FIRST DIVISION

 

JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ and ATTY. LYN L. LLAMASARES,

Petitioners,

- versus

LUCILA C. PACARIEM, Stenographer, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila,Respondent.

A.M. No. P-06-2249

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2351-P]

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 8, 2008

 

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

Courts; Court Personnel; Stenographers; The Court cannot turn a blind eye to a stenographer’s well-documented lapses in typing/encoding decisions and orders of petitioner Judge despite the apparent leniency of other judges in rating her past performance.—With respect to the charge of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty, the Complaint essentially relies on the same acts upon which petitioner Judge Marquez’s “Unsatisfactory” performance ratings of respondent for 2004 were based. Petitioners have adequately shown that such low performance ratings were warranted in view of the error-filled output that respondent appear to have consistently produced during said period. While it may be true that respondent is only human and may commit mistakes, there is simply no excuse for making the same mistakes repeatedly in her drafts despite her superiors constantly calling her attention to correct them. This Court cannot turn a blind eye to respondent’s well-documented lapses in typing/encoding decisions and orders of petitioner Judge Marquez despite the apparent leniency of other judges in rating

respondent’s past performance. Judge Marquez was not bound by the performance ratings given to respondent by her previous superiors and had the discretion to give the rating that he believed she deserved.

Same; Same; Same; Gross Neglect of Duty; Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSNs); Failure to submit Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSNs) within the period prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty.—This Court has repeatedly ruled that failure to submit TSNs within the period prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty. As a stenographer, respondent should bear in mind that “the performance of her duty is essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice, and her inaction hampers the administration of justice and erodes public faith in the judiciary.” In her defense, respondent cites the certification issued by petitioner Atty. Llamasares on January 6 and July 2, 2004 that she (respondent) had no pending stenographic notes as of the said dates. Atty. Llamasares, on the other hand, claims that she was misled by respondent to issue such certification. Notwithstanding the contradicting claims of the parties, it is undisputed that respondent indeed repeatedly failed to submit TSNs within the period prescribed. The circumstances that (a) respondent appears to have submitted all the transcripts enumerated in the Complaint, albeit beyond the period mandated, and (b) there appears to be no proof that any party or counsel has complained about the delay in respondents’ submission of transcripts do not exonerate respondent for her non-compliance with Administrative Circular No. 24-90. This Court need not wait for respondent’s laxity in her duties to in fact impede the administration of justice before we impose sanctions for her admitted violation of said circular.

Same; Same; Same; Loafing; Words and Phrases; Loafing is defined under the Civil Service Rules as “frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular hours.”—We likewise find merit in the charge of loafing, which is defined under the Civil Service Rules as “frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular hours” and, in the case at bar, is closely connected with the charge of dishonesty, as presented in sufficient and painstaking detail by petitioners. Petitioners presented the Logbook of Permission Slips that reflected the numerous times that respondent was out of the office during work hours for the period August 27, 2003 to March 28, 2005.

Same; Same; Judicial employees must devote their official time to government service—they must exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as service in the judiciary is not only a duty but also a mission.—It must be stressed that all judicial employees must devote their official time to government service. They must exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as service in the judiciary is not only a duty; it is a mission. To inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official time. Strict observance of official time is mandatory lest the dignity of the justice system be compromised. Thus, Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that the same shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.

Same; Same; By writing false and inaccurate entries in her former office’s Logbook of Permission Slips and Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court Personnel, respondent likewise failed to meet the standard of honesty.—In the case at bar, we find that respondent has failed to live up to the standard of efficiency and professionalism that the judiciary demands from its court personnel.

Furthermore, by writing false and inaccurate entries in her former office’s Logbook of Permission Slips and Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court Personnel, respondent likewise failed to meet the standard of honesty.

Same; Same; An employee’s long years in public service should not be used as a justification for laxity nor a cover for mediocrity but rather the same entails the expectation that she will continually adhere to the highest standards of professionalism, integrity and efficiency in the discharge of her official duties.—The Court sternly reminds respondent that her long years in public service should not be used as a justification for laxity nor a cover for mediocrity but rather the same entails the expectation that she will continually adhere to the highest standards of professionalism, integrity and efficiency in the discharge of her official duties.

DECISION

LEONARDO - DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is the administrative complaint filed by petitioners Judge Placido C. Marquez (Judge Marquez) and Atty. Lyn L. Llamasares (Atty. Llamasares), former Presiding Judge and former Branch Clerk of Court, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Manila charging respondent Lucila C. Pacariem, former Stenographer III of the said RTC and now Stenographer detailed at RTC, Branch 23, Manila, with gross neglect of duty, gross inefficiency, gross insubordination, and gross misconduct.

 

This controversy arose from petitioners voluminous Complaint[1] dated November 14, 2005 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) detailing the numerous infractions that respondent allegedly committed while working as a court stenographer under the control and supervision of herein petitioners. Petitioners insist that respondents actions constitute gross acts inimical to her continued employment in the government, particularly in the judicial department.

