LAW314–ConstitutionalLawMacquarieUniversitySession1,2016CombinedLecture&TextbookNotesPrescribedText-Winterton’sAustralianFederalConstitutionalLaw:CommentaryandMaterials,3rdedition,2013

WEEK TOPIC PAGEWeekOne FederationandIndependence 3 TheConstitutionandConstitutionalism 6 IndependenceandCitizens–SinghvCommonwealth 9WeekTwo ConstitutionalInterpretation 12WeekThree CharacterisationoftheConstitution 18 TheExternalAffairsPower 18WeekFour TheCorporationsPower 26WeekFive Federalism:StateConstitutionsandInconsistency 39 StateConstitutions 45 Same-sexmarriagecase 49WeekSix Federalism 52 Federalism:FinancialRelations 57 ANationalDocument:EqualTreatmentProvisions 59 FreedomofInterstateTrade 65WeekSeven TheExecutivePower 69 NationhoodandContracting 75 ASummaryoftheExecutivePowerforExams 82WeekEight TheJudicialPower 83 TheFrameworkofChapterIII&BoilermakersCase 87 BoilermakersLimbOne-ExecutiveDetention 92 JudicialPowerNotesforExams 96WeekNine BoilermakersLimbTwo 98 StateCourtsandIncompatibility 103WeekTen ProtectingRights 110 FreedomofReligion 116 Trialbyjury 120WeekEleven ImpliedRightsandFreedoms 121 ImpliedRighttoVote 121 Structuralism–UsingStructuretoImplyRights 123 ImpliedFreedomofPoliticalCommunication 124 ImpliedFreedoms–SummaryforExams 129WeekTwelve Maboandsovereignty 130 TheRacePower;IndigenousRecognitionand

ConstitutionalChange132

WeekFour:TheCorporationsPowerTHECORPORATIONSPOWERTHEINDUSTRIALRELATIONSPOWERSUBSEQUENTISSUES

1. Whichcorporationscanberegulated?2. Whataspectsofthosecorporationscanberegulated?3. Whatcategoriesofpersonsotherthancorporationscanberegulateddue

totheirrelationtoconstitutionalcorporations?WHICHCORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATED?Tradingandfinancialcorporations

• RvFederalCourtofAustralia;ExparteWANationalFootballLeague(Adamson’sCase)(1979)143CLR190

• CommonwealthvTasmania(TasmanianDamCase)(1983)158CLRWHATASPECTSOFTHOSECORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATED?

• Huddart,Parker&CoPtyLtdvMoorehead(1909)8CLR330• ActorsandAnnouncersEquityAssociationofAustraliavFontanaFilmsPty

Ltd(1982)150CLR169,205• CommonwealthvTasmania(TasmanianDamCase)(1983)158CLR1

WHATCATEGORIESOFPERSONSOTHERTHANCORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATEDDUETOTHEIRRELATIONTOCONSTITUTIONALCORPORATIONS?

• ReDingjan;ExparteWagner(1995)183CLR323WORKCHOICESCASECharacterisationIssueRelevanceofConventionDebatesRelevanceofReferendumsThemesandissues

1. Federalism2. ImpactofEngineers3. Interpretation4. Consequences

THECORPORATIONSPOWERSection51(xx)TheParliamentshall,subjecttothisConstitution,havepowertomakelawsforthepeace,order,andgoodgovernmentoftheCommonwealthwithrespectto:…Foreigncorporations,andtradingorfinancialcorporationsformedwithinthelimitsoftheCommonwealth

• ‘Constitutionalcorporations’:shorthandforforeign,tradingandfinancialcorporations.

• ‘Foreigncorporations’:‘formedoutsidethelimitsoftheCommonwealth’NewSouthWalesvCommonwealth(IncorporationCase)(1990)169CLR482,497-8.

THEINDUSTRIALRELATIONSPOWERSection51(xxxv)

TheParliamentshall,subjecttothisConstitution,havepowertomakelawsforthepeace,order,andgoodgovernmentoftheCommonwealthwithrespectto:…ConciliationandarbitrationforthepreventionandsettlementofindustrialdisputesextendingbeyondthelimitsofanyoneState.SUBSEQUENTISSUESWemustundergo1)Interpretationand2)Characterisation.1.Interpretation

• Mainquestion-Whatisthescopeofthepower?• Toanswer-Lookatthemeaningof‘trading’,‘financial’corporation.

2.Characterisation• Mainquestion-whenwillalawbeone‘inrespectof’thecorporations

power?• I.e.mustalawrelatefundamentallytoa‘trading’,‘financial’,or‘foreign’

qualitytobealawinrespectofthecorporationspower?• Or,canalawbeonanymattersolongastheconstitutionalcorporationis

theobjectofcommand?RelevantQuestions

1. Whichcorporationscanberegulated?2. Whataspectsofthosecorporationscanberegulated?3. Whatcategoriesofpersonsotherthancorporationscanberegulateddue

totheirrelationtoconstitutionalcorporations?1.WHICHCORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATED?TRADINGANDFINANCIALCORPORATIONSThecorporationspowerextendsonlytocorporations‘formedwithinthelimitsoftheCommonwealth’.ThismeansthattheCommonwealthdoesnothavethepowertoregulateformationofthosecorporations-IncorporationCase.ThereforetheCommonwealthhadtonegotiatewithallthestatestoenforceuniformcorporationslaw.Howdoweidentifyatradingorfinancialcorporation?Courtshaveconsideredtwotests:anActivitiestestandaPurposetest.ItisshowninQueenslandRail[2015]HCA11(8April2015)thatthepreferredapproachistousebothtests/examinebothfeaturesofthecorporation.RvFederalCourtofAustralia;ExparteWANationalFootballLeague(Adamson’sCase)(1979)143CLR190Issue:wasafootballclubatradingcorporation?Decision:Yes,majorityfocusedontheclub’sactivities.Reasoning

• Withaprimaryfocusonactivities,MasonJlookedtogatereceipts,distributionofincomeagainstclubs,sourcesofincomee.g.broadcasting,sizeofrevenue.Notehealludedtotheclub’spurposeasfinancialgain.

• StephenJindissentlookedattheclub’spurpose,saidtherewasnosharingofprofitsamongstmembersanditspurposewaspromotingthegame.

Remainingissues

• Whatdegreeofactivitymadeacorporationatradingorfinancialcorporation?

o MasonJhadcontrasted‘sufficientlysignificantproportionofitsoverallactivities’with‘soslightandincidental’(e.g.wherechurchesorschoolsengageinsomebutsoslightandincidentalthattheycan’tbeconsideredtradingcorps)(233-4).

• ThisquestionwassettledinStateSuperannuationBoardofVictoriavTradePracticesCommission(1982)150CLR282:

o Majority-Financialactivitiesmustformasubstantialproportionoftotalactivities,evenifothermoreextensivenon-financial(non-trading)activitiesalsotakeplace.

o NotetheminorityviewofGibbsCJandWilsonJ-activitymustbe‘thepredominantandcharacteristicactivity’.

CommonwealthvTasmania(TasmanianDamCase)(1983)158CLRFacts:Hydro-ElectricCommissionwasagovernmentcontrolledcorporationcreatedbytheHydro-ElectricCommissionAct1944(Tas).ItplannedtobuildadamontheFranklinriversysteminTasmaniainordertogenerateelectricitythatwouldbesoldtoconsumers.DecisionandReasoning

• MasonJ(majority):theconnectionofthecorporationwiththegovernmentofastatedoesn’ttakeitoutsidethepower.ItisnotaservantoftheCrown;whileithasasignificantpolicymakingroleandengagesinlarge-scaleconstruction,itcanstillbeatradingcorporation.

• Focusedonactivitiesnotpurposes.RemainingIssues

• Theamountoftradingorfinancialactivitiesofacorporationcanchangeovertime.Thusifwearedefiningtrading/financialcorpsonthebasisofactivities,itsstatusasaconstitutionaltrading/financialcorporationcouldchangeovertime.

QuickendenvO’Connor(2001)109FCR243(FC)

• ‘Substantial’appliedliberally.• HeldthatUniversityofWesternAustraliaisa‘tradingcorporation’

despitetotalrevenuebeingonly18percent.2.WHATASPECTSOFTHOSECORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATED?Differentviewshaveevolvedovertime.TheolderviewHuddart,Parker&CoPtyLtdvMoorehead(1909)8CLR330

• ThecorporationspowerenablestheCommonwealthtorecogniseandprovideforcorporationstooperatebeyondtheirjurisdictionoforigin.I.e.itisaninterstatepower.

• Forexample,thiswouldallowthecommonwealthtoofferlinesofcredittocorporationsoperatinginterstate.Alignswiththereservedstatepowersdoctrine.

