league of cities case

7/29/2019 League of Cities Case

1/116

League of cities case

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN,J

.:

We consider and resolve theAd Cautelam Motion for

Reconsideration filed by the petitioners vis--vis the Resolution

promulgated on February 15, 2011.

To recall, the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted

theMotion for Reconsideration of the respondents presented against theResolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the Resolution dated August 24,

2010, and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws Republic Acts Nos. 9389,

9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434,

9435, 9436, and 9491constitutional.

Now, the petitioners anchor theirAd Cautelam Motion for

Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the Court could no longer

modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws

unconstitutional due to such judgment having long become final and

executory. They submit that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and

Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection

Clause.

The petitioners specifically ascribe to the Court the following errors in

its promulgation of the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, to wit:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO

PROMULGATE THE RESOLUTION OF 15 FEBRUARY

2011 BECAUSE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY ACTUAL

CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO SETTLE.

II. THE RESOLUTION CONTRAVENES THE 1997 RULES

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELEVANT SUPREME

COURT ISSUANCES.

III.THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL

SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLES OF

RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF

IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS.

IV.THE RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE

SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD BILLS DO NOT VIOLATE

ARTICLE X, SECTIONS 6 AND 10 OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION.


2/116

V. THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE THE

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION

AND THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO A

JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES.

Ruling

Upon thorough consideration, we deny theAd CautelamMotion for

Reconsideration for its lack of merit.

I.

Procedural Issues

With respect to the first, second, and third assignments of

errors,supra, it appears that the petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the

Court in promulgating theFebruary 15, 2011 Resolution, claiming that the

decision herein had long become final and executory. They state that the

Court thereby violated rules of procedure, and the principles ofres

judicata and immutability of final judgments.

The petitioners posit that the controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended

with the April 28, 2009 Resolution denying the respondents second motion

for reconsideration vis--vis the November 18, 2008 Decision for being a

prohibited pleading, and in view of the issuance of the entry of judgmenton

May 21, 2009.

The Court disagrees with the petitioners.

In the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court ruled:

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The

motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn

the Resolution of 31 March 2009.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of

18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading,

and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in

Intervention dated 20 April 2009 and the Petition in Intervention

dated 20 April 2009 filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al.

are also DENIED in view of the denial of the second motion for

reconsideration. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let

entry of judgment be made in due course.


3/116

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion,

joined by Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Renato C. Corona,

Minita Chico-Nazario, Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and Lucas P.

Bersamin. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Antonio

Eduardo B. Nachura took no part. Justice Leonardo A.

Quisumbing is on leave.[1]

Within 15 days from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the

respondents filed aMotion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 By

Declaring Instead That Respondents Motion for Reconsideration Of the

Resolution Of March 31, 2009 And Motion For Leave To File, And To

Admit Attached Second Motion For Reconsideration Of The Decision Dated

November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved And To Conduct Further

Proceedings Thereon, arguing therein that a determination of the issue of

constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for reconsideration

by an equally divided vote was not binding on the Court as a valid

precedent, citing the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno

inLambino v. Commission on Elections.[2]

Thus, in its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court issued the following

clarification of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, viz:

As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited

pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure which provides that: No second motion for

reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same

party shall be entertained. Thus, a decision becomes final and

executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the firstmotion for reconsideration.

However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a

second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the

Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for

reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for

reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.

In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion

for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, theCourt allowed the filing of the second motion for

reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration

was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the

required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008

Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the

second motion for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009

Resolution.[3]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn1


4/116

As the result of the aforecited clarification, the Court resolved to

expunge from the records several pleadings and documents, including

respondentsMotion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc.

The respondents thus filed theirMotion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution of June 2, 2009, asseverating that theirMotion To Amend

Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was notanother motion for reconsideration

of the November 18, 2008 Decision, because it assailed the April 28, 2009

Resolution with respect to the tie-vote on the respondentsSecond Motion

For Reconsideration. They pointed out that theMotion To Amend Resolution

Of April 28, 2009 etc. was filed on May 14, 2009, which was within the 15-

day period from their receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution; thus,

the entry of judgmenthad been prematurely made. They reiterated their

arguments with respect to a tie-vote upon an issue of constitutionality.

In the September 29, 2009 Resolution,[4]the Court required the

petitioners to comment on theMotion for Reconsideration of the Resolution

of June 2, 2009within 10 days from receipt.

As directed, the petitioners filed theirComment Ad Cautelam With

Motion to Expunge.

The respondents filed theirMotion for Leave to File and to Admit

Attached Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to

Expunge, together with theReply.

On November 17, 2009, the Court resolved to note the

petitionersComment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge, to grant the

respondentsMotion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to Petitioners

Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and to note the

respondentsReply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to

Expunge.

On December 21, 2009, the Court, resolving theMotion To Amend

Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. and voting anew on the Second Motion For

Reconsideration in order to reach a concurrence of a majority, promulgated

its Decision granting the motion and declaring the Cityhood Laws as

constitutional,[5]disposing thus:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn4


5/116

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration

dated June 2, 2009, their Motion to Amend the Resolution of Apri l 28,

2009 by Declaring Instead that RespondentsMotion for Reconsiderationof the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to

Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated

November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct FurtherProceedings, dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion forReconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 areGRANTED.

