lecture 2 the methodological foundations of eap pedu 7206

Lecture 2The Methodological Foundations

of EAP

PEDU 7206

1. Methodology: How to obtain objective truths and facts?

2. Epistemology: What kind of knowledge has been obtained?

3. Ontology: From what do we obtain the knowledge?

Roadmap for the Explication of Theoretical Foundation of EAP

Methodology:-Quantitative-Qualitative

Ontology:-Objectivism-Idealism-Constructivism-Realism

Methodological Priority:

Epistemology:-Empiricist-Positivism-Interpretive-HermeneuticTradition-Critical Social Sciences



Epistemological Priority:





Ontological Priority:

What is research? “A studious inquiry or examination; esp: critical and

exhaustive investigation or experimentation having for its aim the discovery of new facts and their correct interpretation, the revision of accepted conclusions, theories, or laws in the light of newly discovered facts, or applications of such new or revised conclusions, theories, or laws.” (Webster Dictionary)

Research is act of “the acquisition of reliable knowledge concerning many aspects of the world…and self conscious use of …method.” (Negal, 1961, p.1)

From Research Methods to Methodology: Mapping the Pathway of Social Research

7

What is Research ?

Knower(The Self)

Known(The World)

Knowledge(Reliable & Valid)

Self conscious use of method

Knowing

Methodological Foundation

Epistemological Foundation

OntologicalFoundation

What is methodology?

“Methodology was an analytical approach which examined concrete studies to make explicit the procedures that were used, the underlying assumptions that were made, and the modes of explanation that we offered. It thus involved a codification of ongoing research procedures. Actual research was the material from which methodology is built, without being identical with it.” (Lazrsfield, 1972, p. xi)


Research methods courses offered in the Faculty of Education Curriculum structure in 1995-96 EDM6001 Sampling Design & Survey Research EDM6002 Educational Research Design (Experimental

Design) EDM6003 Comparative-Historical Method in Educational

Research EDM6004 Ethnographic Analysis in Educational Research EDM6005 Statistical Analysis in Educational Research EDM6006 Advanced Statistical Analysis in Educational

Research


Research methods courses offered … Curriculum structure in 2014-15 PEDU 6003 Comparative-Historical Method in Educational

Research PEDU 6004 Ethnographic Study in Educational Research PEDU 6401 Quantitative methods in educational research PEDU 6402 Qualitative methods in educational research PEDU 6403 Quantitative data management & analysis in

educational research PEDU 6404 Quantitative analysis in classroom and school

settings PEDU 6405 Multi-dimensional & multi-causal analysis in

educational research PEDU 6406 Action research in education


Three samples of synthesis in methodology in social sciences Charles C. Ragin (1994/2011) Constructing of Social

Research Robert R. Alford (1996) The Craft of Inquiry:

Theories, Methods &Evidence Jurgen Habermas (1971/1968) Knowledge and

Human Interest


Ragin (1994/2011)

Alford (1996

Jurgen Habermas (1971/1968) Knowledge and Human Interest “There are three categories of processes of inquiry

for which a specific connection between logical-methodological rules and knowledge-constitutive interests can be demonstrated. …The approach for empirical-analytical sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest; that of the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporates a practical one; and the approach of critically oriented sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interest.” (P. 308)


Scientific Revolution in 17th century Enlightenment in 18-19th century Auguste Comte’s thesis of physics of society Vienna-Circle movement of unity of scientific method in the

early 20th century and the emergence of the movement of methodological monism of logical/empirical positivism

Carl G. Hempel’s assault on the inadequacy of historical scientific researches and their methodical approach in 1942s

The rebuttals against Hempel’s assault from scholars of the hermeneutic traditions and the initiation of the cultural and/or linguist turn in social science

The emergence of the Critical Theory and the reinstatement of the Marxian thesis of critique of ideology

Historical Development of Methodological Discourse in Social Sciences

(I)The Methodology of

Analytical-Empirical Approach

In 1942, Carl Hempel, Professor of Princeton University, published an article in Journal of Philosophy entitle “The Function of General Law in History”. The primary objective of the article is to reinstate the Vienna-Circle’s advocation of “the methodological unity of empirical science.” (Hempel, 1965/1942, P. 243)

Carl G. Hempel’s General-Law Explanatory Model

Taking history (as well as other social sciences) as an empirical science, Hempel began his article with an outright criticism on the historians by underlining that they have focused their research efforts on “the description of particular events of the past” rather than on “the search for general laws which might govern those events” and “it is certainly unacceptable”. (Hempel, 1965, P. 231) Hempel then explicate in details his explanatory model by general law.


Deductive-nomological model: The ideal-typical model of explanation in empirical sciences (including both natural and social sciences) is what he characterizes as deductive-nomological model. The model is made up of three parts.


Deductive-nomological model: …

The model is made up of three parts. The specific events (E) to be explained, in Hempel’s

terms, the explanandum The possible antecedent condition (C) which brings

about the occurrence of that specific events In order to logically deduce a causal relation between

E and C, a general law covering the occurrences of both E and C is needed. And by general law it means a statement of universal causal-conditions that has been empirically or logical confirmed. More specifically, causal conditions may be further differentiated into three types:


Deductive-Nomological Explanatory Model

C1,C2,…Ck Statements if antecedent conditions

L1,L2,,...Lr General Laws

E Description of the empirical phenomenon to be explained

Explanans

Explanandum

Logicaldeduction

Deductive-nomological model: …

The model is made up of three parts…. ….More specifically, causal conditions may be

further differentiated into three types:… Sufficient conditions: It refers to the kinds of conditionality

between the C and E, in which the C can exhaustively but not universally explain the truth of the E.

Necessary conditions: It refers to the kinds of conditionality between the E and C, in which the C can universally but not exhaustively explain the truth of the E.

Sufficient and necessary conditions: It refers to the kinds of conditionality between the E and C, in which the C can both exhaustively and universally explain the truth of the E.


The compromised model: Statistical-Probabilistic explanation: The statistical-probabilistic model is the type of

explanation commonly use in quantitative researches in social sciences. It is also made up of three parts similar to those in nomological-deductive explanation. There are two differences in probabilistic explanation. …..


The compromised model: Statistical-Probabilistic explanation: The statistical-probabilistic model ….

One is that the explanatory premises is not in the form of law-like / nomological statement of the sufficient and necessary conditions of the truth of the explanandum but only a probabilistic statement specifying the likelihood of the causal relationship between the explanans and explanandum. The second difference is that in the conclusion, the specific explanandum under study cannot be exhaustive explained by the explanans but can only be explained in probabilistic terms.


Statistical-Probabilistic Explanatory Model

C1,C2,…Ck Statements if antecedent conditions

L1,L2,,...Lr Statistical Laws

E Description of the empirical phenomenon to be explained

Explanans

Explanandum

Logicaldeduction

Transplanting the Deductive-nomological explanatory model from the natural science, researchers in social sciences began to constitute their “Language of social research” (Lazarsfeld, et al., 1955, see also 1972). As a result, the methodology of quantitative research (at least in America) has been founded. Apart from the deductive-nomological explanatory model, two of the other principles of this methodological foundation are the analytical approach and empiricism.

The Constitution of the Analytical-Empirical Approach

….two other methodological foundation are the analytical approach and empiricism. … Analytical approach: By analytical approach, it refers

the way social researchers approach their objects under study, i.e. the social world or social reality, by decomposing the objects into elements or properties and then try to establish causal relations among them. …


Analytical approach: …

In Paul Lazarsfeld own words, “No science deals with its objects of study in their concreteness. It selects certain of their properties and attempts to establish relations among them. The finding of such laws is the ultimate goal of all scientific inquiries. But in social sciences the singling out of relevant properties is in itself a major problem. No standard terminology has yet been developed for this task. The properties are sometimes called aspects or attributes, and often the “variable” is borrowed from mathematics as most general category.” (Lazarsfeld, 1955, P. 15)


Empiricism: It refers to the way social research approach their evidences to be accepted in verifying the propositions or more specifically hypotheses. That is, only observations verified by sensory experience can be accepted as evidences. Furthermore, quantitative social researchers would demand those sensory-observations should be repeatable, recordable, and quantifiable into a mathematical “variables”.


Experimental design: Based on these three principles, viz. deductive- nomological explanatory model, analytical approach, and empiricism; quantitative social researchers could only design their studies, which is to verify causals relation among variables, by observing and recording the outcomes of their experimental design. The most typical design of a true experiment can be represented as follows (Campbell and Stanley, 1963, Pp. 13-22)

Methodological Designs in Social Inquiries

Experimental design:

R O1 X O2

R O3 O4

Connotations:

R=Random assignment of subjects

O=Observation

X=Treatment (effects under study)


Social-survey design: However, by the very nature of the social world, it is basically infeasible or even unethical to conduct experiments on human subjects. As a result, most of the social researchers can only conduct their observation in naturalistic environment of the social world. That is by means of social survey. As a result, one of the three primary design tools, i.e. treatment manipulation, has to be abandoned. What is left are the design-tools of one-short observation and random sampling.


