ARTICLES

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal WelfareStandards Development: The Case of the NationalFarm Animal Care Council

Andrea Bradley • Rod MacRae

Accepted: 21 January 2010 / Published online: 7 February 2010

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract Awareness of farm animal welfare issues is growing in Canada, as part of

a larger food movement. The baseline Canadian standards for farm animal welfare—

the Recommended Codes of Practice for the Care and Handling of Farm Animals—

are up for revision. The success of these standards will depend in part on perceived

legitimacy, which helps determine whether voluntary code systems are adopted,

implemented, and accepted by target audiences. In the context of the Codes, legit-

imacy will also hinge on whether the standards-developers marshal narratives about

farm animals that accord with their audiences’ expectations. The aim of this paper is

to catalogue factors that influence legitimacy in farm animal welfare standard-set-

ting, including which narratives of animal welfare are emphasized by standard-

setters. Drawing upon the example of the baseline Canadian standards, and the

National Farm Animal Care Council, the paper will present a theoretical and

methodological framework for analyzing legitimacy in the context of animal welfare

standards-development and discuss associated policy considerations.

Keywords Canada � Farm animal welfare � Legitimacy � Standards �Voluntary codes � Policy

Introduction

In recent years, consumer interest in food production has grown. This interest can be

seen in the food security, local, and organic food movements. Less visible, but still a

part of this broader shift, has been a heightened awareness of animal welfare issues

in Canada. Unlike many European jurisdictions, where commitments to animal

welfare are stronger, standards for on-farm animal welfare in Canada are relatively

A. Bradley � R. MacRae (&)

Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, 4700 Keele, St. Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada

e-mail: rmacrae@yorku.ca

123

J Agric Environ Ethics (2011) 24:19–47

DOI 10.1007/s10806-010-9240-z

weak and in a state of flux. This paper will focus on the baseline standards in

Canada, the Recommended Codes of Practice for the Care and Handling of FarmAnimals (‘‘the Codes’’), as a case study. To date, the Codes have not had a strong

presence anywhere on the market chain, from primary producers to end consumers.

They were a first attempt at institutionalizing a private, voluntary, on-farm animal

welfare regime. As the Codes are currently being revised through a primarily

industry body called the National Farm Animal Care Council (‘‘NFACC’’), it is an

ideal time to reflect on the success of this regime. And such reflections may prove

useful to other jurisdictions at a similar stage of flux regarding animal welfare.

Using a mix of discourse and policy analysis, with interviews and document

reviews, we will explore the issue of animal welfare standardization as a question of

legitimacy. Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of a rule-maker’s authority to make

a given rule. We apply this theoretical concept of legitimacy, taken from socio-legal

and management studies, to a novel setting, that of animal welfare standardization.

The notion of legitimacy is particularly appropriate for farm animal standards-

development because animals do not speak directly for their own interests in the

policy arena.1 Rather, their interests are interpreted by policy-makers, experts,

welfare advocates, and other stakeholders. These actors must somehow assert their

legitimacy to make rules about animal welfare.

An analysis of legitimacy does have an evaluative component. Of the actors who

are interested in standard-setting, whose rules are successful will depend in part on

legitimacy. As we explore this model of legitimacy analysis through the Codes case

study, we will examine the impact that legitimacy may have on the Codes’ eventual

success.

In conducting our research, we analyzed written materials and conducted

stakeholder interviews. We began by searching popular media sources for

references to the Codes or animal welfare, collecting a list of all the organizations

that appeared to be involved in welfare standardization in Canada (the ‘‘policy

community’’). We then narrowed this list to the specific ‘‘policy network’’ engaged

with the Codes in Canada. We relied primarily upon literature produced by these

actors to analyze how the ‘‘problem’’ of animal welfare is defined by key

stakeholders. We also conducted eight interviews with actors from a range of

stakeholder categories.2 Interviewees were chosen primarily for their knowledge of

the Codes or animal welfare policy-making in Canada in general. We selected

interviewees from each of the dominant stakeholder groups involved in animal

welfare standardization: producers/processors, government, animal welfare scien-

tists, and humane organizations. We did not aim for even representation from these

categories, however, as we used the interviews primarily for factual material on the

history of the Codes. To some extent, we also used the interviews as texts

themselves, in which we could ‘‘read’’ the interviewees’ conceptions of farm animal

welfare.

1 Noske (1997) would caution that although animals cannot ‘‘speak,’’ they can still be listened to.2 See Appendix B for a list of interviewees. Although most consented to being identified by name, we

have elected to code and identify interviewees by general organizational affiliation.

20 A. Bradley, R. MacRae

123

We hypothesize that a key legitimacy factor in the farm animal welfare context is

narrative choice. Given that divergent narratives about farm animals exist in our

culture, standard-setters must draw on narratives about farm animals and animal

welfare that resonate with their audience. This question of narrative choice is an

extension of legitimacy theory, which has not yet been applied to the particular

context of farm animal welfare standards. As this paper employs a novel analytical

framework, we view it as the foundation for further work. This paper also provides

the basis for future applications of legitimacy theory to food policy more generally.

On the presumption that NFACC actors are serious about legitimacy because they

understand, ultimately, the market implications of failing to properly address it, we

relate our findings in this particular case to other processes of code-setting to

identify potential future directions for organizations involved in the NFACC

process. Actors who wish to engage in animal welfare standard-setting might use the

framework presented herein to evaluate their own legitimacy strategies. On a

broader level, animal welfare standard-setting might be viewed as one site where

conflicting discourses about farm animal welfare in contemporary culture must be

confronted.

Legitimacy Theory

Legitimacy is understood in this paper as ‘‘a generalized perception or assumption

that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some

socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’’ (Cashore et al.

2004; Suchman 1995). It is one of the factors that determine whether or not rule-

takers will implement or abide by a given rule. Rules can be understood broadly, to

include both binding, state-imposed obligations and voluntary, private, or public

normative standards. For conceptual clarity, we will use the term ‘‘law’’ to refer to

the former category of rules. The focus of this paper will be on the latter category,

which includes voluntary standards or code systems.3 Although it is relevant in the

context of state rule-making, legitimacy has become of increasing interest because

of the growth of new models of governance throughout the OECD world, including

voluntary code approaches (Bernstein 2004; Cashore et al. 2004; Skogstad 2003;

Wood 2005). Within non-state or trans-state bodies, the dichotomy between rule-

maker and rule-taker is not always clear. Indeed, often the same actor may be

considered both rule-maker and rule-taker. In our case study, national commodity

organizations participate in Code development as rule-makers, but are also

determinative of Code acceptance by those who must implement the Codes—the

primary producers that form their membership. For this reason, we have adopted a

definition of legitimacy that does not depend on a strict dichotomy between rule-

maker and taker. We focus instead on ‘‘stakeholders,’’ which we understand broadly

to include all actors who are economically, morally, or intellectually affected by

3 Not all would agree that law should be defined so narrowly. Szablowski notes that the presumption that

law derives from the state is a relatively recent notion. He argues for a broad conception of the term that is

‘‘capable of including within its ambit those regimes of normative ordering that are significant to the

ability of persons to realize the social and material bases of their lives’’ (Szablowski 2005).

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 21

123

Code content. Key stakeholders are those who are directly involved in either

developing or implementing the Codes.

Whether stakeholders will participate in the process or adopt voluntary

commitments depends on whether they consider the regulatory body or network

developing the rules to be authoritative, to use right process, to be adding value—in

other words, to be legitimate. Legitimacy is just as important in situations where

rules are voluntary, and indeed may be even more determinative of compliance.4

Previous applications of legitimacy theory classify the factors that determine

legitimacy using a number of different schemes. Perhaps the most basic scheme

divides legitimacy into two categories: input and output (Skogstad 2003). Input

legitimacy refers to whether the procedures and structures of rule-making are

perceived as appropriate. Output legitimacy refers to the results of rule-making (i.e.,

whether the rules and their effects meet expectations).5 The existence of different

methods of analyzing legitimacy indicates that different typologies might be

suitable depending on the policy situation to be assessed. Further, these typologies

do not prioritize among the factors. They do not tell us, for instance, whether an

organization’s input factors (internal structure, decision-making processes, etc.) will

be more or less important than output factors (rules produced, goals achieved) in

determining overall legitimacy and rule uptake.