The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May21, 2009 must accordingly beRECALLED.

The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-interventionare DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389,

9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434,

9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

On January 5, 2010, the petitioners filed anAd Cautelam Motion for

Reconsideration against the December 21, 2009 Decision.[6] On the same

date, the petitioners also filed aMotion to Annul Decision of 21 December

2009.[7]

On January 12, 2010, the Court directed the respondents to comment

on the motions of the petitioners.[8]

On February 4, 2010, petitioner-intervenors City of Santiago, City

of Legazpi, and City of Iriga filed their separateManifestations with

Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motions for Reconsideration.[9]Similar

manifestations with supplemental motions for reconsideration were filed by

other petitioner-intervenors, specifically: City of Cadiz on February 15,

2010;[10] City of Batangas on February 17, 2010;[11]and City

of Oroquieta on February 24, 2010.[12] The Court required the adverse

parties to comment on the motions.[13] As directed, the respondents

complied.

On August 24, 2010, the Court issued its Resolution reinstating

the November 18, 2008 Decision.[14]

On September 14, 2010, the respondents timely filed aMotion for

Reconsideration of the Resolution DatedAugust 24, 2010.[15]They

followed this by filing on September 20, 2010 aMotion to Set Motion for

Reconsideration of the Resolution datedAugust 24, 2010 for

Hearing.[16]On November 19, 2010, the petitioners sent in theirOpposition
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn6


6/116

[To the Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution datedAugust 24,

2010].[17]On November 30, 2010,[18]the Court noted, among others, the

petitionersOpposition.

On January 18, 2011,[19]the Court denied the respondentsMotion to

Set Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution datedAugust 24, 2010

for Hearing.

Thereafter, on February 15, 2011, the Court issued the Resolution

being now challenged.

It can be gleaned from the foregoing that, as the June 2, 2009

Resolution clarified, the respondentsSecond Motion For

Reconsideration was nota prohibited pleading in view of the Courts voting

and acting on it having the effect ofallowingthe Second Motion For

Reconsideration; and that when the respondents filed theirMotion for

Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 questioning the expunging

of theirMotion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. (which had been

filed within the 15-day period from receipt of the April 28, 2009

Resolution), the Court opted to act on theMotion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution of June 2, 2009 by directing the adverse parties through its

September 29, 2009 Resolution to comment. The same permitting effect

occurred when the Court, by its November 17, 2009 Resolution, granted the

respondentsMotion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to Petitioners

Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and noted the

attachedReply.

Moreover, by issuing the Resolutions dated September 29, 2009 and

November 17, 2009, the Court: (a) rendered ineffective the tie-vote under the

Resolution of April 28, 2009 and the ensuing denial of the Motion for

Reconsiderationof the Resolution of March 31, 2009 for lack of a majority

to overturn; (b), re-opened the Decision of November 18, 2008 for a second

look under reconsideration; and (c) lifted the directive that no further

pleadings would be entertained. The Court in fact entertained and acted on

the respondentsMotion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2,

2009. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to deliberate anew on the

respondentsSecond Motion for Reconsideration and ended up with the

promulgation of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood

Laws valid and constitutional).


7/116

It is also inaccurate for the petitioners to insist that the December 21,

2009 Decision overturned the November 18, 2008 Decision on the basis of

the mereReflections of the Members of the Court. To be sure,

theReflections were the legal opinions of the Members and formed part of

the deliberations of the Court. The reference in the December 21, 2009

Decision to theReflections pointed out that there was still a pending incident

after the April 28, 2009 Resolution that had been timely filed within 15 days

from its receipt,[20]pursuant to Section 10, Rule 51,[21]in relation to Section

1, Rule 52,[22]of the Rules of Court. Again, the Court did act and

deliberate upon this pending incident, leading to the issuance of

the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws free from

constitutional infirmity). It was thereafter that the Court rendered its August

24, 2010 Resolution (reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision), to

correct which the respondentsMotion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution DatedAugust 24, 2010 was filed. And, finally, the Court

issued its February 15, 2011 Resolution, reversing and setting aside

theAugust 24, 2010 Resolution.

It is worth repeating that the actions taken herein were made by the

Court en banc strictly in accordance with theRules of Courtand its internal

procedures. There has been no irregularity attending or tainting the

proceedings.

It also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered

itself under extraordinary circumstances from the shackles of technicality in

order to render just and equitable relief.[23]

On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res

judicata apply herein, suffice it to state that the succession of the events

recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws

has not yet been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the

principle of immutability of judgments did not yet come into play. For the

same reason is an adherence to the doctrine ofres judicata not yet

warranted, especially considering that the precedential ruling for this case

needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality.

II.

Substantive Issues
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn20


8/116

The petitioners reiterate their position that the Cityhood Laws violate

Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, the Equal

Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the

national taxes.

The Court differs.

Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by

the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The

apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable

disparity between the income requirement of P20 million under the Local

Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the P100 million

under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively

articulated in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations

on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of the

fact that there were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills

during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as

R.A. No. 9009,[24]including the municipalities covered by the Cityhood

Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill

No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in

session, and the conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the

responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would

not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate

during the 11th Congress.

