legal ethics for feb 1

8/13/2019 Legal Ethics for Feb 1

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GENEROSA BUTED and BENITO BOLISAY, petitioners,

vs.

ATTY. HAROLD M. HERNANDO, respondent.

Jorge A. Dolorfino for petitioners.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

On 22 August 1974, spouses Generosa Buted and Benito Bolisay filed an administrative complaint for malpracticeagainst respondent Atty. Harold M. Hernando, charging the latter with having wantonly abused professional secrets

or information obtained by him as their counsel.

After respondent Hernando filed his Answer on 25 June 1974, the Court, in a resolution dated 4 October 1974

referred the complaint to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation.

On 10 February 1975, complainants presented a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 1

On 24 October 1975, the Solicitor-General conducted a hearing where respondent took the witness stand on his

own behalf.

The record of the case shows the following background facts:

In an action for partition instituted by Generosa as compulsory heir of the deceased Teofilo Buted, respondent wascounsel for Luciana Abadilla and a certain Angela Buted. Involved in said partition case was a parcel of land

Identified as Lot 9439-B. Respondent ultimately succeeded in defending Luciana Abadilla's claim of exclusive

ownership over Lot 9439-B. When Luciana died, respondent withdrew his appearance from that partition case.

It appears that Luciana Abadilla sold the lot to Benito Bolisay and a new Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot

was issued in the name of complainant spouses.

When an action for specific performance was lodged by a couple named Luis Sy and Elena Sy against Benito Bolisay

as one of the defendants, 2 the latter retained the services of respondent Atty. Hernando however claims that he

rendered his services to Benito Bolisay free of charge. Subject of this case was a contract of lease executed by

Benito's co-defendant therein, Enrique Buted, over a house standing on a portion of Lot No. 9439-B. It appears

that the Sy's were claiming that the lease extended to the aforementioned lot. Benito was then assertingownership over the realty by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Luciana Abadilla in his favor. Eventually, the

Sy's were ordered to vacate the house subject of the lease. Respondent avers that the relationship between

himself and Benito Bolisay as regards this case was terminated on 4 December 1969. 3

On 23 February 1974, respondent Hernando, without the consent of the heirs of Luciana Abadilla and complainant

spouses, filed a petition on behalf of the heirs of Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco all surnamed Abadilla, seeking the

cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of complainant spouses over the lot. Carlos, Dionisia and

Francisco were Luciana's registered co-owners in the original certificate of title covering Lot No. 9439-B. 4 At the

hearing, respondent Hernando testified that if the petition for cancellation of TCT was granted, Lot 9439-B would

no longer be owned by complainant spouses but would be owned in common by all the heirs of Luciana Abadilla. 5

Complainant spouses, upon learning of respondent's appearance against them in the cadastral proceeding,

manifested their disapproval thereof in a letter dated 30 July 1974. 6 Respondent however, pursued the case until

it was eventually dismissed by the trial court on 2 September 1974 on the ground of prescription. 7

At the hearing before the Office of the Solicitor General and in his Answer, respondent Hernando admitted his

involvement in the cadastral case as counsel for the Abadillas but denied having seen or taken hold of the

controversial Transfer Certificate of Title, and having availed himself of any confidential information relating to

Lot 9439-B.

In its Report and Recommendation dated 29 March 1990, the Solicitor General recommends that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months for violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics by

representing clients with conflicting interests, and filed before this Court the corresponding Complaint 8 dated 30March 1990.

The issue raised in this proceeding is: whether or not respondent Hernando had a conflict of interests under the

circumstances described above.

The Canons of Professional Ethics, the then prevailing parameters of behavior of members of the bar, defines a

conflict of interests situation in the following manner:

6. Adverse influence and conflicting interests.

xxx xxx xxx

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned

given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents


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conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to

another client requires him to oppose.

The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or

confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in

matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been

reposed.(Emphasis supplied)

Though as regards the first and second cases handled by respondent, no conflict of interest existed, the same

cannot be said with respect to the action for specific performance and the cadastral proceeding. By respondent'sown admission, he defended the right of ownership over Lot 9439-B of complainant Benito Bolisay in the action for

specific performance. He assailed this same right of ownership when he subsequently filed a petition for

cancellation of complainants' Transfer Certificate of Title over that same lot. Respondent Hernando was in a

conflict of interest situation.