Given the principles and operations of the methodology of quantitative researches, they reveal that the causal relations between variables, which quantitative researches are supposed to have verified, are, in fact, implicated under at least the following three assumptions (Hirschi and Selvin, 1996)

The Underlying Assumptions of Research Designs in Social Inquiries

…implicated under at least the following three assumptions (Hirschi and Selvin, 1996)

Assuming covariance as causation: In most of the social experiments and most notably social surveys, the observations between the cause-variable and the effect-variable could only be in association formats. That is the two sets of variables vary concurrently. It could not reveal the real causal interactions between the two set of social properties simply by observations. As a result two other working assumption are needed.


…implicated under …three assumptions…. Assuming or manipulating the temporal orderings

between the variables: One of the logical conditions of a causation is that the cause must precede the effect. And simple statistical covariance can never substantiate the temporal orderings between two sets of variables. As a result, temporal orderings could only be built in by experimental design, that is, to have the designed treatment carried out right between the pretest and post-test. However, as for one-short social survey, the temporal orderings among various variables could only be assumed. …


…implicated under …three assumptions … Assuming or manipulating the temporal orderings

between the variables: ….

For examples, in most educational surveys, it is assumed that parents’ education, socio-economic status, students’ genders are precedent to students’ educational achievement.


…implicated under …three assumptions … The assumptions of ceteris paribus: It refers to the

assumption that all other possible factors in the causal relation are being equal or unchanged. The only design-tools available for social researchers deal with this assumption is randomization. In experimental design, it is the random assignments of subjects into treatment and non-treatment group. As for social survey, researchers could only fall back on to random sampling.


(II)The Methodology of

Historical-Hermeneutic Approach

Willhelm Dilthey’s conception of the human sciences: “We owe to Dilthey …that the natural sciences and

the human sciences are characterized by two scientificity, two methodologies, two epistemologies.” (Ricoeur, 1991/1973, p. 275)

The Essentials of the Methodology of Qualitative Research

41(1833-1911)

Wilhelm Dilthey’s Introduction to the Human Sciences (1923)

Willhelm Dilthey’s conception of the human sciences: … Dilthey in his classical work Introduction to the

Human Sciences (1991/1883) underlines that “The sum of intellectual facts which fall under the notion of science is usually divided into two groups, one marked by the name ‘natural science’; for the other, oddly enough, there is no generally accepted designation. I subscribe to the thinkers who call this other half of the intellectual world the ‘human sciences’ (Geisteswissenschaften or translated as ‘the sciences of the mind’)” (Dilthey, 1991, p. 78)


Willhelm Dilthey’s conception of the human sciences: … “The motivation behind the habit of seeing these

sciences as a unity in contrast with those of nature derives from the depth and fullness of human self-consciousness. … (A) man finds in this self-consciousness a sovereignty of will, a responsibility for actions, a capacity for subordinating everything to thought and for resisting any foreign element in the citadel of freedom in his person: by these things he distinguishes himself from all of nature. He finds himself with respect to nature an imperium in imperio.” (Dilthey, 1991, p.79)


Clifford Geertz's conception of culture and its interpretation Geertz in his classical work The Interpretation of

Cultures: Selected Essays (1973) underlines that “The concept of culture I espouse … is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in research of meaning.” (Geertz, 1994/1973, P. 214)


45

(1926-2006)

Clifford Geertz's conception of culture and its interpretation (1973)

Clifford Geertz's conception of culture and its interpretation “Culture is most effectively treated …purely as a

symbolic system …by isolating its elements, specifying the internal relationship among those elements, and then characterizing the whole system in some general way according to the core symbols around which it is organized, the underlying structures of which it is a surface expression, or the ideological principles upon which it is based.” (Geertz, 1994/1973, p. 222)


Max Weber’s conception of sociology and social research Max Weber’s oft-quoted definition of the subject

matter of sociology and that of social sciences in general stipulates that "Sociology is a science concerning itself with interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and consequence. We shall speak of 'action' insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior. …Action is 'social' insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course." (Weber, 1978, p. 4)


(1864-1920)

Max Weber’s conception of sociology and social research …. This definition has generated three

methodological aproia for students of sociology and social sciences to tackle with for generations to come.

First, it has stipulated that in studying human actions the major concerns is to provide “interpretive understanding” of the “subjective meanings” underlying each and every “actions”. This has constituted the basic research question for qualitative research in social sciences.


Max Weber’s conception of … Second, the definition has also stipulate another

aporia to students in social sciences. That is, given human actions are endowed with subjective meanings, how can two actions be oriented into a mutually acceptable social action? Furthermore, one can continue to ask how society and culture be possible in maintaining these varieties of social actions in stable and continuous manner through time and across considerable spatial distance?


Max Weber’s conception of … Third, the definition has also generated yet another

aporia by stipulating the social researchers should also render “causal explanation” for the “course” and “consequence” of the human action under study. This seems to be a statement of a typical research question for quantitative researchers. In other words, Weber seems to expect his followers to bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative approaches to social research.


Max Weber’s conception of … In fact, both Alfred Schutz (1967/1932) and Jurgen

Habermas (1988/1967) specifically began their books with the same quotation of Weber’s definition of sociology and try to resolve the aporia set forth in it.


Jurgen Habermas in his book On the Logics of Social Sciences (1988/1967) has suggested there are generally three approaches to the studies of the subjective meanings of human and social actions. They are The social phenomenological approach The linguistic approach The hermeneutic approach


Phenomenology as a school of thought in modern philosophy was established at the beginning of the twentieth century mainly under the leadership and efforts of Edmund Husserl, a German philosopher. However, it was Alfred Schutz’s work (1967/1932) and the work of two of his “students”, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966), which have brought the phenomenological conceptions of meaning to the studies of social action and social world.

The Conception of Meanings in Social Phenomenological Perspective

In his now-classic work, The Phenomenology of Social World, Schutz begins his inquiry with a critique on Weber’s conception of subjective meanings in human actions. He stipulates that by applying the concepts forged by phenomenologists in philosophy can help to resolve these vagueness in understanding the subjective meanings in human actions. And he has then constructed the framework social-meaning formation with the following constituent concepts of social phenomenology.


57(1899-1959)

Formation of individual subjective meanings: Weber’s aporia No. 1

To account for the formation of subjective meanings of individuals, Schutz introduces the following concepts of phenomenological philosophy to social sciences.


Formation of individual subjective meanings: … Stream of consciousness: According to

phenomenologists, most notably Hernri Bergson, human beings are not only living within the world of discrete and concrete space and time, but also in the stream of consciousness. It is within this stream of consciousness that a man would grant his attention and intention to an object in reality (or ‘the world’) and elevate some of them to become a “phenomenon” within one’s subjectivity. And Husserl has labelled this fundamental inter-connection between consciousness and objects in reality the ‘intentioanlity’.


Formation of individual subjective meanings: … The concept of intentionality: “The term

‘intentionality’ is taken from the Latin intendere, which translates as ‘to stretch forth’.” It indicates the process of how the mind “stretching forth” into the world and “grasping” and “translating” an object into a phenomenon. (Spinelli, 2005, p.15)


Formation of individual subjective meanings: … The concept of intentionality: …

The process of intentionality has been differentiated by Husserl into two components, namely noema and noesis.The concept of noema (intentional-object) indicates the

objects being intended to, conscious of and grasped, i.e. the what;

The concept of noesis (intentional-Act) refers to the act of intending, stretching forth and bringing to consciousness, i.e. the how.


Formation of individual subjective meanings: … Concepts of perception, retention and reproduction: Perception: It refers to the “now-apprehension” granted to an

experience by human minds during the immediate encounter. Retention: It refers to the “primary remembrance” or “primary

impression” of an experience formed within the “after-consciousness” of the encounter.

Reproduction: It refers to the “secondary remembrance or recollection” that emerges after primary remembrance is past. “We accomplish it either by simply laying hold of what is recollected … or we accomplish it in a real, re-productive, recapitulative memory in which the temporal object is again completely built up in a continuum of presentifications, so that we seem to perceive it again, but only seemingly, as-if.” (Husserl, 1964, quoted in Schutz, 1967, p. 48)


Formation of individual subjective meanings: … The concept of behavior: Meaning-endowing

experiences: Husserl makes a distinction between two types of experiences “Experience of the first type are merely ‘undergone’ or ‘suffer’.’ They are characterized by a basic passivity. Experiences of the second type consist of attitudes taken toward experiences of the first type.” Husserl characterized those experiences endowed with ‘attitude-taking Act’ as ‘behavior’. Accordingly, “Behavior is a meaning-endowing experience of consciousness.” (Schutz, 1967, p. 56)


Formation of individual subjective meanings: … The concept of Action and Project: According to

Schutz and Husserl, we can further distinguish behavior from action. The former are experiences endowed with attitudes, while the latter are experiences oriented towards the future. Most specifically, actions are experiences endowed with anticipation, which Husserl has characterized as “the meaning of what will be perceived.” (Husserl, 1931, quoted in Schutz, 1967, p. 58)


Formation of individual subjective meanings: … The concept of Action and Project: …

Furthermore, apart from anticipation of the future, actions are also experiences endowed with another form of intentionality, namely intention of fulfillment. More specifically, actions are not only made up of anticipated goals or “empty protention” to the future. They also consist of the parts of intentions to attaining those goals in the future.