In this paper, we will present a basic framework that may be used to evaluate the

legitimacy of animal welfare standards, including the Codes. Evaluating the

legitimacy of NFACC and the Codes is complicated by the fact that NFACC is a

process-setting organization. NFACC as a body is not responsible for developing

the Codes. The rule-makers in the Code context are instead the ‘‘Code Development

Committees,’’ which will follow the process developed by NFACC. As only one

commodity organization has produced a code through the NFACC process, an

analysis of the legitimacy of Code developers would be premature. We will

therefore illustrate in a preliminary manner the application of the framework to

NFACC. The legitimacy of NFACC is still relevant, but must be understood as a

starting point for the legitimacy of the whole Code development process. Before

presenting the legitimacy framework, we will provide a brief overview of animal

welfare governance in Canada, to provide context for the Codes case study.

The Governance of Farm Animal Welfare in Canada

Canada’s farm animal welfare infrastructure consists of legislated prohibitions

against animal cruelty and practices that cause unnecessary suffering and voluntary

4 Note that legitimacy is not synonymous with support, although the two are interconnected. Authorities

derive legitimacy from the support they enjoy and perceived legitimacy leads people to support an

authority (Issalys 2005).5 Many models of legitimacy analysis exist in the literature. Szablowski’s (2005) model was also

influential to our analysis. He divides legitimacy into three factors: procedural fairness (whether the

organization is perceived to use fair rule-making process), outcome favorability (whether the rule is

perceived to be in audience’s interest), and substantive fairness (whether the rule is perceived to be

normatively appropriate).

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standards. Canadian law does not, for the most part, proscribe positive obligations

(‘‘thou shall’’) towards domestic animals, including farm animals. Negative

obligations (‘‘thou shall not’’) can be found in the Criminal Code of Canada and

the various provincial animal welfare statutes, among others.6 Provinces with

animal welfare statutes employ a standard formula: a prohibition against causing

distress, unless it is in accordance with generally accepted management practices.

The Canadian legislative regime is weak, particularly when compared with

standards in some European jurisdictions.7 Legislatures in Canada have generally

been reluctant to change animal welfare laws, given how infrequently updating has

occurred.8 Positive rules governing farm animal welfare are, for the most part, found

in voluntary, privately-developed codes and standards, several of which will be

addressed below.9

The Codes are the baseline standards in Canada governing the on-farm care of

livestock. They are primarily industry-driven, voluntary ‘‘guidelines’’ for producers

that establish engineering standards for animal care, such as minimum space

requirements, barn lighting, and temperature criteria. In 1980, the Canadian

Federation of Humane Societies (‘‘CFHS’’) began the development of the Codes

with the production of the Recommended Code of Practice for Handling of Poultryfrom Hatchery to Slaughterhouse (National Farm Animal Care Council 2007).10

Although the initial impetus for the Codes came from the humane sector, industry

has always taken an active role in the process. Industry faced the risk that either

government or the humane sector would develop what they felt would be more

onerous standards. Interviewees indicated that industry became involved from the

start, in order to maintain control over the process, and with an interest in avoiding

state regulation. For its part, the humane sector sought to work with industry in

order to maintain legitimacy among producers, and to ensure that the Codes would

actually be implemented. Until 1993, the Canadian Federation of Humane Societies

(‘‘CFHS’’) coordinated their development. At that point, a quasi-governmental body

called the Canadian Agri-Food Research Council (‘‘CARC’’) took over Code

development. In the CARC system, each individual Code was developed by a Code

6 This paper is concerned with voluntary codes and does not directly examine provincial or federal laws

governing animal welfare.7 See, for example, Commission of the European Communities (2002). Note that European frameworks

have progressively been enhanced since this report as part of the Community Action Plan on the

Protection and Welfare of Animals 2006–2010.8 For example, the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.36

was comprehensively updated in 2008 for the first time in approximately 90 years.9 Positive obligations that do exist in law are broadly-stated requirements to provide for animals’ basic

needs, rather than specific housing, feed, or care standards. See, for example, Ontario Regulation 60/09 to

the Ontario Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.O.36 (online: \http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws_regs_090060_e.htm[). This regulation gives basic

standards of care, including ‘‘adequate and appropriate’’ food, water, medical attention, care, and so on,

without specifying what ‘‘adequate and appropriate’’ entails. However, these broad standards do not apply

to practices ‘‘carried on in accordance with reasonable and generally accepted practices of agricultural

animal care, management or husbandry’’ [see Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to AnimalsAct, s. 11.1(2)(a)].10 A list of Codes with latest revision date is provided at Appendix A.

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 23

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Development Committee, whose membership would typically include the national

commodity group concerned, animal welfare scientists, a representative from the

CFHS, government representatives from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada

(‘‘AAFC’’) and later the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (‘‘CFIA’’), as well as

other concerned bodies. Input on Code content was also provided by CARC’s

Expert Committee on Farm Animal Welfare and Behavior (‘‘ECFAWB’’).

Throughout the 1990s, CARC continued to coordinate the development and

revision of the Codes through this system. Whether due to lack of interest, internal

disagreement, or lack of institutional resources, progress on the Codes was slow. In

2001, CARC asked the federal government for an increase in funding, from $30,000

to $300,000 a year. They were turned down, with AAFC and CFIA indicating there

was a need ‘‘to re-assess the efficacy of the codes and their continued relevance

within the context of the Agricultural Policy Framework.’’11 Government support

for the Codes appeared to be waning, but some industry actors were eager to

continue work on them. CARC was soon thereafter disbanded.

NFACC was officially established in 2005. Several interviewees indicated that

most of the industry members of the ECFAWB simply moved over to the newly

formed NFACC. As with the original Code development process in the 1980s,

NFACC is primarily an industry response to market demands, the evolution of

international standards, and the threat of regulation (Ballantyne 2006; I8).12 One of

NFACC’s primary objectives is to coordinate a new Code development and revision

process. The Dairy Farmers of Canada is the first commodity organization to revise

its Code through the NFACC process.

From the beginning, the Codes were not intended to set ‘‘best practices’’ for

animal welfare. Instead, they were, and continue to be, primarily engineering

standards, setting minimum guidelines on housing space, water access, and so on.

The Codes explicitly state that they are educational tools and not standards.13 The

very terminology, ‘‘care and handling,’’ denies that the Codes are intended to

promote animal welfare.14 However, the Codes have been used to determine

acceptable practices in animal cruelty investigations and are being used as the basis

11 Canada Committee on Animals (2002), p. 6. The Agricultural Policy Framework (‘‘APF’’) was a

coordinated policy plan for the Canadian agricultural and agri-food industries, launched in 2003 by

federal, provincial, and territorial agriculture ministries in consultation with industry. All provinces and

territories signed onto the APF, and concluded Implementation Agreements with the federal government.

The APF consisted of five ‘‘pillars’’: food safety and quality, environment, renewal, science and

innovation, and business risk management. In 2008, it was replaced by ‘‘Growing Forward,’’ a new 5-year

national policy framework.12 Interviewees are coded I1–I8. See Appendix B.13 Each Code employs similar language in the preface, indicating that the Codes are voluntary guidelines,

and that laws and regulations take precedence. However, some of the prefaces also indicate that the Codes

have been accepted as standards of practice by courts (see, e.g., the Chickens, Turkeys and Breeders from

Hatchery to Processing Plant Code, at v). Codes are available on the National Farm Animal Care Council

website at http://nfacc.ca/code.aspx.14 The distinction between care and welfare will be discussed in further detail below. Although welfare

can be defined as a part of animal care and vice versa, both industry actors and humane organizations

often emphasize that these terms are distinct.

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123

for both legislated minimum standards and private auditable standards.15 While the

Codes may be intended as educational tools, they are being used as the guidelines

for acceptable animal care in Canada (National Farm Animal Care Council 2006).

We will therefore consider the Codes as the foundation of Canada’s animal welfare

infrastructure, recognizing that they are intended to articulate minimum care

standards and not set ‘‘best practices’’ for animal welfare.

