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Lecture 4 – ECON.S-1620 Prof. Charles Moran 1 Motivation: Contracts & Information Lecture 4 (continued) Copyright 2015

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Page 1: Lecture 4 – ECON.S-1620 Prof. Charles Moran 1 Motivation: Contracts & Information Lecture 4 (continued) Copyright 2015

Lecture 4 – ECON.S-1620Prof. Charles Moran

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Motivation: Contracts & Information

Lecture 4 (continued)

Copyright 2015

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Lecture 4 – ECON.S-1620Prof. Charles Moran

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Attention to Introducing Great by Choice

into our Discussions

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Lecture 4 – ECON.S-1620Prof. Charles Moran

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Drucker – Management and the Worlds Work (1988) – Group 1

“Fundamental task of management remains…:…make people capable of joint performance by giving them common goals, common values, the right structure [later clarified no “one” is right]… ongoing training and development they need to perform and respond to change”

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Drucker – Management and the Worlds Work (1988) (continued)

Is this a sustainable perspective?Can a command model be effective for knowledge

work? Where communication is effective? Where information has transparency?

What does “working smarter – not harder” mean?What is biological model for organizations?

– Independent – Knowledge intensive– Organized by flow of information– Adapting

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Lecture 4 – ECON.S-1620Prof. Charles Moran

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Drucker’s Pension Fund Socialism

Employees become true owners of the country’s means of production – Is identity of interest of (enterprise and employee) required

But assets (hard) have decreasing value (Murphy’s Law) – Power and independence of knowledge worker

Issues – Will they become more independent –or- join in groups?

Implication for organizations

- employee model

- independent contractor model

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Who Sets the Rules – The Standards?

Manager

Organization

Education/Training

Continuity

Loyalty to Firm

Production

Self-Management

Common Goals/Values

Learning

Opportunistic

Individual Responsibility

Customer Satisfaction

Future:

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Role of Motivation• Closing off routes for retreat before committing an

army to battle• Isolating the organization responsible for a new

product• Splitting a corporation into good/bad (i.e. a bank

packaging non-performing loan portfolios) Repeated potential solution

• Reaction to deBeers selling unexamined lots of diamondsSavings – Costs Lack of “Information”

Can this concept be generalized?

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Role of Motivation (continued)Do bonus plans and stock options consistently produce efficient

behavior (as determined by organizational objectives)?If Child A hits Child B and you punish A (physically or verbally) what

does A learn about attracting attention?What alternatives are available to get intended message across!Apply this to:

TerroristsUnmotivated employeesEncouraging employees to take risk – innovate

Can we apply this thinking to – Adverse selection – signaling – screeningSelf-selection (customers determining price, employees determine comp.)

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Lecture 4 – ECON.S-1620Prof. Charles Moran

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Risk Sharing and Incentive Contracts

Huck Finn: “…What’s the use…learning to do right when it’s troublesome to do right and aint no trouble to do wrong and the wages is just the same.”

Can we address moral hazards with incentive?

Contracts? (uncertain future)

Compensation? (quick, specific, trust)

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Lecture 4 – ECON.S-1620Prof. Charles Moran

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Risk Sharing and Incentive Contracts (continued

Can we link action of individual to the result being incented in a complex organization? Incent input and reward output?

Results influenced + or – by external (uncontrollable) factors that may over-reward or penalize the individual.

Does incenting individuals result in inefficient organizations?

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Lecture 4 – ECON.S-1620Prof. Charles Moran

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Dot.Coms v. Not.Coms – Group 2Midland Bank CEO – Wolfe: Lack of imagination?

Entrepreneur (Customer Needs)

Our-Lives.com(young prof. women) -Anderson

Avocado Nat’l Bank (Service Provider-to our lives)

Second Mover (well funded)

concierge2235.com – aggressive

Comment on: “With the internet you have to work from the future backward.”

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What is the model for a successful/sustainable business?

• Customer Oriented

• The Business Model

• Value Creation Driven?

• What are you delivering to the customer – differentiation (Revlon) – Charlie Revson

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Implications for Organizations and Management Behaviors?

Consider (pg 25-Dot.Coms) “Companies are going to have learn to bring…vibrant market for ideas…talent…capital inside their organization”

Consider “The Bottom Line” from GartnerGroup (pg. 25)

- What about Coase?

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