-oriented behaviour. Rules are thé continuous corréla-tion between structure and process, they are not substantive structureswith a built-in determinacy. They are a good remedy for complexity,45 buttheir reproduction is based on a built-in indeterminacy. No reproductionof normative expectations is possible without an amount of intrinsicuncertainty: information "cannot be obtained unless there exists uncer-tainty about thé outcome of an event prior to thé event"; that is to say thatthé amount of information obtained from any event "is a function of whatcould hâve happened but didn't"; it is determined "by thé amount bywhich thé uncertainty has been reduced".46 According to research into théprecommitment and discrétion of monetary authorities (central banks),credibility can be used as substitute of lacking information. But credibilityis itself a scarce resource. It is defined as thé speed with which an observer(for instance, thé public) realises that a shift in préférences has occured.47

Credibility is an institutional product. It can replace information aboutvalid rules only in a context where systematic behaviour of particularagents is possible. This is for example not thé case in an international con-text where governments change frequently and thé game-theoretic condi-tions which govern their behaviour lack more than short-term stability.48

Anyway, observer-dependent descriptive or prescriptive représentations ofthat which is to count as relevant rule, are to be regarded as semantic arte-facts which contribute to thé use, confirmation, spécification or generali-zation of normative expectations.49

Black letter law represents an "unorganized textbook knowledge"50 ina network that associâtes concepts to other concepts and prescriptions toother prescriptions. At thé level of valid norm-sentences thé function oflégal dogmatics lies, on thé one hand, in operating as an "inheritancemechanism" in thé network, so that more spécifie concepts or prescrip-

44 Geiger, 1987, p. 23 et sequ., 34 et sequ.45 Von Hayek, 1969, p. 171: "Regeln beschrànken immer den Bereich der in

Betracht zu ziehenden Umstânde auf einen Teil der môglicherweise bedeutsamen,um so eine Entscheidung praktisch môglich zu machen."

46 Garner, 1975, pp. 3, 7; see further Mathiesen, 1960 and Atlan, 1983.47 Blackburn, 1992, p. 171.« Epstein I Gintis, 1992, p. 175.49 Weber, 1988, p. 355 speaks of thé "'Regel' - Charakter der 'empirischen

Rechtsordnung' ".50 Elio I Scharf, 1990, p. 591.


tions can inherit features of more général concept classes. On thé otherhand, doctrinal commentaries rest on an interpretational argument thatcannot be properly conceived of "in simply bivalent true-or-false ternis"but has to enter "thé realms of thé better-or-worse, thé arguable, thépréférable, thé more or less persuasive".51 Thus, it has to view norm-sen-tences as being open ended.

Now, thé représentation of légal problems contained in textbookknowledge is not to be identified with problem représentation at thélevel of thé playing rules. The efficient récognition and application ofrelevant knowledge about cognitive and normative expectations to théproblem at hand is always domain-specific. Appropriate domain spécifieknowledge and problem-type schémas émerge with expérience in socialinstitutions which functionally organize and represent related domain-specific expectations, inferences, and methods for solving problems. Theshift in problem prototypes and stratégies is a by-product of thé per-ceived différence between previous and new expériences. Therefore, asone solves a problem, thé problem's représentation becomes "enhanced"5

with social domain spécifie inference rules, facts, and solution méthodol-ogies. Social institutions modify thé textbook problem description byvariablizing or constraining thé values on descriptors or by introducingnew descriptors into thé sphère of activity. "Enhanced problem représen-tation" means that a problem's descriptors are determined by thé prob-lem-solving process in thé respective social institutions and not by théproblem statement's original textbook form.

According to this view, administration, and bureaucratie organizationsin général, seem to deal with information in a différent way from thatanticipated from a simple reading of thé theory of décision making. Mostorganizational décision processes are found to be "solution centered".53

Much of thé textbook-knowledge and thé information gathered and com-municated by individuals and organizations before thé décision hâvelittle décision relevance. Much of thé information that is used to justify adécision is collected and interpreted after thé décision has been made.There seems to be rather a prior calculation of needed information thana kind of thermostatic linkage between observations and actions. Theinformation phenomena noted in organizations provide reasons fordecoupling information from décisions.54 The idea of intelligent choiceand thé systematic application of information to décision seem to bevalues belonging to thé core of western ideology. They symbolize that

51 MacCormick, 1994, p. 139.52 Elio / Scharf, 1990, p. 588 et sequ.53 Nutt, 1984, p. 447.54 Feldman / March, 1981, pp. 171 - 186.


processes are legitimate, décisions good and organisations well managed.What information is satisfactory for décision making is negotiatedumong participating organizations. The resuit is "a negotiated informa-i n n i order"55 that détermines what information will be used in décisionm . i k i n g and which organizations "pay" for collecting and using newInformation. The negotiated information order is an interorganizationalitructure that helps détermine when an administration unit will "opti-I M I / . C and when it will satisfice". Information needs to be socially suffi-cici i t and technically sufficient, but thé two are to some degree indepen-dent, so as socially sufficient information need not be technically suffi-rit-nt and vice versa. A negotiated information order is established whena System of criteria for thé social sufficiency of information is workedout which in turn bring about an ordering of organizational specializa-tion in thé application of décision criteria. This theory would apply onthé environmental impact statements of environmental administrativeagencies. When agencies - and environmental groups - hâve thé formairight to review thé environmental impact statements of other agencies, arenégociation of thé information order can occur.56

3. Law-Oriented Behaviour

By comparing thé rules of a game to légal rules, using thé paradigm ofthé game scat, Weber shows that thé rules of a game, like thé rules of thélaw, form a System of orientational points of view, imposing constraintson thé players' sphère of activity.57 Playing rules permit one to makebetter guesses about thé moves of thé other players than one could makewithout thé rules, for playing rules are supposed to be considered bind-ing by other players too. The décisive function of playing rules lies in théfact that they restrict thé field of possibilities at hand, and thus, theyclarify relevant expectations, so that every player can orient his ownaction to thé normative commitments of thé other players.

