Lecture 6. IAEA's Safeguards System: New Directions for 21st Century

Course “Ne w Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime”

Dr. Alexey Ubeev

Dual Master’s Degree Program in Nonproliferation Studies

Moscow, Fall – Winter 2016

OUTLINES

Ø Background, basic definitions and purposes of IAEA SGs;

Ø Evolution of SGs system: types of agreements and protocols;

Ø Seeking to optimize verification activities: from “facility-level” to “State-level” concept;

Ø Challenges to the IAEA SG system and response.

Permanent monitoring of nuclear material to ensure it is not used for military purposes

o Set of technical measures by which the IAEA verifies the correctness and completeness of the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities.

o Confidence-building tools of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

Safeguards objectives:o Prevent the proliferation of

nuclear weapons o Timely detect diversion of

nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities

o Provide credible assurances that States are honoring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes

IAEA Safeguards. Definitions and purposes

IAEA Safeguards (SG). Introduction

• Membership in IAEA does not require acceptance of safeguards

• IAEA SG are possible in non-Member States of the Agency

• Implementation of safeguards requires consent of the State (not self-executing)

• IAEA SG are embedded in legally binding agreements, providing the basis to implement effective verification

What nuclear material is subject to safeguards?

Nuclear material subject to safeguards includes special fissionable material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made (e.g. plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233) and source material (e.g. natural uranium, depleted uranium or thorium), which cannot be directly used for nuclear weapons. (Article XX of IAEA Statute)

Radioactive sources that do not contain uranium, plutonium or thorium are not subject to safeguards and need not be reported to the IAEA under a safeguards agreement.

Significant Quantities (SQ) *Direct use:

Plutonium

U233

HEU (U235 ≥ 20%)

Indirect use:

U ( U235< 20%)

Th

8 Kg Pu (total element)

8 Kg U233 (total isotope)

25 Kg U235

75 Kg U235 (or 10 t NU or 20 t DU)

20 t Th (total element)“Approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded” IAEA Safeguards Glossary

IAEA Statute and Safeguards

IAEA authorized to establish and administer safeguards:

Article III.A.5

Agency assistance

Any bilateral or multilateral arrangements at the request of the parties

Any nuclear activities of a State at its request

Article XII

Fundamental features of IAEA safeguards

Types of IAEA SG agreements and protocols

Safeguards agreements:Comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs)

Item-specific safeguards agreements: (Israel, India, Pakistan) Voluntary offer agreements (VOAs): China, France, Russia, UK and

USA

Protocols: Small quantities protocols (SQPs)

Additional Protocols (APs)

Types of Safeguards Agreements

• Item Specific (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2)• Safeguards system prior to the NPT

• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)• Comprehensive safeguards in connection with the

NPT and NWFZ Treaties • Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOAs)

• China, France, Russia, UK and US (NPT NWSs)

Type of Agreement

Scope Generic objectives

CSA All nuclear material - to detect undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole;

- to detect misuse of declared facilities;- to detect diversion of declared nuclear

material

Items Specified items - to detect misuse of facilities and other items subject to safeguards- to detect diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards

VOA Nuclear material in selected facilities

- to detect undeclared withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material in selected facilities

Comparison of SG Agreements

Item-Specific Safeguards Agreements

1961: Covered research reactors only (INFCIRC/26)

1964: Expanded to cover all reactors

1965: Revised (INFCIRC/66)

1966: Revised and expanded to cover reprocessing plants

1968: Expanded to include procedures for conversion and fuel fabrication plants (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2)

Safeguards Coverage under 66 Agreements

WEAPONIZATION

Nuclear-related infrastructure: research centers and laboratories without nuclear material

HEU

Spent Fuel Storage

Reactors and CAs

PU

Reprocessing

Heavy Water Production

MiningOre

Concen-tration

Fuel Fab.

Con-version

Enrichment

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA), INFCIRC/153

o Developed by an open ended committee of IAEA Board of Governors (1970-1971)

o Approved by the Board in April 1971o The Board requested the Director General to use it as a basis for

negotiating safeguards agreements between the IAEA and NNWSs party to the NPT

o Content: Part I, Part II and Definitions

CSAs required by NPT

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs)

Art. II - Not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

Art. III.1 - Accept safeguards on all nuclear material in the State, as set forth in an agreement with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute and its safeguards system

Art. III.4 - Conclude agreements within 18 months

Safeguard Agreements based on INFCIRC/153

CSAs with NNWSs pursuant to the NPT

CSAs with NNWSs pursuant to NWFZ Treaties1967:Tlatelolco

1986: Rarotonga

1997: Bangkok

1996: Pelindaba

2008: Central Asia

Sui generis CSAs with NNWSs

VOAs with the 5 NPT NWSs

CSA: Basic Obligations of the State

• Provide information to the IAEA concerning nuclear material, facilities and activities

• Provide access to the IAEA for purposes of inspections and design information verification

• Cooperate with the IAEA in the implementation of the safeguards agreement

• Establish a State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC)

CSA: main elements

Access:• DIV: facility design information verification• Inspections:

• Ad hoc – used for verifying initial report/exports of nuclear material

• Routine – once Subsidiary Arrangements agreed; limited to strategic points

• Special – when information available to IAEA “not adequate for IAEA to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement”

Safeguards Coverage under CSAs

WEAPONIZATION

Con-version

Fuel Fab.

