1 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003.]

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY.

EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.

Cesar Ching for complainant.

SYNOPSIS

Complainant sought the disbarment of respondent

for deceit and violation of the Lawyer's Oath

relative to the criminal case for estafa, which he

filed against the latter's client. According to the

complainant he withdrew his complaint against the

respondent's client in exchange for respondent's

personal check which he later found to have been

drawn on a closed account. Complainant claimed

that he refused to accept the said check as

settlement of the civil liability of respondent's client,

but the respondent assured him that the check will

have sufficient funds when presented for payment.

He alleged that the respondent ignored his

repeated demands for payment. When directed to

comment on the administrative complaint against

her, the respondent refused to receive the notices

served on her.

The Supreme Court found the respondent guilty of

deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the

Lawyer's Oath for which she was suspended from

the practice of law for a period of two years.

According to the Court, the breach of trust

committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing

check amounted to deceit and constituted a

violation of her oath for which she should be

accordingly penalized. Such an act constitutes

gross misconduct. A lawyer may be disciplined for

evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such

conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of

a member of the bar, for a lawyer's professional

and personal conduct must at all times be kept

beyond reproach and above suspicion. Moreover,

respondent's persistent refusal to comply with lawful

orders directed at her with not even an explanation

for doing so is contumacious conduct, which merits

no compassion. The Court cannot tolerate any

misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of

an honorable profession.

SYLLABUS

1.LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; ISSUANCE OF

BOUNCING CHECK AMOUNTS TO DECEIT AND

VIOLATION OF THE LAWYER'S OATH; CASE AT BAR. —

The record shows that respondent prevailed upon

complainant to accept her personal check by way

of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio

Natividad, with the assurance that the check will

have sufficient funds when presented for payment.

In doing so, she deceived complainant into

withdrawing his complaint against her client in

exchange for a check which she drew against a

closed account. It is clear that the breach of trust

committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing

check amounted to deceit and constituted a

violation of her oath, for which she should be

accordingly penalized. Such an act constitutes

gross misconduct and the penalties for such

malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27

of the Rules of Court.

2.ID.; ID.; SHOULD BE A PERSON OF GOOD MORAL

CHARACTER. — The nature of the office of an

attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of

good moral character. Since this qualification is a

condition precedent to a license to enter upon the

practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally

essential during the continuance of the practice

and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct

which puts the lawyer's moral character in serious

doubt may render her unfit to continue in the

practice of law. ACIEaH

3.ID.; ID.; PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL CONDUCT

THEREOF MUST AT ALL TIMES BE KEPT BEYOND

REPROACH AND ABOVE SUSPICION. — The loss of

moral character of a lawyer for any reason

whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or

disbarment, because it is important that members

of the legal brotherhood must conform to the

highest standards of morality. Any wrongdoing

which indicates moral unfitness for the profession,

whether it be professional or non-professional,

justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be

disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly

incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does

not speak well of a member of the bar, for a

lawyer's professional and personal conduct must at

all times be kept beyond reproach and above

suspicion.

4.ID.; ID.; REQUIRED TO BE OBEDIENT TO THE DICTATES

OF THE LAW AND JUSTICE. — Moreover, the attitude

of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the

notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful

character or disposition which stains the nobility of

the legal profession. Her conduct not only

underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it

also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister

character flaw in her psyche which renders highly

questionable her moral fitness to continue in the

practice of law: a defiance for law and order which

is at the very core of her profession. Such defiance

is anathema to those who seek a career in the

administration of justice because obedience to the

dictates of the law and justice is demanded of

every lawyer. How else would respondent even

endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when

she disdains to follow even simple directives?

Indeed, the first and foremost command of the

Code of Professional Responsibility could not be

any clearer: CANON I. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD

THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND

2 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL

PROCESSES. aTEScI

5.ID.; ID.; MUST UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY

OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AT ALL TIMES. — Needless

to state, respondent's persistent refusal to comply

with lawful orders directed at her with not even an

explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct

which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is

to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal

profession at all times. She can only do this by

faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar,

to the courts and to her clients. We can not tolerate

any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair

name of an honorable profession.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private

offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-

1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina

City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas

Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled "People of the

Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad,

Accused." During the proceedings, respondent

Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused,

tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the

amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account

with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of

the civil aspect of the case against her client.

Complainant refused to accept the check, but

respondent assured him that the same will be paid

upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She

manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a

check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus,

respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to

accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from

participating as a complaining witness in the

criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the

same and the release of the accused, Sergio

Natividad. cECTaD

When complainant deposited the check, the same

was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the

reason: "Account Closed." On June 19, 1997,

complainant wrote a letter to respondent

demanding that she pay the face value of the

check. 1 However, his demand was ignored by

respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal

complaint against her for Estafa and Violation

of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the

City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as

I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the

Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary

information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang

22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva. 2

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the

instant administrative complaint for disbarment of

respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyer's

Oath. 3

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to

respondent's given address at Carmelo Compound,

Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was

required to comment on the complaint within ten

(10) days from notice. 4 However, it was returned

unserved with the notation "Moved". 5 The Assistant

National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest

address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street,

Pasig City. 6

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring

respondent to comment on the administrative

complaint filed against her was served at the

aforesaid address. This was again returned

unserved with the notation: "Refused". Thus, the

case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and

recommendation.7

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating

Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent

guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of

the Lawyer's Oath. Thus, he recommended that

respondent be suspended from the practice of law

for two (2) years.

On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors

passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted

the recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner that respondent be suspended from

the practice of law for two (2) years. TaIHEA

We fully agree with the findings and

recommendation of the IBP Board of

Governors. DIETcC

The record shows that respondent prevailed upon

complainant to accept her personal check by way

of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio

Natividad, with the assurance that the check will

have sufficient funds when presented for payment.

In doing so, she deceived complainant into

withdrawing his complaint against her client in

exchange for a check which she drew against a

closed account.

It is clear that the breach of trust committed by

respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted

to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath,

for which she should be accordingly

penalized. 8 Such an act constitutes gross

misconduct and the penalties for such

malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27

of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 27.Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by

Supreme Court, grounds therefore. — A member of

the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his

office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any

deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in

such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason

of his conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he

is required to take before the admission to practice,

3 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney

for a party without authority to do so.

The nature of the office of an attorney requires that

a lawyer shall be a person of good moral

character. Since this qualification is a condition

precedent to a license to enter upon the practice

of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential

during the continuance of the practice and the

exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which

puts the lawyer's moral character in serious doubt

may render her unfit to continue in the practice of

law. 9

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any

reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or

disbarment, 10 because it is important that

members of the legal brotherhood must conform to

the highest standards of morality. 11 Any

wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the

profession, whether it be professional or non-

professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a

lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of

a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is

unbecoming and does not speak well of a member

of the bar, for a lawyer's professional and personal

conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach

and above suspicion. 12

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately

refusing to accept the notices served on her

betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition

which stains the nobility of the legal

profession. 13 Her conduct not only underscores her

utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to

the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in

her psyche which renders highly questionable her

moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a

defiance for law and order which is at the very core

of her profession.

Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a

career in the administration of justice because

obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is

demanded of every lawyer. How else would

respondent even endeavor to serve justice and

uphold the law when she disdains to follow even

simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost

command of the Code of Professional Responsibility

could not be any clearer:

CANON 1.A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND

PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondent's persistent refusal to

comply with lawful orders directed at her with not

even an explanation for doing so is contumacious

conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a

lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the

legal profession at all times. She can only do this by

faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar,

to the courts and to her clients. 14 We can not

tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the

fair name of an honorable profession. HDAaIc

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent

ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years,

effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this

Decision be entered in her record as attorney and

be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

and all courts in the country for their information

and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,

Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J ., is on leave.

||| (Grande v. de Silva, A.C. No. 4838, July 29,

2003)

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5687. February 3, 2005.]

FELIX E. EDQUIBAL, complainant, vs. ATTY.

ROBERTO FERRER, JR., respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

In a letter-complaint 1 under oath dated January 8,

2002, Felix E. Edquibal, complainant, charged Atty.

Roberto Ferrer, Jr., respondent, with professional

misconduct and neglect of duty.

Complainant alleged that he engaged the services

of respondent to assist his mother Ursula Edquibal in

cases she filed against his sister Delia Edquibal-

Garcia involving a certain real property in Masinloc,

Zambales. His mother obtained favorable

judgments in four (4) out of the five (5) cases

handled by respondent. However, in Civil Case No.

RTC-1495-I (filed with the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 70, Iba, Zambales), the trial judge rendered

a decision adverse to his mother. Respondent then

advised complainant to appeal to the Court of

Appeals and that the cost involved is P4,000.00.

When complainant informed respondent that he

does not have enough money, the latter said

P2,000.00 would be sufficient for the moment. After

receiving the money from complainant, respondent

told him just to wait for the result. The appeal was

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65019.

When complainant failed to hear from respondent

in January 2001, he went to the Court of Appeals to

follow-up the appealed case. He then learned that

the appeal was dismissed for failure of the

appellant to file the required appellant's brief.

In his comment 2 dated June 2, 2003, respondent

denied that he filed an appeal, on behalf of

complainant's mother, with the Court of Appeals or

received P2,000.00. What happened was that

4 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

complainant told him that there is someone in the

Court of Appeals who can help him regarding his

appeal. Respondent claimed that he "did his best"

for complainant's mother and did not even ask for

attorney's fees. HDICSa

On July 30, 2003, we referred the complaint to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for

investigation, report, and recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation dated March

19, 2004, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid, IBP

Commissioner, made the following findings:

"It is clear from the records of this case that per the

records of CA-G.R. CV No. 65019, Respondent is the

counsel of record of defendants-appellants therein

(including Complainant's mother). In the Resolution

dated 31 August 2000, it was explicitly noted that

'(N)otice sent to counsel for defendants-appellants

requiring him to file appellant's brief within forty-five

(45) days from receipt thereof was received by him

on March 16, 2000.' If it is true that Respondent

never agreed to handle the appeal, upon receipt

of said notice, Respondent should have

immediately manifested to the Court of Appeals

that he is not handling the appeal on behalf of said

defendants-appellants. Thus, Section 2, Rule 44 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that '[T]he

counsel and guardians ad litem of the parties in the

court of origin shall be respectively considered as

their counsel and guardians ad litem in the Court of

Appeals.' By failing to do so, the Court of Appeals

had every reason to assume that he was likewise

representing defendants-appellants in the appeal.

