legal justifications for the iraq war

8/8/2019 Legal Justifications for the Iraq War

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THE LEGAL WAR: A JUSTIFICATION FORMILITARY ACTION IN IRAQ

Adam P. Tait*

Cite as: Adam P. Tait, The Legal War:

A Justification for Military Action in Iraq

9 GONZ.J.INTL L. 96(2005),

available athttp://www.across-borders.com

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 96II. THE ROLE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS DURING THREATS TO

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY............................................ 98

III. THE HISTORY OF IRAQ AND THE UNSECURITY COUNCIL ............. 100

IV. EXISTING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS JUSTIFIED ARMED

FORCE AGAINST IRAQ..................................................................... 105

V. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFIED THE INVASION OF IRAQ .. 110

VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 114

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 15, 2004, in a radio interview with the BBC, UnitedNations Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that the military campaign

against Iraq in March of 2003 was illegal, calling into question, yet again,

whether the decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power was in line

with customary international law.1 Annans comments echoed the

sentiments of several nations (most notably Russia, France, and Germany),

as well as some international legal scholars, that the actions of the United

States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and a coalition of the willing

* Adam P. Tait is a 2005 graduate of Gonzaga University School of Law, cum laude. Mr.

Tait will begin practicing commercial litigation at the Spokane firm of Reed & Giesa, P.S., in

the fall of 2005. Mr. Tait would like to thank his lovely wife, Nicola, and his son Riley, age 4,and daughter Paige, age 2 for the support and joy they give him.

1Patrick E. Tyler, U.N. Chief Ignites Firestorm By Calling Iraq War Illegal, NEW

YORKTIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at 11.

96


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Fall 2005] The Legal War 97

did not conform to the United Nations (UN) Charter.2 Meanwhile, both

the US and the UK argued that the action was justified under international

law due to the combined effect of numerous UN Security Council

resolutions concerning Iraq.3

In September 2002, for example, PresidentGeorge W. Bush spoke to the UN about the danger that Saddam Hussein

and his Baath regime posed to the free world, citing Iraqs continuing

repudiation of Security Council resolutions and the threat it posed to

international peace and security as a justification for military action.4

This article examines the justifications for the war, and details two

reasons why the invasion of Iraq was legal under customary international

law. First, existing Security Council resolutions were valid and effective in

2003 to authorize the United States and other member states to participate in

the military effort against Iraq. Because those resolutions had never been

repealed or extinguished, and because events of the past 13 years made clear

that those resolutions still had effect, the US and UK were correct to justify

their actions on those resolutions. Second, this article will argue that theeffort was justified as preemptive self-defense as codified in Article 51 of

the UN Charter. Because Iraq posed a possibly imminent threat to the

collective security of the world, and because the definition of imminence

has changed in a post-Sept. 11 world, the coalition effort to remove Saddam

Hussein from power was an appropriate response to the Iraqi threat.

This article is separated into four parts. Part I examines the role of the

UN Security Council during times of international conflict and threats to

peace and security. Namely, this section discusses the Security Councils

ability to address specific threats, as well as the shortcomings and

inadequacies of this body. Part II details the history of events concerning

Iraq since Saddam Husseins forces first entered Kuwait in 1990. This

article provides a description of important Security Council resolutions that

concerned Iraqs actions and refusals to abandon its Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) programs. Part III argues why military action by

coalition forces against the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party

was justified according to existing Security Council resolutions. Part IV

explains that military action was justified according to the inherent right to

self-defense, as codified by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Further, this

section demonstrates that state practice over the course of history affirms

the inherent right of self-defense. In conclusion, this article will offer some

2 Id.

3 See US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Briefing on Situation with Iraq (March

17, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/

18771.htm.4

George W. Bush, Address at the UN General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002), in 38

Wkly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1529 (Sept. 16, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.


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98 Gonzaga Journal of International Law [Vol. 9:1

suggestions to resolve the disputes that arose over the debate concerning

military action in Iraq.

II. THE ROLE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS DURING THREATS TOINTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The Security Council is perhaps the most well known organ of the

United Nations, and surely the most controversial. Paragraph 1 of Article

24 of the UN Charter states:

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations,

its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for

the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in

carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council

acts on their behalf.5

According to this responsibility to maintain peace and security among

the nations of the world, the Security Council must determine the existence

of threats to the peace, any breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, and

make recommendations or decisions to restore peace.6 This duty is

tempered by the fact that it must act in accordance with the Purposes and

Principles of the UN, namely principles of justice and international law.7

When the Security Council acts according to this mandate, its decisions

become binding on Member States, which agree to accept and carry out the

decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the...Charter.8 While

there is a great deal of discussion about what constitutes a decision of the

Security Council and just when it acts in accordance with its mandate,9 the

Security Council remains an important body in the realm of international

lawwhen it speaks, nations do listen.

That is not to say that the Security Council clearly and definitively sets

forth decisions. Indeed, there have been numerous occasions when the

Security Council was not able to decide on a course of action, yet Member

States took up arms regardless of such inactivity. The Security Councils

impotence with regards to the situation in Kosovo in the late 1990s is

telling. In 1993, the Security Council passed a resolution that asked the

former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to reconsider its refusal to

5 U.N. CHARTERart. 24, para. 1.6

U.N. CHARTERart. 39.7

U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para 2; DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE

SECURITY COUNCIL UNDERCHAPTERVII OF THE UNCHARTER28-29 (2001).8


SCHWEIGMAN,supra note 7, at 31 n.115-117.


