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Legitimizing the War on Terror: Political Myth in

Official-Level Rhetoricpops_762 357..392

Joanne Esch

University of Colorado at Boulder

This paper argues that mythical discourse affects political practice by imbuing language

with power, shaping what people consider to be legitimate, and driving the determination

to act. Drawing on Botticis (2007) philosophical understanding of political myth as a

process of work on a common narrative that answers the human need to ground events in

significance, it contributes to the study of legitimization in political discourse by examining

the role of political myth in official-level U.S. war rhetoric. It explores how two ubiquitous

yet largely invisible political myths, American Exceptionalism andCivilization vs. Barbar-

ism, which have long defined Americas ideal image of itself and its place in the world, havebecome staples in the language of the War on Terror. Through a qualitative analysis of

the content of over 50 official texts containing lexical triggers of the two myths, this paper

shows that senior officials of the Bush Administration have rhetorically accessed these

mythical representations of the world in ways that legitimize and normalize the practices of

the War on Terror.

KEY WORDS: Political myth, Rhetoric, Legitimization, Narrative stories, War on Terror

When it comes to understanding the crucial political events of our epoch,

there is a temptation to believe that meaning is intrinsic and facts speak forthemselves (Jackson, 2005). This, of course, is never actually the case. In reality,

meaning is layered upon a narrative after the fact like Technicolor added to a black

and white film. The process of layering meaning over a narrative is complex and

contested; it mythologizes the narrative so that it holds shared significance for a

group. This is the process of work on political myth; and it is ongoing because

significance is never agreed upon once and for all. Bottici and Challand (2006)

defined political myth as the continual process of work on a common narrative by

which the members of a social group can provide significance to their political

conditions and experience (p. 320). Political myth operates within all political

Political Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2010

doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00762.x

357

0162-895X 2010 International Society of Political Psychology

Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ,

and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria Australia


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cultures, regardless of how demythologized or enlightened a group may

consider itself. Myth responds to the fundamental need to create significance in a

chaotic and perhaps indifferent world; thus, all societies have a mythical dimen-

sion, but what they differ in is the degree to which myth is exposed to critical

discussion (Bottici & Challand, 2006). An understanding of political myth can

shed light on the intersection of political discourse and political practice and

provide insight into the psychology of legitimization in political discourse.

This paper will address the following questions:

What is political myth and why is it relevant in contemporary American

society?

How have the myths ofAmerican Exceptionalism and Civilization vs. Bar-

barism come to provide significance for Americas political situation follow-

ing 11 September 2001?

How have these myths been accessed by senior officials in the Bush Admin-

istration in their rhetoric surrounding the War on Terror?

How has myth-evoking language legitimized policy in the War on Terror?

In examining the role of political myth in American political culture, I will

first discuss the theory of political myth and establish a framework for my use of

the term. Next, I will explore two political myths that lie at the heart of American

political culture: American Exceptionalism and Civilization v. Barbarism. The

former defines Americas ideal image of itself and its place in the world, and the

latter defines American national identity in opposition to an evil other. Both

myths have been instrumental in providing moral justification for military violence

throughout American history and are important for understanding contemporary

war rhetoric. I will discuss how official-level rhetoric has tailored these myths in

order to provide significance for contemporary political circumstances and legiti-

mize the War on Terror.

In order to discover how political myth operates within the official-level

rhetorical construction of the War on Terror, I have qualitatively analyzed the

content of over 50 official texts (including speeches, interviews, radio addresses,

and reports to Congress) containing lexical triggers1 of American Exceptionalism

and Civilization v. Barbarism. In addition to presidential rhetoric, I have also

examined the rhetoric of senior members of the administration including Attorney

General John Ashcroft, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security

Advisor/Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-

feld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, so as to test the consistency

of the rhetoric across various speakers. I first selected words I consider to be

lexical triggers of the myths and then entered them as search queries in three

1 See the appendix for a definition and justification of lexical triggers.

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different databases2 containing texts relevant to the War on Terror. Thus I

retrieved primary sources and qualitatively analyzed the content of each text. In

order to ensure that the texts I chose to analyze are representative of the larger

official-level discourse, I searched within the 117 official documents listed under

the subject of terrorism in the White House database for documents containing

lexical triggers. I discovered that of these 117 documents, 112 contained at least

one lexical trigger of either myth. Additionally, I entered War on Terror as a

search term into the Yale University Law Library terrorism database and manually

searched within the results for texts notcontaining lexical triggers. Of the first 50

relevant texts (i.e., briefings, speeches, and remarks by the speakers listed above)

returned in this search, nine did not contain any lexical triggers of either myth.

Eight of these nine texts were news briefings or press conferences rather than

prepared speeches, and several recalled one or both of the myths without the use

of the lexical triggers I identified. Some recalled the myths with synonyms of the

lexical triggers or with historical analogies (see, for example, Rumsfeld, 6 Mar.

2002; Wolfowitz, 12 Feb. 2002; Cheney, 18 Mar. 2002). In other cases, speakers

outside of the Bush Administration (i.e., heads of state speaking in joint press

conferences) used lexical triggers of the myths in the text, thus mythical discourse

was present in the text, but not in a way that is relevant to this study of legitimiza-

tion (see, for example, Bush, 28 Jan. 2002; Cheney, 18 Mar. 2002).

While lexical triggers are useful tools for detecting the presence of political

myth in a discourse, they are not by themselves sufficient analytical measures, nor

does their absence necessarily reflect an absence of political myth operating within

a text. I have used lexical triggers to identify texts for analysis, but my analysis has

gone beyond the words themselves and has always accounted for the broader

context that establishes their meaning. My analysis of each text has sought to

answer the following questions: (1) What political myths, if any, are recalled in the

language of the text? (2) How does the text recreate, reinforce, or challenge the

political myth? (3) What knowledge or practices are legitimized or normalized

through the use of political myth in the text? By focusing on political myth, these

analytical questions help situate the text within a broader social and cultural

context. By making political myth the central focus of my analysis, I hope to shed

light on the process of policy legitimization in political discourse and on the

broader importance of elite-led discourse in influencing political practice.

A Theoretical Understanding of Political Myth

The rise of social constructivism has brought in tow a vast body of work on the

roles of myth and symbolism in society and politics. Scholars such as Blumenberg

2 Databases include the U.S. governments document archive database (USA.gov) and two databasesat Yale University Law School titled September 11, 2001: Attack on AmericaA Collection ofDocuments and Terrorism: A Document Collection.

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(1985), Geertz (1983), and Malinowski (1992) have dealt with the concept of myth

broadly and noted its often-underestimated importance in society, particularly in

the form of symbols and religion. However, these studies tended to equate myth

with religion because they focused on traditional societies where religion and

politics were fused. Edelmans (1975) assumption that political language can

evoke a set of mythic beliefs in subtle and powerful ways laid the groundwork for

subsequent studies on how myth operates in the political sphere and is the corner-

stone of the present study (p. 1). Recently, scholars such as Bottici (2007) and

Flood (1996) have turned their attention to the distinct concept of political myth

and its role in contemporary and secular societies. Stone (2001) has also

approached this concept in her discussion of symbolic representation. She defined

narrative stories as explanations of how the world works . . . [that] are often

unspoken, widely shared, and so much taken for granted that we are not even

aware of them, and, she explained, They can hold a powerful grip on our psyches

because they offer the promise of resolution for scary problems (p. 137).

This explanation touches on some key components of political myth: its

invisibility, its ubiquity, and its powerful grip on our psychesall qualities that

allow myth to bypass critical scrutiny. Flood (1996) referred to this phenomenon as

the primacy effect, which he defined as the power of a persons earliest percep-

tion of a phenomenon to function as the basis for generalization, categorizations,

and expectations which are not easily or always adequately revised (p. 87). In other

words, myth is powerful because it has the ability to remain invisible while

influencing basic perceptions of the world. As Bennett (1980) has proposed,

political myths act as cognitive lenses: they are not the things people see when they

look at the world, but the things they see it with (p. 167). Similarly, Edelman (1975)

conceived of myths as prestructured beliefs regarding the nature and the causes of

public problems and noted that they are situated outside critical reasoning (p. 1).