 

Petitioners assert that respondent repeatedly committed numerous grammatical and typographical errors in her typewritten work despite constant reminders. Furthermore, she constantly failed to follow corrections in the drafts which usually required three to five revisions before they are finalized. In support of these allegations, petitioners attached to their Complaint two hundred fifty-four (254) pages worth of error-filled output allegedly made by respondent.[2]

 

Petitioners also complain that respondent failed to submit the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of forty-five cases[3] within twenty (20) days from the time the notes were taken as required under Administrative Circular No. 24-90, which became effective on August 1, 1990. The pertinent portion of the said circular states:

 

2. (a) All stenographers are required to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to the record of the case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes are taken. (Italics supplied)

In five (5) cases, respondent purportedly did not submit to petitioner Atty. Llamasares the stenographic notes she had taken immediately at the close of the particular sessions when they were taken, as required under Section 17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, which reads in part:

 

It shall be the duty of the stenographer who has attended a session of a court to either in the morning or in the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the close of such morning or afternoon session, all the notes he has taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it shall likewise be the duty of the clerk to demand that the stenographer comply with said duty. xxx (Italics supplied)

 

It is also alleged that respondent misled Atty. Llamasares to sign certifications dated January 6 and July 2, 2004 which declared that respondent had no pending stenographic notes to be transcribed as of said dates. Furthermore, for failure to timely file her application for sick leave on July 5, 2004 and special leave on August 10, 2004, respondent is also accused of violating Sections 21, 53, and 54 of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No.41 (Series of 1998), to wit:

Section 21. The special leave privileges are subject to the following conditions:

 

2.5.2.1. That the official/employee may be granted a maximum of three (3) days within a calendar year of any or combination of special leave privileges of his choice which he would opt to avail;

 

2.5.2.2. That such privileges shall be non-cumulative and non-commutative;

 

2.5.2.3. That the official/employee shall submit the application for the said leave privileges for at least one (1) week prior to availment except on emergency cases; and

 

2.5.2.4. Special leave privilege may be availed of by the official/employee when the occasion is personal to him and that of his immediate family.

xxx

 

Section 53. All applications for sick leave of absence for one (1) full day or more shall be made on the prescribed form and shall be filed immediately upon employees return from such leave. Notice of absence, however, should be sent to the immediate supervisor and/or the agency head. Application for sick leave in excess of five (5) successive days shall be accompanied by a proper medical certificate.

 

Sick leave may be applied for in advance in cases where the official or employee will undergo medical examination or operation or advised to rest in view of ill health duly supported by a medical certificate.

 

In ordinary application for sick leave already taken not exceeding five (5) days, the head of department or agency concerned may duly determine whether or not granting of sick leave is proper under the circumstances. In case of doubt, a medical certificate may be required.

Section 54. Sick leave shall be granted only on account of sickness or disability on the part of the employee concerned or of any member of his immediate family.

Approval of sick leave, whether with pay or without pay, is mandatory provided proof of sickness or disability is attached to the application in accordance with the applicable requirements. Unreasonable delay in the approval thereof or non-approval without justifiable reason shall be a ground for appropriate sanction against the official concerned.[4] (Italics supplied)

 

In addition to the foregoing, petitioners accuse respondent of loafing, or spending an unseemly amount of time outside of the office during office hours, as revealed in the courts Logbook of Permission Slips covering the period August 27, 2003 to March 28, 2005. From the said Logbook, it can be gleaned that respondent often left the office purportedly to go to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), the Supreme Court (SC), the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and other government offices.Petitioners allege that she falsified entries in the said Logbook. In some instances, she did not indicate in the same Logbook her purpose for

leaving the office during office hours and, in ten (10) instances, she registered in the Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court Personnel a time of arrival that is different from the one noted by the courts Officer-in-Charge. The same document also discloses that she allegedly went to this Court on July 9, September 28, October 25, December 14, 2004, February 11 & 14, and March 2 & 28, 2005 but an inquiry with the SC Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division revealed that her name did not appear in the SC Logbook on the said dates.[5]

 

Petitioners also allege that respondent obtained a rating of Unsatisfactory for her work performance during the periods of January 1 June 30, 2004, July 1 December 31, 2004, and January 1 April 5, 2005.[6] The last rating period was abbreviated because respondent was transferred to Branch 23 pursuant to the Order of the Executive Judge of ManilaRTC dated April 1, 2005. Respondent was informed in writing of her Unsatisfactory performance rating for the period January 1-June 30, 2004 and was sufficiently warned that a subsequent Unsatisfactory rating would result in her separation from service pursuant to OCA Circular No. 37-2002 dated 31 July 2002 in connection with Section 2.2 (a), Rule XII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998. In connection with the said CSC Memorandum, respondent was sufficiently warned that her failure to improve performance within the remaining period shall warrant her separation from service. Respondent filed a protest of her Unsatisfactory performance rating for January 1 June 30, 2004 and for July 1 December 31, 2004 with the OCA-Performance Evaluation Review Committee (PERC). However, petitioners point out that a previous Joint Protest co-filed by herein respondent with regard to her Unsatisfactory performance ratings from January-June 2002 also given by petitioner Judge Marquez was dismissed per OCA-PERC Resolution dated September 12, 2003.[7]

 

Lastly, petitioners aver that respondent had a pending administrative case for gross misconduct filed by her former officemate at Branch 40, Rey C. Mutia. This case was subsequently resolved by this Courts Third Division in a Resolution[8] promulgated on July 11, 2006, the dispositive portion of which declared:

 

WHEREFORE, we find Lucila C. Pacariem GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a court employee and impose on her a FINE of P2,000, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.[9]

Respondent filed a Comment[10] dated February 7, 2006 wherein she alleges that petitioners Complaint was filed in reaction to the Joint Protest which she co-filed with reference to the Unsatisfactory performance ratings she received in 2002 from Judge Marquez and to the Reply she made in response to the series of Memoranda issued to her by petitioner Atty. Llamasares. In both documents, she claims that she had been discriminated against in her performance ratings. She also asserts the fact that she had obtained consistent Very Satisfactory performance ratings when she was in the service of previous judges, namely, Judges Felicidad

Varangdang-Villalon, Felipe G. Pacquing, and Herminia Pasamba. Even Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., to whose court she was transferred from her previous position in Judge Marquezs court, allegedly gave her a Very Satisfactory rating.