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allow European bodies to continue their monitoring activities in Kosovo.10

By 1998, several nations, including the US, UK, Russia, Germany, and

France, urged the Security Council to pass a resolution forming an embargo

against the FRY, a request that the Council granted on March 31, 1998.11

This latest resolution did little to deter the bloodshed in Kosovo, as

matters became increasingly worse. By September of 1998, Serbian and

Yugoslavian forces had ruthlessly displaced hundreds of thousands of

Kosovars, prompting the Security Council to demand an immediate cease-

fire in the region;12 however, nothing in the resolution clearly authorized the

use of force if the FRY continued to disregard former resolutions.13 It

became clear at that time that the Russians were prepared to veto any

resolution that went towards authorizing force against the FRY.14 NATO

nations took up the task of persuading Slobodan Milosevic, the FRY

President, through their authorization of activation orders for air strikes

shortly thereafter.15

On March 24, 1999, after repeated attempts to bring the conflict to anend, NATO nations commenced air strikes against FRY targets in Kosovo

and Serbia. The bombing campaign lasted for seventy-seven days, and

throughout the campaign the Security Council remained unable to influence

those events.16 The UK delegate to the Security Council reported to the

Council that the bombing campaign was legal and justified to prevent

humanitarian suffering, and that [e]very means short of force ha[d] been

tried.17 Two days later, a Russian effort to call an end to the NATO action

was voted down twelve against three.18 Commentators have considered this

to be an important event in defining the role of the Security Council in times

of crisis, showing that the proponents of military action may not have to

secure a resolution to justify such actions.19 Some military actions will go

forth without the blessing of a Security Council resolution when a

permanent member of the Security Council will not follow the others. In

this case, however, although the Security Council did not expressly

10Sec. C. Res. 855, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/855 (1993).

11Sec. C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998)

(imposing an arms embargo against the FRY and stated that the failure to move towards peace

in Kosovo would invite further action from the Council).12

Sec. C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998).13

Paul Heinbecker,Kosovo, in TheUN Security Council: From the Cold War to the

21st

Century 537, 540 (David Malone ed., 2004).14

Id.15

Id.16 Id.17

UK permanent representative Jeremy Greenstock, Address to the U.N. Security

Council (March 24, 1999).18

Paul Heinbecker,Kosovo, in THE UNSECURITY COUNCIL:FROM THE COLD WAR

TO THE 21ST

CENTURY537, 542 (David Malone ed., 2004).19

See id.


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authorize the use of force, it was clear that many Member States were

willing to support military action even if a minority of nations were

unwilling to do so.

The Security Council has in fact rarely used its Chapter VII authority toenforce international peace and security. During the Korean conflict, for

example, the Soviet delegations refusal to support a resolution to denounce

that aggression almost kept the Council from having any influence.

Fortunately, based on the absence of the Soviet delegation (which had

protested the inclusion of Nationalist Chinese as the Chinese representative

in the Council), the remaining members were able to pass a

recommendation to denounce aggression on the Korean peninsula.20 With

the return of the Soviets, however, no further Security Council action was

taken.21 The Security Council was unable to provide leadership during the

crisis. This situation, along with the crisis in Kosovo, shows that the

Council is often hard-pressed to exercise its authority under Chapter VII of

the Charter to authorize the use of force when international peace andsecurity are at risk.

III. THE HISTORY OF IRAQ AND THE UNSECURITY COUNCIL

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces stormed across the Kuwaiti border and

ruthlessly took control of that nations capital, Kuwait City. Six days later,

Iraq declared that it would annex Kuwait, and then, on August 28, 1990,

claimed that the country was a province of Iraq.22 In response to the armed

aggression of Saddam Husseins regime, the United Nations Security

Council passed Resolution 660, which denounced these actions and called

for Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait.23 Of course, this call went

unheeded. The Security Council then passed Resolution 661, wherein it

expressed its concern with the actions of Iraq and its desire to end the

occupation of Kuwait and restore the sovereignty, independence, and

territorial integrity of Kuwait.24 Resolution 661 also addressed the right of

Kuwait and other nations to exercise the use of force in recognition of the

inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in response to the

armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the

Charter.25 The Security Council then passed Resolution 662, which

20John F. Murphy,Force and Arms, in THE UNITEDNATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW, 108 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997).

21 See id.22

See C. Warbrick, The Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, 40 ICLQ pt. 1, at 482-492

(1991).23

Sec. C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).24

Sec. C. Res. 611, U.N. SCOR, 46th

Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/611 (1990).25

Id.


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memorialized its position that the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait

had no legal validity, and [was] considered null and void.26

Meanwhile, a coalition of nations led by the United States formed an

alliance named Desert Shield to defend against a possible invasion ofother Gulf States, most notably Saudi Arabia.27 On August 12, 1990, the

