legal origins* edward l.glaeserand andrei … · for a legal system to protect property, the...

LEGAL ORIGINS

EDWARD L GLAESER AND ANDREI SHLEIFER

A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of lawenforcers from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes The higherthe risk of coercion the greater the need for protection and control of law enforcersby the state Such control however also makes law enforcers beholden to thestate and politicizes justice This perspective explains why starting in the twelfthand thirteenth centuries the relatively more peaceful England developed trials byindependent juries while the less peaceful France relied on state-employed judgesto resolve disputes It may also explain many differences between common andcivil law traditions with respect to both the structure of legal systems and theobserved social and economic outcomes

I INTRODUCTION

The laws of many countries are heavily inuenced by eitherthe English common law or the French civil law1 The commonlaw tradition originates in the laws of England and has beentransplanted through conquest and colonization to Englandrsquos col-onies including the United States Australia Canada and manycountries in Africa and Asia The civil law tradition has its rootsin the Roman law was lost during Dark Ages but rediscovered bythe Catholic Church in the eleventh century and adopted byseveral continental states including France Napoleon exportedFrench civil law to much of Europe including Spain by conquestFrench civil law was later transplanted through conquest andcolonization to Latin America and parts of Africa and Asia

Structurally the two legal systems operate in very differentways civil law relies on professional judges legal codes andwritten records while common law on lay judges broader legalprinciples and oral arguments In addition recent research re-veals signicant differences between common law and (French)

Both authors gratefully acknowledge the nancial support of the NationalScience Foundation Alberto Alesina Gary Becker Harold Berman John CoatesMirjan Damasiuml ka Bradford De Long Simeon Djankov Avinash Dixit Mark Dug-gan Benjamin Friedman Nicholas Georgakopoulos Claudia Goldin Andrei Gou-reev Simon Johnson Louis Kaplow Lawrence Katz David Laibson Rafael LaPorta Steven Levitt Richard Messick Eric Posner Richard Posner Eric Ras-mussen Rafael Repullo Sherwin Rosen Alan Schwartz Steven Shavell and twoanonymous referees provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper

1 In a study of civil procedures in 109 countries Djankov et al [2002a]identify 42 countries in the English common law tradition and 40 in the Frenchcivil law tradition In addition German civil law Scandinavian law and socialistlaw prevail in parts of the world

copy 2002 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnologyThe Quarterly Journal of Economics November 2002

1193

civil law countries in a variety of political and economic condi-tions At the same level of development French civil law coun-tries exhibit heavier regulation less secure property rights morecorrupt and less efcient governments and even less politicalfreedom than do the common law countries [La Porta et al 1999La Porta Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2002 Djankov et al2002b] One area where the greater insecurity of property rightsin the civil law countries shows up clearly is the development ofnancial markets On just about any measure common law coun-tries are more nancially developed than civil law countries [LaPorta et al 1997 1998]

These observations raise two crucial questions First whydid such very different legal systems evolve in France and inEngland Second why are these differences in the organization oflegal systems associated with such different social and economicoutcomes In this paper we argue that the historical evolution oflegal systems in France and England starting in the twelfth andthirteenth centuries has shaped how these systems operate Le-gal historians such as Dawson [1960] Berman [1983] andDamasiuml ka [1986] show that the two countries chose very differentstrategies for law enforcement and adjudication Specicallythey opted for different levels of control that the sovereign exer-cised over judges France went in the direction of adjudication byroyally controlled professional judges while England moved to-ward adjudication by relatively independent juries Over the sub-sequent millennium the conditions in England and France rein-forced the initial divergence in the legal systems Moreover thetransplantation of the two legal systems through conquest andcolonization may account for some crucial differences in socialand economic outcomes among countries that are reported in theempirical studies

The different choices made in England and France in thetwelfth and thirteenth centuries are especially puzzling in light ofthe widely recognized observation that at that time the Englishking commanded greater power over his subjects than did theFrench king [Dawson 1960 Reynolds 1994] By that time theEnglish kings had clearly prevailed over the nobles In contrastthe French king was at best the rst among equals with variousdukes and did not even have full military control over the Ile-de-France It would seem natural then for the more powerfulEnglish kings to create a legal system that extended royal controlmore deeply into the life of the country while for the weaker

1194 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS

French king to accept more decentralized adjudication of dis-putes Yet the opposite happened

What explains the different choices in legal design A centralgoal of a national legal system is how to protect law enforcersfrom being bullied with either physical force or bribes by powerfullocal interests In the middle ages judges and juries faced bothphysical and nancial incentives to cater to the preferences oflocal feudal lords ldquoA celebrated statement in the Yorkshire eyreroll of 1294 stated that lsquoJustice and Truth are completely chokedrsquoas a result of the way in which inuential men manipulated legalproceedingsrdquo [Prestwich 1997 p 283] In another instance ldquoAconspiracy in 1287 on the part of some sailors at Dunwich was aserious matter They had prevented the local court from sittinghad appropriated nes imposed by royal justices and preventedthe execution of royal writs and judgmentsrdquo [Prestwich 1997 p281] More recently in Russiarsquos transition economy in the 1990sbusinessmen occasionally bribed judges to excuse breaking thelaw In one instance when a judge jailed a powerful executive thejudgersquos husband was assassinated A rapid release of the execu-tive followed

For a legal system to protect property the effects of coercionand corruption must be limited When bullying is moderate it ismore efcient to leave the adjudication of disputes to independentlocal decision makers such as juries than to delegate it to pos-sibly biased state-employed judges who are better insulated frombullying In contrast when bullying is extreme it is better toaccept the distortions inherent in more biased but better insu-lated adjudication by state-employed judges than to leave deci-sions in the hands of the vulnerable locals The politicization ofjustice may be necessary when the state is the only institutionwith enough military power to ght local bullies Consistent withthe historical evidence we argue that France chose to rely onstate-employed judges precisely because local feudal lords weretoo powerful there was no possibility of effective local justicewhen these lordsrsquo interests were involved England in contrasthad weaker local magnates and so its juries were less vulnerableto subversion and could be trusted with adjudication Moreoverthese differences in basic conditions persisted for centuriesmainly because of persistently greater power of local magnates inFrance than in England As a result different legal systemspersisted as well

There is another perhaps more general way to make this

1195LEGAL ORIGINS

point Feudal lords in France were so powerful that they weremore afraid of each other than of the king and as a consequenceit was more efcient to delegate dispute resolution to the sover-eign even if he had his own stake in the matter People demanda dictatorship when they fear a dictator less than they fear eachother [Olson 1993 Grossman 1997] Feudal lords in England incontrast were less powerful and more afraid of the king than oftheir neighbors As a consequence they were willing to pay theking to allow them to resolve disputes locally This could occurbecause in England but not in France the royal power wassufcient to protect local law enforcers Both France and Englandthus opted for a system that was more efcient for each countryat the time In fact we argue that the English Magna Carta wasa Coasian bargain supporting the efcient outcome

This analysis of the structure of common and civil lawmdashwithits emphasis on protecting law enforcersmdashhelps understandmany of the structural differences in the organization of the twosystems Many writers see the nineteenth century codicationwhich involves greater reliance on specic ldquobright linerdquo rulesrather than broad principles for adjudication as a dening ele-ment of a civil law system [von Mehren 1957 Merryman 1969]Codication emerges in our model as an efcient attempt by thesovereign to control judges as his knowledge of individual dis-putes deteriorates (as it did when the states and the economiesdeveloped) The simplicity of bright line rules and the possibilityof verifying their violation enables the king to use them to struc-ture incentive contracts for judges Codication thus naturallyfollows from the original choice of royal judges over juries Ourmodel also sheds light on such differences between the two sys-tems as the reliance on written records versus oral argumentimportance of trials role of appeal combining versus separatingprosecution from judging and the importance of precedent In allthese dimensions common and civil law systems differ and thedifference can be plausibly traced to the fundamental choice ofstate-controlled versus independent justice

Our approach also sheds light on legal convergence andtransplantation We show that as the accuracy of codes improvesand the local pressure on the judges declines common and civillaw systems tend to produce similar resolutions of specic dis-putes In contrast the transplantation of rules designed for asystem with a relatively benign government into a system with amore autocratic regime can lead to poor outcomes In our model


civil law works very badly in dictatorships where it becomes amethod of control by a sovereign unresponsive to public prefer-ences These results may explain the evidence of the comparativeeffectiveness of common and civil law in securing property rightsin different countries and markets

We note three alternative explanations of why such differentlegal systems with different procedures and social outcomesdeveloped in England and France According to the rst theorythe choice of law was shaped by a countryrsquos predisposition toCatholicism and the institutions of the Catholic Church ratherthan by its law and order environment This explanation ignoresthe fact that at the time all states in Europe were Catholic yettrying to establish secular law France nonetheless adopted theinstitutions of the Church while England did not According tothe second theory distance from Rome was critical to legal adop-tion This theory is contradicted by the fact that Scotland adoptedcivil law Finally some scholars argue that only the much laterdevelopments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such ascodication really distinguished the two legal systems Codica-tion was indeed crucial but we agree with legal historians likeDawson [1960] and Berman [1983] that the systems divergedmuch earlier when the choice of royal judges versus independentjuries was made in France and England

