learning from notes: wanda j. orlikowski august, 1992

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LEARNING FROM NOTES:Organizational Issues in

Groupware Implementation

Wanda J. Orlikowski

CCS TR # 134, Sloan School WP # 3428-92(revised version)

August, 1992

AcknowledgmentsThis research was sponsored by the Center for Coordination Science at theMassachusetts Institute of Technology. This support is gratefully acknowledged.Thanks are due to Jolene Galegher, Robert Halperin, Tom Malone and JudithQuillard who provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.Thanks are also due to the men and women of Alpha Corporation who participatedin this research.

LEARNING -FROM NOTES:Organizational Issues in Groupware Implementation

Wanda J. Orlikowski

Sloan School of ManagementMassachusetts Institute of Technology50 Memorial Drive (E53-329)Cambridge, MA 02139(617) 253-0443 [email protected]

ABSTRACTThis paper explores the introduction of groupware into anorganization to understand the changes in work practicesand social interaction facilitated by the technology. Theresults suggest that people's mental models andorganizations' structure and culture significantly influencehow groupware is implemented and used. Specifically, inthe absence of mental models that stressed itscollaborative nature, groupware was intepreted in terms offamiliar personal, stand-alone technologies such asspreadsheets. Further, the culture and structure providedfew incentives or norms for cooperating or sharingexpertise, hence the groupware on its own was unlikely toengender collaboration. Recognizing the central influenceof these cognitive and organizational elements is criticalto developers, researchers, and practitioners of groupware.

KEYWORDSGroupware, Implementation, Lotus Notes, OrganizationalFactors, Technological Frames

INTRODUCTIONComputer-supported cooperative work, collaborativecomputing, and groupware have become common labelsin our contemporary technological vocabulary. Whilesome have discussed the potential for such technologies toenhance organizational effectiveness [3, 8, 9, 15], othershave suggested that the implementation of suchtechnologies is more difficult and yields more unintendedconsequences than is typically acknowledged [2, 10, 11,12, 16]. Empirical studies of groupware usage inorganizations are clearly needed to shed light on thesediverse expectations. While there have been many fieldstudies of electronic mail usage [1, 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 17],groupware (that includes more collaborative features thanelectronic mail) has been studied less frequently.

In this paper I describe the findings of an exploratory fieldstudy which examined the implementation of thegroupware product Notes® (from Lotus DevelopmentCorporation)' into one office of a large organization. Myinterest in studying the implementation and use of thisproduct was to investigate whether and how the use of acollaborative tool changes the nature of work and thepattern of social interactions in the office, and with whatintended and unintended consequences. The findingssuggest that two organizational elements seem especiallyrelevant in influencing the effective utilization ofgroupware: people's cognitions or mental models abouttechnology and their work, and the structural properties ofthe organization such as policies, norms, and rewardsystems. The findings suggest that where people's mentalmodels do not understand or appreciate the collaborativenature of groupware, such technologies will be intepretedand used as if they were more familiar technologies, suchas personal, stand-alone software (e.g., a spreadsheet orword processing program). The findings further suggest,that where the premises underlying the groupwaretechnology (shared effort, cooperation, collaboration) arecounter-cultural to an organization's structural properties(competitive and individualistic culture, rigid hierarchy,etc.), the technology will be unlikely to facilitatecollective use and value. That is, where there are fewincentives or norms for cooperating or sharing expertise,goupware technology alone cannot engender these.Conversely, where the structural properties do supportshared effort, cooperation, and collaboration, it is likelythat the technology will be used collaboratively, that is, itwill be another medium within which those values andnorms are expressed. Recognizing the significant influenceof these organizational elements appears critical togroupware developers, users, and researchers.

1 Notes is an application development environment that cansupport communication, coordination, and collaborationwithin groups or organizations. While some features suchas electronic mail are built-in, others need to be built bythe adopting organization, e.g. discussion forums andcustomized views of shared databases. See Marshak (1990)for more details.