• ThecasewasoverturnedbyStricklandvRoclaConcretePipesLtd(1971)124CLR468,484(BarwickCJ)wherenotedthatRPdoctrinehadbeenoverturnedinEngineers.

IsaacsJdissent(393)• Empoweringlawthatdependsonsimplythespecificobjectsofthe

power-aforeign,tradingorfinancialcorporation-whetherinasingleStateorinterstatecanregulateonthesemattersonceidentified.

• Suchcorporationsaredistinguishablefromdomesticcorporationsformunicipal,mining,manufacturing,religious,scholasticorcharitablepurposes.

• ThisdistinctionstillcitedinWorkChoices.HigginsJmajority

• IftheCommonwealthcouldregulateonanymattersolongasitreferredtotheobject(e.g.identifiedfinance,trade,foreign),itcouldregulatetoomuch.

THERELEVANCEOFTRADINGANDFINANCIALOvertime,threeviewshavedevelopedonthescopeofthepower.

1. Narrowview:thecorporationspowerislimitedtotheregulationoftradingactivitiesoftradingcorporationsorfinancialactivitiesoffinancialcorporations.

2. Intermediaryview:thepowerextendstoactivitiesoftradingcorporationsengagedinforthepurposesoftrade.

3. Broadview:itcanbeusedtoregulatetheactivitiesofatradingcorporationinanyrespectwhatsoever.Providedacorporationhasthecharacteristicsthatbringsitwithins51(xx),anyaspectoractivityofthatcorporationcanberegulatedbytheCommonwealth.

Thefirsttwoviewsreflectthe‘distinctivecharacter’test:

• I.e.thefactthecorporationisatrading,financialorforeigncorporationshouldbesignificantinthewaythelawrelatestoit(Wintertonpg520).Thelawshouldberelatedtothataspect.

Thethirdviewreflectsthe‘objectofcommand’test:

• This‘requiresthataconstitutionalcorporationbeanobjectofthecommandofalaw,permittingorprohibitingatradingorfinancialcorporationfromengaginginconductorformingrelationships’(Ibid).I.e.lawneedstousetradingorfinancialcorporationasitssubjectmatterandthenitcanregulateinanymannerconnectingtoit.

Viewone:NarrowviewActorsandAnnouncersEquityAssociationofAustraliavFontanaFilmsPtyLtd(1982)150CLR169,205Directlyregulatingtradingactivitiesofatradingcorporation

• MasonJ205‘Suchalawiswithinpowerbecauseitnecessarilyoperatesdirectlyonthesubjectofthepower-itisalawabouttradingcorporations.’

IndirectlyregulatingtradingactivitiesofatradingcorporationIssue:WhethertheTradePracticesAct1974(Cth)s45D(1)(b)(i)wasvalidunders51(xx).

• Itprohibitedsecondaryboycotts,whichiswhathadoccurred.ItprohibitedtheactorsunionfrompreventingtheatreagentsfromsupplyingFontana(acorporation)withlabour.

• Thiswasnotalawdirectlyonthesubjectoftradeactivitiesbutprotectedatradingcorporationbyregulatingstrikeactions.

• Thetargetofthelegislationwaspreventingsecondaryboycottslikelytoresultineventssuchassubstantiallossofbusiness.

JudgmentsMasonJ

• Thereisnodistinctionbetweenalawprotectingthebusinessofacorporationfromlossordamageandoneoperatingtoprotectthecorporationfrominterferencewithitstradingactivities.Eachprotectsthesubjectofapowerbyoperatingdirectlyonit-207.

• Indicta,saidtheCPdoesnotonlyapplytotradingactivitiesbutmustapplytothesubjectmatter(tradingcorporations).

Murphy

• CP‘enablesParliamenttomakecomprehensivelawscoveringallinternalandexternalrelationsofforeigntradingandfinancialcorporations’(212)

• ThispowerincludesIR. Gibbs(narrowview)

• GivenfederalnatureofConstitution,difficulttosupposethatpowerswereintendedtoextenttotheenactmentofacompletecodeoflawsapplicabletothepersonsnamedinparasxixandxxofCP(181).

• Foreign,tradingandfinancialaspectsmustbesignificantinthenatureofthelawforittobevalid(181).E.g.lawcanonlyrelatetoforeignaspectoftheforeigncorporation.

Viewtwo:IntermediaryviewThisproposesthatthecorporationspowerextendsalsotoactivitiesoftradingcorporationsengagedinforthepurposesoftrade.AnexampleisshownintheTasmanianDamscase.CommonwealthvTasmania(TasmanianDamCase)(1983)158CLR1Facts:

• WorldHeritagePropertiesConservationAct1983(Cth)providedthattheGovernor–Generalcoulddeclarepropertyasapropertytowhichs10appliedifitisbeingorlikelytobedamagedordestroyed.S10(1)defined‘foreign’and‘trading’corporationsascorporationswithinthemeaningofs51(xx)forthepurposeoftheAct.S10(2)prohibitedwithoutminister’sconsent,a‘foreigncorporation’,acorporation‘incorporatedinaterritory’and‘atradingcorporationformedwithinhelimitsoftheCommonwealth’fromengaginginactivitiessuchasdrillinganddeforestation.I.e.sections7and10preventedconstructionoftheGordon-below-Franklindam.

Significance:• Thiscasesignificantlyexpandedtheambitofs51(xx)byrecognising

thatitextendedbeyondtheregulationofthetradingactivitiesoftradingcorporationstoactivitiesundertakenforthepurposeoftheirtradingactivities.ThiswasnotappreciatedbyJusticeGibbs.

• TheActreferredtoactsdonebyatradingcorporation‘forthepurposeofitstradingactivities’10(4)

• ThispossiblymeansthattheCommonwealthcouldregulate,forexamplethebuildingoffactoriesestablishedforproductionthatwouldleadtotrade.

MasonJ

• 146-Therelevantquestioniswhetherthecorporationspowerextendstotheregulationofactivitiesoftradingcorporations,notbeingtradingactivities.I.e.cantheyregulateactivitiesofTC’swhentheseactivitiesaren’ttrading.

• Thesubjectmatterofthepowerispersons,notactivities.• 148-TheproposedrestrictionwoulddenyParliamentpowertoregulate

borrowingbytradingcorporations,despitethefactthepurposeofs51(xx)wastoenablePtoregulatetransactionsb/wcategoriesofcorporationmentionedandthepublic,indeedtoprotectthepublic,shouldtheneedarise,inrelationtotheoperationsofsuchcorporations.

• Rejectsthe‘distinctivecharactertest’(148)whicharguesthatCthcanonlyregulateactivitiesengagedinbyaTCforpurposeoftrading.Hegivesthreereasons:(149)

1. Thatanalysishasnoapplicabilitywhenlookingatfinancialandforeigncorporations.Thescopeoftheirpowerwasn’ttobelimitedbyreferencetotheforeignaspectsofforeigncorporationsandfinancialaspectsoffinancialcorporations.

2. ThisinterpretationfailstogiveeffecttotheprinciplethatlegislativepowerconferredbytheConstitutionshouldbeliberallyconstrued.

3. Thepowerisattachedtoadesignatedtypeoflegalperson,thuswouldseem‘naturallytoextendtotheiractsandactivities’.

• MentionsGriffithJinHuddartat348:theCorporationspowerallowsCthtoregulatecorporationswithregardsto:

o Officersandservantsitmustemploy,conditionsoflabour,remuneration,thuscan‘exercisecompletecontrolofthedomestictradecarriedonbythem’.

• ‘Alawwhichprohibitstradingandforeigncorporationsfromdoinganactisalawabouttradingandforeigncorporations,notwithstandingthatitisalsoalawabouttheactwhichisprohibited’(153).

• Conclusion:thereis‘nosoundreasonfordenyingthatthepowershouldextendtotheregulationofactsundertakenbytradingcorporationsforthepurposeofengagingintheirtradingactivities’.

DeaneJ

• Makestwopoints:1)relationofCPtootherheadsofpowerand2)relationofCPtoappropriatenationalpower.

• 268:‘Thegrantofpowercontainedins51(xx)oftheConstitution…mustnotbereaddownbyreferencetoanypresumptionthatthevariousgrantsofpowercontainedins51shouldbeconstruedasbeingmutuallyexclusive’àseeWorkChoices.

• 270:‘Noonewithknowledgeofthepoliticalandothernon-tradingactivitiesoftradingcorporationsinandsincethedaysoftheEastIndiaCompanywouldsuggestthatthenon-tradingactivitiesoftradingcorporationsareanylessappropriatetobeplacedunderthelegislativecontrolofanationalgovernmentthanaretheirtradingactivities.’