II ROYAL JUDGES VERSUS INDEPENDENT JURIES

A central choice in the design of a legal system is thatbetween judges controlled by the sovereign (royal judges) andjudges who are not (juries) In this section we formally considerthis choice Historians of legal systems such as Berman [1983]and Dawson [1960] agree that this choice is central for thedivergence between the French and English legal systems in thetwelfth and thirteenth centuries and explains many persistentdifferences between civil and common law

We focus on the twelfth and thirteenth centuries because thelegal systems of the two countries until then were similar andgoverned primarily by religious and customary law Disputesamong nobles were resolved by battle Murder suspects weretried by ordeal whereby they were tossed into a river with a stonearound their legs Those who oated were presumed innocent[Dawson 1960] Yet over the following two centuries these prac-

1197LEGAL ORIGINS

tices were largely replaced by procedures that have persisted tomodern times in a recognizable form

In the eleventh century the Gregorian revolution delineatedthe scope of secular and ecclesiastical authority opening up theneed for secular legal systems [Berman 1983] We focus on whatBerman calls royal law which in the early years covered majorcrimes and civil disputes Our analysis does not apply to manyothermdashmore pervasivemdashareas of law such as manorial feudaland urban law where adjudication was entirely local and gov-erned by custom and where the issues we discuss were notcentral On the other hand it is the royal law that eventuallycame to dominate We present a theoretical account of the devel-opment of royal law

In the twelfth century England under Henry II develops thejury system Pollock and Maitland [1898] dene the jury as ldquoabody of neighbors summoned by some public ofcer to give uponoath a true answer to some questionrdquo [Vol 1 p 138] Despite along-standing debate on the true novelty of juries (eg to whatextent were they just a slight modernization of the Frankishinquest) there is no question that the jury became a primary toolof English law around that time In its original formulation(dated roughly to the various royal assises in the 1150s and1160s) the jury was an assembled body of local notables whowould inform itinerant royal judges of local facts The jury ofnovel disseisin for example had to inform a royal judge of whowas seized (roughly meaning ldquoin possessionrdquo) of the land at somepast date In its initial incarnation the jury was responsible forproviding vere dicta (true statements) and not actually givencontrol over the outcome of the case While the public nature ofthe juriesrsquo verdicts surely made it difcult for judges to completelyignore them initially juries were an efcient means of gatheringinformation not a check on the royal prerogative

In fact in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries Englishkings did not surrender ultimate control to juries ldquoBehind thekeen interest of Henry II and John in the operations of the courtsof justice there lay a ready instinct to ensure that judgmentsinclined favourably towards the kingrsquos friends and ministers andaway from those who were out of favour or distrusted On occa-sion Johnrsquos writs assumed that customary procedure should giveway if necessary to royal prohibitionrdquo [Holt 1992 p 84] ldquoIt isnoteworthy that the one novelty with which the king [John] canreasonably be linked was designed to investigate and if needed


quash the verdicts of local jurors Its purpose was supervisoryAnd it is tting that it should appear on the Fine roll for it is inthis roll that the kingrsquos control of government is seen at its mostimmediate and unremittingrdquo [Holt 1992 p 182]

In subsequent years there was a gradual movement to ensurethat judges could not convict without the consent of a jury Thecritical statement of this veto power is the Magna Carta AtRunnymede in exchange for cash and peace King John agreedthat he and his subjects were to be governed by rule of law andthat ldquono person may be amerced (ie ned) without the judgmentof his peersrdquo (Cap 39) At this point there is little doubt that theking accepted juries as a check on royal judges and royal powerAfter 1215 the inuence of the juries generally increased In thefourteenth century Parliament ldquointerpreted the phrase lsquolawfuljudgment of peersrsquo to include trial by peers and therefore trial byjury a process which existed only in embryo in 1215 Secondlylsquothe law of the landrsquo was dened in terms of yet another potentand durable phrasemdashlsquodue process of lawrsquo which meant procedureby original writ or by an indicting juryrdquo [Holt 1992 p 10] In factan important phenomenon in English legal history is jury nulli-cation whereby juries systematically refused to convict suspectsof crimes when the penalties were seen as excessive (such as ahanging for theft of value above one shilling)2

During the ensuing centuries despite the fact that Englishjudges continued to serve the king juries remained a check onroyal discretion ldquoThe presence of the jury as fact-nder and theabsence of any effective modes of controlling the juries meantduring the earlier centuries that the judgersquos role was limited tomaintaining courtroom order framing the questions that thejuries must answer and ensuring compliance with the groundrules of the various forms of actionrdquo [Dawson 1960 p 136] Inaddition even the judges in England have been traditionallymore independent than those in France Throughout historycommon law judges insisted that the principal source of Englishlaw was historical precedent rather than the will of the sovereignwith Coke emerging as the leading advocate of this view TheTudors responded to the increasing independence of judges andjuries by creating new courts more subordinate to the monarchy

2 Kessler and Piehl [1998] present a more modern example of juries in acommon law system undoing harsh penalties (mandatory sentencing guidelines inthe United States)

1199LEGAL ORIGINS

such as the Star Chamber and by punishing juries whose deci-sions they disliked Only the Revolution of the seventeenth cen-tury conclusively removed royal control over the legal systemThe Star Chamber was abolished in 1641 and the Act of Settle-ment in 1701 conrmed judicial independence from both king andParliament Starting in the eighteenth century judicial indepen-dence was an undisputed element of the English legal system incontrast to the sovereign control of judges in France

Indeed the French path was radically different The Frank-ish inquest existed in France as well and institutions like ju-riesmdashsuch as enquete par turbemdashcontinued to show up through-out the ancien regime However the critical step in France wasthe decision under Philip Augustus and Louis IX (who organizedthe Parlements de Paris in 1256) to move toward a judge-inquis-itor model governed by Romano-Canon law This model becamewidely available in the twelfth and especially thirteenth centu-ries after the Justinian code was rediscovered in 1080 and thescholars of Bologna modernized it for the use by the CatholicChurch in its own courts3 In this system judges would questionwitnesses privately and separately prepare written records andthemselves determine the outcome of the case These judges weredirectly beholden to the king and there is no question that theking had the ability to strongly inuence their actions throughappointments reappointments and bribes

As in England royal control over judges in France was notabsolute Sale of judicial ofces afforded judges at least someindependence Indeed through the centuries French kings madeefforts to redesign the system of courts and to create new courtsof law whose judges would be more responsive to the kingrsquos will[Ford 1953] Some like Louis XIV succeeded better than otherslike Louis XV Yet despite this ongoing tug-of-war between theking and the judges sovereign control over the judiciary re-mained greater in France than in England and culminated in aneffort at a complete subordination of the judiciary by Napoleon

To explain the different choices in England and France werely on the generally accepted historical fact that the power oflocal magnates in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries including

3 It is sometimes argued that Henry II designed his legal system too earlyand that the choice of Romano-Canon law was not available to him Berman[1983] presents compelling evidence against this view including the fact that oneof Henryrsquos principal advisors had previously worked for Roger II in Palermo whochose the Roman law system for his country


inuence over lower level local notables such as knights wasgreater in France than in England ldquoIn practice relations betweenkings and counts [in France] were still in many cases more likethose between independent powers than Suger would have ad-mittedrdquo [Reynolds 1994 p 272] In contrast ldquoThe power of theEnglish government meant that all English fees in the twelfthand the thirteenth centuries were to some extent precarious butthe same power also protected free property from anyone exceptthe governmentrdquo [p 394]

In this environment a jury of notables in France would nothave been able to deliver justice when the interests of the localmagnates were involved It was more efcient to surrender adju-dicatory powers to royal judges even when the preferences of theking did not reect community justice In England in contrastlocal magnates were weaker relative to the knights in large partbecause William the Conqueror prevented the creation of vastcontiguous land holdings As a consequence local pressure on thejuries was weaker and the decisions they could reach were prob-ably closer to the community standards of justice It was moreefcient then to delegate the adjudicatory powers to the juriesand the magnates were willing to pay the king for that privilegeldquoThe French kings could not make effective use of local villageand county institutions as English kings could because the tra-dition of local self-government was less developed in the Frankishthan in the Anglo-Saxon kingdom and was therefore more vul-nerable to a takeover by the feudal baronsrdquo [Berman 1983p 465]

We examine the choice of the legal system from the viewpointof social welfare including that of the king and the nobles In thismodel the king always prefers adjudication by a royal judgebeholden to him However if the nobles want a jury systemstrongly enough they are willing to ght and to pay for it As longas there is some way of enforcing a bargain whereby the kingagrees to decentralized adjudication in exchange for taxes theremight be efciency pressures toward such a bargain includingefforts to secure peace The Magna Carta as a document in whichthe king gave up some control over adjudication in exchange forpeace and taxes might reect such a bargain To consider thispossibility more closely we examine the conditions under whicheither of the two systems sits on the Pareto frontier

