LEGAL ETHICSIn re: David 93 Phil 461

FACTS: Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession as a lawyer for a period of five years from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in `his written report filed on March 17, 1951, yet he continued to exercise the profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to November 8, 1954.On Feb 28 1950 the respondent file a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a lawyer but as an agent. (For and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy) CFI decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently Atty Felix David filed a motion for execution. In another civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill, Inc vs Tolentino, defendant filed a brief for an order to demolish homes.In order - says the appeal - to show That I did not Have the intention to disregard the suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not With The Knowledge of Tan Tek Identified Sy Even myself as the attorney for the Appelles But In Good Faith, I signed for and in Behalf of the appellee Without Designating That I am Practicing as attorney-at-law.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Atty Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.

HELD: Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm name under the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency, and because he will, by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of the constitutional restriction. He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly.

TAN VS. SABANDAL, 206 SCRA 473 (1992)DOCTRINES:The practice of law is not a matter of right.No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.FACTS:Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land since then.

The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.

ISSUE:Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.

HELD:His petition must be denied.

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.

It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could not but have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where no determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings.

Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

Canlas vs. CA 164 SCRA 160PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA,respondents.

G.R. No. L-77691August 8, 1988

SARMIENTO,J .:

Facts:

The private respondent own several parcels of land located in Quezon City for which he is the registered owner. He secured loans from L and R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over the parcels of land for the security of the same. Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties in question after private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The private respondent filed a complaint for injunction over the said foreclosure and for redemption of the parcels of land. Two years after the filing of the petition, private respondent and L and R corporation entered into a compromise agreement that renders the former to be insured another year for the said properties. Included in the stipulations were the attorneys fees amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private respondent however, remained to be in turmoil when it came to finances and was apparently unable to pay and secure the attorneys fees, more so the redemption liability. Relief was discussed by petitioner and private respondent executed a document to redeem the parcels of land and to register the same to his name.

Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the parcels of land to his name but without prior notice, the properties were already registered under the petitioners name. The private respondent calls for a review and for the court to act on the said adverse claim by petitioner on said certificates for the properties consolidated by the redemption price he paid for said properties. The private respondent filed a suit for the annulment of judgment in the Court of appeals which ruled over the same.

Issue: whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition over the said properties.

Ruling:By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," a development that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money."We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his liability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY VS. CA (181 SCRA 367 01/23/1990)

FACTS:A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about ten (10) hectares. Thesepropertieswere thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/orInternationalHOTELCorporation. During the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sistercorporation, Service LeasingCorporationand on thesameday, thepropertieswere resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and ConstructionCorporation. Three months later, mortgaged thesamepropertieswithBanco de Orowherein the lower court found thatprivaterespondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of party as a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service LeasingCorporation.Privaterespondent, on its part, filed a verified motion to enter inthe recordsof the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigatedpropertiesas its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted thesameand ordered the,Register of Deedsof Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land.

Privaterespondentfiled a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paidprivaterespondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears thatprivaterespondentattempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUES:1. Whether or notprivaterespondentis entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney's fee.

2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien.

3. Whether or notprivaterespondentis entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigatedpropertieson a quantum meruit basis.

HELD:1. NO. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: He shall also have a lien to thesameextent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered uponthe recordsof the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have thesameright and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. The civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims."

2. NOT NECESSARY. At this juncture an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. Court trying main case will determine attorneys fees.

3. The Court refused to resolve issue but gave the elements to be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are:

(1) the importance of the subject matter in controvers(2) the extent of the services rendered, and(3)the professionalstanding of the lawyerorder of thetrial court is herebyREVERSED and SET.ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision ofrespondentCourt of Appealsof February 11, 1988 affirming theorder of thetrial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought byprivaterespondentto establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.

Adez Realty Inc. vs. CAPost undercase digests,Legal EthicsatThursday, March 08, 2012Posted bySchizophrenic MindFacts:On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law.

He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client,the Presidentof Adez Realty, Inc., inthe draftof the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not riskcommittingthe act for which he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and BarCounciltothe Presidentfor appointment as regional trial judge.

Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands ofthe legalprofession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. MichaelArchangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City

Issue:Should the disbarment be lifted?

Held:The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity ofthe legalprofession. Hisadmissionof guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standardsthe legalprofession demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules ofthe legalprofession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian ofthe legalprofession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . .

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately.

People vs Tuanda 181 SCRA 692FACTS:Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of thePhilippineBar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court ofAppeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstandingreceiptof the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law). Theappellatecourt affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is nowappealingto the Supreme Court for her suspension to be liftedarguingthat her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law.Arguingfurther that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.

ISSUE:Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court ofAppealscorrectly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: Sec. 27.Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take beforeadmissionto practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfullyappearingas an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied) Sec. 28.Suspension of attorney by the Court ofAppealsor a Court of First Instance. The Court ofAppealsor a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorneyfrom practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure thebanking systemand eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of herattorney'soath and the Code ofProfessionalResponsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.

MELENDREZ vs. DECENA 176 SCRA 14FACTS:ISSUE:RULING:

IN RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATHPetitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991.On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused, the latter admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.ISSUE: RULING: we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachableIn allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.SO ORDERED.

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