As Weber emphasizes, this 'sociological' attitude toward légal rules isnot restricted to social scientists, but is an attitude that is equallyadopted by social actors as well as those performing certain rôles withinthé légal order, such as a practicing attorney who, preparing a case for atrial or advising a client, must act like a "scat player" in a stratégieenvironment, and try to predict how thé behaviour of judges, administra-tive agencies and clients will be influenced by his own interprétation ofthé légal norms and normative commitments to thé law.58 To a certain

55 On this concept and on what follows, see Heimer, 1985, pp. 395, 397.56 Heimer, 1985, p. 414.57 Weber, 1988a, p. 338.58 Weber, 1988a, p. 338 et sequ.; Kronman, 1983, p. 13.

402 Athanasios Gromitsaris [144|

extent, social actors and légal practitioners must be a kind of sociologistof law, because they are in need of information about norms and institu-tional facts in oder to use them as a means to a practical-professionalend - promoting a client's interests or predicting particular outcomes.Thus, sociological understanding of law-oriented behaviour is to be con-sidered a décisive prerequisite for being a successful légal practitioner.

Successful lawyers are distinguished by their légal skills not only inresponding to problems and causes of action once begun but also bytheir ability to anticipate that problems might arise. "Préventive lawyer-ing" seeks to ensure that client behaviour takes a course with leastpotential légal hazard.59 Further, it is taken to include attempts to influ-ence law création or reform. Lawyer's capacity to influence practicalbusiness behaviour consists in scanning thé environment in order toidentify emerging légal issues on thé one hand and in staying in touchwith developments in thé business (which has to run as a business and isnot there for lawyers) on thé other. The successful integrated lawyer (in-house business lawyer) hat to be a translater that can move out of hisown language System and put things in a way managers can understand.Given thé fact that problems are observer-dependent, problem représen-tations hâve to be translated,60 and as we ail know, every translation isbound to betray thé original: traduttore, traditore! Learning to be aneffective translater61 contains a number of skills basic to professionalpractice: a common language between business management and légalmanagement has to be developed which makes it possible for thé lawyerto shift between self-referencing and other-referencing; légal judgementhas to take into considération commercial judgement, and vice versa.This close relationship to thé business world led légal practitioners62 toabandon thé conceptualist utopia (not thé conceptual constructions) ofthé Pandectists and dévote their attention to developing légal instru-ments that could advance thé purposes of corporate economy and helplaw expand into new areas of social life.63

59 Mackie, 1989, p. 74 et sequ.eo Deleuze / Guattari, 1991, p. 32 are aware of this problem, and they even see it as

thé main problem of philosophera: "on se fait parfois de la philosophie l'idée d'uneperpétuelle discussion comme 'rationalité communicationelle" ou comme 'conver-sation démocratique universelle'. Rien n'est moins exact () Les interlocuteurs neparlent jamais de la même chose."

61 Mackie, 1989, p. 94 et sequ., 102 et sequ.62 Osiel, 1990, p. 2058: "It is thé skill in practical reason and complex judgement

that thé practicing bar and bench most esteem in their peers."63 According to Dezalay, 1992, p. 118 et sequ., 131 et sequ., thé foreign offices of

thé "Big Eight" accounting firms and Wall Street law firms hâve seized virtually théentire european market for advice concerning thé law of corporate and publicfinance partly because european lawyers are not trained and experienced as "légalentrepreneurs".

ll-ll.l Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 403

'Sociological' understanding of légal norms is equally indispensable inM i i c i n l areas beyond thé professional activities of légal practitioners. Inf n r t , social actors are met with thé difficulty to identify and harmonizerimlïicting normative expectations as they go about their business. Asnppmpriate expectations are embedded in institutional settings that eutl lmu igh thé usual distinctions between state and society, formai andinformai behaviour, or markets and hiérarchies, thé problem is to find« m l . how access to thé appropriate institutional setting and problem défi-n i l i o n becomes possible. From a normativist point of view, thé difficultylies with thé récognition of thé appropriate rules. But this is actually anaspect of thé wider problem of meaning. Meaning arises for Weber inmultiple settings and can be looked at differently depending on its rela-I ionship to various observers. We can distinguish64 at least: a) thé actor'smlonted meaning b) meaning to thé other participants c) meaning on.•ivorage d) meaning in terms of a dogmatic System e) meaning in ideal-l.ypical terms f) meaning as discovered by social scientists or historiansH) meaning to self and h) institutional meaning. In addition, there are thépossibilités of corrélation, feed-back and second-order observation ordouble hermeneutic.65 Thus, thé self-description of law-oriented behav-lour is described by thé sociologist or evaluated by thé légal scholar, buti h c i r concepts are in turn reinterpreted or incorporated into features oflaw-oriented behaviour.

However, it is not clear how a person becomes aware of rules. Werarely hear a subject announce a rule in recognizable form while acting.The fact that persons seldom mention a rule in abstract form seems to beconsistent with thé hypothesis that ail knowledge is encoded in highlyinstantiated, episodic form, called cases. Rule violation is easier to bedetected. But how does an actor become aware of a rule? Would she orne pause for a while then mumble "l'd better not do that again", orwould she carry on without interrupting her activity?66 In most cases, atthé level of action norms thé process will go on without visible pauses.Contrarily, thé firings of secondary rules always manifest themselves asinterruptions of normal processing in thé actions System. This is due tothé fact that action has, now, to take place at a new level, that of reflex-ive processes.

Still, while we explain much of people's behaviour in terms of rule-making, rule-breaking or rule-following, we cannot explain ail of it inthis way. Compliance does not always occur because of extrême riskaversion, that is to say, because individuals overweight low probability

64 See on this systematization Albrow, 1990, p. 211.65 Ibid.,p. 279etsequ.66 See VanLehn, 1991, p. 3.

27 RECHTSTHEOHIE, 3 - 4/98

404 Athanasios Gromitsaris 1146]

events - for instance thé low probability of audit, combined with highpenalty on detected tax évasion. Compliance also occurs when there isno chance of détection or thé expected value of thé rule-breaking (say,thé tax évasion gamble) is négative. Furthermore, compliance does notnecessarily occur from a belief by individuals that rule-breaking (éva-sion) is wrong, "since their behaviour is unchanged by either (morally)loaded or neutral instructions".67 Therefore, compliance can beexplained neither by thé probability of sanctions nor by thé distinctionbetween légal and illégal or right and wrong. Besides, we should notloose sight of how much external perceptions really matter. If théamount of ambiguity is too high, outsiders (external perceptions) maydemand a formalization of what people already do into norm-sentencessetting out thé way in which people behave. The System has thus todemonstrate to thé outside world that there really are rules, and put inplace some visible policing mechanisms.68