United States began to use its navy to create a blockade against any Iraqi oil

exports, only allowing humanitarian shipments into Kuwait, justifying the

decision as consistent with Article 51 and previous Security Council

resolutions that mandated sanctions against the Iraqi regime.28 After

repeated demands by the United Nations and the world community that

Iraqi forces withdraw from Kuwait, the Security Council adopted

Resolution 678, which authorized Member States to use all necessary

means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant

resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.29 On

January 16, 1991, after Saddam Husseins regime failed to honor the

demands of Resolution 678 and other resolutions, the multinational alliance began a campaign of aerial bombardments of Iraqi sites. After almost a

month of bombing, a massive ground offensive began, which quickly and

effectively routed remaining Iraqi ground forces and removed the Iraqi

presence from Kuwait.30 Shortly thereafter, Iraq accepted the offer of

President George H. W. Bush to suspend offensive combat operations and

declare a cease-fire upon its willingness to abide by all Security Council

resolutions.31

On April 3, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687, often

known as the Mother of all Resolutions, which in effect codified the

cease-fire agreement between Iraq and the international coalition.32 In that

resolution, the Security Council demanded that Iraq unconditionally accept

the destruction of all chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs.33

The resolution also required Iraq to destroy all ballistic missiles with a range

greater than 150 kilometers.34 In accordance with these measures, a strict

monitoring system was put into place to oversee Iraqs compliance. The

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations Special

26Sec. C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 46

thSess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990).

27D. Gilman, The Gulf War and the United Nations Charter: Did the Security

Council Fulfill its Original Mission?, 24 CONN.L.REV. 1131, 1149 (1992).28

Id. at 1150.

29 Sec. C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).30

Supra note 20, at 113-114.31

See id. at 114.32


Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).33

Id. at paras. 8, 9 & 12.34

Id. at para. 8.


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Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) were to supervise this monitoring

system.35

The monitoring system created by Resolution 687, although considered

by some to be the most comprehensive international monitoring systemever established in the sphere of arms control,36 did not compel Iraqs

compliance.37 Just four months after Resolution 687 was created, the

Security Council condemned the non-compliance of the Hussein regime

with regards to the destruction of its weapons programs, stating that such

violations constituted a material breach of the relevant provisions which

established a cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the

restoration of peace and security in the region.38 The Security Council

continued to note Iraqs blatant disregard for relevant resolutions throughout

the 1990s. In June of 1996, the Security Council again condemned Iraqs

refusal to work with UNSCOM inspectors and its clear violations of

relevant resolutions.39 One year later, the Security Council passed

Resolution 1115, noting Iraqs repeated refusal to allow UNSCOM accessto weapons sites, a clear and flagrant violation of its obligations.40

Unbelievably, later that year, the Security Council was forced to again

condemn Iraq, noting the continued violations by Iraq of its obligations

under the relevant resolutions to cooperate fully and unconditionally with

[UNSCOM].41

On February 23, 1998, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reached an

agreement with Iraq to ensure its cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA

on disarmament activities.42 In late 1998, Iraq reported that it would not

finish its work with UNSCOM.43 This action prompted the US and the UK

to commence Operation Desert Fox, a bombing campaign that continued for

seventy hours. Both nations referred to Security Council Resolution 1154

35Sec. C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46

thSess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).

36 Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Special

Commissions Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraqs Compliance with

Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), U.N. Doc.

S/1994/11138 (Oct. 7, 1994).37

A.J.R. Groom, Edward Newman, & Paul Taylor,Burdensome Victory: The United

Nations and Iraq, in A UNITED NATIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: PEACE,

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 149, 156 (Dimitris Bourantonis & Marios Evriviades eds.,

1996).38


Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/707 (1991).39

Sec. C. Res. 1060, U.N. SCOR, 51st

Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1060 (1996).40 Sec. C. Res. 1115, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1115 (1997).41

Sec. C. Res. 1137, U.N. SCOR, 52nd

Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1137 (1997).42

Memorandum of Understanding, U.N. Doc. S/1998/166 (1998).43

See Sec. C. Res. 1205, U.N. SCOR, 53rd

Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1205 (1998). The

Security Council noted with alarm the decision of Iraqto cease cooperation with the United

Nations Special Commission, and its continued restrictions on the work of the [IAEA].


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as providing legal justification for the operation.44 That resolution stressed

the compliance the Government of Iraq with its obligations, repeated again

in the memorandum of understanding, to accord immediate, unconditional,

and unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the IAEA inconformity with the relevant resolutions is necessary for the implementation

of resolution 687 (1991), but that any violation would have the severest

consequences for Iraq.45 Operation Desert Fox was the third armed attack

on Iraqi positions after the cease-fire. The Clinton Administration

conducted military strikes in 1993 and 1996 to extend the southern no-fly

zone, invoking Resolution 678 as authority.46

After Operation Desert Fox, Iraq continued to refuse access to weapons

inspectors. The Security Council disbanded UNSCOM in December of

1999, and replaced it with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and

Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).47 The resolution establishing

UNMOVIC provided that the Security Council would suspend several

sanctions against Iraq if it would cooperate with the inspection regiment putinto place in Resolution 687.48 Iraq refused to comply, denouncing the

resolution because it did not address Iraqs legitimate right to secure a

lifting of the embargo having met its commitments under UN accords.49

On September 12, 2002, a year and a day after the terrorist attacks of

September 11, President George W. Bush went before the United Nations to

call attention to Iraqs decade-long pattern of obstructionism and defiance

towards the international community.50 Two months later, the Security

Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, which called Iraq to task on

its continuing refusal to comply with previous resolutions and to address

the threat...proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range

missiles poses to international peace and security.51 The resolution

condemned the fact that Iraq had not allowed inspectors in almost four

years, as well as its failure to condemn international terrorism.52

Importantly, the resolution gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its

44 See S.M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi

Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MILITARY L.REV. 115-180 (1999).45

Sec. C. Res. 1154, U.N. SCOR, 53rd

Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1154, at para. 3

(1998).46

Frederick Rawski & Nathan Miller, The United States in the Security Council: A

Faustian Bargain?, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST

CENTURY 361 (David M. Malone ed., 2004).47


Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (1999).