Perhaps because the Codes represent a lowest common denominator approach, a

number of other welfare standards have recently been developed by various NGOs,

commodity organizations, and restaurant/retail organizations. On the industry side,

the Canadian Pork Council and Chicken Farmers of Canada have both developed

certification programs. Both of these programs use the Codes as baselines upon

which auditable parameters have been developed. These programs are also based on

the respective industry’s existing food safety verification systems. Various chain

restaurants and restaurant organizations have also implemented animal welfare

purchasing standards, including Burger King, KFC, McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and

Whole Foods (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2002). NGO-developed standards

include the British Columbia SPCA’s ‘‘SPCA Certified’’ and the Winnipeg Humane

Society’s ‘‘WHS Certified’’ programs. Local Food Plus created its livestock

standard and certification program in 2008.16 These programs are intended to certify

a higher level of welfare than the Codes. In the United States, the Animal Welfare

Institute’s (‘‘AWI’’) ‘‘Animal Welfare Approved’’ certification program is one of

the more prominent NGO-developed standards. As of March 2009, AWI certifi-

cation has been available for Canadian farms.17

The use of voluntary codes in agriculture is also part of a wider transition away

from state-centered regulation to new regulatory models that position the state as

one actor among many in policy-making (Cashore et al. 2004; Rhodes 1996; Wood

2006). Regulation is now seen as an activity that can be undertaken by public,

private, and hybrid bodies. Political engagement with the issue of animal welfare

has been relatively low in Canada. The legitimacy of private actors setting animal

welfare standards has rarely been challenged. Given the growing interest in food

production, including the organic and local food movements, this situation may

change. The dialogue about animal welfare in Canada has only just begun. The

success of the Canadian Codes will be partly influenced by the perceived legitimacy

of NFACC and the Code developers.

15 Manitoba’s Animal Care Act, S.M. 1996, c. 69 provides one example of the incorporation of the Codes

into provincial legislation. Section 4(1) of the Act lists ‘‘agricultural uses of animals’’ as an accepted

activity under the Act. Section 4(2) further specifies that to be acceptable, ‘‘an activity must be consistent

with a standard or code of conduct, criteria, practice or procedure specified as acceptable in the regulations.’’

Under s. 2 of the Animal Care Act Regulation, the various Codes are specified as acceptable standards.

Therefore, agricultural uses of animals are acceptable in Manitoba law as long as they are consistent with the

Codes. The Act and Regulation can be found online at http://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/regs/index.php.16 The websites for these programs are, respectively, at http://www.spca.bc.ca/welfare/farm-animal-

welfare/spca-certified/; http://www.winnipeghumanesociety.ca/animal_Issues_And_News/WHS_Certified.

php; and http://www.localfoodplus.ca.17 See http://www.animalwelfareapproved.org/.

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 25

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The Framework

As discussed above, we employ a basic framework that divides legitimacy into input

and output factors. Input factors include stakeholder representation on the rule-

developing body, the procedures established for developing the rules, and what

might be termed ‘‘problematization.’’ These broad factors can be further subdivided.

Stakeholder representation, for instance, will be evaluated based on who is enabled

to participate, how they are enabled to participate, and in what ratio as compared to

other stakeholder categories. Procedures would include not only the content of rule-

making processes, but also the transparency, clarity, and level of formality of these

processes. The term ‘‘problematization’’ refers to how the problem to be addressed

is defined by the rule-makers. It recognizes that defining the problem in a particular

way can suggest which solutions are desirable. As Wood describes, ‘‘not only do

[problematizations] define what appears to be a coherent problem… they condition

the field of possible interventions upon that problem and the range of authorities or

institutions best suited to make these interventions’’ (Wood 2005). We address

problematization as an issue of narrative choice. In the case study presented below,

we examine how stakeholders define animal welfare. How welfare is defined by

policy-makers establishes the problem that is to be addressed, determines the range

of acceptable regulatory tools, and indicates which stakeholders are the appropriate

rule-makers. We hypothesize that standards-developers will adopt narratives about

welfare that match their audience’s expectations in order to improve their

legitimacy.

Output legitimacy usually concerns the effectiveness and efficiency of the final

product (i.e., the rules developed). Effectiveness might be measured in a number of

ways, such as whether the rules are morally appropriate (result in a substantive

improvement, however defined), pragmatic (in the rule-taker’s best interests) or

result in high uptake (are widely adopted by the rule-taking audience) (Suchman

1995; Szablowski 2005). As a process-setting organization, NFACC’s output

legitimacy will also depend on the Code development process it establishes. The

Code development process will, in turn, form part of the input legitimacy for the

actual Code Development Committees. The effectiveness and efficiency of the

Codes will inform the output legitimacy of both NFACC and of the Code

Development Committees. As only one commodity organization has developed a

new Code through the NFACC process, it is too early to evaluate NFACC’s output

legitimacy in terms of Code effectiveness and efficiency. Our analysis will thus

focus on NFACC’s primary output, the Code development process. We will also

highlight the potential difficulty of measuring the Codes’ ultimate success, given the

current lack of a verification scheme.

Case Study: The Recommended Codes of Practice

We applied this legitimacy framework to NFACC and the Codes in a preliminary

manner. As a relatively new organization, NFACC has not produced enough

material to supply a complete analysis.

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123

NFACC has taken a number of steps to improve the legitimacy of the Code

development process. It has made it clear that it is not a standards-developer itself.

Rather, it is to provide a bureaucratic framework within which commodity

organizations can develop their own Codes. However, even if NFACC’s only

involvement was to set up the new process for Code development, the risk would

still exist that NFACC’s composition would detract from the Codes’ credibility with

target audiences (including producers and processors, as well as retail organizations,

and ultimately consumers). While NFACC does not claim to be a policy-maker

itself, its legitimacy is still relevant.

In a more traditional analysis, legitimacy might be considered from the

perspective of those who will be implementing the rules in questions (i.e., primary

producers). Here we consider legitimacy from the consumer (our own) perspective.

The legitimacy of any chosen regulatory form will depend on perspective (Issalys

2005). As consumers are an important driver of changes to animal welfare

standardization, their perceptions of legitimacy and their trust in the Code

development system may be important to its success (Frewer et al. 2005). However,

consumer perceptions of legitimacy will only be relevant if they are aware of the

Codes, such as through labeling or media. To date, the Codes themselves have not

directly been part of a labeling scheme, and so consumer visibility is limited.18

Interested consumers can, however, find information on the Codes through humane

organizations, and through NFACC’s website. As NFACC has deliberately inserted

greater transparency and public participation into the process, it seems to have

anticipated that interested members of the public may seek out information on the

Codes. We recognize, though, that the consumer perspective on Code legitimacy

may be of limited importance to their eventual success. Future work in this area

might analyze legitimacy from the rule-taker’s perspective (commodity organiza-

tions and individual producers). Perceived legitimacy from restaurant and retail

stakeholders may also be a determinative factor to Code success.

INPUT: Stakeholder Representation

Here we consider stakeholder representation as an ‘‘input’’ factor, by examining

representation on NFACC itself. We will also discuss stakeholder representation as

an ‘‘output’’ factor, in examining representation in the Code development process

NFACC has produced. NFACC has made it clear that it is primarily an industry

forum. Positions for non-industry representatives are fixed and limited, whereas any

commodity organization that wishes to develop a Code may join. Although

voluntary code approaches offer the potential for new stakeholders to become

involved in standard-setting, there is a concomitant risk that the more powerful

stakeholders will dominate the process (Cohen 2004). There is a very real risk of

this occurring in the context of an industry-dominated NFACC.

In this section, we will discuss how stakeholder representation has changed from

the CARC to the NFACC process. We will examine five broad stakeholder

18 In contrast, some private standards that have used the Codes as foundational material do have labeling

programs.

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 27

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categories (industry, humane, welfare science, government, restaurant/retail/

consumer) and provide suggestions as to how stakeholder representation might be

improved. Our discussion implies that the current representation of broad

stakeholder categories may be insufficient because of the diversity that exists

within stakeholder groups and the range of motivations that bring individual actors

to the table.

Industry

NFACC has clearly recognized diversity within the agricultural industry by giving

most of the national producer organizations and some processor organizations a

voice on the council. Differences among industry actors may not always be

acknowledged by industry outsiders or actors within the humane movement. Some

industry organizations may not feel that animal welfare is an issue at all, whereas

others have had a prominent role in creating and supporting NFACC or other

welfare standard initiatives (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2002). Interviewees

often cited differences between the supply managed industries (dairy, poultry, and

eggs) and the market-governed industries.19 NFACC itself initially encountered

resistance from the ‘‘feathers’’ (chicken, turkey, and egg industries) and some work

went on ‘‘behind the scenes’’ to bring these industries on board (I5).