The available évidence indicates that an individual's normative beliefsare not consistent with his behaviour and that norms can change rapidlyand without intensive resocialization. Rules do not merely refer to "sharedbeliefs about ranking norms, membership norms, and reality assump-tions".69 They also affect behaviour by specifying thé actions and attri-butes that will validate particular identities. The behaviour of individ-uals tends to be consistent with thé norms of older colleagues, insofaras their professional identity is controlled by thèse colleagues. Ail thissuggests that lacking direct information about thé subjects' norm-oriented behaviour and rule acquisition practices, one must use thé sub-jects' overt behaviour and - especially - thé respective situation contextto inf er normative-commitments or changes in attitude and problem-solv-ing rules. Thus, we can conclude: We can learn a lot about appropriate'situation-expectations fits' by studying misfits,70 but we may not identifynorm- and law-oriented behaviour with thé probability of sanctions.

4. Globalization and Formalization of Law-Oriented Behaviour

Law-oriented behaviour takes place in a world, in which local andglobal modes of coordination and guidance are intertwinned. Globaleconomy requires formalized communication networks. Large companiesare likely to hâve workers, supplier s, shareholders and customers fromdifférent value Systems. Normative commitments dépend less on shared,


67 Alm, étal., 1992, p. 36.68 This point has been very important for thé formalization of thé rules of thé City

Code on Takeovers and Mergers, see Hobson, 1990, pp. 168, 252.es On this point and what follows, see Cancian, 1976, pp. 355, 362 - 363.'0 See Hochschild, 1980, p. 568.

i i i i s | i ( i k c i i customs and values and more on laws and formai statements< > f cl lues. Obligations to friends, family, and countrymen are not of thé

u n e nature as obligations to Etrangers in thé sphère of non-intimaten u l distant social relations.71 The internationalization of thé economy

i un:, | > ; i i allol with thé process of producing normative commitments thati i i r v . - i l i d everywhere. Nevertheless, familial and national amoralism as\ v r l l as corruption in thé political, judiciary, and civil service continue to

c - i r a i ! - barriers to entry into local business. The growing sensé of légal. u n i inoral responsibility to Etrangers doesn't replace thé informai net-w n i ' k s based on local personal connections or money relationships. Inde-l i r iu lcncies and interdependencies go hand in hand. On thé one hand, asinstitutions like church, family, éducation, and thé state are less effectiveal shaping shared values and norms in citizens, global organizations andinternational business hâve to create formalized norms to guide employ-t'cs, shareholders and other stakeholders, while at thé same time tolerat-i i i i ; a variety of local and individual values.

On thé other hand, participating in thé international System leads to. i i l u p U n g outward oriented policies, and accepting thé respective interna-i n ma l norms and assumptions about states and their management as wellOH ubout contractual and other légal commitments.72 For instance, it hasbccn proved that state interests in Africa are not determined solely by apatrimonial or patronage-oriented political logic. The world community ofstates and thé international System of political, économie and légal com-munication develop not only broadly accepted patterns of action andnorms but they also institutionalize new rôles for traditional and newactors.73 As a resuit, changes and international predictability are inducedin local settings. Thus, investment codes hâve been rewritten in manycountries so as to favour thé foreign investment.74 Further, inclusion in théinternational System can be used as a resource of legitimacy for an estab-lished local authority. Lacking an anti-colonial struggle to refer to, a gov-ernment can tie thé legitimacy of its authority to thé inclusion of thé statein thé international System, "to a new économie deal for thé people".75 Thehighly developed set of international institutions for finance renders busi-ness indépendant of thé patrimonial features of states and local patron-client networks.

n On this point and on what follows, see Ciulla, 1991, pp. 75,77, 83.72 Fischer, 1990, p. 58; Huntington, 1996, p. 524 et sequ. overlooks this argu-

ment laying .stress upon «shared values».73 For example thé institutionalization of thé kin State's rôle in protecting eth-

nie minorities, Varsanyi, 1989, p. 133. On thé rôle of other participants in théinternational légal order (besides thé states) see Attar, 1994, p. 56 et sequ. whospeaks of "les intervenants" or "sujets dérivés", parcellaires, fragmentaires.

74 Ngwasiri, 1989, p. 200.75 Fearon, 1988, pp. 136, 137.


5. International Communication and National Laws

[148]

Law-oriented behaviour of global players (mostly large organizations)is characterized by thé simultaneous orientation toward différentnational and international légal Systems. Organizations hâve an informa-tional or a resource perspective on their societal environment and otherorganizations in it.76 According to thé first perspective, environmentis conceived as information-uncertainty, and power dépends on controlover uncertainty. From thé resource perspective thé environment is asource of scarce resources, which are sought after by a population oforganizations that competes for as well as shares them. Accounting stand-ards and financial régulation are thé main tools used by thé national lawsto regulate thé way organizations manage both their information uncer-tainty and resource dependence. Dependence and uncertainty may varyindependently of each other but it is their joint effect that explains théinterrelation of money, uncertainty and authority in interorganizationalnetworks. An appropriate explanation of such joint effects is conditionalupon thé description of thé existent institutipnal environments77 of globalorganizations. We hâve to emphasize that institutions are not to be identi-fied with organizations. Institutionalization processes eut through théboundaries of organizations and function Systems. Therefore, to give anexample, thé "Geldmarktabhangigkeit des deutschen Kapitalmarktes"78 isto count as an institution although it cannot be adequately described internis of interorganizational networks.

In what follows, we give an example of how a Systems theory approachcan incorporate an institutional approach to law. The institutional con-straints of international law-oriented behaviour cannot be distilled fromthé plurality of national blackletter laws. Whith thé help of Systemstheory we focus our attention on law-oriented behaviour as a type ofsocial communication that occurs under thé auspices of thé distinctionlégal/illégal. National laws are programs that détermine thé use of thisdistinction by constraining thé values on its two descriptors. By meansof thé institution theory we concentrate on rulegoverned behaviour as itprésents itself in relation to a spécifie issue, combining thus, a textualand contextual norm-theoretic approach.