It is clear from the above-quoted portion of the Canons of Professional Ethics that in cases where a conflict of

interests may exist, full disclosure of the facts and express consent of all the parties concerned are

necessary. 9The present Code of Professional Responsibility is stricter on this matter considering that consent of

the parties is now required to be in written form. 10In the case at bar, such consent was wanting.

Respondent persistently argues that contrary to the claims of complainant spouses, he had never seen nor takenhold of the Transfer Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 9439-B nor obtained any confidential information in

handling the action for specific performance. 11 The contention of respondent is, in effect, that because

complainant has not clearly shown that respondent had obtained any confidential information from Benito Bolisay

while representing the latter in the action for specific performance, respondent cannot be penalized for

representing conflicting interests. That is not the rule in this jurisdiction. The rule here is, rather, that the mere

fact that respondent had acted as counsel for Benito Bolisay in the action for specific performance should have

precluded respondent from acting or appearing as counsel for the other side in the subsequent petition for

cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses Generosa and Benito Bolisay. There is no necessity

for proving the actual transmission of confidential information to an attorney in the course of his employment by

his first client in order that he may be precluded from accepting employment by the second or subsequent clientwhere there are conflicting interests between the first and the subsequent clients. The reason for this rule was

set out by the Court in Hilado v. David 12 in the following terms:

Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated

affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the

complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of

the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that

might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of other

unsalutary results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent; i.e., to

make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an

attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which

is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in

litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the

attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants

would be in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the

proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of

the facts that came to him.

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client

as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to

prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honestlawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n. 183

III., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792) It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said

another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the

attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves

attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the

appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their

secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of

justice. 13 (Emphasis supplied)


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This Court went further in San Jose v. Cruz, 14 where the lawyer was charged with malpractice for having

represented a new client whose interest was opposed to those of his former clients in another case:

The record shows that the respondent offered his services to the Matienzo spouses knowing that

the petitioner had obtained a favorable judgment in the civil case No. 5480 and that his efforts in

the subsequent civil case No. 5952 would frustrate said judgment and render it ineffectual, as has

really been the result upon his obtaining the writ of injunction above-mentioned. Obviously his

conduct is unbecoming to an attorney and cannot be sanctioned by the courts. An attorney owes

loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relationof attorney and client has terminated and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to

defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is

distinct from, and independent of the former case. 15 (Emphasis supplied)

The appropriate rule has been expressed by Justice Malcolm in the following manner:

An attorney is not permitted, in serving a new client as against a former one, to do anything which

will injuriously affect the former client in any manner in which the attorney formerly represented

him, though the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and the new employment is in a

different case; nor can the attorney use against his former client any knowledge or informationgained through their former connection. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

The absence of monetary consideration does not exempt the lawyer from complying with the prohibition against

pursuing cases where a conflict of interest exists. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client

relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship.

The Court therefore agrees with the Solicitor-General that respondent Hernando is guilty of violation of the

Canons of Professional Ethics by representing clients with conflicting interests. We believe, however, that a

heavier penalty is appropriate.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Harold M. Hernando from the practice of law for a period

of five (5) months, with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severepenalty. A copy of this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and

spread on the personal record of respondent.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

CBD CASE No. 251 July 11, 1995

ADELINA T. VILLANUEVA, complainant,

vs.ATTY. TERESITA STA. ANA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Complainant Adelina T. Villanueva has sought the disbarment of respondent Attorney Teresita Sta. Ana.

From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the records of the case, it would

appear that complainant first met respondent lawyer some time in April 1992 when the former brought certain

documents to the latter for notarization. Respondent later learned that complainant had planned to borrow a

substantial sum from a bank or lending institution. Respondent represented that she could facilitate the loan if

complainant could put up a land collateral and provide a "guaranty deposit" of P150,000.00. Evidently convinced that

respondent could help, complainant handed over and entrusted to respondent the amount of P144,000.00, as well asvarious documents, e.g., a special power of attorney, deed of sale, tax declaration and land title (in the name of

complainant's father), required for the loan application. Respondent later told complainant that an additional

amount of P109,000.00 was needed for withholding and documentary stamp taxes, plus surcharges. Complainant

thereupon decided to forego the loan application. She demanded from respondent the return of her money;

however, the latter not only failed to heed the request but also then began to avoid complainant.