In other words, it may be difficult to reach consensus even within industry on

broad issues, such as whether the Codes should have a verification component. This

issue is to some extent not relevant for NFACC as a process organization. NFACC

envisions the Codes as the basis for verification programs industry organizations set

up themselves, leaving it up to each sector to determine whether verification is

desirable or feasible and who should be responsible for it. It is also important to

recognize, however, that each commodity organization may represent thousands of

individual producers or processors. Just as great diversity exists among Canadian

consumers, so does it exist among Canadian producers, whose interests and values

may not be adequately represented by their trade organization. Because of this

diversity, many commodity organizations are reluctant to engage in process and

product differentiation for fear it will create or enhance divisions among members.20

Humane

Just as differences exist across and within agricultural sectors, there are vast

differences across the animal protection or humane movement. These differences

are often oversimplified into the animal rights/animal welfare dichotomy. The

decision to limit representation of the humane movement to CFHS may be

motivated by fear of animal activists. A number of interviewees indicated that fear

of extremism exists among Canadian producer/processor organizations, despite the

19 The supply managed industries have a narrower range of market relations and a more restricted

exposure to consumer concerns, and may be less willing to diversify their product lines to respond to

consumer demands.20 The second author has participated in many standard-setting and verification discussions among a wide

range of Canadian commodity groups and has regularly heard this argument against verification systems.

28 A. Bradley, R. MacRae

123

fact that animal activism in Canada has been limited. Within the humane movement

itself, the animal rights/welfare dichotomy plays out in a struggle for legitimacy.21

Characterizing organizations as either ‘‘rights,’’ and therefore abolitionist and

contrary to NFACC’s interests, or ‘‘welfare’’ and willing to work with industry is

overly simplistic. Organizations concerned with animal welfare can vary greatly in

terms of size and scope. The Canadian Coalition for Farm Animals (‘‘CCFA’’), for

example, has a very limited mandate: improved transportation standards, and

abolition of gestation crates and battery cages. Beyond Factory Farming, on the

other hand, has a much broader mandate, and is concerned with the environmental

impacts of industrial farming operations, as well as animal welfare. Both might be

considered ‘‘rights’’ organizations in the sense that they are abolitionist. However,

‘‘welfare’’ oriented organizations may also have an abolitionist stance. CFHS is the

only humane sector representative on NFACC, yet clearly states that it does not

support gestation crates or battery cages and uses the term ‘‘factory farming’’ in its

literature.22

At this stage, there is only one ‘‘humane’’ representative on NFACC. A number

of members of the Council, industry representatives included, would like to see this

situation change, but they have been unable to locate another national, moderate

organization with a broad enough scope to satisfy their requirements (I4; I5). CCFA

and the World Society for the Protection of Animals Canada both requested

membership, but there were concerns as to how well they would work with industry

(I6). CFHS has suggested that a representative from a provincial SPCA be involved.

As provincial SPCAs are usually responsible for animal cruelty investigations, they

would be good candidates. The fact that they are not national in character should not

be a barrier, as there is a seat for a provincial government representative on NFACC.

Animal protection groups may have greater access to consumers. It may be

preferable to include organizations that are willing to work within the system than to

exclude them, creating the perception that industry is not willing to engage. In

considering whether to include a humane organization at the table, NFACC might

look beneath the rhetoric to consider the particular expertise and demonstrated

willingness to work in a multi-stakeholder process of the individual who would be

participating. An organization that uses ‘‘animal rights’’ language does not

necessarily support the abolition of animal agriculture and an abolitionist

organization (which CFHS is regarding some practices) does not necessarily

support animal rights (Thompson 1998). The vast differences in philosophy,

political mandate, expertise, and scope across humane organizations cannot be

captured by simplistic rights/welfare or radical/moderate dichotomies.

21 CFHS consistently distinguishes itself from more extremist organizations within the humane

movement. See the CFHS website section titled ‘‘Understanding the difference between animal rights and

animal welfare’’ at http://cfhs.ca/info/understanding_the_animal_rights_animal_welfare_spectrum/.

Another example is found in the president of the Humane Society of the United States describing the

organization as the ‘‘legitimate’’ part of the animal protection movement (Garner 2004, p. 65).22 See, for instance, the material on CFHS’s website on the ‘‘realities of farming in Canada’’ at

http://cfhs.ca/farm/farming_in_canada/, accessed July 17, 2009.

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 29

123

Science

Heterogeneity can also be found among welfare scientists. Fraser identifies three

traditions in welfare science, each with a different understanding of animal welfare

(Fraser 2004). The first tradition focuses on biological functioning to measure and

improve welfare. Scientists in this tradition might measure health through

reproductive functioning or lifespan. The second tradition focuses on affective

states such as pain and fear. These scientists attempt to measure how an animal feels

in certain situations, and to understand their preferences. The final school defines

welfare in reference to how the animals would live ‘‘naturally.’’ Scientists in this

tradition might study a species’ behavior in a wild setting and try to construct an

artificial environment that will provide for their demonstrated needs. Each of these

traditions is based on different values and understandings of what is meant by

welfare. Each can also contribute to improving the welfare of animals (Fraser 2004).

Industry tends to support a biological functioning understanding of welfare,

whereas consumers may identify more with the natural states understanding (Fraser

2004; te Velde et al. 2002).23 If industry is determining which welfare scientists to

consult, or which to include on Council, one dimension of welfare may be elevated

above others. I7, a prominent welfare scientist, gave the example that some in the

industry believe if a hen is laying eggs, she is fine. In line with the ‘‘affective states’’

tradition of welfare science, I7 stated that hens will keep laying eggs until they die:

this feature of biological functioning does not indicate freedom from suffering.

Implicitly, this scientist’s example cautions against considering only one dimension

of welfare. Fraser also argues for a need to balance these three conceptions of

animal welfare (Fraser 2004).

Another difference among welfare scientists is the extent to which they are able

to act as advocates. A scientist’s willingness to act as an advocate will depend in

part on personal philosophy, but also upon career logistics. I1, for instance, was

early in her career and felt it was not up to her to change social expectations of

animal welfare. She described her job as to identify the problems, leaving it up to

wider society to advocate for change. She acknowledged that she took this stance

partly from the necessity of working with industry to survive in her career. I2, on the

other hand, has been able to take a more activist stance, being in the later stages of

his career. He had, however, a more pessimistic view on the role of scientists.

Although he is frequently consulted on animal welfare issues, he felt it might be just

‘‘window dressing.’’

The reflections of these scientists highlight several issues regarding representa-

tion of welfare scientists in standards-development. First, standard-setters should

23 For an example of the biological functioning approach, see the industry promotional brochure, ‘‘Farm

Animals: Who Cares?’’ at http://farmissues.com/issues/facts/web/pdf/FarmAnimalsWhoCares.pdf,

accessed July 17, 2009. For an example from the humane sector, CFHS relies on popular perceptions of

‘‘natural’’ and agrarian ideals in its descriptions of current production practices. The section of their

website on farm animals describes current production practices in these terms: ‘‘Where chickens once

roamed free in the barnyard, most are now cooped up in battery cages with so little space they can’t flap

their wings.’’ Pigs, ‘‘instead of rooting in the mud…bite the bars of their cage and rarely see the light of

day.’’ See http://cfhs.ca/farm/humane_labelling/, accessed July 17, 2009.

30 A. Bradley, R. MacRae

123

consult as much literature as possible to engage the range of philosophies in welfare

science. While representation of different scientific views of animal welfare is not

institutionalized within NFACC or in the Code development process, there is a

requirement for a literature review that will take into account divergent views on

welfare requirements for any given species. As is discussed further below, the new

Code process formalizes scientific input through a Scientists’ Committee that

identifies priorities for each species. However, the industry-dominated Code

Development Committees also identifies priorities, and makes the final determina-

tion on Code content. The possibility remains that the scientists consulted may be

precluded from identifying ‘‘best practices’’ or providing strong opinions, in order to

protect their career. On NFACC itself, only one position has been established for a

welfare researcher. Given the dominance of industry stakeholders on the Council, it

is quite likely that contributions from welfare science to Council decisions will be

limited.

Government

Turning to the fourth stakeholder category, differences also exist among govern-

ment actors, particularly in Canada as a federal state. NFACC currently includes one

federal and one provincial representative. The federal representative from AAFC

does not hold a position that explicitly deals with animal welfare, care, or even

animal health. In itself, this is not a problem. AAFC’s mandate does not include

animal welfare, so it is not surprising that there is not a position in the Ministry

dedicated to welfare or care issues. NFACC includes a position on Council for a

provincial representative, as on-farm animal welfare is within provincial jurisdic-

tion. However, given the differences across the provinces in animal welfare

infrastructure, it might improve representation to include more representatives from

the provincial than the federal level. NFACC might consider opening more space

for government representation.