As thé flow of information around thé world has increased greatly,investors hâve begun looking abroad for better returns on their portfo-lios, and companies hâve seeked access to thé international capital mar-

I I i ' ' I Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 407

76 For a discussion of thé distinction and an extended bibliography, see:Aldrich / Mindlin, 1978.

77 Tolbert, 1985, pp. 2, 3.78 Fuchs, 1989.

kets. Conversely, thé securities industry, facing increasing compétitionfor business from electronic, régional and international exchange,

i M i r i ' . l r i l to attract listings from foreign companies whereas thé regula-I I I I N bodies for securities markets had to reach compromises on disclo-

rules with thé foreign companies. Regulators had to relax theirIQI "imting requirements in order not to de ter foreigners from thé local

l ' M - k exchange, while foreign listing companies had to provide an infor-mation bridge for local investors.79 Globally minded international com-punies who obtained a full listing for their shares on several stockc«xchanges around thé world had access to various capital pools, but theyhud to deal with thé diversity of international accounting and auditingpractice and thé indeterminacy of "true and fair view".80 They had toexercise in restating their accounts according to différent standards.81 Itl u r n c d out that thé main influence on disclosure was based on thé pat-I c i - i i of ownership, thé scope of companies' opérations and thé distinctionIx'tween market oriented and bank oriented financial Systems.82

Companies of thé bank oriented type83 (Germany, Japan) tend to under-roport earnings and book values because of accelerated dépréciation poli-cics and unrestricted provisions ("hidden reserves"). Bank oriented finan-n . i l Systems hâve normaly a less developed market for risk capital, so thatsavings are primarily transformed in thé form of crédits through banks.Shareholdings are less dispersed and commercial banks ("Hausbank"-rnncept) hâve very often large shareholdings in individual firms.84 Thus,rnntrolling blocs of shares are relatively seldom transacted and hostilel.ikrover bids ar not common. In Germany private companies (GmbH) aremon; important relative to public ones. For a second or third génération(iwner of a Mittelstand company, loyalty to his company, to thé communityin which it is based and to thé workforce is likely to be more importantlhan thé shorttermism of a purchaser of thé market oriented type. Com-mrivial banks use financial distress or insolvency to reorganize probleml i i i n s . 8 5 They act as reorganization specialists, whereas - in marketni icnted Systems - this rôle is normally played by an external group ofHhareholders. Access to international capital markets and exposure to thédisclosure and control demands of foreign institutional investors couldiiow bring this ownership structure under a higher amount of stock

7" See Moran, 1991."<> From a german point of view, see Grofifeld, 1986, p. 196 et sequ.»i See Kirchner, 1978.»2 CIFAR 1993.":l On thé distinction between bank-oriented and market-oriented financial sys-

l.cins, see Berglôf, 1990 and further Roe, 1991.11/1 Adams, 1994; Bundesverband deutscher Banken, 1994.85 Zimmerer, 1993; Hess/Fechner, 1991.


market pressure and cause some changes in thé cross-holdings, votingstrength of préférence chares and takeover prévention devices of thé com-panies of thé bank oriented type.

As thé two main types of financial Systems are fundamentally différ-ent, global players find themselves in différent stratégie environments86

To identify thé officiai and 'invisible' barriers for foreign actors as wellas thé institutionalized forms of légal, political and économie con-straints, they hâve to develop their own 'sociology of law', which in turnhas to be taken into account by thé scientific analysis of their law-oriented behaviour.

V. Social Intégration Through Law-Oriented Behaviour?

1. Contracts

Max Weber has associated thé growing importance of contracts inmodem society as a source of légal rights and obligations with théexpansion of thé market as a form of économie organization and thé rôleplayed by money. The contractual character of modem society allows adecentralization of thé law-making process. Modem contracts are purpo-sive contracts. Unlike status contracts, which effect a total change in thépersonalities of thé individuals involved and create an ail-inclusive fra-ternal relationship, purposive contracts are delimited in thé sensé thatthey neither affect thé status of thé parties nor give rise to new qualifiesand obligations of comradeship and brotherliness but aim solely at somespécifie performance, commodity or resuit.87 Modem individuals findthemselves - as légal persons - at thé centre of a web of contractual asso-ciations; their identity is irreducible to thé séries of relationships createdby thé contracts themselves, because they can always enter an additionalcontract without acquiring a new or losing their identity. Contract lawhas its foundation in thé ancient dualism of légal relations within thékinship group and between différent kindship groups. It begins wherethé self-sufficient houshold community ends and régulâtes thé imper-sonal relationships of formai économie exchange with outsiders withinthé market community.88 The contract itself, as an institution, has théability to transform social relationships, thé two crucial effects being (a)thé convergence of 'kinsmen' and 'strangers' that générâtes migrantlabour groups and extra-familial labour89 and (b) thé independence of(international) business of (local) personal relationships.90 Nevertheless,

se Diïser, 1990, p. 117 et sequ., 122 et sequ.87 Weber, 1976, p. 401; Kronman, 1983, p. 100 et sequ.88 Weber, 1976, p. 402.


r m i t i . 1 1 - 1 n a l l'reedom produces both inclusion and exclusion: on thé onei i n u l , rvery légal person can enter a contract, but on thé other hand,' "iitracts create law only for thé parties. Further, thé effect of contrac-I M i l aurccments on thé rights of third parties is a spécial problem, whichK i lu I » ' solved from an external point of view in thé various institu-i i i mal settings in which contracts are embedded. The behaviour of non-|. H i i i i | i ;mts , although of gréât importance to thé parties, cannot beiilmlnistered by thé contractual order. The rest of society becomes rele-

v f i u t . «nly in ternis of a réservoir of extra-contractual prerequisites of thér n n l i .H I

2. Organizations

A r i - o n l i i i g to Weber, thé development and continuai spread of thédern form of thé organization of corporate groups in ail fields of