We focus on the adjudication of cases involving local mag-nates or their interests The key advantage of juries is that they

1201LEGAL ORIGINS

reect the preferences of the community not those of the king Byassumption juries unlike judges cannot be incentivized or con-trolled by the king or at least that there are signicant limits ofsuch control The disadvantage of juries is that they are vulner-able to inuence by local magnates which can take the form ofeither physical bullying or corruption intended to inuence theverdict A royal judge is less vulnerable to bullying by a powerfullocal lord than a jury both because of the kingrsquos own militaryresources and because the kingrsquos payments offset the inuence oflocal magnates On the other hand a royal judge caters to thekingrsquos rather than the subjectsrsquo preferences In our model thetrade-off is between a judge incentivized by the king and there-fore less vulnerable to local magnate pressure and a jury whosepreferences are closer to those of the community but which facesno incentives and can be more easily coerced

The Setup

We think of a king and the community of his subjects includ-ing knights and nobles (the peasants were not important for theadministration of justice at that time) Some of the members ofthe community whom we call the magnates are especially pow-erful and have the ability to subvert justice when their interestsare infringed upon We examine the vulnerability of alternativemechanisms of law enforcement to subversion by the magnates

We focus on violations like the takings of land which involvethe interests of local magnates or of parties close to them Wethink of these violations as crimes as they would be today but inthe twelfth century there was no clear distinction between civiland criminal justice For concreteness we suppose that one mag-nate has taken the land of another and that the offender ispowerful enough to threaten or corrupt the adjudicator In a moregeneral model both sides would bully adjudicators

Violations differ on two dimensions denoted by D and R Dcaptures the severity of the violation The utility of the commu-nity from punishing a violation of type D is normalized to equalD These gains combine deterrence incapacitation and taste-for-vengeance and subtract social costs of punishment The commu-nity wants to punish all violations for which D 0

The variable R captures the extent to which the king wantsto punish a violator R might be positive in the case of politicalviolations that are dangerous to the king Alternatively if theviolator is a royal ally R might be negative The kingrsquos utility


from conviction is given by D 1 R where 0 The termcaptures the degree to which the preferences of the king do notmatch those of the community In a perfect democracy ispresumably close to zero but it rises as the sovereign becomesless constrained by his subjects In this section we assume that Dand R are common knowledge and that the two attributes areindependently distributed with smooth cumulative distributionfunctions F(D) and G(R) and nite variances The expected valueof D is positive and the expected value of R is zero

To compare the efciency of alternative systems of adjudica-tion we dene ldquosocial welfarerdquo as a weighted average of thepreferences of the king and the community with the kingrsquosweight in the social welfare function given by and the commu-nityrsquos by 1 2 The total social payoff from each convictiontherefore equals D 1 R For most of history the kingrsquos re-sources were relatively meager relative to those of the commu-nity and hence we concentrate on the case of close to zero Infact 5 0 is an important special case for which all of our resultshold Our model can also deal with the case of close to 1 inwhich an outcome close to the kingrsquos preferences materializesThis may be a useful case to describe the developments of thenineteenth and especially twentieth centuries but not for most ofhistory

With these assumptions social welfare is given by

(1) E E ~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

We consider two possible modes of adjudication the jurywhich is a group of members of the community and the royaljudge The jury and the royal judge have two features in commonand one crucial difference Both the jury and the royal judge havesome preferences over punishing particular violations (althoughthese preferences may differ) Both the jury and the royal judgeare also subject to pressure from the magnatemdashthrough bullyingand bribesmdashto rule in his favor We assume that the amount ofpressure brought on the jury and on the royal judge is exactly thesame although one could argue that especially with a unanimityrule for juries it might be cheaper to bribe one juror Jury una-nimity however is neither a universal nor a fundamental ele-ment of the jury system ldquoFrom the reign of Edward I onwards thefunction of the jury was slowly being judicially dened questions

1203LEGAL ORIGINS

of law became separated from questions of fact and graduallyunanimity was requiredmdashalthough for some time whether a ver-dict by eleven jurors was not sufcient in which case the twelfthmight be committed to prisonrdquo [Plucknett 1956 p 129]

The fundamental difference between juries and royal judgesin our model is that the latter but not the former can be put onan incentive scheme (ldquoprotectedrdquo) by the king so as to eithercounter the pressure from the magnate or follow the kingrsquos ownpreferences The dening feature of juries in our model is theirindependencemdashin fact that was the whole point of juries inMagna Carta There are many reasons why juries are muchharder than judges for the sovereign to control there are manymore of them they rotate from case to case and the sovereignusually does not even know who the jurors are to ldquoincentivizerdquothem Sometimes of course kings try In the sixteenth and sev-enteenth centuries the Tudors and the Stuarts engaged in juryintimidation possibly contributing to the English RevolutionAfter the Revolution acts of Parliament specically reafrmedthe independence of the juries and prohibited various forms ofbullying them

We assume that the tastes of the jury mirror those of thecommunity in part because the jurors come from among themThe jurors do not care about R but want to see the violators ofcommunity rules punished They alsomdashto some extentmdashinternal-ize the social costs of punishment because one day a juror mighthimself be accused The juryrsquos utility from conviction is taken tobe D 2 A The shift parameter reects the extent to which thejury cares about doing justice relative to being bullied or bribedThe term ldquoArdquo captures the pressure put on the jury by the localmagnate whose interests are jeopardized These could be directphysical reprisals for conviction but also bribes that the jurorreceives if he acquits the magnate

In some well-functioning societies A is small and jurors arewell protected from physically or nancially powerful interestedparties But elsewhere A may be higher In the twelfth andthirteenth centuries a central problem of government was thedivision of control over local affairs (including adjudication) be-tween local feudal lords and the king In a more recent context ofthe developing world unpaid or low-paid judges and jurors aresubject to local political pressures and corruption from oligarchslandowners and local ofcials In Russia today inuence by theoligarchs and regional governments over courts is the central


problem of rule of law Even in the United States local juries andjudges have been routinely intimidated or bribed (as in variousacquittals of Al Capone or civil rights cases in Southern courts)The susceptibility of law enforcers to bullying A is the centralparameter of the model

Under these assumptions the jury convicts if D A whichalways leads to fewer convictions than the society wants Obvi-ously in cases where local magnates wish to convict a rivalmagnate pressure might also lead to overconviction

Because the unconditional expectation of R is zero and thejuries ignore R social welfare under the jury system equals

D A Df(D)dD Figure I illustrates the social welfare loss fromjury coercion relative to the rst best when 5 0 The area to theright of D 5 0 is the social optimum the area to the right of D 5A is where the bullied jury still convicts and the shaded areain which the community wants to convict but the jury does not isthe social loss This social loss is increasing in A and decreasingin Juries perform worse when local magnates are more pow-erful and better when they are more committed to their ownindependent preferences

The royal judge like the jury has some set of innate prefer-ences and is also subject to local pressure However unlike the

FIGURE ISocial Losses from Jury Coercion Relative to the First Best When 5 0

1205LEGAL ORIGINS

jury the judge can be punished and rewarded by the king whoperfectly observes all aspects of the case The judgersquos utility fromconvicting is J(D 1 JR) 2 A plus whatever the king chooses inhis incentive scheme The parameters J and J are meant tokeep the judgersquos preferences exible4 However as the king ob-serves R and knows the preferences of the judge a simple incen-tive scheme can easily induce the judge to exactly follow thekingrsquos preferences The king simply pays the judge A 1 J ( 2

J ) R if the judge convicts This payment compensates for boththe coercion by the magnate and the deviation in the judgersquospreferences from those of the king After the judge had beenincentivized he convicts whenever the king would ie if and onlyif R 2D For any given D then a fraction of cases equal to1 2 G(2D ) reach conviction

For 5 0 total social welfare in this case equals

ED

D S 1 2 G S 2D D D f~DdD

and the total social losses are shown in the two triangles inFigure II The top triangle covers the kingrsquos enemies whosecrimes are mild by the standards of the community but who arenonetheless convicted by the kingrsquos judge The bottom trianglecovers the kingrsquos friends whose crimes are major but who arenonetheless acquitted by the kingrsquos judge Unsurprisingly thesocial losses from the royal judge system increase when the pref-erences of the king and the community fail to overlap Moregenerally the following proposition holds (all proofs are in theAppendix)

PROPOSITION 1 When is sufciently close to zero there exists avalue of A 0 at which ldquosocial welfarerdquo is the same underroyal judges and independent juries For A A royaljudges yield higher social welfare For A A juries yieldhigher welfare The value of A rises with and falls with When is sufciently close to zero A rises with

The crucial parameter in Proposition 1 is A which representsthe ability of local notables to bully coerce or corrupt the arbitersof the kingrsquos justice Across societies A is generally higher when