48 Id. at pt. C.

49 Statement by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz (Feb. 20, 2000) quoted inIraq Condemns UN Resolution, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/

middle_east/649826.stm.50

George W. Bush, Address at the UN General Assembly,supra note 4.51


Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).52

Id. at 2.


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disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council.53 Iraq

was expected to comply with the resolution, as the Security Council

reminded the nation that it (the Security Council) had repeatedly warned of

serious consequences that would result from continued non-compliance.54

Subsequently, Iraq allowed inspectors back into the country.55 While

Resolution 1441 aimed at the complete disarmament of Iraq under the threat

of serious consequences, the nation never complied.56 In accordance with

the mandates of Resolution 1441, Iraq submitted a declaration of the state of

its weapons programs and compliance efforts; however, this declaration was

considered a weak and untruthful attempt at compliance.57 Dr. Blix, in

January of 2003, acknowledged that the Iraqis had not lived up to the

demands of 1441, stating that the nation had yet to show a genuine

acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of

it.58 In March of 2003, the US and UK attempted to persuade the Security

Council to pass one more resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq

for its continuing disregard of previous resolutions. However, certainnations on the Security Council including Russia, France and Germany

were opposed to such a resolution.59 The follow-up resolution never

materialized, and the US and UK abandoned their attempts to convince their

stubborn partners on the Council.60 On March 19, 2003, the United States

led a coalition of nations that quickly destroyed Iraqi resistance and took

control of the nation.61 In May of 2003, President Bush announced an end

to major combat operations, signaling the end of the regime of Saddam

Hussein.62

53 Id. at 3.

54 Id. at 5.

55Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC Dr. Hans Blix, Briefing of the Security Council

(Dec. 19, 2002), available athttp://www.unmovic.org.56

George W. Bush, Address at the UN General Assembly,supra note 4.57

U.N. SCOR Twelfth Quarterly Report at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2003/232 (1999), available

at http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/quarterly_reports/s-2003-232.pdf (UN-

MOVIC Executive Chairman Dr. Hans Blix stated that the declaration contained little new

significant information).58

Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC Dr. Hans Blix, Briefing of the Security Council

(January 27, 2003), available athttp://www.unmovic.org.59 Adam Roberts, The Use of Force, inTHEUNSECURITYCOUNCIL:FROM THECOLD

WAR TO THE21ST

CENTURY141 (David M. Malone ed., 2004).60

See id.61

John Yoo,Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict: International Law and

the War in Iraq, 97 A.J.I.L. 563, 564 (2003).62

Id.


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IV. EXISTING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS JUSTIFIED ARMED FORCE

AGAINST IRAQ

The text of Resolution 678 is very clear. Member States wereauthorized to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution

660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international

peace and security in the area.63 It is telling that this resolution does not

contain language expressly authorizing the US-led coalition to engage in

military action against Iraqi forces.64 Further, the Security Council did not

speak to enforcement measures after Resolution 678; this resolutionserved

as the basis for military action in Iraq in 1990, and served as justification for

any use of force to enforce the cease-fire memorialized in Resolution 687.

Resolutions 678 and 687 stand together as twin pillars of justification

for the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Whereas the former enables

Member States to employ all necessary means to uphold subsequent

resolutions with regards to Iraq,65

the latter sets out the mandates that Iraqwas required to obey in order to preserve the cease-fire and suspend

Resolution 678.66 Tracing the history of armed conflict in Iraq from the end

of the Gulf War and identifying the relevant Security Council resolutions

during those periods makes clear that Resolutions 678 and 687 were still in

effect in March of 2003, and provide the legal basis for the use of armed

force to enforce those resolutions.67

The US and UK worked feverishly in late 2002 and early 2003 to

create the required consensus to pass a resolution that would authorize the

use of force in Iraq.68 Such a resolution would have been the eighteenth

resolution with regards to Iraqs violation of international law, but it never

materialized.69 Three members of the Security Council, Russia, France and

Germany, strongly opposed such a resolution, believing that Resolution1441 was the limit for threats against Saddam Hussein.70 As the Kosovo

and Korean situations illustrated before, the interests of but a few members

of the Security Council may bar the entire Council from fulfilling its duties

under the Charter. This surely was the case during the Iraq debate.

One scholar has pointed out that the stance of Russia, France, and

Germanythat former resolutions such as 678 and 687 were no longer in

forceundermines the premise that Security Council resolutions are law at

63Sec. C. Res. 678,supra note 29, at para. 2.

64 See Sec. C. Res. 678,supra note 29.

65 Sec. C. Res. 678,supra note 29, at para. 2.66

See Sec. C. Res. 687,supra note 32.67

See Yoo,supra note 61, at 564-67.68

See Roberts,supra note 59, at 141.69

See id.70

Id.


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all.71 Professor John Yoo explains that these nations had agreed to authorize

the use of force against Iraq in 1991. The text of those resolutions has not

been changed and the conditions for their enforcement have remained

constant. If Russia, France, and Germany were to consider Resolutions 678and 687 expired, argues Yoo, there would be considerable dispute about the

legal force and legitimacy of Security Council resolutions. Such a result

would call into question whether such resolutions are legal legislative acts

or ad hoc legislative edicts.72 In other words, when one or two Security

Council member states call into question the effectiveness of existing

resolutions, they in effect minimize the importance and legitimacy of the

resolutions. This then begs the question of whether a Security Council

resolution is binding as an expression of international law.