Skogstad argues that despite the proliferation of new models of governance,

state-based authority remains the most legitimate and effective form of governing in

Canada (Skogstad 2003). She identifies three other forms of authority: expert,

private (those with an economic interest in the matter), and public (‘‘the people’’).

NFACC may successfully marshal these first two forms, but government and public

involvement remain limited. NFACC should also ensure that the government

representatives have the appropriate expertise to contribute meaningfully to the

Council.24

Retail, Restaurant, and Consumer

There is not a consumer representative per se on NFACC. In part, this omission

results from a lack of Canadian consumer organizations that focus specifically on

food issues. Arguably, the organizations that are closest in the supply chain to the

24 There are certainly many government actors who have the required expertise, but the criteria by which

representatives are chosen by NFACC are not clear.

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 31

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consumer on the Council are the Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors (CCGD)

and the Canadian Restaurant and Food Services Association (CRFA). Their

motivation to become involved was their need as retailers to provide assurances to

their customers. Over the years, however, they have reduced their participation. At

the time of interview, I5 indicated that there was no longer a representative from

CCGD on the Council and the CRFA representative had withdrawn from the

executive. Part of the issue may be that these organizations do not have sufficient

expertise to meaningfully contribute. As Cohen notes, ‘‘the inclusion of consumer

representatives in the code development process is meaningful, as many authors

point out, only when they have access to technical expertise that permits them to

engage in meaningful dialogue with the major firm actors’’ (Cohen 2004). The same

is true of any representative without intimate knowledge of the issue at stake. To

improve representation of retail/restaurant stakeholders, NFACC might consider

whether these organizations have a sufficient base of information to meaningfully

contribute to the dialogue.

The Council might also benefit from broader consumer representation, but it may

be impracticable to locate an organization with knowledge of animal welfare that

represents consumer concerns. Furthermore, the category ‘‘consumer’’ is so broad as

to be almost meaningless. Vast geographical and demographic differences exist

across Canada regarding awareness and concern for animal welfare. In the NFACC

process, interested consumers will have an opportunity to comment on the final drafts

of the Codes, which may be the most feasible mode of participation in this area.

Stakeholder Representation, and Individual Motivations

Clearly, diversity exists within all the stakeholder categories represented on

NFACC. Given the heterogeneity of stakeholder categories, is ‘‘stakeholder

representation’’ a feasible or desirable goal? NFACC has elected to select

representatives from broad stakeholder categories. This strategy risks excluding

valuable expertise. When examining the motivations that bring the various actors to

the table, the need for a more nuanced understanding of stakeholder engagement

becomes even more apparent. We found very different opinions through interviews

and in the literature on who should be involved. Three main philosophies on who

should be engaged may be identified: those with economic interest, those who care,

and those with expertise.

The argument that those with an economic interest should participate is, not

surprisingly, largely an industry perspective. The positive development is that ‘‘those

with an economic interest’’ has expanded in recent years to include all players in the

supply chain. We now see the inclusion of grocery and retail representatives on

animal welfare bodies, such as NFACC, and the creation of legitimate welfare

requirements by individual restaurants and restaurant associations.25

The argument that those who care should be involved is marshaled from quite

divergent actors. Industry propaganda material commonly asserts that farmers are

25 Of course, the risk remains that ‘‘lowest common denominator’’ standards will be generated if these

actors do not have the expertise to effectively participate.

32 A. Bradley, R. MacRae

123

motivated by compassion for animals.26 I4, an executive member of NFACC,

became involved as a concerned individual, rather than a processor representative.27

The welfare scientists interviewed indicated that scientists are motivated by a love

for animals (I1; I2). The representative of the CFHS stated that their organization

represents its members, but ultimately represents the interests of animals (I5).

Essentially, everyone involved claims to be motivated by care or concern for

animals. This claim may be made in some cases to convince consumers of

legitimacy, as consumers who are interested enough to seek out information on

animal welfare are likely motivated by concern for the animals.

I4 provided a perspective that bridged the economic and care/concern schools:

‘‘those who eat meat.’’ He perceived two separate questions: one was whether we

should use animals, and the other was how we should treat them if we do. He felt

that those who did not eat meat should not be engaged in setting standards about

animal welfare. While this relates to the economic standpoint in that those who are

interested in using animals often have an economic stake in them, it also includes

consumers whose only economic stake is in the steady supply of affordable meat.

This position also ties into the care/concern standpoint because it is a question of

how to treat animals humanely. However, it excludes those who believe animals can

be used, should be treated humanely, but choose not to use animals themselves. This

perspective was interesting because, while it is not the official position of NFACC,

it was asserted by an executive member who was influential in NFACC’s

establishment. Individual members of NFACC may have views on who should be

involved in the Code process that diverge from NFACC’s official position, but

nonetheless influence who is allowed to participate.

A final rationale for who should be involved is those with expertise in the area.

Animal welfare is partly a moral issue. Those with an economic interest in animal

products should not necessarily have the final veto over standard-setting (Botterill

2004). Conversely, the financial constraints under which many producers operate

should not be ignored in giving preference to those who speak on behalf of the

animals. The claim of independence may mediate between these two conflicting

drivers.28 Perhaps by giving greater voice to the independent experts consulted (such

as those on the Scientists’ Committees, who are not necessarily members of the Code

Committees or NFACC), NFACC might strike a balance between participants

motivated primarily by economics and those motivated by care/concern.29

26 For numerous examples, see the educational material provided at www.livestockwelfare.com. Serpell

also discusses this claim (Serpell 1999).27 His desire to become involved came after witnessing the impact of foot and mouth disease. He also

recounted an anecdote about two swine operations he viewed in the UK. The one he perceived to be the

humane system was unable to sell to the local processor because it did not meet their requirement for

outdoor housing. I4 returned to Canada with the desire to find out who was setting the standards in

Canada, and the resolve that similar mistakes be avoided.28 An example of the claim to independence can be found in the McDonald’s Corporation material on its

welfare initiatives (Corporate Responsibility Committee 2005).29 Science, of course, is not independent. Thompson (1998) argues that agricultural research is not

morally neutral, and is informed by utilitarian philosophy. Fraser discusses the need to balance input from

scientists and ethicists to overcome the simplistic claims from the ‘‘new perception’’ of animal agriculture

and the industry response (Fraser 2001).

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 33

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Overall, NFACC’s composition reflects a tension between representativeness and

maintaining industry control over the process. The variation within stakeholder

categories makes it impossible to be truly representative. Furthermore, there are

common narratives that cut across stakeholder categories regarding why individuals

are motivated to participate. The implication is that in seeking to improve

stakeholder representation, dialogue will not necessarily become more difficult. It

may not be necessary to sacrifice stakeholder representation (and thereby reduce

legitimacy) in order to maintain a workable process. Instead of focusing on

disparate stakeholder interests, dialogue might be improved by looking within

categories for common motivations and common understandings of the problem to

be addressed. To elaborate on this theme, in the following section we will explore

some different views on the ‘‘problem’’ of animal welfare.

INPUT: Problematization

The second aspect of input legitimacy to consider is the issue of problematization.

In other words, how do the actors involved in standard-setting discuss the

‘‘problem’’ of animal welfare? As NFACC is a new body and has not participated

extensively in public dialogue about animal welfare, we will present narratives of

animal welfare from the broader policy community. We examine five narrative

tensions regarding how farm animals and welfare are represented that exist in the

literature: animals as commodities, care versus welfare, health versus welfare,

welfare as a public good, and narratives of dependency.

The Dominant Narrative: Animal Commodities

In order to participate effectively in any policy community, an actor must be able to

speak the same language as the dominant members of that community. Dominant

members of the animal welfare policy community speak about animals in largely

economic or consumptive terms (Bracke et al. 2005; Fraser 2001; Serpell 1999). For

the most part, in scientific literature and industry material, those who raise animals

for food are called producers. In publications intended to appeal to consumers, on

the other hand, they are referred to as farmers.30 The animals themselves are also

described in economic terms. Hens are ‘‘laying hens,’’ emphasizing their function as

egg producers. The chickens we eat are ‘‘broilers’’ and the chickens that produce the

chickens we eat are ‘‘broiler hatchers.’’ Even the animals’ life stages are described

in economic terms, such as ‘‘breed to wean’’ and ‘‘wean to finish.’’ If the dominant

function of these animals is to produce meat, this narrative choice may be logical.