 

Respondent admits that she does commit mistakes in the performance of her job but she protests that petitioners magnified even her trivial errors. She argues that the drafts presented as evidence were really meant for correction and that corrections are normal because of the courts heavy workload and due to petitioner Judge Marquezs work method where, for instance, he allegedly sometimes changes the contents of what he dictated in open court after it is reduced into writing. She maintains that she never neglected her duties and that she has no pending stenographic notes as indicated by the Certification issued by petitioner Atty. Llamasares herself.

 

Furthermore, respondent denies that she ever engaged in loafing. Whenever she went out during office hours, these travels were made to the SC, GSIS, Court of Appeals (CA) and the LBP for important matters like filing a loan, transmitting a TSN to the CA, or to encash checks. In explaining her non-registration in the SC Logbook, she avers that she usually goes to the SC through the CA, where her kumare would accompany her to the SC which results in her entry without being asked to register by the SC guards. She takes issue with the fact that petitioners seem to be monitoring her every move which included the time of her arrival and departure from the office. She also insists that the alleged difference of a few minutes between her actual time of arrival and her logbook entry which petitioners attribute to bad faith on her part is merely the result of non-synchronicity of watches used by the parties.

 

Respondent also points to the fact that several other employees of RTC, Branch 40, Manila had transferred or resigned under petitioners term.

 

In response to the supposed violations of the 20-day period for transcription of stenographic notes, she refers to her Answer[11] dated March 14, 2005 to the Memorandum of petitioner Atty. Llamasares dated February 28, 2005 involving the same issue, wherein she admits not being able to submit TSNs within the 20-day period due to heavy workload. However, respondent claims that no party or lawyer ever complained that she was not able to submit any transcript when requested and that there was never an instance when Judge Marquez was not able to decide a case due to non-transcription or delayed transcription of stenographic notes on her part.

 

In its Report dated July 28, 2006,[12] the OCA noted that respondent was rated Unsatisfactory for two consecutive rating periods covering January 1 June 30 and July

1December 31, 2004 based mostly on the same acts enumerated in petitioners Complaint. Furthermore, the OCA foresees a similar rating for the first semester of 2005 had it been not for her transfer to another court on April 1, 2005. At the time the report was released, respondents Protest regarding her performance ratings has not yet been resolved by the PERC of RTC Manila. In the same report, the OCA found meritorious the allegations of loafing and falsification of the court attendance logbook against respondent but found no merit in the other charges. Thus, the OCA made the following recommendations:

 

1.     That the instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative case;

 

2.     That respondent stenographer, Lucila C. Pacariem, be found   GUILTY   of inefficiency, loafing and inaccuracies in her entries on the logbook as to time of arrival, for which she should be penalized with   SUSPENSION FROM SERVICE   for a period of   ONE YEAR   without pay;

 

3.     The rest of the charges be DISMISSED for lack of merit. (Underscoring supplied)

 

Thereafter, the Court, through its Second Division, issued a Resolution[13] dated September 25, 2006, ordering the redocketing of the present case as a regular administrative matter and requiring the parties to manifest to the Court whether they are willing to submit the matter for decision/resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed, within ten days from notice.

 

Petitioner Atty. Llamasares, for herself and petitioner Judge Marquez, filed a Manifestation[14] dated November 7, 2006 expressing their willingness to submit to a decision/resolution based on the pleadings. Respondent in turn filed her Manifestation[15] dated November 6, 2006 asking instead for a hearing on the matter and calling the attention of the Court to her Protest of the performance ratings that she received in 2004 and the first quarter of 2005 pending before the PERC of RTC Manila and to her Motion for Reconsideration to this Courts Second Division Resolution, finding her guilty of conduct unbecoming of a court employee.

 

In a Resolution[16] dated March 7, 2007, the Courts First Division ordered Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, RTC, Branch 8, Manila to submit a report on the status of respondents Protest within thirty (30) days from notice. Judge Olalia responded in a Letter[17] dated May 15, 2007 that the records of respondents Protest were indorsed on March 8, 2007 to the Office of the Executive Judge, RTC Manila which referred the same to Judge Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, 1st Vice-Executive Judge, RTC Manila.

 

In an Order dated November 20, 2007, the RTC Manilas Office of the 1st Vice Executive Judge denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing her protest of the two consecutive Unsatisfactory performance ratings for the periods January June 2004 and July December 2004 given to her by Judge Marquez. In the November 20, 2007 Order, it was held that (1) respondent [protestant] failed to prove her allegations of bad faith or prejudice on the part of Judge Marquez in giving her the Unsatisfactory ratings complained of and (2) Judge Marquezs ratings of respondent enjoyed the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.[18]

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that this case can already be decided based on the pleadings filed by the parties.

 

The issue to be resolved here is whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges alleged in the Complaint. In this regard, we find the recommendations of the OCA well-taken.

