When A Document Is In Two Or More Copies Executed At Or About The Same Time, With Identical Contents, All Such Copies Are Equally Regarded As OriginalsbyThe Lawyer's PostMarch 20, 2015Comments Offon When A Document Is In Two Or More Copies Executed At Or About The Same Time, With Identical Contents, All Such Copies Are Equally Regarded As OriginalsIn 2000, Capitol Shoes Factory, a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of shoes, and Traveler Kids, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing, importing and distribution of shoes and sandals agreed to a business arrangement whereby TKI would import shoes and sandals made by CSFL from its factory in China according to the designs and specifications of TKI. TKI would pay 30% of the purchase by way of letters of credit, while 70 % would be thru telegraphic transfer. Averring that TKI has unpaid accounts amounting to US$325,451.39 and manufactured US$92,000.00 pursuant to its designs and specifications, and TKI failed to pay despite numerous concessions and extensions, CSFL, after demand sent, filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against TKI. At trial, CSFL thru its witness, identified several invoices and order slips it issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI, but TKI objected to its presentation being mere photocopies of documents. TKI also objected to presentation of evidence to prove the amount of attorneys fees as the issue of attorneys fees was not raised as an issue during the pre-trial. CSFL then rested its case and filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits, marking as evidence the earlier documents objected to by TKI for being mere photocopies, and documents proving the amount for its claim of attorneys fees. Despite vigorous opposition from TKI, the trial court admitted the exhibits, and ordered TKI to present its evidence. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, but the RTC denied it, asseverating that the documentary exhibits can be admitted as the duplicate originals were already identified by CSFLs principal witness, Ms. Susan Chiu. As to the documents proving claim for attorneys fees, the same may be admitted as the issue of attorneys fees was impliedly raised as issue on whether TKI should be liable to CSFL. TKI then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to question the RTC orders; lacking any TRO to suspend trial, the RTC considered TKI as having waived its right to present evidence and for CSFL to present its memorandum. The Court of Appeals, acting on the petition for certiorari filed by TKI, partially granted it. Applying Section 3 of Rule 130, it ruled that Susan Chius identification of the photocopies merely established its due execution and existence of the original invoices. It did not however present the originals of the documents contrary to Section 5 of Rule 120, hence it denied its admission. As to attorneys fees, the CA agreed with the RTC. CSFL thus fled a petition for review of the CA decision.The Supreme Court:The Court finds merit in the petition.After a review of the RTC and the CA records, which were ordered elevated, the Court is of the considered view that the CA erred in not admitting the invoices and order slips denominated as Exhibits D to GG-1 and HH to KK-1, which were duplicate originals. Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads:Sec. 4 . Original of document. (b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.x x x xIn Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies v. The Court of Appeals and Associated Bank[1], it was stressed that duplicate originals were admissible as evidence. Pertinent portions of the said decision read:Respondent court is of the view that the above provision must be construed to mean the original copy of the document evidencing the credit and not its duplicate, thus:. . . [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of the private document evidencing a credit, it must be construed as referring to the original. In this case, appellees (Trans-Pacific) presented, not the originals but the duplicates of the three promissory notes. (Rollo, p. 42)The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless. It is undisputed that the documents presented were duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by petitioner. In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]), we said:When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.[Emphases supplied]Records reveal that Chiu, CSFLs principal witness, was able to satisfactorily explain that Exhibits D to GG-1 and HH to KK-1 were duplicate originals of invoices and order slips, and not mere photocopies. She testified as follows:Atty. Fernandez:Q The documents that you have brought today, to what records do they belong?A Those originals are from our company because one copy was sent to the customer and one we keep in our company, Sir.Q When you prepare a particular invoice pertaining to a particular transaction Miss Witness, how many copies do you prepare for that invoice? How many copies of the invoice will you prepare?A Two sets of invoice, one to the customer and one for our office sir.Q And the copies that you brought today, are those the ones that were retained to you in your office, the copies you brought to court?A Yes sir[2].[Emphases supplied]The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu convincingly explained that CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and retaining the other copy. The Court combed through her testimony and found nothing that would indicate that the documents offered were mere photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with her statement that the subject invoices were duplicate originals as they were prepared at the same time. The Court sees no reason why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court should not apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part of the testimony of Chiu.The Court went over the RTC records and the TSNs and found that, contrary to the assertion ofTKI, the duplicate originals were produced in court and compared with their photocopies during the hearing before the trial court. The transcripts bare all of these but were missed by the appellate court, which believed the assertion of TKI that what were produced in court and offered in evidence were mere photocopies. The TSNs further reveal that after the comparison, the photocopies were the ones retained in the records[3].The Court notes that this case involves a foreign entity and has been pending since October 6, 2005[4]. It is about time that this case be decided on the merits. At this juncture, the Court reminds counsel for TKI of his duty, as an officer of the court, to see to it that the orderly administration of justice be not unduly impeded.After the admission of CSFLs