The US and UK, when confronted with the reality that an eighteenth

resolution would not pass, moved forward with military plans, relying on

existing Security Council resolutions to justify the March 2003 invasion.

This was not a position of weakness. Resolutions 678 and 687 were stillviable, effective mandates at that time, as events of the previous decade

make clear.

On January 13, 1993, US, UK and French aircraft attacked Iraqi

positions, destroying Iraqi missile launchers. In response to the attacks, UN

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said:

The raid, and the forces that carried out the raid, have received a

mandate from the Security Council, according to Resolution 678, and

the cause of the raid was the violation by Iraq of Resolution 687

concerning the cease-fire. So, as Secretary-General of the United

Nations, I can say that this action was taken and conforms to the

resolutions of the Security Council and conforms to the Charter of the

United Nations.73

Clearly, the military action in 1993 was considered legal under

international law, not because a new resolution had been passed to authorize

such a use of force, but instead because the action was in conformity with

existing Security Council resolutions. President George H.W. Bush cited

Iraqs failure to live up to the resolutions when he ordered the strikes. 74

In his report to Congress concerning the action, the President cited the

comments of Secretary-General to justify the action as conforming with

71 Yoo,supra note 61, at 568.72

See id.73

Simon Chesterman,Just War or Just Peace? HUMANITARIAN I NTERVENTION ANDINTL LAW, 201 (2001) (quoting Boutros Boutros-Ghali, January 14, 1993).

74Barton Gellman & Ann Devroy, Military Action Against Iraq Signaled by

Administration, Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1993, at A1.


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international law, and necessary in light of Iraqs violations of Resolution

687.75

In December of 1998, the US and UK launched a seventy-hour air

assault against Iraqi targets. US officials, in providing a legal foundationfor the military action, made clear that Iraqs continuing breaches of

obligations under existing resolutions served as a justification for the

attacks.76 President Bill Clinton justified the military action in much the

same way as his predecessor did stating that the military action was:

consistent with and has been taken in support of...Resolutions 678

and 687, which authorize UN Member States to use all necessary

means to implement the Security Council resolutions and to

restore peace and security in the region and establish the terms of

the cease-fire mandated by the Council, including those related to

the destruction of Iraqs WMD programs.77

Although some members of the Council did voice objections to the

action, international approval for the air strikes was strong. Thirteen nations

offered some sort of support, either in the form of facilities, troops, or

equipment, including Australia, Canada, Spain, and Germany.78 This

sentiment to enforce Resolutions 678 and 687 only served to strengthen the

position of the US and UK that the cease-fire and disarmament provisions of

those resolutions were still effective to authorize the use of force.

The precedent from the 1993 and 1998 attacks on Iraqi targets is as

clear today as it was at those times. Saddam Husseins regime remained in

material violation of Resolution 687, which required the regime to comply

with the inspection regime and abandon and destroy its weapons programs.

Resolution 678, which authorized Member States to use all necessarymeans to uphold subsequent resolutions such as Resolution 687, was the

correct authorization for the attacks of 1993 and 1998. There had been no

resolution which in effect caused those resolutions to expire; in fact, they

were very much effective and relevant in 2003 when the US-led coalition

invaded Iraq.

It is important to note Security Council practice with regards to ending

its authorization to use force. When the Council decides to end the use of

force, it either passes a new resolution extinguishing the previous resolution,

75 Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraqs Compliance With United

Nations Security Council Resolutions (Jan. 19, 1993), 2 Pub. Papers of George Bush 2269-70

(1993).76 Security Council Meets to Discuss Military Strikes Against Iraq; Some Members

Challenge Use of Force Without Council Consent UN Doc. SC/6611, at 1-2, 7 (Dec. 16,

1998).77

Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Military Strikes Against Iraq (Dec. 18,

1998), 2 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 2197 (1998).78

UN Doc. SC/6611,supra note 76, at 4.


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or it makes a clear duration for authority in the resolution itself. 79 In other

words, the Security Council must expressly terminate the authority of its

resolutions. There is no such language in Resolution 678 which makes clear

that its authorization to use force would lapse at a specific point or that theCouncil had reserved the right to determine when the authorization would

end. Nor has the Council ever expressly terminated the effect of Resolution

678.80 These facts, coupled with the express language of Resolution 1441,

make clear that Resolutions 678 and 687 remained in effect in March 2003,

when the invasion of Iraq began.

Resolution 1441, passed in late 2002, explicitly refers to Iraqs non-

compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and long-range missiles...[.]81 The resolution actually referred

to Resolutions 678 and 687, as the Security Council recall[ed] that its

resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means

to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all

relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restoreinternational peace and security in the area.82 Further, 1441 recalled Iraqs

obligations under Resolution 687:

Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full,

final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687

(1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of

mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than

one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such

weapons, their components and production facilities and locations,

as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it

claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable

material.

Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate,

unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the

United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate

fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons

inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately

ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,

79 See, e.g., Sec. C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50

thSess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031, at

para. 3 (1995) ("[T]he mandateshall terminate on the date which the Secretary-General

reports to the Council."); Sec. C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49 th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/929, atpara. 2 (1994) ("[T]he mission of Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General will

be limited to a period of two months").80

See Sec. C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th

Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).81

See Sec. C. Res. 1441,supra note 51, at para. 1.82

See id., at preamble.


