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Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International CooperationAuthor(s): Brett Ashley LeedsSource: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Oct., 1999), pp. 979-1002Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2991814.

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DomesticPolitical nstitutions,CredibleCommitments,ndInternational ooperationBrett shley eeds,FloridaStateUniversityI considerhe nfluencefdomesticoliticalnstitutionsnthe bilityf eadersoes-tablish ilateralooperationnthe nternationalystem.eadersperatingndifferentdomesticnstitutionalnvironmentsave ifferingbilitieso ommitrediblyofuturecoursesf ction,o ccepthe osts fpolicy ailures,nd o djusto hangesn hen-ternationalnvironment.sing ame heory,deduce ypothesesbout he ffectsfdomesticnstitutionaltructuresn the ikelihoodfcooperation.ymodeluggeststhatointly emocraticyads nd ointlyutocraticyadswill ooperate ore eadilythan yads omposedf nedemocracynd ne utocracy.nalysisfCOPDAB ventsdata evealsvidenceommensurateithhese ypotheses.his esearchuggestshatinternationalooperationheory illbenefitromonsiderationf henfluencefdo-mesticoliticsn eaders'ecisions,ut hat hisnfluencean nly e fullynderstoodin he ontextf trategicehaviorn he nternationalystem.

1. DOMESTIC OLITICSAND NTERNATIONALOOPERATIONIn recent ears, cholars f nternationalelations avefocused onsid-erable ttentionnthe nfluence f domestic olitics n internationalehav-ior. One example of thisrenewed nterestn the second mage s the argu-ment hat haracteristicsypical f democratic olitical ystems dvantagestatesnmaking redible ommitmentsnthe nternationalrena Cowhey,1993; Fearon, 1994; Gaubatz, 1996; McGillivray ndSmith,1998). Ifde-mocracies remore apable of guaranteeingheir wnfuture ehavior nd fthis bility s crucial to achieving ooperation nder narchy,hen tmayfollowthatdemocracies xhibitmorecooperative ehavior n the nterna-tional ystem.nthis rticle examine his otentialelationshiphroughhelogicof a simplemodelof cooperation,nd come to conclusions hat fferpartial upport or hecontentionsn the iterature,ut hat lso suggest hatprevious hinkings incomplete.Myresearch uggests hat ntegrationflevelsofanalysis swarranted;tate evelfactors o have an influence n theThe author hanks avid Davis,Pat James,AndrewKydd,WalterMattli, im McKeown,SaraMcLaughlinMitchell,Will Moore, CliffMorgan,JimMorrow, ill Reed, Dan Reiter, vanRingquist,ruceRussett, lastairmith, uzanneWerner,hris orn, ndthree eviewersor elp-ful uggestions. ortionsfthis rticle raw nComprehendingooperation: redibleCommit-ments nd nternationalelationsPh.D. dissertation,mory niversity,998).A replicationatasetmaybeobtainedthttp://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/-aleeds.American ournal fPolitical cience,Vol. 43, No. 4,October 999,Pp. 979-1002 @1999 bytheMidwest olitical cienceAssociation

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980 Brett shley eedsability nd willingness f state eadersto coordinate olicy nternationally.Atthe same time,however,myresearch uggests hatdrawing onclusionsregardingnternationalnteractionasedonthedomestic olitics f a singlestate s also inappropriate.nstead,nternationalolicy oordinations betterunderstood s an outcomeof strategicnteractionmong state eaders re-sponding o bothdomestic nd nternationalonstraintsnd mperatives.My article roceedsnfour teps.First, offer simplemodelofdyadiccooperation n the nternationalystem.Neoliberal institutionalistsavenoted hat he ack ofexternalnforcementn the nternationalystemmayimpede ooperation ecausecheatingndopportunisticbrogationre diffi-cult oprevente.g.,Axelrod ndKeohane,1986).When ncentives xistforunilateralefection nd when uchbehavior as thepotentialoprove ostlyto partnerso agreements, utually eneficial ooperationmaybeprecludedby the nability f state eadersto guarantee heir wnfuture ehavior. hemodel present aptures hefact hat ecisions o formgreementsrebasedinpart n actors' xpectations egardingheprobabilityhat greements illbe fulfilled. he decisions oform greementsnd to fulfillgreementsrenotseparate ecisions, ut nextricablyinked see also Downs, Rocke,andBarsoom, 1996; Fearon, 1998). Cooperative greementswith low prob-ability fbeingfulfilledre unlikelyo be formed,nd thus he ikelihood fcooperations driven othby the bility nd willingness f states o assuagefearsofopportunismnd theability ndwillingness fstates oacceptre-maining isks.Next, explainthe meansthroughwhich the structures f domesticpolicy-making rocesses ystematicallyffecthe ncentives acedbystateleadersacting nternationally.ccording omy argument,ariance ndo-mestic ccountabilitynd theflexibility ithwhichpoliciescan be formu-latedandadjusted ffecthechoicesthat tate eadersmake nattemptingocoordinate olicy nternationally.ecause leaders n democracies xperi-ence costs from oreign olicyfailures ndfind tdifficulto alterpolicyquickly, hey ind othbreaking romises ndbeing exploited yothers obe undesirable olicy outcomes. Democraticexecutives xperience ostsfrom otfollowing hrough na planned ourseof action nd find tdifficultto adjustquicklyto changing ircumstancesn the nternationalnviron-ment.As a result,heir ommitmentsre ikely o be credible,ndthey eekto form nly ecure greements.ince autocratic tates end obe character-ized bymorepolicy-making lexibilitynd lower evels ofdomestic on-straint,eaders an adjustmorequickly ndeasilytochanges n the nterna-tional nvironment.s a result, hey ave moredifficultyuaranteeingheirownfuture ehavior,butthey re more ikelyto accept agreementswithsome risk fabrogation.Third, derive omparative-staticsypothesesromhegame regardingthe ikelihood fdyadic ooperation mong tateswith aryingomestic o-

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DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL OOPERATION 981

litical structures. oth ointlydemocratic nd ointly utocratic yads aremore ikely o form greementshan re dyadscomposedof one democracyand one autocracy. he domestic ccountabilityfdemocraticeaders nd thelack of policy-making lexibilityharacteristicf democratic nstitutionalstructures ake t easierfordemocratic tates o assureothers f their utureintentions. hus, ointlydemocraticdyads find t easier to overcometheproblems ssociated with he ack of external nforcementf internationalagreements. he tendency ordemocracies o fulfill ommitmentsnd thedifficultieshey ace naltering olicy uickly, owever,make hem eluctantto enter nto greementshat hey earmaybe broken;ointly utocratic y-ads arewilling o form greementshat democracywould not ccept.Theresult s that tateswith imilar tructuresind t easierto cooperatewith neanotherhan o stateswith ifferentnternalnstitutionalesigns.Finally, test hese hypotheses egarding herelationship etweenre-gimetype nd nternationalooperation sing vents ata from heConflictand Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) dataset Azar, 1993). The evidenceiscommensurate ith hehypotheses. find hatdomestic olitical tructure,and particularlyyadic imilarityndomestic tructure,oes haveanimpacton levels ofcooperationnd thatbothointlydemocratic nd ointly uto-cratic yadstend oward igher verage evels ofcooperationhando stateswith ifferentomestic olitical tructures.The lessons of thisresearchreas follows. nternationalooperationsfundamentallyn interactiverocess.No attributefa singlestate rindi-vidualdecision anlogically xplain noutcome hat equires heparticipa-tionofat leasttwo states.Atthesame time,however, spectsof domesticpolitics an help us to understandnternationalutcomes ftheyhelp toex-plainthe nterests,ctions, ndexpectationsfstate eaders.The researchpresented ere uggests hat he ncentivesnd constraintsreated or tateleadersbytheir omestic olitical nstitutionsre relevant orunderstandinginternationalooperation, ut hat full ppreciationf their ffectsequiresintegratingn understandingf these ncentiveswith n understandingfstrategicehavior.