. . M i . i l ad.ivity is besides purposive contracts thé most crucial phenom-ri io i i of modem society. On thé one hand bureaucratie organization iscnmpli'tely indispensable for thé needs of mass administration today. OnI h c ot.her hand there are clusters of normative expectations which hâveI h c i r l'ocus on formai or informai organizations relatively independent ofi l i c 1 bureaucratie exercise of state control on thé basis of technicalKnowledge. The validity of thèse normative expectations and thé possibil-i t . i i - s l'or their enforcement extend only to thé members of thé organisa-I ion or organizations-set. This means that thé inner-directedness of organ-i/.;it,ions doesn't affect thé behaviour of non-members which is subject toni l ier mechanisms of guidance and control, such as market coordination,l > i ) l i t . i c a l power, public opinion, formai légal authority, or generalizedmédia of social communication. The question of what constitutes a partni an organization or a member of interorganizational relationships is, ifposcd in isolation, a spurious one.91 A formalistic définition thatu n - I n d e s or excludes ex ante clients, suppliers, independent organiza-i i i m s , departments or merely temporary commitees is due to thé concep-t i o n of organization as an organism and implies a reification of interor-i' . .nii/ . ,-iUonal sets.

' T i n s becomes obvious in thé cases of failure in network organizationsI h . - i l . seek to use an 'internai market' as an alternative to hierarchy as amodo of internai coordination within thé firm. Hère organizational unitsbuy and sell goods and services among themselves at priées establishedand verified in thé open market. The most common mistep in such inter-

8» On thé corrélation between migrant labour, money contract and freedom, seeWeber, 1988e, pp. 489, 506.

90 Roitman, 1990, p. 686.91 Negandhi, 1975. p. 251 et sequ.


nal networks turned out to be corporate intervention in resource flows orin thé détermination of transaction priées. Corporate décision makinginclines to rather dictate priées and processes than simply manage inter-nai economy. This means that bureaucracy turns thé essential relation-ships among autonomous network's components into relationshipsamong included organisation-members: they can no longer be external -and thus highly visible to ail parties - and they can no longer reflectvoluntary and explicit commitments. Hierarchical politics, power andinfluence rather than performance are guiding members behaviour.92 Atthé level of network intégration thé concept of membership refers tofirms and to thé network's ability to efficiently allocate member firms,uncoupling and recoupling them with minimum cost and minimum lossof operating time as well as of visibility and explicitness in thé essentialnormative relationships among components. Therefore, we hâve to con-clude that thé concept of membership in organizations does not stand fora général principle of social intégration; rather, it is a symbol of inter-dependence and independence, of inclusion and exclusion at thé sametime.93 But a général principle of social intégration should perhaps besought at a completely différent level, that of thé inclusion of individualsin thé légal order as a totality representing thé whole of society.

3. Citizenship

The distinction between inclusion and exlusion in thé légal Systemilluminâtes a problem that premodern societies solved by creating andseparating various "spécial law communities".94 In those social segments(religious, ethnie groups or politically autonomous clans and cities)which were politically integrated by a common suprême authority, likethé Roman empire or thé islamic states, thé body of laws to be appliedby thé judicial officers differed in accordance with thé characteristics ofthé component groups. Thus, an individual had thé right to be treated asthé member of a spécial law community and to demand that thé normsof that légal order be applied to his dealings with other members andsometimes even with outsiders. An individual's cognizable légal identityand total légal status were determined by his membership in thé lawcommunity to which he belonged. This meant that relations with stran-gers were beyond thé law.95 According to Weber, despite thé émergenceof thé political community, spécial law is a widespread phenomenon in

92 See Miles/Snow, 1992, pp. 55, 65 et sequ.93 See Luhmann/De Giorgi, 1993, p. 327 et sequ.94 "Sonderrechte": Weber, 1976, p. 410; Kronman, 1983, p. 108.95 "Der Einzelne tràgt (seine) Rechtskonfession mit sich herum": Weber, 1976,

p. 418.


M i o i l c ' i n society as well. Modem law has created anew a gréât mass ofi i r i l p i i I icularisms but, as Weber points out, it has done so upon a dif-i . 1 1 n i l iasis , which refers to économie or technical qualities.96

Wlini cconomic contacts between strangers became necessary an inde-i" i n l c n l body of norms had to be developped. Thèse norms were con-

- i l lïom thé beginning as norms of thé market or as norms of a widerI H I | I | M - . I | community, distinct from thé légal orders of thé various groupsi n \ \ l n r l i différent individuals belonged. They regulated thé relationships"i i i . n i ^ c r s in law.97 The modem, western concept of thé state (andn . i l mil state) is based on thé émergence of thé political community asw r l l ;is !ho notions of citizenship and legal-rational authority; it suggestsn i u n i l y of political and légal sovereignty.98 An individual's membership

i n i l i r pohUcal community - his citizenship - came to be conceived in théi in r .-ik'i lr .-ict terms as thé légal personality of thé parties to a modem,

kct-oriented contract.

Thr significance of thé fact that membership in thé political commu-n i i v r i n i l d be treated as a légal construction for which personal charac-i . 1 1 h. 's were ultimately irrelevant, becomes clearer if we take into con-

i i l i i i l ion thé ability of thé colonial state to create new catégories ofUbjei is . In thé libéral tradition in thé West, thé theorisation of rights is

• i l i u n i l'rom an inévitable opposition between thé state and thé individ-H i l This aspect has tended to be reproduced in thé colonial setting: ailr p identities and idéologies were regarded as nothing but a "carry-i i v r i of 'tradition'".99 The colonial practice in relation to group iden-n i i r s tended to exhibit a sharp duality. On thé one hand, déniai of thél i r . i i i i nacy of any identity apart from that statutorily defined by thé

i î l e ; on thé other, a statutory récognition of "frozen identities" as théi . r i . s of community (résidence), or work (job réservation and rémunéra-t i o n ) , or provision of services (schools, hospitals), or political processesi i ! • . l ions, constituencies). This duality reflects thé tension between thébr . inry of state formation (thé political history of countries) and that of"' i . i l transformation (thé social history of peoples). A comparison of thé

I . M i l K H I of thé sub-categories of colonial subjects with that of metropoli-i n i i i l i/.ens100 shows that new distinctions were used to treat ail colonial

i i l > | i r t s (natives and non-natives) "as a resource to be managed by théi o loniul state for thé saké of 'économie development'". Finally, thé end

11(1 Wtber, 1976, pp. 410, 503 - 504; Kronman, 1983, pp. 109 - 112.»'' Weber, 1976, p. 503.1 1 : . ! • ! • on this point Pauly. 1995; on Weber's concept of thé state and thé correla-

l i m i between bureaucracy, democracy and nationality see Anter, 1995, p. 83 etNcqu., 131 et sequ.