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RESEARCH SITE AND METHODSField work was conducted within a large services firm,Alpha Corporation (a pseudonym), which providesconsulting services to clients around the world. The careerstructure within Alpha is hierarchical with four primarymilestones--staff consultant, senior consultant, manager,and principal. In contrast to the pyramidal career structure,the firm operates through a matrix form, with client workbeing executed and managed in a decentralized fashion outof local offices, while being coordinated throughconsulting practice management centralized in theheadquarters office.

A few years ago, Alpha purchased and distributed Notes toall their consultants and support staff as part of a strategy,described by a senior principal as an attempt to "leveragethe expertise of our firm." My research study examined theimplementation of Notes in one large office of Alpha overa period of five months.2 Detailed data collection wasconducted through unstructured interviews, review ofoffice documents, and observation of meetings, worksessions, and training classes. Over ninety interviews wereconducted, each about an hour in length, with someparticipants being interviewed more than once over theperiod of study. In addition to the office where the studywas conducted, I interviewed key players from Alpha'sheadquarters and technology group. Participants spannedvarious hierarchical levels and were either consultants inactive practice, administrators supporting practiceactivities, or members of the centralized technologysupport function (see Table 1).

Practice Technology Total

Principals 13 4 17

Managers 26 15 41

Seniors 12 13 25

Admin. 8 -- 8

Total 59 32 91

Table 1: Number and Type of Interviews in Alpha

The research study was designed to examine how thegroupware technology is adopted and used by individuals,and how work and social relations change as aconsequence. The research study began in February 1991before the Notes system was due to be installed within theoffice and continued through the implementation and earlyuse of the Notes system (June 1991). The findings reflectparticipants' anticipations of as well as their earlyexposure to the Notes system.3 These findings need to be

2 henceforth referred to simply as "the office."3 This research study represents the first of a series of studies

that are being conducted within Alpha over time. Furtheranalyses and observations are thus anticipated.

interpreted cautiously as they only reflect the adoption andearly use experiences of a sample of individuals within aspecific office in what is a larger implementation processcontinuing over time in Alpha. While early, the findingsto date are interesting as they reflect people's initialexperiences and assessments of Notes in light of theircurrent work practices and assumptions about technology.The initial period following the implementation of atechnology is typically a brief and rare opportunity forusers to examine and think about the technology as adiscrete artifact, before it is assimilated into cognitivehabits and work practices, and disappears from view [18].It is possible that with time, greater use, and appropriatecircumstances, these early experiences will change.

RESEARCH RESULTS

Background to the Notes AcquisitionIn the late eighties, a few senior principals realized thatAlpha, relative to its competitors and clients'expectations, was not utilizing information technology aseffectively as they could. In response, they commissionedan internal study of the firm's technological capabilities,weaknesses, and requirements. On the basis of this study'srecommendations, a new and powerful position--akin tothat of a Chief Information Officer (CIO)--was createdwithin Alpha with responsibility for the firm's internaluse of information technology. One of the first tasks thenew CIO took on was the creation of firm-wide standardsfor the personal computing environments utilized inAlpha offices. It was while reviewing communicationsoftware that the CIO was introduced to the Notesgroupware system. As he remarked later, after a few daysof "playing with Notes," he quickly realized that it was "abreakthrough technology," with the potential to create "arevolution" in how members of Alpha communicated andcoordinated their activities. Shortly thereafter the CIOacquired a site license to install Notes throughout thefirm, and announced that the product would be Alpha'scommunications standard.

The CIO began to market Notes energetically withinvarious arenas of the firm. He gave numerous talks toprincipals and managers, both at national meetings and inlocal offices, during which he promoted his vision of howNotes "can help us manage our expertise and transformour practice." Through interest and persuasion, demand forNotes grew, and the physical deployment of thetechnology proceeded rapidly throughout the firm. Theactual use of Notes within the office I studied, however,appeared to be advancing more slowly. While electronicmail usage had been adopted widely and enthusiastically,the use of Notes to share expertise, and the integration ofNotes into work practices and policies had not yet beenaccomplished. The data I collected and analyzed during myfield study of one office suggests that at least twoorganizational elements--cognitive and structural--influenced the participants' adoption, understanding, andearly use of Notes.