4 For a discussion of preferences of judges see Posner [1995]


there is signicant local inequalitymdashpowerful local lords have theresources to bribe or bully A is also a function of the general levelof violence in the society When the supply of armed warriors ishigh it is cheaper to coerce the kingrsquos justice A is also higherwhen the crown is weak and cannot punish violators The crownmay be weak either because it has access to few tax revenues orbecause transport costs prevent its forces from enforcing justice

Throughout the past millennium the ability of local bullies tocontrol their environment was higher in France than in EnglandDuring the earlier period the nobles such as the Duke of Bur-gundy or the Constable Bourbon essentially ran independentprincipalities within the technical borders of France5 In thenineteenth century France saw major regional ghts over therevolution (the Chouans resisting the forces of the Directory themerchants of Bordeaux acquiescing only nominally to the revolu-tion of 1848) Even during the apotheosis of the centralizedFrench power under Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte theability of local authorities to undermine central control was muchgreater in France than in the age of Parliamentary control inEngland [Woloch 1994]

5 The kingrsquos writ did not run in the duchies which exemplify the power ofthe nobles

FIGURE IISocial Losses from the Royal Judge System When 5 0

1207LEGAL ORIGINS

Why were the local magnates so much weaker in Englandthan in France We see two key differences First in 1066 Wil-liam the Conqueror gave out to his followers dispersed holdings ofland precisely to minimize the ability of any general to create alocal power base As a consequence while the French nobles heldsway over vast contiguous areas of land the English nobles hadparcels that were dispersed over the country This initial alloca-tion of land holdings limited the creation of concentrated localauthority

Second during the last millennium England experiencedmuch more limited warfare on its territory than did FranceWithout recounting the full history of hostilities we estimate thatbetween 1100 and 1800 France had a war on its soil during 22percent of the years whereas England only 6 percent (one canalso argue that the wars on English soil were relatively blood-less) The constant war on the French soil meant that weaponsand warriors were readily available to anyone who wanted tosubvert justice

Interestingly the two periods of lengthy battle on Englishsoil were the War of the Roses in the second half of the fteenthcentury and the English civil war As our model suggests theability of local nobles to subvert justice increased during the Warof the Roses and after the war Henry Tudor brought Englishjustice closer to the French model through the courts of StarChamber The English civil war was fought in part to secure theindependence of the legal system from royal control and in factsucceeded in doing so

Our theory then suggests that England and France wenttheir different ways in adopting judicial systems for reasons ofefciency The relatively higher ability of the magnates to subvertjustice in France led to the adoption of the civil law systemcontrolled by the crown The relatively lower ability of such mag-nates in England to subvert justice led to the adoption of thejury-controlled common law system Both outcomes were efcientat the time for their environments In fact one can view theMagna Carta as a remarkable example of an early Coasian bar-gain in which the community and the crown agree on a cashtransfer needed to support the efcient outcome It is perhaps toofar-fetched to think of the Magna Carta literally as an enforceableCoasian contract A broader view of the Coase theorem is toidentify the incentives and pressure to move toward efciency Tothe extent that decentralized jury-controlled adjudication was


more efcient in England the Magna Carta might reect suchpressure

This analysis is broadly consistent with the available his-torical accounts of the divergence in approaches to adjudicationand in particular with the classic work of Dawson [1960] ldquoSo wereturn to the question why France which started with institu-tions so similar [to the English] followed in the end such adifferent course The answer that has been given centers onweaknessmdashweakness at the critical times The marks of weak-ness had appeared very early The community courts analogousto the English county and hundred courts had been captured bylocal feudal lords during the breakdown of government in thetenth and eleventh centuries When the rebuilding of monarchybegan the French crown lacked an important resource that theNorman kings of England had already put to very good use Butit was much more than this Over large parts of France that oweda nominal fealty to the king great territorial lords had effectivecontrol in them for long the kingrsquos writ did not run Even withinthe kingrsquos own domain there could be no massive enlistment offree subjects whose allegiance was to the crown as a symbol ofnational government transcending and displacing the bonds offeudal tenure [p 299]rdquo In Dawsonrsquos view the adoption of canon-ist inquest by royal judges was a sign of the crownrsquos weakness inFrance not of strength

In broader terms this analysis reveals how the royal judgeversus independent jury decision hinges upon the extent to whichthe magnates fear the crown more or less than they fear eachother This point has much broader implications It suggests inpart that the connection between English legal origin and rule oflaw emphasized by Hayek [1960] may ow as much from rule oflaw to the common law system as vice versa Juries are bettersystems when local magnates are not freely able to terrorizethem ie when peace prevails Without peace state inquisitorsmay be the only means of enforcing the law It is not entirelysurprising in this regard that tight state control of adjudicationhas often been introduced as part of national liberation or uni-cation often in the aftermath of civil war and other disorderWithout internal peace to begin with a system of juries maysimply not work

Proposition 1 has several other implications for the optimalchoice of a legal system When juries care more about communityjustice and are less vulnerable to the inuence of the local mag-

1209LEGAL ORIGINS

nate ( is higher) jury systems work better This may explainwhy juries in England were often made up of twelve local knightsPresumably a body of twelve ghting men was not as easy to bullyas that of unarmed but otherwise respected citizens When thesovereign has greater political power in bargaining with thecommunity or alternatively when the social welfare functionputs a higher weight on his preferences ( is higher) the systemof royal judges is more likely to emerge It is not surprising inthis regard that centralized civil law systems were often cham-pioned by the great autocrats like Napoleon

Finally the value of captures the extent to which thepreferences of the king differ from those of the society Proposi-tion 1 holds that so long as the social welfare function does notput too much weight on the preferences of the king the fartherthese preferences are from those of the community the lessefcient is the system of royal judges Put differently civil lawworks better when the government is more constrained by itssubjects or more democratic

This result has signicant implications for the effectivenessof alternative legal arrangements in different political regimesOn the one hand this argument suggests that the problems withcentralized justice are less severe in democratic societies Asdemocracy replaces royal government and the community truststhe democratically elected leaders who control the judicial sys-tem then juries may become less essential This analysis mightaccount for the expansion of public law and regulation in thetwentieth century even in common law countries such as theUnited States and England Such growth of parliamentary con-trol over lay justice is broadly consistent with our analysis yet asHayek [1960] so clearly emphasized is likely to undermine thefreedoms inherent in the Magna Carta On the other hand theargument suggests that in autocratic societies the power thatthe sovereign obtains by controlling judges will lead to politiciza-tion of justice and socially inefcient outcomes As we argue inSection IV this result has profound implications for legal trans-plantation and for the consequences of centralized justice for thesecurity of property rights and other aspects of governance

III THE ADOPTION OF BRIGHT LINE RULES

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries civil law systemsin France and Germany experienced an important change


namely codication Von Mehrenrsquos [1957] classic textbook statesin its opening chapter ldquoTwo points of difference are emphasizedin comparing the civil and the common laws First in the civillaw large areas of private law are codied Codication is nottypical of the common law Second the civil law was strongly andvariously inuenced by the Roman law The Roman inuence onthe common law was far less profound and in no way pervasiverdquo[p 3] In this section we focus on codication as a way of control-ling law enforcers

Codication aims to provide adjudicators with clear brightline rules as opposed to broad legal principles or standards formaking decisions Compared with a legal principle a bright linerule describes which specic actions are prohibited Some modernexamples clarify the difference The law can prohibit dangerousdriving (a standard) or it can impose a speed limit (a BLR) Thelaw can prohibit stock trading by insiders on nonpublic informa-tion (a standard) or all trading by insiders within N days of apublic announcement by a rm (a BLR) The law can prohibitself-dealing by corporate ofcers (a standard) or require that allnancial transactions by such ofcers be approved by a vote of themajority of disinterested directors of the rm (a BLR) The lawcan prohibit all ldquosham transactions designed to evade taxesrdquo (astandard) or very specic trades in the capital market (a BLR)

No system is made up entirely of bright line rules but civilcodes are basically collections of rules intended to restrict theactions of the participants in the legal system We maintain thatthe purpose of such rules to enable sovereignsmdashwhether kings orparliamentsmdashto control judges they are a natural consequence ofthe reliance on state-controlled judiciaries Merryman [1969] de-scribes the role of the judge and the code as seen by the writers ofCode Napoleon as follows ldquoIf the legislature alone could makelaws and the judiciary could only apply them (or at a later timeinterpret and apply them) such legislation had to be completecoherent and clear If a judge were required to decide a case forwhich there was no legislative provision he would in effect makelaw and thus violate the principle of rigid separation of powersHence it was necessary that the legislature draft a code withoutgaps Similarly if there were conicting provisions in the codethe judge would make law by choosing one rather than another asmore applicable to the situation Hence there could be no conict-ing provisions Finally if a judge were allowed to decide whatmeaning to give to an ambiguous provision or an obscure state-

1211LEGAL ORIGINS

ment he would again be making law Hence the code had to beclearrdquo [p 30]