Complainant finally sought assistance from the office of the Vice-President of the Philippines, which referred the

matter to the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"). Respondent was subpoenaed twice by the agent-on-case

but she failed in both instances to appear. The investigation, nonetheless, went through; thereafter, the NBI

recommended that respondent be criminally charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised


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Penal Code and that disbarment proceedings be taken against her. In a letter-referral, dated 03 May 1993, then

NBI Director Epimaco A. Velasco transmitted to the Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission") of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") the Bureau's evaluation.

The Commission required respondent to respond to the charges but respondent neither complied nor appeared at

any of the hearings scheduled by it.

In the course of its proceedings, the Commission noted several criminal charges filed against respondent; viz:

(1) Criminal Case No. 92-8849 for Falsification of Private Document,

pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch 73;(2) Criminal Case No. 93-9289 for Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b)

of the Revised Penal Code, pending before the Regional Trial Court

of Antipolo, Branch 72;

(3) Criminal Case No. 93-118159 for Estafa through Falsification of

Public Document filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch

15, which resulted in her conviction. The dispositive portion of the

decision, dated 24 March 1994, read:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Estafa thru falsificationof public document and hereby imposes upon said accused an

indeterminate penalty of 2 years 4 months of prision correccional as

minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and indemnify

the offended party the sum of P136,000.00 and to pay the cost.1

(4) Criminal Cases Nos. 8015 and 8019 for Violation of Section 3(c),

Republic Act No. 3019, pending before the Second Division of the

Sandiganbayan;

(5) Criminal Cases Nos. 7351 and 7354 also for Violation of Section

3(c), Republic Act No. 3019, pending before the Second Division of

the Sandiganbayan;(6) Criminal Case No. 7036 for Violation of Section 3(c), Republic

Act No. 3019, pending before the Second Division of the

Sandiganbayan; and

(7) Criminal Case No. 6731 for Violation of Section 3(c), Republic Act

No. 3019, pending before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.

In the Commission's Report and Recommendation, dated 25 July 1994, Investigating Commissioner Victor C.

Fernandez recommended that "the respondent be disbarred for being totally unfit to be a member of the legal

profession."2In its Resolution No. XI-94-219, dated 14 January 1995, the Board of Governors of the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") resolved to adopt and approve the report of the Investigating Commissioner.

We also agree.

Well-settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the legal

profession but it must also remain extant in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored

fraternity.3The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 1 . . . .

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into

his possession.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the

client.Despite all the opportunities accorded to her, respondent has failed to present her defense and to refute the

charges or, at the very least, to explain herself. The Court is thus left with hardly any choice other than to accept

the findings and recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Commission on Bar Discipline.

WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita Sta. Ana is DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out her name

from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ.,

concur.

Feliciano, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., are on leave.


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GLORITO V. MATURAN, petitioner, vs. ATTY. CONRADO S. GONZALES, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

ROMERO, J.:

A complaint for disbarment was filed with this Court on October 25, 1983, by Glorito V. Maturan against his

counsel, Atty. Conrado S. Gonzales, charging him with immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts. The respondent filed

his comment thereto on February 6, 1984. On November 11, 1997, or after thirteen (13) years, the Board of

Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines submitted their report and recommendation on the instant

case.The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Spouses Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V. Maturan (herein petitioner), as

their attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated November 6, 1981. Said SPA authorized

Maturan to file ejectment cases against squatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50375, located in General Santos

City, as well as criminal cases against the latter for violation of P.D. 772, again in connection with said lot.

Respondent, Atty. Conrado Gonzales, prepared and notarized said Special Power of Attorney.

Subsequently, Glorito Maturan engaged the services of respondent in ejecting several squatters occupying Lot

1350-A, Psd-50735. While said lot was registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had,

however, instituted a case for reconveyance of property and declaration of nullity against the former, docketed asCivil Case No. 2067.

As a consequence of his engagement by petitioner, respondent Gonzales filed Civil Case No. 1783-11 for

Forcible Entry and Damages against several individuals. On February 18, 1983, a judgment was rendered in favor of

petitioner. Petitioner, through respondent, filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution on March 10, 1983.