R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12 th Congress

was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the

municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th

Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,

entitledJoint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills

Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act

No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No. 29.

Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as

Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress,[25]and forwarded Joint

Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval. Again, the Senate failed to

approve Joint Resolution No. 1.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn24


9/116

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of

Senator Pimentel with respect to Joint Resolution No. 1, to wit:

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL

House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain

municipalities seeking conversion into cities from the requirement

that they must have at least P100 million in income of locally

generated revenue, exclusive of the internal revenue share that

they received from the central government as required under

Republic Act No. 9009.

The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say

the least. The House wants the Senate to do away with the incomerequirement of P100 million so that, en masse, the municipalities

they want exempted could now file bills specifically converting

them into cities. The reason they want the Senate to do it first is

that Cong. Dodo Macias, chair of the House Committee on Local

Governments, I am told, will not entertain any bill for the

conversion of municipalities into cities unless the issue of income

requirement is first hurdled. The House leadership therefore

wants to shift the burden of exempting certain municipalities from

the income requirement to the Senate rather than do it itself.

That is most unusual because, in effect, the House wants the

Senate to pass a blanket resolution that would qualify the

municipalities concerned for conversion into cities on the matter

of income alone. Then, at a later date, the House would pass

specific bills converting the municipalities into cities. However,

income is not only the requirement for municipalities to become

cities. There are also the requirements on population and land

area.

In effect, the House wants the Senate to tackle thequalification of the municipalities they want converted into cities

piecemeal and separately, first is the income under the joint

resolution, then the other requirements when the bills are file to

convert specific municipalities into cities. To repeat, this is a

most unusual manner of creating cities.

My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the

House to do what they want to do regarding the applications of

certain municipalities to become cities pursuant to the

requirements of the Local Government Code. If the House wantsto exempt certain municipalities from the requirements of the

Local Government Code to become cities, by all means, let them

do their thing. Specifically, they should act on specific bills to

create cities and cite the reasons why the municipalities concerned

are qualified to become cities. Only after the House shall have

completed what they are expected to do under the law would it be

proper for the Senate to act on specific bills creating cities.

In other words, the House should be requested to finish

everything that needs to be done in the matter of converting


10/116

municipalities into cities and not do it piecemeal as they are now

trying to do under the joint resolution.

In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a

resort to this subterfuge is being undertaken to favor the creation

of certain cities. I am not saying that they are not qualified. All

I am saying is, if the House wants to pass and create cities out

of certain municipalities, by all means let them do that. But

they should do it following the requirements of the Local

Government Code and, if they want to make certain

exceptions, they can also do that too. But they should not use

the Senate as a ploy to get things done which they themselves

should do.

Incidentally, I have recommended this mode of action

verbally to some leaders of the House. Had they followed the

recommendation, for all I know, the municipalities they had

envisioned to be covered by House Joint Resolution No. 1 would,

by now if not all, at least some have been converted into

cities. House Joint Resolution No. 1, the House, in effect, caused

the delay in the approval in the applications for cityhood of the

municipalities concerned.

Lastly, I do not have an amendment to House Joint

Resolution No. 1. What I am suggesting is for the Senate torequest the House to follow the procedure outlined in the Local

Government Code which has been respected all

through the years. By doing so, we uphold the rule of law

and minimize the possibilities of power play in the approval of

bills converting municipalities into cities.[26]

Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually

filed in the House of Representatives, and were all unanimously and

favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of

Representatives.[27] The bills, when forwarded to the Senate, were likewise

unanimously approved by the Senate.[28] The acts of both Chambers of

Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the

Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent

to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No.9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended,

not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the

exemption clauses.

The petitioners further contend that the new income requirement

of P100 million from locally generated sources is not arbitrary because it is

not difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that have


11/116

already complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been converted into

cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (R.A. No 9264), Navotas (R.A. No.

9387) and San Juan (R.A. No. 9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmarias in Cavite

(R.A. No. 9723), and Bian in Laguna (R.A. No. 9740); and that several

other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of P100 million

from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in

Pampanga, and Bacoor in Cavite.

The contention of the petitioners does not persuade.

As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59)

existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an average annual income

of P100 million based on the figures contained in the certification

dated December 5, 2008 by the Bureau of Local Government. The large

number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with

the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect

renders it fallacious and probably unwarranted for the petitioners to claim

that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply with.

In this regard, the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 may prove

enlightening, thus:

Senator Osmea III. And could the gentleman help clarify why a

municipality would want to be converted into a city?

Senator Pimentel. There is only one reason, Mr. President, and itis not hidden. It is the fact that once converted into a city, the

municipality will have roughly more than three times the share

that it would be receiving over the internal revenue allotment than

it would have if it were to remain a municipality. So more or less

three times or more.

Senator Osmea III. Is it the additional funding that they will be

able to enjoy from a larger share from the internal revenue

allocations?

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Osmea III. Now, could the gentleman clarify, Mr.

President, why in the original Republic Act No. 7160, known as

the Local Government Code of 1991, such a wide gap was made

between a municipalitywhat a municipality would earnand a

city? Because essentially, to a persons mind, even with this new

requirement, if approved by Congress, if a municipality is earning

P100 million and has a population of more than 150,000


12/116

inhabitants but has less than 100 square kilometers, it would not

qualify as a city.