H" On this point and on what follows, see Mamdani, 1990, pp. 372 - 373.i » « On this point, see Sack, 1993, p. 429.


of colonialism didn't mean thé end of thé state in thé colonies. It is withthé 'independence' that entire communities became 'non-citizens' in for-eign territories, and thé significance of cross-border migrant labour - inAfrica, a traditional institution feeding thé labour needs of commodityagriculture - became enormous.101 Moreover, a host of secessionist move-ments brought about thé invevitable balkanisation.

In thé West, thé notion of citizenship disjoins thé concept of member-ship in a political community from thé identity of thé person. Ideally,while nationality, religion and state are delinked, political unity fuseswith légal unity.102 On thé other hand, participation in thé welfarestate doesn't encompass political participation.103 The voting rights ofimmigrants is thé most famous example. As immigrants hâve mostly noaccess to thé central104 aspects of thé realm and order of symbols, ofvalues and beliefs which govern thé host country, they implicitly culti-vate thé myth of repatriation and social intégration "at home". Theytacitly establish an instrumental, monofunctional106 relation to thé hostcountry. On thé one side - according to Weber's concept of closure10'System boundaries are maintained against outsiders and procédures aredeveloped to maintain distinctions of honour and prestige within théSystem. On thé other side, immigrants show thé tendency to be a '"non-political' speech community".107 Being parasitical as well as oppositionalin nature, their vocabulary of politics stands both against and in need ofthé dominant political vocabulary and culture. Thus, it confirms a domi-nant/subordinate cultural relationship and is not likely to work for thécause of thé "Verfassungspatriotismus".108 Rather, it restricts thé discur-sive reproduction of thé immigrants' political culture in its ability topromote interests and needs effectively. The immigrants' political dis-course shares thèse characteristics with other "nonpolitical" speech com-munities such as workers.109 But nationality supplies 'nonpolitical',

101 Mamdani, 1990, P. 367.102 See thé example of thé citizenship of thé "Volksdeutschen" Seeler, 1960.i°3 Alpa, 1992, p. 32: "la cittadinanza si trasforma in 'appartenenza' a una cate-

goria sociale () un significato più pregnante di quelle ancora corrente che désignail vincolo tra un soggetto e uno stato".

104 On thé distinction between center and periphery see Eisenstadt, 1968,pp. XXX, XXXIII.

105 On this point, see Weber, 1972, p. 27: "Denn daB die blofie Tatsache des Hei-matwechsels bei der Arbeit zu den mâchtigsten Mitteln ihrer Intensivierunggehôrt, steht durchaus fest." According to Weber, a "polish girl" or a "migratoryitalian laborer" get transformed as if by miracle into virtuous workers whenplaced in an industrial setting in a capitalist country.

106 Weber, 1976, p. 23.107 Huspek/Kendall, 1991, p. 15.i°8 On this concept, see Habermas, 1992, p. 642.109 Ibid., p. 14.


n . M H n i , - i l speech communities with symbolic resources for voicing criticalini 'Ti 's ts in hard times of social and économie exclusion.

I n ;i functionally differentiated society, thé nation as 'community' may,l i n l need not play thé rôle of a symbolic substitute for thé non existentNor l r l . i i l représentation and intégration.110 The view of thé nation asn i l lonal community, endowed with thé attributes of independence, con-I l i i n a n e e for thé future and sovereignty, may, but need not be thé focus ofi " ople's sensé of belonging and identification as well as a major compo-i i r n i of their personal identities. However, even under thé régime of func-h o n . i l diffcrentiation and globalization, thé symbolic resources of thémi l ion as community to which "we" belong, "our" forfathers belongedi ind "our" descendants will belong, are significant.111 The national com-n i i i i i i l y supplies thé function Systems of society with semantic artefacts

I H h ;is national éducation, national law, national literature, nationalpai i ics or national church. Nations still put limits to thé multinatio-

n . i l i / a l ion of shareholdings in thé parent companies of global enterpriser ioups . On thé other hand, although thé global company is exposed ton i . i i i v nirisdictions, and even though its management and workforce arei n i i l i i n . i l iona l , it usually has a home government and a home tax author->\\ i h . M matters to it more than others.112

Hi Mi les , in certain religious environments, for example Eastern Ortho-i l i n i v , nationality fuses with religion and thus,'diverges markedly fromU n 1 Western secular notion of thé nationstate. In this case, those of. n u i l l i e r religion, even if citizens of thé nation-state, are not viewed as

I I . I M H J ; a national identity. This is due to thé "millet System"1 3 of théi i l l o i n , - in empire which replaced Byzantium and enhanced thé Orthodoxl ' I n i r e l i ' s power as ruler over thé Orthodox community within thé con-M i n i I n l . N of Ottoman rule by delegating to it administrative and civilM i i l i o r i l . y , and merging religious and political functions. As a resuit, thé

. 1 nietion of thé national identity incorporated religion as a crucialiponent of thé personal identity. Under thé rule of thé newly con-

I M M led nation-state, this led (and leads) to restrictions on thé exercise. . I i e h | > i o i i s freedom which violate thé European Convention on HumanI d r . l i i . 1 . and thé underlying values of thé European Community.114 As a

H" l'uni n, 1995, p. 54 et sequ.n i / / i / , 1992, p . 124.H ' !.. pp. 114, 117.I I ' Tins means that thé question of ethnie minorities could only be addressed

h mu ,-i western point of view and in western catégories. To this problem: Afshar,r i ' M . | > . 132.

I I I l'ollis, 1993, pp. 347, 349-350; see further Makrides, 1994, p. 76. Chargeshnvc been brought against Greece before thé European Commission and théKuinpean Court of Human Rights; see EuGRZ 1993, p. 228.