GibbsCJ:maintainedviewthatCPonlyempoweredregulationofactivities‘properlyregardedastradingactivities’(117)

• ConsideredmostoftheactsprohibitedbytheWorldHeritagestatutewere‘preparatorytothetrade’,aimedatconservation,andappliedtoanypersons.Theywerenotconcernedwithtradingcorporationsengagedintradingactivities(118).

DawsonJ

• Federalismconcern317:The‘tradingcorporation’etctagsare‘pegsuponwhichParliamenthassoughttohanglegislationonanentirelydifferenttopic’.PattemptingtoregulateenvironmentalconductofacorporationratherthanitstradingactivitiesthroughtheCP.ReachingintowhatwastraditionallyastatebasedmatterthroughtheCPnotthroughtradingactivities

3.WHATCATEGORIESOFPERSONSOTHERTHANCORPORATIONSCANBEREGULATEDDUETOTHEIRRELATIONTOCONSTITUTIONALCORPORATIONS?ReDingjan;ExparteWagner(1995)183CLR323Facts:

• TasmanianPulp(thecorporationinthiscase)contractedwiththeWagnerstoharvesttimber.TheWagnerssubcontractedtotheDingjan’s.

• TheDingjan’ssoughtareviewandvariationoftheircontract,pursuanttotheIndustrialRelationsAct1988(Cth)whichallowedtheIRCommissiontovarycontractsforunfairness.

• TheActapplied‘inrelationtoacontractrelatingtothebusinessofaconstitutionalcorporation’127C(1)(b).

Issue:• Wassection127C(1)(b)alawwithrespecttothecorporationspower?• ThisarosebecausetheWagner’sandDingjan’swerenotcorporations.It

waspurportingtoregulateathirdpartythroughitscontractualrelationshipwithaconstitutionalcorporation.

Held:

• Thesectionwasinvalidby4:3.MasonCJ,DeaneandGaudronJJdissenting.

Brennan(majority)

• Thelawmustdiscriminatebetweenconstitutionalcorporationsandotherpersons.

• 338-TheActaffectedrightsandobligationsofcontractualparties,regardlessofwhethertheywereaconstitutionalcorporation.Thepowertoaffecttheircontractmayormaynotaffecttherelatedbusinessoftheconstitutionalcorporationatall.Thus,thescopewastoowide.

McHughJ(majority)368

• CorporationspowerallowstheCommonwealthtomakelawsonanysubjectthataffectsthecorporation.

• Aslongasthelawcanbecharacterisedasalawwithrespecttotrading,financialorforeigncorporations,PcanregulatemanysubjectmattersthatareotherwiseoutsidethescopeofCommonwealthlegislativepower.

• However,thelawmusthave‘arelevancetoorconnectionwith’as51(xx)corporation.Itisnotenoughforthelawtorefertothesubjectmatterorapplytothesubjectmatter.

• Itmusthavesignificancetoactivities,functions,relationshipsorbusiness.I.e.givesomebenefitordetrimentaleffect.

• ‘Alawoperatingontheconductofoutsiderswillnotbewithinthepowerconferredbys51(xx)unlessthatconducthassignificance’forconstitutionalcorporations(s51(xx)corporations).

• Alawthatmakestheactivitymerelyaconditionforregulatingtheconductofanotherislikelytobeoutsideofpower.

GaudronJ:Dissent–adoptedinWorkChoices

• Section51(xx)‘istobeconstruedaccordingtoitstermsandnotbyreferencetounnecessaryimplicationsandlimitations’(364)-rejectingconcernsraisedinseveralcases

• CPextendsto‘thebusinessfunctions,activitiesandrelationshipsofconstitutionalcorporations’,andalso‘tothepersonsbyandthroughwhomtheycarryoutthosefunctionsandactivitiesandwithwhomtheyenterintothoserelationships.’365-movementtowardsobjectofcommandtest;identifyingCCasobjectofcommand,oncethisisdone,regulationcanoccuronanynumberofactivitiesrelatingtoitsfunctions,activities,relationsetc.

• Inthiscase–theprovisioninquestioneitherrelatestobeinginacontractwiththecorporationorapartywhoisitselfinacontractwiththecorporation(365-6)

WORKCHOICESCASENewSouthWalesvCommonwealth(WorkChoicesCase)(2006)229CLR1Facts:

• WorkplaceRelationsAmendment(WorkChoices)Act2005(Cth)restructuredworkplacerelationsfor‘constitutionalcorporations’.Thisaffected85%ofworkers.

• Previously,Commonwealthlegislationreliedmostlyontheconciliationandarbitrationpowers51(xxxv).WhereasthisAmendingActreliedlargelyonthecorporationspower.

• Section6ofthenewActincludedinitsdefinitionof‘employers’,constitutionalcorporations.

• Itaimedtocreateanationalworkplacerelationssystembasedonthecorporationspower.

• Fivestates,twounions(withsupportofTasmaniaandTerritories)broughtanactionseekingdeclarationthattheActwasinvalid.

LegalIssues:• Coulds51(xx)(Corporationspower)beusedtorefashionthelegislative

regimethathadpreviouslydependedons51(xxxv)(Conciliationandarbitrationpower)?

• Isalawrequiringcertainemployeeminimumentitlementsinrespectofconstitutionalcorporationsa‘lawwithrespecttosuchcorporations’?[17]

BreakingdownthequestionsA:Processofcharacterisationandinterpretation:

• A1:Whatdegreeofrelevanceorconnectionto‘constitutionalcorporations’isnecessaryforcharacterisationasalawwithrespecttothosecorporations?

• A2:Whatistherelevanceoffederalbalance?• A3:Isthecorporationspower‘readdown’bylimitswithinotherpowers?

(i.e.theconciliationandarbitrationpower).B:DidtheConventionDebatesshedlightonthemeaningofthecorporationspower?C:WasthefailuretoamendtheConstitution(byreferendum)toprovideforageneralIRpowerrelevanttointerpretingthecorporationspower?Relevantprovisions

• Corporationspowers51(xx)-canmakelawswithrespecttoforeigncorporations,tradingandfinancialcorporationsformedwithinthelimitsofthecommonwealth.

• Conciliationandarbitrationpowers51(xxxv)-canmakelawson‘Conciliationandarbitrationforthepreventionandsettlementofindustrialdisputesextendingbeyondthelimitsofanyonestate’.I.e.can’tmakeIRlawsonmattersthatarestatebased.

Plaintiff’sargument

• CommonwealthpowerislimitedbecauseemploymentandIRaretraditionallystatematters.

Judgement

• Majority:GleesonCJ,Gummow,Hayne,Heydon,andCrennanJJ• Dissenting:KirbyJandCallinanJ(separatejudgments)

CharacterisationIssue

A1:Whatdegreeofrelevanceorconnectionto‘constitutionalcorporations’isnecessaryforcharacterisationasalaw‘withrespectto’thosecorporations?Themajoritydiscussedtwodifferenttests:1)Distinctivecharactertest,2)ObjectofcommandtestDistinctivecharactertest(103)

• Proposesthatalawwouldonlybealawwithrespecttothecorporationspowerwhen‘thefactthatthecorporationisaforeign,tradingorfinancialcorporationshouldbesignificantinthewayinwhichthelawrelatestoit’.

• Onthisbasis,theCommonwealthcouldregulateinregardtotradingactivitiesorfinancialactivities.Employmentisnotamatteroftrading,thuswouldfalloutsidethecorporationspower.

RejectionofdistinctivecharactertestMajorityrejectsforthreereasons:

1. Itreliedonpreviouscasesbutthesewerefactspecificandnotrelevant-[141].

2. TheCourtmustnotinterpretapowerbasedonsuspicionoverpower’sfutureandpotentialuse[118].PhadraisedconcernsthatbroadinterpretationwouldgiveCthtoomuchpower-seeparadeofhorriblesconcern;HigginsJinHuddart.

3. Itleavesseriousriskofinvertingtheproperorderofinquiry/constitutionalinterpretation[141]postEngineers.Weknowtheproperorderistoreadpowerbroadlyandthenaskwhetherlawsignificantlyrelatestotheconstitutionalpower(herecorporationspower),regardlessofwhetheritencroachesonstatepower.Wearenottoaskwhetherlawisproperlyanemploymentlawortradinglaw.

Objectofcommandtest

• ACCisanobjectofcommand(law)thatpermitsorprohibitsatradingorfinancialcorporationfromengaginginconductorformingrelationships.

• ProposesthatonceyouidentifytheCC,theCthisthenempoweredtoregulateitsrelationshipsandanyconduct.Oneoftheseisemployment.Itisirrelevantthatemploymentisnotatradingissue.YouwouldjustneedtoidentifyaTCsoastothenregulateitsactivities/relationships.

Adoptionofobjectofcommandtest

• Thecorporationspowerisa‘personspower’(104).‘[T]hepoweristomakelawswithrespecttoparticularjuristicpersons.’