exhibits as evidence, TKI should have let trial proceed in due course instead of immediately resorting to certiorari, by presenting its own testimonial and documentary evidence and in case of an unfavorable decision, appeal the same in accordance with law. After all, the RTC stated that, granting that the questioned exhibits were not admissible, there still remained enough evidence to substantiate plaintiffs claim on which the Court can validly render judgment upon application of the pertinent law and/or jurisprudence[5]. In the case of Johnson Lee v. People of the Philippines[6], it was written:In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cases filed by the public respondent against the petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies of the charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence in lieu of the original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the conditions sine qua non to the admission of the said evidence is a factual issue addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the resolution of the trial court admitting secondary evidence must be sustained. The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission of the photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to adduce his evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may be properly raised.[Emphases supplied]WHEREFORE, the October 5, 2011 Decision and the January 16, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120413, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the exclusion of Exhibits D to GG-1 and HH to KK-1 are concerned. The May 13, 2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, is REINSTATED.The pertinent records of the case are hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, for appropriate proceedings.The trial court is directed to give priority to this case and act on it with dispatch.SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 200065, September 24, 2014, CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD., PETITIONER, VS. TRAVELER KIDS, INC., RESPONDENT.RA 7610: A Child Is Deemed Subjected To Other Sexual Abuse When He Or She Engages In Lascivious Conduct Under The Influence Or Coercion Of An AdultbyThe Lawyer's PostJanuary 17, 2015Comments Offon RA 7610: A Child Is Deemed Subjected To Other Sexual Abuse When He Or She Engages In Lascivious Conduct Under The Influence Or Coercion Of An AdultVivencio, Executive Director of a credit cooperative, was charged with violation of Section 5(b) Article III of Republic Act 7610, after he allegedly mashed the breast of AAA, daughter of BBB who works as secretary and treasurer at the credit cooperative. AAA was left alone after BBB left for some errands. Vivencio then closed the door of the office, ashes AAA if she was feeling any pain, and when she answered tooth ache, proceeded to mash her breast. Not content with the breast, Vivencio also slid his hand towards her abdomen. When BBB returned, AAA narrated the incident, thus they reported it to the legal department. After trial, Vivencio was convicted as charred by the RTC, thus he appealed his conviction to the CA, which affirmed it. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, he alleges the following errors: he was charged with two offenses, one for violation of Art. 336 of the RPC, and one for violation of RA 7610; the prosecutor had no authority to filed the case, as the complaint for acts of lasciviousness was not signed by the mother or victim; further, the case for violation of Section 5(b) only applies when the child is engaged in prostitution; AAA, not being engaged in prostitution, the case should not apply to him.The Supreme Court:The petition is bereft of any merit.First, Roallos claim that the Information filed against him is duplicitous as it charged him with the commission of two crimes is plainly untenable. The designation of the crime in the Information is clear Roallos was charged with the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.The mention of the phrase acts of lasciviousness in the Information does not mean that Roallos was charged with the felony of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The charge of acts of lasciviousness against Roallos is specifically delimited to that committed in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.In any case, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information that was filed against Roallos clearly makes out a case for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows:1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct[;]2. The [said] act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse[; and]3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. (Emphasis supplied)The Information that was filed against Roallos alleged that he committed lascivious acts towards AAA, i.e., that he mashed the breasts and kissed the cheeks of the latter. It likewise alleged that AAA, at the time she was subjected to sexual abuse by Roallos, was only 15 years of age. Clearly, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are set out in the Information that was filed against Roallos.In this regard, the Court likewise finds that the CA and the RTC did not err in finding Roallos criminally liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. It is undisputed that AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the incident. Further, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the committed lascivious conduct towards AAA, who is a child subjected to sexual abuse within the purview of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.That Roallos did in fact commit lascivious conduct towards AAA is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which this Court cannot simply disregard. In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below. The Court finds no reason to overturn the factual findings as the lower courts in this case.Roallos assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. [T]he law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.Second, Roallos claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of arrest and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is likewise untenable. InMiclat, Jr. v. People, the Court emphasized that the accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending his arrest should he fail to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)Similarly, inVillarin v. People, the Court stressed that the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation by entering his plea and actively participating in the trial without raising the lack of a preliminary investigation. Thus:Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation.Here, it is conceded thatVillarinraised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsmans verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration. Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. (Citations omitted and emphases ours)It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. Indeed, he actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.Third, Roallos failed to substantiate his claim that his right to speedy trial was violated. The right to speedy trial is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance. In order for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: first, that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and second, that there was no more delay that is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.As aptly ruled by the CA, Roallos failed to show that the proceedings below were attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The postponements sought for by the prosecution did not, in any way, seriously prejudice Roallos. If at all, the delay in the proceedings below is only attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.Lastly, that neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information filed against Roallos would not render the charge against the latter defective; it does not signify that they did not conform to the filing of the Information against Roallos. AAA and BBB vigorously pursued the indictment against Roallos. Likewise, contrary to Roallos claim, AAA executed a complaint-affidavit for the indictment of Roallos.[26] The foregoing circumstances clearly indicate the conformity of both AAA and BBB to the charge against Roallos.For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding that R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, Roallos may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Roallos shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by R.A. No. 7610. The penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from eight (8) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. On the other hand, the maximum term of the penalty should be taken from the penalty prescribed under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of which is from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to reclusion perpetua. The minimum, medium and maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; medium seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years; and maximum reclusion perpetua.[27]Considering that there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances extant in this case, both the RTC and the CA correctly imposed on Roallos the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as the minimum term to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term. The Court likewise upholds the fine imposed by the lower courts in the amount of P15,000.00.Nevertheless, the Court hereby modifies the amount of moral damages and civil indemnity awarded by the CA. The RTC directed Roallos to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00. The CA increased the amount of moral damages awarded by the RTC to P50,000.00 and imposed an additional award for civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. In line with recent jurisprudence, the Court deems it proper to reduce the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P15,000.00, as well as the award of civil indemnity from P50,000.00 to P20,000.00.In addition, and in conformity with current policy, the Court imposes interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.FIRST DIVISION,G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013,VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT

Mere Physical Resemblance Between Child And Alleged Father Not Enough To Establish Paternity And FiliationbyThe Lawyer's PostDecember 17, 2014Comments Offon Mere Physical Resemblance Between Child And Alleged Father Not Enough To Establish Paternity And FiliationFlorencia filed a petition for recognition in behalf of her child Camelo, against Camelo. According to her, when her husband left her, she sought employment as a household helper and it was there that she met Camelo who hired her as house helper. While working as a maid, Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where they had sexual intercourse. Twenty seven days after their sexual intercourse, she discovered that she was pregnant. Their tryst was repeated in March, 1982. Camelos housewife, suspecting her to be pregnant, sent her home. Instead of bringing her home, Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, she gave birth to Camelo. On the other hand, Camelo, the alleged father, denied fathering Camelo the son. He averred that in the course of her employment, Florencia would often go home to her husband and return to work the next morning, which displeased his wife and sent home Florencia. On the way to Cadiz City, they were onboard a Ceres bus so he invited her to dinner, where she confided that she was financially hard-up. They had sexual intercourse, but felt something jerking. It was then that she admitted being pregnant.The RTC, after trial, believed the testimony of Florencia, and declared that owing to the physical resemblance between Camelo the father and Camelo the son who was presented in open court, there can be no doubt that Camelo is the father of Camelo. Thus it ruled that Camelo is entitled to support from Camelo the father. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Camelo thus elevated his case to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court:Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.xxx xxx xxxPrivate respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.[9] Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.THIRD DIVISION,G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004,CAMELO CABATANIA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT PATERNITY AND FILIATIONPERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONSMere Physical Resemblance Between Child And Alleged Father Not Enough To Establish Paternity And FiliationbyThe Lawyer's PostDecember 17, 2014Comments Offon Mere Physical Resemblance Between Child And Alleged Father Not Enough To Establish Paternity And FiliationFlorencia filed a petition for recognition in behalf of her child Camelo, against Camelo. According to her, when her husband left her, she sought employment as a household helper and it was there that she met Camelo who hired her as house helper. While working as a maid, Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where they had sexual intercourse. Twenty seven days after their sexual intercourse, she discovered that she was pregnant. Their tryst was repeated in March, 1982. Camelos housewife, suspecting her to be pregnant, sent her home. Instead of bringing her home, Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, she gave birth to Camelo. On the other hand, Camelo, the alleged father, denied fathering Camelo the son. He averred that in the course of her employment, Florencia would often go home to her husband and return to work the next morning, which displeased his wife and sent home Florencia. On the way to Cadiz City, they were onboard a Ceres bus so he invited her to dinner, where she confided that she was financially hard-up. They had sexual intercourse, but felt something jerking. It was then that she admitted being pregnant.The RTC, after trial, believed the testimony of Florencia, and declared that owing to the physical resemblance between Camelo the father and Camelo the son who was presented in open court, there can be no doubt that Camelo is the father of Camelo. Thus it ruled that Camelo is entitled to support from Camelo the father. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Camelo thus elevated his case to the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court:Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.xxx xxx xxxPrivate respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.[9] Thus, certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

RA 9225: Where The Private Handwritten Document Was Accompanied By Other Relevant And Competent Evidence, It Suffices That The Claim For Filiation Be Shown To Be Handwritten By The Acknowledging ParentbyThe Lawyer's PostFebruary 14, 2015Comments Offon RA 9225: Where The Private Handwritten Document Was Accompanied By Other Relevant And Competent Evidence, It Suffices That The Claim For Filiation Be Shown To Be Handwritten By The Acknowledging ParentJenie and Christian Dominique lived together as husband and wife in 2005, thus Jenie became pregnant. In September, 2005, however, Dominique died. Two months later, Jenie gave birth to Christian. She then applied for registration of the birth of Christian, attaching his Certificate of Live Birth, the Affidavit To Use Surname Of The Father, which she executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment signed by Dominiques father, Domingo. Attached to the affidavit to use surname is an Autobiography written by Dominique during his lifetime, where he narrated his personal circumstances, and the fact that he had fallen in love with Jenie, and that the latter is pregnant and living with him at their house. It was unsigned by Dominique, however. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo, by letter, denied his application for registration of birth certificate, averring that the same does not comply with Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004, because the minor was born out of wedlock, Dominique died prior to his birth, thus cannot execute anymore the Affidavit Of Acknowledgment of Paternity or the Affidavit To Use Surname. Rebiffed, Jenie filed a case for injunction/registration of name against the City Civil Registrar before the RTC of Antipolo, reiterating therein the allegetions as well as the documentary evidence presented before the LCR, the Autobiography being her evidence in chief. Joseph, lone brother of Dominique, corroborated her testimony. However, the RTC, after trial, dismissed her complaint for lack of cause of action. According to the RTC, the private hand-written instrument, even if written by Dominique, does not contain an express admission of his paternity. Thus, Jenie appealed to the Supreme Court on pure question of law. She submits that Art. 176 of the Family Code does not expressly require that the private hand-written instrument containing the fathers admission of paternity be signed by the father. The Office of the Solicitor General, agreeing with the respondents, submits that the Authobiography contains an admission of pregnancy, not paternity.The Supreme Court:Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.[1]Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.x x x xArt. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.[2]Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.InHerrera v. Alba[3], the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:Laws, Rules, and JurisprudenceEstablishing FiliationThe relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.x x x xART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.This Courts rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. InPe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a fathers operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting him.[4]Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:Article 31. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.[5](Underscoring supplied)It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.[6]Too, (t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.[7]In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.SO ORDERED.

False Affidavit Of Cohabitation Renders A Marriage Void For Lack Of Marriage LicensebyThe Lawyer's PostDecember 17, 2014Comments Offon False Affidavit Of Cohabitation Renders A Marriage Void For Lack Of Marriage LicenseJose filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Felisa before the RTC of Pasay City. According to him, she was deceived by Felisa, who was his landlady, into signing a set of papers which he later found out to be their marriage contract, when she invited him to Pasay City Hall to fetch a package. Furthermore, their marriage was celebrated without a license, as the affidavit of cohabitation they executed was false, they not having complied with the 5-year requirement of cohabitation prior to marriage since they were introduced to each other five months before their marriage. In her answer, Felisa averred that her marriage to Jose is valid; they maintained the relationship between man and wife without marriage since 1980 but deferred marriage on account of they age; while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with Rufina, to which she filed criminal and civil actions against him, resulting in his suspension by the Office of the Ombudsman for one year.The RTC dismissed Joses complaint, citing it as incredible and ruled his marriage to Felisa valid in the absence of fraud or trickery, which even if present was already barred by prescription. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA initially dismissed Joses case but reversed itself on motion for reconsideration. According to the CA, applying Ninal vs. Bayadog, it ruled that inasmuch as Jose and Felisas period of cohabitation did not extend for at least five years, their marriage was solemnised without a marriage license, hence vid from the very beginning. It was at this juncture that the OSG filed a petition for review of the CA ruling, alleging that Jose did not come to court with clean hands, hence he must not benefit, on account of equity, on his fraudulent conduct. Further, the presumption of marriage must be upheld.The Supreme Court:Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review. It is already well-settled that:The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.x x xSimilarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.THIRD DIVISION,G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008,REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. [G.R. No. 179474]FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent

In Unions Between A Man And A Woman Who Are Incapacitated To Marry Each Other, The Ownership Over The Property Or Properties Acquired During The Subsistence Of That Relationship Shall Be Based On The Actual Contribution Of The PartiesThe Facts:Esteban (Abletes) and Soccoro (Torres) were married in 1980. Both had children from prior marriage, Evangeline (Abuda) was the daughter of Esteban from a previous wife who died in 1960, while Ediberto Ventura (petitioner) was the grandson of Socorro from her marriage to Crispin, but they themselves had no common children. At the time of her marriage to Esteban, Socorro had a valid and subsisting marriage with Crispin. In 1968, Esteban acquired one-half of a lot situated in 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila, while Evangeline bought the other half for her father in 1970. When the title to the property (TCT No. 141782) was released in 1980, it was registered in the name of Esteban Abletes, married to Socorro Torres. Evangeline also alleged that she and her father operated small business establishments at 903 and 905 Delpan St,. Tondo, Manila. When Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer, according to Edilberto, he decided to sell the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband. Esteban died in 1997, while Socorro died in 1999. In 2000, Leonora, Edilbertos mother discovered the sale of the properties to Evangeline, which she then relayed to Edilberto. The latter, represented by Leonora filed a petition for annulment of deeds of sale before the RTC of Manila, alleging that the sales were fraudulent as Estebans signature in the deeds were forged. Evangeline countered that because of the prior marriage by Socorro to Crispin, her marriage to Esteban was null and void, hence, Socorro and her heirs may not claim any right or interest over the properties she and her father acquired.After trial, the RTC ruled in favour of Evangeline and Paulino. Since the marriage of Socorro and Esteban were void, the applicable rule was Article 831of the Civil Code, which was the governing law at the time the two were married. It also appliedNinal vs. Badayog2ratiocinating that no prior judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is needed in order to establish the nullity of the marriage. The Vitas and Delpan properties were not conjugal, and governed by Articles 1443and 4854of the Civil Code. Applying the foregoing provisions, the RTC determined that they were properties of Esteban, and since Socorro did not contribute any funds to the acquisition of the properties, she was never a co-owner thereof, and she or her heirs cannot claim any right over the properties.The CA affirmed the RTC decision, but clarified that the applicable law is Article 1485of the Family Code, and applied the ruling inSaguid vs CA6. It held that the provisions apply even if cohabitation or acquisition of the property occurred prior to the enactment of the Family Code. In this case, Edilberto failed to provide evidence that Socorro contributed to the acquisition of the properties.Edilberto elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.The Issue/s:Whether or not Esteban and Socorro were co-woners of the Delpan and Vitas properties, thus entitling Edilberto as heir of Socorro to a share of the properties.The Courts ruling:We deny the petition.Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling inBorromeo v. Descallar7in his petition:It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.8This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres.9We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase married to Socorro Torres is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property.10The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page 9 of his petition wherein he quotes an excerpt of our ruling inBorromeo:[R]egistration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.Edilberto claims that Estebans actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortisations.11 Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property.We cannot sustain Edilbertos claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro.12Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtors consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorros alleged monetary contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA:[s]ettled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here it is Appellant who is duty bound to prove the allegations in the complaint which undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.13WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.SECOND DIVISION,G.R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013,EDILBERTO U. VENTURA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES PAULINO AND EVANGELINE ABUDA, RESPONDENTS.1Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person shall be illegal and void from its performance unless:1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or2. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void.2384 Phil. 661 (2000).3Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.4Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.5x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.Qualified Theft: As Long As The Property Taken Does Not Belong To The Accused Who Has A Valid Claim Thereover, It Is Immaterial Whether Said Offender Stole It From The Owner, A Mere Possessor, Or Even A Thief Of The PropertybyThe Lawyer's PostMarch 7, 2015Comments Offon Qualified Theft: As Long As The Property Taken Does Not Belong To The Accused Who Has A Valid Claim Thereover, It Is Immaterial Whether Said Offender Stole It From The Owner, A Mere Possessor, Or Even A Thief Of The PropertyAnita, was employed as accounting clerk of Video City Commercial Inc (VCCI) and Viva Video Inc., (Viva), sister companies engaged in video rentals and manages a chain of stores, which are either company-owned or operated as joint-ventures with franchisees, and assigned to the account, among others, of Jefferson Tan. The latter was mostly out of the country, hence he pre-signed checks to cover the stores disbursements and entrusted them to Anita. The pre-signed checks were from an account maintained jointly with Jefferson and VCCI at BPI Family Bank, Sta. Mesa. For any disbursement not exceeding P20,000.00, only the signature of Jefferson is required, as agreed with the bank. Because of Jeffersons frequent absence, Anita used the joint-venture account of the latter