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1 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed Workshop August 12, 2003 Protection of an Open Computing Environment

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Page 1: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

James RothfussComputer Protection Program Manager

Lawrence Berkeley National Lab

Internet2Security at Line Speed Workshop

August 12, 2003

Protection of anOpen Computing Environment

Page 2: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Presentation will cover:

• Types of Protection• Berkeley Lab Philosophy• Bro• NETS

Page 3: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Classical Notion of Security

SecureRestrictControl

Hide

Page 4: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Often “Classical Security” is not appropriate

The tools can be so secure that their value is marginal

Consider:When the goal is RESEARCH,

a missed scientific breakthroughmay be more costly and damaging than

the worst “hacker” incident

Page 5: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

ClassifiedProtection

Commercial

Academic

ClassifiedProtection

Commercial

Academic

Protective measures can be different without be less effective

Page 6: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Service Protection

vs

Information Protection

Page 7: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Wea

pons

Res

earc

h

Usene

t new

sgro

ups

Yaho

o

Open

Resea

rch

Onlin

e St

ore

Banking

ServiceProtection

InformationProtection

Primary protection concerns

Page 8: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Protective measures are based on the

known attacks.

System weaknesses are identified and

protected.

“Threat”Based

Protection

“Vulnerability”Based

Protection

AntivirusIntrusion Detection

FirewallsPatching

Bro NETS

Page 9: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

• Open by default, restrict as necessary

• Protect rather than Secure

• Utilize both Threat and Vulnerability Protection

• Strive for Dynamic Protection

Underling LBNL Philosophies

Protecting an Open Environment is NOT EASY

Quality People are extremely important

Page 10: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

LBL Intrusion Detection - Bro

• Analyzes network traffic for attacks and policy violations

• Operational 24x7 since 1996(> 4 billion connections monitored &

archived)

• Coupled with border router, provides an adaptive firewall

• Currently operational @ LBNL, NERSC, UCB, JGI, ESNET, ICSI …

“Threat”Based

Protection

Page 11: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

• Taps GigEther fiber link passively, sends up a copy of all network traffic.Network

How Bro Works

Page 12: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

• Kernel filters down high-volume stream via standard libpcap packet capture library.

Network

libpcap

Packet Stream

Filtered PacketStream

TcpdumpFilter

How Bro Works

Page 13: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

• “Event engine” distills filtered stream into high-level, policy-neutral events reflecting underlying network activity– E.g., connection_attempt, http_reply, user_logged_in

Network

libpcap

Event Engine

Packet Stream

Filtered PacketStream

TcpdumpFilter

EventStream

EventControl

How Bro Works

Page 14: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

• “Policy script” processes event stream, incorporates:– Context from past events– Site’s particular policies

Network

libpcap

Event Engine

Policy Script Interpreter

Packet Stream

Filtered PacketStream

TcpdumpFilter

EventStream

EventControl

Real-time NotificationRecord To Disk

PolicyScript

How Bro Works

Page 15: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

How Bro Works

• “Policy script” processes event stream, incorporates:– Context from past events– Site’s particular policies

• … and takes action: • Records to disk• Generates alerts via syslog or paging• Executes programs as a form of response

Network

libpcap

Event Engine

Policy Script Interpreter

Packet Stream

Filtered PacketStream

TcpdumpFilter

EventStream

EventControl

Real-time NotificationRecord To Disk

PolicyScript

Page 16: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Bro policy scripts

• Written in a specialized language for networks– Network types (IP addresses, connections, protocol, etc.)

– Typed constanst, variables

– Network operators (comparison, ranges, etc.)

– Control statements (IF/THEN, etc.)

– Regular expressions

• Can– Generate alerts

– Reset connections

– Call exterior programs

Page 17: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Teasers

• Stepping Stone Detection (Telnet to SSH to Host)• Non-standard port backdoor detection• Work with Force Ten and Juniper for tighter

“firewall” integration.• Real Experiences

– Max Butler (aka, MaxVision)

– Worms (Code Red, Nimda)

– Three lettered agency “gray hat”

– Boyz from Brazil

Page 18: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

V. Paxson, Bro: A System for Detecting Network Intruders in Real-Time. Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Security Symposium, San Antonio, TX, January 1998. A later version appears in Computer Networks, 31(23-24), pp. 2435-2463, 14 Dec. 1999.

Y. Zhang and V. Paxson, Detecting Backdoors, Proc. 9th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2000.

Y. Zhang and V. Paxson, Detecting Stepping Stones, Proc. 9th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2000.

M. Handley, C. Kreibich and V. Paxson, Network Intrusion Detection: Evasion, Traffic Normalization, and End-to-End Protocol Semantics. Proc. 10th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2001.

S. Staniford, V. Paxson and N. Weaver, How to 0wn the Internet in Your Spare Time, Proc. 11th USENIX Security Symposium 2002.

D. Donoho, A. G. Flesia, U. Shankar, V. Paxson, J. Coit, and S. Staniford, Multiscale Stepping-Stone Detection: Detecting Pairs of Jittered Interactive Streams by Exploiting Maximum Tolerable Delay, Proc. RAID 2002.

D. Moore, V. Paxson, S. Savage, C. Shannon, S. Staniford and N. Weaver, The Spread of the Sapphire/Slammer Worm, technical report, February 2003.

Ruoming Pang and Vern Paxson, A High-level Programming Environment for Packet Trace Anonymization and Transformation, Proc. ACM SIGCOMM 2003, to appear.

R. Sommer and V. Paxson, Detecting Network Intruders Using Contextual Signatures, in submission.

Want to know more?

Page 19: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

“Vulnerability”Based

Protection

Network Equipment Tracking System

NETS

Page 20: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Current Method of Vulnerability Based Protection

Range ofProtection

• Analyze network• Guess at “reasonable” firewall rules• Hope the rules stay current (assume a static network)

SafetySecurity

Protection

CapabilityPerformance

Access

Static

Point of Optimum Protection

Page 21: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Continuous Optimization

• Constant analysis of network• Protection measures adapt

SafetySecurityProtection

CapabilityPerformanceAccess

Dynamic Point ofOptimization

Optimum balance between protection and access

Page 22: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Current NETS Prototype

OracleDatabase

DNS forward

Port Locator

ARPwatch

DNS reverse

DHCP Server Logs

Policies &Business

Rules

Reports

ScanDispatcher

Targeted Systems

LBLnet

Control

Future

Page 23: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

NETS VisionFully automated vulnerability

discovery and elimination

• Network information continuously collected

• Systems continuously scanned

• Network vulnerabilities detected as they appear

• Vulnerabilities immediately resolved

•Automatically Blocked

•Automatically alert owners/sys admins

•Automatically remove blocks when vulnerabilities are fixed

Safe systems given full access -Internet access is maximized

Page 24: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Future Integration With BroNETS uses Bro

information toprioritize

vulnerabilitiesbased a on threat

Bro NETSExtra attentiongiven to vulnerabilities with a high risk of attack

Extra attentionto attacks

againstknown

weaknesses

Bro uses NETS information to prioritize threats based on vulnerabilities

Page 25: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Views of Protection

“Threat”Based

Protection

“Vulnerability”Based

Protection

Page 26: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 1 James Rothfuss Computer Protection Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Internet2 Security at Line Speed

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Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

NETS and Bro Integration

Network protection adapts based on both threats and vulnerabilities

“Threat”and

“Vulnerability” Based

Protection