Accordingly, his failure to timely file the required

appellants' brief resulted in the dismissal of the

appeal.

The facts of this case clearly show that Respondent

violated Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility ('CPR').

Undoubtedly, Respondent's failure to exercise due

diligence in protecting and attending to the interest

of Complainant (Complainant's mother) caused

the latter material prejudice. It should be

remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a

client's cause, he covenants that he will exert all

effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A

lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or

abandons his client's cause makes him unworthy of

the trust reposed in him by the latter. . . ."

Atty. Villadolid recommended to the IBP Board of

Governors that respondent be reprimanded "for

failure to act with reasonable diligence in

representing the cause of complainant;" and that

respondent be directed to "return the amount of

P2,000.00 as and by way of restitution to

complainant."

In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-383 dated July 30,

2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and

approved the Report and Recommendation of

Atty. Villadolid, thus:

"RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein

made part of the Resolution as Annex "A"; and,

finding the recommendation fully supported by the

evidence on record and the applicable laws and

rules, and considering the respondent's failure to

act with reasonable diligence in representing the

cause of complainant, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr., is

hereby REPRIMANDED and Ordered to Return the

amount of P2,000.00 by way of Restitution to

complainant." 3

We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of

Governors except as to the penalty recommended.

Records show that respondent was the counsel of

record for the appellants, complainant's mother

and other relatives in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019. The

Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 31,

2000 clearly states that the "notice sent to counsel

for defendants-appellants requiring him to file

appellant's brief within forty-five (45) days from

receipt thereof, was received by him on March 16,

2000." 4 However, respondent failed to file the

appellants' brief despite receipt of such notice.

Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 2.Counsel and guardians. — The counsel and

guardians ad litem of the parties in the court of

origin shall be respectively considered as their

counsel and guardians ad litem in the Court of

Appeals. When others appear or are appointed,

notice thereof shall be served immediately on the

adverse party and filed with the court.

If it were true that respondent did not agree to

represent the appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019,

why did he not file with the Court of Appeals a

motion to withdraw as their counsel? Obviously, his

negligence, which resulted in the dismissal of the

appeal, caused prejudice to his clients. Likewise,

respondent's failure to inform complainant of the

status of his mother's appeal is inexcusable.

It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is

one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a need

for the client to be adequately and fully informed

about the developments in his case. 5 A client

should never be left groping in the dark, for to do so

would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence

reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and

the legal profession in general.

Respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:

"Canon 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of

his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and

confidence reposed in him.

5 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with

competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal

matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in

connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed

of the status of his case and shall respond within a

reasonable time to his client's request for

information." DTAHEC

Diligence is "the attention and care required of a

person in a given situation and is the opposite of

negligence." 6 A lawyer serves his client with

diligence by adopting that norm of practice

expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes

entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm

zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights,

and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and

ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or

withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally

applied. 7 It is axiomatic in the practice of law that

the price of success is eternal diligence to the

cause of the client.

The practice of law does not require extraordinary

diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme

measure of care and caution which persons of

unusual prudence and circumspection use for

securing and preserving their rights." 8 All that is

required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that

degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater

familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard,

respondent's failure to attend to his client's appeal

is clearly wanting.

In People v. Cawili, 9 we held that the failure of

counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary

period is an offense that entails disciplinary

action. People v. Villar, Jr. 10characterized a

lawyer's failure to file a brief for his client as

inexcusable neglect. In Blaza v. Court of

Appeals, 11 we held that the filing of a brief within

the period set by law is a duty not only to the client,

but also to the court. Perla Compania de Seguros,

Inc. v. Saquilaban 12 reiterated Ford v.

Daitol 13 and In re: Santiago F. Marcos 14 in holding

that an attorney's failure to file brief for his client

constitutes inexcusable negligence.

In cases involving a lawyer's failure to file a brief or

other pleading before an appellate court, we did

not hesitate to suspend the erring member of the

Bar from the practice of law for three months, 15 six

months, 16 or even disbarment in severely

aggravated cases. 17

Accordingly and considering the circumstances of

this case, we find a need to scale the

recommended penalty upward. Here, we are

convinced that respondent deserves the penalty of

suspension for three (3) months.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR. is hereby

found guilty of professional misconduct and

neglect of duty. He is SUSPENDED from the practice

of law for three (3) months with a WARNING that a

repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be

dealt with more severely. He is further DIRECTED to

return immediately to the complainant the amount

of P2,000.00.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar

Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and

all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Corona, Carpio Morales and Garcia,

JJ., concur.

Footnotes

||| (Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, February

03, 2005)

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6788. August 23, 2007.]

(Formerly, CBD 382 )

DIANA RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE R.

IMBANG, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM p:

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension 1

against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations

of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

THE COMPLAINT

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the

assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in

filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses

Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. 2 She gave

respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter

issued a receipt for P5,000 only. 3

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled

hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.

Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the

courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He

would then come out after several hours to inform

her that the hearing had been cancelled and

rescheduled. 4 This happened six times and for

each "appearance" in court, respondent charged

her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the

complainant became suspicious. She personally

inquired about the status of her cases in the trial

courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was

shocked to learn that respondent never filed any

case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in

6 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office

(PAO). 5

RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE

According to respondent, the complainant knew

that he was in the government service from the

very start. In fact, he first met the complainant

when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's

Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of

Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the

complainant's daughter. 6

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her

file an action for damages against the

Jovellanoses. 7 Because he was with the PAO and

aware that the complainant was not an indigent,

he declined. 8 Nevertheless, he advised the

complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative

who was a private practitioner. 9 Atty. Ungson,

however, did not accept the complainant's case as

she was unable to come up with the acceptance

fee agreed upon. 10 Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's

refusal, the complainant allegedly remained

adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses.

Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the

complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000

while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's

acceptance fee. 11

A year later, the complainant requested

respondent to issue an antedated receipt because

one of her daughters asked her to account for the

P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for

safekeeping. 12 Because the complainant was a

friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July

15, 1992. 13

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the

PAO. 14 A few months later or in September 1994,

the complainant again asked respondent to assist

her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was

now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to

prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to

finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.

15

RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar

Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed,

received evidence from the parties. On November

22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and

recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. 16

The CBD noted that the receipt 17 was issued on

July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the

PAO. 18 It also noted that respondent described

the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and

that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For

these reasons, the complainant would not have

accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent

have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's

claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate

a friend's request. 19 It found respondent guilty of

violating the prohibitions on government lawyers

from accepting private cases and receiving

lawyer's fees other than their salaries. 20 The CBD

concluded that respondent violated the following

provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money

or property collected or received for or from a

client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a

legal service which he knows or should know that

he is not qualified to render. However, he may

render such service if, with the consent of his client,

he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer

who is competent on the matter.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from

the practice of law for three years and ordered him

to immediately return to the complainant the

amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the

receipt. 21

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved

the findings of the CBD that respondent violated

Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the

CBD's recommendation with regard to the

restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal

rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's

failure to return the total amount, an additional

suspension of six months. 22

THE COURT'S RULING

We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with

honesty and integrity. 23 More specifically, lawyers

in government service are expected to be more

conscientious of their actuations as they are subject

to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the

bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity

to public service. 24

Government employees are expected to devote

themselves completely to public service. For this

reason, the private practice of profession is

prohibited. Section 7 (b) (2) of the Code of Ethical

7 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

Standards for Public Officials and Employees

provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In

addition to acts and omissions of public officials

and employees now prescribed in the Constitution

and existing laws, the following constitute

prohibited acts and transactions of any public

official and employee and are hereby declared

unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities

related thereto, public officials and employees

during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession

unless authorized by the Constitution or law,

provided that such practice will not conflict with

their official function. 25

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle

private cases for they are expected to devote

themselves full-time to the work of their respective

offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from

the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15,

1992 while he was still connected with the PAO.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an

attorney-client relationship. 26 Respondent's

admission that he accepted money from the

complainant and the receipt confirmed the

presence of an attorney-client relationship

between him and the complainant. Moreover, the

receipt showed that he accepted the

complainant's case while he was still a government

lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition

on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his

receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for

the purpose of providing free legal assistance to

indigent litigants. 27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III,

Book V of the Revised Administrative Code

provides:

Sec. 14. . . .

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the

Government in extending free legal assistance to

indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,

administrative and other quasi-judicial cases. 28

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have

accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as

this was inconsistent with the office's mission. 29

Respondent violated the prohibition against

accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:

CANON 1. – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND

PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL

PROCESSES.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. 30 This

undertaking includes the observance of the above-

mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by

respondent when he accepted the complainant's

cases and received attorney's fees in consideration

of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's

acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule

18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

because the prohibition on the private practice of

profession disqualified him from acting as the

complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against

handling private cases and accepting attorney's

fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the

complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint

against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he

should not have done), respondent also led the

complainant to believe that he really filed an

action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it

appear that the cases were being tried and asked

the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for

hearings that never took place. These acts

constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's

oath not to do any falsehood. 31

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the

integrity and good moral character required of all

lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.

Lawyers in public office are expected not only to

refrain from any act or omission which tend to

lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in

government but also uphold the dignity of the legal

profession at all times and observe a high standard

of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is

a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a

high degree of social responsibility, higher than his

brethren in private practice. 32

There is, however, insufficient basis to find

respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did

not hold the money for the benefit of the

complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees.