with VCCI and used it as a clearinghouse to make unauthorised transfer of funds. Anita deposited VCCI checks from other accounts, then withdrew the funds using Jeffersons pre-signed checks. The theft was discovered only after Anita went on maternity leave and later resigned, after she refused to turn over financial records in her possession. An audit discovered that she made unauthorised withdrawals and fund transfers amounting to P4,877,759,60. A case for qualified theft was filed against her by VCCI. During trial, the prosecution presented Jose, the assistant manager/acting cashier of BPI who presented the microfilm of the checks, the encashed checks, and the deposit slips. From this, it was discovered that she encashed a total of 42 checks with a total amount of P797, 187.85. Anita opted not to present evidence, hence the RTC convicted her for qualified theft, and sentenced her to 8 years anfd 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The CA upheld her conviction, hence she appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that she should not have been convicted of qualified theft as the prosecution failed to prove the private complainants ownership of the thing stolen. She also stresses that the checks and vouchers presented by the prosecution were not originals and secondary evidence was not presented in lieu of the original.The Supreme Court:The appeal lacks merit.A careful review of the records of this case and the parties submissions leads the Court to conclude that there exists no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the CA. We note that the arguments raised by petitioner in her petition are a mere rehash of her arguments raised before, and correctly resolved by, the CA.The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308[1]of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[2] Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances under Article 310[3]is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.[4]Here, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P797,187.85 taken does not belong to petitioner but to VCCI and that petitioner took it without VCCIs consent and with grave abuse of confidence by taking advantage of her position as accountant and bookkeeper. The prosecutions evidence proved that petitioner was entrusted with checks payable to VCCI or Viva by virtue of her position as accountant and bookkeeper. She deposited the said checks to the joint account maintained by VCCI and Jefferson Tan, then withdrew a total of P797,187.85 from said joint account using the pre-signed checks, with her as the payee. In other words, the bank account was merely the instrument through which petitioner stole from her employer VCCI.We find no cogent reason to disturb the above findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the CA and fully supported by the evidence on record. Time and again, the Court has held that the facts found by the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the CA, are as a general rule, conclusive upon this Court[5] in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion. In this case, none of the exceptions to the general rule on conclusiveness of said findings of facts are applicable.[6]The Court gives weight and respect to the trial courts findings in criminal prosecution because the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses in person and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[7]Absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses.Moreover, we agree with the CA when it gave short shrift to petitioners argument that full ownership of the thing stolen needed to be established first before she could be convicted of qualified theft. As correctly held by the CA, the subject of the crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property.[8]In any event, as stated above, the factual findings of the courts a quo as to the ownership of the amount petitioner stole is conclusive upon this Court, the finding being adequately supported by the evidence on record.However, notwithstanding the correctness of the finding of petitioners guilt, a modification is called for as regards the imposable penalty. On the imposition of the correct penalty, People v. Mercado[9]is instructive. Pursuant to said case, in the determination of the penalty for qualified theft, note is taken of the value of the property stolen, which is P797,187.85 in this case. Since the value exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be added to the basic penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is deducted from P797,187.85, which yields a remainder of P775,187.85. This amount is then divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The end result is that 77 years should be added to the basic penalty. However, the total imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed 20 years. Thus, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the trial court, as well as the appellate court, should have imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.WHEREFORE, the January 11, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29858 affirming the conviction of petitioner Anita L. Miranda for the crime of qualified theft is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is increased to reclusion perpetua.

Parricide: It Is Astoundingly Impossible For All Safety Features Of The Gun To Go Off At Precisely The Same Time Or In SuccessionThe Facts:George (Zapata) started his drinking session with his brother Manny and cousin Edwin at around3 PM of May 11, 2002. At around 7PM of the same day, a gunshot wound rang out n the room of George and his wife Queeny. George killed his wife Queeny, and left her at the sala soaked in her own blood. He then fled from the scene without seeking help from his wife. Manny and Edwin also fled the scene. Georges neighbours were alerted to the gunshot and they were the ones who brought Queeny to the Amang Rodriguez Hospital. Geroge and his 3 year old daughter were brought to the Municipal Hall of San Mateo. The police officer meanwhile conducted investigation of the crime after they were informed by the guard at the hospital that a victim of a gunshot wound was brought to the hospital. At Georges house they were able to recover one Cal. 45 pistol empty shell inside their bedroom. The medico-legal officer testified that Queeny died of a single gunshot wound. In his defense, George claimed that the shooting of his wife was accidental. He wanted to show his gun to his cousin but it fell when he tried to retrieve the gun. In his attempt to catch the gun, he accidentally squeezed the trigger hitting his wife.After trial, the RTC found Geogre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, which ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In his brief before the Supreme