Reactors and CAs

Spent Fuel Storage

Reprocessing

PU

HEU

Enrichment

MiningOre

Concen-tration

Heavy Water Production

Nuclear-related infrastructure: research centers and laboratories without nuclear material

Small Quantities Protocol (SQP)

State eligibility for SQP (GOV/INF/276, Annex B):Little or no nuclear material and

No nuclear material in a nuclear facility

Holds in abeyance most of State’s reporting and access requirements

Does not hold in abeyance:Obligation not to divert nuclear material to proscribed uses

Requirement to establish SSAC

Report annually imports and exports of nuclear material

Model Additional ProtocolModel Protocol Additional

to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and

the International Atomic Energy Agency

for the Application of Safeguards INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)

Model Additional Protocol

• Approved by the Board in May 1997• Model for CSA States: must accept all measures• Other States encouraged to conclude APs: need

not accept all measures• 127 States with CSAs brought into force APs and

all NWSs have an AP in force (by January 2016)

What is an Additional Protocol?

A protocol to any safeguards agreement – not free standing

Standardized model (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.))

Board of Governors approval required for each AP

Signed by the State and the Director General

Entry into force: Upon signature

Upon receipt of notification by the Agency

Can be implemented provisionally pending entry into force

Additional Protocol: New Tools

More complete information about a State’s nuclear fuel cycle

Broader (but not unlimited) access to locations within a State

New administrative measures

Complementary Access: Where and Why?

• Any place on a site Art. 5.a.(i)

• Other places where nm declared to be Art. 5.a.(ii)

Decommissioned facilities/LOFs Art.5.a.(iii)

• Other locations declared by State (R&D, functionally related) Art. 5.b.

• Other locations for ES Art. 5.c.

To assure the absence of undeclared

nuclear material and activities**

(Art. 4.a.(i))

** includes resolution of questions and inconsistencies

To confirm decommissioned status

(Art. 4.a.(iii))

To resolve questions or

inconsistencies(Art. 4.a.(ii))

Safeguards Coverage: CSAs with APs

WEAPONIZATION

ReprocessingMiningOre

Concen-tration

Con-version

Enrichment

Fuel Fab.

Reactors and CAs

Spent Fuel Storage

PU

Heavy Water Production

HEU

Nuclear-related infrastructure: research centers and laboratories

without nuclear material

Expanded coverage with an Additional Protocol

Waste Storage

Waste StorageSafeguards coverage under a Comprehensive

Safeguards Agreement

Legal Authority – INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540

Safeguards Coverage under CSAs with APs, cont’d

Evolution of IAEA Safeguards System

* Integrated safeguards is defined as an optimized combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA under CSA and AP to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency’s safeguards obligations within the available resources.

SG State-Level Approach/ConceptDesigned for each State – combination of SG approaches

for the specific facility types present in the State taking into account:

State SG evaluation;

State nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure;

Interaction between facilities; and

Other State’s specific features (predictable use of nuclear material, tell-tale traces in the environment, etc…)

In State-Level concept (SLC) national nuclear program is considering as a whole (past, present and future) with interface of all nuclear activities. SLC also provides:o More information about locations and activitieso More access to locations of interesto New technical measures (environmental sampling, remote

monitoring, satellite imaginary , etc…)

What is Needed to Implement Safeguards?

Ensuring that legislation and regulations are in place

Ensuring that legal framework is consistent with State’s international obligations

Ensuring that the SSAC has adequate:Authority

Independence

Human resources

Financial resources

Four main stages for SGs implementation

SGs were applied in 181 States, 173 of these States with CSAs, five have voluntary offer agreements and three have item-specific safeguards agreements • At the end of 2015, Additional Protocols were in force in 127 States • 1 ,286 nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities (LOFs) were under IAEA safeguards • 2 ,118 in-field inspections, 623 design information verifications and 64 complementary accesses were conducted, constituting 13,248 calendar days in the field for verification • Almost 800,000 nuclear material accountancy reports were received• By the end of 2015, the Agency had 1,416 cameras connected to 863 systems operating at 266 facilities in 35 States • 407 satellite images were acquired • 132.5 million euros were allocated to the regular budget and 43.3 million euros were provided in extra budgetary contributions • 883 people (793 staff and 90 contractors) worked in the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA * Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) 2015

Some key IAEA SGs activities (2015) *

New challenges facing IAEA SG systemØ Nuclear power and nuclear technologies are expanding and will

likely continue to do so. More nuclear facilities and material come under IAEA safeguards;

Ø Number of safeguards agreements and additional protocols entering into force is increasing, while the IAEA SG’s budget does not;

Ø Renewed drive on the part of (a few) states as well as non-state actors seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and nuclear “knowhow”;

Ø Big challenges to effective IAEA safeguards and their further evolution are not purely technical (Iraq, Iran, Syria, DPRK cases, etc…)

1. IAEA Safeguards system is an essential component of the Nuclear nonproliferation regime;

2. Safeguards evolution during nearly 60 years shows that its independent verification allows to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all;

3. The IAEA is committed to continuing to work closely with States to ensure the rigorous, transparent and non-discriminatory implementation of safeguards;

4. New challenges facing the Agency, including political aspects, demand the optimization of SG’s activities and adequate response to new threats.

Summary

Special thanks to I.Suseanu (IAEA) for kind assistance Questions?