 

With respect to the charge of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty, the Complaint essentially relies on the same acts upon which petitioner Judge Marquezs Unsatisfactory performance ratings of respondent for 2004 were based. Petitioners have adequately shown that such low performance ratings were warranted in view of the error-filled output that respondent appear to have consistently produced during said period. While it may be true that respondent is only human and may commit mistakes, there is simply no excuse for making the same mistakes repeatedly in her drafts despite her superiors constantly calling her attention to correct them.

 

This Court cannot turn a blind eye to respondents well-documented lapses in typing/encoding decisions and orders of petitioner Judge Marquez despite the apparent leniency of other judges in rating respondents past performance. Judge Marquez was not bound by the performance ratings given to respondent by her previous superiors and had the discretion to give the rating that he believed she deserved.

 

We do not find credence in respondents assertion that petitioners were merely magnifying her errors and were motivated by ill-will or prejudice in filing the Complaint against her. As the Office of the 1st Vice Executive Judge of the RTC Manila correctly found in its November 20, 2007 Order, respondent failed to prove that her low performance ratings were due to evident bad faith on the part of Judge Marquez or were arbitrarily given to her.

 

Quite apart from the poor quality of her work, respondent admits that she has not been able to faithfully follow the twenty-day period for completion and submission of theTSN provided under Administrative Circular No. 24-90. She claims that the delay is due to heavy workload and further asserts in her defense that her delay in submission of transcripts has not caused any prejudice to Judge Marquez, the counsels or the litigants.

This Court has repeatedly ruled that failure to submit TSNs within the period prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross neglect of duty.[19] As a stenographer, respondent should bear in mind that the performance of her duty is essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice, and her inaction hampers the administration of justice and erodes public faith in the judiciary.[20] In her defense, respondent cites the certification issued by petitioner Atty. Llamasares on January 6 and July 2, 2004 that she (respondent) had no pending stenographic notes as of the said dates. Atty. Llamasares, on the other hand, claims that she was misled by respondent to issue such certification. Notwithstanding the contradicting claims of the parties, it is undisputed that respondent indeed repeatedly failed to submit TSNs within the period prescribed. The circumstances that (a) respondent appears to have submitted all the transcripts enumerated in the Complaint, albeit beyond the period mandated, and (b) there appears to be no proof that any party or counsel has complained about the delay in respondents submission of transcripts do not exonerate respondent for her non-compliance with Administrative Circular No. 24-90. This Court need not wait for respondents laxity in her duties to in fact impede the administration of justice before we impose sanctions for her admitted violation of said circular.

 

We likewise find merit in the charge of loafing, which is defined under the Civil Service Rules as frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular hours[21] and, in the case at bar, is closely connected with the charge of dishonesty, as presented in sufficient and painstaking detail by petitioners. Petitioners presented the Logbook of Permission Slips that reflected the numerous times that respondent was out of the office during work hours for the period August 27, 2003 to March 28, 2005.

 

The same documents, among others, showed that she went out of the office on July 9, September 28, October 25, and December 14, 2004, February 11 & 14, and March 2 & 28, 2005, purportedly to go to this Court. However, an inquiry made by petitioners with the SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, revealed that respondents name did not appear in the Logbook of the Court on these dates. We are unconvinced by respondents explanation that her name was not reflected in the Courts Logbook because she usually entered through the CA where

she would be accompanied to this Court by her kumare, a CA employee, thereby excusing respondent from registering with the Courts security personnel. The Courts security personnel maintain a strict policy of inspecting outsiders going into its premises, which respondent could not have escaped. In fact, such an explanation would only compound her predicament as she did not disclose such fact in her permission slips and, if true, she would then likewise be admitting to flouting the security policies of this Court. An inference of loafing on the part of her kumare can also be logically deduced from respondents explanation.

 

Moreover, petitioners pointed out that in some instances respondent did not even state in the Logbook of Permission Slips her purpose for leaving the office during regular hours. She also entered false information in the Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court Personnel as can be gleaned from the substantial discrepancies between respondents Logbook entries and those noted by the Officer-In-Charge as to respondents time of arrival in the office on November 12 & 19, 2003, December 28, 2004, and March 8, 2005, which cannot be deemed as inconsequential as respondent sees them.

 

It must be stressed that all judicial employees must devote their official time to government service. They must exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as service in the judiciary is not only a duty; it is a mission. [22] To inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official time.[23] Strict observance of official time is mandatory lest the dignity of the justice system be compromised.[24] Thus, Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that the same shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.[25]

 

In the case at bar, we find that respondent has failed to live up to the standard of efficiency and professionalism that the judiciary demands from its court personnel.Furthermore, by writing false and inaccurate entries in her former offices Logbook of Permission Slips and Logbook of Daily Attendance of Court Personnel, respondent likewise failed to meet the standard of honesty.

 

In the Complaint, respondent is also accused of delayed filing of her application for sick leave on July 5, 2004 and special leave on August 10, 2004, in violation of Sections 21, 53, and 54 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41 (Series of 1998). In denying this, respondent claims to have notified petitioner Clerk of Court by phone of her absences on those two occasions and that she in fact filed her applications therefore but both petitioners did not approve and sign them. [26] On this matter, we adopt the finding of the OCA that although respondents leave applications appear to have been filed after the period prescribed in the rules, there might have been an attempt on respondents part to file her leave applications immediately but she was prevented by petitioners

in view of the apparent strained relations among them. We agree with the OCA that respondent is not liable for this charge and the other remaining charges in the Complaint.