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Cognitive ElementsCognitive elements are the mental models or frames ofreferences that individuals have about the world, theirorganization, work, technology, and so on. While theseframes are held by individuals, many assumptions andvalues constituting the frames tend to be shared withothers. Such sharing of cognitions is facilitated bycommon educational and professional backgrounds, workexperiences, and regular interaction. In the context ofgroupware, those cognitive elements that have to do withinformation technology become particularly salient.Elsewhere, I have termed these technological frames, anddescribed how they shape the way information technologyis designed and used in organizations [7].

When confronted with a new technology, individuals tryto understand it in terms of their existing technologicalframes, often augmenting these frames to accommodatespecial aspects of the technology. If the technology issufficiently different, however, these existing frames maybe inappropriate, and individuals will need to significantlymodify their technological frames in order to understand orinteract effectively with the new technology. How userschange their technological frames in response to a newtechnology is influenced by (i) the kind and amount ofproduct information communicated to them, and (ii) thenature and form of training they receive on the product.

(i) Communication about NotesEmployees in the office I studied received relatively littlecommunication about Notes. Many of them first heardabout the CIO's decision to standardize on Notes throughthe trade press. Others encountered it during Alpha'sannual management seminars that form part ofconsultants' continuing education program. Mostencountered it for the first time when it was installed ontheir computers. Without explicit information about whatNotes is and why Alpha had purchased it, these individualswere left to make their own assumptions about thetechnology and why it was being distributed. Thiscontributed to weakly developed technological framesaround Notes in the office. Consider, for example, theseremarks made by individuals a few weeks before Noteswas to be installed on their computers:

I know absolutely nothing about Notes. I don't knowwhat it is supposed to do.

All I know is the firm bought it, but I don't know why.

I first heard that the firm had bought Notes through theWall Street Journal. Then your study was the nextmention of it. That's all I know about it.

I heard about Notes at the [management seminars] abouteight months ago. I still don't know what it is.

It has something to do with communications.

It's big email.

I've heard that it's hard copy of email ... but I am notvery clear about what it is exactly.

Is it a new version of 1-2-3?

I believe Notes is putting word processing power intospreadsheets.

It's a network... I don't know how the network works.Where does all this information go after I switch mymachine off?

It's a database housed somewhere in the center of theuniverse.

Weakly developed technological frames of a new anddifferent technology are a significant problem intechnology transfer because people act towards technologyon the basis of the meaning it has for them. If peoplehave a poor or inappropriate understanding of the uniqueand different features of a new technology they may resistusing it, or may not integrate it appropriately into theirwork practices. In the office, one consequence of suchpoor understanding was a skepticism towards Notes and itscapabilities. For example, principals and managers in theoffice commented:

I first heard about Notes when I read in the Wall StreetJournal that Alpha had purchased a revolutionary newpiece of software. My first thought was -- how much isthis costing me personally? ... [T]his kind ofimplementation affects all of our pocketbooks. ... Ihave [heard that] there is no value in informationtechnology -- so you can imagine how Ifeel!

When I first heard about it, I thought "Oh yeah? Firsthook me up to the network, and then I'll listen." Rightnow I still can't see the benefit.

I don't believe that Notes will help our business thatmuch, unless all of our business is information transfer.It's not. Business is based on relationships. Ideas arecreated in non-work situations, socially, over lunch, etc.

Poor circulation of information about Notes was aconsequence of the rapid installation of Notes that Alphahad pursued. The CIO had delegated responsibility forNotes deployment to the firm's technology group.Because demand for Notes was growing quickly, thetechnologists did not have an opportunity to plan theNotes rollout, and did not develop or pursue a formalimplementation plan or information disseminationstrategy. Two technology managers commented:

We tried to stay one step ahead of the firm's demand and[the CIO's] evangelism. We were swamped withrequests. Every time [the CIO] gave a talk, we'd bedeluged with requests for Notes. ... We had no time todo a formal plan or a grand strategy because [the CIO]had raised the level of enthusiasm in the firm, and therewas no way we could say to the principals "wait whilewe get our act together."