Senator Pimentel. Yes.

Senator Osmea III. Now would that not be quite arbitrary onthe part of the municipality?

Senator Pimentel. In fact, Mr. President, the House version

restores the or. So, this is a matter that we can very well take

up as a policy issue. The chair of the committee does not say that

we should, as we know, not listen to arguments for the restoration

of the word or in the population or territorial requirement.

Senator Osmea III. Mr. President, my point is that, I agree

with the gentlemans and, but perhaps we should bring down

the area. There are certainly very crowded places in this country

that are less than 10,000 hectares100 square kilometers is

10,000 hectares. There might only be 9,000 hectares or 8,000

hectares. And it would be unfair if these municipalities already

earning P100,000,000 in locally generated funds and have a

population of over 150,000 would not be qualified because of the

simple fact that the physical area does not cover 10,000 hectares.

Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, in fact, in Metro Manila thereare any number of municipalities. San Juan is a specific example

which, if we apply the present requirements, would not qualify:

100 square kilometers and a population of not less than 150,000.

But my reply to that, Mr. President, is that they do not

have to become a city?

Senator Osmea III. Because of the income.

Senator Pimentel. But they are already earning a lot, as thegentleman said. Otherwise, the danger here, if we become lax

in the requirements, is the metropolis-located local

governments would have more priority in terms of funding

because they would have more qualifications to become a city

compared to far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the

Cordilleras, or whatever.

Therefore, I think we should not probably ease up on the

requirements. Maybe we can restore the word or so that if they

do not have the 100 square kilometers of territory, then if theyqualify in terms of population and income, that would be all right,

Mr. President.

Senator Osmea III. Mr. President, I will not belabor the point

at this time. I know that the distinguished gentleman is

considering several amendments to the Local Government

Code. Perhaps this is something that could be further refined at a

later time, with his permission.


13/116

So I would like to thank the gentleman for his

graciousness in answering our questions.

Senator Pimentel. I also thank the gentleman, Mr. President.[29]

The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the

petitioners as having generated the threshold income of P100 million from

local sources, including those already converted into cities, are either in

Metro Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the

municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different

provinces of the Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions,

and are considerably very distant from Metro Manila. This reality

underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to

prevent, i.e., that the metropolis-located local governments would have

more priority in terms of funding because they would have more

qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao

or in the Cordilleras, or whatever, actually resulting from the abrupt

increase in the income requirement. Verily, this result is antithetical to what

the Constitution and LGC have nobly envisioned in favor of countryside

development and national growth. Besides, this result should be arrested

early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire country due to the

local government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded

easier access to the bigger share in the national coffers than other local

government units.

There should also be no question that the local government units

covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They have

proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their

respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and

commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of

agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism

spots. In his speech delivered on the floor of the Senate to sponsor House

Joint Resolution No. 1, Senator Lim recognized such unique traits,[30]viz:

It must be noted that except for Tandag and Lamitan, which

are both second-class municipalities in terms of income, all the

rest are categorized by the Department of Finance as first-class

municipalities with gross income of at least P70 million as per

Commission of Audit Report for 2005. Moreover, Tandag and

Lamitan, together with Borongan, Catbalogan, and Tabuk, are all

provincial capitals.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn29


14/116

The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities,

which would have increased further by this time, indicate their

readiness to take on the responsibilities of cityhood.

Moreover, the municipalities under consideration are leading

localities in their respective provinces. Borongan, Catbalogan,Tandag, Batac and Tabuk are ranked number one in terms of

income among all the municipalities in their respective provinces;

Baybay and Bayugan are number two; Bogo and Lamitan are

number three; Carcar, number four; and Tayabas, number

seven. Not only are they pacesetters in their respective provinces,

they are also among the frontrunners in their regions Baybay,

Bayugan and Tabuk are number two income-earners in Regions

VIII, XIII, and CAR, respectively; Catbalogan and Batac are

number three in Regions VIII and I, respectively; Bogo, number

five in Region VII; Borongan and Carcar are both number six in

Regions VIII and VII, respectively. This simply shows that these

municipalities are viable.

Petitioner League of Cities argues that there exists no issue with

respect to the cityhood of its member cities, considering that they became

cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion at the time of their

creation.

The Court considers the argument too sweeping. What we pointed out

was that the previous income requirement of P20 million was definitely not

insufficient to provide the essential government facilities, services, and

special functions vis--vis the population of a component city. We also

stressed that the increased income requirement of P100 million was not

the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive andremain viable as a component city. These observations were unerringly

reflected in the respective incomes of the fifty-nine (59) members of the

League of Cities that have still failed, remarkably enough, to be compliant

with the new requirement of the P100 million threshold income five years

after R.A. No. 9009 became law.

Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of P100

million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. When the

sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no research or

empirical data buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal

took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise. As already

mentioned, even the danger the passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent

might soon become a reality. While the Constitution mandates that the

creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down


15/116

in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to

yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment

imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to

promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the

concomitant national growth.