Court, he argues that there was no criminal intent on the killing of his wife as it was accidental.The Courts ruling:We are not persuaded.There is no doubt that appellant intentionally killed his wife; the shooting was not accidental. Both the trial court and the appellate court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.Appellants claim that he accidentally pulled the trigger while attempting to catch the same when it fell from the cabinet is incredible.First,as correctly noted by the CA, appellant was a former Corporal in the Philippine Marines and is thus assumed to know and undertake all safety precautions in storing his firearm.1In this case, appellant apparently threw caution to the wind when he placed the gun on top of a cabinet and not inside a locked drawer or cabinet.Second,the gun was loaded.Third,the gun is equipped with several safety measures. Interestingly, all these safety measures were not in place at the time of the shooting making appellants claim of accident highly unbelievable. As aptly noted by the trial court:x x x The gun including the magazine in this case was carelessly placed on top of a cabinet and not on a locked drawer or shelf. x x x Secondly, the gun was loaded. x x x Third, the gun was cocked. The hammer of the gun was set to a firing position. Accused argued that the gun may have been cocked when the same hit the side of the cabinet when it slipped while he was getting it. x x x How convenient that the gun had by plain mishap of hitting the side [of] the cabinet x x x cocked itself. Fourth, the accused accidentally squeezed the trigger when he tried to catch the gun to prevent it from falling on the ground. There is physical impossibility for the accused to have squeezed the trigger when he was allegedly trying to catch the gun. Instinct dictates that to be able to catch a falling object, you have to catch it with both hands or at least with an open hand with fingers spread or moved apart. It is surprising that the finger x x x found itself on the gun trigger and instinctively squeezed the same. The probability that the finger would accidentally slip on the minute hole of the trigger at such spur of the moment and at an awkward position is very remote, if not virtually impossible.It is astoundingly impossible for all safety features of the gun to go off at precisely the same time or in succession. As admitted by the accused, a .45 caliber pistol has four or five safety features to prevent any accidental discharge of the firearm. First, the user must load the magazine. Second, you have to put a round in the firing chamber. Third, the gun must be cocked. Fourth, the safety grip was held and was put off. Fifth, the user must be able to squeeze the trigger despite the presence of a trigger guard. Considering that herein accused is a soldier, adept or skilled in the handling of guns, it is highly disturbing why he allowed all safety features of the gun to falter causing it to fire [accidentally]. With all safety mechanisms installed in the gun, the occurrence of such a misfortune is only possible if there is human intervention, purposely done and not by mere chance or stroke of bad luck2Fourth, the trajectory of the bullet and the point of entry negate appellants claim that he pressed the trigger when the gun fell on the floor. As correctly pointed out by the CA, [i]f the shot came from the floor where the gun allegedly fell, the shot should have been in an upward direction.3However, as testified to by the medico-legal officer, the bullets point of entry was at the breast region and it exited at the lower back of the body.4In short, the assailant was in front of the victim and the shot was directed posteriorwards.Moreover, appellants actions immediately after the shooting is contrary to his assertion that he did not intend to harm his wife. Indeed, if the shooting was accidental, appellant would have immediately sought help from his relatives and neighbors to bring the victim to the hospital. Instead, he just left her sitting on a chair soaked in her blood. Appellant would not have become alarmed by the arrival of the police authorities. Instead, he fled from the crime scene leaving his neighbors to tend to his bleeding wife. We concur with the observation of the trial court that It was this accidental firing that accused x x x had allegedly hit his wife fatally. According to the accused, upon seeing his wife, he embraced her and let her sit. He saw that his daughter was crying so he first brought her to his cousin Edwin. He went back to his wife and let her [sit] on a plastic chair. He shouted to his companions to get a vehicle. His wife was already motionless. His wife fell down and his brother [seated] her again. When he got impatient, he went out of the house. He heard a siren so he got confused and left the house and proceeded to Fort Bonifacio. x x x Having seen his wife bleeding, it baffles the Court why he did not immediately carry and rush his own wife to the hospital for immediate medical care and attention. It was a most unusual reaction for a man who has accidentally shot his wife to just [seat] her on a chair and leisurely wait for a vehicle to bring his wife to a hospital. x x x Being the husband, he is expected to come to the succor of his wife. Laying seriously ill and hovering between life and death, x x x accused even left his wife. x x x Such actuations of the accused is a clear manifestation that he intended all the consequences of his nefarious acts. x x x If he was truly innocent, he would not have fled. By having opted to escape instead of attending to his wife, accuseds guilt had been indubitably established. Accuseds flight from the scene of the crime sealed his fate. x x xIt is likewise noteworthy to point out that neither one of the relatives of the accused, Manny Zapata (brother) and Edwin Bautista (cousin) who were at the scene volunteered to bring the victim to the hospital. x x x5In the crime of parricide, only the following elements need to be satisfactorily established: (1) the death of the deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.6]All these elements have been proven beyond doubt.Both the trial court and the appellate court properly sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua. Appellant, however, is not eligible for parole.7The award of P42,983.80 as actual damages is likewise proper as the same is supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is also proper. However, the awards of civil indemnity must be increased to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence8.In addition, all monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.WHEREFORE, the appeal isDISMISSED. The assailed December 8, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01376 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONSthat appellant is not eligible