[The CIOJ set the tone for the deployment strategy bygenerating interest in the product at the top. He waspushing a top-down approach, getting to all theprincipals first. So our deployment was driven by a lotof user pull and a little push from us. ... We wereconstantly struggling to keep up with demand.


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This rapid, demand-driven rollout was consistent with theCIO's assumption about how technologies such as Notesshould be implemented. He commented that:

Our strategy was to blast Notes through ourorganization as quickly as possible, with no prototypes,no pilots, no lengthy technical evaluation. We want totransform the way we deliver service to clients.

He believed that an "empowering" technology such asNotes should be put in the hands of as many people aspossible, and that if the technology is compelling enough"they will drift into new ways of doing things." That is,

[l]f you believe that Notes is a competitive technologyyou have to deploy it quickly, and put it in the hands ofthe users as fast as possible. Critical mass is key.

In particular, the CIO focused on convincing the key"opinion leaders" in the firm of the value of thetechnology, as he believed that these individuals wouldlead the charge in defining and spreading the uses of Notesthroughout the firm.

(ii) Training on NotesTraining users on new technology is central to theirunderstanding of its capabilities and appreciating how itdiffers from other technologies with which they arefamiliar. It also significantly influences the augmentationof existing technological frames or the development ofnew ones. Because the technologists were extremely busydeploying Notes and keeping it up and running, they didnot have the resources to pay much attention to theeducation of users. Their first priority was to physicallyinstall hundreds of copies of Notes in multiple officesaround the country and keep them operational. As onetechnology manager noted, it was a matter of priorities:

We made a conscious decision between whether weshould throw it [Notes] to the users versus spending alot of time training. We decided on the former.

The under-emphasis on training was consistent with theCIO's general view that Notes does not require formal end-user training, and that it is through experimentation anduse, not formal education programs that people begin toappreciate a technology's potential and learn to use it indifferent and interesting ways. This user-driven diffusionstrategy, however, typically takes time, particularly in abusy services firm with considerable production pressures.Because this study did not detect any new user initiativesaround the use of Notes in the office, it is possible thatthe timing of the research is simply too early in theimplementation process. The following experiences thusrepresent the first encounters consultants had with Notesand how they initially appropriated it.

The training that was made available to users in the officeI studied came in two forms, self-study and classroomtraining. The former provided users with a videotape andwork-book, and covered Notes' basic functions andinterfaces. The latter offered up to four hours ofinstruction and hands-on exercises by local computersupport personnel. None of these training optionsemphasized its collaborative nature or possible business

value. The training materials were relatively technical,individual-oriented, and non-specific in content. Traineeswere exposed to the basic Notes functions such aselectronic mail, editing, and database browsing. Whilefacilitating the accessibility of the material to allindividuals, from secretaries to principals, this "one sizefits all" training strategy had the effect--at least initially--of not conveying the power of Notes to support specificconsulting applications or group coordination.

This training on Notes resembled that of the trainingconducted on personal productivity tools. While useful forteaching the mechanics of Notes, it does not give users anew way of thinking differently about their work in termsof groupware. While Alpha was less concerned withcollaborative or group work than with sharing expertiseacross the firm, the effect of the initial training was thatparticipants in my study attempted to understand Notesthrough their existing frame of personal computingsoftware. Such interpretations encouraged thinking aboutNotes as an individual productivity tool rather than as acollaborative technology or a forum for sharing ideas. Forexample, one manager noted:

I see Notes as a personal communication tool. That is,with a modem and fax applications I can do work athome or at a client site and use Notes to transfer workback and forth. In the office, instead of getting mysecretary to make twenty copies of a memo she can justpush a button.