In the interim, the parties to Civil Case No. 2067 entered into a compromise agreement, which was judicially

approved in a judgment dated March 28, 1983.

On June 22, 1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was pending, and without withdrawing

as counsel for petitioner, respondent filed, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., Civil Case No. 2746, an action to

annul the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 2067. The action was predicated on the lack of authority on the part

of petitioner to represent Antonio and Gloria Casquejo, as no such authorization was shown to be on record in CivilCase No. 2067. On August 24, 1983, respondent, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., also filed Special Civil Case

No. 161 for injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction, with damages, against petitioner.

Aggrieved by respondents acceptance of professional employment from their adversary in Civil Case No. 2067,

and alleging that privileged matters relating to the land in question had been transmitted by petitioner to

respondent in Civil Case 1783-11, petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the former for immoral,

unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his disbarment.

Respondent, in a comment dated January 25, 1984, denied having committed any malicious, unethical,

unbecoming, immoral, or anomalous act against his client. Respondent declared that he was of the belief that filing

a motion for issuance of a writ of execution was the last and final act in the lawyer-client relationship between

himself and petitioner, and that his formal withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to

sever the lawyer-client relationship between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his acceptance of employment

from Yokingco was for him, an opportunity to honestly earn a little more for his childrens sustenance.

The investigating commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in his report dated August 21, 1997,

found respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommended that he be suspended for three (3)

years. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the

investigating commissioner but recommended that the suspension be reduced from three (3) years to one (1) year.

This Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding respondent guilty of representing

conflicting interests. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the adverse party who

is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharginginconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a

person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.[1]That the representation of conflicting

interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition

inoperative.

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and

confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his clients case. He

learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered

sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the clients secrets. A
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lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by

the loss thereof.[2]

This Court finds respondents actuations violative of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which

provide in part:

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given

after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests

when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

Moreover, respondents justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the fiduciary obligations

which a lawyer owes to his client. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of a motion for a writ

of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be

permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to the prejudice of his client.

As to the recommendation that the term of suspension be reduced from three years to one year, we find the

same to be unwarranted. In similar cases decided by the Supreme Court, the penalty of two or three years

suspension has been imposed where respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests. In Vda. De

Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, Sr.,[3]the respondent, who appeared for complainant in a case for revival of judgment, even

though he had been the counsel of the adverse party in the case sought to be revived, was suspended for a period

of two years. InBautista vs. Barrios,

[4]

a suspension of two years was imposed on respondent Barrios, who haddrafted a deed of partition for petitioner, but who appeared for the other party therein, when the same was

sought to be enforced by petitioner. In PNB vs. Cedo,[5]the Court even suspended the respondent therein for

three years, but only because respondent not only represented conflicting interests, but also deliberately intended

to attract clients with interests adverse to his former employer. Finally, in Natan vs. Capule,[6]respondent was

suspended for two years after he accepted professional employment in the very case in which his former client was

the adverse party.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to MODIFY the IBP recommendation to suspend respondent for one year

and modifies it to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

VILL TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC., petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ENERGY CORPORATION, and the DEPUTY SHERIFF of the Regional Trial

Court, Makati, Metro Manila, respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:p

The issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether or not notice of a decision served upon counsel in a

case who did not leave a forwarding address after he had moved from his address of record, is a valid servicethereby making the decision final and executory after the lapse of the period to appeal.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

In Civil Case No. 45167 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch CXLI, defendant Vill Transport Service,

Inc. (Vill Transport for brevity) was held liable for damages for breach of contract in favor of the plaintiff Energy

Corporation. Vill Transport was ordered to pay Energy Corporation US$25,524.75 or P191,435.62 as damages,

P40,000 for charter fees, P33,931.65 for rental and maintenance costs and P63,750 for service fees, with all of

these amounts being subject to 12% interest per annum from June 16, 1980, plus attorney's fees of P8,866.60.

On June 7, 1985 a copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to Atty. Amante Pimentel, counsel of record of

Vill Transport, at his address at 563 Tanglaw Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. However, it was returned to the

court with the notation that the addressee had moved out of his given address without leaving a forwardingaddress.