2. A MODEL OF COOPERATIONAccording o Keohane (1984), cooperation ccurs when actors djusttheir ehavior hrough processofpolicy oordination.olicycoordinationmayhavethepotentialoresultnmutual enefit,utthesebenefits annotbe achievedwithoutctiveeffort;he nterests f the actors renot n har-mony.Because mutual enefits possiblewhenpolicy s coordinated,tateleaderswishtocooperate, utthecondition fanarchyn the nternationalsystemmaymakecooperationdifficulto achieve. In some interactions,statescan receiveshort-termnilateral enefits y defecting rom gree-mentsdespitethe ong-term esirability f mutualcooperation. n these

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982 Brett shley eedsinstances,he isks fcheatingnd brogationoom arge; ooperatione-quires ctors oconvincethershathey ave oth he bilitynd he ncen-tive obehave s promised.When ctors re deciding hethero propose ndform greementsocoordinateolicy, hey onsider he ikelihoodhat he greementillbefulfillednd he osts obe borne hould he greemente broken.herisksand osts ssociated ith nilateralefectionromnagreementrenot ni-form;ftheres no ncentiveor heatingrabrogationr fsuch pportu-nistic ehaviorscostlessoothers,ackof xternalnforcementhould otimpede ooperation.f,however,ctors elieve hat n agreementillnotbeadequatelynforcednd hat onfulfillmentscostly,heyre ess ikelyto engagenpolicy oordination,ven f tmight ffermutual enefitsfcomplianceould eenforced.hus ounderstandhe hoices f tateead-ers oformooperativegreementsndto commitopolicy oordination,wemust nderstandheirxpectationsegardingompliance ithhe ermsof he greement.I approachhis ask hroughhe se ofgame heory.hegame icturedin Figure is a simplifiedepresentationf the tepsnvolvednpolicycoordination.t s a two-playerame fcompletenformation;he ayoffsreceived y each playerfrom ach outcome re common nowledge.Throughbservinghe nternaltructurendpoliticalnvironmentfthenegotiatingartner,nternationalctors evelop trong ypothesesboutthe osts ndbenefitsnticipatedytheirounterparts.hegame s notgameofperfectnformation,owever; layersreoccasionallyncertainabout he ctions f heirounterparts.s a result,he ame oesallow orthe tudyndunderstandingfthe mpact fstrategicncertaintynthelikelihoodf ooperation.2

Theprocessfpolicyoordinationsrepresentedntwo teps. irst,hetwo ctorsiandj)make decision hetheroformnagreement.3chooseswhetheropropose ooperation,ndjchooseswhethero ccept rrejectheagreement.f he greementsformed,and decidewhetheroupholdheirobligationsnderhe greement.tthe ime achdecideswhethero fulfillIMany cholars egin heir tudies f cooperation ith he ssumptionhat ctors acepayoffstructuresharacteristicfprisoners' ilemma. he formulationf themodelpresentedere llowsfor he epresentationf numberfdifferentx 2 games hroughariancenthe ayoff arameters.2I assume hat ll players reriskneutral. y useofthe erm isk hroughouthis aper efersto the nformationituationhat ccurswhenplayers now heprobabilityf eachoutcome,ndmore han ne outcome as a probabilityfoccurringetween and 1. do notmake ssumptionsaboutvariancen the hapes fplayers' tilityunctions.nlessvariancen attitudesoward isk shighly orrelated ith ariance n domestic olitical nstitutions,yhypotheseshouldbe unaf-fected ythis implifyingssumption.3Themodel ppliesnot nly oformal greementsut lso s intendedo apply o decisions ocoordinateolicymore enerally.

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DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONALCOOPERATION 983Figure .AModel ofCooperation

FORMATIONOFAGREEMENT (RI-Hi, jHj)

D (0-SrHi,Ri+TrKrHj)A , c (R,+TrKrHi,O-SrHj)

(0-Hi,0-Hj) (0-KOHiO-KrHj)-P

(0,0)

PAYOFFPARAMETERSR BenefitomutualooperationT Marginalenefitounilateralefectioncompared omutualooperation)S Cost ufferedy ctor ue o unilateralefectionypartnerK Cost obreakingcommitment

lH Cost onegotiation

theagreement, either nowswhether heotherhas chosentocooperate rdefect.fthey oth lecttofollow hroughntheir romises,he greementis fulfilled.44I haverepresentedhefulfillmentubgame s a one-shot ameof simultaneoushoice.Theassumptionf simultaneoushoice s intended orepresenthefact hat ponforminghe gree-

ment, eitherctor nowswhetherhe ther ctorwillcooperate rdefect; ach actor orms xpec-tations ithout nowledgef the ther'sctions. lthought s certainlyhe ase that ome gree-mentswill be fulfilledhroughseries frepeated teps nvolvinghe ame ncentivesan iteratedgame),many greementsre not haracterizedysuch process. eadersmaygetone chance ofulfillnagreement;f he greementsnot ulfilled,t s obsolete ndmust ereplaced. omepos-sibleexamples re decisions o assist n allywhen onflictrises rdecisions o adhere o a peacetreaty.hefindings resentederemaybe sensitive o the tructurefthefulfillmentubgame;beginwith parsimoniousepiction.

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984 Brett shley eedsFormal iscussionf he quilibrias reservedor he ppendix,ut heintuitions as follows.Whetherhe layerslect oform given greement

depends artiallyn theirxpectationsegardinghe ikelihoodhat heagreementillbe fulfilled.ctors illnot ormn agreementhatheyx-pectwillbebroken; oing o would lways emore ostlyhanhe tatusquo.When he ctors elieve potentialgreementillbeupheld,heyormthe greementf he enefitsf ooperationxceed he osts nvolvednne-gotiatinghe greement;f hererebenefitsocooperationndnoreasonofear oncompliance,ooperations notmpeded.5ometimes,owever,heactors renot ertain hethern agreementillbefulfilled;hey nownlythe robabilityithwhichtwillbe fulfilled. hen he ctors reuncertainwhetherhe bligationsftheproposed greementillbemet, he ctorsconsiderhe robabilityffulfillment,he osts fa failedgreement,ndthe enefitsf uccessfulooperationndeciding hetheromake he eal.Translatinghese ctionsnto utcomes, e can conclude hatwe willnot bserve he ormationf agreementshat he ctors recertainrenotenforceable.greementshatreformedave ome robabilityfbeing ul-filled. t he ame ime,ecause ctorsometimesormgreementshatheyareuncertainillbeupheld, edowitnesshe ailuref ome greements.Actors evelop heirxpectationsegardinghe ikelihoodffulfillmentbased nthe elationshipsmong nly few arameters.or achplayer,fthe ost ssociated ith reakingpromiseK) isgreaterhan oth he ostbornef he therlayer efectsnilaterallyS) and he enefitodefectingunilaterallyT),the layer as a dominanttrategyfcooperation;he ostofbreakinghe greementxceeds oth hebenefitobreakingtandthecost ufferedromooperatingvenf partnerheatsrreneges.imilarly,if he ost ssociated ith reakingpromiseK) is lessthan he ost orne

if he therlayerefectsnilaterallyS) and he enefitfdefectingnilat-erally T), theplayer asa dominanttrategyfdefection.fat eastoneplayer as dominanttrategy,he layersandeterminehetherhe gree-ment illbe fulfilledithertainty.Whenneitherlayer as a dominanttrategy,owever,he ctors reuncertain hetherhe greementillbefulfilled.achplayer's referredaction ependsn the hoice fthe therlayer.or nstance,layer maywish ocooperatefplayer cooperates,ut efectfplayer defects.layerj maynot hink nilateralefectionsbetterhanmutualooperation,utmay ear eing hevictimfdefection-theucker ayoff ay e very n-desirable. ecan maginehathis ircumstanceightxist,ornstance,n

'Under complete nformation,here re no costs to determining hichproposalswill beacceptable.The costs of negotiation efernstead o thecosts of generatingnd institutingheagreement.