• Distinguishesthisfromapower‘withrespecttoafunctionofgovernment,afieldofactivityoraclassofrelationships’(ibid).

• Inotherwords,oncesufficientlyconnectedtothejuristicperson(theconstitutionalcorporation),thelawmayextendtosubjectmattersbeyond‘foreign’,‘finance’,and‘trade’.

• Tosupportthis,theHCadoptsAt[177]–adoptsGaudronJ’sdissentinReDingian;ExParteWagner(1995)183CLR323,365:Power‘alsoextendstothepersonsbyandthroughwhomtheycarryoutthosefunctions

andactivitiesandwithwhomtheyenterintothoserelationships.’Thisextendstoindustrialrightsandobligations.

• Issue:dowefollowmajorityinDinjanorGaudronJ’sdissentinReDingianwhichwasadoptedinWorkChoices?Gaudron’sdissent!

A2:Whatistherelevanceoffederalbalance?Themajorityrejectedargumentsappealingtofederalbalance.

• See[119],[194],[195].• Itwouldbeanimproperorderofinterpretation.• Interpretationshouldbeginbylookingatthetext.• TheCourtwascriticalofthenotionthatemploymentlawwasreservedto

thestates.• TheCourtshouldnotinterpretinamannerthatbringsintodoubtthe

continuedexistenceofstates.Buthere,federalpowerisstronger.• CourtrecognisedcharacterisationofEngineers:whichshouldbe

understoodinapoliticallightreflectingemergingpoliticalidentityafterWWI.

A3:Isthecorporationspower‘readdown’bylimitswithinotherpowers?

• Section51(xxxv)(conciliationandarbitrationpower)isnotconcernedwithindustrialrelationsassuch,butanarrowercategory.

• Limitsinonepowerdonotrestrictthescopeofanotherpower[50].• Thecommercepowernolongerrestrictsthecorporationspower

(Strickland)sowhyshouldthearbitrationpower?o IfPcanregulateT’sandC’sonwhichCCscandealwithcustomers

orsuppliersofgoods/services,whycanitnotintheexerciseofthesamepowers,regulateTsandCsonwhichCCsmaydealwithemployeesorpotentialemployees?[50].

o ‘Dealingswithemployeesarepartofitstradingpractices’.• Section51(xxxv)doesnotcontainapositiveprohibitionorrestriction

upontheambitofCommonwealthpower[221].Unlikesays116whichpreventstheCommonwealthfromsettingupit’sownreligion.

• Courtalsorejectsdissent’sargumentthatthelawis‘properly’onewithrespecttoindustrialaffairs.

o ‘Todescribealawas“really”,“truly”or“properly”characterisedasalawwithrespecttoonesubject-matter,ratherthananother,bespeaksfundamentalconstitutionalerror.’[51]

o Thiswouldbetheapproachpre-Engineers.Solongasitaffectsconstitutionalaffairs,itcanaffectanynumberofsubjects.

Kirby’sdissentCharacterisation

• Kirbycharacterisedthelawasaboutindustrialrelations.ThiswasderivedfromtheAct’sobject(preventingandsettlingindustrialdisputes,notmentioningcorporations)andtherights/liabilitiesitcreates(which‘properlypertain’topreventingindustrialdisputes’.[478]-[479].

• Hesaiditsvalidityturnsontwoheadsofpower;corporatepowerandtheconciliation/arbitrationpower[480].

• NB:CallinanJagreesAct’struecharacterwasindustrialaffairs(341).Isthecorporationspower‘readdown’bylimitswithinotherpowers?

• Arguesthatthelaw,relyingons51(xx)isattemptingtoovercomea‘safeguard,restrictionorqualification’ins51(xxxv)[483].

• Youcannotmakealawinrelianceupononesubjectmatter(e.g.corporationspower)whenthatlawisproperlycharacterisedasonewithrespecttoanotherheadofpower(suchastheconciliationandarbitrationpower)incircumstanceswherethelatterpowerisaffordedtotheFederalParliament‘’subjecttoasafeguard,restrictionorqualification’’(Schmidt).

• ‘therequirementthatfederallawsoperateindirectlythroughindependentresolutionbywayofconciliationandarbitrationcan,inmyview,properlybedescribedasatypeof“guarantee”.’[518]

Federalbalance

• WemustreadconstinlightofitsFederalcharacteranddesign[470],[471],[491]

• Interstatenesspreservedfederalcharacterofindustrialrelationslaw.[446]

DidtheConventionDebatesshedlightonthemeaningofthecorporationspower?

• Kirby’sview[428],[436].• CallinanJdissenting[690]:twothingsareclearfromtheconvention

debates:1)anyfedpowerrelatingtoindustrialaffairswastobeconfinedtothoseofaninterstatecharacter,2)formercoloniesweretoretainpoweroverinternalindustrialdisputes.IfitwasalwaysthecasethattheCommonwealthcouldappealtotheCPtomakeemploymentlaws,whydidn’tthishappenfromearliestdays?Itdidn’thappenbecausealwaysunderstoodtheCthlimitedbyconciliationandarbitrationpower.

• ThemajoritywerenotkeenonthisuseofhistoryengagedinbyKirbyandCallinan.Retortedthatthedisputedquestionatpresentwasnotonframers’minds[120].

• Majority:supportedbroadappealtocorporationspower.Saidthattheframersdidnotunderstandthatcorporationslawwasstillindevelopmentinthe19thcenturyanddidn’tunderstandthecentralplaceofcorporationsinAustralia’spresenteconomy.

o Arguably,majorityispointingtowardsanationaleconomy.Maybeit’sbettereconomicallytohavethispowerresidewiththeCommonwealth.

Therelevanceofreferendums

• Inthepast,therehadbeensixrelevantreferendumsproposingthattheconciliationandarbitrationpowerbeextendedtoregulateemployeeandemployerrelationships.

• Eachtime,thesefailed.TheConstitutionwasnotamendedtoprovideforageneralindustrialrelationspower.

• Therelevantquestioniswhethersuchfailedamendmentswererelevanttointerpretingthecorporationspower.

• Majority-failuresnotrelevant.[131]-[133].o Qputtoelectoratenotthesameaswhatwe’readdressingnow.A

contraryapproachpresumesthatwhatpeoplehadinmindwasakintorejectingabroad,liberalinterpretationofthecorporationspower.Thisdoesnotfollow.

o Fewreferendumssucceedthustheyshouldn’thavetoomuchweight.

• Kirby-dissent200-201[468].FailuretoamendrelevanttolimitingCPandCAP.

o AuthorityforConstitutionisderivedfromthepeople,repeatrefusalisrelevant.

o TheConstitutionisgroundedonatheoryofpopularsovereignty.Shouldlooktopeopleandwhattheysay.

• CallinanJsimilarlyat299-300[732]-[733].ThemesandIssuesinWorkChoices

1. Federalism2. OngoingimpactofEngineers:methodofinterpretationisbroad.3. Interpretation:Originalism(Kirby,Callinan),Textualism(majority),

Structualist(Kirby-readinlightoffederaldesigncoherently).4. Consequencesarisingfromthedecision.

Federalism

• Kirby[612]:thisCourtneedstorediscoverthefederalcharacteroftheConstitution.Ithasbeenforgotten.Normativelyitisarestraintonpower.Therehasbeenashiftto‘opportunistic’federalism[543]whichwould‘destroytheStatesandtheirexpressandimpliedroleintheConstitution[548]inaprocessofcentralisation[556].

• CallinanJ[777]-[780]:Federalbalancematters,weshouldn’tsubjugaterequirementthatamendmenthappensbyreferendum.Reducingstatepowerisdangerous.

ImpactofEngineers

• Weknowtheproperorderistoreadpowerbroadlyandthenaskwhetherlawsignificantlyrelatestotheconstitutionalpower(herecorporationspower),regardlessofwhetheritencroachesonstatepower.Wearenottoaskwhetherlawisproperlyanemploymentlawortradinglaw.

Interpretation

• Majorityanddissentsusehistorydifferently.• Kirbyhaspropagatedanoriginalistargument,whereasthemajorityhas

beenquiteprogressiveinitsunderstanding.• GregCraven,‘OriginalIntentandtheAustralianConstitution–Coming

SoontoaCourtNearYou?’(1990)1PublicLawReview1066:‘…theHighCourthas,inthemain,departedfromtheintentionsoftheFramersmerelyforthepurposeofreallocatingpowerfromtheregionstothecentre.’

Consequences• Kirbyappealstothedecision’sconsequences[537],[541].Willcausea

radicalreductioninareasofstategovernance(e.g.education,healthcare)ifCthcanregulatebodiesandalltheirrelationships.

• NBmajoritynotedat(86)thatcertaindomesticcorporationswereoutsideTCsorFCs-municipal,mining,manufacturing,religious,scholastic,charitable,scientific,literary(asstatedbyIsaacJinHuddart).