On September 14, 1985, Energy Corporation moved for execution of the decision and on September 19, 1985, the

court favorably acted on the motion. On September 24,1985, a writ of execution was therefore issued.

A month later, Vill Transport filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the order of September 19, 1985 and

served notice of its intention to appeal. It contended that the decision had not as yet become final because it came

to know of the decision only on October 21, 1985. It also claimed that the writ of execution was void as no copy of

the motion for execution was served on it.

Energy Corporation filed an opposition to said urgent motion pointing out that the decision had become final and

executory since a copy of the decision was served on Vill transport through its counsel at his address of record and
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no appeal was perfected within the reglementary period of appeal. It added that a motion for execution of a final

and executory judgment did not have to be with notice to defendant.

Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved by the court, Vill Transport filed a motion for new trial

based on newly-discovered evidence. Again, without waiting for the resolution of said motion, it filed with the

Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction aimed at the setting aside of

the order of execution and the issuance of an order for a new trial.

On September 30, 1986, the Court of Appeals 1rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 2It

held that petitioner's counsel was duty-bound to notify the trial court of any change of address and his failure todo so could not be excused. It added that the trial court had every reason to consider the service of its decision

completed upon the expiration of five days from notice to counsel in the absence of prior notice by the latter of

any change of address. It opined that "to hold that Rule 13, Sec. 8 cannot apply here because Atty. Pimentel did

not get the notice, would be to encourage litigants or their attorneys to evade the service of judgments and orders

by simply leaving their addresses without notice of their whereabouts." 3

Its motion for the reconsideration of said decision having been denied, Vill Transport interposed the instant

petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner admits the negligence of its counsel in not leaving a forwarding address but contends that its counsel

was not actually notified of the registered letter containing a copy of the trial court's decision for he had movedfrom his address of record. Hence, service thereof could not have taken effect after the lapse of the five-day

period mentioned in Rule 13, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. It invokes due process complaining that it was

deprived of its right to appeal from the decision of the lower court on account of its failure to receive a copy of

the decision.

On the other hand, private respondent avers that the petition was prosecuted manifestly to delay execution of the

decision of the lower court which had long become final and executory. It stresses the fact that, being designated

by Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court to receive copies of all court processes, petitioner's counsel was duty-

bound to inform the court of any changes in his address of record and therefore, should he fail to do so, service of

such processes in his address of record should be considered complete and binding upon his client.

We find for the private respondent.Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that "(s)ervice by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt

by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first

notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time." In Barrameda vs. Castillo, 4the

Court held that since the exception in service by registered mail refers to constructive service, not to actual

receipt of the mail, it is but fair and just that there be conclusive proof that a first notice was sent by the

postmaster to the addressee. While in the more recent case of De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz, 5the Court appears to

have adopted the more stringent rule of requiring not only that the notice of the registered mail be sent but that

it should also be delivered to and received by the addressee, We find that this rule cannot be applied in this case

wherein the element of negligence is present.

Petitioner herein disputes that a first notice was ever sent to its counsel of record because "the post office just

returned the registered letter and put the stampmark . . . 'Moved'" thereon. 6To our mind, petitioner's contention

is sufficient proof that indeed a first notice was sent to its counsel of record. Its non-receipt by the addressee,

however, was due entirely to his neglect in informing the court of the fact that he had moved and had a new

address. To cater to petitioner's rhetorical argument would put a premium on negligence and encourage the non-

termination of cases by reason thereof.

In Antonio vs. Court of Appeals, 7the Court categorically stated that the requirement of conclusive proof of

receipt of the registry notice "presupposes that the notice is sent to the correct address as indicated in the

records of the court. It does not apply where, as in the case at bar, the notice was sent to the lawyer's given

address but did not reach him because he had moved therefrom without informing the court of his new location.The service at the old address should be considered valid. Otherwise, no process can be served on the client

through his lawyer if the latter has simply disappeared without leaving a forwarding address. There is no need to

stress that service on the lawyer, if valid, is also valid service on the client he represents. The rule in fact is that

it is on the lawyer and not the client that the service should first be made."