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Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of

international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required

by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction andballistic missiles...[.]83

This was not the sort of language that could be interpreted as expressly

terminating any previous authorization to use force or repealing Iraqs

duties under the inspection regime, as nations such as France, Germany, and

Russia argued.84 Instead, this language makes clear that those resolutions

still had a binding effectreinforcing Security Council practice that

resolutions, if they are to be held as binding, must be expressly terminated,

or expressly limited by time or event requirements.

Resolution 1441 also refers to the Security Councils repeated previous

warnings to Iraq of serious consequences that would result from

continued violations of the regimes obligations.85

That language, whencompared to the language of Resolution 678, shows a high degree of

justification for the view that Resolution 1441 allowed the use of force upon

further non-compliance by Iraq. Resolution 678 gave Iraq one final

opportunity to withdraw from Kuwait and comply with the demands of the

Security Council.86 If Iraq did not take advantage of that opportunity, then

Member States were allowed to use all necessary means to comply

enforcement.87 Likewise, the language of 1441, while not specifically

authorizing the use of force, makes clear that such an option was authorized

upon Iraqs further non-compliance with its obligations. The resolution

gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its duties.88 That language,

coupled with the serious consequences that would follow upon non-

compliance, shows that Resolution 1441 was in fact a legal authorization touse force to ensure Iraqi compliance. The fact that no Member State found

Iraq to be in compliance with its obligations under existing resolutions

further justified the decision to use force.

It should also be noted that the cease-fire agreement embodied in

Resolution 687 declares a formal suspension of hostilities between Iraq and

Member States such as the US, rather than with the United Nations itself.89

The resolution was a formal cease-fire...between Iraq, Kuwait, and the

Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with Resolution 678

83 Id.

84 See Roberts,supra note 59, at 141.

85 See Sec. C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 at para. 13(2002).


87 Id. at para. 2.


89Sec. C. Res. 687,supra note 32, para. 33.


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(1990).90 Iraqs continued breaches of this resolution, which the US and

other nations cited when they used force in 1993 and 1998, served to

suspend the cease-fire and in effect renewed the authority given in

Resolution 678. In 2003, there was no disagreement as to whether Iraq wasin breach of its obligations under Resolution 687, all of which were re-

affirmed in Resolution 1441. Iraqs breach suspended the cease-fire of

Resolution 687. As was the case in 1993 and in 1998, Member States that

had cooperated with Kuwait in the Gulf War were again authorized, under

Resolution 678, to use force in order to enforce Iraqs existing obligations.

In international law, a nation that is specially affected by another

nations breach of a treaty agreement may either suspend or terminate the

effect of the treaty with regards to the breaching nation.91 Iraq had

repeatedly breached its obligations under the cease-fire agreement of

Resolution 687. Therefore, the US and UK, as Member States cooperating

with Kuwait, had the right to suspend or terminate the cease-fire with

respect to Iraq.92 The treaty that was Resolution 687 did not have effect in1993, 1998, or 2003, because of Iraqs repeated breaches. The US and UK

could therefore legally suspend or terminate the cease-fire and appeal to

Resolution 678 to enforce serious consequences for Iraqs intransigence

and to restore international peace and security to the region.

V. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFIED THE INVASION OF IRAQ

Article 51 of the UN Charter provides the rights of nations to defend

themselves from threats to national security. Indeed, this right is considered

independent of any treaty or convention under international law: [n]othing

in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right to individual or

collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the

United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measure necessary to

maintain international peace and security.93 This language makes clear that

there is a right to defend ones nation, or other nations, independent of

Security Council approval.94

90 Id.

91 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(2)(b), May 23, 1969, 21

U.S.T 77.92

See Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The

Threat of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 AJIL 724, 726 (1998);see

also, Vienna Convention, Art. 60,supra note 92, at art. 60;see also John Yoo, Agora: Future

Implications of the Iraq Conflict: International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 A.J.I.L. 563, 568-

569 (2003).93


See Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AJIL

597, 599 (1963); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force , 82 MICH.L.REV.

1620, 1634-1634 (1984); Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J.

INTL LAW 1, 16 (2000).
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The inherent right to self-defense was first enunciated in the Caroline

incident. In 1837, a secret British military unit entered the United States and

destroyed the American vessel Caroline, which had been aiding Canadian

insurgents fighting against British rule. The incident resulted in the loss ofthe vessel as well as two American lives. Confronted by American officials,

the British maintained that the attack on the Caroline was an act of self-

defense. Daniel Webster, the US Secretary of State, wrote a letter in return,

demanding that the British justify this claim by showing that the need for

self-defense was:

instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no

moment for deliberation...even supposing the necessity of the

moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United

States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act,

justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that

necessity, and kept clearly within it.95

The British accepted this test by justifying its actions accordingly.96

As has been explained by international scholars,97 the Caroline test

requires that nations show that use of force is necessary due to an imminent

threat, and that the response is proportionate to the threat.98 Accordingly,

the decision to invade Iraq, if not justified by existing Security Council

resolutions, would have to have been justified by an imminent threat coming

from Iraq, one proportionate to a response such as regime change. While

there most certainly was debate as to whether the threat emanating from Iraq

was imminent, the United States has made clear that nations can no longer

wait for threats to materialize in a post-Sept. 11 world:

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not

suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend

themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of

attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned

the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent

threat...

Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using

conventional means...Instead, they rely on acts of terror and,

95Letter from U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Websterto British Minister Henry Fox

(Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1840-1841, at 1138 (1857).96

Letter from Lord Ashburton to U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster (July 28,

1842), in 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1841-1842, at 1858 (1857).97

See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,AGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 208-212 (3d

ed. 2001); Yoo,supra note 92, at 572.98

DINSTEIN,supra note 98, at 208-212, & 219-220.


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potentially, the use of weapons of mass destructionweapons that

can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without

warning.

As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass

civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these

losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired

and used weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive

actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The

greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more

compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend

ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of

the enemys attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our

adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, actpreemptively.99

This view, prompted by the terrible events of Sept. 11, changes the

entire paradigm of the Caroline test. No longer can nations be aware of

imminent threats, and at least one nation, the United States, has made clear

that it will act preemptively to forestall or prevent a hostile regime or

group from attacking American targets.

Preemptive self-defense has been practiced before, such as the Torrey

Canyon incident of 1967. There, the United Kingdom took unilateral action

to protect its coastal and marine resources after the Liberian oil tanker

Torrey Canyon ran aground in the English Channel.100 Fearing for the well-

being of its resources, the UK bombed and destroyed the ship, asserting acustomary international law right of intervention.101 In the 1950s, the

French seized foreign merchant ships on the high seas thought to be

carrying arms to the Algerian rebel movement.102 The French government

cited its inherent right to self-defense to justify the seizures.103 On several

occasions, the US has attacked another nation out of concern for self-

defense. In 1986, the US attacked Libyan targets in order to stop possible

99The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html.100

See Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law 175 (3d ed.

1977).101

Seeid.102

Id.103

Id.


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terrorist attacks.104 In 1989, took military action in Panama, citing an

imminent threat to American lives.105 In 1993, the Clinton administration

ordered attacks on Iraqi targets after the regime failed to honor its

obligations under Resolution 687.106

In each instance, the UN took noaction, unable to pass a unanimous declaration that Article 51 of the UN

Charter did not authorize such actions.107

The threats posed by the Iraqi regime in 2003 were not precisely

known, but current intelligence showed that the regime had not complied

with its obligations under Security Council resolutions to cooperate with the

inspections regime and declare the extend of its nuclear, chemical, and

biological weapons programs. Such intransigence had long worried the

world community, hence the seventeen resolutions that the Security Council

had passed since the invasion of Kuwait. President Clinton justified the

military action against Iraq in 1993 as an exercise in self-defense, stating:

The evidence of the Government of Iraqs violence and terrorismdemonstrates that Iraq poses a continuing threat to United States

nationals and shows utter disregard for the will of the international

community as expressed in Security Council Resolutions and the

United Nations Charter...I concluded that there was no reasonable

prospect that new diplomatic initiatives or economic measures

could influence the current Government of Iraq to cease planning

future attacks against the United States.108

In his testimony before the United Nations in February, 2003, US

Secretary of State Colin Powell set forth the case against the Iraqi regime,

explaining the threat as determined by US and foreign intelligence:

The material I will present to you comes from a variety of

sources. Some are U.S. sources and some are those of other

countries. Some are the sources are technical, such as intercepted

telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other

sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world

know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.

104 See Presidents Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the

President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the United States Air Strike Against Libya (Apr. 16,

1986), in 1 Pub. Papers 478 (1986).105

See Presidents Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the

President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the United States Military Action in Panama (Dec.

21, 1989), in 2 Pub. Papers 1734 (1989).106 See Presidents Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraq Intelligence

Headquarters (June 28, 1993), in 1 Pub. Papers 940 (1993).107

See UN Doc. S/PV. 2682 (Apr. 21, 1986) (US, UK, Australia, Denmark, and

France oppose declaration); UN Doc. S/21048 (Dec. 22, 1989); UN Doc. S/PV. 2902 (Dec.

23, 1989) (US, UK, France, and Canada oppose declaration).108

Supra 106.


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I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share

with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over

the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an

accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior. Thefacts and Iraqis behavior, Iraqs behavior, demonstrate that

Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort, no effort, to

disarm, as required by the international community.

Indeed, the facts and Iraqs behavior show that Saddam Hussein

and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more

weapons of mass destruction.109

Given what the international community knew about Iraqs continued

intransigence, the fact that the extent of Iraqs weapons programs was

unknown, and the magnitude of suffering that could occur if Iraq did have

those weapons programs, the US-led coalition, in an act of collective self-defense, was justified in its invasion of Iraq under the Caroline test.

Invasion was a proportionate response to the threat that Iraqs weapons

programs posed, and the history of violations by the Saddam Hussein

regime made clear that his removal was justified. Further, the events of

September 11, 2001, made clear that threats not considered imminent are

real and deadly nonetheless. The aggressive actions of the coalition were

consistent with previous acts of self-defense taken by numerous nations, and

entirely appropriate under the Caroline test.

VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the US-led coalition was justified in its invasion of Iraqand removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Existing Security Council

resolutions and authorization, coupled with Iraqs continued breach of its

obligations under those resolutions, show that there was license to enforce

those duties by all necessary means. The Security Council never

expressly extinguished authorization to use force under these resolutions,

nor did it put a time limit on that authority. Resolutions 678 and 687 were

still effective in 2002-2003, as evidenced by the language of Resolution

1441.110 Second, because the threat posed by Iraqs non-compliance with

weapons programs was grave, growing, and possibly imminent, the action

to remove him from power was justifiable as an act of preemptive self-

defense. The US has expressed the view that, in a post-Sept. 11 arena,

109U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address at U.N. Security Council (Feb. 5,

2003), available athttp://www.un.int/usa/03clp0205.htm.110

Supra note 85.