WeekSeven:ExecutivePowerEXECUTIVEPOWERUNDERSECTION61Prerogativepower

• TampaCase:s61maygaincontentfromtheprerogativebutitsnotthesourceofprerogativepower

• CPCFvMinisterforImmigrationandBorderProtection[2015]HCA1ThescopeofSection61-emphasisonresponsiblegovernmentThescopeofSection61-historicalcontextandnationhoodNationhoodpower

• Acombinationofs61+Section51(xxxix)• S61-Allowspowerforpurposeofservingnationalgovernment• S51xxxix(ancillarylegislativepowertos61)‘mattersincidentaltothe

executionofanypowervestedbythisConstitution…intheGovernmentoftheCommonwealth’

• NationhoodpowermorelikelytoarisewherethereisnoconflictwiththestatesTasmanianDams;DavisvCommonwealth

APPROPRIATIONSANDSPENDINGSection81:powertoappropriatefundsfromtheconsolidatedfundEffectsofanappropriationactIssuesarisingunderSection81TheExecutiveOftenreferredtoasthe‘Crown’Includes:

• KingorQueen• Governorgeneral• Ministers(includingPMandCabinet)• Publicservantsemployedbygovernmentdepartments

THEEXECUTIVEPOWERUNDERSECTION61Section61:‘TheexecutivepoweroftheCommonwealthisvestedintheQueenandisexercisablebytheGovernor-GeneralastheQueen’srepresentative,andextendstotheexecutionandmaintenanceofthisConstitution,andofthelawsoftheCommonwealth.’Section61issilentastoscopeofthepower.AccordingtoWinterton,therearesevensetsofpower:

1. Powerconferredonexecutivebystatute.Limitstothesepowersandmeansofholdingtheexecutivetoaccount–administrativelaw

2. PowersalthoughnotconferreddirectlybyastatutearenecessaryorincidentaltotheexecutionandmaintenanceofalawoftheCommonwealth.I.e.whenCthpassesslaws,Executivemaybegrantedpowertoundertakeactionstothatlegislation’simplementation.

3. PowersnecessaryorincidentaltotheadministrationofadepartmentofStateestablishedunders64oftheConstitution-‘TheGovernor-GeneralmayappointofficerstoadministersuchdepartmentsofStateoftheCommonwealthastheGovernor-GeneralinCouncilmayestablish’

4. PowersdefinedbythecapacitiesoftheCommonwealthcommontolegalpersons.SeeWilliamsNo1–Cthargueditcouldmakecontracts.

5. PowersexpresslyconferredbytheConstitution.6. *TheprerogativepowersoftheCrownproperlyattributabletothe

Commonwealth.7. *Inherentauthorityderivedfromthecharacterandstatusofthe

Commonwealthasthenationalgovernment.PrerogativePower

• Itisaformofprimarylegislationthattheexecutivecanundertake.• Traditionalexamples:

o Sovereignhaspowertodeclarewar(prerogativeofwar)o Sovereignpowertodispensewithpunishmentforanycriminale.g.

ifterminallyill(prerogativeofmercy).• Seenasincorporatedinsection61buttheypreexistthatprovision.E.g.

prerogativeinoperation:RuddockvVadarlis(TampaCase)(2001)183ALR1-wasthereaprerogativepowertoexpelaliensorwasthispowernowovertakenbytheMigrationAct?

RuddockvVadarlis(TampaCase)(2001)183ALR1

• Issue:wasthereaprerogativepowertoexpelaliensorwasthispowernowovertakenbytheMigrationAct?

• FrenchJ:Therewasaprerogativepowertoexpelaliensconferredbysection61.TheMigrationActdoesn’tevidenceintentiontotakethispoweraway.

o Section61isthesourceofexecutivepower,nottheprerogative.o Thisisbecauses61is‘apowerconferredaspartofanegotiated

federalcompactexpressedinawrittenConstitutiondistributingpowersbetweenthethreearmsofgovernment’(49).

o However,s61maygainsomeofitscontentfromtheprerogative.o Section61issubjecttothelimitationsimposedbytheConstitution

andlawspassedunderit.o Onthepowertoexclude,usings61:‘Thepowertodeterminewho

maycomeintoAustraliaissocentraltoitssovereigntythatitisnottobesupposedthatthegovernmentofthenationwouldlackunderthepowerconferreduponitdirectlybytheConstitution,theabilitytopreventpeoplenotpartoftheAustraliacommunity,fromentering…’52

• BlackCJ,dissenting:s61doesn’tprovidethisprerogativepowertoexpel,butinanyevent,theActnowprovidesacomprehensivescheme

o Therearedoubtswhethertheprerogativepowertoexpelaliens(andinpeacetime)stillexists.

o Raisesadifficultissue:canaprerogativepowerberevivedafterithasfallenintodisuse?Note:Prerogativepowersarehistorical.UKCourtshave,forexample,statedthatnewprerogativepowerswillnotberecognised.SeeBBCvJohns[1965]Ch32,79perDiplockCJ.

o ‘Itwouldbeaverystrangecircumstanceiftheatbestdoubtfulandhistoricallylong-unusedpowertoexcludeorexpelshouldemergeinastrongmodernformfroms61oftheConstitutionbyvirtueofgeneralconceptionsof‘thenationalinterest’.(12)

• Parliamentthenpassedretrospectivelegislationsothecasenotappealed.CPCFvMinisterforImmigrationandBorderProtection[2015]HCA1(28January2015)

• Facts:InterceptingSriLankanTamilsinAustralia’scontiguouszone(outsideofAustralia’sterritoryatChristmasIsland).DetainedonanAustralianvesselandtakentoIndia–doneundertheMigrationAct1958(Cth)andtheMaritimePowersAct2013(Cth)

• Issue:Whethertherewasapowerunders61orMPAtodetainandremovepeoplefromAustralia’scontiguouszonetoIndia[4].

• Frenchandmajority:o Notnecessarytoconsiderwhethertherewasapowerunder

section61todetainandremovepeoplebecauseMigrationActandMPAgaveAustralianauthoritiespowertodothis.

• HayneandBellJ:o MigrationActdidn’tauthoriseCthactionsandTamilshadbeen

falselyimprisoned.o Unhelpfultoappealtonotionsof‘thedefenceandtheprotectionof

thenation’[143]o SuchstatementsassumedtheCthmusthavethepower[143](See

similarlyHayneJ’scriticismsinPape)o Atcommonlaw,theexecutivecouldonlydetainapersoncould

whenauthorisedbystatute[148];o Thisisunaffectedbyanappealtoprerogativepoweroutsideof

Australianwaters:o ‘ToholdthattheExecutivecanactoutsideAustralia'sbordersina

waythatitcannotlawfullyactwithinAustraliawouldstandlegalprincipleonitshead’[150].

• KiefelJ:o PointedtoideaofBlackCJinVardalisthatitwouldbestrangeto

haveprerogativepowerresurrectedwhenithasn’tbeenusedforcenturies.

o ‘Evenifoneassumes,forpresentpurposes,thataCommonwealthexecutivepowerofthekindcontendedforexistedatFederation,statuteshaveforalongtimeprovidedforpowersofexpulsionanddetention.AsamatterofprincipleanyCommonwealthexecutive

powermayinthosecircumstancesbeconsideredlostordisplaced.’[277]

Scholarlyinterpretationsofthepower

• Blackstone:Powers,rights,immunities,orprivilegesnecessarytomaintaininggovernment,andnotsharedwithprivatecitizens(thisdefinitionwouldmeanadefinablelist).

• Dicey:‘aresidueofdiscretionaryorarbitraryauthority’…‘EveryactwhichtheexecutivegovernmentcanlawfullydowithouttheauthorityoftheActofParliamentisdoneinvirtueofthisprerogative’.ThiswasacceptedinA-GvDeKeyser’sRoyalHotel[1920]2AC508(HL).

Scopeofsection61-emphasisonresponsiblegovernmentEganvWillis(1998)195CLR424at[96]McHughJdiscussingtheConstitutionAct1855(NSW)

• ‘ContemporarymaterialsmakeitclearthattheImperialauthoritiesintendedthatthenewConstitutionwouldbeadministeredinaccordancewiththeprinciplesofresponsiblegovernment.’

• Parliament(asopposedtoExecutive)‘providesthemoneyrequiredforadministrativepurposesbyauthorisingtaxation’appropriatingwheremoneyistobeprovidedandcriticisesmodeinwhichmoneyisspentandinwhichpublicaffairsareadministered.

• Supportindispensabletothosewhoareresponsibleforadministration,butitdoesnotadminister.Thistasklefttoexecutive.

• CallsParliamentthe‘criticisingandcontrollingpower’;incontrasttotheExecutive.