In conclusion, according to Schutz formulation, an action is experiences endowed with meanings in the form of “a project”, which consists of anticipated goals and intentions and efforts to fulfill them.


Formation of individual subjective meanings: …In summary, by applying these concepts to Weber’s

stipulation of understanding of subjective meanings in human actions, Schutz asserts confidently that ….


Formation of individual subjective meanings: …“Now we are in a position to state that what

distinguishes action from behavior is that action is the execution of a projected act. And we can immediately proceed to our next step: the meaning of any action is its corresponding projected act. In saying this we are giving clarity to Max Weber’s vague concept of the “orientation of the action.” An action, we submit, is oriented toward its corresponding projected act.” (Schutz, 1967, p. 61) That is resolution to Weber’s aporia No. 1.


Configuration of meaning-context of individuals: Schutz’s theory building about subjective meanings of individuals does not stop here. He further put forth two concepts. The concept of Durée: …


Configuration of meaning-context … The concept of Durée: Henri Bergson has coined the

concept ‘durée’ to specify the inner stream of duration constituted within human consciousness. It refers to, as Husserl characterized, the types of experiences, that human minds would “transverse” (translate or transform) into “intentional unities”, within which “immanent time is constituted, …an authentic time in which there is duration, and alteration of that which endures.” (Husserl, 1964; quoted in Schutz, 1967, p. 46)


Configuration of meaning-context … The concept of meaning-context: By meaning-

context, Schutz characterized it as follows

“Let us define meaning-context formally: We say that our lived experience E1, E2, …, En, stand in a meaning-context if and only if, once they have been lived through in separate steps, they are then constituted into a synthesis of a high order, becoming thereby unified objects of monothetic attention.” (Schutz, 1967, p.75) Schutz indicates that meaning-context derived within one’s inner time consciousness bears numbers of structural features. (Schutz, 1967, p. 74-78)


Configuration of meaning-context … The concept of meaning-context: …. bears numbers

of structural features. Unity: Though intentional acts and/or fulfillment-act various

meaning-endowing experiences are unified and integrated into coherent whole within the Ego. Hence, meaning-context generated from meaning-endowing experiences also bears the internal structure of unity and coherence.

Continuity: As lived experiences are set within the stream of consciousness of duration (i.e. Durée), therefore, the meaning-context thereby derived is internally structured into a continuity of temporal ordering.


Configuration of meaning-context … The concept of meaning-context: …. bears numbers

of structural features. … Hierarchy: Through her lived experiences in different

spheres of the life-world, individual will congifurated various meaning-contexts for lived experiences in various spheres of life. And these complex meaning-contexts are structured in hierarchical order according to their degree of meaningfulness and significance.


73Phenomenological conceptual framework of meaning

The subject

Intentional object

Intentional-Act

Stream of consciousness(Intentionality)

Reproduction, Retention, Perception

Internal time consciousnessDurée

BehaviorAttitude-taking Act

ActionAnticipation & fulfillment Meaning-context

of unity and continuity

Meaning-context of unity and continuity

HierarchySubjective Meanings

Formation of social meanings: Weber’s aporia No. 2 As a practicing sociologist, Alfred Schutz’s major

contribution to phenomenological studies is to extend the study of human consciousness and experiences from individual level to social level. Built on phenomenological investigations of meaning-configurations and meaning-contexts of individuals, Schutz poses the following series of questions: How meaning-configurations among individuals are possible? ……


Formation of social meanings: Weber’s aporia No. 2 …..More specifically, how meanings among different

inner consciousness of durations are able to be corresponded, shared or even come to consensus? And how individual thinking and acting beings come to act harmoniously, concertedly and cooperatively into a social entity?


Formation of social meanings…. Schutz’s concepts of meaning-context of the social

worldSchutz suggests that constructions of social meanings within

a human aggregate are possible simply because members of a “society” share common “lived” experiences generated from common temporal and spatial situations.

These common lived experiences have then been accumulated geographically, historically, verbally and textually into a “totality” of meaning-configuration and meaning-contexts, which we now called the culture or what Berger and Luckmann called symbolic universe.

Based on commonly-share culture, Schutz has differentiated the process of meaning-construction into three types


Formation of social meanings…. Social meaning construction in face-to-face

relationshipThe primary base of mutual understanding between two

humans in face-to-face situation is that there are two inner consciousnesses of durations who share similar if not the same temporal-spatial flows, that is, each is conscious of the other’s presence. In short, each takes the other as intentional-object (noema) of her intentional-Act (noesis) and vice versa.

Expressive movement and expressive act: They refer to non-verbal gestures (body movements) which indicate the “attitudinal-Act” of an individual implicates to an subjective experience which she undergoes. Schutz has further differentiates them into



relationship ….Expressive movement and expressive act: …. Schutz has

further differentiates them into • Expressive movement: It refers to gestures which bears no

communicative intention from the part of the initiator. As Schutz states “expressive movements … have meaning only for the observer, not for the person observed.” (Schutz, 1967, p. 117)

• Expressive act: It refers to body movements “in which the actor seeks to project outward the content of his consciousness, whether to retain the latter for his own use later on (as in the case of an entry in a dairy) or to communicate them to others.” (Schutz, 1967, p. 116)



relationship ….Sign and sign system:

• “Signs are artifacts or act-objects which are interpreted not according to those interpretive schemes which are adequate to them as objects of the external world but according to schemes not adequate to them and belong rather to other object.” (Schutz, 1967, p. 120)

• In constructing a sign, the actor undertakes the act of signification, that is, to assign a sign to an object in the external world.

• ….



relationship ….Sign and sign system:

• ….

• As on the part of the reader of the sign, she has to undertake an act of interpretation, which has been defined as the core activities that qualitative researchers have to undertake. Spoken and written signs in a language are the exemplary representations of sign used by human kind.

• Accordingly, sign system refers to well established, widely used, and universally interpreted signs disseminating and communicating among members of a defined human aggregate; for instance, language systems of Chinese, English, etc.



relationship ….Concept of externalization and objectification:

• The concept of externalization of subjectivity: It is within a sign system, i.e. a culture and/or a cultural system, that subjective experiences and consciousnesses of individuals can be externalized and communicate to other members of the corresponding language and/or cultural system.

• The concept of objectification of subjectivity: By externalizing one’s subjectivity onto concrete artifacts, subjectivity of mortal individual has then obtained endeavoring existence of its own, which may out-live the originating person.


82Phenomenological conceptual framework of social meaning

Intentionality

Durée

Sign systems

ExpressMovements

Signs

Intentionality

Durée

ExpressActs

Externalizations

Objectifications

Cultural system

Formation of social meanings…. Social-meaning construction with the

contemporaries As individuals move farther and farther apart, such as

residents in a metropolitan such as Hong Kong, fellow citizens of a nation such as PRC, members of a “nation” such as the Chinese, dwellers of the same continent such as the Asians, fellow residents of the global village, how can they come to shared meanings?


Formation of social meanings…. Social-meaning …contemporaries…

Concepts of ideal type and typification:• As contemporaries, who are located in physically long distance which

does not enable them to have face-to-face confirmation of their meanings to their counterparts, they have to then presume and rely on the ideal-typical interpretive schema generated and established in so-called “institutional contexts”.

• For examples, the ideal-typical role-performances prescribed to teachers and students in modern educational institutions; ideal-typical role-performances presumed by both the husband and the wife in the marriage institution; or sellers and buyers in international trade or cyber-transactions.

• The act of prescribing ideal-typical roles and their corresponding role-performances to partners in interaction has been characterized by Schutz and his followers as “typification”.

• (To be explicated in details in Lecture 4)


Formation of social meanings…. Social-meaning …contemporaries…

Accordingly, the concepts of institution and institutionalization have been reformulated and used by followers of Alfred Schuts, such as Berger and Luckmann, and advocates of New-institutionalism in qualitative researches in social sciences in recent decades. (To be explicated on Topic 8)


Formation of social meanings…. Social-meaning construction with the predecessors

To come to agreement with the deaths: When the meaning configurations are constructed in remotely temporal distance and the text and relics, it poses insurmountable difficulties to researchers who are supposed to retrieve the “authentic” meanings because the interpretive findings can no longer be confirmed with their “authors”. The situation has been characterized by Ricoeur (1984) as the most acute example of Kant’s demarcation between noumenon and phenomenon, that historians can never bridge the past in itself from the historical texts and relics.