Myth is a cognitive device based on social cues that creates meaning and signifi-

cance and can easily serve as a basis for flawed but appealing reasoning. In this way,

myth is related to analogical reasoning. Borrowing from the field of cognitive

psychology, Khong (1992) viewed analogies as diagnostic devices and proposed

that analogical reasoning is a shortcut for processing information and making sense

of the world around us. The fact that we interpret new information by matching it to

preexisting schemata in our minds is responsible for the influential power of both

analogy and myth. The success of analogical arguments and reasoning depends on

mythological encoding of historical events. Like myth, analogical reasoning is

intuitively appealing (it gives us a blueprint for understanding and interpreting a

bewilderingly complex and structurally uncertain world) but overly simplistic and

rationally flawed (see Neustadt and May, 1986). Thus, myth and analogy are

relevant to one another, but they are conceptually distinct.

While Stones (2001) narrative stories explain how the world works and

offer to resolve problems, this is not necessarily true of political myths, which

more generally ascribe significance to common narratives and direct the determi-

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nation to act (Sorel, 1975). Myths, as Edelman (1975) observed, help us cope

with widely shared anxieties but typically fail to analyze problems adequately and

rarely solve them (p. 1). Myths help us cope with scary problems because they

provide social cues for how to interpret problems and relate them to ourselves. And

while they may or may not propose a solution, they frame problems in a way that

validates certain courses of action while precluding others. Political myths do not

answer the questions how? and why? so much as whence? (Bottici, 2007).

Despite the growing body of literature on the political significance of mythical

narratives, the terms (myth, symbol, narrative) have not been employed

within a shared theoretical framework. Further, very few studies have examined

the different uses of the concept of myth, even fewer have done so specifically

within the context of political rhetoric, and most studies have failed to address the

question of the concepts utility.

Bottici (2007) has provided a much-needed philosophical understanding of

political myth, which serves as a theoretical framework for my use of the term.

Botticis work draws heavily on Blumenbergs (1985) understanding of myth as

work on myth, as well as Edelmans (1967, 1975) belief that myth influences

politics in subtle and profound ways. Bottici (2007) also incorporates and cri-

tiques the work of Sorel (1975), Malinowski (1992), Flood (1996), and Strath

(2000).

Approaching Myth

In the popular vernacular, the word myth generally indicates falseness or

refers to fanciful tales, and it is often used pejoratively (i.e., myth v. reality).

Enlightenment thinkers dismissed myth as superstition. However, myth has thrived

throughout history, even alongside scientific rationality, demonstrating a need for

a theoretical understanding of myth that goes beyond its claims to truth (Bottici,

2007). Scholars such as Flood (1996) and Lincoln (1989) placed undue emphasis

on the validity of myths content. This is problematic because, as Bottici and

Challand (2006) explained,

Political myths cannot be falsified because they are not scientific hypoth-

eses as to the constitution of the world or astronomical almanacs that

foretell its future: they are determinations to act that always reinforce

themselves. (p. 321)

Myth ought to be approached from a phenomenological perspective that leaves

aside the question of the reality of myth and instead focuses on the process

through which a social group adapts and readapts a common narrative so that it

lends significance to their political conditions and experience (Bottici, 2007).

Thus, this study makes no attempt to determine the extent to which mythical

representations of the world actually reflect the true nature of reality.



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What Makes a Political Myth Out of a Narrative?

Three key attributes distinguish a political myth from a simple narrative: First,

a mythical narrative provides significance. Second, it is shared by a group and

(re)produced at various levels. Third, it can come to affect the political conditions

of the group (Bottici, 2007).

Significance. Myth is a product of the endless human attempt to minimize

chaos and master the unknown. While myth sometimes has religious roots and

connotations, it is not exclusively a religious phenomenon. As Bottici (2007),

Cassirer (1973), and others have pointed out, myth answers a call for significance

that goes beyond the simplest form of meaning (wherever there is language there

is meaning) but stops short of providing ultimate meaning in matters of life and

death (this is the realm of religion). Blumenberg (1985) conceived of significance

as a grounding that draws events and narratives closer to the individual and renders

them less indifferent to him or her. Unlike science, myth does not simply describe

the world; by providing significance, it helps us reduce the worlds complexity.

Blumenberg (1985) has highlighted the difference between making sense and

making significance in order to explain the functional difference between science

and myth: science explains phenomena and can be universal, while myth brings

the phenomena closer to us and is always particular. Bottici (2007) has summa-

rized what I will call the proximization function of myth by explaining, While

something can have a meaning but I can still remain completely indifferent to it,

something that has significance is something that I feel close to (p. 124). What

is myth for one person may simply be a story for another or even for the same

person at a different point in time.

Work on Myth. The second aspect that distinguishes myth from narrative is

that myth is interrelationalit is borne within a web of relationships in which it

is continually (re)produced, (re)interpreted, and (re)transmitted. Blumenberg

(1985) understood myth as work on myththat is, as a continual process of

reworking by narrators and perceivers who can scarcely be distinguished from

one another. Myths are not singular entities stated or written at one point in

time; but rather, living entities that always relate to the present. The process of

work on myth takes place at innumerable sites: art, speech, rituals, and social

practices being only a few examples (Bottici & Challand, 2006). Myth is also

condensationalit can be compressed into symbols and words, and these con-

densed fragments can then recall an entire body of work on a given myth

(Bottici & Challand, 2006). Cumulative exposure to the work on myth thus

allows it to frame our understanding of the world without our consideration or

even awareness. Additionally, as a consequence of the interrelational and ever-

evolving nature of myth, there are often many variations of myth built around

one central mythical core. While this paper focuses on the utility of (re)produc-

ing myth at the level of official rhetoric, it must be understood that this is only

one of many sites for work on myth.

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The Power of Myth. The third aspect of the definition of political myth is

that it addresses the political conditions and experiences of a group. Political

myths frame our perception of the world and shape how we feel about it;

consequently, they help determine how we act within it (Bottici & Challand,

2006). They shape political practice by giving language its reality-making effect.

Scholars such as Jackson (2005) and Wilmer (2002) have pointed out that wars

cannot be fought without a widespread willingness in society, and social will-

ingness requires a shared understanding of circumstances and significance,

which is constructed through language. Language and practice are two sides of

the same coin, and political myth has an exceptional ability to give power to

language.

Iyengars (1991) idea that rhetoric frames issues so as to offer the addressee

implicit contexts for understanding information provides some insight into myths

utility for policy legitimization. Frames reside in the types of key words, meta-

phors, concepts, and symbols speakers choose to emphasize in their narratives

(Entman, 1993). Thus, the use of linguistic cues to encourage addressees to

perceive events through the lens of a particular myth may be understood as a type

of framing.3 Words may become mythically encoded and then serve as key words

or lexical triggers. When used in rhetoric, these words allow a myth to serve as an

implicit frame of reference for understanding the given narrative. Thus, myth is

subtle because it is condensable. As Flood (1996) explains,

Myths do not . . . have to be recounted in extenso in order to function as

elements of political discourse. Myths can be evoked by labels (the

Aryan myth!), watchwords and slogans (Workers of the world,

unite!), metonymic allusions (the Vietnam syndrome), echoes or quo-

tations (I cannot tell a lie) . . . [E]ven single words such as Liberty,

Free Enterprise, or Communism can carry a range of associations

with widely accepted, ideologically slanted accounts of historical events.

(p. 85)

For this reason, language that carries mythical connotations gives meaning

to statements that goes beyond what is actually said. Such mythical connotations

often preclude certain responses. For example, deeming someone a Fascist

renders the idea of negotiating with that person absurd and irresponsible because

the word is loaded with mythical associations as broad as evil and as specific as

the historical lesson of the 1938 Munich Agreement.4 Language that contains

3 Gamson (1992) has extended the study of framing from the top level (i.e., mass media and politicalofficials) to the lower levels of social discourse (i.e., citizens that consume mass media andofficial-level rhetoric). Those wishing to examine public reception and reproduction of political mythmay find his work useful.