He neither held the amount in trust for the

8 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

complainant (such as an amount delivered by the

sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in

favor of the client) 33 nor was it given to him for a

specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing

fees and bail bond). 34 Nevertheless, respondent

should return the P5,000 as he, a government

lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not

allowed to accept them. 35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of

violating the lawyer's oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and

Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED

from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED

STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also

ordered to return to complainant the amount of

P5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from

1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the

personal records of respondent in the Office of the

Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the

Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to

all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-

Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Garcia, Velasco, Jr.,

Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Chico-Nazario, J., took no part.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1062. July 31, 2000.]

MS. ALICE DAVILA, complainant, vs. JUDGE

JOSELITO S.D. GENEROSO, respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1260. July 31, 2000.]

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 97-251-MTJ)

DR. LETICIA S. SANTOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE

JOSELITO S.D. GENEROSO, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Two letter-complaints were sent to the Office of the

Court Administrator complaining of undue delay in

the disposition of their respective cases before the

sala of respondent Judge Joselito S.D. Generoso

Presiding Judge of Branch 34 of the Metropolitan

Trial Court of Quezon City. The Court issued several

resolutions requiring respondent judge to comment

on the complaints against him, but respondent

repeatedly failed to comply with the said

resolutions. The Court Administrator recommended

the dismissal from the service of respondent judge,

with forfeiture of all benefits and leave credits and

disqualification from reinstatement or appointment

to any public office, including government-owned

or controlled corporations. ScCIaA

The Supreme Court upheld the recommendation of

the Court Administrator. According to the Court,

the failure of respondent judge to comply with the

show-cause resolutions constitutes "grave and

serious misconduct affecting his fitness and

worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to

his office." The Court noted that respondent judge

was afforded several opportunities to explain his

failure to decide the subject cases long pending

before his court and to comply with the directives

of the Court, but he had failed, and continued to

fail, to heed the orders of the Court; a glaring proof

that he has become disinterested in his position in

the judicial system to which he belongs.

Respondent judge's failure to decide the cases in

question within the reglementary period of ninety

(90) days from their date of submission in itself

constituted gross inefficiency and was violative of

Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct. The separation of the respondent judge

from the service is indeed warranted, if only to see

to it that the people's trust in the judiciary is

maintained and speedy administration of justice is

assured.

SYLLABUS

1.POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC

OFFICERS; JUDGES; FAILURE OF RESPONDENT JUDGE

TO COMPLY WITH THE SHOW-CAUSE RESOLUTIONS

CONSTITUTES GRAVE AND SERIOUS MISCONDUCT

AFFECTING HIS FITNESS AND WORTHINESS OF THE

HONOR AND INTEGRITY ATTACHED TO HIS OFFICE. —

After a careful study, and considering the failure of

respondent judge to explain the undue delay in the

disposition of subject cases before his court and his

repeated failure to comply with the orders issued in

connection therewith, the Court finds merit in the

recommendation of the Court Administrator. The

failure of respondent judge to comply with the

show-cause resolutions aforecited constitutes

"grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness

and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached

to his office." It is noteworthy that respondent judge

was afforded several opportunities to explain his

failure to decide the subject cases long pending

before his court and to comply with the directives

of the Court, but he has failed, and continues to

fail, to heed the orders of the Court; a glaring proof

that he has become disinterested in his position in

the judicial system to which he belongs.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; SEPARATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE

FROM THE SERVICE IS WARRANTED, IF ONLY TO SEE

9 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

TO IT THAT THE PEOPLE'S TRUST IN THE JUDICIARY BE

MAINTAINED AND SPEEDY ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE BE ASSURED. — It is beyond cavil that the

inability of respondent judge to decide the cases in

question within the reglementary period of ninety

(90) days from their date of submission, constitutes

gross inefficiency and is violative of Rule 3.05,

Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which

provides that "[a] judge shall dispose of the court's

business promptly and decide cases within the

required periods." The separation of the respondent

judge from the service is indeed warranted, if only

to see to it that the people's trust in the judiciary be

maintained and speedy administration of justice be

assured. cTSHaE

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM p:

The office of a judge requires him to obey all the

lawful orders of his superiors. A judge is required to

decide cases before him with dispatch, mindful

that delay in the disposition of cases erodes the

faith of the people in the judicial system. A judge

who cannot comply with such a sworn duty should

not serve the judiciary any longer.

Administrative Matter No. MTJ-95-1062 was

commenced by a letter-complaint 1 sent to the

Court Administrator by Ms. Alice Davila

(complainant Davila), complaining of undue delay

in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 12293 before

respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 34 of the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

Complainant Davila alleged that subject criminal

case was deemed submitted for decision way back

on February 16, 1993 but has remained undecided.

In a 1st Indorsement 2 dated May 30, 1994, Deputy

Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis (DCA

Abesamis) required the respondent judge to

comment on the complaint within ten (10) days

from notice. In view of the failure of respondent

judge to comply with the said 1st Indorsement,

Reynaldo L. Suarez (DCA Suarez), successor of DCA

Abesamis, sent a First Tracer 3 warning the

respondent judge that should he fail to comment

he (DCA Suarez) will recommend resolution of the

Complaint without respondent's comment.

On October 11, 1995, the Court Administrator

received a letter 4 from complainant Davila, dated

September 7, 1995, requesting information as to the

status of her subject complaint against the

respondent judge. Thereafter, DCA Suarez

recommended to the Court that respondent judge

be made to explain his failure to decide subject

Criminal Case No. 12293 and to comply with the

directives of the Court Administrator in connection

therewith. HTDCAS

Acting thereupon, the Court issued the following

Resolutions, to wit:

1.Resolution, 5 dated December 11, 1995, requiring

respondent judge to

"(a)EXPLAIN his failure to decide Crim. Case No.

12293; and (b) SHOW CAUSE why he should not be

administratively dealt with or held in contempt for

failure to comply with the directive of the Office of

the Court Administrator requiring him to inform said

Office of his comment/action on the complaint of

Alice Davila, both within ten (10) days from notice

hereof."

2.Resolution, 6 dated October 7, 1996, requiring the

respondent judge, anew, to comment on the

subject complaint within fifteen (15) days from

notice;

3.Resolution, 7 dated August 13, 1997, requiring, for

the last time, the respondent judge to comply

within ten (10) days from notice with the aforesaid

Resolution of December 11, 1995; otherwise, the

same complaint will be decided on the basis of the

pleadings and records on hand;

4.Resolution, 8 dated January 21, 1998, requiring the

respondent judge to show cause why he should not

be dealt with disciplinarily or held in contempt for

failure to comment on subject complaint of

complainant Davila and to comply with the

resolution of August 13, 1997, within ten (10) days

from notice;

5.Resolution, 9 dated October 5, 1998, requiring

respondent judge to comply with the resolution of

January 21, 1998, within ten (10) days from notice,

under pain of appropriate disciplinary action; and

6.Resolution, 10 dated March 17, 1999, requiring

respondent judge to show cause why he should not

be dealt with more severely for failure to comply

with the Resolution, dated December 11, 1995, and

to file the required comment within ten (10) days

from notice.

Administrative Matter No. OCA IPI 97-251-MTJ was

commenced by the letter-complaint 11 of Dr.

Leticia S. Santos complaining of the delay in the

resolution of her case pending before the

respondent judge. She stressed that Civil Case No.

10 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

11072, a simple case of ejectment, was submitted

for decision on June 28, 1995 but as of June 17,

1996, the case had not been decided.

In a 1st Indorsement 12 dated June 20, 1996, DCA

Suarez required respondent judge to comment on

the said complaint within ten (10) days from receipt

thereof. Absent any Comment filed, DCA Suarez

sent a 1st Tracer, 13 with the follow-up letter 14 of

Dr. Santos thereto attached, requiring the

respondent judge to comply with the 1st

Indorsement of June 20, 1996 within five (5) days;

otherwise, the case would be submitted for the

consideration of the Court.

On March 17, 1997, the Court resolved to

consolidate Administrative Matter No. OCA IPI 97-

251-MTJ with Administrative Matter No. MTJ-95-1062.

15

It bears stressing that, in the above-cited Resolutions

dated August 13, 1997, January 21, 1998, October

5, 1998, and March 17, 1999, respectively,

respondent judge was required to comment on the

Complaint and to explain his failure to comply with

the directives of the Court. But as in the former

case, the respondent judge utterly failed to heed

the orders of the Court.

The Court Administrator recommended the

dismissal from the service of respondent judge, with

forfeiture of all benefits and leave credits and

disqualification from reinstatement or appointment

to any public office, including government-owned

or controlled corporation.

After a careful study, and considering the failure of

respondent judge to explain the undue delay in the

disposition of subject cases before his court and his

repeated failure to comply with the orders issued in

connection therewith, the Court finds merit in the

recommendation of the Court Administrator.

The failure of respondent judge to comply with the

show-cause resolutions aforecited constitutes

"grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness

and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached

to his office." 16 It is noteworthy that respondent

judge was afforded several opportunities to explain

his failure to decide the subject cases long pending

before his court and to comply with the directives

of the Court, but he has failed, and continues to

fail, to heed the orders of the Court, a glaring proof

that he has become disinterested in his position in

the judicial system to which he belongs. 17

It is beyond cavil that the inability of respondent

judge to decide the cases in question within the

reglementary period of ninety (90) days from their

date of submission, constitutes gross inefficiency 18

and is violative of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of

Judicial Conduct, which provides that "[a] judge

shall dispose of the court's business promptly and

decide cases within the required periods." EcTCAD

The separation of the respondent judge from the

service is indeed warranted, if only to see to it that

the people's trust in the judiciary be maintained

and speedy administration of justice be assured.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Joselito S.D.

Generoso is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with

forfeiture of all benefits and leave credits, and with

disqualification from reinstatement or appointment

to any office in the government, including

government-owned and controlled corporations.

ACcHIa

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,

Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago,

and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is abroad on official business.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 6249. October 14, 2004.]