Formation of social meanings…. Social-meaning construction with the predecessors

…. Schutz suggests that historians, who are to “reconstruct”

the meaning configurations of the deaths, have to presume the notion of the stream of history in parallel to the streams of consciousness, social institutions and cultural system and to strive to constitute the “fusion of horizons” across times. Most specifically, as Paul Ricoeur underlines, historians are expected to be able to muster kinds of “sympathetic efforts” and “temporal imagination”, that is, to project “not merely an imaginative projection into another present but a real projection into another human life.” (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 28)


Formation of social meanings…. Taking together all the concepts relating to the

formation of social meanings in face-to-face situations, with contemporaries across space, and predecessors across times, we may conclude that Schutz with his students Berger and Luckmann have rendered a resolution to Weber’s aporia No. 2.


89

Phenomenological conceptual framework of social-meaning construction with contemporaries and predecessors

Typiifcation Typiifcation

InstitutionalizationInstitutionalization

Institutional context of the contemporaries

Fusion of horizons

Institutional context of the predecessors

Language as expressive system of meanings: As Schutz has indicated, one of the tools that

humans have invented and used to express their consciousness and subjective meanings is language. Hence, language can be taken as one of the major system invented and institutionalized by humans to externalize, objectivate and communicate their subjective meanings.

Lingustics as discipline studying languages can therefore be conceived as one of approaches to acquire interpretive understanding of subjective meanings endowed in social action.

The Conception of Meaning in Linguistic Approach

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic pluralism: Ludwig Wittgenstein has been chosen by Habermas

as the primary reference in the linguistic approach in helping him to construct his logic of the social sciences.

Habermas has specifically made a connection between phenomenological and linguistic approaches in interpreting social meanings in the following manner. …


Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic pluralism: …connection between phenomenological and

linguistic approaches …

"The problem of language has taken the place of the traditional problem of consciousness: the transcendental critique of language takes the place of that of consciousness. Wittgenstein's life forms, which correspond to Husserl's lifeworld, now follow not the rules of synthesis of a consciousness as such but rather the rules of the grammar of language games." (Habermas, 1988, p. 117) More specifically, the connection and comparison between the two approaches can be summarized as


Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic pluralism: …connection between phenomenological and

linguistic approaches …

…More specifically, the connection and comparison between the two approaches can be summarized as Consciousness——Language Rules and structures of consciousness ——Rules of

grammar of a language Lifeworld ——Life forms


Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic pluralism: The two approaches in fact can further be compared

in their developmental stages:


Developmental stages of Wittgenstein's linguistic approach

Developmental stages of social phenomenological perspectives

The linguistic transcendentalism in Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (1922)

Husserl's transcendental phenomenology

The linguistic pluralism in Philosophical Investigations (1953)

Schutz's phenomenology of the social worlds

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic pluralism: Language games in linguistic pluralism: According

to the perspective of linguistic pluralism, each linguistic communities with their own grammatical rules and life forms will construct their meanings and lifeworld accordingly. As a result, each will constitute its own “language game”.

The subsequent development of the linguistic approach in qualitative research in social sciences, which has been characterized as the “linguistic turn in social research” has triggered diverse perspectives and approaches on “post-modern” fashion, which will not to be explored in this course.


The meanings of hermeneutics: The origin of the hermeneutic tradition, as Martin Jay

has specified, is “originally a Greek term, it referred to the god Hermes. The sayer or announcer of divine messages ― often, to be sure in oracular and ambiguous form. Hermeneutics retained its early emphasis on saying as it accumulated other meanings, such as interpreting, translating, and explaining.” (Jay, 1982, P. 90)

The Conception of Meaning in Hermeneutic Tradition

The meanings of hermeneutics: Paul Ricoeur’s provides a working definition of

hermeneutics as follow:

“Hermeneutics is the theory of the operations of understanding in the relation to the interpretation of texts.” (Ricoeur, 1981a, p.43)


The meanings of hermeneutics: "What is hermeneutics? Any meaningful expression

—be it an utterance, verbal or nonverbal, or an artifact of any kind, such as tool, an institution, or a written document—can be identified from a double perspective, both as an observable event and as an understandable objectification of meaning. We can describe, explain, or predict a noise equivalent to the sounds of a spoken sentence without having the slight idea what this utterance means. ….


The meanings of hermeneutics: “….. To grasp (and state) its meaning, one has to

participate in some (actual or imagined) communicative action in the course of which the sentence in question is used in such a way that it is intelligible to speakers, hearers, and bystanders belonging to the same speech community." (Habermas, 1996, p. 23-24)


Levels of hermeneutic inquiries: With reference to the meanings retrieved from the “texts”, hermeneutic studies can be classified into different levels: Hermeneutics at literal level: Decoding the authentic

meanings embedded in literal texts or in utterances in dialogues

Hermeneutics at ontological level: Encoding and decoding meanings from the ontological

condition of the authorEncoding and decoding meanings from the ontological

condition of the world referred in the text


Levels of hermeneutic inquiries: …. Hermeneutics at historical and cultural level:

Encoding and decoding meanings from the historical and cultural context within which the text was produced

Hermeneutics at the existential level: Hermeneutic experience as “the corrective by means of

which thinking reason escapes the prison of language” ." (Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Habermas, 1988, p. 144)

Hermeneutics as the “fusion of horizons” of that of the author and reader.


Levels of hermeneutic inquiries: …. Hermeneutics at critical level:

Encoding and decoding “meanings” from the perspective of human interests

Encoding and decoding “meanings” from the perspective of systemic distortions of institutional context

Encoding and decoding “meanings” from the perspective of ideology of given cultural hegemony


Paul Ricoeur’s literal hermeneutics as bridging of the distanciations in the text Paul Ricoeur, French Philosopher, defines that “A

text is any discourse (speech act) fixed in writing.” (Ricoeur, 1981a, p.145) As fixations of speech acts text enables the speech to be conserved, i.e. durability of text.


104

Paul Ricoeur’s literal hermeneutics

1913-2005

Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations…. Hermeneutics is therefore needed as a means to

bridge the distance created by the text between the two sides of the speech accts, namely writing and readings. This bridging efforts has been called distanciation functions of hermeneutics by Ricoeur. Ricoeur has differentiated distanciation functions into five levels


Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations…. Distanciation as bridging efforts between two

separate language events (i.e. discourse), namely writings and readings. It is the most elementary of distanciation and “the core of the whole hermeneutic problem.” (Ricoeur, 1981a, p. 134)


Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations…. Taken text as work, in which the author has specific

intent to make the effort to put down his meanings into text or even “work”. Accordingly “hermeneutics remains the art of discerning the discourse in the work; but this discourse is only given in and through the structures of the work. Thus interpretation is the reply to the fundamental distanciation constituted by the objectification of man in work of discourse, an objectification comparable to that expressed in the products of his labour and his art.” (Ricoeur, 1981a, P. 138)


Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations…. Taken the contexts of the text production and

interpretation into consideration, both the acts of production and interpretation of the text are

performed in specific contexts; as a result, “the text must be able to…’decontextualise’

itself in such a way that it can be ‘recontextualise’ in a new situation ― as accomplished …by the act of reading.” (Ricoeur, 1981a, p. 139)


Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations…. Text as fixation of discourse, can and should be

understood in terms of the referent and reality which it intends to designate or even signify. Ricoeur has characterized it as “the world of thee text”. Accorrdingly, the effort of distanciation can be construed at the level of bridging two “worlds of the text” designated by the authors and readers. Ricoeur has underlined that “the most fundamental hermeneutical problem … is to explicate the type of being-in-the world (life-world) unfolded in front of the text.” (Ricoeur, 1981a, p.141)


Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations…. Finally, the effort of distanciation-bridging can also

be taken as “self-understanding in front of the work”. In the process of reading, the readers can and in act are applyig ‘the world of the work’ to the present situation of the reader. ….


Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations…. . ….In Ricoeur’s own words,

"To understand is to understand oneself in front of the text. It is not a question of imposing upon the text our finite capacity of understanding, but of exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an enlarge self." (Ricoeur, 1981a, p. 143)

“As a reader, I find myself only by losing myself. Reading introduces me into the imaginative variations of the ego. The metamorphosis of the world in play is also the playful metamorphosis of the ego." (Ricoeur, 1981a, p.144)


Hans-Georg Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics (philosophical hermeneutics) as fusion of horizons Existential understanding of language:

Following the teaching of his teacher Heidegger, Gadamer sees that “all human reality is determined by its linguisticality. …Because human beings are thrown into a world already linguistically permeated, they do not invent language as a tool for their own purposes. It is not a technological instrument of manipulation. Rather, language is prior to humanity and speaks through it. Our infinite as human beings is encompassed by infinity of language.” (Jay, 1982, P. 94)


1900-2002

Hans-Georg Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics as fusion of horizons Existential understanding of language:

…Accordingly, human existence is a linguistically encoded

existence, which is made up of all the preconceptions or what Gadamer called “prejudices” accumulated and sustained in a particular cultural-linguistic “tradition. Hence, as human agents speak and act, they are speaking and acting within a prison house of language.


Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics … Gadamer’s conception of hermeneutic experience: In

order to liberate oneself from such a prison, Gadamer suggests that human agents have to undertake the hermeneutic experience.

"Hermeneutic experience is the corrective by means of which thinking reason escapes the prison of language, and it is itself constituted linguistically …. Certainly the variety of languages presents us with a problem. But this problem is simply how every language, despite its difference form other languages, is able to say everything it wants. …


Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics … Gadamer’s conception of hermeneutic experience:

“. …We then ask how, amid the variety of there forms of utterance, there is still the same unity of thought and speech, so that everything that has been transmitted in writing can be understood." (Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Habermas, 1988, p. 144)


Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics … Gadamer’s redefinition of hermeneutic inquiry:

Within Gadamer’s framework of existential linguistics, hermeneutics is no longer simply an act of empathetic bridging other distanciations within the text, particularly historical text, revealing what actually happened in the past, as Ranke advocated; but to “fuse” the horizons of the reader and the author. This is what Gadamer calls “fusion of horizons”.

By horizon, Gadamer defines it as “the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.” (Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Jay, P. 95) However, Individual horizons are partial and incomplete. Furthermore, they “are open, and shift; we wander into them and they in turn move with us.” (Habermas, 1988, P. 147)


Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics … Varieties of hermeneutic experiences and inquiries:

Accordingly, such a fusion of horizons may take varieties of formsHermeneutic experiences of the translator striving to bridge

two languagesHermeneutic experience of the historian attempting to bridge

two epochs Hermeneutic experience of the anthropologist trying to bridge

two culturesHermeneutic experience of the sociologist trying to bridge two

classes, status groups and political partiesHermeneutic experience of the comparative-historical

researcher striving of bridge big structures, large process and great communities across times and spaces


Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics … Gadamer’s concepts of authority and tradition:

The notion of “legitimate prejudice”: According to Gadamer, human agents could only approach the world with preconceptions or “prejudices” of accumulated and sustained in a particular cultural-linguistic community. However, in hermeneutic experiences and inquiries, the fusion of horizons may not be smooth and armonious but in contradictions or even conflicts. As a result, prejudices and their constituent horizons must be justified in situations where encounters and fusions of horizons take place. That brings about Gadamer’s the concept of authority and the issue of “legitimate prejudice”.


Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics … Gadamer’s concepts of authority and tradition: …

Gadamer contends that the legitimacy of individual horizons and its prejudices are gained in daily-life practices of speech acts, discourse and understanding within a prevailing cultural-linguistic community. While the legitimate “prejudices” at social level can also establish their authority in dialogues, social interactions and institutional practices. Therefore, Gadamer contends that “authority, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to a command. Indeed, authority has nothing to do with obedience, it rests on recognition.” (Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Ricoeur, 1991, P. 279) ……



…….. By recognition, Gadamer refers to “that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence, i.e. it has priority over one’s own.” (Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Ricoeur P. 278) “This is the essence of the authority, claimed by the teachers, the superior, the expert.” (Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Ricoeur 991, P. 279)



As these “legitimate prejudices” sustained and spread their authority within a linguistic community, they establish what Gadamer calls their “effective-historical” status and become the “tradition”. “This is precisely what we call tradition: the ground of their validity…. tradition has a justification that is outside the arguments of reason and in large measure determines our attitudes and behavior.” (Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Ricoeur, 1991, P. 279)


Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics The Gadamer-Habermas debate: The focus of

contention between on Gadamer and Habermas is exactly on the difference in the authority of prejudice and conception of tradition. Habermas disagrees to Gadamer’s treatment of the tradition and its authority of prejudices in a given cultural-linguistic community as normative imperatives derived out of practical speech acts, discourses and fusions of horizons. Instead Habermas underlines the power and domination that are at work in all human relationships including linguistic communications. ….


Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics The Gadamer-Habermas debate:

….. In Habermas own words, “This metainstitution of language as tradition is evidently dependent in turn on social processes that are not in normative relationship. Language is also medium of domination and social power.” (Habermas, 1977, Quoted in Jay, 1982, P. 99)


Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics From the stance of the Critical Theory of the

Frankfurt School as well as of Marxism, Habermas criticizes Gadamer of neglecting the frozen ideology, hypostatized power, and systemic distortion that may have been prevailed in cultural-linguistic traditions as well as in its supporting institutions.


Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics Critical hermeneutics and critique of ideology:

According to Habermas’ critique on Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics, Habermas has elevates hermeneutic inquiry yet to another level, namely critical hermeneutics. First of all, Habermas criticizes Gadamers’ conception of

authorities of “prejudices” and tradition of neglecting the notion of power that is supposed to be at work behind all these authority. This brings out one of the basic concept in the Critical Theory, i.e. the hypostatized power, which is at work in all human relationships and discourses.

Accordingly, this hypostatized will impose systemic distortions to human relationships and discourses.


Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics Critical hermeneutics and critique of ideology:

….One of these systemic distortions, which

manifests in individual horizon, fusion of horizons, prejudices, and tradition, is the ideological elements frozen in these cultural-linguistic representations.


Under the domination of methodological monism of the analytical-empiricism and the deductive-nomological explanation, historical-hermeneutic approach has been criticized as unable to render any valid explanations for human actions. It was Georg H. von Wright, an Oxford Professor of Philosophy, who led the counter-attack for the historical-hermeneutic approach by putting forth the distinction between causal and teleological explanations.

Explaining Social Actions: Weber’s Aporia No. 3


(1916-2003)

He stated in his book Explanation and Understanding (1971) that

“It is…misleading to say that understanding versus explanation marks the difference between two types of scientific intelligibility. But one could say that the intentional or non-intentional character of their objects marks the difference between two types of understanding and of explanation.” (von Wright, 1971, p.135)


Georg H. von Wright…distinction… Causal explanation: It refers to the mode of

explanation, which attempt to seek the sufficient and/or necessary conditions (i.e. explanans) which antecede the phenomenon to be explained (i.e. explanandum). Causal explanations normally point to the past. ‘This happened, because that had occued’ is the typical form in language.” (von Wright, 1971, p. 83) It seeks to verify the antecedental conditions for an observed natural phenomenon.


Georg H. von Wright…distinction… Teleological explanation: It refers to the mode of

explanation, which attempt to reveal the goals and/or intentions, which generate or motivate the explanadum (usually an action to be explained) to take place. “Teleological explanations point to the future. ‘This happened in order that that should occur.’” (von Wright, 1971, p. 83)


Intentional explanation: This type of explanation is the typical mode of explanation employed by social scientists. In fact, as Jon Elster underlines, its feature "distinguishes the social sciences from the natural sciences." (Elster, 1983, p. 69) It focuses on revealing the intentions, motivations, meanings, desires, and believes working behind human actions both at individual and social levels. Within the mode of intentional explanation, we may distinguish numbers of perspectives, they are


Intentional explanation: …. Intentional explanation in social phenomenological

perspective: As Schutz suggested, human actions should be allocated within with its “corresponding projected act” to seek for explanation. While social actions can also be explained with reference to the rational-choice theory.


Intentional explanation: …. Rational-choice explanation: To avoid the diversity

in human intentions and idiosyncrasy of subjective meaning, rational-choice theorists have made the working assumption that all men are rational. Subsequently rational-choice theorists have formulated their explanatory models in different formats. Elster’s model: According to Jon Elster’s formulation

(Elster, 1982, 1994, 2007, 2009), by rational choice, men conduct their actions consistently with the best evidence available. (Elster, 2009).


Cognition

Desire

Action

Evidence

Elster’s Rational-Choice Explanatory Model (1993)

Cognition

Desire

Action

Information

Elster’s Rational-Choice Explanatory Model (2009)

in-order-to explanation

because-of explanation

Intentional explanation: …. Rational-choice explanation: … Economic-man model: In accordance with the

economic-man assumption commonly made by economists, the rational choice made by humans are in much more aggressive terms that they will conduct their actions with the objective that maximized returns will be guaranteed in their means-ends or even cost-benefit calculations.

(To be discussed in greater details in Topic 6 of the course)


Quasi-teleological explanation (functional explanation): It is the type of teleological explanation most

commonly used in biology. It "takes the form of indicating one or more functions (or even dysfunctions) that a unit performs in maintaining or realizing certain traits of the system to which the unit belongs." (Nagel, 1979, p. 23) For example, in explaining why human being has lung, the typical explanation in biology is that lung performs the function of breathing, i.e. provide oxygen to the of the proper maintenance of the system of a human body. ….


Quasi-teleological explanation (functional explanation): Accordingly functional explanation consist of the

followings X perform the function of Y to the system of Z Y therefore explains the existence of X or Z's

possession of X.