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DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONSAND INTERNATIONALCOOPERATION 985

the ecisionouphold ceasefire.he eadersmay oth referot ofight,butmay ear eing hevictim fa firsttrike.imilarncentives ightc-companyn arms-reductiongreement.oth idesmay referodisarmutfear he esult hould ither isarmndfindhe ther adnot. f playerdoesnotknow t the ime he greements proposed hetherlayerwillcooperaterdefectbecause layeris simultaneouslyryingoguesswhatplayer willdo), neitherlayer nowswhetherhe greementillbe suc-cessfullypheld. achplayer oesknowhe osts ndbenefitshat he ndher artner ill xperienceiven achpotentialutcomefthegame; s aresult,achplayermakes decision hetheroformhe greementased nthe robabilityf achoutcome nder mixedtrategyquilibrium.6o de-terminehedesirabilityfforminghe greement,layers eigh heprob-abilityffulfillmentnd he enefitsffulfillmentgainsthe robabilityfnonfulfillmentndthe osts fnonfulfillment;n other ords, heplayersdetermineheirxpectedtilityor his robabilisticutcome. hen he o-tentialenefitsutweighhe isks,he ctorslect oformnagreementhatmay eupheldrmay e broken.As the enefitounilateralefectionnd he ost ufferedrom part-ner's nilateralefectionecreasenrelationothe ost fbreakingcom-mitment,greementulfillmentecomesmoreikely.When or oth layersthe ostofbreakingcommitments greaterhan hebenefitounilateraldefectionndthe ost ufferedrom partner'snilateralefection,oop-erationsnot mpededy he ack f xternalnforcement;heres no ncen-tive or heatingr abrogation.nderhese onditions,hethern agree-ment s formedepends nly nthe elationshipetween hebenefitsfmutual ooperationndthe osts fnegotiatinghe greement. hen hebenefitsocooperationutweighhe osts fnegotiatingnagreement,cooperativegreements formedndfulfilled.Whathis quilibriumf hemodel uggestssthatwhen eitherlayerhas anyncentiveo defect nilaterallyromn agreement,eneficialoop-erationhould ccurwith ittle ifficulty.nteractionshat implynvolvecoordinationonot equirepecial uards gainstefection,ndwhile heymay e inhibitedydisputesver hedistributionfbenefits,heyrenotimpededy he ack f xternalnforcement.nteractionsnvolvingonspe-cific ssets hat ose ittleonocost ssociated ith partner'sefectionrealso ess ikelyorequirexternalnforcement.imilarly,ctors ho xpe-rience igh omesticoliticalosts romreakingommitmentsrwho t-tributeigh alue o an nternationaleputationor rustworthinessillbeable to achieve ooperativeutcomes ithoutxternalnforcement;heseactorsxperienceigh osts romreakingommitments.

6Please ee themathematicalppendix or urtheriscussion.

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986 Brett shley eedsIt salso possible or greementsobe formed hen layersreunsurethat he greementsillbe fulfilled.ftheplayers oldpositive xpectedutilitiesor he robabilisticutcomend hese xpected tilitiesxceed hecosts fnegotiation,heplayers illelect oformhe greement.notherwords, layers illformgreementshen he robabilityhat heywillre-ceivebenefitssworthhepossibilityhatheywill ufferosts.tfollows,therefore,hatome greementsillbe formednd ater roken.tateead-ersdo not, owever,ormgreementshathey re ertain illbe broken.Actors onsiderhe ikelihoodhat n agreementillbe fulfillednde-termininghetheroform he greement.omepossibilityfcheatingrabrogation ay e considerednacceptableisk, nd husome greementswillbe formedhat re ater roken.greementshat reformed,owever,should ave reasonablyigh robabilityfbeing ulfilledfnonfulfillmentimposesosts.tfollows,herefore,hatffeaturesfstates rofdyadsn-fluenceheikelihoodhatgreementsillbe fulfilled,hese eatureshouldbe influentialndetermininghe ikelihoodhat state r a dyadwillformcooperativegreementsobeginwith.nthenextection,examinehe o-tentialinks etweenomesticoliticaltructurend he redibilityf nter-nationalommitments.

3. DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONSANDCREDIBLE COMMITMENTSDomestic oliticaltructuresary long everal imensionshat houldaffecthe bilitiesfstatesomake redibleommitmentsnd hewilling-ness f tates o nterntonternationalgreements.nthe ollowingiscus-sion considerhe ffectsftwo fthese imensionsnturn:ccountabilityandflexibility.7Most rgumentshat elate omestic oliticaltructureothe bility fstatesomake redibleommitmentsmphasizehedegreeo which tateleaders reheld ccountableya domestic opulationor heirctions.nstateswith igher egreesndbroaderanges fpoliticalccountability,stateeadersremoreikelyofacedomesticoliticalosts or reakingn-ternationalommitments.here retwomechanismshrough hich c-countabilityiscouragesefection.irst,eadersufferomesticudiencecosts or olicy acillation.econd, omesticoalitionsevelophat enefitfromnternationalonditionsndwould ufferrom changenpolicy;when ccountabilityshigh, he nterestsfthese oalitions ave n nflu-enceonpolicy. hus, here rebothhort-runnd ong-runactorshatn-courage onsistencynpolicy.

7Variancenthe ransparencyfthe olicy-makingrocessmay lso affecthe bilityndwill-ingness f tate eaders oform ndfulfillnternationalgreementsCowhey, 993;Gaubatz, 996).Becausethemodelpresentedere s a gameofcompletenformation,cannot xamine he nflu-enceofvariancen transparencyn thebehaviorf eaders.

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DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONALCOOPERATION 987Fearon1994)relies n the oncept fdomesticudienceosts o ex-plain he emocraticeace.Fearon bserveshat hen leadermakes hreatsand ngagesnhighlyonflictualctivity ith rival, henational onorsseen obe at take.npoliticalystemsnwhicheaders reheld ccountablefor heirctions,ach evel fcrisis scalationesultsnthe otentialor n-creasing omesticudienceosts or ackingown.Asa resultfthe ostsfaced romackingown rompublic tatementr ction, ighlyccount-able eaders re ikelyofollowhroughnthreats;hen heyscalate rises,their illingnessouseforcencreases ecause hangingolicy ecomesmoreostly.While earon's rimaryntentions toexplainhe evelopmentf risesinvolvinghreatsftheuse offorce,nhisconclusion e ndicates beliefthat he pproachs more enerallypplicable.He argues hat lliancesamong emocratictatesre lso essrisky,s leaderswould ncur omesticcostsfor eneging.mith1998) endogenizeshese udience osts nhismodel f risis ehaviorn he ontextf domestice-electionrocess,x-plaininghat ueto nformationsymmetriesnd heneed or lectoratesorely nobservationsfpolicyutcomesoudge eader ompetence,eaderswhodesire e-electionave n ncentiveot o make romisesheywillnot