Moreover, if we were now to adopt the stringent interpretation of the

Constitution the petitioners are espousing, we may have to apply the same

restrictive yardstick against the recently converted cities cited by the

petitioners, and find two of them whose conversion laws have also to be

struck down for being unconstitutional. The two laws are R.A. No.

9387[31]and R.A. No. 9388,[32]respectively converting the municipalities

of San Juan and Navotas into highly urbanized cities. A cursory reading of

the laws indicates that there is no indication of compliance with the

requirements imposed by the LGC, for, although the two local government

units concerned presumably complied with the income requirement of P50

million under Section 452 of the LGC and the income requirement of P100

million under the amended Section 450 of the LGC, they obviously did not

meet the requirements set forth under Section 453 of the LGC, to wit:

Section 453.Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.Itshall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly

urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the

minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding

Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a

plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.

Indeed, R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388 evidently show that the

President had not classified San Juan and Navotas as highly urbanized cities

upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified

voters therein. A further perusal of R.A. No. 9387 reveals that San Juan did

not qualify as a highly urbanized city because it had a population of only

125,558, contravening the required minimum population of 200,000 under

Section 452 of the LGC. Such non-qualification as a component city was

conceded even by Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill

No. 2157.

The petitioners contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right

to a just share in the national taxes is not acceptable.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/april2011/176951.htm#_ftn31


16/116

In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government

units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific

amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis

of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share

is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the

number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for

cities. However, we have to note that the allocation by the National

Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With

every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for

cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each

city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than

that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of

Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC.

As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution,

the Cityhood Laws were not violative of the Constitution and the LGC. The

respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for

cities. They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of their

respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because

they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With

their conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only

around 120 cities.

Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated

income, but also depend on the IRA to support their development. They can

spur their own developments and thereby realize their great potential of

encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet

their potential will effectively be stunted if those already earning more will

still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial

activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near Metro Manila.

III.Conclusion

We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by

the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the

11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC

prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably

gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play


17/116

demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping

its imprimaturto the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly

recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress.

WHEREFORE, theAd Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the

Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied with finality.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

ROBERT P. GUZMAN,Peti

tioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, MAYOR

RANDOLPH S. TING

AND SALVACION

GARCIA,Respond

ents.

G.R. No. 182380

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,QUISUMBING*,YNARES-SANTIAGO*,CARPIO,

CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO**and

ABAD**,JJ.

Promulgated:

August 28, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn1


18/116

BERSAMIN, J.:

Through certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, Rules of

Court, the petitioner assails the February 18, 2008 resolution of the

Commission of Electionsen banc (COMELEC),[1]dismissing his criminal

complaint against respondents City Mayor Randolph Ting and City

Treasurer Salvacion Garcia, both of Tuguegarao City, charging them with

alleged violations of the prohibition against disbursing public funds and

undertaking public works, as embodied in Section 261, paragraphs (v) and

(w), of the Omnibus Election Code, during the 45-day period of the election

ban by purchasing property to be converted into a public cemetery and by

issuing the treasury warrant in payment. He asserts that the COMELEC

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in thereby exonerating City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer

Garcia based on its finding that the acquisition of the land for use as a public

cemetery did not constitute public works covered by the ban.

Antecedents

On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang

Panlungsodof Tuguegarao City passed Resolution No. 048-2004 to

authorize City Mayor Ting to acquire two parcels of land for use as a public

cemetery of the City. Pursuant to the resolution, City Mayor Ting purchased

the two parcels of land, identified as Lot Nos. 5860 and 5861 and located at

Atulayan Sur, Tuguegarao City, with an aggregate area of 24,816 square

meters (covered by Transfer Certificates of Title [TCT] No. T-36942 and

TCT No. T-36943 of the Register of Deeds in Tuguegarao City), from

Anselmo Almazan, Angelo Almazan and Anselmo Almazan III. As

payment, City Treasurer Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant No.

0001534514 dated April 20, 2004 in the sum of P8,486,027.00. On May 5,

2004, the City Government of Tuguegarao caused the registration of the sale

and the issuance of new certificates in its name (i.e., TCT No. T-144428 and

TCT No. T-144429).

Based on the transaction, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Office

of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan Province against City

Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia, charging them with a violation of

Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code, for
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn5


19/116

having undertaken to construct a public cemetery and for having released,

disbursed and expended public funds within 45 days prior to the May 9,

2004 election, in disregard of the prohibitions under said provisions due to

the election ban period having commenced on March 26, 2004 and ended on

May 9, 2004.

City Mayor Ting denied the accusations in his counter-affidavit but

City Treasurer Garcia opted not to answer.

After investigation, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of

Cagayan recommended the dismissal of the complaint by a resolution

dated December 13, 2006, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned

investigator finds that respondents did not violate Section 261

subparagraphs (v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code and

Sections 1 and 2 of Comelec Resolution No. 6634 and hereby

recommends the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack

of merit.[2]

The COMELEC en banc adopted the foregoing recommendation

in its own resolution dated February 18, 2008 issued in E.O. Case No. 06-

14[3] and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, holding that the

acquisition of the two parcels of land for a public cemetery was not

considered as within the termpublic works; and that, consequently, the

issuance of Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 was not for public works and

was thus in violation of Section 261 (w) of theOmnibus Election Code.