[Formerly AC CBD No. 232 ]

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, complainant, vs.

ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

QUISUMBING, J p:

In a Verified Complaint 1 filed with the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines on January 25, 1993,

complainant Social Security Commission (hereafter

the Commission, for brevity) sought to disbar

respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral for preparing,

notarizing, and filing with the Commission's Regional

Office in Bacolod City two complaints allegedly

executed and verified by people who have been

long dead.

The Commission alleged that respondent filed the

first spurious complaint 2 on April 18, 1986, on behalf

of one Hermogenes Bareno. The complaint was

signed by respondent himself, but appeared to

have been verified by Bareno with a thumbmark

and acknowledged before respondent on April 16,

11 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

1986. Later, upon investigation, it was discovered

that Bareno had died two years earlier. 3

The second spurious complaint, 4 for its part, was

filed on September 10, 1987, on behalf of one

Domingo N. Panadero, under similar circumstances.

The complaint was likewise signed by respondent

himself and likewise appeared to have been

verified by Panadero with a thumbmark and

acknowledged before respondent shortly prior to

filing. When this complaint was investigated, it was

discovered that Panadero had also died long

before. 5

Adding to these charges, the Commission filed on

May 16, 1994, a Supplemental Complaint. 6 The

Commission added that on July 12, 1990,

respondent had filed a third similarly spurious

complaint. 7 Like the other two complaints, the third

complaint was signed by respondent himself and

likewise appeared to have been subscribed and

sworn to before him in Bacolod by the purported

complainant, one Catalino de la Cruz, who, upon

being investigated, declared in an affidavit that he

had never been to Bacolod City for the last ten

years, that he had never verified any such

complaint, and that he did not even know who

respondent was. 8

Claiming that respondent was liable for misconduct

and unethical practice of law, the Commission

prayed in both its Verified Complaint and

Supplemental Complaint that respondent be

disbarred and his name removed from the Roll of

Attorneys.

In his Comment, respondent argued that since

Hermogenes Bareno's impostor had Bareno's Social

Security System (SSS) card, Domingo Panadero's

impostor had Panadero's SSS FORM E-1, and

Catalino de la Cruz's impostor had an ID, he could

not be faulted for not investigating further into their

identities. He argued he had sufficiently complied

with his obligations as notary public when he relied

only on what they had presented, especially since

they sought only the preparation of simple, but

justified, complaints for remittance of unpaid SSS

premiums. 9

After investigating the matter, the Board of

Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

issued on September 27, 2003, Resolution No. XVI-

2003-175 recommending that respondent be

disbarred. The IBP resolution reads:

RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-175

CBD Case No. 232

Social Security Commission vs.

Atty. Napoleon Corral

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein

made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A";

and, finding the recommendation fully supported

by the evidence on record and the applicable laws

and rules, with modification, and considering

Respondent's violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility by failure to

fulfill his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and

as a Notary Public, Atty. Napoleon Corral is hereby

DISBARRED. 10

The Resolution, now before the Court for final action

pursuant to Sec. 12 par. (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules

of Court, 11 is well taken. DaCEIc

Respondent failed to exercise utmost diligence in

the performance of his duty under Section 1(a) of

Public Act No. 2103, 12 which requires a party to

any document notarized by a notary public to

personally appear before the latter. 13 Bareno,

Panadero, and de la Cruz did not personally

appear before respondent. The death certificates

presented show that both Bareno and Panadero

had long been dead, while de la Cruz's unrebutted

affidavit proves he had never been to Bacolod City

where he supposedly verified the complaint. It is a

mystery, then, how respondent, in notarizing the

complaints, could have certified that Bareno,

Panadero and de la Cruz personally appeared

before him and swore to the truth of the facts

stated in the complaints.

Respondent did not clarify whether the forms of

identification presented to him and on which he

relied were valid IDs. He never expounded on what

documents Bareno's impostor presented or on what

kind of ID de la Cruz's impostor showed him. An

examination of said SSS Form E-1, presented to him

by Panadero's impostor, also shows that it is only a

statement of a member's beneficiaries and does

not, in any way, tend to prove that the bearer is the

member whose name appears on said form.

Respondent did not even state what precautions

he took to ascertain the identities of those who

appeared before him. He asseverated that it was

sufficient that he relied on some form of

identification, especially since he was merely

notarizing simple complaints for remittance of

unpaid SSS contributions. Respondent failed to

realize that the complaints he had prepared and

carelessly notarized would haul the prospective

12 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

defendants in those complaints to the Commission

and cause them to spend valuable time and incur

expenses in their defense. Such jaunty indifference

betrays his deplorable failure to heed the

importance of the notarial act and observe with

utmost care the basic requirements in the

performance of his duties as a notary public. It is

noteworthy to stress here that a notary public is

duty bound to require the person executing a

document to be personally present, to swear

before him that he is that person and ask the latter

if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same.

Respondent is reminded that faithful observance

and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the

oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.

14 Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,

routinary act. 15 Being a lawyer, respondent has a

graver responsibility because of his solemn oath to

obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent

to the doing of any. 16 He is mandated to

discharge his duties, which are dictated by public

policy and impressed with public interest, with

accuracy and fidelity. 17

By recklessly notarizing the complaints without

ascertaining that Hermogenes Bareno, Domingo

Panadero, and Catalino de la Cruz were indeed

personally appearing before him to attest to the

contents and truth of what were stated in the

complaints he prepared, respondent undermined

the confidence of the public on notarial

documents. He breached Canon I of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to

uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land

and promote respect for the law and legal

processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes

lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct. 18 Serious doubts

exist in his fitness to continue as a member of an

esteemed and honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, for violating Public Act No. 2103,

Section 1(a) and the Code of Professional

Responsibility, respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral's

notarial commission, if still extant, is INDEFINITELY

SUSPENDED. 19

Respondent is further DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE

within ten (10) days from receipt of copy of this

Resolution why he should not be disbarred. IcHTAa

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Panganiban, Ynares-

Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-

Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ .,

concur.

Carpio Morales, Azcuna and Chico-Nazario, JJ .,

are on leave.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004.]

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO,

SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D.

EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON B. MELGAR,

complainants, vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA,

respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino,

Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr.,

Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar

against Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza for Grossly

Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.

Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint

that respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court

Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V.

Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela

Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G.

Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have

been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband

and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro;

respondent had fathered two children by his

paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and

Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth

certificates of their two daughters that they were

married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that

their two children are legitimate, while in

respondent's Certificate of Candidacy filed with the

COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent

declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in

respondent's certificate of candidacy for the 1998

elections, he declared his civil status as separated;

such declarations in the birth certificates of his

children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts

constituting falsification of public documents; and

respondent's acts betray his lack of good moral

character and constitute grounds for his removal as

a member of the bar.

Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states

that complainants, who are his political opponents

in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this

case to exact revenge on him for his filing of

criminal charges against them; complainants

illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of

Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and

13 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in

violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,

series of 1993, thus, such documents are

inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not

participate in the preparation and submission with

the local civil registry of subject birth certificates;

respondent never declared that he had two wives,

as he has always declared that he is separated in

fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and

complainants have used this issue against him

during elections and yet, the people of Naujan,

Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence,

respondent has not offended the public's sense of

morality.

The administrative case was referred to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for

investigation, report and recommendation.

Thereafter, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the

IBP conducted hearings.

Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and

Romeo M. Laygo, submitted their affidavits as their

direct testimony and were subjected to cross-

examination by respondent's counsel. IcTEaC

Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as

follows: He knows respondent for they both reside in

Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as

a practicing lawyer and a former Municipal Trial

Court Judge. Respondent has been cohabiting

openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente,

representing themselves to be husband and wife,

and from their cohabitation, they produced two

children, namely, Mara Khrisna Charmina dela

Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela

Fuente Mendoza. Sometime in 1995, he (witness

Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen,

informing him that respondent was married to

Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on

January 16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his

wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached

to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification

issued by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage

between respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also

received information from concerned citizens that

Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally married to one

Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a Certification

from the Office of the Civil Register. Respondent

stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed with the

COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to

Felicitas Valderia. In respondent's Certificate of

Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he

declared his civil status as separated. Respondent

has represented to all that he is married to Marilyn

dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper

where respondent holds the position of Chairman of

the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was

reported by said newspaper as husband to Marilyn

dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna

Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.

On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as

follows: He was the former mayor of Naujan and he

and respondent belong to warring political parties.

It was not respondent who told him about the

alleged immoral conduct subject of the present

case. Although he received the letter of a

concerned citizen regarding the immoral conduct

of respondent as far back as 1995, he did not

immediately file a case for disbarment against

respondent. It was only after respondent filed a

criminal case for falsification against him that he

decided to file an administrative case against

respondent. 1

On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified

that there were people who were against the open

relationship between respondent and Marilyn dela

Fuente as respondent had been publicly

introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact

that they are both still legally married to other

persons, and so someone unknown to him just

handed to their maid copies of the birth certificates

of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna

Normina. 2

The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was

adopted as his direct testimony, is practically

identical to that of witness Melgar. On cross-

examination, witness Laygo testified that he was not

the one who procured the certified true copies of

the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela

Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela

Fuente Mendoza, as somebody just gave said

documents to Nelson Melgar. He was a municipal

councilor in 1995 when the letter of a concerned

citizen regarding respondent's immorality was sent

to Melgar, but he did not take any action against

respondent at that time. 3

Complainants then formally offered documentary

evidence consisting of photocopies which were

admitted by respondent's counsel to be faithful

reproductions of the originals or certified true copies

thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudez

informing Nelson Melgar of respondent's immoral

acts, 4 the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar

of San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the celebration

of the marriage between respondent and one

Felicitas Valderia, 5 the Birth Certificate of Mara

Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza, 6 the Birth

Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente

Mendoza, 7 the Certificate of Candidacy of

14 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

respondent dated March 9, 1995, 8 the Certificate

of Candidacy of respondent dated March 25, 1998,

9 Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of

Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998,

attesting to the marriage celebrated between

Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos, 10 and

the editorial page of the Naujanews (February–

March 1999 issue), 11 wherein it was stated that

respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn

dela Fuente.

Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to

present any evidence and merely submitted a

memorandum expounding on his arguments that

the testimonies of complainants' witnesses are mere

hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their

documentary evidence have no probative weight.

On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the

IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading as

follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein

made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,

finding the recommendation fully supported by the

evidence on record and the applicable laws and

rules, and considering respondent's violation of Rule

1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.

Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED

INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he

submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer

cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and

has abandoned such immoral course of conduct.

Portions of the report and recommendation of the

IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, upon which the

above-quoted Resolution was based, read as

follows:

FINDINGS:

The evidence of complainants to support their

charge of immorality consists in a) the testimonies of

Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo given by way of

affidavits executed under oath and affirmed before

the Commission and b) their documentary

evidence consisting of their Exhibits "A" to "H".

Respondent filed his comment through counsel and

did not formally present or offer any evidence.

Respondent opted not to present his evidence

anymore because according to him "there is none

to rebut vis-à-vis the evidence presented by the

private complainants." Respondent instead

submitted a memorandum through counsel to

argue his position. As can be seen from the

comment and memorandum submitted,

respondent's counsel argues that the complaint is

politically motivated since complainants are

political rivals of respondent and that the birth

certificates Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which were

offered to show that respondent sired the children

namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente

Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente

Mendoza out of his cohabitation with Marilyn dela

Fuente are inadmissible because they were

allegedly secured in violation of Administrative

Order No. 1, Series of 1993. The rest of the exhibits

are either hearsay or self-serving according to

respondent. TDcHCa

The witnesses who are also two of the complainants

herein, on the other hand, categorically state in

their affidavits [Exhibits "A" and `B"] particularly in

paragraph 2 that "Respondent has been

cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la

Fuente, representing themselves to be husband

and wife." In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the

witnesses also categorically state that "respondent

has even represented to all and sundry that Marilyn

de la Fuente is his wife." These categorical

statements made under oath by complainants are

not hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondent

chose not to rebut them.

Exhibit "E," the Certificate of Candidacy executed

by respondent shows that respondent is married to

one, Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit "H", a

marriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married

to one, Ramon G. Marcos. Duly certified true copies

of said exhibits have been presented by

complainants.

With respect to Exhibits "D" and "D-1", we believe

that they are competent and relevant evidence

and admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary

rule which bars admission of illegally obtained

evidence applies more appropriately to evidence

obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures.

The instant case cannot be analogous to an illegal

search or seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of

Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by

respondent risks the penalty of imprisonment or

payment of a fine but it does not make the

document so issued inadmissible as evidence

specially in proceedings like the present case.

Exhibits "D" and "D-1" which are duly certified birth

certificates are therefore competent evidence to

show paternity of said children by respondent in the

absence of any evidence to the contrary.

15 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

By and large the evidence of complainants

consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Nelson

Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and corroborated by

the documentary exhibits will show that indeed

respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a

certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and

that out of said cohabitation respondent sired two

children. These facts we repeat have not been

denied by respondent under oath since he chose

to just argue on the basis of the improper

motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and

self-serving nature of the documents presented.

Complainants have presented evidence sufficient

enough to convince us that indeed respondent has

been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not

his wife. The evidence taken together will support

the fact that respondent is not of good moral

character. That respondent chose not to deny

under oath the grave and serious allegations made

against him is to our mind his undoing and his

silence has not helped his position before the

Commission. As between the documents and

positive statements of complainants, made under

oath and the arguments and comments of

respondent submitted through his lawyers, which

were not verified under oath by respondent himself,

we are inclined and so give weight to the evidence

of complainants. The direct and forthright

testimonies and statements of Nelson Melgar and

Romeo Laygo that respondent was openly

cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente is not hearsay.

The witnesses may have admitted that respondent

Mendoza did not tell them that a certain Marilyn de

la Fuente was his paramour (for why would

respondent admit that to complainants) but the

witnesses did state clearly in their affidavits under

oath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn

de la Fuente who is not respondent's wife. Again

their categorical statements taken together with

the other documents, are enough to convince us

and conclude that respondent is not of good moral

character.

Members of the Bar have been repeatedly

reminded that possession of good moral character

is a continuing condition for membership in the Bar

in good standing. The continued possession of

good moral character is a requisite condition for

remaining in the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras

100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA

680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)].

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a

member of the bar to continue as such includes

conduct that outrages the generally accepted

moral standards of the community, conduct for

instance, which makes "mockery of the inviolable

social institution of marriage" [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274

SCRA 1 (1997)].

In the instant case respondent has disregarded and

made a mockery of the fundamental institution of

marriage. Respondent in fact even so stated in

Exhibit "F" that he is separated from his wife. This fact

and statement without any further explanation from

respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral

character which good moral character we repeat

is a continuing condition for a member to remain in

good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not

engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct. Respondent has violated this rule against

engaging in immoral conduct.

We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the

pronouncement made in Santos vs. Dischoso, 84

SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be used by

private persons particularly disgruntled opponents

to vent their rancor on members of the Bar through

unjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the

instant case the charges can hardly be considered

as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence

presented. The evidence presented shows that

respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral

character necessary as a condition for him to

remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He is

therefore not entitled to continue to engage in the

practice of law.

We find such report and recommendation of the

IBP to be fully supported by the pleadings and

evidence on record, and, hence, approve and

adopt the same. CSDAIa

The evidence presented by complainants reach

that quantum of evidence required in

administrative proceedings which is only substantial

evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conviction. 12

Witness Melgar's testimony that respondent had

been publicly introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his

wife is corroborated by the contents of an article in

the Naujanews, introducing respondent as one of

Naujan's public servants, and stating therein that

respondent has been blessed with two beautiful

children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente. 13 It

should be noted that said publication is under the

control of respondent, he being the Chairman of

the Board thereof. Thus, it could be reasonably

concluded that if he contested the truth of the

contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he

did not wish to publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente

16 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

as his wife, he could have easily ordered that the

damning portions of said article to be edited out.

With regard to respondent's argument that the

credibility of witnesses for the complainants is

tainted by the fact that they are motivated by

revenge for respondent's filing of criminal cases

against them, we opine that even if witnesses

Melgar and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility

of their testimonies cannot be discounted as they

are fully supported and corroborated by

documentary evidence which speak for

themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna

Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna

Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16,

1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M.

Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the

Certification from the Office of the Local Civil

Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its

records of an entry of a marriage between

respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated

on January 16, 1980, are public documents and are

prima facie evidence of the facts contained

therein, as provided for under Article 410 14 of the

Civil Code of the Philippines.

Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth

certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente

Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente

Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990,

respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn

Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for

having been obtained in violation of Rule 24,

Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, which

provides as follows:

Rule 24.Non-Disclosure of Birth Records. —

(1)The records of a person's birth shall be kept

strictly confidential and no information relating

thereto shall be issued except on the request of any

of the following:

a.the concerned person himself, or any person

authorized by him;

b.the court or proper public official whenever

absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial or

other official proceedings to determine the identity

of the child's parents or other circumstances

surrounding his birth; and

c.in case of the person's death, the nearest of kin.

(2)Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer

the penalty of imprisonment of at least two months

or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred

pesos, or both in the discretion of the court. (Article

7, P.D. 603)

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on

Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible

when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded

by the law or these rules." There could be no

dispute that the subject birth certificates are

relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is

whether the law or the rules provide for the

inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for

having been obtained in violation of Rule 24,

Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series

of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons

violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records,

but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth

records in violation of said rule would render said

records inadmissible in evidence. On the other

hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides

for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a

result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be

emphasized, however, that said rule against

unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only

to protect a person from interference by the

government or the state. 15 In People vs. Hipol, 16

we explained that:

The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of

Rights does not concern itself with the relation

between a private individual and another

individual. It governs the relationship between the

individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of

Rights only tempers governmental power and

protects the individual against any aggression and

unwarranted interference by any department of

government and its agencies. Accordingly, it

cannot be extended to the acts complained of in

this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by

Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the

treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of

the constitutional proscription on unwarranted

searches and seizures. CDAHIT

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as

private individuals, obtained the subject birth

records as evidence against respondent, the

protection against unreasonable searches and

seizures does not apply.

Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,

series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do

not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the

birth certificates in question, said public documents

are, therefore, admissible and should be properly

taken into consideration in the resolution of this

administrative case against respondent.

17 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of

Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and

Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and

respondent's Certificate of Candidacy dated

March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself declared

he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never

denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said

public documents sufficiently prove that he

fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente

despite the fact that he was still legally married to

Felicitas Valderia at that time.

In Bar Matter No. 1154, 17 good moral character

was defined thus:

. . . good moral character is what a person really is,

as distinguished from good reputation or from the

opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate

in which he is held by the public in the place where

he is known. Moral character is not a subjective

term but one which corresponds to objective

reality. The standard of personal and professional

integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely

enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal

law.

In Zaguirre vs. Castillo, 18 we reiterated the

definition of immoral conduct, to wit:

. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or

shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of

good and respectable members of the community.

Furthermore, such conduct must not only be

immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so

corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so

unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high

degree or committed under such scandalous or

revolting circumstances as to shock the common

sense of decency.

In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a

member of the Bar and officer of the court is not

only required to refrain from adulterous relationships

or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave

himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by

creating the belief that he is flouting those moral

standards and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a

woman other than his wife is a conduct way below

the standards of morality required of every lawyer.

19

We must rule in the same wise in this case before us.

The fact that respondent continues to publicly and

openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal

wife, thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of

good moral character. Respondent should keep in

mind that the requirement of good moral character

is not only a condition precedent to admission to

the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing

requirement to maintain one's good standing in the

legal profession. 20 In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr., 21 we

emphasized that:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for

integrity and good moral character of members of

the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold

the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and

refrain from any act or omission which might lessen

the trust and confidence reposed by the public in

the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal

profession. Membership in the legal profession is a

privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that

an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and

confidence of the public, it becomes not only the

right but also the duty of this Court, which made

him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of

ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M.

Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in

violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from

the practice of law until he submits satisfactory

proof that he has abandoned his immoral course of

conduct.

Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on

respondent at his last known address and entered

in his record as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar

Confidant, and the Court Administrator be

furnished also a copy of this resolution for their

information and guidance as well as for

circularization to all courts in the country. SDECAI

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-

Nazario and Garcia, JJ ., concur.

Azcuna, J ., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6441. October 21, 2004.]

(Formerly CBD 02-946)

VIOLETA R. TAHAW, complainant, vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS

P. VITAN, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J p:

A lawyer must at all times comport himself in a

manner befitting a member of this noble profession

18 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

and worthy of his esteemed position in society.

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be

eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct

of a member of the Bar. 1 Thus, any indicia of

erosion in the dignity of the profession will be dealt

with accordingly by this Court.

In a Complaint 2 dated 11 March 2002, Violeta R.

Tahaw claimed that she secured the services of

respondent for filing the appropriate action for the

partition of a real property located in Makati City

sometime in 1999. As agreed upon, petitioner

delivered to respondent four (4) checks in the total

amount of P30,000.00 representing payment of the

latter's professional fee. However, after almost a

year without petitioner hearing from respondent

about the case he would file in court, petitioner

sent respondent a letter-inquiry as to the status of

the case. Respondent assured complainant that he

had already filed the appropriate case in Makati.

Not convinced by her counsel's assurance,

complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of

Court of Makati City to check if a case was indeed

filed by respondent for and in her behalf.

A Certification dated 15 August 2000 issued by the

assistant Clerk of Court of Makati City confirmed

complainant's suspicion that respondent did not file

the case as agreed upon. She wrote respondent

informing him that she is terminating the latter's

services as counsel and demanded the refund of

the P30,000.00. Respondent failed to refund the

aforesaid amount, and complainant was thus

prompted to seek the assistance of the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The IBP, responding to complainant's predicament

and wrote respondent two (2) letters, 3 informing

the latter of complainant's grievance and asking his

position thereon. Respondent, through a letter 4 to

the IBP, claimed that the problem arose from a

miscommunication between client and counsel. In

addition, respondent insinuated that the case he

was supposed to file for the complainant was

complicated by the filing of other earlier complaints

which he was not privy to. He promised to refund

the complainant the P30,000.00. ECDHIc

The IBP acknowledged receipt of respondent's

response and instructed him to issue six (6)

postdated checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00

and dated a month apart, and to deliver the same

to the IBP's office to facilitate the return of the

P30,000.00 to complainant. Despite the instruction,

respondent failed to refund the amount to

complainant, and succeeded only in having

complainant go back and forth to his office.

Complainant once more wrote to respondent

regarding the checks, only to be told by

respondent that he will just send the checks through

his secretary. Complainant then filed a complaint

for disbarment or suspension with the IBP.

For his part, respondent denied that he obligated

himself to file the partition case upon receipt of the

P30,000.00 as claimed by complainant. He averred

that the said amount represents consultation fees,

research fees, and minimal acceptance fees. 5 He

stated that complainant failed to disclose to him

circumstances which would have adverse effects

on the case sought to be filed 6 and that when he

confronted complainant about these, the latter

became "lukewarm." 7 Furthermore, he claimed

that he asked complainant for the filing fees but the

latter "dilly-dallied" and after a while he received a

letter terminating his services. 8 In fact, complainant

had already affixed her signature to the complaint

but was probably swayed by other advisers not to

proceed with the case and instead pursue the

refund of the P30,000.00. 9

On 27 November 2003, IBP Commissioner Acerey C.

Pacheco submitted his report and

recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. As

per the report, respondent's agreement to

represent complainant in the partition case

intended to be filed was established. 10 Likewise,

the report pointed out the inconsistency between

respondent's statement in his Answer denying that

he obligated himself to file the case upon receipt of

P30,000.00 and complainant's dilly-dallying in giving

him the amount for filing fees, as against his

assurances to complainant that the case was

already filed. 11 The report noted that respondent's

failure to reply to or deny complainant's allegation

in her letter terminating his services was an

admission that he miserably failed to diligently

attend to the latter's case. 12 Finally, the report

stated that respondent failed to comply with his

commitment to return the P30,000.00. Considering

that the amount was paid by the complainant for

his professional services which he miserably failed to

perform, the same must be returned to

complainant without delay. 13 The report

recommended that respondent be reprimanded

and admonished to be more careful in the

performance of his duty to his clients. 14

On 27 February 2004, the IBP Board of Governors

issued a resolution adopting and approving the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, 15 to wit:

19 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein

made part of this Resolution as Annex "A;" and,

finding the recommendation fully supported by the

evidence on record and applicable laws and rules,

considering that a lawyer should refrain from any

action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he

abuses or takes advantage of the confidence

reposed in him by his client, Atty. Jeremi[as] P. Vitan

is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be,

henceforth, more careful in the performance of his

duty to his clients and Ordered to Immediately

Return the amount of P30,000.00 to complainant.

After a careful consideration of the record of the

instant case, the Court agrees with the IBP in its

findings and conclusion that respondent has been

remiss in his responsibilities. However, this Court

holds that the appropriate sanction should be a

suspension for a period of six (6) months.

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his

client and he shall be mindful of the trust and

confidence reposed in him." In the case of Aromin

v. Atty. Boncavil, 16 this Court held:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client,

the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must

always be mindful of the trust and confidence

reposed in him. He must serve the client with

competence and diligence, and champion the

latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and

devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion

to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the

maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and

the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the

end that nothing be taken or withheld from his

client save, by the rules of law, legally applied. This

simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit

of any and every remedy and defense that is

authorized by the law of the land and he may

expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or

defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it

is because the entrusted privilege to practice law

carries with it the correlative duties not only to the

client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the

public. A lawyer who performs his duty with

diligence and candor not only protects the interest

of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does

honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of

the community to the legal profession. 17

The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by

clients require in a lawyer a high standard and

appreciation of his duty to them. To this end,

nothing should be done by any member of the

legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any

degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,

honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. 18

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that

complainant wanted to partition a parcel of

residential land owned in part by her deceased

husband, Simeon Tahaw, Sr. 19 Allegedly, Simeon

owed complainant sums of money which the

former failed to pay, as a result of which,

complainant filed a case against him. To settle the

case, the spouses entered into an agreement 20

dated 27 May 1987 wherein Simeon Tahaw, Sr. and

complainant agreed that a specific forty (40)

square meter portion of the same parcel of land

"shall pass on to complainant as her exclusive

property to the exclusion of all other heirs." 21 When

Simeon died, complainant went to respondent to

seek the partition of the same parcel of land with

the forty (40) square meter portion thereof awarded

to her. aAHDIc

It is an elementary principle in civil law that every

donation between the spouses during the marriage

is void. 22 The agreement relied upon by

complainant for the proposed partition case

partakes the nature of a donation by Simeon of a

part of his undivided share in the property. Hence,

the agreement is void and cannot be the source of

any right in favor of complainant. The partition case

was premised on a void agreement and thus could

not prosper.

Even if complainant did not disclose the previous

litigation and agreements between her and her

deceased husband, respondent would eventually

find out, as in fact he did, about it in the course of

drafting the proposed complaint. Any lawyer worth

his salt would know that the partition case sought to

be filed would have no basis and would not

prosper. Respondent should have immediately

appraised complainant on the lack of merit of her

case. Instead, he asked for money for filing fees,

and worse, pretended to have filed the complaint.

Clearly, respondent's protestations that the delay

and eventual non-filing of the case for complainant

was due to the latter's fault fall flat in view of the

circumstances surrounding the case. Complainant's

assertion that respondent reassured her that the

case had already been filed remains

uncontroverted by the latter. Why would

respondent lead complainant to believe that a

20 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

case has been filed, and why would the latter

expect that it be filed, if as respondent claims, he

was still waiting for the filing fees from the

complainant? Moreover, in his letter to the IBP

dated 29 November 2000, 23 respondent stated

that he was willing to arrange for the refund of the

P30,000.00 as he "in conscience cannot file a case

merely just for the sake of filing a case to earn [a]

few bucks." 24 If respondent believes that

complainant's case appeared hopeless, why did he

not advise her so? Why did he let the matter drag

until this very proceeding before he explained the

non-filing of the proposed case?

When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby

covenants that he will exert all effort for its

prosecution until its final conclusion. 25 Thus, when

respondent's services were engaged by

complainant, the former took it upon himself to

perform the legal services required of him. In the

instant case, however, respondent seemed to have

forgotten his sworn duty after he received the

money from his client. acCETD

Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

mandates that a "lawyer shall at all times uphold

the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." The

strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity

and integrity of its members. For this reason, this

Court has been exacting in its demand of integrity

and good moral character of the members of the

Bar. As explained in Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina: 26

This Court has been exacting in its demand for

integrity and good moral character of the members

of the Bar. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the

integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust

and confidence necessarily reposed by clients

requires in the attorney a high standard and

appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession,

the courts and the public. The bar must maintain a

high standard of legal proficiency as well as of

honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a

lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by

faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar,

to the courts and to his clients. To this end, members

of the legal fraternity can do nothing that might

tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the

public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the

profession. 27

Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he should

undertake the task with dedication and care, and if

he should do any less, then he is not true to his

lawyer's oath. 28 The records of the case clearly

show that respondent failed to live up to the duties

and responsibilities of a member of the legal

profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias P. Vitan is

hereby found GUILTY of violation of Canons 7 and

17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his

failure to file the necessary pleading for his client's

case and for the failure to return and immediately

deliver the funds of his client advanced for the

purpose of filing the said case, upon demand, and

even after his commitment with the IBP to do so.