Common law countries also have codes of laws such as theUniform Commercial Code in the United States and the manycodes of the State of California Some of these codes have evenmore statutes than civil codes do However as Merryman [1969]explains the codes in common law countries often summarizeprior judicial decisions Moreover a common law judge to theextent that he can focus on the differences between the caseunder review and specic provisions of the code has some exi-bility to disregard these provisions when they conict with thebasic principles of common law In civil law countries in contrastjudges are not even supposed to interpret the codes very muchand in principle must seek not to differentiate a specic situationbut to t it into the existing provisions of the code As a restrainton the judge codes are much more powerful in civil than incommon law countries

Historically codication has often been associated with ef-forts to control judges Although there is some dispute of whetherthe Code of Justinian has the character of modern codes asopposed to the summary of cases there is little doubt that Jus-tinian himself was interested in the control of justice Similarlythe work of the Glossators and their successors for the RomanChurch and the continental kings was centrally focused on devel-oping centralized control over adjudication through a system ofclear rules The early Stuarts tried to introduce codication inseventeenth century England out of their frustration with thefailure of common law judges to cater to royal preferences Absentthe rebellion against the king they might have succeeded Else-where codication was promulgated by Philip II in Spain Fred-erick the Great in Prussia and Napoleon Bonaparte in FranceThese men saw their codes as a means of controlling their judgesNapoleon wrote that he wanted to turn French judges into au-tomata simply enforcing his code We believe that this perspectiveexplains the history of codication better than the view thatbright line rules make adjudication ldquoless complexrdquo which focusesmore on the control of individual conduct than on the control ofthe judges [Kaplow 1992 1995]

We keep the basic structure of the previous model and againcompare the efciency of royally controlled judges and juriesViolations have attributes D and R We assume that the king nolonger observes the values of D and R Instead he observes only


a bright line namely whether D D The value D representssome xed threshold of severity We assume that D does not equalzero (which would yield the rst best) Increases in the absolutevalue of D correspond to higher imprecision of BLRs

The assumption that the king can observe (or verify) lessthan all the attributes of the violation may indeed accuratelyreect the fundamental changes in law enforcement in the eigh-teenth and nineteenth centuries In the twelfth and thirteenthcenturies the range of violations subject to royal justice wasextremely limited Judges were often members of the kingrsquoshousehold and the king himself got involved in many decisionsThe assumption that D and R were known to the king is appro-priate for this period Over the centuries both the states andtheir economies grew tremendously and royal justice becamemore anonymous This necessarily led to the loss of informationat the center and therefore eliminated the possibility of incen-tivizing every royal judge to do what the king wants in every caseThe assumption that only limited information trickles up to theking or the top judges becomes more suitable Below we describethe circumstances under which codication is an efcient re-sponse to such information loss

We also make the following assumption

ASSUMPTION 1 Expectation(D u D D) 0 Expectation(D u D D)

This assumption ensures that if the only thing known aboutan act is its relation to the BLR the king would want to convictviolators and acquit nonviolators We think of this signal asexogenously given by nature rather than a choice by the king asto where ldquoto draw the linerdquo

What is the optimal policy for the king when he can verifywhether a bright line has been crossed We take the view that thecommunity and the king can strike a Coasian bargain over thetype of system but that the king cannot credibly commit not toinuence his judges The incentive contract for the judge is thenthe one the king chooses

After each case the king receives two pieces of information(1) was the bright line rule violated and (2) did the judge convictAny incentive scheme must be based exclusively on these twopieces of information Since both of these items are binary itmust be the case that any optimal incentive system contains atmost four different payouts Furthermore since we are not con-cerned with the absolute level of payment to the judge but only

1213LEGAL ORIGINS

with the quality of the judgersquos decisions we can normalize thepayouts in the case of nonconviction to zero regardless of whetherthe BLR had been violated The judgersquos decision is only affectedby the incremental payment for conviction which would dependon whether the BLR had been violated or not

Denote this increment by Pi for i 5 vnv (ie the BLR hasbeen violated or not violated)

The judge convicts if

J~D 1 JR 1 P i A

The king chooses incremental payments for conviction PV

and PN V for the cases when the BLR has been violated (D D)and when it has not (D D) to maximize his welfare Forexample when D D the king chooses PV to maximize

(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~Dg~R dD dR when J 0

and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


The value of PN V is chosen in a similar mannerWe dene a pure bright line rule system as one where the

king commands a royal judge to punish an act if and only if thebright line has been crossed The question is under what circum-stances would the king choose to use this pure bright line rulesystem as the incentive contract for the judge that maximizes thekingrsquos welfare We can show the following

PROPOSITION 2 If the density g is sufciently close to uniformthen the kingrsquos optimal strategy is a pure bright line rulesystem if and only if J 0

When J 0 as the king raises P the marginal violator(holding D constant) has an increasingly higher value of R andthe king wants to pay even more for convictions This makes thekingrsquos problem convex so it is optimal for the king to get eitheruniversal conviction or universal acquittal within a given region


of Drsquos Since Assumption 1 guarantees that convictions dominatewhen the bright line rule is violated and acquittals dominatewhen it is not the king just orders the judge to follow the brightline rule to the letter

The condition that the density function of Rmdashof how muchthe king dislikes a violatormdashis near uniform has an interestinginterpretation By adopting a pure bright line rule system theking accepts the impartiality of law and gives up on using thejustice system to discriminate between his friends and enemies Ifthe density function g places a lot of weight on either highR rsquosmdashthe kingrsquos enemiesmdash or low R rsquosmdashthe kingrsquos friendsmdashhewould choose a more elaborate incentive system for his judgeswhich discriminates between friends and enemies Such a systemwould use the information in bright line rules but not rely on itexclusively

Proposition 2 illustrates the importance of judicial tastes inpushing the king toward bright line rules Bright line rules areparticularly attractive to a sovereign when the tastes of thejudges are far from his own (eg when J 0) Napoleonrsquosjudiciary was made up of men trained in prerevolutionary timesand sometimes holding monarchist views These judges did notshare Napoleonrsquos preferences and he could not count on theirunconstrained choices to reect his views Napoleonrsquos Code washis attempt to control such disagreeable judges

As in the previous section the next question we address isthat of comparative efciency of the two alternatives of juries androyal judges the latter now incentivized through bright linerules We continue to assume that the fundamental differencebetween juries and royal judges is that juries cannot be put onany incentive system Even bright line rules are subject to jurynullication A good example of this is the response of Englishjuries to the Tudor innovation of mandatory hangings fortheft of value above one shilling In response to this brightline rule English juries refused to declare the value of stolenproperty as exceeding one shilling when they did not want tohang the offender even when the stolen goods were much morevaluable

With a pure bright line rule system social welfare is D D

Df(D)dD assumed to be strictly positive The key parametershaping the relative attractiveness of juries and BLRs is again A

1215LEGAL ORIGINS

PROPOSITION 3 There exists a value of A denoted A at whichsocial welfare is the same under independent juries and apure bright line rule system For A A bright line rulesdominate and for A A independent juries dominate Thevalue of A rises with the absolute value of D

Proposition 3 shows that pure bright line rules are sociallydesirable when A is high (jurors are susceptible to pressure) andwhen D is close to zero (bright line rules are accurate) Thisproposition we believe goes to the heart of von Mehrenrsquos obser-vation of complementarity between civil law and codication Thecommon law regime is efcient when juries are capable of makingroughly efcient and independent decisions and therefore brightline rules are unnecessary to control adjudication In contrastwhen pressures on adjudicators are high the king chooses toemploy his judges and to restrict their discretion through codesThrough bright line rules inherent in the codes the king uses theinformation he can verify to monitor and shape the decisions ofthe judges and thus to protect themmdashand justicemdashfrom subver-sion Bright line rules are the optimal instrument of control aslong as they can be made sufciently precise Bright line rulesthus emerge as a central element of a civil law regime because inthe absence of full veriability of information by the sovereignthey allow state control over adjudication

The use of bright line rules the violations of which can beveried by higher level authorities as an instrument of control ismore general than our application to legal design For examplebright line rules can be used to control agents in a bureaucracyIn his classic study of the United States Forest Service Kaufman[1960] describes how forest rangers in the United States wereobligated to follow extremely detailed operating manuals regu-lating their behavior in a large number of foreseeable circum-stances The focus of forest rangers is especially interesting be-cause they operate nearly alone in remote locations and aresubject to signicant pressures from the logging interests to makefavorable decisions on harvesting trees In this instance as wellprecise instructions are used as an antidote to local bullying

To conclude this section has focused on our central theme akey goal in the design of a legal system is to control law enforcersStarting with Becker [1968] the law and economics literature hasfocused on the regulation of the behavior of individuals as theprincipal goal of legal design (see Polinsky and Shavell [2000])


Becker and Stigler [1974] consider the compensation of law en-forcers as a way of preventing corruption but the focus on thedesign of law enforcement has remained peripheral In our viewthe control of law enforcers has historically been as or moreimportant to the design of legal systems as the control of individ-ual behavior Not just the compensation of enforcers but legalrules themselves are shaped with the purpose of verication ofthe decisions of law enforcers such as judges Codication whichmany have seen as one of the dening elements of a civil lawsystem is best understood from this perspective In the nextsection we argue that other differences between common and civillaw systems are also best understood from the perspective ofefcient design of enforcement

