legal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to cloud

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Legal & technical strategies addressing data risks as security controls shift to the Cloud David Snead & Nadeem Bukhari

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SOURCE Barcelona 2011 - David Snead & Nadeem Bukhari

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Page 1: Legal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to Cloud

Legal & technical strategies addressing data risks as security controls

shift to the CloudDavid Snead

&Nadeem Bukhari

Page 2: Legal/technical strategies addressing data risks as perimeter shifts to Cloud

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• Sectoral Based• Reactive• Generally state

based• Narrowly tailored

• Issue Based• Proactive• National

implementation

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Legislative and Regulatory Targets

• Breach – both benign and malicious

• Breach notification

• Mitigation

• Security policies

• Contracting parties, third parties and vendors

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• Data governance laws are here to stay• Expectation that in some format data breach will be extended

to cover not just telecoms• General data breach requirements in some EU Member States

already• Accountability and transparency principles• Broad scope of definition of personal data• Cloud and jurisdictional challenges• The role of controllers and processors

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Sectoral• GLB • HIPAA / HITECH• CFAA• ECPA

Sectoral / Country Specific• Sectoral standards• Encryption• Implementation of EU

directives

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Data transfer

Country specific regulation

Disposition of data on termination

Access to data

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In what country is the provider located?

Where is the provider’s infrastructure?

Will other providers be used?

Where will the data be physically located?

What should be included in the outsourcing contracts?

What kind of backup / disaster recovery should be considered?

Is special permission needed for outsourcing?

Are appropriate data protection measures in place for all countries?

What kind of sensitive information should not be outsourced?

What happens if there is a breach?

Who in the company should be involved?

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Security

• Define “breach” • Determine when a breach happens• Assume there will be data breach laws• Review any laws that my currently exist• Understand who will be responsible for security• Create enforceable contract terms• Remember post termination issues• Understand that you may not be made whole

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Vendor has provided Sol Vidro with a copy of its current security policy (Policy) as it applies to the services to be performed by Vendor pursuant to this Agreement. Vendor represents and warrants that this security policy represents best of breed security procedures in its industry. Vendor shall give Sol Vidro no less than sixty days prior written notices of any changes in the Policy that impact the services provided to Sol Vidro. Should Sol Vidro determine that these changes materially impact the security of the services, Sol Vidro shall have the right to terminate this Agreement. In such a case, Vendor shall provide reasonable assistance to Sol Vidro to transition its services to another provider.

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Data Transfer

• How is the data transmitted?• Understand concepts like: controller, processor,

transfer and aggregation.• Limit uses • Require flow down and flow up contract terms• Evaluate whether “Safe Harbor” is appropriate• Create methods to address data leakage

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Sol Vidro is providing payroll data to Vendor solely for the purpose of processing the data as set out in Exhibit A to this Agreement. Vendor may only provide access to this data to third parties upon written notice and receipt of Sol Vidro’s express consent. Sol Vidro’s consent may be withheld.

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Disposition of data upon termination

• Review data retention laws • Specify terms for deletion / transfer• Set out obligations for security post

termination

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Upon termination or expiration of this Agreement, Vendor shall delete all data and provide Sol Vidro with written confirmation of this deletion. Vendor shall also instruct any entities who have had access to the data to also delete it and provide Vendor with written certification of this deletion. The security obligations set out in this Agreement relating to the data shall survive termination or expiration of this Agreement until such time as the data is completely deleted by Vendor and/or Vendor’s suppliers. Vendor shall require this provision, or one similarly protective of Sol Vidro’s rights in all its contracts with suppliers or other vendors who provide aspects of the Services.

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Access to data

• Understand how transmission is outsourced / subcontracted

• Review your obligations to provide access to police• Review your provider’s obligations to provide access• Research your laws about third party police access• Set out notification and consent provisions• Determine your legal obligations to provide access to

parties in your contracting chain

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Vendor shall provide Sol Vidro with no less than ten days prior written notice of any governmental request for access to the data. For the purposes of this paragraph only, the term “governmental” includes any law enforcement or similar entity. Should Vendor be prohibited by law from providing this notice, Vendor shall strictly limit any disclosure of the data to that which is required by the law and the written document upon which disclosure is based. Under no circumstances shall Vendor provide access without a written request of disclosure which cites the law requiring such disclosure. Vendor shall require this provision, or one similarly protective of Sol Vidro’s rights in all its contracts with suppliers or other vendors who provide aspects of the Services. Vendor agrees, upon written request, to provide access, including, but not limited to transmission, of data provided by Sol Vidro to Vendor.

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Can you lower costs AND improve your security posture by rationalizing your security

Can you enforce IT policies and remediate deficiencies?

Can you control who has access to your information?

Do you know how the services will be used

How does termination affect you?

Have you researched breach notification?

Have you researched high risk regulatory areas?

Do you know where sensitive information resides and how to protect it?

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Do things go wrong?

2010 - Google engineer broke into the Gmail and Google Voice accounts of several children. Parents of the children complained.

2011 - 20 million Gmail accounts hacked, allowing for user information to be gathered.

+100´s more US Public sector org´s

~3 hours of outage affected multiple availability zones in the service's "US East" region.

people were shocked by how many web sites and services rely on EC2

$9.75 million to settle investigations by 41 state attorneys general.

the incident was reported by TJX officials around a month after an extensive fraud had occurred.