The respondent is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of

six (6) months effective from the date of

promulgation hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a

repetition of the same and similar acts shall be

dealt with more severely. Atty. Vitan is ORDERED to

immediately RETURN the amount of P30,000.00 to

complainant.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.

Vitan's personal record in the Office of the Bar

Confidant and copies thereof be furnished to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED. CAHTIS

Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-

Nazario, JJ ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6442. October 21, 2004.]

HON. MARIANO S. MACIAS, complainant, vs. ATTY.

ALANIXON A. SELDA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J p:

For violation of the lawyer's oath, Judge Mariano S.

Macias, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,

Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, filed before

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Petition

for Administrative Discipline against Atty. Alanixon

A. Selda. 1

The facts are undisputed. On January 24, 2000,

respondent Selda withdrew as counsel for one

Norma T. Lim, private protestee in Election Case No.

SE-01 entitled Ruth Maraon v. The Municipal Board

of Canvassers, Salud, Zamboanga del Norte, and

Norma T. Lim for Annulment of Election, etc. 2 He

basically submitted as ground for his withdrawal

that he could not cope up with the pace of the

proceedings in view of his workload. He claimed

that the hearings of the election protest case would

run from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and he still had to

attend to his other cases including classes at

21 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

Philippine Advent College, which start at 5:30 p.m.

on Mondays and Wednesdays.

In light of these representations, complainant

granted the Motion and ordered respondent

relieved of all his responsibilities as counsel for

private protestee. However, on May 22, 2000,

respondent executed an affidavit disavowing his

grounds for withdrawing as counsel for private

protestee. He swore that he only filed the Motion on

account of the pre-judgment of the case by

complainant, who, on several occasions insinuated

to him that his client would lose in the protest. He

stated that he was convinced that chaos would

result if his client were unseated, and withdrawal

from the case was his best recourse.

On the basis of respondent's affidavit, his former

client and private protestee in subject election

protest case, moved for the inhibition of

complainant. On June 2, 2000, complainant

granted the motion for his inhibition if only to

disabuse any doubt on his impartiality. But on

August 23, 2000, this Court set aside complainant's

inhibition after finding no strong and valid reason

therefor, and directed him to continue hearing the

case and to resolve it with reasonable dispatch.

aEIcHA

Deploring the act of respondent as "serious deceit,

malpractice, gross misconduct as a lawyer and in

utter violation of the lawyer's oath," complainant

requested the IBP to investigate the matter and

recommend to the Court an appropriate penalty

against respondent. On January 30, 2002, the IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline 3 required respondent

to answer. He failed.

On November 21, 2003, after several

postponements filed by the parties, their failure to

personally appear before the IBP investigating

commission, and the request of complainant to

resolve the case on the basis of the pleadings,

Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,

submitted her report and recommended to the IBP

Board of Governors that respondent be suspended

from the practice of law for two (2) years.

The Board, in its Resolution No. XVI-2004-122 dated

February 27, 2004, adopted and approved with

modification the Report and Recommendation of

Commissioner Maala. It reduced the suspension of

respondent to six (6) months; hence, the transmittal

of the case and its records to this Court for final

resolution 4 pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of

the Rules of Court, viz:

Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. —

. . . (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its

total membership, determines that the respondent

should be suspended from the practice of law or

disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its

findings and recommendations which, together

with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be

transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

We affirm the findings of the IBP on the culpability of

respondent.

All members of the legal profession made a solemn

oath to, inter alia, "do no falsehood" and "conduct

[themselves] as [lawyers] according to the best of

[their] knowledge and discretion with all good

fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients."

These particular fundamental principles are

reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility,

specifically:

Canon 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and

good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,

nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall

he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by an

artifice.

When respondent executed his affidavit of May 22,

2000 retracting his reason for withdrawing as

counsel for Norma T. Lim, he acknowledged, under

oath, his misrepresentation. He misled the court in

clear violation of his oath as lawyer and failed to

abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

TaSEHD

Candor towards the courts is a cardinal

requirement of the practicing lawyer. 5 In fact, this

obligation to the bench for candor and honesty

takes precedence. 6 Thus, saying one thing in his

Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Private Protestee

and another in his subsequent affidavit is a

transgression of this imperative which necessitates

appropriate punishment.

The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an

errant attorney involves the exercise of sound

judicial discretion based on the facts of the case.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides,

viz:

Sec. 27.Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by

Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of

the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his

office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any

deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in

22 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason

of his conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is

required to take before admission to practice, or for

a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a

superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing

as an attorney for a party to a case without

authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases

for the purpose of gain, either personally or through

paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The circumstances in this case demand that

respondent be imposed suspension from the

practice of law for one (1) year. This serves the

purpose of protecting the interest of the court, the

legal profession and the public. For indeed, "if

respect for the courts and for judicial process is

gone or steadily weakened, no law can save us as

a society." 7

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the February 27, 2004 Resolution

of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 02-

921 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that

respondent Atty. Alanixon A. Selda is SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for one (1) year, to

commence upon receipt of this Decision. He is

further sternly warned that a repetition of a similar

offense will call for a more severe consequence.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the

personal record of respondent with the Office of

the Bar Confidant. Likewise, let copies of this

Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines and all its chapters, and to all the courts

in the land. IaAEHD

Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-

Nazario, JJ ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[A. C. No. 3523. January 17, 2005.]

RASMUS G. ANDERSON, JR., petitioner, vs. ATTY.

REYNALDO A. CARDEÑO, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AZCUNA, J p:

For resolution is an administrative case against Atty.

Reynaldo A. Cardeño for malpractice and neglect

of duty, stemming from his alleged neglect or

deliberate mishandling of a case involving herein

petitioner, resulting to the latter's prejudice.

After receipt of the complaint and the

corresponding comment thereto, this Court, on

October 17, 1990, referred the matter to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for

investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 6, 1998, this Court received a Manifestation

from the IBP Investigating Commissioner Victoria

Gonzales de los Reyes stating that when the case

was referred to the IBP, the same was initially

handled by Commissioner George Briones. In view

of the fact that the case had only been recently re-

assigned to her, she needed time within which to

investigate as well as prepare the required report

and recommendation.

Thereafter, on March 13, 2001, Commissioner de los

Reyes submitted her Report and Recommendation

to the IBP Board of Governors. In turn, the IBP Board

of Governors passed Resolution No. XIV-2001-187,

dated April 29, 2001, remanding the Report and

Recommendation to the Investigating

Commissioner, requiring the latter "to make the

recommendation clearer and review the report."

iatdc2005

Upon review of the records, the Investigating

Commissioner affirmed her findings and maintained

her recommendation. In turn, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted the said report, with a

modification of the recommended penalty of three

months suspension, to a penalty of six months

suspension, from the practice of law. EScAHT

The records show the following antecedent facts:

Complainant Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., an American

citizen from Kodiak, Alaska, USA, filed an action

before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal

(Pasig), to recover title and possession of a parcel

of land against the spouses Juanito Maybituin and

Rosario Cerrado, and Fernando Ramos. The case

was dismissed by the trial court, which declared the

defendants the true and lawful owners of their

respective portions of the land in question.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), 3rd Civil

Cases Division, in AC-G.R. CV No. 68459, modified 1

the decision of the trial court, stating:

WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby modified by

ruling that the respective Torrens Titles in the names

of the defendants spouses Maybituin and Fernando

Ramos are maintained at this stage but without

prejudice on the part of the plaintiff to institute an

action for reconveyance thereof after determining

his rightful share from the estate of his late father.

Costs against the appellant.

23 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

SO ORDERED. 2

The CA judgment was not appealed and,

thereafter, it was duly entered.

On February 16, 1985, Anderson, Jr., through his

counsel Atty. Cesar S. de Guzman, filed an

Amended Complaint before the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67,

docketed as Civil Case No. 0110-B, entitled "Rasmus

Anderson, Jr., Plaintiff v. Spouses Juanito Maybituin

and Rosario Cerrado, et al., Defendants." 3

It was at this stage of the proceedings when Atty.

Cesar S. de Guzman died. Anderson, Jr. was now

without a counsel to represent him. Upon referral by

a friend, Anderson, Jr. engaged the services of

herein respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeño.

On July 19, 1990, Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., filed an

administrative complaint 4 before this Court

wherein he alleged that respondent Atty. Reynaldo

A. Cardeño caused "the loss" or the adverse ruling

against him in the aforementioned case before the

RTC, Civil Case No. 0110-B. Specifically,

complainant alleged the following:

1.)That when the respondents in the civil case filed

a Demurrer to Evidence, Atty. Cardeño did not file

an opposition thereto and did not appear at the

formal hearing set for the purpose of considering

the merits of the demurrer. Thus, in addition to

finding merit in the demurrer, the trial court, noting

the non-appearance of Atty. Cardeño, assumed

that even he, the plaintiff's counsel, appeared

convinced that there was merit, validity and

reasonableness in the demurrer filed;

2.)That after the trial court issued an Order finding

the respondents' demurrer to evidence meritorious,

Atty. Cardeño did not even file a Motion for

Reconsideration thereof, which in turn caused the

same order to become final and executory;

3.)That even prior to the above events and in view

of what the complainant perceived to be

respondent lawyer's loss of interest in the case,

complainant verbally told Atty. Cardeño to

withdraw as his counsel. However, Atty. Cardeño

allegedly insisted on continuing to represent the

complainant as the case was already in its closing

stage.

Complainant concludes that Atty. Cardeño abused

his client's trust and confidence and violated his

oath as a lawyer in failing to defend his client's

cause to the very end. Complainant prays that

Atty. Cardeño be disbarred. IADCES

When asked to comment, Atty. Cardeño replied:

1.)That complainant was being ungrateful to him. In

the first place, he was only asked by a good friend

of the complainant Anderson, Jr., to step into the

shoes of the latter's deceased counsel. He

accommodated the request and took the case,

even without personally meeting the complainant,

as the latter was residing in the United States;

2.)That as a client, complainant Anderson, Jr., did

not give him full cooperation. Although voluminous

records were turned over to him, they were "in

disarray". Atty. Cardeño alleges that when he

began representing the complainant in court, he

had to "proceed and appear with only half the

information[] and background[] of the case, and

not knowing the person he was representing." He

allegedly did his best to familiarize himself with the

case, although there were several questions left

unanswered by the complainant's good friend;

3.)That their first meeting happened at the time he

was about to present their last witness. At that time,

Anderson, Jr.'s deposition had already been taken

by his former counsel, now deceased. Atty.