Further, the applications built for users by the technologygroup tended to automate existing information flowsrather than creating new ones through the cooperativefeatures of Notes. This reinforced the message that usersreceived in their training, that Notes is an incrementalrather than a transforming technology, and that newtechnological frames or new work practices around it arenot required. Thus, in contrast to the technologists' visionof Notes as a technology that can "fundamentally changethe way we do business," consultants in the officeappeared to expect, at most, incremental improvements inoperations. A manager noted:

The general perception of Notes is that it is an efficienttool, making what we do now better, but it is notviewed by the organization as a major change.Remember we're ... a management consulting firm andmanagement consultants stick to management issues.We don't get into technology issues.

Another said:

I think it will reduce the time of gathering information.I think it will cut down on frustration in transferringinformation. But it is not a radical change.

As a result of the lack of resources that technologists hadfor communication and training, users of Notes in theoffice developed technological frames that either hadweakly developed notions of Notes, or that interpretedNotes as a personal rather than a group or firmproductivity tool. Because technological frames maychange over time and with changing contexts, it is



possible that the frames developed by the officeparticipants will change over time. For example, ifindividuals are exposed to other applications of Notesdeveloped elsewhere in the firm or in other firms, or iftheir increased use of Notes helps them understand howthey can change the way they work, new understandingsand uses of Notes may result. Our ongoing study of thisimplementation will monitor such possible developments.

Structural ElementsStructural properties of organizations encompass thereward systems, policies, work practices, and norms thatshape and are shaped by the everyday action oforganizational members. In the office, three suchstructural properties significantly influenced individuals'perceptions and early use of Notes.

(i) Reward SystemsWithin Alpha there is an expectation--shared by manyservices firms--that all or most employee hours should be"billable," that is, charged to clients. This is a majorevaluation criterion on which employees are assessed, andemployees studiously avoid "non-billable hours." Becausemost of the participants did not initially perceive usingNotes as a client-related activity (and hence as "notchargeable"), they were disinclined to spend time on it.Further, given their lack of understanding and skepticismof Notes, they were unwilling to give up personal time tolearn or use it. Consider these comments from seniorconsultants and managers:

One of the problems is time. Given my billing rate, itmakes no sense for me to take the time to learn thetechnology. In Alpha we put so much emphasis onchargeable hours and that puts a lot of pressure onmanagers. ... And now we've made an enormouscommitment to Notes and Hardware, and LANs, but wehaven't given people the time and opportunity to learnit. For them to do classes they have to work extra onweekends to meet deadlines.

I think it is going to be a real issue to find time to useNotes. We don't have the time to read or enterinformation in Notes. What would I charge it to? Wealready complain that we can't charge our reading of ourmail to anything. We end up having to charge it toourselves [he reads his mail on the train going home].

I don't think that Notes will ever be used in Alpha aseffectively as it could be. We're not going to make sureeveryone in the office has fifteen hours over the nextyear to spend time learning it. And if they expect us totake it out of our own time I'm not going to invest thattime. I have another life too.

The opportunity costs for me to take training in theoffice are very high. At my level, every week is adeadline, every week is a crisis. No accommodations aremade in our schedules or workload to allow us to trainon technology. So I won't learn it unless it'smandatory.

Thus, one significant inhibitor of learning and usingNotes was the office's reward system with itsaccompanying incentive schemes and evaluation criteria.Because the reward system had not changed since theimplementation of Notes, consultants in the officeperceived time spent on Notes as less legitimate thanclient work. While many used Notes for electronic mail ordatabase browsing, these activities amounted to a fewminutes a day, and hence were easily subsumed into clientor personal time. However, any more extensive use ofNotes was seen as potentially disrupting the balancebetween billable hours and personal time, and hence to beavoided. These concerns, however, varied by position inthe office. Not surprisingly, principals were willing totake a longer-term and firm-wide perspective on Notes,being less preoccupied than were managers and seniorconsultants with time constraints, "billable hours,"personal performance, and their own careers.