Quasi-teleological explanation (functional explanation): However, there is a basic logical setback in this

functional-explanatory structure. That is, since X performs Y, therefore X must be an antecedent of Y. However in the cause-effect explanatory structure, the existence of an effect (Y) could not have anteceded that of its cause (X). Therefore, Y could not have been the cause of X.


Quasi-teleological explanation (functional explanation): Nevertheless, in biology this setback can be

compensated by the mechanism of natural selection in the theory of evolution. That is the seemingly temporal ordering mismatch between X and Y can be explained away within the much longer timeline in the evolutionary process of species. G.A. Cohen has called this requirement in functional explanation "consequence law" (Cohen, 1978, p.250)


Quasi-teleological explanation (functional explanation): Debate on functional explanation in social sciences

The focal point of the debate is that there is no commonly accepted "consequence law" available for the functional explanation of the origin and existence of social phenomena, such as education, available in social sciences. Unless we accept the thesis of social Darwinism that there is natural selection principle at work in social world, otherwise we may have to accept Jon Ester suggestion that functional explanation is not applicable in social science.

…


Quasi-teleological explanation… Debate on functional explanation in social sciences….One resolution or qualification offered by Philip Pettit (2002)

and Harold Kincaid (2007) is that instead to use functional explanation and trace to origins of species as biologists do, social scientists could restrain themselves to explain the origins of social institutions and instead simply applying functional explanation to account for the resilient patterns or persistent regularities in social world. Such a qualification or reservation can release social scientists of the burden of proof of tracing the history of actual selection and evolution of the resilience of a social institution. Instead social scientists can simply base on a "virtual selection" assumption and focus on the accounting for the persistence of a given phenomenon.


Quasi-teleological explanation… Debate on functional explanation in social

sciences .... Accordingly, functional explanation can be employed to

account for the existence, especially its resilience, continuity, and regularity, of social institutions, such as institutions of education and family in human societies.

(To be discussed in greater details on Topic 8 of the course)


Social Actions

Institution

Persistence

Social Function at T0

.

.

.

Functional Explanation of the Persistence of Institutions

Social Function at Tn

Other Factors

Contexts

Taking together the precedent discussions on the methodology of the historical-hermeneutic approach, meanings of human and social actions may appears in a varieties of forms, which can be characterized as “representations. They includes Texts: It refers to literal representations, in which

meanings expressed in speech acts (discourse) are fixed in written forms.

Narratives: It represents the efforts of individuals or human aggregates to arrange their experiences in meaningful (consistent, coherent, and continuous) manners.

Representations: The Fields of Historical-Hermeneutic Studies

…..“representations…include Relics and historical documents: It refers to the

representations meanings form the past. Ethnographic sites: It refers to forms of

representations which reveal the meanings embedded in human activities and routines, such as rituals and organizations.

Institutions: It refers to the “rules of the games” (North, 1990), which represents the meanings typified and legitimized in sets of rules governing particular kind of human activities, such as exchange (i.e. market), resolutions of conflicts (i.e. the state), and reproduction (i.e. family and education)


…..“representations…include Discourse (in Foucaultian sense): It refers to the

“totalities” of “technologies of power”, which subjugate human bodies and minds within human societies.


(II)The Methodology of

Critical Social Science

Immanuel Kant’s critical theories in transcendental idealism:

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) may be considered as the first critical theorist of the modern philosophy

Traditions of Critical Theory: A Brief Account

Kant’s critical theories … In his famous essay on “What is Enlightenment?”

(1784), Kant celebrates the human capacities of liberating from dogmatism and tutelage and to reason independently and self-reflectively.

"Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude (Dare to know)! 'Have courage to use your own reason!' - that is the motto of enlightenment." (Kant, 1996/1784)


Kant’s critical theories … Accordingly, Kant had produced a series of books to

apply his formulation of critical reasoning to different domains of human intellectualities, namely theoretical reasons seeking truth, practical reasons seeking ethical-moral goods, and aesthetic-teleological reasons seeking judgment on beauty and substantive ends. Accordingly, he published three books respectively entitled Critique of Pure Reason (1781)Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and Critique of Judgment (1790)


Kant’s critical theories … Taking together the three critiques, Kant attempts to

elevate human reasons to the transcendental and universal level. That is to seek the transcendental principles guiding human reasons in epistemological enquiries, in ethic-moral practices, and aesthetic-teleological judgments. Kant’s critical project has been characterized in philosophy as transcendental idealism. That is because he has built his three critical projects on separate sets of transcendental ideas, which will not be explicated in details in this course.


Karl Marx’s critical theory in historical materialism

Karl Marx (1818-1883) is one of the prominent critical theorists of the nineteenth century. He directs his reflective and critical reason on one specific aspect of human society in the nineteenth century’s Europe, namely the capitalistic-industrial mode of production. As a result, Marx has produced a series of strong critique of the political-economy of capitalism in the nineteenth–century’s Western Europe.


Karl Marx’s critical theory in historical materialism

…Most notably, his critiques on The exploitative nature of the class relationship of

capitalism The alienating and reifying effects of the

commodification process on human existence in the capitalistic mode of production

The ideological and hegemonic distortions on cultural context of capitalism


Max Weber’s critical theory on Rationalism:

Max Weber (1864-1920) is one of the founding father of sociology and a critical theorist of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His critical theory is mostly built on his critique of the rationalization of Western European societies. For example, (To be expounded in details in Topic 6) The domination or even hegemony of the instrumental

rationality; and The reified iron cage upon the existence of the modern

man.


Critical Theory of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt School: Critical Theory (in capital letter) is commonly designated to the theoretical and methodological orientations initiated by a group of scholars in the Institute of Social Research in the University of Frankfurt. The Institute was founded in 1923. As the Nazi assumed power in Germany in January 1933, the institute was forced to leave Germany and finally settled in New York and affiliated with Columbia University in 1934.

The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School

Critical Theory of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt School:

….

Work produced by the leading scholars of the Institute, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse focused mainly on critical examination of human reason and its potentiality as well as fallibility.


Max Horkheimer(1895-1973)

Herbert Marcuse(1898-1979)

Theodor Adorno(1903-1969)

Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … Max Horkheimer’s distinction between Traditional

Theory and Critical Theory:

Horkheimer, as the founding director of the Institute for Social Research, has explicitly laid down the methodological and epistemological differences between Critical Theory, the research orientation of which the Institute of Social Research has identified with, and what Horkheimer labelled Traditional Theory, which dominates the intellectual scenery of Western Europe in the twentieth century. (Horkheimer, 1982, Pp. 188-252) …


Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … …distinction between Traditional &Critical Theory: Traditional Theory: Horkheimer points out that according to

the epistemological orientation of Traditional Theory, theory is a configuration of interconnected propositions stipulating a specific aspect of the world. The validity of the theory depends on whether the contents of its propositions finds correspondence and consonance with the actual facts in the external world. The methodological assumption of the Traditional Theory presuppose that the nomological regularities verified in empirical-analytical science are objectively existed and given. ….


Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … …distinction between Traditional &Critical Theory: Traditional Theory: ….

At the same time it is assumed that the interpretations and meanings revealed from historical-hermeneutic studies are necessary and authentic representations of the lifeworld. Hence, in Traditional Theory, knowledge is taken as ahistorical, decontextual and interest-neutral products of human reasons.


Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … …distinction between Traditional &Critical Theory: … Critical Theory: In opposite to the epistemological orientation

of the Traditional Theory, Critical Theory views theory and its propositions as intellectual products embedded in particular historical and socio-economic contexts. “The critical theory of society…has for its object men as producers of their own historical way of life in its totality. The real situations which are the starting-point of science are not regarded simply as data to be verified and to be predicted according to the law of probability. Every datum depends not on nature alone but also on the power man has over it. Objects, the kind of perception, the questions asked, and the meaning of the answers all bear witness to human activities and the degree of man’s power.” (Horkheimer, 1982, P. 244) …..


Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … …distinction between Traditional &Critical Theory: … Critical Theory: ….

Accordingly, the social world to be studied is no longer assumed as given or fixed. “The critical theory in its concept formation and in all phases of its development very consciously makes its own that concern for the rational organization of human activities which it is its task to illumine and legitimate. For this theory is not concerned only with goals already imposed by the existent way of life, but with men and all their potentialities.” (Horkheimer, 1982, P. 245) Therefore, critical theory “never aims simply at an increase of knowledge. Its goal is man’s emancipation from slavery.” (Horkheimer, 1982, p. 246)


Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … Max Horkheimer’s critique on pure reason and formal

logic: Taking the assumption that human reasons are embedded in particular historical-social contexts and at the same time embodied in specific subjectivities, Horkheim accordingly wages his critiques on pure reason and formal logic. …


Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … …critique on pure reason and formal logic: …

Max Horkheimer critique on Immanuel Kant's famous theses on “critique of reason” by asserting that the assumptions on " transcendental ego", “decontextualized self” and "pure reason" are spurious in the light of Critical Theory. He emphasizes that "it is the human being who thinks, not the Ego or Reason…. [And that] is not something abstract, such as the human essence, but always human beings living in a particular historical epoch." (Horkheimer, 1968, p.145; quoted in Hoy and McCarthy, 1995, p.9) Accordingly, critical theorists must strive to guard against the “impure reason” that may be spawned from particular historical and social contexts in which thinkers and researchers embedded.


Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … …critique on pure reason and formal logic: …

By the same taken, Horkheimer also waged his critique on formal logic. He argued that human reason should not merely rely on formal logic but must include the part on substantive logic. “Horkhiemer wrote: ‘Logic is not independent of content.’ (Horkhiemer, 1934)…Formalism characteristic of …bourgeois logic, had once been progressive, but it is now served only to perpetuate the status quo. True logic, as well as true rationalism, must go beyond form to include substantive element as well.” (Jay, 1973, p. 55)


Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … Dialectic of Enlightenment: One of the exemplar

research of the Critical Theory is the study conducted by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno is to analyze how human reason has fallen into the Nazi rule. The research project commenced at the end of the WWII with its objective as follows:


“The dilemma that faced us in our work proves to be the first phenomenon for investigation: the self-destruction of the Enlightenment. ...The fallen nature of modern man cannot be separate from social progress. On the one hand the growth of economic productivity furnishes the conditions for greater justice; on the other hand it allows the technical apparatus and the social groups which administer it a disproportionate superiority to the rest of the population. The individual is wholly devalued in relation to the economic powers, which at the same time press the control of society over nature to hitherto unsuspected heights.” (Horkhiemer and Adorno, 1986/44, p.xiii-xv)


Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … The project of “Studies in Prejudice”: Fronted by the

“facts” produced by the Nazi’s project of Anti-Semitism, members of the Frankfurt School migrated to the US launched a large scale empirical project “Studies in Prejudice” to investigate how individual as well as social reasons are distorted and biased. The project had produced five publications.


Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: … The project of “Studies in Prejudice”: …The project

had produced five publications. Adorno, Theodor W., E. Frenkel-Burnswick, D.J. Levinson and

R.N. Sanford (1950) The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper & brothers.

Bettelheim, Bruno and M. Janowitz (1950) Dynamics of Prejudice. New York: Harper & brothers.

Ackerman and M. Jahoda (1950) Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder. New York: Harper & brothers.

Massing, Paul (1949) Rehearsal for Destruction. New York: Harper & brothers.

Lowenthal, Leo and N. Guterman (1949) Prophets of Deceit. New York: Harper & brothers.


Jurgen Habermas’ critical social science: As a prominent members of second generation of Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School, Jurgen Habermas in his Frankfurt inaugural address in 1965 summarized the development of research projects of Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, which he renamed as the “critical social science” as follows.


Jurgen Habermas’ critical social science: … “Critical social science …is concerned with going

beyond this goal to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed. To the extent that this is the case, the critique of ideology, as well, moreover, as psychoanalysis, take into account that information about lawlike connections sets off a process of reflection in the consciousness of those whom the law are about. ….


Jurgen Habermas’ critical social science: … “. ….Thus the level of unreflected consciousness,

which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can be transform. Of course, to this end a critically mediated knowledge of laws cannot through reflection alone render a law itself inoperative, but it can render it inapplicable.


Jurgen Habermas’ critical social science: … “The methodological framework that determines the

meaning of the validity of critical propositions of this category is established by concept of self-reflection. The latter releases the subject from dependence on hypostatized powers. Self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest.” (Habermas, 1971, P. 310)


The distinctiveness of the critical social science: With references of precedent discussion, we may conclude that the critical social science has developed into an independent methodological approach and epistemological perspective distinct itself from the analytical empirical science and historical hermeneutic traditions in numbers of significant ways.


The distinctiveness of the critical social science: In contrast with the analytical-empirical science on

the research outcomes of finding nomological or probabilistic regularities of the social world, critical social scientists will not settle with these regularities as they are but will strive to reveal the possible power hypostatized within these regularities and social structure. Furthermore, they will try to reveal the possible social inequality, bias, distortion, and oppression, which have been institutionalized and legitimatized by these social regularities and structures.


The distinctiveness of the critical social science: Critical social science agree with historical-

hermeneutic tradition on the research outcomes of retrieving the meanings encoded in different representations. Critical social scientists would even accept the existence of meaning configurations constituted in the forms of institutions, traditions, and cultures, which perpetuate resiliently and continuously. ….


The distinctiveness of the critical social science: ….However, they will not settle within interpretations

at this level, but will try to reveal the possible ideology and false consciousness underlying these meaning configurations. Furthermore, they will attempt to reveal the possible distortion, alienation and reification, which have been frozen and legitimatized in these meaning configurations.


The distinctiveness of the critical social science: Accordingly, critical social scientists will not satisfied

with providing correct predictions about social regularities or rendering understanding about social practices, they will try to develop human potentialities, to emancipate them from slavery, and to seek possibility for social betterments.


The paradigm of the critical social science: Given the above explications of the methodological approach to critical social science, we may summarize the approach into the following research questions.


The paradigm of the critical social science: Critique of the impurity and fallibility of reason: One

of the primary research questions confronting the critical social scientists is to go beyond the self-confident or even self-complacent belief in human’s own reason and rationality, and reflectively confront the fallibility or even detrimental effects of reason on humanity and the lifeworld.

Habermas has summarized the efforts of critical theorists’ reflections on human‘s own reason and rationality and especially its fallible and detrimental efforts as “rationalization as reificaion” (Habermas, 1987/1981, P. 379)


The paradigm of the critical social science: Critique of the impurity and fallibility of reason:….

….They includeKarl Marx’s critique on rationalization of mode of production

by the bourgeoisie, which led to the rise of capitalism and its reification of human labor and alienation of human production.

Max Weber’s extended the critique on Occidental rationalization by not only examining its effects on production but reflecting on modern society at large. This is especially significant in Weber’s examine the reifying effects of bureaucratization of human organization in general, which Weber has characterized as the constitution of the “iron cage”.



….They includeThe first-generation critical theorists of the Frankfurt School

have further developed this line of critique on rationalization in modern society by empirically inquiring into the detrimental effects of rationalization manifested during the two World Wars.



….They includeJurgen Haberma, in his two-volume work The Theory of

Communicative Action (1984 & 1987) has summarized the general effects of Occidental rationalization into the constitutions of the capitalist market and the modern state. He has further underlined the two imperatives that both the market and the state have imposed upon human existence and their communal lives (the Lifeworld), namely the money steering and power-steering imperatives. Habermas finally stipulates that these two systemic imperatives have not only colonized the Lifeowrld but have also reified the very communicative rationality that men possess.


The paradigm of the critical social science: Critique of human subjects and their subjectivity:

Based on the assumption of the embeddedness of human reasons in their historical and social context, critical social scientists stipulate that one should turn their critical examinations to the inquirers themselves. That is because “knowing and acting subjects are social and embodied beings, and the products of their thought and action bear ineradicable traces of their situations and interests.” (McCarthy, 1991, P. 44) …..


The paradigm of the critical social science: Critique of human subjects and their subjectivity: …

Accordingly, one line of inquiry within the critical-theory tradition is to reflect and examine the reification of the subjectivity and consciousness of the “modern man”. Follow the lead of Freund’s psychoanalysis, the first generation of the critical theorists such as Eric Fromm and Herbert Marcuse have produced a series of work on the reification of subjectivity of the modern man Eric Fromm (1941) Escape from Freedom, andHerbert Marcuse (1964) One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the

Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society


The paradigm of the critical social science: … Critique of transcendental truth and the emphasis on

the practical truth: Under the epistemological assumption that both the knowers

and their attained knowledge are historically and socially embedded, critical social scientists refute the concept of truth of transcendental idealism formulated by Kant. That is truths are no longer conceived as essences in human knowledge which universally, permanently and transcendentally exist. Instead, the reality of social world is conceived as the outcomes of human practices which have been vindicated, validated, accumulated and even legitimatized in daily social interactions across time and space with a “Lifeworld”. …


The paradigm of the critical social science: … ….emphasis on the practical truth:

As a result, the truth claims of any knowledge about any aspects of a social world must be tested against the practical validity, which is to be found in the correspondent social interactions within the relevant aspects of a specific “Lifeworld”. Hence, truths are no longer to be sought after as something universal and transcendental, but must be revealed from social practices within particular historical and social contexts. The traditional oppositions between theory and practice, theoretical science and practical science, facts and values, and more specifically the primacy of theory over practice, are therefore invalid demarcations to critical social scientists. (McCathy, 1991, Pp. 44-45)


The paradigm of the critical social science: Critique of prevailing social reality and emphasis on

social possibilities and potentialities: For critical social scientists, social world is configuration produced by human efforts, therefore it is assumed that there may be “power hypostatized” and “ideology frozen” within this seemly permanent social structures and regularities. As a result, two of the major areas of inquiry of critical social sciences are Critical inquiry of social power (To be explicated in details on

Topic 6)Critical inquiry of ideology and hegemony (To be explicated in

details on Topic 6)

.