Not satisfied but without first filing a motion for reconsideration, the

petitioner has commenced this special civil action under Rule 64, in relation

to Rule 65,Rules of Court, claiming that the COMELEC committed grave

abuse of discretion in thereby dismissing his criminal complaint.

Parties Positions

The petitioner contended that the COMELEC's point of view was

unduly restrictive and would defeat the very purpose of the law; that it could

be deduced from the exceptions stated in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus

Election Code that the disbursement of public funds within the prohibited

period should be limited only to the ordinary prosecution of public
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn6


20/116

administration and for emergency purposes; and that any expenditure other

than such was proscribed by law.

For his part, City Mayor Ting claimed that the mere acquisition of

land to be used as a public cemetery could not be classified as public works;

that there would be public works only where and when there was an actual

physical activity being undertaken and after an order to commence work had

been issued by the owner to the contractor.

The COMELEC stated that the petition was premature because the

petitioner did not first present a motion for reconsideration, as required by

Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure;[4]and that

as the primary body empowered by the Constitution to investigate and

prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions

constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices,[5]it assumed full

discretion and control over determining whether or not probable cause

existed to warrant the prosecution in court of an alleged election offense

committed by any person.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) concurred with the

COMELEC to the effect that the acquisition of the land within the election

period for use as a public cemetery was not covered by the 45-day public

works ban under Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code; but differed

from the COMELEC as to the issuance of Treasury Warrant No.

0001534514, opining that there was probable cause to hold City Mayor Ting

and City Treasurer Garcia liable for a violation of Section 261(w),

subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code.

Issues

The issues to be resolved are:

(1) Whether or not the petition was premature;

(2) Whether or not the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881

during the period of the election ban was covered by the

termpublic works as to be in violation of Section 261 (v) of

the Omnibus Election Code; and
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn8


21/116

(3) Whether or not the issuance of Treasury Warrant No.

0001534514 during the period of the election ban was in

violation of Section 261 (w) of theOmnibus Election Code.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

I

The Petition Was Not Premature

The indispensable elements of a petition forcertiorari are: (a) that it is

directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial orquasi-

judicial functions; (b) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted without

or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that

there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary

course of law.[6]

The COMELEC asserts that the plain, speedy and adequate remedy

available to the petitioner was to file a motion for reconsideration vis--

vis the assailed resolution, as required in the 1993 COMELEC Rules of

Procedure; and that his omission to do so and his immediately invoking

the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court instead rendered his petition

premature.

We do not sustain the COMELEC.

As a rule, it is necessary to file a motion for reconsideration in the

court of origin before invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of a superior court.

Hence, a petition forcertiorari will not be entertained unless the public

respondent has been given first the opportunity through a motion for

reconsideration to correct the error being imputed to him.[7]

The rule is not a rigid one, however, for a prior motion for

reconsideration is not necessary in some situations, including the following:

a. Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a

quo has no jurisdiction;


22/116

b. Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings

have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,

or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower

court;

c. Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the

question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests

of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter

of the action is perishable;

d. Where, under the circumstances, a motion for

reconsideration would be useless;

e. Where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there

is extreme urgency for relief;

f. Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is

urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is

improbable;

g. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for

lack of due process;

h. Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the

petitioner had no opportunity to object; and

i. Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public

interest is involved.[8]

That the situation of the petitioner falls under the last exception is

clear enough. The petitioner challenges only the COMELECs interpretation

of Section 261(v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code. Presented here is

an issue purely of law, considering that all the facts to which the

interpretation is to be applied have already been established and become

undisputed. Accordingly, he did not need to first seek the reconsideration of

the assailed resolution.

The distinctions between a question of law and a question of fact are

well known. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises

as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Such a question does not


23/116

involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by

the litigants or any of them. But there is a question of fact when the doubt

arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts or when the query

necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the

credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding

circumstances, their relation to one another and to the whole, and the

probabilities of the situation.[9]

II

Acquisition of Lots 5860 And 5881

During the Period of the Election Ban,

Not Considered as Public Works in Violationof Sec. 261 (v), Omnibus Election Code

The COMELEC held in its resolution dated February 18, 2008 that:

To be liable for violation of Section 261 (v), supra, four (4)

essential elements must concur and they are:

1. A public official or employee releases, disburses, or

expends any public funds;

2. The release, disbursement or expenditure of such

funds must be within forty-five days before regular

election;

3. The release, disbursement or expenditure of said

public funds is for any and all kinds of public works;

and

4.

The release, disbursement or expenditure of the publicfunds should not cover any exceptions of Section 261

(v). (Underscoring supplied).

Applying the foregoing as guideline, it is clear that what is

prohibited by law is the release, disbursement or expenditure of

public funds for any and all kinds of public works. Public works is

defined as fixed works (as schools, highways, docks) constructed

for public use or enjoyment esp. when financed and owned by the

government. From this definition, the purchase of the lots

purportedly to be utilized as cemetery by the City Government ofTuguegarao cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as

public works, hence it could not fall within the proscription as

mandated under the aforementioned section of the Omnibus

Election Code. And since the purchase of the lots is not within the

contemplation of the word public works, the third of the elements

stated in the foregoing guideline is not present in this case. Hence

since not all the elements concurred, the respondents are not liable

for violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code.