Losing a case on account of one's counsel's negligence is a bitter pill to swallow for the litigant. But then, the Court

is duty-bound to observe its rules and procedures. And, in the observance thereof for the orderly administration

of justice, it cannot countenance the negligence and ineptitude of lawyers who wantonly jeopardize the interests of

their clients. 8On his part, a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the

ends of justice. 9


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Thus, a lawyer should so arrange matters that official and judicial communications sent by mail will reach him

promptly and should he fail to do so, not only he but his client as well, must suffer the consequence of his

negligence. 10Failure to claim registered mail of which notice had been duly given by the postmaster is not

excusable negligence that would warrant the reopening of a decided case. 11The same rule applies in cases like the

instant one where the counsel, through his negligence, caused the nondelivery of a judicial notice.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied for lack of merit. This decision is immediately executory. Costs

against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD

NORDISTA, complainants,

vs.

ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.

DAVIDE JR., J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be

disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation ofthis complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:

1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No. 38153

of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case

reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to

malpractice and negligence in the performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the

aforesaid case. That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and riding high on the

trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously

neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No.

3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in default.

2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That he had

already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a copy

he continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all because

according to him he was a very busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August 17,

1993.

3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the Judge Capulong

case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined

and disbarred in the practice of his profession.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No.

3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunatelydenied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because it

was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA)

which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in

the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e., the

decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA)

membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him

because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The respondent

then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured

and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his

disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession.

The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit this case for

decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both manifested in the

affirmative.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the

President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the


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union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a

complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.

In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and

directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the rights

and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and

Employment.

Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a

complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, underArticles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res

judicataby virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction,

since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to

dismiss.

The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case.

Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case,

and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from

notice.Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This

motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred

to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did

not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the

complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of

evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally,

plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or correctivedamages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, however,

affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for

the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.

The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant

disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the

latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence,

which was received ex-parte.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to

become his client. He has the right to decline employment,1subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause

and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 2He must serve the client with competence

and diligence,3and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.4Elsewise stated, he

owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights,

and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client,

save by the rules of law, legally applied.5This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and

every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every

such remedy or defense.6If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practicelaw carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.

A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also

serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal

profession. 7

The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure to

do so in this wise:

[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8[he] instead, thru honest

mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court,

docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .


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And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he again

"inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his overzealousness as

stated earlier. . . . "

In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake but was

"deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for,

as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and

pressure of legal work."9In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent has given

inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained

his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure

of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his

overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.

Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct

and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty

to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a

reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of

Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based onforgetfulness because of his other commitments.

Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty

to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the

trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even

after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he

further assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to

prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his

motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious defense. 10And, in his appeal from the

judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the

order of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that order.Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due diligence

in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence,

skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires

him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which

provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith

shall render him liable."

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause"

for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter

declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought

which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he

should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility expressly provides:

A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable

results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of the case.

Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the trouble

of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the

adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he

meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were notentirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all

the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of the

complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more

careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.


11/13

CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY OR

MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF

RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT. The cause of

the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted

to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should haveexpected . . . By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had

been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or

proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the

law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable

profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court . . . For

this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as a

punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.

Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the

rights and privileges appurtenant to membership of the Philippine bar.R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM, p:

In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty.

Crisanto L. Francisco.

On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena

Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite

repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he

had an option to extend the lease for another 5 years and the right of pre-emption over the property.

In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits

before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings weredecided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issues and

parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping.

Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as were

authorized by law.

The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as follows:

1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint against Garcia and the other lessors for specific

performance and reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil

Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9, 1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to

state a cause of action, laches and prescription. The case was dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10,

1989.

2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455. Through Francisco, Lee filed an

answer alleging as special and affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City. On September 5, 1989, Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation

on the ground that the issues before the two courts were separate and different.

3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for

certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista, Garcia and the other lessors. This was

docketed as civil Case No. Q-89-3833. In filing this petition, Francisco knew or should have known that it violated

the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition againstany interlocutory order issued by the court.

Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denial of

his prayer for dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-89-3833 was clearly a special civil

action and not an appeal. On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista

from proceeding with the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant, however, the

injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.

4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for

preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors.


12/13

Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476, the petition assailed the January 9, 1990 order of Judge Vera dismissing Civil

Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the petition was denied.