 

Having determined the liabilities of respondent, we come now to the imposition of the appropriate penalty for her acts.

 

It is on record that petitioner Judge Marquez had given respondent two (2) consecutive Unsatisfactory performance ratings in 2004. Under OCA Circular No. 37-2002, quoting Section 2.2(a), Rule XII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40 (s.1998):

An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive UNSATISFACTORY ratings may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or employee concerned is informed in writing of his/her unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is sufficiently warned that a succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30 days from the end of the semester and shall contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation. (Italics supplied)

 

Furthermore, Section 5, Rule IX, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, provides that an employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him may appeal through the established Grievance Procedure of the Department or Agency within fifteen (15) days after receipt of his copy of his performance rating.

 

In its Report, the OCA appears to have refrained from recommending the highest penalty of dismissal considering that respondents Protest of her performance ratings for 2004 was still pending. It is undisputed that respondent has already availed of the grievance procedure prescribed and was undoubtedly provided with due process and consideration albeit with an undesired result, since respondents Protest was dismissed.

 

In this regard, the law on the matter gives us the option of meting out the penalty of dismissal on the respondent. In fact, in the past, this Court has dropped from the rolls a stenographer who was likewise given two (2) consecutive Unsatisfactory ratings by her superior for delay in transcribing stenographic notes and her failure to transcribe notes properly.[27]

 

However, this Court, in other cases, has mitigated the imposable penalty for humanitarian reasons. In such cases, we also considered length of service in the judiciary; the respondents acknowledgement of his/her infractions and feelings of remorse; and family circumstances, among others, in determining the proper penalty. We have also ruled that where the penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only because of the laws concern for the workingman. There is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage-earner.[28] In the present case, apart from respondents long service in the government (since 1975), it appears on record that she was given a Very Satisfactory rating by Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., to whose court she was transferred after her stint in Judge Marquezs court.[29] We are inclined to give respondent the benefit of the doubt and construe her subsequent favorable performance rating as an indication of improvement in the discharge of her duties.

 

Having said the foregoing, we are accepting the OCAs recommendation of imposing a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay on respondent for inefficiency/neglect of duty, loafing and making false/inaccurate entries in the office Logbook.

 

On a final note, the Court sternly reminds respondent that her long years in public service should not be used as a justification for laxity nor a cover for mediocrity but rather the same entails the expectation that she will continually adhere to the highest standards of professionalism, integrity and efficiency in the discharge of her official duties.

 

WHEREFORE, we find that Ms. Lucila C. Pacariem is guilty of inefficiency/neglect of duty, loafing and making false/inaccurate entries in the office Logbook for which we impose the penalty of SUSPENSION FROM SERVICE for a period of ONE (1) YEAR without pay, with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.

 

The other charges in the Complaint are dismissed for lack of merit.

 

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1762. December 17, 2008.*

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1422-RTJ)

SERGIO & GRACELDA N. ANDRES, complainants, vs. JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, ELMER D. LASTIMOSA, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio

Provincial Sheriff, RTC-OCC, and NASIL S. PALATI, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, respondents.

Courts; Judges; Raffle of Cases; The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases—by raffling the cases, public suspicion regarding the assignment of cases to predetermined judges is obviated.—Respondent judge violated the explicit mandate of the Court when he took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he was named as one of two defendants and instantly dismissed it without first conducting the requisite raffle. The Court, enunciating the importance of the raffling of cases, held in the case of Ang Kek Chen v. Bello, 163 SCRA 358 (1988): The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases, public suspicion regarding the assignment of cases to predetermined judges is obviated. A violation or disregard of the Court’s circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not to be countenanced.

Same; Same; An Executive Judge ought to know that raffling of cases is his personal duty and responsibility—he is expected to keep abreast and be conversant with Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of cases before him and strictly comply therewith at all times.—Respondent judge cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge by dispensing with the raffle of the case and dismissing it outright on the pretext that it would be just a waste of time on his part to raffle and entertain the case. As Executive Judge, he ought to know that raffling of cases is his personal duty and responsibility. He is expected to keep abreast and be conversant with Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of cases before him and strictly comply therewith at all times. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should therefore administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law.

Same; Same; Contempt; Penalties; By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing them to pay a fine of 2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) days, respondent judge exhibited his bias against herein complainants—here, respondent judge cited complainants in direct contempt of court for filing a complaint based on a deed of quitclaim that had already been declared null and void, instead of having the said case, wherein he was one of the defendants, raffled to the court which could properly act on the case; A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.—By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing them to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) days, respondent judge exhibited his bias against herein complainants. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially, or such conduct

as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of justice into disrepute or disrespect. Here, respondent judge cited complainants in direct contempt of court for filing a complaint (Civil Case No. 7066) based on a deed of quitclaim that had already been declared null and void, instead of having the said case, wherein he was one of the defendants, raffled to the court which could properly act on the case. While the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, still, judges must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.

Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Authority; Besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge; Respondent judge’s act of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.—The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. It has time and again been stressed that besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Indeed, Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that: Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Respondent judge’s act of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.

Judges; Bias and Partiality; A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent—he has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to its integrity.—Respondent judge violated the above canon when he dispensed with the raffle and took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 as well as ordered its outright dismissal and cited the complainants in contempt of court. He thus created the impression that he intended to favor his former clients, Melencio and Dominga. His actuations gave ground for the parties to doubt his impartiality and objectivity. A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. He has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to its integrity. Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, for all the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.