Scopeofsection61-pointingtohistoricalcontextandnationhood• Inthepast,prerogativepowerreferredtoasthe‘nationhood’power–

arisingfromtheinherentrightoftheCommonwealthtoprotectitself;animpliedright(e.g.seditionlaws).ButmorerecentlytheCourthasshiftedtogroundingthisins61,withanancillarylegislativepowerunders51(xxxix).

• Section51(xxxix)enablesParliamenttomakelawswithrespectto‘[m]attersincidentaltotheexecutionofanypowervestedbythisConstitution…intheGovernmentoftheCommonwealth’

• ‘Whilehistoryandthecommonlawinform[s61’s]content,itisnotalockeddisplaycabinetinaconstitutionalmuseum.Itisnotlimitedtostatutorypowersandtheprerogative.Ithastobecapableofservingtheproperpurposesofanationalgovernment.’PapevCommissionerofTaxation(2009)238CLR1,60.

• Aswellasappealingtoprerogative,courthastalkedaboutnationhoodpower,orpowervestedinExecutiveforpurposeofservinganationalgovernment.

NationhoodpowerCommonwealthvTasmania(TasmanianDamCase)(1983)158CLR1

• Facts:WorldHeritagePropertiesConservationAct1983(Cth)allowedforprotectingdeclaredpropertyonbasisthatitispartofAustralia’sheritageandbyreasonoflackorinadequacyofotheravailablemeansfor

protection,it’sappropriatetoprotectbynationalParliamentandGovernment.

• Thenotionofnationhoodunders61notconsidered,ordeniedasaproperuseofthepowerbecauseitarisesmostlikelywherethereisnoconflictwiththestates.

DavisvCommonwealth(1988)166CLR79

• Facts:ConcerningbicentenaryofsettlementinNSW.DavismarketedT-shirtssaying200yearsofsuppressionanddepression.Bicentenniallawsrestricteduseoflogosandwords.

• Held:legislationinvalidbecausetheylackedproportionality.• MasonCJ,DeaneandGaudronJJ:

o ‘Theseresponsibilities[are]derivedfromthedistributionoflegislativepowerseffectedbytheConstitutionitselfandfromthecharacterandstatusoftheCommonwealthasanationalpolity’(92)-thatiswhythereisanationalpower-totakeactionfornationalpurposes.

o ‘theexistenceofCommonwealthexecutivepowerinareasbeyondtheexpressgrantsoflegislativepowerwillordinarilybeclearestwhereCommonwealthexecutiveorlegislativeactioninvolvesnorealcompetitionwithStateexecutiveorlegislativecompetence.’(94)

• BrennanJ:o ‘TheConstitutiondidnotcreateamereaggregationofcolonies,

redistributingpowersbetweenthegovernmentoftheCommonwealthandthegovernmentsoftheStates.TheConstitutionsummonedtheAustraliannationintoexistence’(110)

o Onthatbasis,wecanrecognisethatExecutivehasanationalpower.

o Initiativesthatstrengthenthenationandsupportedbys61:e.g.flagandanthem,nationalinitiativesinscienceandliterature.

o ‘WheretheExecutiveGovernmentengagesinactivityinordertoadvancethenation–anessentiallyfacultativefunction–theexecutionofexecutivepowerisnottheoccasionforawideimpairmentofindividualfreedom’…‘Inmyopinion,thelegislativepowerwithrespecttomattersincidentaltotheexecutionoftheexecutivepowerdoesnotextendtothecreationofoffencesexceptinsofarasisnecessarytoprotecttheefficacyoftheexecutionbytheExecutiveGovernmentofitspowersandcapacities…’(112-3)

§ Contrastingvalidnationalinitiativese.g.flags/anthemwithwhatwasbeingdonehere,byestablishingoverlyrestrictiveandcoercivelawsallowingBicentennialauthoritytofinepeopleforusingflags/logosetc.

CoercivelawsappealingtotheexecutivepowerPape

• ‘absentauthoritysuppliedbyastatuteundersome[other]headofpower…likelytobeansweredconservatively’.

AustralianCommunistPartyvCommonwealth(1951)83CLR1at187:

• ‘Historyandnotonlyancienthistory,showsthatincountrieswheredemocraticinstitutionshavebeenunconstitutionallysuperseded,ithasbeendonenotseldombythoseholdingtheexecutivepower.Formsofgovernmentmayneedprotectionfromdangerslikelytoarisefromwithintheinstitutionstobeprotected.’

• Morereluctanttoallowingcoercivepowersappealingtonationhood.AppropriationsandSpendingSection81:‘AllrevenuesormoneysraisedorreceivedbytheExecutiveGovernmentoftheCommonwealthshallformoneConsolidatedRevenueFund,tobeappropriatedforthepurposesoftheCommonwealthinthemannerandsubjecttothechargesandliabilitiesimposedbythisConstitution.’EffectsofanappropriationAct

• AuthorisesthegovernmenttowithdrawmoneyfromtheConsolidatedTreasuryFund;

• DirectspurposestowhichthemoneycanbeappliedbytheExecutivegovernment;

Issuesarisingundersection811.DoesSection81provideauthoritytospendthemoneyormustthatauthoritybefoundelsewhere?

• Pape:alljudgesagreethatappropriationactdoesn’tprovideExecutivewithauthority.

• Theconsequenceofthisdecisionwasthatnumerousexpendituresthoughtjustifiedbys81nowindoubt.E.g.HayneandKiefelJJsuggestedthatCSIROmightnowbesupportedasanexerciseofthepatentspowerins51(xviii).

2.ArethereanylimitsonhowtheExecutivecanspendpublicmoney?WhatauthorisesExecutivespendingintheabsenceofspecificlegislation?InWilliamsvCommonwealth(2012)weseethattheCommonwealthgovernmentarguedthat:

1. *InherentauthorityderivedfromthecharacterandstatusoftheCommonwealthasthenationalgovernment;

2. PowersnecessaryorincidentaltotheadministrationofadepartmentofStateestablishedunders64oftheConstitution;

3. *PowersdefinedbythecapacitiesoftheCommonwealthcommontolegalpersons(thuswithoutstatutoryauthorisation,maycontractlikeanordinarypersonandthisisatleastcoextensivewiththescopeoffederallegislativepower).Thiswasrejected.

WeekSeven:NationhoodandContractingTheExecutivePowerPapevFederalCommissionerofTaxation(2009)

• Rejectedimpliednationhoodpower• Instead,it’spartofsection61• EPunders61givespowertolegislateinrespecttomatterspeculiarly

adaptedtothegovernmentofanationandwhichcannototherwisebecarriedonforthebenefitofthenation’

• Thispower,combinedwithincidentalpowertolegislate,allowedTaxBonusScheme

• Thelegislationwassupportedbyactionproperforanationalgovernment.

WilliamsvCommonwealth(2012)THEEXECUTIVEPOWERSection61:‘TheexecutivepoweroftheCommonwealthisvestedintheQueenandisexercisablebytheGovernor-GeneralastheQueen’srepresentative,andextendstotheexecutionandmaintenanceofthisConstitution,andofthelawsoftheCommonwealth.’

• Relatesto‘executing’and‘maintaining’theConstitutionandthelawoftheCommonwealth.

• Silentastoscope.• Twocomponents:

o Actionpeculiarlyadaptedtoanationalgovernment(nationhoodpowerPape).

o Contractualcapacitytospend(Williams).PAPEVFEDERALCOMMISSIONEROFTAXATION(2009)238CLR1Facts

• ChallengedvalidityoftheTaxBonusforWorkingAustraliansAct(No2)2009(Cth).

• Section5oftheActcreatedanentitlementtoa‘taxbonus’forcertaincategoriesofAustraliantaxpayers.

• AppropriationsupportingforpaymentsfoundinTaxationAdministrationAct1953(Cth).Takingofmoneyfromconsolidatedfund.

• MrPaperaisesachallenge.Legalissues

• (1)Isanappropriationalonesufficienttoauthoriseexecutivespending?• (2)Ifnot,wasthereasourceofpowertospendtheappropriatedfunds,

andaheadoflegislativepowercapableofsupportingtheTaxBonusforWorkingAustraliansAct(No2)2009(Cth)?

Decision(1)Isanappropriationalonesufficienttoauthoriseexecutivespending?

• Unanimously:ss81and83(appropriationsanddrawingmoney)donotconferasubstantivespendingpower.

• ‘Therelevantpowertoexpendpublicmoneys,beinglimitedbys81toexpenditurefor“thepurposesoftheCommonwealth”,mustbefoundelsewhereintheConstitutionorstatutesmadeunderit.’[8].

• Sections81and83areparliamentarycontrolsoftheexerciseofexecutivepowertoexpendpublicmoneys.Theydonotauthoriseexecutivespending.