IV CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS

Civil Procedure

In the previous sections we described the difference betweenlegal systems of France and England as the outcome of an ef-cient choice This is the choice between a regime that favorsincentivized decision-makers to protect against local pressureand corruption and a regime that favors de-incentivized decision-makers to protect against the state Once we focus on this choicewe can understand many of the aspects of the two legal tradi-tions both in terms of the procedures used by the legal systemand in terms of the implications for social outcomes6 We beginwith legal procedures In our comparison we rely on the standardcomparisons of the two approaches to adjudication presented inthe comparative law textbooks such as von Mehren [1957] Mer-ryman [1969] and Schlesinger et al [1988]

Comparative law textbooks emphasize the following proce-dural differences between civil and common law systems Thecommon law system greatly relies on oral argument and evidencewhile in civil law systems much of the evidence is recorded inwriting Trials play a much larger role in a common law than ina civil law system Civil law systems rely on regular and compre-hensive superior review of both facts and law in a case in com-

6 In this analysis we obviously simplify Even the legal systems of theUnited States and the United Kingdom have important structural differences[Posner 1996]

1217LEGAL ORIGINS

mon law systems in contrast the appeal is much less frequentand is generally restricted to law rather than facts

Common law systems at least in the last century havegenerally relied on heavily incentivized state prosecutors whoare separate from judges especially in the criminal cases In civillaw systems in contrast judging and prosecution are generallycombined in the person of the same judge Finally although thisdistinction is less clear-cut common law systems generally rely toa greater extent on the precedents from previous judicial deci-sions than do the civil law systems We argue below that thesedifferences can be understood from the perspective of our model

First compare the English tradition of oral argument andevidence with the French reliance on written evidence The keyfeature of written evidence is that it facilitates oversight of thecourt by higher level ofcials For the central authorities to moni-tor judges it is much easier to verify whether the decisionsadhere to the rules and to the preferences of the sovereign whenthere are written records A higher authority would nd it dif-cult to punish and reward judges in the hinterland if the judgesdo not produce any written records and decisions are made basedon oral evidence provided to the jury Furthermore written evi-dence in a jury-type system would have been hard in any modernperiod because of high rates of illiteracy among the general popu-lation In fact insofar as in the twelfth and thirteenth centurieskings wanted to control their judges they needed written recordsand because of the need for such records they needed to useliterate clerics as judges It is possible that the imperative ofusing clerics in a civil law system was a further factor that movedthe English kings during this period toward juriesmdashrecall thatboth Henry II and King John were excommunicated Using clericsmust have been much more attractive to the French kings whowere closely allied with the Church and usually canonized

Second the more central role of trials in the common lawsystem is obviously linked with adjudication by generally illiter-ate juries Evidence can only be collected from and presented tosuch juries in a public trial In civil law systems in contrast mostevidence is collected prior to the trial by a judge-inquisitor andhence the trial plays only a secondary role of rehashing thisevidence publicly The surprises and revelations of a common lawcourtroom play no role in this process Moreover the reliance ontrials makes it harder to review judicial decisions than does thewritten report of the ndings which is inconsistent with the


centrality of such review in civil law This difference then is alsolinked to the choice of the method of adjudication

Third review by higher level courts is automatic in a civil lawsystem and reconsiders both law and evidence Review by higherlevel courts in a common law system restricts itself largely to lawAgain this appears to be closely linked to the problem of moni-toring judges As we argued the dening element of the civil lawsystem is the reliance on state-employed judges who need to beincentivized to follow the preferences of the sovereign Appellatereview is how this incentive scheme works it is one of the mainways that judicial incompetence and corruption are detected In asystem based on incentivizing judges this type of review createscrucial data for providing these incentives In a common lawsystem in contrast it is the unincentivized juries rather than thestate-employed judges that render verdicts The need to monitorthe decisions of such juries is less pronounced except to theextent that the judges must be properly informing the juriesabout the basic outline of the law

The extensive superior review in the civil law systems leadsto very different manpower requirements Dawson [1960] reportsthat ldquoThe total number of royal judges [in France] at this stage[sixteenth century] must certainly have exceeded 5000 Theseestimates from France should be compared with gures fromEngland from 1300 to 1800 the judges of the English centralcourts of common law and Chancery rarely exceeded fteenThese judges furthermore conducted most of the trials and allthe appellate review that English courts undertookrdquo [p 71]

Fourth with independent and weakly incentivized judgesand juries a common law system needs to rely on state prosecu-tors to develop cases Judges and juries do not care stronglyenough about convictions to invest resources in collecting infor-mation and otherwise developing cases In the instances of pri-vate litigation private parties bringing suit have strong enoughincentives to do the work In criminal cases (which were broughtprivately in England until well into the nineteenth century forobvious incentive reasons) in contrast it may be necessary tohave motivated prosecutors who are paid for convictions even ifthey end up being advocates of the statersquos position rather thanseekers of justice7 In a civil law system to the extent that a judge

7 Incentives for prosecutors are discussed by Dewatripont and Tirole [1999]and Glaeser Kessler and Piehl [2000]

1219LEGAL ORIGINS

is already motivated to do the statersquos bidding a state prosecutoris less necessary to pursue the goals of the state Thus thedifference in approaches to advocacy and prosecution in the twosystems emerges as a consequence of the difference in incentivesfaced by the judges

Our model also suggests why precedents play a larger role ina common law system as exemplied by the doctrine of staredecisis Absent bright line rules and other guides for adjudicatorsprecedents may serve to remind judges and juries where the lawhas drawn lines previously Despite precedents it is common foradvocates in common law systems to draw subtle distinctionsbetween cases unlike in the civil law systems where similaritiesare sought by a judge [Damasiuml ka 1986] Nonetheless precedentsmay serve to eliminate excessive unpredictability which may bea natural consequence of the importance of individual trials andof particular sentiments of the juries ldquoCertainty is achieved inthe common law by giving the force of law to judicial decisionssomething theoretically forbidden in civil lawrdquo [Merryman 1969p 51] Precedents have the further advantage that unlike brightline rules they have been established by independent judgesrather than by the sovereign As such they again may provideprotection from the ability of the state to change the rulesthrough dictate It is for this reason that writers like Coke andHayek have celebrated the reliance on precedents as a key guar-antee of freedom in the English legal system

Social Outcomes

Recent research identies some systematic differences be-tween French civil law and common law countries in a variety ofsocial outcomes Holding the level of economic development con-stant French civil law countries have less secure property rightsgreater government regulation and intervention greater govern-ment ownership of banks and industry and higher levels ofcorruption and red tape than do common law countries [La Portaet al 1999 2002 Djankov et al 2002b] There is also evidencethat at the same level of development common law countries aremore nancially developed than their civil law counterparts [LaPorta et al 1997 1998] Can our model help explain suchndings

In thinking about this question it is important to distinguishbetween countries that have chosen their legal rules and regula-tions and countries into which such rules were transplanted


sometimes involuntarily For the countries that choose their legalrules our model suggests that the reliance on more extensiveregulation is an efcient response to lack of law and order sinceregulation facilitates the enforcement of laws For such countriesthe insecurity of property rights causes heavier regulation ratherthan regulation making property rights less secure

However as we argued in the introduction most countrieshave not developed their legal systems on their own but ratherhave inherited them from their colonizers Indeed the empiricalresults described above are driven almost entirely by formercolonies rather than by England and France For such countriesit is incorrect to think about the choice of a legal regime as anefcient response to the law and order environment Instead weneed to think about the transplantation of rules developed in oneenvironment into another

From this perspective our results suggest that the trans-plantation of a civil law system into a new environment may raisesignicant problems for the security of property rights Proposi-tion 1 shows that civil law systems work relatively better whenthe preferences of the sovereign are close to those of the commu-nity ie when is low If a civil law system is introduced into acommunity with a high the sovereign will use his control overjudges and legal rules to politicize dispute resolution He willpunish his enemies rather than violators of community justiceThe transplantation of common law does not suffer from thisproblem to the same extent since law enforcement is relativelydepoliticizedmdashjuries (and judges) are independent A sovereignwhose tastes do not reect those of the community cannot use thecommon law system as extensively to promote his goals as he cana civil law system As a consequence when a civil law system istransplanted into a country with a ldquobadrdquo government it will leadto less secure property rights heavier intervention and regula-tion and more corruption and red tape than does a common lawsystem transplanted into a similar environment Put simplyregulations and controls are much more vulnerable to misuse bythe sovereign than is community justice This of course is exactlywhat the evidence shows

Our approach might also explain why civil law works betterin some areas of law than in others Suppose that the choice of theform of adjudication is systemwide rather than specic to a givenarea of law The analysis implies that for a given level of pressureon adjudicators A civil law systems work better when bright line