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Cloud Security Control

Platform as a Services (PaaS)

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)

USER

In Control of Security

PROVIDER

Software as a Services (SaaS)

API

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When things go wrong: HR SaaS?

"Your use of the Service is at your sole risk. The service is provided on an ‘as is’ and ‘as available’ basis."

"You expressly understand and agree that HR SaaS Companyxyz shall not be liable for any direct, indirect...losses...unauthorized access to or alteration of data”

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Nothing is 100% Secure

VM2VM2

HYPERVISOR

Operating System (Linux, Windows....

APP/ API

OS

APP/API

OS

APP/API

OS......

VM1

CLIENT ABC INSTANCE

...

...CLIENT XYZ INSTANCE

IaaSPaaSSaaS

60% of Virtual Servers less secure than their physical counterparts (Gartner 2010)

Yes, Hypervisors Are Vulnerable. (Gartner 2011)

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Audit Log Trends

“Cyber attacks can get costly if not resolved quickly….companies using SIEM were better able to quickly detect and contain cyber crimes than those companies not using SIEM” (Ponemon 2011)

Worldwide revenue for SIEM was $663.3 million in 2008 and is expected to grow to $1.4 billion in 2013” (IDC 2010)

Audit trail collection, preservation and reporting regulatory and compliance demands e.g. PCI DSS, FISMA, FDA 21 CRF Part 11, EU DRD, SoX, SEC 14a, ISO27001,..

“Audit trails/ logging issues” top 5 internal/ external audit findings. (Deloitte 2011)

Credit for image: jscreationzs

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Audit Trails Security

Changing audit trails knowledge is in the mainstream - NEVER DELETE THE LOGS!

NOT near real-time protection false sense of security

“system logs need to be protected, because if the data can be modified or data in them deleted, their existence may create a false sense of security.” ISO27001

Linux Log Eraser 1.0 - Linux Log Eraser is a set of shell scripts that will cleanly search for specific data in log files and wipe it

wtmpclean Record Wiper 0.6.7 - wtmpClean is a tool for Unix which clears a given user from the wtmp database; http://www.logwiper.biz; bowz4p.c, chusr.c cloak.c, cloak2.c, displant.c, gh0st.sh, invisible.c, lastlogin.c, logcloak.c, logrzap2.c, logsunwtmptmp.c, logutmpeditor.c, logwedit.c, logzap2.c, marryv11.c, mme.c, pimpslap.c, remove.c, rclean.c, sysfog.c, utcl.c, vanish.c, vanish2.tgz, wipe-1.00.tgz, wzap.c, zap.c, zap2.c

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Digital Evidence Audit Trails Digital Evidence

American Express Travel Related Services Co. Inc. vs Vee Vinhee

Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company

California v Khaled

BS10008 – Evidential Weight and Legal Admissibility of Electronic Information

NIST SP 800-92 - Guide to Computer Security Log Management

“In cases where logs may be needed as evidence, organizations may wish to acquire copies of the original log files”

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The Depth of Secure Logging: Trust in Untrusted Environments M.Bellare and B.Yee – Forward integrity for

secure audit logs (1997)

Bruce Schneier/ John Kelsey - Secure Audit Logs to Support Computer Forensics (1999)

J.Holt – Logcrypt: Forward security and public verification for secure audit logs (2006)

Rafael Accorsi – Safekeeping Digital Evidence with Secure Logging Protocols: State of the Art and Challenges (2009)

Transmission Phase - Origin authentication, message confidentiality, message integrity, message uniqueness, reliable delivery

Storage Phase - Entry accountability, entry integrity, entry confidentiality

Jeff Jonas (IBM Chief Scientist) / Markle Foundation - Implementing a Trusted Information Sharing Environment: Using Immutable Audit Logs to Increase Security, Trust, and Accountability (2006)

“Immutable audit logs (IALs) will be a critical component for the information sharing environment”

#MAC

DATA + Metadata #MAC=

#MAC

DATA + Metadata #MAC=

#MAC

DATA + Metadata #MAC=

DATA + Metadata #MAC=

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VM2VM2

Implement and insist on secure audit logs?

HYPERVISOR

Operating System (Linux, Windows....

APP/ API

OS

APP/API

OS

APP/API

OS......

VM1

CLIENT ABC INSTANCE

...

...CLIENT XYZ INSTANCE

IaaSPaaSSaaS

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SaaS users are at the mercy of the service providers contracts

PaaS users should ensure audit event logging and preservation capabilities are build into the applications.

IaaS users should deploy audit log collection, analysis and preservations tools.

Collect logs from firewalls, monitoring systems, applications, databases, operating systems

Ensure delivery of logs cannot be spoofed

Ensure audit log time cannot be refuted

Protect the integrity of the data as soon as you can. Use cryptographic data integrity tools

Remember to comply with data retention legislation... I.e. Securely delete the data.

Consider complying to BS10008 Evidential Weight and legal admissibility of information stored

Secure Logging

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Include testing of audit logs, monitoring systems and incident response in your proposals

Be stealthy, turn off auditing systems, change audit logs, note response times…

Include secure logging remediation in your reports

For the Pen Testers

Access Controls and Encryption are not data integrity controls