(ii) Policies and ProceduresAlong with the few resources dedicated to Notes trainingand communication, the office--at the time of my study--had not formulated new work procedures or set newpolicies around data quality, confidentiality, and accesscontrol. Many participants indicated that their use ofNotes was inhibited by their lack of knowledge aboutthese issues, particularly concerns about liability (theirown and Alpha's). Principals for example, worried aboutdata security:

Security is a concern for me. ... We need to worry aboutwho is seeing the data. ... Managers should not be ableto access all the information even if it is useful, [suchas] financial information to clients, because they leaveand may go and work for competitors. So there shouldbe prohibitions on information access.

I am not sure how secure Notes is. Many times we haverun into difficulties and things have got lost in never-never land.

I have concerns about what goes into the databases andwho has access to them and what access they have....But we haven't thought that through yet.

Managers and senior consultants in the office were moreanxious about personal liability or embarrassment:

I would be careful what I put out on Notes though. Ilike to retain personal control so that when people callme I can tell them not to use it for such and such. Butthere is no such control within Notes.

My other concern is that information changes a lot. Soif I put out a memo saying X today and then have a newmemo two weeks later, the person accessing theinformation may not know about the second memowhich had canceled the first. Also if you had a personaldiscussion you could explain the caveats and theinterpretations and how they should and shouldn't usethe information.

I'd be more fearful that I'd put something out there andit was wrong and somebody would catch it.


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I would be concerned in using Notes that I would cometo the wrong conclusion and others would see it. Whatwould make me worry is that it was public informationand people were using it and what if it was wrong? Iwould not want to be cited by someone who hasn'ttalked to me first. I'm worried that my informationwould be misconstrued and it would end up in Wichita,Kansas "as per J. Brown in New York" being used andrelied on. You should be able to limit what accesspeople have to what information, particularly if is yourinformation. I would definitely want to know who waslooking at it.

There is a hesitancy here because you don't want to puteverything into public information as people may relyon that information and screw up, and it may reflectbadly on you.

The lack of explicit procedures and policies around Noteshighlights the difficulty of enforcing firm-wide policies ina decentralized firm. While the CIO has been able toinstitute standards around certain technology platforms--clearly a technical domain, instituting standard proceduresand policies about data quality, control, and liabilitybegins to encroach on the organizational domain--an arenawhere the CIO's authority is less established. As a result,the technologists have been careful about setting policiesthat would require organizational changes and that mightinvoke turf issues. Managers of local offices, however,had not devoted any attention to this issue, at least in theearly adoption phase. As a result, there was someambiguity about the locus and nature of responsibility andliability with respect to the intellectual content of Notesdatabases. This may have inhibited the application ofNotes to a broader range of work practices in the earlyphase of implementation.

(iii) Firm Culture and Work NormsAlpha shares with many other consulting firms arelatively competitive culture--at least at the levels belowprincipal. The pyramidal structure and the hierarchical "upor out" career path promote and reinforce an individualisticculture among consultants, where those who have not yetattained principal status vie with each other to get therelatively few promotions handed out each year. In such acompetitive culture, there are few norms aroundcooperating or sharing knowledge with peers. Thesecomments by consultants in the office are illustrative:

This is definitely a competitive culture--it's an up orout atmosphere.

Usually managers work alone because of thecompetitiveness among the managers. There is a lot ofone-upmanship against each other. Their life dream is tobecome a principal in Alpha, and they' II do anything toget there.

The atmosphere is competitive and cut-throat; all theywant is to get ahead as individuals.

Interestingly, there was some evidence that there is muchmore collegiality at the highest levels of the firm, where

principals--having attained tenure and the highest careerrank--enact more of a "fraternal culture" than thecompetitive individualism evident at lower levels. This isalso evident in service organizations with similarorganizational structures, such as firms providing legal,accounting, or medical services. Below the principal level,however, managers and senior consultants in my studyindicated that there was generally little precedent forsharing or cooperating with colleagues, and little incentiveto do so as they needed to differentiate themselves fromtheir peers. For example:

The corporate psychology makes the use of Notesdifficult. Particularly the consultant career path whichcreates a back-stabbing and aggressive environment.People aren't backstabbing consciously, it's just thatthe environment makes people maximize opportunitiesfor themselves.