414 Athanasios Gromitsaris [156] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 11!)

resuit, we conclude that citizenship implies a partial inclusion. It doesnot run parallel with participation in thé welfare state, in thé nationalcommunity or in thé central aspects of thé symbolic and institutional

order.

4. Individual Rights

In a functionally differentiated society religions righteousness, finan-cial distress and légal assertions are subject to différent mechanisms ofsélection. For instance, economists see law as a "giant pricingmachine".115 Their problem is that before policies - introduced by rule-making - become economically effective, they "suffer thé ravages" of thépolitical and légal Systems.116 On thé other hand, jurists base their workand their reality assumptions on thé distinction between norms andfacts, taking, thus, thé risk of intervening in an institutionally irrelevant

reality.The constitutional protection of civil and political rights on thé one

side, of social, économie and cultural ones, on thé other side, symbolizesthé multi-inclusion of persons in thé functionally differentiated society.From a normative point of view, under thé influence of thé doctrine ofindivisibility of human rights, thé idea of a global approach - which nolonger distinguishes between thé two catégories of rights - is gainingsome ground.117 Nevertheless, although thé multi-inclusion of persons insub-systems is legally protected, it can only partly be prescribed andenforced, let alone coordinated. Légal décisions and enforcementprocesses can neither replace thé opérations of thé other societal sub-systems nor totally neutralize thé informai rules of inclusion adminis-tered within patron-client networks.118 Therein lies thé difficulty of théso-called state intervention. Every effort in designing général rules ofinclusion seems to be met with thé fact that "every good regulator of aSystem must be a model of that System".119 The protection of inclusioncannot replace inclusion because direct control of sub-systems by law isnot attainable. The légal enforcement of inclusion would hâve to ade-quately represent thé internai complexity of thé controlled sub-system.This either leads to over-simplification by de-differentiation or to ungo-vernability because of hypercomplexity. Nevertheless, thé mère existenceof formai rules of inclusion which are valid for everybody, for nationals

H5 Veljanovski, 1990, p. 15.ne Ibid., p. 85.H' Trindade, 1990.118 On thé conflict between

1992, p. 156 et sequ.us Canant/Ashby, 1970.

'statalismo" and "Catena clientelare", sçe Zincone,

i - l l ;is l'or allons, has an at least symbolic integrative effect.120 Ac-inclusion occurs at thé level of "intermediate" institutions: Local

i i . n i | ' , « ' and trading Systems, community planning and socially respon-i M c mvrstment, community associations, neighbourhood partnerships,

m n i i i | > l n y m < > n t action centres, resource and support centres, religiousmmnit ies and urban or community studies and technical aid centres,

H" \ . i l l play a very important rôle in determining thé conditions ofI Iniion,121

i l " - légal construction of thé political membership and thé inclusion inU n |")lit,ical System do not détermine thé multi-inclusion of thé person inl i n "Hier sub-systems. The multi-inclusion is guaranteed by means ofI h r mdividual rights provisions of thé modem constitutions, but thé con-

i i i n l m n a l protection of rights doesn't explicitly address thé question ofh" l i a s thé ability and compétence to define thé content of thé individ-

H i l i i/'.hts.122 Distinctions such as libertarianism and légal paternalism"i i r | ' . i ilat,ory state and social selfregulation are partly due to thé contin-n . . M l ' f fort to answer this question. Libertarians place gréât emphasisn i vnluntariness: a person gives shape to her or his rights by means of

M i i i i i ; voluntarily. The state has no right to legislate what people should' I " i long as their actions harm no one else. On thé contrary, accordingi" l ' r . ' i l p.it.ernalism, thé state law and légal institutions may thwart ai 's own goals if it is for thé person's own good. But there's thé rub,I l l i r i lar ians reply: thé state goals for a person do not coincide with his

i l s l'or himself.123 The solution seems to lie with a compromise, ani | i | > i ï > . - i r h that privilèges neither thé action and self-détermination of thé

m i l i v i i l t i a l nor thé demands of thé institutional totality.124

5. Constitutions and Issue Avoidance

No matter how thé content of human rights is defined, thé rights pro-i i i i i - d by a constitution are not subject to political revision. For thoséwli" believe that there is a conflict between constitutionalism andi l ' in'icracy, thé tension stems from thé fact that constitutions remove cer-

1 " Viola, 1992, p. 68: "Per vivere insieme qualche cosa deve essere commune,f t iNN'mi rhe solo le regole formali"; Zincone, 1992, p. 243: "Per integrazione inten-i l i . i i n i ) la capacità di fare accetare ai vecchi e ai nuovi membri di una comniunità

i l i - ' nmmuni di convivenza civile."i:n Sec IFP "Lokale Ôkonomie", 1994.1 ' ' I.iensee, 1980; Badura, 1989, p. 43.1 • • ' < Hospers, 1980, p. 265.12* On thé définition of matrimony, see Friauf, 1986, p. 2600: "Art. 6 I GG aïs

Frciheitsrecht und personal geprâgte Institutsgarantie"; further Louven, 1993,p. 13: "Die Beurteilung der Gleichgeschlechtlichkeit mag sich verândern. DasKochtsinstitut Ehe darf darunter nicht leiden."

416 Athanasios Gromitsaris [158] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 417

tain topics from collective délibération and public review: Paradoxically,it is thé removal of subjects from thé public sphère that is regarded as ameans of ensuring thé proper functioning of thé démocratie process andsocial intégration. The removal is also supposed to divert resources fromunresolvable problems to soluble ones.125 The distinction between théuniversal suppression of a thème and thé mère transferral of that thèmeto a différent institutional context makes clear that everything dépendson thé agenda to which forbidden décisions are transferred. To exclude atopic (for instance, voting rights of immigrants)126 from thé national lég-islative agenda may be to place it on thé local agenda and to subject it tothé control of local majorities. On thé other hand, a décision may bewithdrawn from thé jurisdiction of ail branches and levels of govern-ment and consigned to private individuals.127 The classical example isthé exclusion of religion from politics: religious disputation might factio-nalize thé System and pose a threat to inclusive political citizenship."Neutral territory" or "institutional neutrality"128 hâve played an essen-tial rôle in unifying multidenominational societies, whereas religiousindoctrinators remained free to practice their arts outside school wallsand public institutions.129 By imposing "gag rules" on themselves, boththé political and thé légal System avoid issues that might threaten inté-gration and democracy. But privatization of issues like abortion, redistri-bution of property, thé rôle of women in society or thé rights of racialand ethnie minorities and homosexuals through constitutional lawimmunizes them from public scrutiny.130 In addition, if resolutionthrough political and légal processes is unavailable, people may losefaith in thé system and resort to extralegal means. The distinctionbetween issues that produce conflict and issues that do not, is thusinadéquate to décide which issues to remove from law-making andnormal politics. This brings up thé main difficulty - thé problem of iden-tification of thé issues that should be justifiably privatized on thégrounds of thé fear of factionalization and draining of public resourcesto insoluble problems.131 A sélection criterion is viewed in thé questionwhether thé issue sought to be privatized by constitutional law can beconsidered a right. Rights provisions are designed to fence off certainareas from majoritarian control. But as thé category of interests that can