fulfill;hus,hepromiseshey omake rehighlyredible.rzeworski,nhisdiscussionfdemocracynd conomiceform,uggestshat emocraticleaders ay price or ot ollowinghroughnpublic olicy eclarations.He states,Confidences a stock: tcanbedepletednd tcanbe accumu-lated.tcanbe eroded ntwoways:byerroneousorecastsndbyvacilla-tions Przeworski,991, 68).For eaders fdemocracies,nce public ommitmentsmade, changeinpolicy ecomes ndesirable.hecompetencef eadersmay e udgednpart yconsistencynpolicy ndwillingnessouphold ommitments.democraticeader hould ear ensureor reakingpublic greement,ornot ollowinghroughn a stated ourse faction, or acking own ndriskinghenational onor.hispotentialomesticudience ostmakes e-fectionessdesirableor hateadernd ooperationessriskyorhe tate'spartners.Inaddition,nce greementsave eennstituted,ubnationalctors d-justtheir ehavioro that hey eceive hemost enefitromovernmentpolicy.or xample,free-tradegreementncourageshe evelopmentndincreaseshepower ffirmshat enefitromree radeLipson,1983).These ctors ome oserve s a supportingoalition,making changenpolicyessdesirableor emocratictateeaders howish omaintainoliti-cal supportromhese roups. ogowski1989)claims hatnternationalpolicies ave causal ffectnfutureomesticoliticalleavagesndpowerrelations;hosewhobenefitromnternationalonditionsre trengthened

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988 Brett shley eedspolitically.ormingnd nstitutingn agreementhus esultsna changenincentivesor emocraticxecutiveshat educes he robabilityfalteringpolicy.While heremaybe exceptions,emocratictates regenerallyx-pected obe characterizedyhigher egreesfpoliticalccountabilityhanautocratictates. emocraticolicy-makingrocedureslso tend ofeaturechecks ndbalances hat educe he peed ndease withwhich tates anreverse ajor oreign-policyommitmentsCowhey, 993;Gaubatz, 996).Policymakingndemocratictates ends o be slow ndmethodicalnd oexhibit significanttatusuobias.Democraticeaders avemuchessflex-ibilityo alter olicy rasticallyhan o theirutocraticounterparts.s aresult,nce greementsre reatednd mplemented,hey remoreikely obemaintained.It s an oldthemen nternationalelationshat he eaderwith heeastautonomynd hemost omesticonstraintss advantagedn nternationalbargainingSchelling, 960;Putnam,988).Fearon, owhey,ndGaubatzfollownthis radition,rguinghatheeaderswith heeast utonomyillbe most uccessfultencouragingooperationecause f heirreaterbil-ity ocommitrediblyo course f ction. hey eason hatfdemocraciesareadvantagednmakingredibleommitmentsnd fthe bilityomakecredible ommitmentss crucial oestablishingooperation ithoutn-forcement,henweshouldxpecthat emocraciesindteasier oachievecooperationndernarchy.ome mpiricalnalyses ave entupporto heclaim hat emocratictatesxhibitighevels f nternationalooperation(SiversonndEmmons, 991;Leeds ndDavis,1999).Yet,wecan magine otentialdvantagesodomesticutonomys well.Autonomyllows lexibleesponse,hichskey o mplementingtrategiesofreciprocityMilner, 992).Reciprocity,thasbeen hown,anencouragethe mergencefcooperationAxelrod,984).Flexibletatesanrespondmore asily othe ctionsf heirnternationalounterpartsndmay ufferless from changenthenternationalnvironment,ornstancerom de-fectionya dyadic artner. oreflexible tatesmaybewilling oformagreementshat emocratictates ould void.This uggestsmore omplicatedelationshipetweenxecutiveon-straintnd ooperation.omesticudience osts or enegingnd low,me-thodicalolicy-makingrocesses aymake nternationalounterpartsorewillingo enternto greementsith state, ut heymay lso affecthewillingnessfthe tate nquestionoaccept hepossibilityhat nagree-mentwill notbe fulfilled. hiledemocraciesmight e better t makingcredibleommitments,heymay indtmore ifficultomake ny ommit-ments. utocratictates, ith heir reateregreefpolicy lexibility,ayfind ome hance funilateralefectioncceptable.hroughhe pplication

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DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONALCOOPERATION 989of hemodel f ooperationevelopedbove,we canexaminehe ogic ndimplicationsfvariancen eader ccountabilityndpolicy-makinglexibil-ity or trategicehaviornthe nternationalystem.

4. THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONSON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONBy makingssumptionsbout he elationshipsetween omestic o-litical nstitutionsnd ome fthe ayoffarametersn thegame, can de-velophypothesesbout he ypesfdyads hat re east ikely o find oop-eration ifficultithout echanismsor nforcement.ased on the bovediscussion,assume hat omesticoliticaltructureffectswo f he ost/benefitarametersnthemodel.First, assume hat tates hat eaturehigheregrees f ccountabilityodomesticroupsdemocracies)acehighcosts or reakingromises.econd, assume h-attatesharacterizedymore lexibleolicy-makingpparatusesautocracies)uffereasonablyowcosts rom partner'snilateralefectionecause hey anmore uicklyandeasily djust ochangesnthe nternationalnvironment.ncontrast,autocraciesufferow osts romreakingromises,nddemocraciesufferhigh osts rom partner'sefection.additionallyssume hat omestic

politics sserts greater roportionalnfluencenthe osts o breakingcommitmentshannthe osts ufferedromnilateralefection.hile hecosts ufferedrom changen the nternationalnvironmenthould arywith he lexibilityfthe tate olicy-makingpparatus,hese osts emainlargely ependentncharacteristicsfthe nteraction.egardlessftheirabilitiesoadjust olicies, e canassume hat tates uffer ore romomedefectionshan thers. or nstance, surprisettackepresentingpart-ner's efectionn a cease-firegreement ightemore ostly han failureto containnflations promisednanagreementesignedomanage x-changeates. ndyet,tmay till e the ase that neitherssue, emocraticleaderswouldfind djustingo thenewenvironmentarticularlyostly,whetherhe djustmentnvolved ilitaryefense rmonetaryolicy.Therelationshipsetweenhe osts obreakingromisesK),the ostssufferedrompartner'snilateralefectionS), and he enefitsfunilat-eraldefectionT) for oth layers eterminehethergreementsreful-filled. greementsrefulfilledheneverhe osts fbreakingcommit-ment regreaterhan oth he enefitsounilateralefectionndthe ostssufferedrom partner'snilateralefectionor oth layers. s the ostsassociated ith reakingcommitmentncrease,ctorsremoreikelyomeet heirbligations.ecause have ssumed hat emocratictatesufferhigh osts or reakingommitments,ndbecause assume hat he nflu-ence of domesticolitics nK is strongerhan he nfluencef domesticpolitics nS, interactionsetweenwodemocraciesremostikely o be