4 Khong (1992) referred to the Munich Agreement as an example of analogical reasoning. Note thatsuch powerfully mythologized events make for intuitively compelling historical analogies.



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condensed fragments of myth can thus have powerful consequences for social

processes and structures. By influencing our perception, cognition, and emotions,

linguistic recollection of political myth can deeply affect what we consider to be

legitimate, making myth a pivotal intersection of discourse and political practice.

As Bottici and Challand (2006) put it, a political myth is not simply a prophecy,

but it tends rather to become a self-fulfilling prophecy (p. 329).

Mazlish (1981) postulated that leaders draw on a psychic repository which

embodies recurrent themes, ideals, values, fantasies, imagery, symbols, myths,

and legends (quoted in Kellerman, 1986, p. 278). The psychic repository may

be thought of as a basis for policy legitimization. Some of the most powerful

legitimization effects in political discourse are achieved with a proximization5

strategy involving political myth. Cap (2007) defined legitimization in political

discourse as a linguistic enactment of a speakers sociopolitical right to be

obeyed, and has discussed the concept of legitimization via proximization at

length (p. 1). Cap (2005) outlined three proximization methods by which speak-

ers make distant events and actors seem closer to the addressee: spatial, in which

events from outside the deictic center are construed as physically closing in on the

addressee; temporal, in which events are construed as momentous and historic

and thus of central significance to the addressee; or, past events are evoked in

such a way that they determine the centrality of the current situation to the . . .

addressee; and axiological, in which events are construed as following from an

unprecedented and growing ideological clash between [those inside the deictic

center] and [those outside the deictic center] (p. 14). Although Cap does not

employ the concept of political myth in his work, his proximization model for

analysis of legitimization in political discourse could benefit from a theoretical

understanding of political myth, because myth is an important mechanism of

axiological proximization.

In sum, myth is best understood as a relational process involving a cycle of

production, reception, and reproduction, wherein perceivers are also (re)produc-

ers, and vice versa (Bottici & Challand, 2006). Common narratives do not become

political myths because of their content or accuracy, but because of their ability to

provide and reproduce significance that is shared by a group in a way that impacts

the groups political conditions and experiences (Bottici, 2007). Political myth is

a self-reinforcing determination to act rather than merely a description, so it

shapes political experience at least as much as it reflects it (Sorel, 1975). There-

fore, the most powerful political rhetoric makes use of existing myths and taps into

widely held, underexamined beliefs. The following sections investigate two long-

standing American political myths and examine both how they have been adapted

to provide significance for the political circumstances following 9/11 and how they

5 Cap (2005) defined proximization as a rhetorical strategy that pictures the occurring events and theiractors as directly affecting the addressee, often in a negative or threatening way (p. 14).

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have been accessed in official rhetoric so as to normalize and legitimize policies of

the War on Terror.

Political Myth in the War on Terror

The War on Terror is the largest and furthest-reaching counter-terrorist

campaign in history, and it has come to define the domestic and international

political environment. It extends into multiple dimensions: a military dimension

involving two major wars plus covert assassinations, expansion of American

military presence overseas, and military assistance to other countries; a security

dimension including worldwide intelligence gathering and presidential authori-

zation of extreme means of interrogation (torture); a diplomatic dimension that

has included psychological operations as well as the use of coercion and foreign

aid to enlist support of other countries; and a domestic dimension, which

consists of military expenditure levels not seen since World War II

and the U.S. PATRIOT Act (Jackson, 2005). The open-ended definition of U.S.

strategic priorities in the War on Terror goes beyond what the United States

committed itself to during the Cold War. One American military official

expressed, There should be no doubt, we are at war, and it is a world war.

There is simply no other way to put it (Melshen, 27 June 2003; qtd. in Jackson,

2005, p. 9).

Since the beginning of War on Terror, it has become commonplace to

preface articles and scholarly writings in the field of international affairs with a

clause stating that everything changed after 9/11. But it was not the terrorist

attacks themselves that changed the global landscape, it was the United States

response. And the social willingness for that response, which was not an inevitable

consequence of the attacks, was made possible through a shared, mythologized

understanding of the significance of 9/11.

Following 9/11, the myths of American Exceptionalism and Barbarism vs.

Civilization and their variations have been reappropriated to make significance of

the 9/11 narrative and the threat of new terrorism. These two myths have helped

to define American national identity and have been prominent elements of war

discourse throughout the countrys history. Because they have been tools of moral

justification for military violence since the Declaration of Independence, it is no

surprise that today they compound the rally effect (see Mueller, 1973) in the

War on Terror. These myths prominence adds to their power, as their ubiquity

enhances the primacy effect. Mueller (2005) drew attention to the mechanisms of

threat exaggeration and alarmism, comparing the statistical insignificance of ter-

rorism with the resources dedicated to its proposed defeat. To build on Muellers

point, it was not just hype that was behind the global crusade against terrorism,

it was myth. And myth is a wild card that must be accounted for in the analysis of

political decisions. The following sections explore the historical roots and con-

temporary roles of the myths and then examine where they are accessed in rhetoric



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and how they are used to provide significance and legitimize policy in the context

of the War on Terror.

Historical Roots and Variations of American Exceptionalism and

Civilization v. Barbarism

American Exceptionalism

American Exceptionalism is an old term with many meanings. Toc-

queville (1835) coined the phrase simply to refer to the fact that America is

qualitatively different from Europe, primarily in terms of class structure and

religion. Later on, American and European radicals used it to refer to the fact

that the United States was exceptional in that, unlike other industrialized nations,

it never had a significant labor party or socialist movement (Lipset, 1996). The

term is also used more generically in reference to the many ways in which the

United States is qualitatively different from other societies. Lipsets (1996)

examination of the good and bad qualities that distinguish the United States

from other countries has been a notable contribution to scholarship on this topic.

As Lipset (1996) pointed out, the phrase also refers to the notion that America

is a providential nationnot only a special nation, but a better nation, a shining

city on a hill. This idea is rooted in the very founding of the republic and today

retains a strong cultural appeal. It is this aspect of American Exceptionalism that

has become most powerfully mythologized.

The myth of American Exceptionalism details Americas ideal image of its

place in the world. It consists of three main ideas: America is a chosen nation,

America has a calling or mission, and, in answering that calling, America

represents the forces of good against evil (Judis, 2005). The myth of American

Exceptionalism is grounded in the Protestant millennialism brought to America by

the English Puritans, who believed the battle of Armageddon foretold in the Book

of Revelation was to take place in America (Judis, 2005). In the late eighteenth

century, the myth evolved from a biblical vision of the New Jerusalem to a

nationalist vision of America as a God-given land destined for greatness and

triumph. Americans have approached grand objectivesfrom independence to

seizing Texas and Mexico to the World Wars to the Cold War to the first Gulf War

to the War on Terrorwith an outlook reminiscent of seventeenth-century

Protestant millennialism (Judis, 2005). This religious-turned-nationalist mentality

can be considered apocalyptic in that it has portrayed America transforming

itself and the world in cataclysmic leaps and bounds rather than through subtle,

incremental changes (Judis, 2005). The myth can be broken down into three main

aspects.

Natures Nation. The first aspect of the myth holds that America is Gods

nation, or Natures Nation (Hughes, 2003, p. 45). According to this element of

the myth, Americas founders masterminded a new political system guided by God

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and Nature that, in Jacksons (2005) words, transcended the particularities of

time and space, and . . . owed no debt to history or culture (p. 44). The religious

element of the founding documents bears witness to the idea that America is Gods

countrythe colonies demanded the separate and equal station to which the

Laws of Nature and of Natures God entitle them and put forth the Declaration of

Independence with firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence. The

myth ofNatures Nation provides significance beyond the context of the countrys

founding and serves more generally to decontextualize American experience from

history and politics. In Henry Fords words, History is bunk (qtd. in Jackson,

2005, p. 44). According to Ronald Reagan, The calendar cant measure America

because we were meant to be an endless experiment in freedom, with no limit to

our reaches, no boundary to what we can do, no end point to our hopes (27 Jan.