125 Holmes, 1988, pp. 24, 26.126 From thé point of view of german constitutional law thé définition of

"Staatsvolk" coïncides with thé one of "Gemeindevolk", therefore an issueremoval is not possible.

127 Holmes, 1988, p. 41.128 Schlaich, 1972, p. 129.129 Ibid., p. 44.iso Sunstein, 1988, p. 340.13l Ibid., pp. 340 - 342.

ic( |uiic I l i c status of a right is relatively small, thé removal of issuesh c i n i i hc public sphère remains limited. AU this suggests that "issue-

i lance" and "stratégie self-censorship" cannot bring about socialm i e l ' i . i h n n ; they will sometimes promote thé proper functioning of théi c i i l •! i i - :.|)here, but sometimes they will not.

VI. Conclusions

i c i ; . i l norms are symbolized by norm-sentences which should not bei c i . n i il 'u-d with thé norms as such. They are thé product of processes« l i n h Imt.h regulate behaviour and confirm or modify thé normative

i . i i n l . i n l usrd to regulate behaviour. In this sensé légal norms are 'rules'i n . I ( I r p r i i t l on thé formation of social expectations of a normative char-i c in in private and public institutions. The concept of rule is a token of

U n i -n r r r l . - i l . ion between normative expectational structures and thé onl ' . m i i ' M-IccUon of anticipated or unanticipated events. Déviation and

| i h . n i c c make sensé only in thé light of existing normative expecta--. w l i i i - h , in turn, are modified or confirmed by déviation and compli-

i . t%nal décisions seem to be premissed on normative informationn, i i i u n ml l » t > distilled from textbooks or précédents. On thé contrary, it

I n - lirought into connection with them, ex post. Therefore, instead of. H . I I I I I I : l'or "real laws" (A. M. Honoré) we should search for "real

M i l .

W i n l i - I I if command or imperative theory of légal norms départs fromi l H i n . i h i n of a state monopoly in thé powers of law making, thé recogni-i n u i i h i -o ry sees thé légal character of thé norm depending not on théi » > i l n i i l y of state intervention, but on a discource deciding about théI . H i whH.her thé norm is reasonably acceptable or worthy of recogni-i n in Arrurding to Max Weber it is thé simultaneous diversification ofi h l l i M n i mrchanisms for thé formation, innovation and institutionaliza-I I . . M "I c-xpt'ctations rather than coercion as such that is of primaryi n i p i i i i .n icc for thé légal ordering of action. Law-oriented behaviour

i ' i INCS u vast range of actions. A social action is law-oriented if (a) an i . i h v r standard for thé évaluation of conduct and (b) thé possibility. i l i r l l r r i i i i ) ' , on compliance and déviation are among thé background. . M n M u n i s of thé action itself.

l i n - , implies a shift from a legalistic perspective to a more sociologi-c n l l y Ncnsitive one which is bare of prefabricated reality assumptions

i l i Hi t 1 rôle of thé state, modernization and functional differentiation.Tlion'fore, describing law-oriented behaviour as it understands and pre-

. n i i l self , is an enterprise that présupposes thé successful intégrationn i l'T,al theory and sociology of law. It has to entail middle range thé-

Athanasios Gromitsaris Ml

418

ories that in turn entail corrigible hypothèses and observer-dependentdata about law-oriented behaviour in various institutional settings.

At thé level of thé distinction between légal and illégal behaviour,modem légal Systems are ail-inclusive. They include every single socialaction which can be evaluated as legally right or legally wrong. The for-malization of normative expectations makes exchange relations betweenlégal and moral strangers more predictable but cannot replace informairules and décisions about inclusion and exclusion. At thé level of con-tracts and organizations légal Systems produce both inclusion and exclu-sion. While contracts produce légal norms that are not binding for non-parties, organizations cannot regulate non-member behaviour. Extracon-tractual binding effects and prerequisites hâve to be administered byother institutions (for instance, organizations or thé state). Similarly,extra-organizational binding effects can only be brought about by extra-organizational institutions such as thé market or thé generalized médiaof communication. Besides, although constitutions prescribe thé societalmulti-inclusion of persons by means of instituting civil, social, politicaland économie rights, thé légal protection and enforcement of individualrights remain internai opérations of thé légal System which cannotreplace thé opérations of other sub-systems. Finally, deleting divisiveand/or unanswerable questions from thé political agenda by constitu-tional law will sometimes decrease and sometimes increase factional

struggle.

Références

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Garzôn Valdés, Berlin, pp. 3-15

Adams, M. (1994): Stellungnahme. Die Macht der Banken - Anhôrung im Bundes-tag, in: Zeitschrift fur Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft, pp. 77 - 86

Afshar, F. (1994): Der Umgang mit Minderheiten im Islam und im Okzident, in:Batzli / Kissling / Zihlmann (eds.) Menschenbilder, Menschenrechte. Islam und

Okzident im Konflikt, Zurich, pp. 128 - 135

Albrow, M. (1990): Max Weber's Construction of Social Theory, London

Aldrich, H. / Mindlin, S. (1978): Uncertainty and Dépendance. Two Perspectives onEnvironment, in: Lucien Karpik (éd.), Organization and Environment. Theory,

Issues and Reality, Guildford, Surrey, pp. 149 - 170

Alexy, R. (1989): On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality, in: Ratio

Juris 2, pp. 167 - 183

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