The paradigm of the critical social science: Critique of prevailing social reality and emphasis on

social possibilities and potentialities: …

Along these two lines of inquiry, one the primary objectives of critical social inquiries is to reveal the possible systemic distortions and biases prevailing in existing social structures and representations. Subsequently, critical social scientists are obliged to seek out possible way to emancipate human potentialities that are trapped and suppressed by these systemic distortions.


Lecture 3The Epistemological Foundations

of EAP

PEDU 7206

In light of the three methodological approaches discussed in precedent lecture, we can proceed to explicate the theories of knowledge each of these methodological approaches is intend to achieve. By epistemology or the theorization of knowledge, it refers to the intellectual efforts to analyze the following aspect of a given system of knowledge:

Introduction to the Epistemological Foundation of EAP

The assumptions of the object of inquiry: It refers to analyzing the assumptions that each methodological approach presume upon the natures and features of the social reality that they are to enquire

The conception of the knowledge constituted: It refers to analyzing the knowledge that each methodological approach has conceptualized and has intended to attain.


The human interest to be constituted: Habermas has introduced the concept of knowledge-constitutive interests in his book Knowledge and Human Interests (1971) He states that “I term interests the basic orientations rooted in specific fundamental conditions of the possible reproduction and self-constitution of the human species, namely work and interaction. …Knowledge-constitutive interests can be defined exclusively as a function of the objectively constituted problems of existence as such. Work and interaction by nature include processes of learning and arriving at mutual understanding.” (1971, P. 196) Accordingly, this aspect of epistemological analysis will trace the primary human interests that a system of knowledge is supposed to pursuit.


The assumptions of the object of inquiry: Transplanting the logical/empirical positivism prevailing in natural scientific enquiry, the analytical-empirical science presumes that there is no essential difference between natural and social worlds. As a result, it presumes the following features upon the social reality it is to enquire.

The Epistemological Foundation of Analytical-Empirical Science

The assumptions of the object of inquiry: … Analytical approach: By analytical approach, it refers

to the working assumption that social scientists impose upon their objects under study. They assume that the social world or social reality can be decomposed into elements or properties. They further assume that these elements are causally related into structure of antecedent causes and consequent effects. Accordingly, the task of social researchers is to select the most significant and relevant components in social reality and to verify the causal structures among them.


The assumptions of the object of inquiry: … Empirical grounded: It refers to the existential

assumption that social researcher presume upon the social world, from which social researchers are supposed to find evidences in verifying or falsifying their propositions or more specifically hypotheses. That is, it is assumed that evidences existing in social world are observable by sensory experiences. Moreover, the features recorded in these evidences are objectively and externally exist and will not be affected by the sensory observations themselves. Accordingly these sensory-observations can be objectively retainable, recordable, and quantifiable into a mathematical “variables”.


The assumptions of the object of inquiry: … Universal and permanent nomology in features: In

correspond with natural science, social scientists assume that phenomena in social reality persistent and permanent in features. They are also universally the same across time and space as natural phenomena.


The assumption of the knowledge constituted: The knowledge to be constituted and verified by social scientists in analytical-empirical science are presumed to bear the following features: They are coherent sets of verbal propositions (or even

numerical formula) describing the nomological features of a specific domain the social world.

These verbal propositions are objective statements in form. That is, they are interest-neutral and value-free verbal statements recording the objective features of the social phenomena in point.


The assumption of the knowledge constituted: … These objective statements of social phenomena, as a

rule, must be verified with relevant empirical evidences. They must comply with the so-called “correspondence principle”, that is, the descriptions in the statements must find its correspondent evidences in the empirical world.


The implied knowledge-constitutive human interest: Given its causal-law structure and universal and permanent features, analytical-empirical knowledge can be used for prediction of future events. It can be technically applied for enhancing the occurrence of desirable outcomes and for preventing undesirable events from happening. According to Habermas’ formulation, the knowledge-constitutive human interest that analytical-empirical knowledge is to serve is the “technical-cognitive interest” embedded in “work” in general and material production in particular. (Habermas, 1971, P. 196).


The implied knowledge-constitutive human interest: …. With well work-out analytical-empirical knowledge or what Habermas termed “technically exploitable knowledge” (Habermas, 1971, P. 191), human beings are supposed to be able to control how the social world works. It can help human to “engineer” and “domineer” the social world.


The assumptions of the object of inquiry: Contrary to analytical-empirical science, historical-hermeneutic studies assume that the social world to bear numbers of features which are quite opposite to those in analytical-empirical science.

The Epistemological Foundation of Historical-Hermeneutic studies

The assumptions of the object of inquiry: … Meaning-laden and value-laden: It is assumed that

social phenomena are loaded with meanings and values. In fact, it is exactly the features of meaning-laden and value-laden that lend a social activity and social institution its regularity, resilience and consistency. And this is exactly the task of social researchers to reveal the meanings and values at work underlying each and every social phenomenon.


The assumptions of the object of inquiry: … Meaning coherence and meaningful whole: Apart from

the feature of meaning-laden, historical-hermeneutic studies also assumes the meanings and values at work in social phenomena and institutions are configured in coherent and integral forms. At individual levels, these meaning integrals usually appear in narrative identities; at societal level, they are constituted in different forms of integrative and enduring instituions; at cultural level, these meaningful wholes take the forms of effective practices of cultural tradition and heritages; and at historical level, the meaning configurations usually passed on in the forms of historical narratives of nations or civilizations.


The assumptions of the object of inquiry: … Persistent but transformable in structure: In historical-

hermeneutic studies, though the meaning laden social phenomena are subjective and/or intersubjective in nature, yet they are not so idiosyncratic and ephemeral in appearance that they make them unobservable, non-recordable and non-researchable. It is assumed that most of the meaning configurations are regular and persistent in forms, but of course they are not universal, permanent and nomological in form as the natural phenomena. Therefore, they are presumed to be contextualized with particular historical and societal aggregates and to be subject to vary and change with times, spaces and human efforts.


The assumption of the knowledge constituted: The knowledge to be constituted and accepted in historical-hermeneutic studies has been characterized as descriptions. They can be discerned in the following elements:


The assumption of the knowledge constituted: … The deep and thick descriptions: They refer to the

descriptive “field notes” recording the meanings endowed into the social practices by their indigenous participants, mostly the respondents in the studies. They may take on varieties of formats and representations, such as text, historical documentations and relics, narrative story-line, ethnographic situations, and “discourse” (in Foucaultian sense).


The assumption of the knowledge constituted: .. The interpretation: It refers to the meanings attributed

by participants and then by the researchers to the “data”. These interpretations of course cannot be “verified or falsified” empirically and analytically as those in analytical-empirical sciences, yet they can still be “confirmed” in terms of their “effective practices” in the correspondent “Lifeworld” from which the data were initially retrieved. Furthermore, the “validity” of the interpretations, especially those imputed by the researchers can also be cross examined by other researchers in the field in the form of hermeneutic criticism or historical criticism.


The assumption of the knowledge constituted: .. Intentional and institutional-functional explanations:

Given the descriptions and interpretations obtained, historical-hermeneutic researchers may render explanations for human actions, interactions, and institutional regularities in intentional and/or institutional-functional explanatory modes, which have been explicated in Topic 2.


The assumption of the knowledge constituted: .. The practical truth: Accordingly, one of the primary

differences between analytical-empirical sciences and historical-hermeneutic studies is their conception about the idea of truth. In natural sciences, the truth in scientific knowledge must be test externally against the facts found in the natural and material world, i.e. compliance with the “correspondence principle”. On the other hand, in historical-hermeneutic studies, truth must be sought after the very practices embedded in the historical-hermeneutic field and/or embodied among participants within socio-cultural situations. Hence, Habermas has termed it as the “practical truth”.


The implied knowledge-constitutive human interest: Given the nature and features of the historical-hermeneutic knowledge, the knowledge-constitutive human interest to be served, according to Habermas’ formulation, is “practical cognitive interest” effective embedded in human communications, interactions and more generally communal practices. (Habermas, 1971, P. 196) …


The implied knowledge-constitutive human interest: …It is therefore implied that with the well-grounded historical-hermeneutic knowledge, or what Habermas termed “pratcial effective knowledge” (Habermas, 1971, P. 191) humans are able to understand, to communicate, to bridge distances across historical and socio-cultural communities (or in Gadamer’s terms “fusion of horizons), and finally arrive at consensus. In Habermas conception, it means to achieve “communicative rationality”. (To be explicated in details in Topic 7)


The Epistemological Foundation of the Critical Social Science

To be explicated in details at the end of Topic 4 & 5

End

Topic 2-3 Methodological & Epistemological Foundations of EAP

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