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990 Brett shley eedscharacterizedythis elationshipmong hese ayoff arameters.llelsebeing qual, greementsormedytwodemocraciesremoreikelyo befulfilled,nd greementsormedy ointlyutocraticyads ndmixed y-adsare ess ikelyobefulfilled.When ctors xpect greementso befulfilled,greementsreformedwheneverhebenefitsfcooperationrepositivendexceed he osts fnegotiation.hese renot he nly onditions,owever,nder hich gree-mentsreformed.nternationalctors ill ormgreementshatheyrenotcertain illbe fulfilledf he xpectedenefitsxceed he osts.When lay-ersknowhat heressome robabilityhatbligationsnder he greementwillbemet, ut hat his robabilitys neither nor , each actor ecideswhetheroformhe greementydeterminingfthepotentialenefitsfachievinggoodoutcome arrantcceptinghe ossibilityfa less desir-ableoutcome.A discussion fthe ormalomparativetaticsnalysiss reservedorthemathematicalppendix.ngeneral, owever,hen ll else sequal, u-tocratictatesremoreikely otake hancesnforminggreementshatmaynot efulfilled.ecausedemocratictatesxperienceigh osts rombreakinggreementsndfrom partner'spportunism,emocraticeadersare ess ikely han heirutocraticounterpartso enternto nsecureoop-erativerrangements.ecause he osts f a failedgreementrehigh ordemocraticeaders,heyre ess ikely o udgethe hance f a desirableoutcome obe worthhepossibilityfan undesirableutcome. utocraticleaders, ecause heirosts romailed greementsrecomparativelyow,aremoreikelyoexpect ositivetilityromnuncertainutcome.mpor-tantly,his esult s dependentnassumptionsbout othK andS, bothaudience osts ndtheflexibilityfpolicymaking. emocraciesmaybeadvantagednmakingredibleommitments,ut heyre lsomorewaryfmakingommitmentshatheyreuncertainillbefulfilled.Given he ssumptionsbout he elationshipetweenomesticnstitu-tional tructurend wo ayoffarameters,herefore,e canderive he ol-lowing eneralonclusionsrom hemodel. irst, emocraciesanmakemoreredibleommitments.s a result,ooperationmong emocraciessless ikelyobeimpeded yfears fopportunisticehavior.econd, efec-tions romgreementsillbe more ommonnointlyutocraticyadshanin ointlyemocraticyads. his onclusionerives romhewillingnessfautocraciesoselect hemselvesnto greementsith greaterhance fabrogation.hird,ecause emocraciesremoreikelyohavencentivesofulfillgreements,akinghemelf-enforcing,ndbecause utocraciesrewillingoformgreementshat emocracies ould onsideroorisky,othjointlyemocraticnd utocraticyadswillformmoregreementshan y-

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DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONALCOOPERATION 991

ads composed ofone democracy nd one autocracy.8hose dyads that recomposed f one democracynd oneautocracy ind ooperation nder nar-chy difficultecause theautocracynthedyad s less likely o have certainincentive o fulfill he greement,nd thedemocracys less likely o acceptthepossibility f potential efection. nteractionsndyads containing nedemocracyndone autocracy houldresultncomparativelyow levels ofcooperation ecause uncertaintyegardingulfillments unappealing o de-mocracies.These conclusions uggest hefollowing ypotheses hat an betested mpirically:HI: Jointlyemocraticyadswill ngagencomparativelyigh evels fco-operation.H2: Jointlyutocraticyadswill ngagenhigherevels fcooperationhandyads omposed fonedemocracynd neautocracy.H3: Dyads omposedfonedemocracyndone autocracy illfind hem-pedimentsocooperationtrongest;heywill ngagen ower evels fcoop-erationhantates ith imilarnternaltructures.

These arethehypotheseshat re tested elow.5. TESTING THE HYPOTHESESSelecting domain or nempiricalest fthesehypothesess challeng-ing given he mportancefnonobservations.ecause I argue hat ecisionsto form ooperative greementsre fundamentallyonnected o the ikeli-hoodthat heir bligationswillbe fulfilled,ests hat ncludeonlyformedagreements re inappropriate. mpiricaltestsofcompliancewith gree-ments hat re performedn a sampleofagreementshat tates hoose to

form houldbe biased; thosethat reparticularlynreliablewillneverbeobserved.Whatthismeans s that hedecisiontocooperate nd the success withwhichpolicy s coordinateds promised houldbe studiedointly. he ap-propriateample s all setsof states hatmight ave chosento form coop-erative elationship. ince intentions re unobservable nd such a sample81do notdevelophypothesesegardingherelativeikelihoodf differentquilibriumondi-tions, nd hus cannot ddress he uestionfwhetherointly emocraticr ointlyutocraticairsof stateswillformmore greements;ointly emocraticyads re more ikely o meet neequilib-rium ondition,nd ointly utocraticyads re more ikely o meet notherquilibriumondition.Mixed dyads re ess likely o meet ither f these quilibriumonditions.hus, hehypothesestestedn this aper mphasize he ifferenceetween tateswith imilarnternaltructuresnd hosewith ifferentolitical nstitutions.doexpect hatmore f the greementsormedmong emoc-racieswillbefulfilled.

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992 Brett shley eedscan never e identified,t s necessaryo make ome ssumptionsboutwhich tates re ikely ohave eason o nteract. aoz 1996)hasdone ustthisndefiningach state's oliticallyelevantnternationalnvironment(PRIE) to ncludell contiguoustates nd ll major ndregional owers.Thespatial-temporalomain fthis mpiricalestncludes achpoliticallyrelevantyad or achyear etween953 nd1978; he nit fanalysissthe yadyear.Because am nterestedncapturingoth he xtento which dyadchooses o nteractooperativelynd he uccess tates ave ndoing o (inother ords, oth ormationndfulfillment),use a very eneralmeasuredrawnrom vents ata.Measures f nternationalooperationomefromthe Conflict nd Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) data set (Azar, 1993).COPDAB s aneventsata et hatmeasuresnternationalehaviorhroughthe oding fprimaryews eports.ventsre caled,weightedntermsfintensityy panel f xperts,nd ggregatedoproduce continuous ea-sure f he enor frelationsetweenwo tates. or his roject,nly oop-erativenteractionserencluded.9Values fzero ndicate hathedyad xhibitedocooperativenterac-tions nthe iven ear.nthis nalysis,7percentf he asesengage nnocooperativenteractions.onzero alues ndicatehatt east necoopera-tive ctoccurrednthe yadnthat ear. or his tudy,he ependentari-able s the verageevelofcooperationnthedyadnthegiven ear. e-causethedependentariables the verageevelofcooperation,ighernonzero alues ndicate reaterntensityocooperativects,notgreaterfrequency.hismeasure fthe ependentariables advantageousor woreasons. irst,redible ommitmentsecome ncreasinglymportantormorentenselyooperativects.A theoryasedon credible ommitmentssuggestsfocus n the ntensityfcooperation,atherhanhenumberfacts.Second, ecauseCOPDAB data recollected rom ewsmedia, heinteractionsf ome tates rereportedithmuchmore requencyhanrethose fothers. sing he verageevel fcooperationelps o counteractthis ias.Measures fregime ypewere btained rom hePOLITY III data et(JaggersndGurr, 996). code as ointly emocraticnydyad nwhichboth tates eceive cores f six orhighern the en-pointOLITY III de-mocracycale.Similarly,ointly utocraticyads recomposed f two

9TheCOPDAB cooperationcale ncludes ehaviorsangingromimplemeetingsndsup-portive tatementso economicagreements,militaryollaboration, ndpolitical ntegration.COPDAB events re codedona fifteen-pointcaleandthenweightedocapture ifferencesn n-tensityrom nescalevalueto thenext. o create n averageyearlymeasure fcooperationnadyad, summed heweighted aluesfor heyear nddivided ythenumber fevents.