Same; Same; It is basic that a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce the slightest doubt on his honest actuations and

probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination.—We take this occasion once more to impress upon a trial judge that he must at all times maintain and preserve the trust and faith of litigants in the court’s impartiality. When he exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit himself voluntarily. It is basic that a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce the slightest doubt on his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself. Respondent judge was a party defendant in Civil Case No. 7066 which was enough reason not to act on the same and just leave the matter to the Vice-Executive Judge. His reluctance to let go of the case all the more induced doubts and suspicions as to his honest actuations, probity and objectivity. Evidently, respondent judge violated the clear injunction embodied in the aforecited Canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.—We rule that there is no merit in complainants’ charge of gross ignorance of the law leveled against respondent judge. For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a person who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the grounds for the accusation.

Same; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; It is well-settled that when an order is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandate.—It is well-settled that when an order is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandate. The primary duty of sheriffs is to execute judgments and orders of the court to which they belong. It must be stressed that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. It is said that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. It is also indisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Hence, the officers charged with this delicate task must act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice, otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of justice would be futile.

D E C I S I O N

 

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This administrative case arose from the complaint-affidavit[1] dated February 21, 2002 of Sergio N. Andres, Jr. and Gracelda N. Andres charging respondents Judge Jose S. Majaducon, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), General Santos City, and Presiding Judge, Branch 23, with violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Misconduct, and both Elmer D. Lastimosa, Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of South Cotabato, and Nasil S. Palati, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, with Abuse of Authority, Ignorance of the Law and Grave Misconduct.

 

The complaint stemmed from the Special Order of Demolition[2] issued by Judge Majaducon on August 22, 2001 in connection with the consolidated Civil Case Nos. 1291[3]and 4647,[4] an action for declaration of nullity of documents and recovery of possession of real property with writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages. The said order directed the provincial sheriff of General Santos City to demolish the improvements erected by the heirs of John Sycip and Yard Urban Homeowners Association on the land belonging to spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga. Pursuant to the Order of Demolition, a Notice to Vacate[5] dated September 12, 2001 was issued by Sheriff Palati and noted by Provincial Sheriff Lastimosa. The said notice was addressed to the heirs of John Sycip, all members of Yard Urban Homeowners Association, and all adverse claimants and actual occupants of Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, the land subject of Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647.

 

To forestall the demolition of their houses, complainants, who claimed an interest over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740, filed a Special Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation[6]informing the court of the pending protest between them and the heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), docketed as RED Claim No. 3735.[7] In the Ex-Parte Manifestation, complainants alleged that they and their predecessor-in-interest Concepcion Non Andres introduced improvements and authorized the construction of several improvements on Lot No. 2, Psu-135740. They also averred that they are not bound by the judgment rendered in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 because neither they nor their predecessor-in-interest were impleaded as parties therein. They prayed that the provincial sheriff or any of his deputies be enjoined from implementing the special order of demolition on the improvements they made. They also wrote a letter[8] addressed to respondents Lastimosa and Palati enjoining them from executing the order of demolition under pain of administrative sanction.

 

On February 6, 2002, notwithstanding complainants manifestation and letter, Lastimosa and Palati proceeded with the demolition of the improvements erected by the complainants and their predecessor-in-interest.

 

Thus, on February 18, 2002, complainants instituted, with the RTC of General Santos City, Civil Case No. 7066, an action for Specific Performance, Reconveyance and Damages against the heirs of Melencio Yu and impleaded Judge Majaducon, Lastimosa and Palati as co-defendants. The complaint alleged that complainants title over Lot No. 2, Psu-135740 was valid, that they had been occupying the property since 1957 and that the reckless and arbitrary demolition of their improvements had unlawfully disturbed their peaceful occupation of the property.[9] Complainants also filed an Urgent Motion for Special Raffle of said Civil Case No. 7066.

 

In an Order[10] dated February 18, 2002, Judge Majaducon, acting as the Executive Judge of RTC, General Santos City, denied the Urgent Motion for Special Raffle and dismissed outright Civil Case No. 7066. On the same day, respondent judge issued another Order[11] declaring complainants in direct contempt of court for allegedly filing a complaint based on a quitclaim that had already been pronounced null and void by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, complainants were ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) days.

 

This prompted complainants to file the instant administrative complaint. They averred that the actions of herein respondents constitute bad faith, malicious motive, serious partiality, grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. They also alleged that prior to his appointment in the judiciary, Judge Majaducon was the former counsel of Melencio Yu and his mother Dominga Pinagawang.

 

In his Comment[12] dated April 16, 2002, respondent judge vehemently denied the accusations hurled against him. He explained that he issued the special order of demolition in the consolidated Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 after a decision[13] was rendered and a resolution[14] was issued by the Supreme Court affirming the judgments of the RTC and the Court of Appeals (CA) declaring spouses Melencio Uy and Talinanap Matualaga as the rightful owners of Lot No. 2, Psu-135740 and ordering all occupants to vacate the premises. This was also the reason why he ordered the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 7066 filed by herein complainants. He believed that complainants had no cause of action because the courts had already decided that the quitclaim upon which complainants based their action was null and void. Thus, to entertain the complaint would be just a waste of time on the part of the court. Anent the contempt order, he maintained that the same was justified because complainants had instituted an unfounded suit based on a falsified document, thereby demonstrating an obvious defiance and disrespect of the authority and dignity of the court.