1221LEGAL ORIGINS

rules accurately capture community justice (ie D is close tozero) while common law systems work better when BLRs areinaccurate (ie D is far from zero) One area in which BLRsnotoriously fail to catch undesirable conduct is the expropriationof investors by corporate insiders generally governed by companyand security laws BLRs do not work well in this area because abroad range of creative behavior designed to expropriate inves-tors ldquofalls between the cracksrdquo in the rules [Johnson et al 2000]When the resources at stake are enormous the creativity in suchconduct rises accordingly As a result the model predicts thatcommon law regimes would do better than civil law in the areasof law governing investor protection just as the evidence indi-cates [La Porta et al 1997 1998]

In summary this section has argued that many of the keyfeatures of a civil law systemmdashas seen both in the legal proce-dures and in the social outcomesmdashldquocome withrdquo its reliance onstate-employed judges to adjudicate disputes Many of these fea-tures do not have a role in a system that relies heavily on adju-dication by local unincentivized juries

V CONVERGENCE

In this section we ask under what circumstances do commonand civil law systems converge ie lead to similar decisions andalternatively when do they yield different outcomes

Some writers argue that judging by substantive outcomesthere has been a great deal of convergence in wealthy economiesbetween common and civil law systems in the twentieth century[Coffee 2000] To understand this phenomenon we consider thedegree of overlap in the decisions between the BLR and theindependent jury systems Assume that A 0 D In thisscenario the range of cases in which the two regimes lead todifferent decisions is given by A D D When bright linerules are inaccurate (D is far from zero) and there is no rule of law( A is high) the two systems deliver very different outcomesWhich one does better depends on whether the lack of rule of lawor the inaccuracy of the BLRs is a bigger problem

The degree of divergence of the two systems is (1) rising withA (2) falling with and (3) falling with D Unsurprisingly weexpect to see convergence in outcomes as juries become moreimmune to pressure and corruption (ie as either A falls or as


rises) The tendency of juries to be swayed by local inuencewould have fallen as the ability to protect them rose over thetwentieth century This may be one reason for the tendency ofsystems to converge

A second reason is that codications may have been broughtmore into line with the tastes of the public at large ie D hasgotten closer to zero As societies became more democratic par-liaments wrote laws and codes that better reected the views ofthe entire community As a result the tendency of codes to reectthe preferences of the elite rather than the will of the people musthave declined Bright line rules may also have become better asthe information systems in the society have improved and henceit became possible to draw sharper ldquolinesrdquo between differentforms of conduct As D goes to zero when A is low civil codes willresemble jury systems more and more In that case the twosystems are both more or less accurately reecting the will of thepublic In fact as we take the limit as both A and D converge tozero the two systems converge to efciency in terms of the out-comes they deliver

VI CONCLUSION THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE

Economists generally agree that the statersquos main role in theeconomy is to protect property rights The libertarians believethat this is pretty much all the state should do while economistswith more interventionist tendencies begin from there and go onThe trouble with this imperative is that it does not tell us exactlyhow the state can design a functional legal system and what ittakes to ldquoprotect property rightsrdquo At the heart of the libertarianview is Coasersquos [1960] idea that individual contracting will movesocieties toward efcient resource allocation as long as thesecontracts are enforced by courts But there is nothing in theCoasian logic to explain what would enable or motivate courts toenforce contracts or for that matter why such judicial enforce-ment would work better than property rights protection by othermeans such as government regulation In at least some in-stances regulation by government agencies appears to work bet-ter than enforcement of contracts by inefcient courts susceptibleto political pressures [Glaeser Johnson and Shleifer 2001] Theimperative of protecting property rights at the most general

1223LEGAL ORIGINS

level says nothing about the desirable extent of governmentintervention

In fact as we try to show in this paper efcient solutions tothe problem of the design of legal systems to protect propertyrights may lead to very different answers in different environ-ments When the law and order environment is benign to beginwith a system of law enforcement relying on decentralized adju-dication by peers may be the most efcient In such a system wewould see greater security of property rights and relatively littlestate intervention in the economy and society In contrast whenlaw and order is weak to begin with a system of law enforcementrelying on more centralized adjudication of disputes by govern-ment employees may be the most efcient In such a system wewould see less security of property rights more regulation andmore state intervention in the economy Indeed we might seesome institutions that can be viewed as unfriendly to a freemarket economy even thoughmdashfrom a broader perspectivemdashtheymight be efcient for the environment Put differently peoplemight demand some level of ldquodictatorshiprdquo and ldquostate controlrdquobecause the alternative is lawlessness

Unfortunately however this assessment of government con-trol and regulation as an antidote to lawlessness is too optimisticAs our propositions show the civil law approach to law enforce-ment with its reliance on enforcers beholden to the sovereign andon bright line rules is especially vulnerable to abuse by a badgovernment Such a government can use the controls inherent incivil law to politicize justice to its own end rather than to pursuecommunity standards of justice As a consequence civil law ifused to direct justice to political ends will lead to heavy govern-ment intervention insecure property rights and poor governancein general Common law with its decentralization of adjudica-tion is less vulnerable to politicization

As we have noted most countries in the world have inheritedtheir legal systems from their occupiers and colonizers ratherthan developed them indigenously In this process French civillaw and English common law have been transplanted throughoutthe world If the logic of this paper is correct and civil law canbecome a control instrument of a bad government the transplan-tation of civil law can have adverse consequences for the securityof property rights The cross-country evidence on governmentintervention security of property rights and governance is con-sistent with this hypothesis


APPENDIX PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS

PROPOSITION 1 When is sufciently close to zero there exists avalue of A 0 at which ldquosocial welfarerdquo is the same underroyal judges and independent juries For A A royaljudges yield higher social welfare For A A independentjuries yield higher welfare The value of A rises with andfalls with When is sufciently close to zero then A riseswith

Proof Because the unconditional expectation of R is zerosocial welfare under the jury system equals D A Df(D)dDThis expression both is monotonically declining in A and con-verges to zero as A increases to innity The social welfare underthe royal judge equals

(A1) ED

D S 1 2 G S 2D D f~DdD 1 E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR

The rst term is positive because E(D) 0 and the weight-ing function puts a higher weight on higher D rsquos The second termis positive because E(R u R 2D ) is positive for every DBecause social welfare under royal judges is strictly positive andsocial welfare under juries converge to zero as A increases forsufciently high levels of A judges must dominate juries

When A 5 0 and 5 0 social welfare under juries reachesthe rst best and therefore strictly dominates social welfare un-der judges of D D(1 2 G(2D ) f(D)dD which does not reachthe rst best Because social welfare under judges is continuousin for values of close to zero judges still dominate juries atA 5 0 Using the mean value theorem for these values of theremust exist a value of A (denoted by A) at which social welfareunder judges and that under juries are equal By monotonicity ofsocial welfare under judges with respect to A for values of Aabove A juries dominate judges and for values of A below Ajudges dominate juries

Note next that the value of A is dened through

(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

For (A2) to hold A must remain constant as risesDifferentiation then shows that

1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0

Differentiating both sides of (A2) and inverting gives us that

(A3)A

52 2

D R2D Rf~Dg~RdDdRAf~A

which is always negative since E(R u R 2D ) 0Differentiating both sides of (A2) and inverting gives us that

(A4)A

5

2 D ~~1 2 D2 2 f~D g~2D dD2 D R2D Rf~Dg~RdDdR

Af~A

which is positive if and only if

(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR

which always holds when is sufciently small

PROPOSITION 2 If the distribution g is sufciently close to uniformthen the kingrsquos optimal strategy is a pure bright line rulesystem if and only if J 0

Proof For any subset of D rsquos (denoted Vi) captured by anybright line the problem is to choose Pi the subsidy towardconviction to maximize

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 This problem yields the rst-order condition

(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0


Pi is dened as the solution to (A6) and when second-orderconditions hold this will represent the optimal incentive scheme(from the kingrsquos perspective) The second derivative of the maxi-mand is

(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD

when J 0 and 21 times this quantity when J 0 Thus ifterms involving g9 are small (A7) is positive if and only if J 0 When (A7) is positive for any nite value of Pi then no systemwith nite payoffs can be an optimum Thus we only need con-sider schemes where the judge is given innite positive or innitenegative incentives to convict In the case of high levels of Dconvicting is on average better than letting go In the case oflevels of D below the bright line rule convicting is on net worsethan letting go Thus when J 0 it is optimal to pursue a purebright line rule strategy

When J 0 second-order conditions hold and (A6) deter-mines the optimal subsidy for conviction Since (A6) implies niterewards and judicial discretion a pure bright line rule system isnot optimal for the king when J 0


Proof As before social welfare under juries is a function of Aand social welfare under bright line rules is not At A 5 0 juriesproduce the social optimum and bright line rules do not so juriesare preferable For sufciently large values of A social welfareunder juries is arbitrarily close to zero and social welfare underbright line rules is assumed to be strictly positive Because thesocial welfare under juries is monotonically and continuouslydecreasing in A there must exist a value of A for which the levelsof social welfare under juries and bright line rules are identical

1227LEGAL ORIGINS

Above that value bright line rules dominate and below thatvalue juries dominate

A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD

and taking derivatives yields

(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A

Because (A8) takes on the sign of D this means that Arises with the absolute value of D