The foregoing ratiocination of the COMELEC is correct.


24/116

Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code provides as follows:

Section 261. Prohibited acts.- The following shall be guilty

of an election offense:

x x x

(v)Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure

of public funds.- Any public official or employee

including barangay officials and those of government-owned or

controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-

five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special

election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds:

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

(a) Maintenance of existing and/or completed public works

project:Provided, that not more than the average number of

laborers or employees already employed therein during the sixth-

month period immediately prior to the beginning of the forty-five

day period before election day shall be permitted to work during

such time:Provided, further, That no additional laborer shall be

employed for maintenance work within the said period of forty-

five days;

(b) Work undertaken by contract through public bidding

held, or negotiated contract awarded, before the forty-five day

period before election:Provided, That work for the purpose of

this section undertaken under the so-called takay or paquiao

system shall not be considered as work by contract;

(c) Payment for the usual cost of preparation for working

drawings, specifications, bills of materials and equipment, and all

incidental expenses for wages of watchmen and other laborers

employed for such work in the central office and field storehousesbefore the beginning of such period:Provided, That the number of

such laborers shall not be increased over the number hired when

the project or projects were commenced; and

(d) Emergency work necessitated by the occurrence of a

public calamity, but such work shall be limited to the restoration

of the damaged facility.

No payment shall be made within five days before the date of

election to laborers who have rendered services in projects orworks except those falling under subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and

(d), of this paragraph.

This prohibition shall not apply to ongoing public works

projects commenced before the campaign period or similar

projects under foreign agreements. For purposes of this provision,

it shall be the duty of the government officials or agencies

concerned to report to the Commission the list of all such projects

being undertaken by them.


25/116

(2) The Ministry of Social Services and Development and

any other office in other ministries of the government performing

functions similar to the said ministry, except for salaries of

personnel and for such other expenses as the Commission may

authorize after due and necessary hearing. Should a calamity or

disaster occur, all releases normally or usually coursed throughthe said ministries shall be turned over to, and administered and

disbursed by, the Philippine National Red Cross, subject to the

supervision of the Commission on Audit or its representatives,

and no candidate or his or her spouse or member of his family

within the second civil degree of affinity or consanguinity shall

participate, directly or indirectly, in the distribution of any relief

or other goods to the victims of the calamity or disaster; and

(3) The Ministry of Human Settlements and any other office

in any other ministry of the government performing functions

similar to the said ministry, except for salaries of personnel and

for such other necessary administrative or other expenses as the

Commission may authorize after due notice and hearing.

As the legal provision shows, the prohibition of the release,

disbursement or expenditure of public funds for any and all kinds of public

works depends on the following elements: (a) a public official or employee

releases, disburses or spends public funds; (b) the release, disbursement and

expenditure is made within 45 days before a regular election or 30 days

before a special election; and (c) the public funds are intended for any and

all kinds ofpublic works except the four situations enumerated in paragraph

(v) of Section 261.

It is decisive to determine, therefore, whether the purchase of the lots

for use as a public cemetery constituted public works within the context of

the prohibition under the Omnibus Election Code.

We first construe the termpublic works which the Omnibus

Election Code does not define with the aid of extrinsic sources.

TheLocal Government Code of 1991 considers public works to be thefixed infrastructures and facilities owned and operated by the government

for public use and enjoyment. According to the Code, cities have the

responsibility of providing infrastructure facilities intended primarily to

service the needs of their residents and funded out of city funds, such as,

among others, roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for

public elementary and secondary schools; and clinics, health centers and

other health facilities necessary to carry out health services.[10]


26/116

Likewise, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),

the engineering and construction arm of the government, associates public

works with fixed infrastructures for the public. In the declaration of policy

pertinent to the DPWH, Sec. 1, Chapter 1, Title V, Book IV,Administrative

Code of1987, states:

Sec. 1.Declaration of Policy. - The State shall maintain an

engineering and construction arm and continuously develop its

technology, for the purposes of ensuring the safety of all

infrastructure facilities and securing for all public works and

highways the highest efficiency and the most appropriate quality

in construction. The planning, design, construction and

maintenance ofinfrastructure facilities, especially nationalhighways, flood control and water resources development

systems, and other public works in accordance with nationaldevelopment objectives, shall be the responsibility of such an

engineering and construction arm. However, the exercise of this

responsibility shall be decentralized to the fullest extent feasible.

The enumeration in Sec. 1,suprainfrastructure facilities,

especially national highways, flood control and water resources development

systems, and other public works in accordance with national development

objectives means that only the fixed public infrastructures for use of the

public are regarded as public works. This construction conforms to the rule

ofejusdemgeneris, whichProfessorBlack has restated thuswise:[11]

It is a general rule of statutory construction that where

general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by

words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words

are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as

applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or

class as those specifically mentioned. But this rule must be

discarded where the legislative intention is plain to the contrary.