I'm trying to develop an area of expertise that makes mestand out. Ifl shared that with you you'd get the creditnot me.... It's really a cut-throat environment.

Power in this firm is your client base and technicalability. ... It is definitely a function of consultingfirms. Now if you put all this information in a Notesdatabase you lose power. There will be nothing that'sprivy to you, so you will lose power. It's importantthat I am selling something that no one else has. WhenI hear people talk about the importance of sharingexpertise in the firm, I say "Reality is a nice construct."

The competitive individualism--which reinforcesindividual effort and ability, and does not supportcooperation or sharing of expertise--is counter-cultural tothe underlying premise of groupware technologies. It isthus not surprising that, at all but the highest career level,Notes is being used largely as an individual productivitytool in the office. Senior consultants and managers withinthis office feel little incentive to share their ideas for fearthat they may lose status, power, and distinctivecompetence. Principals, on the other hand, do not sharethis fear and are more focused on the interests of the officeand the firm than on their individual careers. Aninteresting contrast to this point, which further supportsit, is that Notes is being used by Alpha technologists toexchange technical expertise. Not being subject to thecompetitive culture, individual-focused reward systems,"up-or-out" career pressures, and "chargeable hours"constraints of the consultants, the technologists appear tohave been able to use the technology to conduct theirwork, that is, solving technical problems.

DISCUSSIONThe results of this research suggest that the organizationalintroduction of groupware will interact with cognitive andstructural elements, and that these elements will havesignificant implications for the adoption, understanding,and early use of the technology. Because people acttowards technology on the basis of their understanding ofit, people's technological frames often need to be changedto accommodate a new technology. Where people do not

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appreciate the premises and purposes of a technology theymay use it in less effective ways. A major premiseunderlying groupware is the coordination of activities andpeople across time and space. For many users, such apremise may represent a radically different understandingof technology than they have experienced before. Thissuggests that a particularly central aspect of implementinggroupware is ensuring that prospective users have anappropriate understanding of the technology, that is, thattheir technological frames reflect a perception of thetechnology as a collective rather than a personal tool.

At the time I conducted my study, many of theparticipants in the office did not have a good conception ofwhat Notes was and how they could use it. Theirtechnological frames around Notes were weakly developedand relied heavily on their knowledge and experience ofother individually-used technologies. Given suchcognitions, it is not surprising that in their early use ofthe technology, these participants had not generated newpatterns of social interaction, nor had they developedfundamentally different work practices around Notes.Instead, they had either chosen not to use Notes, or hadsubsumed it within prior technological frames and wereusing it primarily to enhance personal productivitythrough electronic mail, file transfer, or accessing newsservices. As indicated above, however, these findingsreflect an early phase of the participants' experiences withNotes. It is possible that these experiences will changeover time as they get more accustomed to using Notes,and these are expected to change over time depending ontheir ongoing experiences with the technology.

Where a new technological frame is desirable because thetechnology is sufficiently unprecedented to require newassumptions and meanings, communication and educationare central in fostering the development of newtechnological frames. Such communication and educationshould stress the required shift in technological frame, aswell as provide technical and logistic information on use.A training approach that resembles that used for personalcomputing software is unlikely to help individualsdevelop an appreciation of groupware. For individuals usedto personal computing environments and individualapplications, shared technology use and cooperativeapplications are difficult to grasp. In these cases, concretedemonstrations of group applications can help to provideinsight. Further, learning groupware collectively mayfoster joint understanding and expectations. Whereindividuals learn a shared technology in isolation, theymay form their own assumptions, expectations, andprocedures which may differ from those of the people theywill interact with through the technology.