1987). For Abraham Lincoln, America was the last, best hope of the earth; for

Madeline Albright, it is the indispensable nation; and for George W. Bush, it has

a unique role in human events (qtd. in Judis, 2005, p. 55).

Americas Calling. The second element of the myth holds that America has

a calling or mission. This notion can be traced to the early sixteenth century in

England, where William Tyndale had spread the idea that England had a covenant

with God: if it lived by Gods commands, it would be blessed; if not, it would be

forsaken (Hughes, 2003). The idea of the national covenant also held that

England, like Israel of old, had been chosen by God for a special mission in the

world (Hughes, 2003, p. 20). The Puritans carried the notion of a national

covenant with them to the new world. John Winthrops famous sermon aboard the

ship Arbella made this clear:

Thus stands the cause between God and us: we are entered into a Cov-

enant with him for his work. . . . Now if the Lord shall please to hear us,

and bring us in peace to the place we desire, then hath he ratified this

covenant and sealed our Commission. (qtd. in Hughes, 2003, p. 29)

Winthrops understanding of the covenant had more to do with responsibilities to

others than it did with special privilege. However, over time, the notion of the

covenant took more to meaning chosenness, and by implication, the chosen

had a calling to fulfill (Hughes, 2003).

The most obvious manifestation of the myth was the notion of manifest

destiny, a term that first appeared in the Democratic Review in 1845. Its editor,

John OSullivan, wrote:

To state the truth at once in its naked simplicity . . . our claim to Oregon

. . . is by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the

whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the develop-

ment of the great experiment of liberty and federative self-government

entrusted to us. (qtd. in Hughes, 2003, p. 106)



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Manifest Destiny represented a significant transformation in how Americans saw

their calling in the world: in the early nineteenth century, Americas special role

was to lead and transform the world by example, to be John Winthrops City on

a Hill. George Washington emphasized that America was to lead by example

preservation of the constitution, he proclaimed, would acquire to [the people of

the United States] the glory of recommending it to the applause, the affection,

and adoption of every nation which is yet a stranger to it (Washington, 1796).

Manifest Destiny, on the other hand, granted that America had the right (and

even duty) to extend its influence not only by example, but by force (Hughes,

2003). The myth of Manifest Destiny was used to legitimize the goal of west-

ward expansion during the latter part of the nineteenth century and remains

relatively confined to that period. However, the underlying sense of duty and

divine sanction endures to the present. Many presidents, including John Adams,

Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt,

and Ronald Reagan, attributed Americas role in the world to Providence or

Destiny; and many spoke of a mission or calling to further freedoms

triumph (Judis, 2005). Richard Nixon proclaimed that America had come into

the world 180 years ago not just to have freedom to ourselves, but to carry it to

the whole world, while Ronald Reagan saw Americans as one people, under

God, dedicated to the dream of freedom that He has placed in the human heart,

called upon now to pass that dream on to a waiting and hopeful world (qtd. in

Judis, 2005, p. 54). Thus when George W. Bush declared in his 2005 inaugural

address that the United States had been given a mission by the Maker of

Heaven and the Author of Liberty to spread freedom and democracy, he was

acting in a long-held tradition and invoking a deeply rooted American political

myth (Judis, 2005).

America Represents the Forces of Good Against Evil. The third element of

the myth flows naturally from the first and second: the image of Natures Nation

setting out, unblemished by the mess of human history, to fulfill its God-given

mission makes obvious the ultimate meaning of America in the grand scheme

of good and evil (Hughes, 2003). As previously mentioned, American Excep-

tionalism comes from the Protestant millennialism of the English Puritans,

which was translated into a more secular and nationalist civil millennialism

in late eighteenth century (Judis, 2005, p. 55). The myths religious underpin-

nings are made particularly apparent by the aspect of the myth that defines

America as a force fighting for good against evil. Abraham Keteltas of the Revo-

lutionary Army articulated what Judis (2005) has called the apocalyptic

outlook when he declared in 1777 that American victory in the war would

mean triumph of

the cause of trust against error and falsehood; the cause of righteousness

against iniquity; the cause of the oppressed against the oppressor; the

cause of pure and undefiled religion against bigotry, superstition, and

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human inventions . . . the cause of heaven against hellof the parent of

the universe against the prince of darkness and the destroyer of the human

race. (qtd. in Judis, 2005, p. 56)

This apocalyptic outlook has been applied to subsequent international con-

flicts involving the United States, where U.S. victory has been seen to signify a

triumph of civilization, a new world order, and an end to war rather than

merely a temporary relief from conflict (Judis, 2005, p. 56).

In his memoir, Lawrence Wright recalled the confidence in Americas virtue

that characterized the World War II period:

When my father went off to war, I understood that he was going to

make the world safe for democracy and that that was what the world

wanted. . . . [He had] matured in a magic age, the 1940s, when great

evil and great good faced each other. In that splendid moment he knew

which side he was on. He was an American farm boy doing what God

and his country has designed for him. . . . Here he was, saving the

world. I grew up expecting to inherit his certainty. (qtd. in Hughes,

2003, p. 153)

To an extent, Americans have inherited the sense of certainty Wright described,

albeit a version of it that has been adapted through the process of work on myth to

fit a new era and a new villain. A mythical encoding of the War on Terror that

recalls the magic age and reliably casts America as a hero has a powerful

legitimization effect.

Like all political myths, American Exceptionalism has been adapted

throughout history to apply to changing circumstances and to provide signifi-

cance for various narratives. The founders generation sought to trounce Old

World tyranny and build what Thomas Jefferson called an empire of liberty;

Jacksonian Democrats wanted to defeat the red demons and build a Christian

civilization; and the generations since the nineteenth century aimed to triumph

over imperial Germany, then fascism, then communism to create a global demo-

cratic order (Judis, 2005). The Cold War was conveyed as a battle of good

against evil (Reagans evil empire), with the God-fearing United States con-

fronting the Godless Communists.

The aspect ofAmerican Exceptionalism that grounds the meaning of America

in the overall battle of right against wrong, virtue against vice, and democracy

against tyranny also lies at the heart ofCivilization v. Barbarism (Hughes, 2003,

p. 153). While the third aspect of American Exceptionalism is closely related to

Civilization v. Barbarism, the key difference is that the former tells a story about

the essential goodness of American actions and objectives, while the latter relates

to national identity and tells of the good nature and good character of Americans

vis vis the evil Other.



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The myth of Civilization v. Barbarism (also known as the new barbarism

thesissee Richards, 1996) and its variations are an outgrowth of the third aspect

of the myth of American Exceptionalism: America represents the forces of good

against evil. This myth is a classic story of Us versus Them that favors cultural

or civilizational explanations for conflict over political or economic ones. The

myths central dichotomy appeals to identity and makes it powerfully intuitive.

Linguists and anthropologists have noted that language has a binary structure

wherein almost every noun, adjective, and verb has a direct opposite. Generally,

one term has positive connotations while the other does not, and using one term

brings to mind its value-opposite. This underlying architecture of language is

relevant to the study of this myth, because it means that either wordcivilization

or barbarismalone can conjure the larger body of work on myth. If a speaker

talks about the triumph of civilization, it can be understood that (good) civili-

zation is triumphing over (bad) barbarians (Jackson, 2005). Thus, words that have

clear oppositesfor example, justice, western, evil, freedom, and hateare espe-

cially powerful lexical triggers of political myth. According to Cap (2005),

The present formula of social communication in the US demonstrates a

striking proportion of language which portrays reality in terms of a

necessary division into two, which the latter usually means different

and opposing. Such a stance is hence expected of politicians, and non-

compliance is scarcely toleratedPresident Bill Clinton . . . got under a

massive wave of criticism for being too conciliatory in his 1997 State

of the Union Address. (p. 14)

This sheds light on the groundwork and intuitive appeal of Civilization v. Barbar-

ism. Huntingtons 1993 thesis, The Clash of Civilizations, and Barbers (1992)

Jihad vs. McWorld are reified traces of work on this myth. Today, Civilization v.