At the same time, the use of economic language serves as a distancing device

through which those involved in making policies about animals are able to dis-

identify with the animals themselves. Serpell studied the complex relationship

farmers and scientists have to the animals they work with (Serpell 1999). The

relationship is one of ambivalence: on the one hand, they may identify with and care

for the animals they raise (or study), while on the other they must accept that these

30 See, for example, the Ontario Farm Animal Council at http://www.ofac.org/.

34 A. Bradley, R. MacRae

123

animals cannot be entirely free from suffering if they are going to be raised

intensively to produce meat (or otherwise kept in captivity). Serpell identified

strategies that those who use animals for food or research adopt to cope with this

ambivalence, one of which is distancing through language.

Another implication of using predominantly economic terminology in the policy

arena is that those who want to participate in the policy conversation may be

precluded from discussing the non-productive aspects of these animals’ lives. The

CHFS representative on NFACC related her surprise at hearing a prominent welfare

scientist discuss what makes farm animals ‘‘happy’’ (I5). She noted that she would

not use this language, as it would discredit her organization in the eyes of the

dominant actors. To comply with the dominant view, instead of happiness, scientists

might refer to the animals’ ability to cope with environmental stress.31 Humane

organizations and laypeople might understand animal welfare in terms of happiness,

but in order to participate in policy-making, these actors may have to adopt

language that does not capture their true concerns.

Care and Welfare

Perhaps the predominant tension in the literature is that between narratives of care

and narratives of welfare. Actors who speak in terms of animal care often also

prefer to discuss animal health rather than welfare, but again diverse actors can

use any or all of these terms depending on their audience and what they wish to

accomplish.

There is a strong tendency in industry literature to discuss animal care as an issue,

avoiding use of the term ‘‘welfare.’’ Humane organizations, on the other hand, tend

to use the term ‘‘welfare’’ and define it in terms of the wellbeing of individual

animals, reminiscent of the affective states school of welfare science. One of the

scientists interviewed mentioned industry’s fear of the ‘‘w’’ word, indicating that the

choice of terminology is quite deliberate and a live issue (I1).32 For one example,

industry submissions to Canada’s Next Generation of Agriculture and Agri-Food

Policy called specifically for ‘‘initiatives predicated on the premise that good care in

the Canadian context fosters healthy and productive animals, rather than premises

derived from international or animal rights/activists perspectives’’ (emphasis

added).33 Presumably these industry actors use care purposely as a preferable term

to animal welfare. The title of NFACC itself uses the word ‘‘care’’ as opposed to

welfare.

The use of the term care shifts the emphasis from the subjective wellbeing of the

animal to the actions of the caregiver. The caregiver (in this case, the producer or

31 Not all scientists would deny animal pleasure, however. See Balcombe for an exploration of non-

human animals’ experiences of pleasure (Balcombe 2006).32 See Haynes for a discussion of resistance to welfare terminology in the context of the Animal Care

Panel in the United States (Haynes 2008).33 All of the submissions to the Next Generation remain available online. This industry ‘‘Statement of

Principles’’ is available at http://www4.agr.gc.ca/resources/prod/doc/pol/consult/miss/pdf/b08.pdf,

accessed July 17, 2009.

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 35

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farmer) becomes the policy subject, and not the animal.34 Those who prefer welfare

would surely agree that care is a fundamental part of animal welfare, but the reverse

does not seem to be true. It would appear that care and welfare have become distinct

policy issues. Indeed, CFHS argues that NFACC is inadequate to address animal

welfare because it is dedicated to animal care.35 By defining the problem as animal

care, NFACC risks losing legitimacy with this audience. Of course, this may not

concern NFACC as the welfare sector is not its core audience.

Health and Welfare

The distinction between care and welfare is linked to the distinction between health

and welfare. However, actors on all sides of the table seem to classify them as part

of the same issue. Claiming health and welfare are linked may be a legitimacy tactic

on both sides. Those who prefer to advocate for welfare argue that it is inextricably

linked to animal health. Those who argue for animal health may imply that welfare

is co-extensive with health. Governments in some Canadian jurisdiction have

recognized the importance of animal health issues after BSE and other food safety

concerns (Haines 2004). Humane organizations and industry actors alike might

therefore claim the linkages between health and welfare in appealing for

government funding or in seeking to influence government policy.

Again, this distinction was highlighted in the submissions to the Next Generation

consultations. Stephanie Brown of the CCFA stated in her submission that animal

health is ‘‘inextricably linked’’ to animal welfare.36 CCFA and the BC SPCA called

for a separate animal welfare pillar in the Next Generation, and based their

arguments in part on the linkage between welfare and health.37 The more moderate

voice of the humane movement also capitalized on this link in calling for a health

and welfare pillar.38 The industry conglomeration mentioned above, on the other

hand, called for a separate animal health pillar, that would include responsible

animal care.39 NFACC itself uses both terms (health and welfare) in its

34 Kheel notes, from an ecofeminist perspective, that an ethic of care should be distinguished from

caretaking or stewardship (Kheel 2004). Haynes further articulates the distinction between care giving

and caretaking. Care giving might be likened to the relationship between a parent and child. Caretaking,

on the other hand, refers to the managerial relationship between a caretaker and his or her animal-

property. The purpose of caretaking includes protecting the value of the property and ensuring that the

animal is fit to the use to which it will be put. Haynes indicates that those who adopt the language of care

giving are often applying an ethic of caretaking (Haynes 2008). See also ‘‘Welfare as Dependency’’

below.35 Taken from the CFHS submission to the Next Generation of Agriculture and Agri-Food Policy,

available at http://www4.agr.gc.ca/resources/prod/doc/pol/consult/miss/pdf/c16.pdf, accessed July 17,

2009. See footnote 31 above.36 A copy of the CCFA’s email submission to the Next Generation is on file with the author.37 The BC SPCA submission is available online at http://www4.agr.gc.ca/resources/prod/doc/pol/

consult/miss/pdf/a03.pdf, accessed July 17, 2009.38 See footnote 33 above.39 See footnote 32 above.

36 A. Bradley, R. MacRae

123

publications.40 Both humane and industry actors seem to agree that health and

welfare are linked. The disagreement may lie in the extent to which health

determines welfare. Humane organizations may be more inclined to give the two

equal consideration (White 2004). Industry actors may speak of welfare as entirely

determined by health and productivity. This observation is borne out also by

Serpell’s research. In his study, ‘‘without exception, farmers placed considerable

emphasis on the health and productivity of their charges, as if freedom from disease,

rapid growth, and high reproductive performance were entirely synonymous with

good welfare’’ (Serpell 1999).

Welfare as a Public Good

Another tension exists between the idea of welfare as a public good and welfare as

an economic prerogative. Industry material that speaks about animal health typically

positions it as a public good in terms of food safety. Other actors, however,

emphasize that welfare must be defined by the public.41 If animal welfare is a public

good, should private actors have the final word on welfare standards? Given the

limited role of the Canadian state in this discussion, this question will likely be

answered by the degree of consumer acceptance of Canada’s developing animal

welfare infrastructure.

A contrasting narrative describes welfare as driven by economic imperatives

(Ballantyne 2006). Animal welfare in this context is driven by external market

forces. Animal welfare and rights groups, however, argue against positioning

welfare as driven solely by economics. Animal Alliance, for instance, argues that

‘‘one must distinguish between regulations meant to protect animals and those

meant to protect the products we make from them’’ (Bisgould et al. 2000).

Welfare as Dependency

Defining animal welfare as a public good is not to deny that private actors should be

involved in setting standards for their care. Private actors may have greater

expertise, resources, and flexibility than government. Another dominant narrative

that legitimizes producer participation in standards-development is the image of the

‘‘good shepherd’’ (Serpell 1999). This narrative depicts farmers as caring for their

animals and preserving the rural tradition. Doubtless, this narrative is founded at

least in part in farmers’ genuine motivations for working with animals. One dairy

farmer described his motivation to work with animals in the following terms: ‘‘they

need to be cared for, and it’s a wonderful feeling knowing that you’re caring for that

animal, you’re making sure that animal is fed, you’re making sure that animal is

40 For an example, see NFACC’s first Annual Report, available online at http://www.nfacc.ca/

Documents/Default.aspx, accessed July 17, 2009.41 For instance, Temple Grandin states that ‘‘producers need to ask themselves, what would the public

think?’’ (Grandin 2001). The World Organisation for Animal Health (‘‘OIE’’) defines welfare as ‘‘a

complex, multi-faceted public policy issue which includes important scientific, ethical, economic and

political dimensions’’ (International Committee of the OIE 2002).