In situations where the premises underlying groupware areincongruent with those of the organization's culture,policies, and reward systems, it is unlikely that effectivecooperative computing will result without a change instructural properties. Such changes are difficult toaccomplish, and usually meet with resistance. Without

such changes, however, the existing structural elements ofthe firm will likely serve as significant barriers to thedesired use of the technology. For example, in the studydescribed above, the existing norms, policies, and rewardsappear to be in conflict with the premises of Notes.Because incentive schemes and evaluation criteria in theoffice had not been modified to encourage or accommodatecooperation and expertise sharing through Notes, membersfeared loss of power, control, prestige, and promotionopportunities if they shared their ideas, or if their lack ofknowledge or misinterpretations were made visible. Thus,in a relatively competitive culture where members areevaluated and rewarded as individuals, there will be fewnorms for sharing and cooperating. If groupware is to beused cooperatively in such cultures, these norms need tobe changed--either inculcated top-down through training,communication, leadership, and structural legitimation, orbottom-up through support for local opportunities andexperimentation around cooperation. Without some suchgrounding in shared norms, groupware will likely be usedprimarily for advancing individual productivity.

In addition to norms, resources are a further importantfacilitator of shared technology use. Whether formally ear-marked from some firm-wide R&D budget, or providedinformally through local slack resources, occasions forexperimenting with shared applications are needed togenerate interest and use around cooperative computing. Inthe office, for example, there had been no change in theallocation of resources following the implementation ofNotes, and members had not been given time to use andexperiment with Notes. There was thus a tension betweenthe structural requirement that all work be production-oriented, and the adoption of an infrastructure technologysuch as Notes which was perceived to be only indirectlyrelated to production work. Where individuals are notgiven resources to learn and experiment with the newtechnology, or not given specific applications that helpthem accomplish their production work within thetechnology, the immediate pressures of daily productiontasks and deadlines will tend to dominate their decisionsaround how they allocate their time.

This research study suggests that in the early adoption of atechnology, cognitive and structural elements play animportant role in influencing how people think about andassess the value of the technology. And these significantlyinfluence how they choose to use the technology. Whenan organization deploys a new technology with an intentto make substantial changes in business processes,people's technological frames and the organization's workpractices will likely require substantial change. Aninteresting issue raised by this requirement is how toanticipate the required structural and cognitive changeswhen the technology is brand new. That is, how do youdevise a game plan if you have never played the gamebefore? This is particularly likely in the case of anunprecedented technology such as groupware. One strategywould be to deploy the technology widely in the beliefthat through experimentation and use over time, creative

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ideas and innovations will flourish. Another strategywould prototype the technology in a representative groupof the organization--on a pilot basis--and then deploy it tothe rest of the organization once the technology'scapabilities and implications are understood. This way therequired structural and cognitive changes learned throughthe pilot can be transferred. Viewed in terms of these twostrategies, aspects of Alpha's adoption activites nowappear to resemble the former strategy. Our future studiesshould indicate how successful this strategy has been.

It is worth noting that while the early use of Notes in theoffice has proved more valuable for facilitating individualproductivity than for collective productivity, theimplementation of Notes has resulted in the installation ofan advanced and standardized technology infrastructure. Asone technology manager put it: "A side-benefit of Notes isthat it got people into a more sophisticated environmentof computing than we could have done otherwise." Mostof the office members--from principals to seniorconsultants--now have ready and easy access to a networkof personal computers and laser printers. Thus, while theinitial experiences with Notes in the office may not havesignificantly changed work practices or policies, the officeappears to be relatively well-positioned to use thisplatform to take advantage of any future technological orwork-related initiatives.

In general, the findings presented here provide insight forfuture research into the structural and cognitiveorganizational elements that interact with and shape theadoption and early use of groupware in organizations.They also have practical implications, indicating how andwhere such organizational elements might be managed tomore effectively implement groupware in variousorganizational circumstances.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSSupport from MIT's Center for Coordination Science isgratefully acknowledged. Jolene Galegher, Bob Halperin,Tom Malone, and Judith Quillard provided helpfulcomments on an earlier version of the paper. Thanks arealso due to the participants from Alpha Corporation.

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November 1992CSCW'92 Proceedings

learning from notes: wanda j. orlikowski august, 1992

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