 

As to the charge of partiality, respondent judge denied being the former counsel of Melencio Yus mother, Dominga Pinagawang. He explained that his real client was Cesar Baas who requested

him to write a letter demanding the squatters to vacate the lot owned by Dominga. He asserted that after writing the letter, another counsel took over the case.

 

Respondents Lastimosa and Palati filed their own Comment[15] on April 9, 2002 and averred that they faithfully observed the correct procedure in the implementation of the order of demolition, including the twin requirements of notice and hearing. According to them, they were extra careful in implementing the same especially because it was, by far, the biggest demolition undertaken by their office as it involved a 12-hectare property and about 1,500 persons. It also generated interest among the media, thus they made sure that they consulted with respondent judge all issues and questions relative to its implementation.

 

In the Agenda Report[16] dated December 12, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for violation of the rules governing the raffle of cases, and that the administrative case against him be redocketed as a regular administrative matter. The OCA, however, found that respondents Lastimosa and Palati did not abuse their authority in the implementation of the order of demolition and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint against them.

 

In the Resolution dated March 5, 2003, the Court required the parties to manifest their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.[17] Pursuant to respondents manifestation,[18] they filed their memorandum with additional exhibits on April 22, 2003.[19] Complainants, on the other hand, manifested that they would no longer file a memorandum and that they were submitting the case for resolution.

Complainants assailed the respondent judges issuance of a special order of dismissal in connection with Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 despite their pending protest before the DENR. To complainants, the issuance of said order of demolition constituted gross ignorance of the law.

 

We are not persuaded. The evidence on hand shows that respondent judge issued the special order of demolition only after carefully determining that there was no more hindrance to issue the same. For one, the trial court, in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, had already adjudged that the land in question belonged to spouses Yu and Matualaga and even nullified the quitclaim and all documents of conveyance of sale in favor of complainants predecessor-in-interest. [20] In fact, the records of the case disclosed that the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. No. 69000[21] and CA-G.R. CV No. 54003[22] and ultimately by this Court via its decision dated November 9, 1990 in G.R. No. 76487[23] and resolution dated July 19, 1999 in G.R. No. 138132.[24]

 

It is thus beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 had already attained finality. The special order of demolition was issued by respondent judge so that the final judgment could be fully implemented and executed, in accordance with the principle that the execution of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party, and mandatory and ministerial on the part of the court or tribunal issuing the judgment. [25] To be sure, it is essential to the effective administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.[26]

 

However, respondent judge abused his authority in dealing with Civil Case No. 7066 which cast serious doubt as to his impartiality. Respondent judges outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 7066 entitled Heirs of Concepcion Non Andres, namely Sergio, Sergio Jr., and Sofronio and Gracelda, all surnamed Andres v. Heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga, namely Eduardo, Leonora, Virgilio, Vilma, Cynthia, Imelda and Nancy, all surnamed Yu, and represented by Virgilio Yu and Cynthia Yu Abo, Atty. Elmer Lastimosa, in his capacity as Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of South Cotobato, Mr. Nasil Palati, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, and Hon. Jose S. Majaducon, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City was irregular. As correctly found by the OCA, respondent judge completely ignored the procedure for the raffling of cases mandated by Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, which we reproduce hereunder:

 

I. RAFFLING OF CASES

 

All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any branch without being raffled. The raffle of cases should be regularly conducted at the hour and on the day or days to be fixed by the Executive Judge. Only the maximum number of cases, according to their dates of filing, as can be equally distributed to all branches in the particular station or grouping shall be included in the raffle. x x x

 

 

Clearly, respondent judge violated the explicit mandate of the Court when he took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 wherein he was named as one of two defendants and instantly dismissed it without first conducting the requisite raffle. The Court, enunciating the importance of the raffling of cases, held in the case of Ang Kek Chen v. Bello[27]:

 

The procedure for the raffling of cases under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 is of vital importance to the administration of justice because it is intended to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases. By raffling the cases, public suspicion regarding the assignment of cases to predetermined judges is obviated. A violation or disregard of the Courts circular on how the raffle of cases should be conducted is not to be countenanced.

 

Respondent judge cannot excuse himself from his duty as Executive Judge by dispensing with the raffle of the case and dismissing it outright on the pretext that it would be just a waste of time on his part to raffle and entertain the case. As Executive Judge, he ought to know that raffling of cases is his personal duty and responsibility. He is expected to keep abreast and be conversant with Supreme Court rules and circulars that affect the conduct of cases before him and strictly comply therewith at all times. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law. Judges should therefore administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law.[28]

 

By declaring complainants guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing them to pay a fine of P2,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) days, respondent judge exhibited his bias against herein complainants.

 

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially, or such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of justice into disrepute or disrespect.[29] Here, respondent judge cited complainants in direct contempt of court for filing a complaint (Civil Case No. 7066) based on a deed of quitclaim that had already been declared null and void, instead of having the said case, wherein he was one of the defendants, raffled to the court which could properly act on the case. While the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, still, judges must be slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used judiciously and sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.[30]

 

The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[31]

 

It has time and again been stressed that besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain.[32]

 

Indeed, Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.

 

Respondent judges act of unceremoniously citing complainants in direct contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.

 

Respondent judge also took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 despite the fact that prior to his appointment as judge, respondent served as counsel for Melencio Yu and his mother, Dominga Pinagawang.

 

Respondents explanation that it was Cesar Baas who was his client and not Melencio and Dominga was belied by the demand letter[33] dated June 20, 1980, which was signed by him.