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 37

123

milked in the morning, and if it wasn’t for me who is left to do that?’’42 The Codes

themselves adopt the language of dependencies and ethical commitments to care for

farm animals. For example, from the Poultry-Layers Code: ‘‘Domestication and

selective breeding have made farm animals dependent on humans. Consequently,

according to ethical principles, humans must accept this domestication as a

commitment for humane conduct toward chickens for their ultimate well-being’’

(Canadian Agri-Food Research Council 2003).

An alternative possibility is to place more emphasis on the interdependency of

animals and humans. CFHS, for instance, describes animal welfare as recognizing

the ‘‘innate interdependencies’’ that exist between humans and animals.43 In a

narrative of interdependency, animal care and the duty towards animal dependents

is still emphasized, but the assertion that we are as equally dependent upon them as

they are on us is a significant narrative shift.

These are just a few of the narratives that NFACC and Code developers may

adopt in ‘‘problematizing’’ animal welfare. Future work in this area would track

their use through and across actor categories. Questions that remain unanswered

include the following: Which narratives are preferred by which actors, and to

convince which audiences? Which narratives will the revised Codes adopt, and will

these correspond with producer, public, domestic, international, and other stake-

holder expectations?

As an issue of legitimacy, how animals and animal welfare are discussed must

accord with public, as well as rule-taker, understandings. If animal agriculture is to

preserve consumer trust, it must not only speak about animals in a way that accords

with consumer understandings, but also address the same problems that consumers

perceive. If welfare is problematized as an economic issue, animals characterized

primarily as commodities, and the solutions described as technical, the people who

should speak for animals at the policy table are naturally those with an economic

interest, the caregivers, and the scientific experts. If, however, welfare, is

understood as a public good and an ethical obligation that extends beyond the

producers and retailers, then it may be appropriate for a broader range of

stakeholders to be engaged in setting standards.

OUTPUT: Code Development Process

To this point, we have discussed factors that might be considered part of NFACC’s

input legitimacy. As NFACC’s involvement with the Codes is primarily to establish

a development/revision process, its output will arguably be the main criterion by

which it is evaluated. The Code development process forms part of NFACC’s output

legitimacy. It will also be considered part of the Code Development Committees’

input legitimacy. Again, as it is too early to evaluate the actual effectiveness or

42 This quote is taken from an industry-produced video clip titled ‘‘Tie stall dairy virtual farm tour:

Caring for animals?,’’ available at farmissues.com, accessed July 17, 2009.43 See the CFHS website section titled ‘‘Understanding the difference between animal rights and animal

welfare’’ at http://cfhs.ca/info/understanding_the_animal_rights_animal_welfare_spectrum/, accessed

July 17, 2009.

38 A. Bradley, R. MacRae

123

efficiency of the Codes themselves, we will focus our analysis of NFACC’s output

legitimacy on the Code development process.44

First, a commodity organization wishing to revise its Code will contact NFACC,

which can assist with marshalling funds and resources. The commodity organization

selects the members of its Code Development Committee based on guidelines

supplied by NFACC. NFACC then posts on its website that a Code is up for

revision, or that a new Code is to be developed. After a 30-day comment period,

NFACC establishes a committee of six scientists with expertise in the area. The

Scientists’ Committee identifies relevant research and key welfare issues and

generates a report with recommendations for Code development or revision. The

commodity organization’s Code Development Committee then reviews the

scientific report in developing or revising the Code, and must provide a rationale

for going against any of the recommendations from the Scientists’ Committee.45

The Code Development Committee may continue to work with the Scientists’

Committee as the Code draft is being prepared and the Chair of the Scientists’

Committee sits on the Code Development Committee.

Once a draft is prepared, the Code Development Committee submits it to

NFACC, along with enough information to demonstrate that the process was

followed. If NFACC is satisfied that the correct procedure was followed, it will post

the Code and the Scientists’ Committee report online for a 60-day comment period.

Feedback from this period may be taken into account in further revisions before the

final Code is printed.

Technical Input

This process represents a significant improvement over that practiced by CARC in

terms of formalized scientific input. Under CARC, scientific input was ad hoc;

scientists, industry, and humane organizations worked together under a consensus

model. The NFACC process improves upon this model by mandating that an

independent committee of scientists review the literature and provide a (presum-

ably) independent perspective on the priority issues. While NFACC formalizes

scientific input through the Scientists’ Committee, the Code Development

Committee, which is ultimately responsible for actually writing the Code, might

benefit from more formal scientific involvement. The Code Development Commit-

tee is composed of members from the industry group. The Chair of the Scientists’

Committee sits on the Code Development Committee, and the two committees work

collaboratively at certain stages. There is a risk, however, that the Code

Development Committee will be motivated by interests that override the technical

input of the Scientists’ Committee.

Further, animal welfare is not just a technical problem. One of the risks of

voluntary codes is their potential to gloss over the political nature of a problem by

setting up its solution as a technical one (Wood 2005). Cohen writes that ‘‘voluntary

44 The final Code development process is available online through the NFACC website at

http://www.nfacc.ca/Projects/Detail.aspx?id=5, accessed January 9, 2010.45 This last requirement is not included in the NFACC Process, but was communicated by I5.

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 39

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codes may simply permit the most knowledgeable and powerful actors in market

economies to dominate not only the production of private goods but our definition

and creation of public goods as well’’ (Cohen 2004). Although animal welfare has

not become a dominant public policy issue in Canada, overlooking the cultural and

ethical aspects of the problem may detract from the legitimacy of the Codes.

Stakeholder Representation

Stakeholder representation within the Code development process itself is limited to

industry members and welfare scientists. Limiting representatives to these

stakeholder categories potentially obscures the political and ethical dimensions of

animal welfare. Some voluntary code developers include consumer representatives

to gain the non-technical, demand-side perspective. NFACC might consider what

contributions an ethicist or a consumer representative might bring to the table. Such

a representative might contribute to establishing priorities for particular animal

species at the scientific committee stage, and play less of a role at the technical

development stage.

Transparency, Participation, & Clarity

Although NFACC does not include stakeholders outside of industry or welfare

science in the actual Code development process, other stakeholders do have some

ability to participate through the posting and comment procedures NFACC proposes

to establish. For the first time, the wider public will have the opportunity to engage

with the Code development process. Further, the process itself is publicly available.

This improved transparency and the avenues for public participation address one of

the main critiques humane organizations have previously leveled against the Codes:

the ‘‘closed door’’ practices of Code development and revision (I6).

Looking forward, the new NFACC process recommends, as did CARC, that

Codes be revised every 5 years. One commonly cited benefit of voluntary codes is

their increased ability to adapt to changing conditions (Purchase 2004; Webb 2004).

Codes will only be flexible and adapt to change, however, if the coordinating body

has the resources and political will to respond to market changes, social

expectations, and new scientific understandings, which was evidently not the case

with CARC. It remains to be seen whether the Codes will be reviewed more

regularly under the NFACC process than they were under CARC. NFACC envisions

that the Codes will be tied to industry-developed verification schemes, and is

currently discussing the possibility of some form of overarching Animal Care

Assessment Framework (National Farm Animal Care Council 2006). Where the

Codes are tied to industry-specific verification schemes, they may be reviewed more

regularly. Commodity groups might be more motivated and better able to marshal

resources if they are auditing their own standards.46

46 There is also a legitimacy issue with auditing: third party auditing systems are perceived as neutral,

and therefore more legitimate than internal auditing. The legitimacy of auditing systems is beyond the

scope of this paper, as the Codes do not, as yet, have an auditing component.

40 A. Bradley, R. MacRae

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OUTPUT: Substantive Impact

The second measure of NFACC’s output legitimacy will be the substantive impact

of the Codes themselves. This factor will also be part of the output legitimacy of the

Code Development Committees. It is premature at this stage to evaluate the Codes’

success. Eventually, however, the Codes will be evaluated based on whether they

are implemented by the primary users, whether they improve animal welfare or care

(however measured), and the extent to which they satisfy consumer demands.