for parole; the awards of civil indemnity are increased to P75,000.00 and exemplary damages to P30,000.00; and all monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6%per annumfrom the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.SO ORDERED.Parricide: It Is Astoundingly Impossible For All Safety Features Of The Gun To Go Off At Precisely The Same Time Or In SuccessionThe Facts:George (Zapata) started his drinking session with his brother Manny and cousin Edwin at around3 PM of May 11, 2002. At around 7PM of the same day, a gunshot wound rang out n the room of George and his wife Queeny. George killed his wife Queeny, and left her at the sala soaked in her own blood. He then fled from the scene without seeking help from his wife. Manny and Edwin also fled the scene. Georges neighbours were alerted to the gunshot and they were the ones who brought Queeny to the Amang Rodriguez Hospital. Geroge and his 3 year old daughter were brought to the Municipal Hall of San Mateo. The police officer meanwhile conducted investigation of the crime after they were informed by the guard at the hospital that a victim of a gunshot wound was brought to the hospital. At Georges house they were able to recover one Cal. 45 pistol empty shell inside their bedroom. The medico-legal officer testified that Queeny died of a single gunshot wound. In his defense, George claimed that the shooting of his wife was accidental. He wanted to show his gun to his cousin but it fell when he tried to retrieve the gun. In his attempt to catch the gun, he accidentally squeezed the trigger hitting his wife.After trial, the RTC found Geogre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, which ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In his brief before the Supreme Court, he argues that there was no criminal intent on the killing of his wife as it was accidental.The Courts ruling:We are not persuaded.There is no doubt that appellant intentionally killed his wife; the shooting was not accidental. Both the trial court and the appellate court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.Appellants claim that he accidentally pulled the trigger while attempting to catch the same when it fell from the cabinet is incredible.First,as correctly noted by the CA, appellant was a former Corporal in the Philippine Marines and is thus assumed to know and undertake all safety precautions in storing his firearm.1In this case, appellant apparently threw caution to the wind when he placed the gun on top of a cabinet and not inside a locked drawer or cabinet.Second,the gun was loaded.Third,the gun is equipped with several safety measures. Interestingly, all these safety measures were not in place at the time of the shooting making appellants claim of accident highly unbelievable. As aptly noted by the trial court:x x x The gun including the magazine in this case was carelessly placed on top of a cabinet and not on a locked drawer or shelf. x x x Secondly, the gun was loaded. x x x Third, the gun was cocked. The hammer of the gun was set to a firing position. Accused argued that the gun may have been cocked when the same hit the side of the cabinet when it slipped while he was getting it. x x x How convenient that the gun had by plain mishap of hitting the side [of] the cabinet x x x cocked itself. Fourth, the accused accidentally squeezed the trigger when he tried to catch the gun to prevent it from falling on the ground. There is physical impossibility for the accused to have squeezed the trigger when he was allegedly trying to catch the gun. Instinct dictates that to be able to catch a falling object, you have to catch it with both hands or at least with an open hand with fingers spread or moved apart. It is surprising that the finger x x x found itself on the gun trigger and instinctively squeezed the same. The probability that the finger would accidentally slip on the minute hole of the trigger at such spur of the moment and at an awkward position is very remote, if not virtually impossible.It is astoundingly impossible for all safety features of the gun to go off at precisely the same time or in succession. As admitted by the accused, a .45 caliber pistol has four or five safety features to prevent any accidental discharge of the firearm. First, the user must load the magazine. Second, you have to put a round in the firing chamber. Third, the gun must be cocked. Fourth, the safety grip was held and was put off. Fifth, the user must be able to squeeze the trigger despite the presence of a trigger guard. Considering that herein accused is a soldier, adept or skilled in the handling of guns, it is highly disturbing why he allowed all safety features of the gun to falter causing it to fire [accidentally]. With all safety mechanisms installed in the gun, the occurrence of such a misfortune is only possible if there is human intervention, purposely done and not by mere chance or stroke of bad luck2Fourth, the trajectory of the bullet and the point of entry negate appellants claim that he pressed the trigger when the gun fell on the floor. As correctly pointed out by the CA, [i]f the shot came from the floor where the gun allegedly fell, the shot should have been in an upward direction.3However, as testified to by the medico-legal officer, the bullets point of entry was at the breast region and it exited at the lower back of the body.4In short, the assailant was in front of the victim and the shot was directed posteriorwards.Moreover, appellants actions immediately after the shooting is contrary to his assertion that he did not intend to harm his wife. Indeed, if the shooting was accidental, appellant would have immediately sought help from his relatives and neighbors to bring the victim to the hospital. Instead, he just left her sitting on a chair soaked in her blood. Appellant would not have become alarmed by the arrival of the police authorities. Instead, he fled from the crime scene leaving his neighbors to tend to his bleeding wife. We concur with the observation of the trial court that It was this accidental firing that accused x x x had allegedly hit his wife fatally. According to the accused, upon seeing his wife, he embraced her and let her sit. He saw that his daughter was crying so he first brought her to his cousin Edwin. He went back to his wife and let her [sit] on a plastic chair. He shouted to his companions to get a vehicle. His wife was already motionless. His wife fell down and his brother [seated] her again. When he got impatient, he went out of the house. He heard a siren so he got confused and left the house and proceeded to Fort Bonifacio. x x x Having seen his wife bleeding, it baffles the Court why he did not immediately carry and rush his own wife to the hospital for immediate medical care and attention. It was a most unusual reaction for a man who ha