Respondent judge clearly acted as counsel not only for Cesar Baas but for Melencio and Dominga as well. Section 2 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct specifically provides that judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. Section 5 of the same Canon further states that judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where (b) the judge previously served as lawyer in the matter in controversy.

 

Respondent judge violated the above canon when he dispensed with the raffle and took cognizance of Civil Case No. 7066 as well as ordered its outright dismissal and cited the complainants in contempt of court. He thus created the impression that he intended to favor his former clients, Melencio and Dominga. His actuations gave ground for the parties to doubt his impartiality and objectivity. A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. He has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of

doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to its integrity.[34] Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, for all the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge.[35]

 

We take this occasion once more to impress upon a trial judge that he must at all times maintain and preserve the trust and faith of litigants in the court's impartiality. When he exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit himself voluntarily. It is basic that a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce the slightest doubt on his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself.[36]

 

Respondent judge was a party defendant in Civil Case No. 7066 which was enough reason not to act on the same and just leave the matter to the Vice-Executive Judge. His reluctance to let go of the case all the more induced doubts and suspicions as to his honest actuations, probity and objectivity. Evidently, respondent judge violated the clear injunction embodied in the aforecited Canon of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Be that as it may, we rule that there is no merit in complainants charge of gross ignorance of the law leveled against respondent judge. For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.[37] Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a person who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the grounds for the accusation.

 

The violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 by respondent judge is classified as a less serious charge under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.  Section 11(B) of the same Rule provides the following sanctions for less serious offenses:

 

Sec. 11. Sanctions.

 

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

 

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or

 

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

 

Finally, as regards the charge against Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff Elmer Lastimosa and Sheriff IV Palati, complainants maintain that they abused their authority when they enforced the order of demolition against complainants even though they were not impleaded as parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647 where the order of demolition was issued.

 

The dispositive portion of the order of demolition issued by respondent judge reads:

NOW THEREFORE, we command you to demolish the improvements erected by the defendants HEIRS OF JOHN SYCIP (namely: NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, JOSE SYCIP, JR., ALFONSO SYCIP II, ROSE MARIE SYCIP, JAMES SYCIP & GRACE SYCIP), Represented by NATIVIDAD D. SYCIP, in Civil Case No. 1291 and the plaintiffs YARD URBAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. ET AL. in Civil Case No. 4647, on that portion of land belonging to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1291 and defendants in Civil Case No. 4647, MELENCIO YU and TALINANAP MATUALAGA, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (V-14496) (P-2331) P-523, located in Apopong, General Santos City.

This Special Order of Demolition shall be returned by you to this Court within ten (10) days from the date of receipt hereof, together with your proceedings indorsed hereon.[38]

 

Clearly, respondent judge neither ordered the eviction of any other person occupying the property of spouses Yu and Matualaga other than the parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, nor directed the Ex-Officio Sheriff to demolish the houses or structures of any person other than the said parties. However, the notice to vacate issued by Palati and noted by Lastimosa was addressed not just to the parties but to all adverse claimants and actual occupants of the land subject of the case. It directed that the houses and improvements of the parties, as well as those of adverse claimants including complainants who were not parties in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, would be demolished.

 

Worth quoting here is the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 54003, which decided the appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. 4647, viz:

Finally, the appellants assertion that they are not bound by the decision in Civil Case No. 1291 because they are not parties therein and that the appellees should first institute an action for ejectment in order to acquire possession of the property is without merit. The appellants failure to establish a vested and better right, either derivative or personal, to the land in question as against the appellees, forecloses any posturing of exemption from the legal force and effect of the writ of execution issued by the trial court to enforce a final judgment under the guise of denial of due process. A judgment pertaining to ownership and/or possession of real property is binding upon the defendants and all persons claiming right of possession or ownership from the said defendant and the prevailing party need not file a separate action for ejectment to evict the said privies from the premises.(Emphasis supplied)[39]

Evidently, the decision in Civil Case Nos. 1291 and 4647, which had long become final and executory, can be enforced against herein complainants although they were not parties thereto. There is no question that complainants merely relied on the title of their predecessor-in-interest who was privy to John Sycip, the defendant in Civil Case No. 1291. As such, complainants and their predecessor-in-interest can be reached by the order of demolition.[40]

 

Respondent sheriffs cannot be faulted with grave misconduct and abuse of authority in implementing the order of demolition. The records before us are simply bereft of any indication supportive of the allegation. Quite the contrary, we find Lastimosa and Palati to have faithfully observed the correct procedure in the implementation of respondent judges order. In fact, they were extra careful in the enforcement of the same knowing that a lot of attention was given to it by the media, involving as it did a 12-hectare property and about 1,500 persons. Despite the controversy, they were able to carry out the demolition peacefully and successfully.

 

It is well-settled that when an order is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandate. The primary duty of sheriffs is to execute judgments and orders of the court to which they belong. It must be stressed that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. It is said that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. It is also indisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Hence, the officers charged with this delicate task must act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice, otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of justice would be futile.[41]

 

We take note of the fact that respondent judge had compulsorily retired from the service on February 24, 2001.[42]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Jose Majaducon GUILTY of abuse of his authority for which he is meted a fine of P20,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

 

For lack of merit, the charge of grave abuse of authority against Elmer Lastimosa and Nasil Palati is hereby DISMISSED.

 

SO ORDERED.

[Anres vs. Majaducon, 574 SCRA 169(2008)]