5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the other

lessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he filed a petition against Judge

Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and damages with

prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil case No. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.

In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawfuldetainer case. Again, he lies. Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not an appeal.

On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990,

Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in that case. Garcia attacked

this order in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp. No.

22392. The petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on September 19, 1991, on the ground that the judgment

in the unlawful detainer case had come final and executory as June 30, 1990.

6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case. On September 27,

1991, Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the hearing of the motion. A writ

of execution was nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991.7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary

injunction and temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other

lessors. This Court denied the petition on January 27, 1992, and reconsideration on April 8, 1992.

8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge

Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside and declare the writs

of execution in Civil Case No. 1455. This was dismissed on August 4, 1992, and Lee, through Francisco, filed a

motion for reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this motion was pending.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.

The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he

wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as heshould have expected. He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable

time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against

his every move.

By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly

rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to

him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath

not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved

himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.

Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and experience in the

practice of the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for

harassment of the complainant and the misuse of judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as punishment for his misconduct but also as a

warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.

Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the

rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.

Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the respondent and circularized to all courts and the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DE DIOS MARIKINA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioner.

Orlando B. Braga for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:

Petitioner suffered physical injuries, requiring two (2) major operations, when he fell from, and then was dragged

along the asphalted road by, a passenger bus operated by private respondent transportation company. The incident

occurred when the bus driver bolted forward at high speed while petitioner was still clinging on the bus door's


13/13

handle bar that caused the latter to lose his grip and balance. The refusal of private respondent to settled

petitioner's claim for damages constrained petitioner to file, on 26 June 1985, a complaint for damages against

private respondent.

After the reception of evidence, the trial court, on 11 December 1989, rendered its decision, the dispositive

portion reading thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing defendant De Dios Marikina Transportation

Co., Inc.'s counterclaim for lack of merit and ordering said defendant to pay plaintiff Jose V. Del

Rosario: (a) the sum of P76,944.41, as actual and compensatory damages; (b) the sum of P15,000.00,as moral and exemplary damages; and (c) the sum of P33,641.50, as attorney's fees, a s well as to

pay the costs of suit; and, as regards the third-party complaint herein, ordering third-party

defendant First Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. to indemnify third-party plaintiff

De Dios Marikina Transportation Co., Inc. in the sum of P12,000.00, with interest thereon at the

legal rate from date of filing of the third-party complaint on August 20, 1985, until full payment

thereof. Further, there being no satisfactory warrant, therefor, the Court hereby dismisses the

rest of the claims in the complaint and third-party complaint herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

On appeal to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the findings of fact of the trial court, as well as the grant topetitioner of damages, but it reduced the award for attorney's fees from P33,641.50 to P5,000.00. Petitioner's

motion for reconsideration questioning the reduction of attorney's fees was denied by the appellate court. Hence,

this petition raising this sole issue.

We see merit in the petition.

There is no question that a court may, whenever it deems it just and equitable, allow the recovery by the prevailing

party of attorneys fees. 1In determining the reasonableness of such fees, this Court in a number of cases 2has

provided various criteria which, for convenient guidance, we might collate thusly:

a) the quantity and character of the services rendered;

b) the labor, time and trouble involved;

c) the nature and importance of the litigation;d) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy;

e) the novelty and difficulty of questions involved;

f) the responsibility imposed on counsel;

g) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the service;

h) the professional character and social standing of the lawyer;

i) the customary charges of the bar for similar services;

j) the character of employment, whether casual or for establishment client;

k) whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge

a higher fee when it is contingent than when it is absolute); and

1) the results secured.

In this instance, the complaint for damages was instituted by petitioner in June 1985, following the refusal of

private respondent to settle petitioner's claim, and the decision thereon was promulgated by the court a quo only in

December 1989 or about four years and six months later. Several pleadings were filed and no less than twenty

appearances were made by petitioner's counsel, not counting the various other pleadings ultimately filed with the

Court of Appeals and now before this Court. Given the nature of the case, the amount of damages involved, and the

evident effort exerted by petitioner's counsel, the trial court's award of attorney's fees for P33,641.50 would

appear to us to be just and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by

REINSTATING the trial court's award of attorney's fees.SO ORDERED

Feliciano, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., is on leave.

legal ethics for feb 1

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