Accordingly, absent an indication of any contrary legislative intention,

the term public works as used in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election

Code is properly construed to refer to any building or structure on land or to

structures (such as roads or dams) built by the Government for public use

and paid for by public funds. Public works are clearly works, whether of

construction or adaptation undertaken and carried out by the national, state,

or municipal authorities, designed to subserve some purpose of public

necessity, use or convenience, such as public buildings, roads, aqueducts,

parks, etc.; or, in other words, allfixedworks constructed for public use.[12]


27/116

It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the petitioner's

insistence that the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881 for use as a public

cemetery be considered a disbursement of the public funds for public works

in violation of Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Codewas

unfounded and unwarranted.

III

Issuance of the Treasury Warrant

During the Period of the Election Ban

Violated Section 261 (w), Omnibus Election Code

Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code reads thus:

x x x

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works,

delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury

warrants and similar devices.- During the period of forty five

days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special

election, any person who: (a) undertakes the construction of any

public works, except for projects or works exempted in the

preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury

warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money,goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds.

x x x

The OSG posits that the foregoing provision is violated in either of

two ways: (a) by any person who, within 45 days preceding a regular

election and 30 days before a special election, undertakes the construction of

any public works except those enumerated in the preceding

paragraph; or(b) by any person who issues, uses or avails of treasury

warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other

things of value chargeable against public funds within 45 days preceding a

regular election and 30 days before a special election.

We concur with the OSGs position.

Section 261 (w) covers not only one act but two, i.e., the act under

subparagraph (a) above and that under subparagraph (b) above. For purposes

of the prohibition, the acts areseparate and distinct, considering that Section

261(w) uses the disjunctive orto separate subparagraphs (a) and (b). In legal

hermeneutics, oris a disjunctive that expresses an alternative or gives a

choice of one among two or more things.[13]The word signifies

disassociation and independence of one thing from another thing in an


28/116

enumeration. It should be construed, as a rule, in the sense that it ordinarily

implies as a disjunctive word.[14]According to Black,[15]too, the

word andcan never be read as or, or vice versa, in criminal and penal

statutes, where the rule of strict construction prevails. Consequently,

whether or not the treasury warrant in question was intended for public

works was even of no moment in determining if the legal provision was

violated.

There was a probable cause to believe that Section 261(w),

subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code was violated when City

Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia issued Treasury Warrant No.

0001534514 during the election ban period. For this reason, our conclusion

that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in dismissing E.O.

Case No. 06-14 for lack of merit is inevitable and irrefragable.

True, the COMELEC, as the body tasked by no less than the 1987

Constitution to investigate and prosecute violations of election laws,[16]has

the full discretion to determine whether or not an election case is to be filed

against a person and, consequently, its findings as to the existence of

probable cause are not subject to review by courts. Yet, this policy of non-

interference does not apply where the COMELEC, as the prosecuting or

investigating body, was acting arbitrarily and capriciously, like herein, in

reaching a different but patently erroneous result.[17]The COMELEC was

plainly guilty of grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion is present when there is a capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such

as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason

of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to

amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the

duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[18]

WHEREFORE, WE grant the petition forcertiorari and set aside

the resolution dated February 18, 2008 issued in E.O. Case No. 06-14 by the

Commission of Elections en banc.

The Commission on Elections is ordered to file the appropriate

criminal information against respondents City Mayor Randolph S. Ting and
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/182380.htm#_ftn18


29/116

City Treasurer Salvacion Garcia of Tuguegarao City for violation of Section

261 (w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code.

Costs of suit to be paid by the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

R E S O L U T I O N

PUNO, J.:

While man is finite, he seeks and subscribes to the

Infinite. Respondent Soledad Escritor once again stands before the Court

invoking her religious freedom and her Jehovah God in a bid to save her

familyunited without the benefit of legal marriage - and livelihood. The

State, on the other hand, seeks to wield its power to regulate her behavior

and protect its interest in marriage and family and the integrity of the courts

where respondent is an employee. How the Court will tilt the scales of

justice in the case at bar will decide not only the fate of respondent Escritor

but of other believers coming to Court bearing grievances on their free

exercise of religion. This case comes to us from our remand to the Office of

the Court Administrator on August 4, 2003.[1]

I. THE PAST PROCEEDINGS

In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant

Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of

Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, for an investigation ofrespondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with a

man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in

arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act

that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to

remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her

act.[2]

Consequently, respondent was charged with committing disgraceful
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn1


30/116

and immoral conduct under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of

the Revised Administrative Code.[3]

Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in

1999,she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.[4]She

admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the

benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still

alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and

Quilapio have a son.[5]

But as a member of the religious sect known as the

Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society,

respondent asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with

their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.[6]

In fact,

after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a

Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.[7]

For Jehovahs Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the

congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into

marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and

binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where

divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovahs

congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the

couple cannot secure the civil authorities approval of the maritalrelationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who have been

baptized and in good standing may execute the Declaration, which requires

the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the

marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses commission of

adultery are investigated before the declarations are executed.[8]

Escritor and

Quilapios declarations were executed in the usual and approved form

prescribed by the Jehovahs Witnesses,[9]

approved by elders of the

congregation where the declarations were executed,[10]and recorded in the

Watch Tower Central Office.[11]

Moreover, the Jehovahs congregation believes that once all legal

impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases,

and the couple should legalize their union. In Escritors case, although she
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june2006/A.M.%20No.%20P-02-1651.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/june20

league of cities case

Documents