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS HARVARD UNIVERSITY

REFERENCES

Becker Gary ldquoCrime and Punishment An Economic Approachrdquo Journal of Po-litical Economy LXXVI (1968) 169ndash217

Becker Gary and George Stigler ldquoLaw Enforcement Malfeasance and Compen-sation of Enforcersrdquo Journal of Legal Studies III (1974) 1ndash18

Berman Harold J Law and Revolution (Cambridge MA Harvard UniversityPress 1983)

Coase Ronald ldquoThe Problem of Social Costrdquo Journal of Law and Economics III(1960) 1ndash 44

Coffee John C Jr ldquoConvergence and Its Critics What Are the Preconditions tothe Separation of Ownership and Controlrdquo Working Paper No 179 ColumbiaLaw School 2000

Damasiuml ka Mirjan R The Faces of Justice and State Authority (New Haven CTYale University Press 1986)

Dawson John P A History of Lay Judges (Cambridge MA Harvard UniversityPress 1960)

Dewatripont Mathias and Jean Tirole ldquoAdvocatesrdquo Journal of Political Econ-omy CVII (1999) 1ndash39

Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and AndreiShleifer ldquoCourts The Lex Mundi Projectrdquo NBER Working Paper No 88902002a

Djankov Simeon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and AndreiShleifer ldquoThe Regulation of Entryrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics CXVII(2002b) 1ndash37

Ford Franklin L Robe and Sword (New York Harper Torchbooks 1953)Glaeser Edward Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer ldquoCoase versus the Coas-

iansrdquo Quarterly Journal of Economics CVII (2001) 853ndash900Glaeser Edward Daniel P Kessler and Anne M Piehl ldquoWhat Do Prosecutors

Maximizerdquo American Law and Economics Review II (2000) 259ndash290Grossman Herschel I ldquoMake us a King Anarchy Predation and the Staterdquo

Brown University Department of Economics Working Paper No 9726 1997Hayek Friedrich A The Constitution of Liberty (South Bend IN Gateway

1960)Holt James C Magna Carta (Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press

1992)Johnson Simon Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei


Shleifer ldquoTunnelingrdquo American Economic Review Papers and ProceedingsXC (2000) 22ndash27

Kaplow Louis ldquoRules versus Standardsrdquo Duke Law Journal XLII (1992)557ndash629

mdashmdash ldquoA Model of Optimal Complexity of Legal Rulesrdquo Journal of Law Economicsand Organization XI (1995) 150ndash163

Kaufman Herbert The Forest Ranger (Baltimore MD Johns Hopkins Press1960)

Kessler Daniel P and Anne M Piehl ldquoThe Role of Discretion in the CriminalJustice Systemrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Organization XIV (1998)256ndash276

La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer ldquoGovernmentOwnership of Banksrdquo Journal of Finance LVII (2002) 265ndash301

La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLegal Determinants of External Financerdquo Journal of Finance LII(1997) 1131ndash1150

La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoLaw and Financerdquo Journal of Political Economy CVI (1998)1113ndash1155

La Porta Rafael Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Andrei Shleifer and Robert WVishny ldquoThe Quality of Governmentrdquo Journal of Law Economics and Or-ganization XV (1999) 222ndash279

Merryman John H The Civil Law Tradition (Stanford CA Stanford UniversityPress 1969)

Olson Mancur ldquoDictatorship Democracy and Developmentrdquo American PoliticalScience Review LXXXVII (1993) 567ndash576

Plucknett Theodore A Concise History of the Common Law (Boston MA LittleBrown 1956)

Pollock Sir Frederick and Frederic W Maitland The History of English LawBefore the Time of Edward I (Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press1968)

Polinsky Mitchell and Steven Shavell ldquoThe Economic Theory of Public Enforce-ment of the Lawrdquo Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII (2000) 45ndash76

Posner Richard A Overcoming Law (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press1995)

mdashmdash Law and Legal Theory in England and America (Oxford UK Oxford Uni-versity Press 1996)

Prestwich Michael Edward I (New Haven CT Yale University Press 1988)Reynolds Susan Fiefs and Vassals The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted (Ox-

ford UK Oxford University Press 1994)Schlesinger Rudolf Hans Baade Mirjan Damasiuml ka and Peter Herzog Compara-

tive Law Case-Text Materials (New York The Foundation Press 1988)Von Mehren Arthur T The Civil Law System (Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice

Hall 1957)Woloch Isser The New Regime (New York W W Norton amp Company 1994)

1229LEGAL ORIGINS

civil law countries in a variety of political and economic condi-tions At the same level of development French civil law coun-tries exhibit heavier regulation less secure property rights morecorrupt and less efcient governments and even less politicalfreedom than do the common law countries [La Porta et al 1999La Porta Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2002 Djankov et al2002b] One area where the greater insecurity of property rightsin the civil law countries shows up clearly is the development ofnancial markets On just about any measure common law coun-tries are more nancially developed than civil law countries [LaPorta et al 1997 1998]

These observations raise two crucial questions First whydid such very different legal systems evolve in France and inEngland Second why are these differences in the organization oflegal systems associated with such different social and economicoutcomes In this paper we argue that the historical evolution oflegal systems in France and England starting in the twelfth andthirteenth centuries has shaped how these systems operate Le-gal historians such as Dawson [1960] Berman [1983] andDamasiuml ka [1986] show that the two countries chose very differentstrategies for law enforcement and adjudication Specicallythey opted for different levels of control that the sovereign exer-cised over judges France went in the direction of adjudication byroyally controlled professional judges while England moved to-ward adjudication by relatively independent juries Over the sub-sequent millennium the conditions in England and France rein-forced the initial divergence in the legal systems Moreover thetransplantation of the two legal systems through conquest andcolonization may account for some crucial differences in socialand economic outcomes among countries that are reported in theempirical studies

The different choices made in England and France in thetwelfth and thirteenth centuries are especially puzzling in light ofthe widely recognized observation that at that time the Englishking commanded greater power over his subjects than did theFrench king [Dawson 1960 Reynolds 1994] By that time theEnglish kings had clearly prevailed over the nobles In contrastthe French king was at best the rst among equals with variousdukes and did not even have full military control over the Ile-de-France It would seem natural then for the more powerfulEnglish kings to create a legal system that extended royal controlmore deeply into the life of the country while for the weaker






1195LEGAL ORIGINS










1197LEGAL ORIGINS










1199LEGAL ORIGINS











1201LEGAL ORIGINS


The Setup











1203LEGAL ORIGINS












1205LEGAL ORIGINS




ED











1207LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS





1195LEGAL ORIGINS










1197LEGAL ORIGINS










1199LEGAL ORIGINS











1201LEGAL ORIGINS


The Setup











1203LEGAL ORIGINS












1205LEGAL ORIGINS




ED











1207LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS










1197LEGAL ORIGINS










1199LEGAL ORIGINS











1201LEGAL ORIGINS


The Setup











1203LEGAL ORIGINS












1205LEGAL ORIGINS




ED











1207LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS










1199LEGAL ORIGINS











1201LEGAL ORIGINS


The Setup











1203LEGAL ORIGINS












1205LEGAL ORIGINS




ED











1207LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS











1201LEGAL ORIGINS


The Setup











1203LEGAL ORIGINS












1205LEGAL ORIGINS




ED











1207LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS


The Setup











1203LEGAL ORIGINS












1205LEGAL ORIGINS




ED











1207LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS






1203LEGAL ORIGINS












1205LEGAL ORIGINS




ED











1207LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS












1205LEGAL ORIGINS




ED











1207LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS




ED











1207LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS





1207LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS










1209LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS










1211LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS













1213LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS




J~D 1 JR 1 P i A



(49)

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J


and

EDD

ER~ A2PV J J2~D J













1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS







1215LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS








Civil Procedure




1217LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS











1219LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS



Social Outcomes








1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS





1221LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS



V CONVERGENCE









1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS





1223LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS









(A1) ED


D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




(A2) EDA

Df~DdD 5 ED

ER2D

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


1225LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS

A5

A 0


(A3)A

52 2



(A4)A

5


Af~A


(A5)1 2

2 ED

D2f~D g S 2D D dD E

D

ER2D

Rf~Dg~RdDdR




ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR

when J 0 and

ED[ Vi

ER~ A2Pi J J2~D J

~D 1 R f~D g~RdDdR


(A6)

1

J JE

D [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~ A 2 P i

J JD g S A 2 P i

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 5 0



(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS


(A7) ED [ Vi

S 2

j2

j2 D g S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD 2 S 1

J JD 2

3 ED [ Vi

S J 2

JD 1

~A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD g9 S A 2 Pi

J J2

D

JD f~DdD





1227LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS


A is dened by

EDA

Df~DdD 5 EDD

Df~DdD


(A8)AD

5Df~D 2

Af~ A



REFERENCES






































1229LEGAL ORIGINS





















1229LEGAL ORIGINS

legal origins* edward l.glaeserand andrei … · for a legal system to protect property, the...

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