(2)Ifnot,wasthereasourceofpowertospendtheappropriatedfunds,andaheadoflegislativepowercapableofsupportingtheTaxBonusforWorkingAustraliansAct(No2)2009(Cth)?Yes,S51(xxxix)givesincidentalpowertolegislateandEPallowsforscheme.(a)Whatunderpinnedtheexecutiveaction(spending)?(b)Whatsupportedthelegislation?

• Section51(xxxix)incidentalpowertolegislate.o ThisenablesParliamenttomakelawswithrespecttomatters

incidentaltotheexecutionofanypowervestedbythisConstitution…intheGovernmentoftheCommonwealth.’

• Thus,toactivateandenliventhisprovision,weneedtofindapowervestedintheCommonwealthgovernment.

• I.e.considerifimpugnedlegislationwasenlivenedbyS61-ExecutivePower.

ConstructionoftheExecutivePower

• Collectionofstatutoryandprerogativepowers(notexercisedbystates)andnon-prerogativecapacities.TheseformpartofbutdonotcompletetheEP:FrenchCJ,Gummow,CrennanandBellJJ[127].Seealso[215]and[228].

• Powerto‘engageinenterprisesandactivitiespeculiarlyadaptedtothegovernmentofanationandwhichcannototherwisebecarriedonforthebenefitofthenation’:VictoriavCommonwealth(1975)134CLR338,397(AAPCase)MasonJ.

• TheCourtdeniedexistenceofanimpliednationhoodpower.Why?Duetoconcernthatgovernmentcouldinvokeimpliednationhoodpowertoovercomeanydivisionofpowersbetweenstates.

o Typicalexamplewouldbeimpliedpowertomakelawsagainstsedition(underminingthegovernment).

• Insteadofbeingimplied,itisfoundwithinsection61EP.• Davis(1988)166CLR79,93-94MasonCJ,DeaneandGaudronJJ:‘the

existenceofCommonwealthexecutivepowerinareasbeyondtheexpressgrantsoflegislativepowerwillordinarilybeclearestwhereCommonwealthexecutiveorlegislativeactioninvolvesnorealcompetitionwithStateexecutiveorlegislativecompetence.’

o I.e.unlikelytofindthatCthcanengageinnationhoodpowerunderEPifitwouldincurcompetitionwithstates.

ChiefJusticeFrenchBelievedthattheTaxBonusschemewaspermissible.At[127],hefocusedon:

• Short-termmeasures;speedandefficacy.• Economicconditionsfacingnationasawhole.• PeculiarlywithincapacityandresourcesofCth.

• Notaffectingdistributionofpowers.Alsosee[133].JusticesGummow,CrennanandBellAlsobelievedthatTaxBonusschemewaspermissiblebutfordifferentreasons.

• Stated(90)thattheEP‘enablestheundertakingofactionsappropriatetothepositionoftheCthasapolitycratedbytheConstitutionandhavingregardtothespheresofresponsibilityvestedinit’.

• GaveamoreexpansivereadingoftheEPthanFrench.TheysaythatunderanappealtonationhoodyoucanundertakepowerappropriatetotheCommonwealthposition.HoweverFrenchfocusesonemergencyandcrisis.

• Nevertheless,theirtestof‘undertakingactions’wassatisfiedbecauseAustraliainGFC.Theyalsoemphasisedhistoricalsignificance[230]-worstcrisissinceGreatDepression.Comparedtonationalemergency.

• SaidthatCthistheonlybodywithresourcescapableofmeetingthenationalemergency.

• However,wouldbeinappropriateifitdistributedstateexecutivestoundertakeownregulation.

JusticesHayneandKiefel(dissent)DidnotsupporttheTaxBonusscheme.Theycriticise:

• Subjectivity:Ascomparedtoprerogativesandcapacities(specific),theyaskedhowCourtscouldpossiblyassesswhichactionsanationalgovernmentisbestplacedtoundertake.

• Aggrandisingexecutivepower:toobroad.• Criticalofrelyingonnotionofemergency[347]:thiswouldjustifyany

actionifwearetrulyinanemergency.• Alternativesmoreappropriate:ifthegovernmentwantstofuelthe

economythengivegrantstostatestobuildroadsorusetaxationpowertoreduceincometaxorgivetaxrebates.

o Counter-argumentevidentinFrench’sreasoning:Appealtospeedandefficacy.Roadstaketoolongandthiswouldbeanimmediateinjectionintobankaccounts.

• Federalism:apowercouldbegreaterthanthedistributionofpowersgrantedtotheCommonwealthifitcandeclareemergenciesorsatisfynotionsthattheCthisbestplacedtoundertakeanaction.Thisistooexpansiveandsubjective.

LingeringQuestionsAreweexpandingtheExecutivePowerifwebroadenitsunderstanding?Whatdoesthisjustify?WILLIAMSVCOMMONWEALTH(2012)248CLR156

• Capacitytocontract.• Limitsonnationhoodpower.

Facts

• Williamschallenged:o NationalSchoolChaplaincyProgramme,ando Fundingagreement(contract)betweenCthandScriptureUnion

QLD(DHFagreement)underNationalGuidelinesissuedbyDepartmentforEducation,ScienceandTraining.

• Notethatthesewerenotauthorisedbystatute.Thus,theCthwasclaimingtospendinabsenceoflegislation;takingmoneyfromconsolidatedfundandarguingthereisanEPtospendmoneyfortheCthtoenterintocontracts.

• FundingwasappropriatedunderannualAppropriationActs.Commonwealth’sargumentsAppealedtoexecutivepower…tospend.Madetwoarguments:

1. (Broadargument):ExecutivepowertospendisunlimitedbecausetheExecutiveenjoyscapacitiessimilartoanyordinaryperson.TheCrownisajuristicpersonandcanenterintocontracts(failed).

2. (Narrowargument):Cthcanenterintocontractswithoutlegislationsolongassubjectmatterofcontractcanbepinnedtoaheadofpower(failed).

NarrowargumentsbytheCommonwealth:

• EPisinallmatters,limitedtosubjectmattersofexpressgrantsofpowerinss51,52and122togetherwith‘nationhood’component(thosepeculiarlyadaptedtothegovernmentofthenation).

• Executivepowertospend(exercisinga‘capacity’)supportedby:o Providingbenefitstostudents(s51xxiiiA)o Contractingwithaconstitutionalcorporation(s51xx).

• Additionalquestion:wasitsupportedbythenationhoodpower(s51xxxix)enlivenedbysection61?I.e.Papethroughcontract.

Commonwealth‘capacities’

• ReferstothingstheCommonwealthcandoasajuristicperson.• Traditionallyunderstoodasonebranchofsection61’scontent.• Juristicpersonscancontract,createtrusts,transferproperty,register

companiesetc.• Thusargueditcanestablishroyalinquiriesandscientificbodies.• TheCtharguedthatconstrainingcontractualcapacitywouldconstrain

otherabilitiesasajuristicperson.HowtheJudgesdivided

• FrenchCJ,Gummow,CrennanandBellJJ:o Rejectedthebroadandnarrowsubmissions.o TheCth’sexecutivepowertospendisnotcoextensivewiththe

potentialscopeofitslegislativepower.o Theschemecouldonlybesupportedbylegislationenactedby

Parliament.• HayneandKiefelJJ:

o Rejectedthebroadsubmission.o Unnecessarytodeterminethecorrectnessofthenarrow

submission.o ClearthattheNSCPcouldnotbethesubjectofavalidlawunders

51.• HeydonJ:

o Unnecessarytodeterminethecorrectnessofthebroadsubmission.

o Acceptedthenarrowersubmission.o ConsideredtheNSCPwaswithinexecutivepowerbecauseitwas

supportedbythelegislativepowerunders51(xxiiiA).

DoestheCommonwealthhavecontractualcapacitytoexpendmoney?No

• ‘TheCthisnotjustanotherlegalperson’[38].Personalcontractsdon’thavetheeffectorpowerlikeCthcontracts.ThelattercanaffectexerciseofpowerbyStateexecutives.Theyaffectverticaldistributionofpower.(CJFrench)See[31],[77].Notethatwemustconsiderthisbutaffectingstatesisn’tacriterionofinvalidity.

o ‘ExpenditurebytheExecutiveGovernmentoftheCommonwealth,administeredandcontrolledbytheCommonwealth,infieldswithinthecompetenceoftheexecutivegovernmentsoftheStateshas,andalwayshashad,thepotential,inapracticalwayofwhichtheCourtcantakenotice,todiminishtheauthorityoftheStatesintheirfieldsofoperation.Thatisnotacriterionofinvalidity.Itis,however,areasonnottoacceptthebroadcontentionthatsuchactivitiescanbeundertakenatthediscretionoftheExecutive,subjectonlytotherequirementofappropriation.’FrenchCJ[37]

o ThisseemsastepbackfromEngineersbecauseit’ssayingwewon’treads61broadlybecausedoingsowoulddiminishcapacityofstates.Yet,notethatFrenchsaidit’snotacriteriaforinvalidity.Ifs61didpermitspendingmoneyhoweveritliked,thenitwouldbepermissible.Butnaturalmeaningofs61doesn’tleadustothatwiderscopebecauseoftheseconcerns(encroachingonStates).