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states hat recoded ixorhighernthe en-pointutocracycale.Mixeddyads ontain nepartner ith democracycore f at east ix andonewith n autocracycore f t east ix.Inthe ample mployedn this nalysis, 5 percent f thedyads rejointly emocratic,2 percent re ointly utocratic,nd 32 percent remixed. heremainingyads ontain t eastone state hat as unclear rundevelopeduthorityharacteristics;he uthorsf he OLITY dataset e-fer o these tates s anocracies. ecausemyhypothesesoncernhe ela-tionshipetween omesticnstitutionaltructurend nternationalehavior,I cannot evelop ypothesesbout he ehaviorf stateswith ndefinedrundevelopednstitutions.hus, haveno hypothesesbout he ehaviorfanocracies.I begin y examininghemean evels f cooperationor yads om-posed f tates ith emocraticnd utocraticnstitutionaltructures.finda statisticallyignificantelationshipetween egime ype tthedyadiclevel ndaverage evels fcooperation.ully ommensurateith hehy-potheses evelopedbove, yads omposedftwodemocraciesxhibithehighest ean evels fcooperation:.77; dyads omposedftwo utocra-ciesexhibithenext ighestevels: .95; ndmixed yads ngagen ess o-operation:.88.A one-waynalysisfvariance emonstrateshathese if-ferencesnmeans re tatisticallyignificant.Inorder o demonstratehathe elationshipetween egime ype ndcooperations not purious,performtatisticalnalysis ithhree ontrolvariables.irst,controlor tatewealth.Wealthytatesend obewell n-tegratednto henternationalystemnd orequiremanyransnationalies.Asa result, ealthytatesmightngagen more ooperativeehavior,ar-ticularlyith achother,egardlessfregime ype. ocreate measure fwealth,calculate ationalncome er apita sa percentagef heU.S.percapita ationalncome or achyear ased ndata btainedrom ummersandHeston1988) andUSACDA (various ears).'0 yads nwhich othstates aveper apitancomes fat east30percentftheU.S. per apitaincomenthe iven ear re oded s wealthy.Second, consider hepolitical tabilityf the nteractingtates. e-gardlessfdomestictructure,state hat asundergonedramaticndre-cent hangenregime ypemayhavedifficultyssuagingts nternationalpartners'ncertaintybout tsfuturenteractionsMaoz, 1989;Walt, 992).Thus, yadsnwhich oth artnersrepoliticallytable houldngagenmore ooperation.hedatafor his ariable ere btained romhePOL-ITY II data et Gurr, aggers,ndMoore, 989).Dyads re oded s ointly

10USACDA atawereusedtocreatemeasures or ases missingnthe ummersndHestondata et.

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994 Brett shley eedsstable fneitherartnerasundergonechangenpoliticalegime ypentheast ive ears.Third,controlor haredlliances. heformationf militaryllianceis an actrepresentinghigh evel f nternationalooperation.pholdingnalliancend upportingn ally s also a newdecision ocooperate; any l-liance ommitmentsrenot ulfilledSabrosky,980;Siverson ndKing,1980).Thus, t s reasonableo rgue hat llianceshould e capturednthedependentariable atherhan ncludeds a controlariablenthis est. e-cause his mpiricalest s imitedotheColdWar ra,however,ncludingcontrol ariableepresentinghared lliancess anappropriateay ocap-ture he verridingipolar aturef nternationalnteractions.employvariable epresentingharedlliances o serve s a proxy or hared osi-tions nthe ast-Westonflict.hus, expecthat tateshathare llianceswill ngagenhigherevels f ooperationith ne notherecause f heirsimilarnternationalnterests.f findhatfterontrollingor hared lli-ances egimeype ontinuesohave neffectn evels f ooperation,willhavemore onfidencehat nexplanationasedoncommitmentredibilityiswarranted;twillbe less ikely hat hefindingsmerelyn artifactfcommonnterests.

Statisticalnalysis f hese elationshipsequirestechniquehat akesinto ccount nusualharacteristicsf he ata. hedata nclude oth ross-sectional ndtime-seriesomponents,ndbecausemany tates chievedindependenceuringhe eriodovered ythis tudy,henumberfpoliti-cally elevantyads hanges ver ime. use amaximumikelihoodstima-tor hatecognizeshe ross-sectionalnd ime-seriesropertiesf he ata,butdoes notrequire ime-seriesfequal lengths. correct or emporalautocorrelationsing common alue or ho nd pecifyhe seofHuber-White tandardrrors,hichre ppropriatehen eteroskedasticitycrosscases slikely.Theresults f this stimationppear nthefirstolumn fTable 1.Whilewealthy,oliticallytable,nd llied yads oengagenhigherevelsofcooperationhan henorm,he nclusion f these dditional ariablesdoesnot ffecthe rimaryelationshipsetweenegimeypend oopera-tion. he coefficientor achofthedummyariablesepresentingegimetypeharacteristicsshighlyignificant,nd hedifferencesmonghe o-efficientsre tatisticallyignificants well. Jointlyemocraticndointly

III performedWald est ndfound hat hedifferencesmong he oefficientsor hediffer-ent egime ype ategoriesre tatisticallyignificant.tatisticalignificances tobeexpected, ow-ever,withuch largenumberfcases.As a result, also estimatedachofmy hreemodelsmodel1discussed ere ndthe wo dditional odels iscussed elow)with he hree egimeype ummyvariablesncluded ne ata time. hisprocedurellowedme tocompare he oefficientsf each ofthedummies gainst herest f thepopulation.n all cases, I found hat ointly emocraticndjointlyutocraticyads re more ooperativehanmixed yads.

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Table 1. Regime ype nd nternationalooperation,1953-1978Unit fAnalysis: yad-YearModel1 Model2 Model 3Average evelAverage evel Cooperation ofCooperationIndependentariable of Cooperation (1 = Yes;0 = No) if Cooperation0

Jointlyemocratic 3.108** 0.606** 2.847**Dyad (0.408) (0.101) (0.237)Jointly utocratic 3.062** 0.410** 1.335**Dyad (0.275) (0.077) (0.166)MixedRegimeType 2.180** 0.311** 0.563**Dyad (0.255) (0.059) (0.174)JointlyWealthy 0.890* 0.225* 0.616**Dyad (0.394) (0.098) (0.192)Jointlytable 0.728** 0.187** 0.271*Dyad (0.167) (0.034) (0.130)Shared Alliance 4.553** 0.542** 1.541**(0.361) (0.082) (0.159)Constant 3.523 -0.455 10.847N 22,320 22,320 11,815Note: Each cell contains he stimatedoefficientith ts ssociated tandardrroristednparen-theses elow.**indicatestatisticalignificancetthe 001 evel.*indicatestatisticalignificanceat the 05 level.

autocraticyads remost ooperative,ithmixed yads xhibitingowerlevels fcooperation.llofthese ypes fdyads, owever,xhibit ighermeanevels fcooperationhan odyads ontainingtateswith ndefinedpoliticalharacteristics.yads ontainingnocracies ave high robabil-ity f ngagingnnocooperativenteractions.12Infact,henumberfobservationsnthis ata et orwhich ocoopera-tion sobservedoses n additionalhallengeor nalysis.hedata renot1265percent fthe oliticallyelevantyad-yearsnvolvingt east neanocracy ngagen nocooperativenteractions.also conductednalysiswith yads ontainingnocraciesxcluded romthe nalysis atherhan sedas the eferenceategory. ixeddyads howed statisticallyignifi-cant ndnegative elationship ith ooperationompared o the est fthe opulation.othointlydemocraticnd ointly utocratic yads howed statisticallyignificantndpositive elationshipwith ooperationomparedothe est f thepopulation, ith he oefficientor ointly emocraticdyads lightlyargerhan hat or ointly utocratic yads.This wastrue othwhenointly emo-cratic nd ointly utocraticyadswere omparedndividuallyothe est f he opulationndwhentheywere ncludedn the ameequationwithmixed yads s the eferenceategory.