Barbarism acts as a classic story of Us versus Them, in which a politically and

culturally civilized western world is defined in opposition to a violent and barbaric

eastern world. Edward Said (1978) drew attention to this construct in his famous

book, Orientalism. The lasting influence of Rafael Patais (1973) book The Arab

Mind is an especially relevant example of (neo-)Orientalism. Patai claimed that

psychological and cultural factors intrinsic to the Arab mind account for what

he described as the violence, stagnation, and backwardness of Arab populations.

Such (neo-)Orientalist explanations for violence have served as a sort of pseudo-

scientific alibi for the Civilization v. Barbarism myth, illustrating the sometimes

porous boundary between myth and scientific theory.

The myth is grounded in foundational myths that, according to Slotkin

(2001), represent American history as an Indian war, in which white

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Christian civilization is opposed by a savage racial enemy: a nation

whose hostility to civilization is part of its nature or fundamental char-

acter, an enemy who is not just opposed to our interests but to civiliza-

tion itself. (qtd. in Jackson, 2005, p. 48)

Certainly, rhetoric of the time accessed this myth in order to legitimize and justify

acts of genocide against Native Americans throughout the eighteenth century. In

fact, William McKinleys secretary of state, John Hay, combined the third com-

ponent of American Exceptionalism with Civilization v. Barbarism when he

described the Indian wars as the righteous victory of light over darkness . . . the

fight of civilization against barbarism (qtd. in Judis, 2005, p. 55). Cold War

rhetoric also conveyed the myth ofCivilization v. Barbarism, and Reagans rheto-

ric in particular used the language of good versus evil. As the discourse and

practice of the Cold War reveals, the significance of the conflict between the

United States and the Soviet Union went far beyond politics and economics; it was

understood that a Godless evil empire was threatening ourway of life. Implicit

in the Nixon-Khrushchev Kitchen Debate was the idea that the encroachment of

the Soviet Union would threaten the commodity-rich lifestyles of average Ameri-

cans. The discourse around the threat of Communism was largely an exercise in

axiological proximization, whereby the evil ideology of the enemy was conveyed

as encroaching on everything we know to be good and right. Because of the

ideological nature of the Cold War, We and They could not be reliably defined by

geopolitical borders; so the myth of Civilization v. Barbarism served as a discur-

sive compensation for blurred boundaries.

George H.W. Bushs public opinion polls and focus groups showed that the

public found rhetoric emphasizing axiological considerations such as the evil

deeds of Saddam Hussein to be more compelling in justifying the Gulf War than

rhetoric emphasizing economic reasons, such as jobs and oil (Rottinghaus,

2008). Thus, the legitimization effect of good versus evil rhetoric is widely

acknowledged.

Crucially, the two myths work together and are mutually reinforcing. For

example, America is understood to be exceptional in that it embodies the very

concept of civilization and is the primary defender of civilization. Jacksons

(2003) work details the reconfiguration of American Exceptionalism into a larger

notion of civilization in order to legitimize NATO following World War II.

Consequently, American Exceptionalism became even more focused on notions of

leadership, and became very much intertwined with Civilization v. Barbarism.

Although visions of the world Americans have sought to create and the

antagonists in the way of those visions have changed over the centuries, the shared

mythical framework ofAmerican Exceptionalism and Civilization v. Barbarism is

threaded throughout American history. The historical continuity of political myth

adds to its power and utility as a rhetorical legitimization strategy. Today, terror-

ism (vaguely defined) is the antagonist in the way of Americas ideal world.



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Political Myth in the War on Terror

American Exceptionalism

In order to discover how the myth of American Exceptionalism has been

called upon in contemporary official rhetoric, I have analyzed the presence of

lexical triggers that recall contemporary forms of the myth in a multitude of

official-level texts. This section discusses three meta-narratives that recreate the

myth of American Exceptionalism in the context of the War on Terror and

illustrates each with examples from the texts. The meta-narratives include the

myth ofExceptional Grievance, the notion that America has a calling and unique

responsibility to fight terrorism, and the idea that America is fighting a good war

against evil. These meta-narratives roughly correspond with the three elements of

the myth of American Exceptionalism.

Exceptional Grievance. The first meta-narrative, the myth of Exceptional

Grievance, is linked to the idea of chosenness or Natures Nation, as it casts

America as an extraordinary kind of victim suffering a unique, historically and

politically decontextualized injustice (Jackson, 2005). Lexical triggers of Excep-

tional Grievance include tragedy, suffering, loss, horror, and calamity

(see the appendix). Of course, it is not surprising that the worst terrorist attack ever

committed on American soil would be described in these terms. Of interest is how

these words, through continual repetition in hundreds of texts, have served con-

struct a profound sense of collective national grievance and victimhood (Jackson,

2005).

Crucially, the myth of Exceptional Grievance emphasizes American owner-

ship of said tragedy, suffering, loss, horror, and calamity. If the rhetori-

cal construction of the event that prompted the War on Terror did indeed rely on

the myth ofAmerican Exceptionalism, lexical triggers of grievance should appear

linked in the text to words such as us, our, we, national, and American

to emphasize the specifically national ownership of the tragedy.

Immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Center, President

Bush remarked: Today weve had a national tragedy. Two airplanes have

crashed into the World Trade Center in an apparent terrorist attack on our

country (11 Sept. 2001a). Throughout the following months, he continued to

reiterate that the attacks were a terrible national shock, an act of evil that

caused, and continues to cause, so much suffering (24 Nov. 2001), and a

wound to our country (20 Sept. 2001). He continued, Each of us will

remember what happened that day, and to whom it happened (Bush, 20 Sept.

2001). During the bombing campaign on Afghanistan, Bush again reemphasized

the nations collective suffering:

One month after great suffering and sorrow, America is strong and

determined and generous . . . theres a certain sacrifice when you lose a

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piece of your soul. I was standing up there at the Pentagon today, and I

saw the tears of the families whose lives were lost in the Pentagon. And

I said in my talk there that America prays with you. (11 Oct. 2001)

Rhetorical emphasis on national grievance following 9/11 was achieved largely

through repetition of the words and sentiments quoted above, which appear in

virtually every press interview and speech given by the administration in the

months following the attacks. So, while expressions of national grievance are

overwhelmingly abundant in the texts, additional examples would be redundant.

Despite Bushs and Powells acknowledgement that citizens of many coun-

tries died in the attacks (see Bush, 14 Sept. 2001, and Powell, 18 Oct. 2001),

official rhetoric overwhelmingly depicted Americans as a special, united people

suffering a uniquely obscene tragedy. Alternatively, the rhetoric could have framed

the events as an attack on humanity or expressed solidarity with victims of political

violence in other countries (Jackson, 2005). However, through continual emphasis

of American ownership of the tragedy, the official rhetoric succeeded in bestowing

upon America the politically valuable status of primary victim (Jackson, 2005). As

Bowman (1994) has pointed out, creating or sustaining a sense of national vic-

timhood and grievance promotes a discourse of violence that rallies support for

war. So while the sense of victimhood and grievance that was emphasized and

reemphasized in hundreds of texts was in no way invented or falsely manufactured,

it did serve the political purpose of justifying American military action in the

subsequent War on Terror. Reinforcing Americas primary victim status at the

hands of a vaguely defined enemy (terrorist networks of global reach) makes it

possible for military actions that are prima facie offensive (i.e., preventative wars)

to be understood as retaliatory. Rhetorical recollection of Americas Exceptional

Grievance also served to shift the moral responsibility for the suffering and

civilian deaths resulting from American military action onto the original attackers

(Jackson, 2005).