NFACC may be particularly evaluated on the extent to which the new process

encourages compliance, given the general lack of awareness of the existing Codes.47

Despite wide recognition that verification of some sort is needed (D. Anderson in

Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 2002; Canadian Council of Grocery Distributors

2006; Mayer 2002), the Codes at this point remain voluntary and unverifiable.48 The

vision for the Codes is that they will provide basic guidelines upon which producers

can develop auditable standards. There is no way to evaluate the substantive impact

of new Codes if there is no system for monitoring their application. Cohen states

that ‘‘all regulatory systems, including legitimate and credible voluntary codes,

require that firm behavior be monitored to assess compliance and thus the

effectiveness of the regulatory scheme’’ (Cohen 2004). While the intent of the

Codes may be to provide a basis for industry-developed auditable schemes, their

credibility will be questionable as long as implementation is not authenticated and

monitored. Further, consumers can be key drivers of changes to animal welfare

standards, although their engagement with the issue in Canada has been low in the

past. Consumers need to trust that animal welfare standards are being upheld; they

desire this reassurance and not detailed information of production practices (Frewer

et al. 2005). If this is the case, there is a definite need to reach consumers through

verification or certification and labeling with the message that the Codes are viable.

One of the main limits to voluntary codes is the potential for ‘‘free riders’’

(Cohen 2004; Purchase 2004; Webb 2004; Wood 2005). Free riders are industry

actors who choose not to participate in code development or implementation but

benefit nonetheless from the improved image, product quality, or efficiency of the

industry as a whole. Free riders are certainly a concern where there is no verification

program to demonstrate who is and who is not in compliance. They give the illusion

of a higher level of compliance with standards than actually exists. From the

industry perspective, free riders may not be a concern, as they may convey the

impression of an industry-wide movement, as long as no investigation ultimately

discredits the entire initiative. If actual improvements to animal welfare are desired,

though, free riders are problematic. The Codes are intended to be educational and

not production guides. Nonetheless, if there is no verification of who is in

compliance, there is a risk that some Canadian producers will benefit from claims to

responsible animal care without meeting the minimum standards.

47 The lack of awareness of the Codes was highlighted by a number of interviewees.48 NFACC has commenced consultations on the development of an overarching animal care assessment

framework. Discussions are at a preliminary stage and it is not clear that the framework would involve

auditing the codes themselves.

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 41

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Unfortunately, it would be impossible to audit producers based on the Codes as

they are formulated now (Widowski 2003). The codes are not ‘‘inspectable.’’

Making them so typically requires more precise language surrounding code

elements and even points-based systems where each practice has a specified number

of points associated with it. By totaling points associated with each element,

inspectors can be assured that a minimum number of practices are being suitably

followed so as to warrant recognition.

At the very least, the low level of awareness of the Codes needs to be addressed.

Otherwise, the Codes will quickly become obsolete as mandatory, measurable

programs are implemented in each sector and consumers who want assurance of

particular levels of animal care turn to niche markets. Particularly for large,

dispersed industries, such as the beef cattle industry, NFACC and/or the appropriate

commodity organization need to consider how a high level of awareness and

compliance will be ensured.

The related substantive challenge of the Codes is whether their adoption would

ultimately shift significantly animal welfare or care. The NFACC codes will likely

be positioned to modestly advance animal welfare (care). Many elements of the

NFACC Codes favor conventional concepts of farm efficiency. Although there is

clearly a tension between economic viability and animal care for many provisions

(e.g., for milking cows, sheep, and goats, how long can the nursing period be before

total milk yield is reduced and negatively impacts on yield and gross revenue), other

standards, such as those of Local Food Plus and the Canadian organic regime

(CGSB 2009) have struck a more welfare-oriented balance between economy and

animal welfare.49 The rationales, in both cases, have been partly concern for the

animal, and partly a recognition of the potential for price premiums associated with

marketing channels for certified producers. The products certified by such processes

are admittedly small at this point, but these standards are designed to attract 10-20%

of producers, so their potential to reshape animal production is significant. NFACC

might consider the value the Codes add to the market in the context of these

growing welfare-oriented certification schemes.

Improving Legitimacy and Future Directions

The framework presented above may assist NFACC and other standard-setters with

evaluating their legitimacy. We have identified a number of improvements NFACC

has made to the Code development process relative to earlier periods, and

highlighted potential legitimacy challenges for the Council. In particular, NFACC

should consider improving its representation of stakeholder interests. The Council

has positioned itself as an industry forum dedicated to animal care, but if it wishes to

be a legitimate voice for farm animal welfare, we contend that a more nuanced

approach to stakeholder representation will be necessary. NFACC should also

consider how the ‘‘problem’’ of animal welfare is being defined within the

organization, and whether these accord with the audiences that will evaluate its

49 See http://www.localfoodplus.ca.

42 A. Bradley, R. MacRae

123

legitimacy (both producers and consumers). At this stage, we are unable to fully

analyze NFACC’s output legitimacy. We have, however, examined the Code

development process. The substantive impact of the new Codes will also contribute

to NFACC’s output legitimacy, but cannot yet be evaluated. Indeed, it will be

difficult to determine the substantive impact of the Codes at all without some form

of verification.

Given Canada’s history of enacting only broad and enabling legislation related to

food and agriculture, jurisdictional disputes between different levels of government,

and the focus on voluntary interventions to improve market functions,50 our

presumption is that the state is unlikely in the short to medium term to seriously

redress legislative deficiencies or mandate changes in farming practices as has been

done by many European jurisdictions. Improving the Code process is thus likely a

more feasible approach to effecting change.

Unfortunately, there is clearly some reluctance among NFACC actors to establish

a more ‘‘aggressive’’ program of change within the animal industries. The risk for

NFACC is that should consumers increase their commitment to animal welfare in

the market place,51 but find the Codes wanting, the animal industries will not reap

any improvements in credibility and legitimacy and may ultimately be punished in

the market place. Were they to entertain a more robust approach, there are Canadian

models in existence. Both Local Food Plus and the organic sector represent

standard-setting, inspection, certification, and labeling systems designed to appeal to

significant, but at this stage, niche-based markets. In both cases, authentication is

third party oriented, particularly in the case of organics, where authentication is

overseen by the Canadian government through authorities under the CanadaAgricultural Products Act, 1985, c. 20 (4th Supp.).

In contrast to the niche market approach, the Canadian Horticultural Council has

designed systems to move the entire Canadian apple industry to more sustainable

approaches. They are attempting to create a new national standard of Stage 2

Integrated Fruit Production, a level that requires significant movement on the part of

the bulk of their apple producing members.52 Although voluntary, almost all

Canadian apple producers have received copies and a significant percentage of

growers have participated in training schemes. Currently without a verification

scheme, the guidelines are constructed to allow for self-assessment, and could

readily be inspected by third parties if the organization was to move in that

direction.53

These examples illustrate alternatives to the approach that NFACC has taken,

which seems geared towards maintaining the Codes as minimum non-verifiable

50 For a fuller discussion of why, see Koc et al. (2008).51 Recent surveys reported in AAFC (2008) suggest this is happening.52 Integrated Fruit Production is a pest prevention oriented approach to fruit production that minimizes

use of synthetic pesticides and enhances biodiversity on farms.53 As with NFACC, the CHC envisages supporting verification systems operated by other parties but

using their guidelines.

Legitimacy & Canadian Farm Animal Welfare Standards Development 43

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guidelines. Whether the Codes will be accepted and applied or become obsolete

depends in part on legitimacy, from both the producer and consumer perspectives.

Of course, legitimacy is not the only factor that will determine the Codes’ success. It

is possible, for instance, that producers may not be interested in the Codes for other

reasons—farming is economically challenging enough without added compliance

burdens. Further, industry may not be interested in improving legitimacy. Its interest

may lie rather in keeping awareness of existing standards low, avoiding consumer

engagement with the issue. Nonetheless, we contend that concern over farm animal

welfare is more likely to grow than not. Legitimacy analysis may assist actors who

have not traditionally been involved to participate in the process. Ideally, improved

legitimacy will also result in improved standards and, ultimately, improved animal

care and welfare.

Appendix A

See Table 1.

Appendix B

See Table 2.

Table 1 Last revision date of Codes

Recommended code of practice Revision date

Beef cattle 1991

Bison 2001

Chickens, Turkeys, and breeders

from Hatchery to processing plant

2003

Dairy cattle 1990 (NB: draft Code has been producedthrough the NFACC process)

Deer 1996

Early weaned pigs- Addendum to pig code 2003

Goats 2004

Horses 1998

Mink 1988

Pigs 1993

Poultry-layers 2003

Ranched fox 1989

Sheep 1995

Transportation 2001

Veal calves 1998

44 A. Bradley, R. MacRae

123

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