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996 Brett shley eedsnormally istributedue to thehighnumber f zero values. nterpretinghemeaning fa zero value can be challenging.t is possiblethat zero valuerepresentshefact hat tates lectednotto engage npotentially eneficialcooperationdue to concernsregarding ulfillment,r it is possiblethatzerovaluerepresentshefact hat he tates idn'thaveanyreason o believethat ooperationould bebeneficial;notherwords, olicy oordination asviewed as unnecessary. ecause we can never bserveunrealized ossibili-ties, make theassumptionhat tateswouldexpectbenefits rom uccess-fulpolicycoordination n some issue each yearwith tates ntheir oliti-callyrelevant nvironments,ratminimum,hat nticipated enefits rompolicy oordinationreuncorrelated ithmyprimaryndependent ariable,dyadicregime ype. n order o ensure hat poordefinitionfrelevant y-ads is not kewingheresults, owever,ndtoaccount or heunusual tatis-ticaldistributionf thedependent ariable, performnadditional wo tageanalysis.First, conduct logistic egression nalysis fthe ikelihood fcoop-erativenteraction,ontinuingo accountforpaneldatacharacteristics.orthisportion ftheanalysis, hedependent ariable s coded zero if thedy-adic level ofcooperations zero and one if the verage evel ofcooperationin thedyadfor hegivenyear s greater han ero.Thismodel allows me todetermine hether he ndependent ariables ffect he ikelihood hat hestateswillengage nanycooperativenteractions.The results fthis nalysis re reportednthesecond columnof Table1.Wealthy yads, tabledyads, nd allieddyadsareall more ikely o en-gage incooperativenteractionshan he norm.Despitecontrols or hesefactors, owever, egime ypehasa definitenfluence n the ikelihood hata dyadwill cooperate.Even without onsideringhevarying ntensityftheacts, ointlydemocratic yadsare most ikely ointeractooperatively,followedby ointly utocratic yads,withmixedregime ypedyadsdem-onstratinglowerpropensityor ooperation.nfact,with he hree ontrolvariablesheldconstant ttheirmodal values (a nonallied,nonwealthy,utjointly tabledyad),theprobabilityfany cooperations 58.4 percent orjointlydemocratic yads,53.5 percent orointly utocratic yads,51 per-cent for mixeddyads,and 43.3 percent ordyads including t least oneanocracy.

Next, drop ll ofthecases forwhich here re no cooperativenterac-tions nd consider nly he ntensityfcooperationnthe ooperating yads.After ropping he ases inwhich ooperations zero, hedependent ariableis much morenormally istributed. ecause dropping ases changes thestructurefthedata so that t nolongerhaspaneldatacharacteristics,per-form rdinaryeast-squares egression,ut continue o use Huber-Whitestandard rrorso account orheteroskedasticitycrosscases.This model l-

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lowsme toassess the mpact fthe ndependent ariables nthe ntensityfcooperation iven hedecision o cooperate.3The results f this nalysis re presentedn the hird olumn fTable 1.A similar atternmerges.Once again,all of thecontrol ariables re posi-tively elated o the ntensityf cooperation,ut he nfluencef regime ypecontinues obe evident. helevel of ntensity ithwhich ointly emocraticdyads ooperates higherhan hat f ointly utocratic yads,which n turnis higher han hat f dyadscomposedof stateswithdifferentegime ypes.These threenalyses ogetherell convincingtory bout he mpact fdomestic nstitutional tructuresn dyadiclevels ofcooperation.Dyadscomposedoftwo democracies recomparativelyikelybothto cooperateandtoengage n more ntensely ooperativectsthan reother ypes fdy-ads. Yet,dyadscomposedoftwo autocracies xhibit greater ropensityocooperate nd a greater ntensityotheir ooperative elationshipshandodyadscomposedof one autocracy nd one democracy. hedata areentirelycommensurate ith hehypotheses rawn rom hemodel. These variablesaccountfor very mallportion fthevariancendyadic evelsofcoopera-tion,butthe ntentfthis esthasnotbeentoexplain onditions ncourag-ing cooperation ully. hereare a number f factors hat nfluenceevelsofcooperationhat re notcapturednthis est.Rather,he ntentfthis naly-sishas been to demonstrateherelationshipetween nevariable f nterest,regime ype, nd evels of cooperation.

6.REGIME YPEAND YADICCOOPERATIONDomesticpolitical institutionsffect nternational ehaviorbecausethey ffect hecosts and benefits hat eadersexpectfrom ifferentoreign-policy ctions. hesystemsf ncentivesndconstraintshat rise s a resultof therulesof domestic olitics nfluence hebehavior f eaders.Notonlydo domesticpolitics nfluence hedecisionsofa state'schiefexecutiveninternationalffairs,ut domesticpolitics lso affect he expectationsnddecisions f other eaders nteractingith he tatenquestionSmith, 996;Leeds andDavis, 1997).I haveargued hat woways n whichdemocracies ndautocracies ys-tematicallyifferre ntheaccountabilityf chief xecutives otheir opu-lations nd theflexibility ithwhich hief xecutives an adjustpolicy.Be-cause democraticeadersoperatenpolitical ystemsnwhich hey re heldaccountable or heir ctions nd nwhich hey re constrained rom hang-ing policy quickly,democraticeaders findfailedforeign olicies costly.

13The ntensityf the ooperativeelationships not measure f fulfillment.his two-stepanalysis snotdesignedo test he wo tages f thegame.Rather, offerttodemonstratehat oththe xistencendthe ntensityfcooperationonsideredndependentlyhare he xpected elation-shipswith he ndependentariables.

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998 Brett shley eedsScholars ave laimedhat hese eaturesfdemocraticule dvantageead-ers nmaking redibleommitmentsnthe nternationalystem,ndthusthat emocraciesindt asier oestablishooperationndernarchy.I find hat ighevels f ccountabilitynd ow evels fpolicy-makingflexibilityoencourageemocraticeaders ofulfillheirnternationalom-mitments.y ncorporatingssumptionsegardinghe ncentivesaced yleaders peratingndifferentnstitutionalettingsnto strategicepresen-tation f nternationalnteraction,owever,amableto refine reviousclaims. xamininghempactfvariancencosts obreakingromisesndto djustingolicynthe ontextf game eveals hathe haracteristicsfdemocracieshat re xpectedo dvantagehemnestablishingooperationundernarchyavemixedffects.he ame haracteristicshatmake emo-craticeaders ikely ouphold ommitmentslso make emocraticeadersdemandecure greements. hiledemocraciesrecomparativelybletomake heirommitmentsrediblenthe nternationalrena, hey realsolesswillingoformgreementshatmaynot e upheld.By more ompletelyxploringhe elationshipetweenccountability,flexibility,ndthedecision o formgreements ithoutxternalnforce-ment, amable toderive ypotheseselatingegimeype o nternationalcooperation.ecause he ormationfcooperativegreementsequiresc-cession yboth arties,ooperationependsn the bilityftwo tatesoassuage heirartners'ears fopportunism.evels f ooperationre nflu-encedboth ythe bilities fstates omake redibleommitmentsndbytheirwillingnessoaccept hepossibilityhat he greementillfail.Byconsideringtrategicnteractionmong ariousyadicombinations,findthat ll elsebeing qual,democraciesre ikelyocooperate ith emocra-cies,butwillbe less ikelyo formgreementsithutocracieshan therautocratictateswillbe.- evelsofcooperationmong tateswith imilardomestictructureshould ehigherhanevels f ooperationmongtateswith ifferentnstitutionalesigns.It has ongbeen rguedhat evels fcooperationnthe nternationalsystemarynter-temporallyracross ssue reasbased n variationntheinternationalnvironment,or nstanceependingnpower istributionsrthe xistencef nternationalnstitutionse.g.,Keohane, 984;AxelrodndKeohane, 986).The ogic nd videncefthis esearchuggesthat oop-erationaries yadicallys well.Allstates nd lldyads onot indheackofexternalnforcementf nternationalgreementsqually roblematic;the tructuresfthe omesticolicy-makingrocessesf tates ffectheirabilitiesndwillingnessocooperatenternationally.et,withoutonsider-ing hempact fdomesticnstitutionsnthe ontextf trategicehaviornthe nternationalystem,he toryemainsncomplete.ecisions ocooper-

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ate redependentot nly n one'sownpreferences,ut none'sexpecta-tions egardinghe ehaviorfothers.Internationalooperationheory illbenefitromntegrationf vari-ablesfrom ifferentevels fanalysis. cholars hould onsiderointly hedomesticoliticalonstraintsnd mperativeshatnfluencehe hoices fstateeaders,he trategicehavioreadersngagen while egotiatingndactingnternationally,nd henternationalnvironmentnwhichhey ego-tiatend ct.Togetherhese actors ill ellus more boutnternationalo-operationhan ny f hem ould ndependently.Manuscript ubmitted ugust 4, 1998.Final manuscript eceivedApril19, 1999.