For example, in a press conference, Rumsfeld stated with regard to the U.S.

attacks on Afghanistan: There are (sic) going to be a loss of lifethere already

have been. It started on September 11th in this building [the Pentagon]. And there

are going to be more (24 Oct. 2001). At a Defense Department briefing the

following week, Rumsfeld responded to the question of whether the United States

should have done more to avoid civilian deaths in Afghanistan:

As a nation that lost thousands of innocent civilians on September 11th,

we understand what it means to lose fathers and mothers and brothers and

sisters and sons and daughters. [. . .] We did not start the war; the

terrorists started it when they attacked the United States, murdering

more than 5,000 innocent Americans. The Taliban . . . started it when

they invited the al Qaeda into Afghanistan and turned their country into

a base from which those terrorists could strike out and kill our citizens.



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So let there be no doubt; responsibility for every single casualty in this

war, be they innocent Afghans or innocent Americans, rests at the

feet of Taliban and al Qaeda. (29 Oct. 2001)

Here, Rumsfeld shifted the attention from Afghan civilian deaths onto American

civilian deaths by stressing that America is the primary victimand Americas

victim status relieves it of moral responsibility for civilian deaths.

The myth ofExceptional Grievance also decontextualizes American suffering

from global realities. As Jackson (2005) pointed out,

The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the suffering they caused in

America were in reality far from exceptional: more than double the

number of people killed by al Qaeda were killed everyday for a hundred

days in Rwanda in 1994 . . . the UN estimates that more than three

million people have died the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of

Congo since 1998; terrorists have killed tens of thousands of civilians in

the last few years in Algeria, Sri Lanka, Israel and Chechnya; and on

September 11, 2001 itself, an estimated 30,000 children died of hunger

and preventable diseases across the developing world, as they do every-

day. (p. 37)

The belief that America is a special kind of victim suffering an exceptional

grievance is linked to the well-established myth of American Exceptionalism in

that it assumes that America is special among the worlds nations. While rhetoric

emphasizing grief and unity is to be expected under such circumstances as

9/11, the significance that 9/11 came to have was not simply intrinsic to the

events. The constant reiteration of national injury and victimhood in the tradi-

tion of American Exceptionalism served to justify subsequent policies and mili-

tary actions in what has become the most intense counterterrorism effort in

history.

Americas Mission against Evil. A second manifestation ofAmerican Excep-

tionalism is seen in rhetoric that frames the War on Terror in apocalyptic terms

and portrays American actions as a response to a larger mission against evil. As

previously mentioned, American Exceptionalism retains an apocalyptic mentality

suggestive of the Protestant millennialism in which it is rooted. Accordingly,

America approaches grand objectives with a vision that it will transform the

world in the face of great evil (Judis, 2005, p. 56). Judis (2005) has noted that this

mentality can shape the way people see reality, inclining them toward revolu-

tionary rather than evolutionary change, and that it discourages complex dis-

tinctions and shadings in favor of generalities and absolute dichotomies (p. 56).

Official rhetoric of the War on Terror has employed this apocalyptic outlook

insofar as it has set its sights on extensive global transformationwhat we have

to do, according to Powell, is not just go after these perpetrators, and those who

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gave them haven, but the whole curse of terrorism that is upon the face of the

earth (15 Sept. 2001). And it has divided the world into two simple categories:

friends and enemies. Overall, it has relied on the notion that America holds a

special place in worldand thus has a special calling to bring about this trans-

formation. Lexical triggers include: mission, call/calling, role, responsibility,

indispensable, rightness/righteous, and the phrases freedoms defender and

defend freedom.

As Judis (2005) pointed out, previous wars have been viewed with an apoca-

lyptic outlook: The First World War was the war to end all wars and The cold

war was Armageddon (p. 56). Similarly, Bush proclaimed, Our war on terror

begins with al Qaeda, but does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist

group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated (11 Sept. 2001b). In

his second inaugural address, he affirmed, it is the policy of the United States to

seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every

nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in the world (20

Jan., 2005). Speaking specifically about the War on Terror, he proclaimed,

What is at stake is not just Americas freedom. This is the worlds fight.

This is civilizations fight. [. . .] As long as the United States of America

is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an

age of liberty, here and across the world. (11 Sept. 2001b)

In other words, liberty (good) and terror (evil) are at war, and it is up to America

to see that liberty triumphs.

By the end of the day on 9/11, Bush had established a broader significance for

Americas circumstances and future actions: America has stood down enemies

before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day.Yet, we go

forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world (11 Sept.

2001b). Notably, the entity against which freedom, goodness, and justice are to be

defended is broad and simple: enemies. In this instance, the enemies are both

present and historical, so that the main point is not a specific issue, but rather, the

larger, ongoing struggle to defend universal (or God-given) values (like freedom,

goodness, and justice) against their value-opposites, personified by the enemy.

Since the speech was given on the day of the attacks, it is not surprising that the

enemy in question was ambiguous. Nevertheless, this text represents the beginning

of an ongoing tendency to construct the enemy as not only evil, but also

monolithic. Official rhetoric has repeatedly conflated various targets and threats in

the War on Terror into a single enemy: the terrorists. They have often been

referred to even more broadly as the enemies of freedom or the evildoers (see,

for example, Bush, 20 Sept. 2001, or Bush, 20 Jan. 2004). Rhetoric that folds

diverse (and often adversarial) groups into a single enemy draws upon and recre-

ates the myth of American Exceptionalism by downplaying nuances that would

undercut the image of America as an indispensable nation fulfilling a divine



20/35

mission, and by overlooking complex details in favor of dichotomous generalities.

Bush divided the world into those who are with us and those who are with the

terrorists (20 Sept. 2001), and he grouped three countries with vastly divergent

interests and agendas (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) into a unitary axis of evil

(29 Jan. 2002). By neglecting to disaggregate rival groups, and instead clumping

them into a monolithic category of terrorists or Islamist terrorists, official

rhetoric embraced the apocalyptic outlook that characterizes the myth ofAmerican

Exceptionalism.

Official rhetoric has also portrayed the War on Terror as a cosmic battle

between good and evil. Bush put it plain and simple: We are in a conflict ofgood

against evil, and America will call evil by its name (1 Jun. 2002). Further, many

texts have portrayed the War on Terror as a struggle of divine significance. For

example:

Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we

know that God is not neutral between them. (Bush, 11 Sept. 2001b)

War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. (Bush,

14 Sept. 2001)

We will not rest until we stop all terrorists of global reach. And for every

nation that harbors or supports terrorists, there will be a day of reckon-

ing. (Bush, 7 Dec. 2001)

Those of us who have lived through these challenging times have been

changed by them. Weve come to know truths we will never question:

evil is real, and it must be opposed. (Bush, 29 Jan. 2002)

[O]ur cause is even larger than our country. Ours is the cause of human

dignity; freedom guided by conscience and guarded by peace. This ideal

of America is the hope of all mankind. [. . .] [L]ight shines in the

darkness. And the darkness will not overcome it. (Bush, 11 Sept.

2002)

These texts are heavy in religious (more specifically, evangelical and mil-

lennial Christian) imagery and symbolismlight and darkness, unquestionable

truths, a day of reckoning, and evil that must be purged. Bush also used a

biblical term when he referred to Osama Bin Laden as the evil one (11 Oct.

2001) and al-Qaeda as the evil ones (29 Nov. 2001). Language that appeals to

the religious moorings of hundreds of millions of Americans has obvious per-

suasive advantages and is a powerful way to elicit intuitive support for both a

speaker and his policies.