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nations cannot wait for an express declaration of war or other clear signs to

designate a threat as imminent. Following the practice of numerous states

over the past half-century, the US led a coalition to preemptively defend

itself and other nations from the possibility of an Iraqi regime armed withWMD. Considering the costs of a WMD attack, regime change was an

appropriate response to the Iraqi threat.

The action against Iraq revives an old and troublesome dilemma for the

United Nations and the Security Council. The events of September 11 gave

rise to the possibility that acts of war will not be announced by formal

declarations, but instead may be delivered by secret and silent terror groups

with no ties to any one nation or state. Nations are more aware of their need

to curb possible violence, and regimes which support terror groups or terror

acts, or which seek weapons of mass-destruction, are now considered

greater dangers than ever before. The US-promoted doctrine of pre-emption

will force the Security Council to consider the mandates and authorizations

it gives in the future, but also magnifies the problems that disagreementbetween Council Members may produce.

Although a large group of nations, including Russia, France, and

Germany, opposed the US-led coalition against Iraq, it is clear that a

precedent has been set, if not reinforced. The US government, under the

leadership of George W. Bush, has made the case that nations cannot wait

for imminent threats to materialize. No longer can nations simply wait

for enemies to formally declare war. Nor can nations even rely on

intelligence capabilities to detect the massing of enemy troops, or the launch

of a missile carrying a nuclear weapon. The sophistication and sinister

motives of terror groups make it almost impossible to identify an imminent

threat before it is carried out. The fact that over thirty nations supported the

coalition efforts against Saddam Hussein demonstrates that this theory is

gaining traction, and will continue to conflict with the Security Councils

Chapter VII authority.

Preemptive self-defense is now squarely in conflict with the view that

Security Council authority is still paramount in armed aggression between

nations. Those who espouse the latter view will continue to argue that no

nation should use force without Security Council authority unless the

inherent right to self-defense is clearly invoked. Those who support the

former view will counter with the claim that, in the end, each nation must

have the right to defend itself, even if without Security Council approval.

Therein lies the danger of such a conflict. As was evidenced in both the

Korea and Bosnia situations, disagreement between Security Councilmembers results in inaction precisely the result that nations cannot afford.

As Security Council members argue as to their rights against the duties and

powers of that body, the question of state action against potential threats

be they rogue states or terror groups goes unanswered. And as was made


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painfully clear on the morning of Sept. 11, complacency or inaction on the

part of the world community can result in deadly consequences.

Although the prospect seems dim, Security Council members are

compelled to find a solution. Some on the political right argue for thedissolution of the United Nations and a return to regional and ad-hoc

coalitions. Some on the far left of the political spectrum push for sanctions

and penalties against the US-led coalition and a strengthening of Security

Council authority. Either way, the Security Councils role must be defined

in this post-Sept. 11 world. This article has argued that the US-led coalition

was justified, not only by existing Security Council resolutions, but also by

the realities of preemptive self-defense after Sept. 11. However, just

because international law justified the coalition action, it should not be

assumed that the action was free from controversy.

This article recommends that UN members work to redefine Article 51

of the Charter. The realities of the threats that nations now face demand

that the world look at what is an imminent threat and determine whenself-defense, including preemptive self-defense, is justified. The text of

Article 51 gives a nation the right to respond to an armed attack. However,

given the manner in which the Bush administration framed the Iraq debate,

it is clear that nations in the future will be more willing to take preemptive

steps to deter attacks, rather than wait for the armed attack to actually take

place. It is clear that Article 51 has run its course in its current form, and

needs revision. Further, UN members must make clear the scope of

authority of UN Security Council resolutions. It must be clear whether a

resolution authorizes the use of force, and if so, when that authority ends.

During the drafting of Security Council resolutions, members must find a

way to escape the political nuance that causes vague and open-ended

resolutions. This may even entail an overhaul of procedural rules, to ensure

that certain requirements are met during the creation of each resolution.

Each nation must be fully aware of its rights and duties under a Security

Council resolution, and must be able to rely on the plain text of the

resolution.

The Security Council is truly at a crossroads. Its inability to assert any

semblance of authority during times of crisis has potentially deadly

ramifications, as was made clear in Bosnia. However, the decision by the

US and UK to break away from the decaying framework surrounding the

Security Council and take action brought hope in more ways than one.

First, the coalition demonstrated that nations can use military force without

approval from the Security Council, and still find justification ininternational law. This result legitimizes military efforts that are necessary,

but perhaps opposed by a few influential nations. Second, the coalition

brought the Security Councils inefficiencies and shortcomings to a head

so perhaps they can be rectified. It is now clear that the UN and the


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Security Council must address these problems. And third, the coalition was

able to remove a murderous regime independently of a UN mandate. While

some may question the virtues of such a result, the action does signal hope

to those in the world whom the UN is to protect. A coalition of willingnations may come together under the mandate of international law, to

actually alleviate suffering in the world. If the rest of the world wants to see

the UN and the Security Council to play a part in such an important mission,

it is now on notice.

legal justifications for the iraq war

Documents