• ItassumesthatExecutiveisspendingitsownmoneyjustasanotherpersonmaydo(Hayne)see[216].

Wastheexecutivepowerco-extensivewithCommonwealth(hypothetical)legislativepower?NoFederalismconcerns:‘Intensionwiththefederalconception’[60].ChiefJusticeFrench

• Thepathofappropriationslegislationisdifferentfromanyotherlegislation.UnderConstitution,theSenatecanrejectoracceptappropriationslegislationbutcannotsuggestamendments.Whereasordinarylegislation-Senatecanproposeamendments.

• NothavinglegislationtosupportcontractualspendingiscontrarytofederalconceptionbecausenolegislationmeansnooversightbySenate.AndtheSenateistraditionallycalledtheState’shouse.

• Havingnolegislationwould‘distorttherelationshipbetweenChIandChIIoftheConstitution’.

• ‘ThefunctionoftheSenateasachamberdesignedtoprotecttheinterestsoftheStatesmaynowbevestigial.’[61]Hepointstopowerfulexecutivesusingpartydiscipline.

• Buttherehasnotbeena‘constitutionalinflation’ofexecutivepower–‘whichmuststillbeunderstoodbyreferencetothe“trulyfederalgovernment”ofwhichInglisClarkwrotein1901andwhich,alongwithresponsiblegovernment,iscentraltotheConstitution.’[61]

• Youneedlegislationtoauthorisecontractualspendingbecauseoffederalism.

• SeealsoKiefelJ[581]onfederalismconcern.Summary(CJFrench)[83]

• TheCommonwealthclaimedthatitsschemewassupportedbyheadsofpower(benefitstostudents;corporations)withoutstatutoryauthorisation.

• Decision:youneedauthorisationforsuchaclaim.• ItdidnotfallwithinrecognisedpartsoftheExecutivePower.

o Wellrecognisedfunctionsofgovernment;grantsbylegislature;prerogativeornationalcharactercomponent.

• RaisesanundecidedquestionWasitnecessaryfora‘nationalgovernment’?ThiswasrelevantbecauseinPapeunders51(xxxix)legislationsupportedbyactionproperforanationalgovernment.ThequestionthusinWilliamswaswhethertheschemecouldbesupportedbylegislationforactionproperforanationalgovernment.GummowandBellJJ[46]

• UnlikePape,notanaturaldisasterornationaleconomicorotheremergency.

• TheStateshavethelegalandpracticalcapacitytodealwiththeissue.• CoulduseSection96.

KiefelJ[599]

• TheExecutivewasrequiringnationalstandards,whichhadrealpotentialforconflictwithState(QLD)standards.Thusunlikelytofinditwasnecessaryfornationalgovernment.

HayneJ(stillpartofmajoritybutdifferentreasons)• Executivepowertospend‘mustbeunderstoodaslimitedbyreferenceto

theextentofthelegislativepoweroftheParliament’[252].PermittingotherwisewouldempowertheCommonwealth(throughs51(xxxix))tolegislateforexpenditurecontrarytodivisionofpowers[248]

• HeisacceptingnarrowsubmissionofCthbutsaysherethereisnopowerthatwouldempowersuchspending.Thereasonforthisisthatbenefittostudentsmeans‘materialbenefit’with‘identifiablestudents’.ConcurringopinionfromCrennanJ.

o Issue:whodecideswhatequalsabenefit?Summary

• Held:onlyacertainexemptclassofCommonwealthcontractscouldbeenteredintowithoutpriorlegislativeauthorisation

o Contractsrelatedorincidentaltotheordinary,well-recognisedfunctionsofgovernmente.g.thoseaboutinternalworkingsofgovernmentdepartment.See[43]FrenchCJ.

• Otherwiseyouneedauthorisationbylegislationappealingtoaheadofpower(withsomesuggestionthatexerciseofnationhoodpowerwillnotrequireadditionallegislativeauthorisation).

• Weareseeingdenialofjuristicpersonality.o Republicancharacter:TheExecutiveasonebranchofgovernment;

shiftawayfrom‘theCrown’;emphasisingdifferentunderstandingtoUK.

• Weseeareemphasisonfederalism.Includingreservingstateexecutivepoweragainstencroachingfederalexecutivepower.

• Nationhoodpower(partofsection61):o Power‘toengageinenterprisesandactivitiespeculiarlyadapted

tothegovernmentofanationandwhichcannototherwisebecarriedonforthebenefitofthenation’VictoriavCommonwealth(1975)134CLR338,397(AAPCase)MasonJ.

• Maysupportcontracting/exerciseofcapacities.Stilllikelytorequirelegislativeauthorisation:pluralityopinioninWilliams.

Issuestoconsider

• Federalandstateexecutivecompetition.• Distributionofpower.

LingeringQuestions

• RaisedbyCJFrench:Isthereaninherentpowertospend,appealingtothenationhoodpower,withoutstatutoryauthorisationunders51(xxxix)?

WeekSeven:ASummaryoftheExecutivePowerforExamsASUMMARYOFTHEEXECUTIVEPOWERTheexecutivepower(s61)contains:

• Oldprerogativepowers• Nationhoodpower

Itdoesnotcontain:• Ageneralcapacitytocontract.Thisargumentputforwardbythe

Commonwealthhasbeenrejected.

PapevFederalCommissionerofTaxation• Nationhoodpower(asapartoftheExecutivepower)enlivenedthe

incidentalpowertolegislatefortheTaxbonus.• Executivecan’tspendonwhateveritlikesunderss81+83.Itcan

spend‘forpurposesoftheCommonwealth’,andsuchpurposesmustbefoundelsewhereinConstitutionorstatutesmadeundertheConstitution.

• However,legislationtospendsupportedbyincidentalpowertolegislates51(xxxix):

o ThisenablesParliamenttomakelawswithrespecttomattersincidentaltotheexecutionofanypowervestedbythisConstitution…intheGovernmentoftheCommonwealth.’

• ThispowertolegislateenlivenedbyExecutivePowers61.o Itwasenlivenedbecause:

§ NorealconflictwithStateexecutiveorlegislativepower§ Needforspeedandefficacytodealwitheconomiccrisis

(French[127])§ NationhoodpowerallowsactionsappropriatetoCth

position(Gummow,Crennan,Bell)§ Cthonlybodycapableofmeetingnationalemergency(Ibid)

WilliamsNo1

• Cthargueditcouldcontractjustlikeanyotherjuristicpersonorelsecontractabsentlegislationaslongastopicmirroredalegislativeheadofpower.Bothargumentsrejectedbymajority.

• Tocontractandspend,Cthexecutiveneedsauthorisinglegislation,andsuchauthorisinglegislationofcourserequiresaheadofpower.

• AuthorisinglegislationcouldnotbeauthorisedbynationhoodpowerunlikeinPape

o Why?Noemergency[46];clearconflictwithstateregulation[599];notamatterfornationalcapacity

o Notethataffectingstatesnotacriterionofinvaliditybutgiventhisconcern,anaturalreadingofs61doesn’tleadustoviewthatitgrantsunlimitedpowertospend.

• Executivepowernotequivalenttolegislativepowerbecauseappropriationslegislationdoesn’thaveoversightbySenate

o Offendsfederalprinciple• Summary:Failedbecause

o Nolegislation+noheadofpowero Didn’tfallwithinpartsofEP:

§ Wellrecognisedfunctionsofgovernmente.g.thoserelatingtointernalworkingsofgovdepartments(thesecontractsdon’trequirepriorlegislation)[43]

§ Nationhood§ Grantsbylegislature

§ PrerogativeWilliamsNo2

• Despitelegislation(absentinWilliamsNo1),itwasinvalidbecausenotsupportedbyaheadofpower.

o Notincidentaltolegislativepowertospend/enterintocontracts.o DistinguishablefromPapewhenthispowerwasenlivenedby

Nationhoodcomponentoftheexecutivepower• Lookedtochaplaincyprogramitself.• CourtrejectedCthargumenttomodifynationhoodpower(itshouldbe

abletopasslawsonmattersthatarereasonablycapableofbeingasseenasofnationalbenefitorconcern[70]:

o TestwasstatedinPape:mustbepeculiarlyadaptedtonationalgovernment–nothere.

o Cthwouldenlargingitspowerthroughconsultation(ithaddiscussedwithstates)insteadofusingconstraintsofthetext.