Although the presidents speechwriters quickly abandoned the word

crusade, extensive use of dichotomous language still served to conjure images of

holy war. Along with constructing the War on Terror as a struggle between good

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and evil, the rhetoric drew on the second aspect ofAmerican Exceptionalism when

it emphasized that America had found our mission to fight the battle (Bush, 20

Sept. 2001). Simply put, our responsibility to history is clear: to answer these

attacks and rid the world of evil (Bush, 14 Sept. 2001). The idea that History

has called us into action became a running theme in the rhetoric (Bush, 9 April

2002). In the 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush proclaimed, History has

called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our

privilege to fight freedoms fight (29 Jan. 2002). He went on to say, In a single

instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that

weve been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced

a choice more clear or consequential. Bush further portrayed Americas role as

indispensable when he said,

[T]his country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as

the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an

age of terror, this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world. (20

Sept. 2001)

In portraying the events as a crucial and decisive moment in history, Bushs

speechwriters (intentionally or otherwise) employed what Cap (2005, 2007) called

a temporal proximization strategy. Portraying events as historic and momentous is

one strategy by which a speaker can bring those events closer and make them more

important to the addressee, which serves the larger purpose of legitimization in

political discourse.

Historical allusions have also played an important role in rhetorical legiti-

mization of the War on Terror. By alluding to World War II and the Cold War, the

texts have recalled past victories with longer-established mythic significance in

order to portray the present war as just and winnable. Soon after 9/11, American

officialdom began comparing the attacks to those of Pearl Harbor:

Americans have known warsbut for the past 136 years, they have been

wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. (Bush, 20 Sept.

2001)

For my country, the events of September the 11th were as decisive as the

attack on Pearl Harbor and the treachery of another September in 1939.

(Bush, 31 May 2003)

Until two months ago, the date most synonymous with surprise was

December 7th. But as we mark the sixtieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor

next month, we may also recall that Japans attack drove us not to fear,

but to action; not into isolation, but to accept a greater role in the world;

not to forsake our friends, but to form with them the most powerful

alliance against evil in history. December 7th was a turning point for the



22/35

world, and September 11th should be no less a turning point. On 9/11, our

generation received one of historys great wakeup calls. Like the Great-

est Generation, we must answer that call. (Wolfowitz, 14 Nov. 2001)

What happened at Pearl Harbor was the start of a long and terrible

war for America. Yet, out of that surprise attack grew a steadfast resolve

that made America freedoms defender. And that missionour great

callingcontinues to this hour, as the brave men and women of our

military fight the forces of terror in Afghanistan and around the world.

[. . .] The attack on Pearl Harbor was plotted in secret, waged

without mercy, taking the lives of 2,403 Americans. [. . .] On Decem-

ber the 8th, as the details became known, the nations grief turned to

resolution. During four years of war, no one doubted the rightness ofour cause; no one wavered in the quest of victory. As a result of the

efforts and sacrifice of the veterans who are with us today, and of mil-

lions like them, the world was saved from tyranny. (Bush, 7 Dec.

2001)

The last two quotations make explicit what the audience is supposed to infer

from Pearl Harbor analogies: a treacherous enemy has taken a cheap shot at

America, and freedoms defender has been called upon once again to defeat evil.

The significance of World War II is already well established in the Americanpsyche as historys most just and necessary war, as the Good War. Historical

analogies to an event with a fixed meaning imbue contemporary events with

significance and a reassuring understanding of what must be done and what the

outcome will be. The following texts do just that:

We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous

ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their

radical visionsby abandoning every value except the will to power

they follow in the path offascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.Andthey will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in historys

unmarked grave of discarded lies. (Bush, 20 Sept. 2001)

Weve seen their kind before. The terrorists are the heirs to fascism. They

have the same will to power, the same disdain for the individual, the same

mad global ambitions. And they will be dealt with in just the same way.

Like all fascists, the terrorists cannot be appeased: they must be

defeated. This struggle will not end in a truce or treaty. It will end in

victory for the United States, our friends and the cause of freedom.(Bush, 7 Dec. 2001)

Across the world and across the years, we will fight these evil

ones, and we will win. Great causes are not easy causes. It was a long

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way from Bunker Hill to Yorktown. It was a long way for the 101st from

Normandy to final victory over fascism in Europe. When wronged, our

great nation has always been patient and determined and relentless. And

thats the way we are today. We have defeated enemies of freedom before.

And we will defeat them again. (Bush, 21 Nov. 2001).

In these speeches, President Bush impresses the certainty of the Great

War upon the War on Terror by portraying terrorists as the latest incarnation

of fascism, and thus the audience is meant to assume that anything short of a

full-scale War on Terror would amount to appeasement of the latest murder-

ous ideology. Bush evoked the lesson of the infamous 1938 Munich Agreement

when he said, in reference to terrorists, Those who hate all civilization and

culture and progress, those who embrace death to cause the death of the inno-

cent, cannot be ignored, cannot be appeased (Bush, 20 Oct. 2001). Neustadt

and May (1986) have written extensively on the danger of misusing historical

analogies in decision making and have aptly noted that decision makers some-

times intentionally misuse history to justify policies. Recall that both World War

II and the Cold War, when viewed through the lens of American Exceptionalism,

are examples of America answering its calling to fight and triumph over evil. In

referring to these two wars, the rhetoric uses analogical reasoning to superim-

pose on the present not only past victories, but also past vindication of American

Exceptionalism.

In addition to the World War II narrative, official rhetoric has compared

terrorism to another historical evil: communism. Deputy Secretary of Defense

Paul Wolfowitz compared the threat posed by terrorism with the threat posed by

nuclear weapons at the height of the Cold War:

The American people breathed a sigh of relief when the Cold War ended

a decade ago. [. . .] And there was a temptation to believe that this

favorable circumstance was a permanent condition. On September 11th,

America learned that it was not. [. . .] This threat is as great as any we

faced during the Cold War. (4 Oct. 2001)

In this instance, the Cold War analogy serves to emphasize the threat of terrorism

and also to encode the War on Terror as both necessary and winnable (Jackson,

2005). Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld implied that victory was more or less

inevitable when he compared the War on Terror to the Cold War: If you think

about it, 50, 40 years, however long it was with the Cold War . . . but here we are.

No Soviet Union (24 Oct. 2001). Vice President Cheney also used the analogy to

imply a historical precedent for American triumph:

Your faith in freedoms ultimate triumph was vindicated when the

Berlin Wall was toppled, when an evil empire vanished from the face



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of the earth. Today, freedom has a new set of totalitarian enemies. (1

May 2003)

As Jackson (2005) has pointed out, the controversial and often-repeated

term axis of evilwhich Bush used in reference to North Korea, Iran, and

Iraq in his 2002 State of the Union addressrecalls both the axis powers of

World War II and Reagans evil empire (the Soviet Union). According to

Jacksons (2005) analysis, This implies not only the vast threat posed by ter-

rorism (it is like fascism and communism combined), but also that the United

States has a historic role to play in protecting the world from this menace (p.

44). By recalling past evils and triumphs, official rhetoric of the War of Terror

has tapped into Americas mythic past in a way that both recalls and reproduces

the myth.

As he concluded an address to a joint session of Congress, President Bush

recreated the various elements of American Exceptionalism:

Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in

our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment.

Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedomthe

great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every timenow

depends on us. Our nationthis generationwill lift a dark threat of

violence from our people and our future. We will rally to this cause by our

efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will

not fail. (20 Sept. 2001)

Here, Bush has reiterated the magnitude of the countrys grievance and stated that

the country has a mission and an indispensable role in determining the outcome of

a great battle between freedom and fear, where the great hope of every time is

at stake. So, official rhetoric has made clear that, as America responds to its

historical calling to fight a War on Terror, it is fighting the larger battle of good

(freedom) against evil (terrorism).

Rhetoric that situated America and its political circumstances within a battle

of good and evil has served to imbue the War on Terror with a sort of divine

sanction (Jackson, 2005, p. 143). The official rhetoric has been rife with pseudo-

theological language that has ascribed apocalyptic significance to the War on

Terror. Further, it has left no question that Americas role in this divine struggle

is indispensable and that it has been called upon to ensure the triumph of God-

given values such as liberty, justice, and freedom (Jackson, 2005). In these ways,

official rhetoric has reproduced the myth of American Exceptionalism; and in

doing so, has built a powerfully intuitive message on the edifice of the countrys

mythic past.