MATHEMATICAL APPENDIXAn agreementsformednthegamewhenUi(agreement)0 andUj(agreement)O- Hj. The following arameterestrictionsre assumed:Ri,Rj,Hi,Hj,Si,Sj,Ki,Kj> 0.T is measurednrelationo R. If T ispositive,heres a benefito unilateralefec-tion. fT is zeroor negative,heres no benefitr a cost o unilateralefection. s a

result,hepayoff or nilateralefectioneginswith heparametersR + T).Utilityor nagreementsdeterminedythe olution othe ulfillmentubgame.SOLUTIONTO THEFULFILLMENT UBGAME

Bothplayers ooperate hen:Ki> TiandKi> SiandKj> Tj

ORKi> TiandKj> Sj andKj> Tj.Bothplayers efectwhen:Ti> Ki and Si> Ki and Sj> Kj

ORSi > Ki and Tj > Kj and Sj > Kj.

Thesolution o the ulfillmentubgames DC whenTj> KjandSi> KiandKj> Sj.Thesolution o the ulfillmentubgamesCD whenKi> TiandKi> SiandTj> Kj.Under omeconditions,heres either oequilibriumnpure trategieswhen Si>K> TiandTj> Kj> Sj)or(Ti>Ki>Siand Sj>K;> Tj)]ortherearemultipleNashequilibrianpure trategieswhenSi> Ki> TiandSj > Kj> Tj)or Ti> Ki> SiandTj>Kj> Sj)].Under hese onditions,layers annot alculate heir tilities rom he ulfill-mentubgamewith ertainty.n a single hot amewith imultaneouslay, heremay

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1000 Brett shley eedsbe no basis uponwhich heplayersan form commononjectureround pure trat-egy quilibriumhenmultiplequilibria xist.As a result, hennosingle ure trategyequilibriumxists, assume hat layers alculate heir xpected tilityor he ulfill-ment ubgame nder mixed trategyquilibriumn order o determineheir tilityoranagreement.ther ssumptionsegardingehaviornder hese onditionsrealsopossible, utgivenmy ssumption,hefollowingolds:Player plays ooperate ith probabilitysuch hat:

KT Si77,-SJ

Playerjplays ooperate ith probabilitysuch hat:Ki. - Siq Ti - Si

Thus, layer 's expected tilityor hemixed trategyquilibriumsymmetricalorj) is:(Si - Ki)(Ri + Ti) H

(Si - Ti

EQUILIBRIA FOR THE FULL MODELGiven he ssumed arameterestrictions,greementsillonlybe formed hen heexpectedutcome o the ulfillmentubgame sCC or themixed trategyquilibrium.Outcomes fDD, CD, or DC arealwaysmore ostly or t east ne player han hestatus uo.Anagreementillbe formed hen he xpected utcomeo the ulfillmentsubgames CC andRi> HiandRj> O.Anagreementillbe formed hen he utcomeo the ulfillmentubgame s uncer-tain ndplayersalculate heirxpected tilityor hemixed trategyquilibriumf:R > Si Ki - Ti)- Hi Si - Ti and R >Sj (Kj TJ)i S.-Ki J Sj-Kj

COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR DEMOCRACIES ANDAUTOCRACIESAll elsebeing qual, ssume hat emocracies avehigh alues f K andS, but hatdomestic olitics as a larger roportionalmpact n K. Similarly,ll else being qual,autocracies ave ow values fK andS. Formationf an agreements a possible qui-librium hen he utcome o the ulfillmentubgames CC. Thiswillbe truewhenK > S andK > T for neplayerndK > T for he ther layer. s K increases, heconditionspecifiedythesenequalitiesre more ikely o be met.Formationf anagreements also an equilibriumhen he utcome f the ulfill-mentubgames the quilibriumn mixed trategiesndthe ollowingnequalitiesremet:

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R, > Si Ki - T ) Hi Si - Ti) and R> Sj (Kj Tj)Si- Ki Si- Ki J Sj - KjAs K and S increase oldingll else constant,he onditionspecified ythese n-equalities ecomeharder omeet. orj,when > K > T,andK and S increase, l-though increasesmore roportionally,hedenominatorfthe ight ideofthe qua-tions a smaller ositive umber,nd thenumeratorontains wo erms hat othincrease. hus,underhe onditionshatwe assume recharacteristicfdemocracies,the xpected tilityor hemixed trategyquilibriums less ikelyo bepositive. on-versely,nderhe onditionsssumed o be characteristicf autocracies,he xpectedutilityor hemixed trategyquilibriums more ikely obepositive.WhenT > K > S,the ffectsf ncreasing and S are slightly ore mbiguous. he denominatorftherightideof the quation ecomes negative umber ith slightlyarger bsolutevalue s thedistance etween andS increases. hefirstermn thenumerator,,increases. hesecond ermnthenumeratorecomes negative umber ith smallerabsolute alue s K approaches .Thus, or onditionsn which alues f S arerela-tivelyarge or ll states ndT isnotdramaticallyarger,emocracies illbe less ikelyto expect ositive tilityrom hemixed trategyquilibrium,ndautocracies illbemore ikely oexpect ositive tility. nly n cases nwhich > K > S,T isvery arge,andS is small,willdemocracies e as likely rmore ikelyoexpect ositive xpectedutilityromhemixed trategyquilibriumhan utocracies. orplayer ,similaron-clusions anbedrawn,lthoughheres an additionalermn thenumeratorfthe ighthand ideofthe quationhat ncludes he osts fnegotiation.

REFERENCESAxelrod, obert. 984.TheEvolution fCooperation. ewYork:Harper ollins.Axelrod, obert,ndRobert . Keohane. 986. Achieving ooperation nder narchy:trategiesand nstitutions.n Cooperation nderAnarchy,d. Kenneth . Oye.Princeton:rinceton

Universityress.Azar, dward . 1993.ConflictndPeace Data Bank COPDAB), 1948-1978, rd elease.CollegePark:UniversityfMaryland, enter or nternationalevelopmentndConflictManage-ment, roducer.nnArbor:nter-Universityonsortiumor oliticalndSocialResearch, is-tributor.Cowhey, eter . 1993. Domestic nstitutionsnd theCredibilityf nternationalommitments:JapanndtheUnited tates. nternationalrganization7:299-326.Downs,GeorgeW.,David M. Rocke, ndPeterN. Barsoom. 996. Is theGood NewsAbout om-plianceGood NewsAbout ooperation? nternationalrganization0:379-406.Fearon,James . 1994. DomesticPoliticalAudiences ndtheEscalationof nternationalis-putes. merican olitical cienceReview 8:577-592.Fearon,James . 1998. Bargaining,nforcement,nd nternationalooperation. nternationalOrganization2:269-305.Gaubatz, urt aylor. 996. Democratictates ndCommitmentn nternationalelations. nter-nationalOrganization0:109-139.Gurr, ed Robert, eithJaggers,nd Will H. Moore. 1989. POLITY II Codebook.UniversityfColorado tBoulder, enter or omparativeolitics.

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