In constructing a battle of divine significance between the forces of good and

evil, the official rhetoric has also made heavy appeals to identity in casting the

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actors in the struggle. The construction of a national identity vis vis the terrorist

Other has taken place largely within the framework of Civilization v. Barbarism.


Presently, the myth of Civilization v. Barbarism links Americas struggle

against terrorism with a larger, ongoing clash between civilization (Us) and bar-

barism (Them). The post-9/11 revival ofCivilization v. Barbarism has been widely

observed. After the attacks, many feared that Huntingtons (1993) prediction of a

clash between Islam and the West had come to fruition. Edelmans (1967) account

of how myth becomes self-perpetuating is relevant here:

As its chief terms are unobservable motives, intentions, traits, and cause-

effect assumptions, observation cannot disprove it but can only provide

material that in turn can be perceived as evidence for its validity. (p. 222)

Significantly, the revival of the myth quickly became evident in media rhetoric

following 9/11, providing an important backdrop and context for the reception of

the official rhetoric that recalled it. Two independent news media analyses (Abra-

hamian, 2003; Seib, 2004) have documented this phenomenon, citing as evidence

an onslaught of articles in prominent American newspapers that framed world

affairs in terms of civilization-based conflict. For example, the New York Times

published the following headlines in a section called A Nation Challenged in the

months following 9/11: Yes, this is about Islam, This is a religious war,

Diffusing the holy bomb, Barbarians at the gate, Faith and the secular state,

A head-on collision of alien cultures, and Hair as a battle field of the soul,

among many others (cited in Abrahamian, 2003). Ancient enmities and the Cru-

sades were recalled in both text and image, and pictures of Richard the Lion Heart

accompanied several articles (Abrahamian, 2003). Other major publications

repeatedly posed the question why do they hate us? and answered it in terms of

values and culture rather than politics and economics. As a case in point, the Wall

Street Journal quoted Norman Podhoretz6 saying that a barbaric culture had

declared war not because of our policies but for what we stood fordemocracy

and freedom (quoted in Abrahamian, 2003, p. 533). Thus the post-9/11 environ-

ment was rife with political and journalistic shorthand that relied on the myth of

Civilization v. Barbarism. This environment of mythical revival allowed its recol-

lection in official rhetoric to resonate powerfully in American society. Official

rhetoric has accessed the larger body of work on the myth by employing a number

of lexical triggers that dramatize binaries such as good/evil and us/them. Refer-

6 Norman Podhoretz has been an adviser to the U.S. Information Agency and an influential neocon-servative columnist. George W. Bush awarded him the honorable Presidential Medal of Freedom in2004.



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ences to the myth have served to legitimize policies in the War on Terror through

a proximization strategy that portrays the current situation as a function of an

unprecedented and growing ideological clash between those inside the deictic

center (Americans, the west) and those outside the deictic center (Saddam

Hussein, terrorists, the Islamic world; Cap, 2007, p. 14).

Wisely, the Bush Administration has made a point of denouncing the idea of

a clash of civilizations, and has explicitly stated, on multiple occasions, that the

War on Terror has nothing to do with differences in faith. It has everything to

do with people of all faiths coming together to condemn hate and evil and murder

and prejudice (Bush, 11 Oct. 2001). Yet, the rhetoric has nonetheless encouraged

dichotomous thinking in its construction of an irrational, depoliticized, evil Other.

So even though it is stated that the administrations evil Other is not Muslims or

the Islamic world in general, the ever-present Us and Them dichotomy creates

fertile ground for (neo-)Orientalist interpretations, as seen in the aforementioned

media rhetoric.

The myth of Civilization v. Barbarism is seen most notably in the way Bush

Administration officials have answered the questions who was responsible for the

9/11 attacks? and why did they do it? In response to the first question, the

answer has been unambiguous: freedoms enemies, savages, and barbarians.

These and other lexical triggers (such as civilization, innocents, cruelty, and

hatred) that recall the larger body of work on Civilization v. Barbarism abound in

the texts.7 A sharp linguistic boundary has been drawn between Us and the

terrorists, who epitomize savagery: The terrorists despise creative societies and

individual choiceand thus they bear a special hatred for America. They desire

to concentrate power in the hands of a few, and to force every life into grim and

joyless conformity (Bush, 7 Dec. 2001). Further, they hate all civilization and

culture and progress (Bush, 20 Oct. 2001), they are devious and ruthless

(Bush, 24 Nov. 2001), and their hatred is equaled by the madness of the

destruction they design (Bush, 29 Jan. 2002). Bush recommended that Americans

go about their business on Monday, but with a heightened sense of awareness that

a group ofbarbarians have declared war on the American people (Bush 15 Sept.

2001). In contrast, America is made to embody enlightened civilization in the

discourse and is defined in opposition to the terrorist Other. Attorney General John

Ashcroft affirmed,

[T]he attacks of September 11th drew a bright line of demarcation

between the civil and the savage, and our nation will never be the same.

On one side of this line are freedoms enemies, murderers of innocents

in the name of a barbarous cause. On the other side are friends of

freedom; citizens of every race and ethnicity, bound together in quiet

resolve to defend our way of life. (24 Sept. 2001)

7 See the appendix.

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Bush further constructed the righteous We when he expressed astonishment

that anyone could hate the United States:

[H]ow do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is

vitriolic hatred for America? Ill tell you how I respond: Im amazed. Im

amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about,

that people would hate us. I am, I amlike most Americans, I just cant

believe it. Because I know how good we are. (11 Oct. 2001)

The boundary between Us and Them has also been maintained in more

recent rhetoric. In a speech honoring an American doctor (incidentally named Dr.

Christian) who performed heart surgery on an Iraqi civilian as part of a charity,

Bush stated,

[T]he contrast couldnt be more vivid. We got people in Iraq who

murder the innocent to achieve their political objectivesand weve

got Americans, who heal the broken hearts of little Iraqi girls. Ours is

a compassionate nation, that believes in the universality of freedom

and ours is a nation full of loving souls that when they find a stranger

in need will lend their God-given talents to help that stranger. (11 Mar.

2008)

The appeal to identity has been an important feature of the War on Terror

discourse. It has identified and othered the enemy, which is always a necessary

part of war, and it has done so in a way that allows the administration great

flexibility in determining who, exactly, that enemy is and how that enemy should

be defeated (Jackson, 2005). By portraying terrorists as mad, hateful, and simply

evil by nature, the rhetoric has deflected questions about political motivations of

terrorist attacks (Jackson, 2005). This function of the rhetoric can be seen very

clearly in how the Bush Administration has answered the second question, why

did they do it?:

They hate what we see right here in this chambera democratically

elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our

freedomsour freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our

freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. (Bush 20

Sept. 2001)

The idea that they hate us because of what we love has been repeated in

numerous texts (Bush, 25 Nov. 2002). To offer just a few examples:

[T]hese people cant stand freedom; they hate our values; they hate

what America stands for. (Bush, 13 Sept. 2001)



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They cant stand what America stands for. It must bother them greatly

to know were such a free and wonderful placea place where all

religions can flourish; a place where women are free; a place were

children can be educated. It must grate on them greatly. (Bush, 29 Nov.

2001)

They hate us because we love the idea that people can worship an

Almighty God any way he or she sees fit. They hate us because we love

political discourse and a free society. They hate us because of our free

press. They hate everything about us, because of our freedom. And

theres anotherthere are a lot of distinguishing features, but one of the

most clear ones to me is this. We value life in America. We say every-

body is precious, everybody counts, every life has worth, every life hasdignity. They dont value life. (Bush, 4 Oct. 2002)

This rhetoric depoliticizes the conflict by attributing terrorism to the barbaric

nature of certain individuals. According to President Bush,

We learned a good lesson on September the 11th, that there is evil in this

world. I know theres a lot of children in America wondering what took

place. I think its essential that all moms and dads and citizens tell th