Cardeño then asked Anderson, Jr., about the

regularity of the taking of said deposition, and the

latter assured him that his former counsel had

exhaustively examined him and that said deposition

had been regularly taken;

4.)That the same was the first and only occasion

when he personally met complainant. At no time

during said meeting did complainant ask him to

withdraw from the case;

5.)That from the records he had on hand, and

based on the reputation of complainant's

deceased counsel, Atty. Cardeño saw no need to

present complainant again to testify in court. This

was also in view of the fact that complainant was

then in a hurry to leave the country, and also

because of complainant's assurances that the

deposition previously made would suffice;

6.)That it was a "big surprise" for him later to discover

that the taking of the deposition was irregular as it

was done without the presence of counsels and

parties, and without the proper notices. This led the

other party to file a demurrer to evidence;

7.)That the "biggest blow and surprise" to him was

when he was approached by "good friends" of the

24 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

complainant and these friends told him that "they

have good access and have made arrangements

with the Presiding Judge." He was asked by these

friends to prepare the motion for reconsideration,

which he "obligingly did" and thereafter he gave

said motion to these friends, for them to file.

However, these friends did not furnish or return a

copy of said motion for his files and reference;

8.)That true to his oath as a lawyer, Atty. Cardeño

considers the representations of the complainant's

good friends to be in bad taste; that he "could not

join complainant's good friends in their plans to

corrupt" the judge; that he considers this course of

action of these friends of the complainant to imply

that "he is no longer needed as a lawyer and that

they have made their own ways";

9.)That because of these actions of the friends of

the complainant which respondent considers

contrary to his duty as an officer of the court, and

also against the respect due to the courts,

respondent asked to be relieved of his duties as

counsel but said request was refused.

Thus, respondent Atty. Cardeño concluded that

complainant cannot accuse him of deliberately

causing their defeat in the case when he, Atty.

Cardeño, did his best with such little information,

support and cooperation given by the complainant

and the latter's friends. It was in fact complainant

and his friends who chose to take "another path" to

deal with the case. Complainant, he claims,

erroneously thinks that a lawyer must do everything,

even crooked or illegal acts, in order to win a case.

Atty. Cardeño then asserted that he has to uphold

his oath as a lawyer and so he refused when

complainant's friends proposed to employ acts to

corrupt the judge or proceed with the case in

dubious ways.

In the aforesaid Report and Recommendation of

IBP Commissioner Victoria G. de los Reyes, it was

found:

After having considered the position taken by each

party in the instant case, this Commission has

arrived at a conclusion that there is apparent lack

of interest on the part of the Complainant to further

pursue his case. The complainant could have

appeared personally and present his evidence or

could have his deposition taken to support the

allegations contained in his complaint. What he did

was just to send a representative by the name of

Bienvenido Maregmen. Clearly, this is not sufficient

to show the needed enthusiasm and interest to

support his accusations against the respondent.

We sustain the respondent in his position that he

should be given the opportunity to confront the

complainant and cross-examine him. Here, the

complainant failed to appear despite the several

settings of hearings in this case. Based on this alone,

this Commission could have recommended the

dismissal of the instant complaint for failure of the

complainant to substantiate his charges against the

respondent. DaAETS

However, the respondent has indubitably failed to

perform an obligation which he owed to his client,

the herein complainant. The respondent himself

categorically stated in his Comment filed with the

Honorable Supreme Court on October 2, 1990 that

he prepared a Motion for Reconsideration in the

case entitled "Rasmus Anderson v. Juanito

Maybituin, et al.", Civil Case No. 0110-B, then

pending in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch

67-Binangonan. But that certain "good friends" of

the complainant made representations to him that

they already made arrangements with the

presiding judge who they claimed had already

been "bought". Respondent allowed these persons

to take over in the filing of the Motion for

Reconsideration and did not even bother to check

with the Court if the same has been filed or not.

Clearly, the respondent was guilty of neglect of

duty and this is a violation of Canon 18 of the Code

of Professional Ethics, which provides that a lawyer

shall serve his client with competence and

diligence; particularly, Rule 18.03 thereof which

states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal

matter entrusted to him and his negligence in

connection therewith shall render him liable". He

likewise breached his duty to the Honorable

Supreme Court to report "corrupt" judges for

appropriate disciplinary action with the aim of

improving the quality of justice and in helping

restore the people's faith in our judicial system. 5

As aforestated, the IBP Board of Governors

thereafter issued Resolution XVI-2004-68 dated

February 27, 2004, which ". . . ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of

the Investigating Commissioner . . . , finding the

recommendation fully supported by the evidence

on record and the applicable laws and rules, with

modification, and considering respondent's

violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility . . ." recommended that

Atty. Reynaldo Cardeño be suspended from the

practice of law for six (6) months and that he be

warned that a graver penalty would be imposed

should he commit the same offense in future.

25 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

This Court sustains the findings and

recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.

It is undisputed that Atty. Cardeño was engaged by

the complainant as counsel. By accepting the

case, respondent should have known the

attendant responsibilities that came with the

lawyer-client relationship.

These imperatives were pointedly explained in

Pariñas v. Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto: 6

Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes

fidelity to the cause of his client. When a lawyer

accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied

representation that he possesses the requisite

academic learning, skill and ability to handle the

case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best

judgment in the prosecution or defense of the case

entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and

ordinary care and diligence in the pursuit or

defense of the case.

A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and

time to his case. Once he agrees to handle a case,

he should undertake the task with dedication and

care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath

as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept only as

much cases as he can efficiently handle, otherwise

his clients' interests will suffer. It is not enough that a

lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the

legal matter. He must also give adequate attention

to his legal work.

The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost

learning and ability in handling his cases. A license

to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to the

public that the licensee possesses sufficient skill,

knowledge and diligence to manage [his] cases.

The legal profession demands from a lawyer the

vigilance and attention expected of a good father

of a family. 7

Thus, respondent's defenses that the complainant

was "uncooperative" as a client, that the

voluminous records turned over to him were in

disarray, and that the complainant did not disclose

to him certain particulars of the case, are all

unavailing.

First, it was incumbent upon Atty. Cardeño to insist

on his client's participation in the proceedings in the

case. While the complainant shares the

responsibility for the lack of communication

between lawyer and client, Atty. Cardeño should

not have depended entirely on the information his

client gave or the time his client wished to give

them. As a lawyer representing the cause of his

client, he should have taken more control over the

handling of the case. Knowing that his client was

based in the United States should, with more

reason, have moved him to secure all the legal

means available to him either to continue

representing his client effectively or to make the

necessary manifestation in court, with the client's

conformity, that he was withdrawing as counsel of

record. That his client did not agree to terminate his

services is a mere allegation that has not been

substantiated.

Thus, in view of the fact that he remained counsel

of record for the complainant, it was highly irregular

for him to entrust the filing of the Motion for

Reconsideration to other people who did not

lawfully appear interested in the subject litigation.

DCTHaS

In the same case of Paguinto, citing Gamalinda v.

Alcantara, 8 this Court stated:

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and

must be mindful of the trust and confidence

reposed in him. He shall serve his client with

competence and diligence, and his duty of entire

devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but

entitles him to employ every honorable means to

secure for the client what is justly due him or to

present every defense provided by law to enable

the latter's cause to succeed. An attorney's duty to

safeguard the client's interests commences from his

retainer until his effective release from the case or

the final disposition of the whole subject matter of

the litigation. During that period, he is expected to

take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care

as his client's interests may require. 9

The Court therein declared that a lawyer's failure to

do so violates Canon 18 of the Code. It added that

the said rule is clear in its mandate that a lawyer

should not undertake a legal service that he is not

qualified to render, nor should a lawyer handle any

legal matter without adequate preparation. A

lawyer has the duty to prepare for trial with

diligence and deliberate speed and he should not

neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, for his

negligence shall render him liable. 10

From the records it is evident that Atty. Cardeño has

fallen short of the professional standards this Court

has set for members of the Bar. A lawyer should

never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,

otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty subjects

him to disciplinary action. Respondent is reminded

26 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

that the practice of law is a special privilege

bestowed only upon those who are competent

intellectually, academically and morally. This Court

has been exacting in its expectations for the

members of the Bar always to uphold the integrity

and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from

any act or omission which might lessen the trust and

confidence of the public. 11

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Reynaldo A.

Cardeño is hereby found guilty of violating Canon

18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his

lawyer's oath. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of

law for six (6) months effective from notice and is

WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will

be dealt with more severely. DTCSHA

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the

record of respondent as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago and

Carpio, JJ.,concur.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5580. June 15, 2005.]

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as

represented by REBECCA V. LABRADOR,

complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS,

respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM p:

This is a Petition 1 for disbarment against Atty.

Roberto B. Romanillos for allegedly representing

conflicting interests and for using the title "Judge"

despite having been found guilty of grave and

serious misconduct in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos. 2

The facts are as follows:

In 1985, respondent represented San Jose

Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the

Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC)

in a case 3 against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for

violation of the Subdivision and Condominium

Buyer's Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged

that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in

the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the

Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to

spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano without

disclosing it as a school site.

While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent

represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in

requesting for SJHAI's conformity to construct a

school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased

from Durano.

When the request was denied, respondent applied

for clearance before the Housing and Land Use

Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre.

Petitioner's Board of Directors terminated

respondent's services as counsel and engaged

another lawyer to represent the association. DEScaT

Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia

Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil

Case No. 18014 entitled "San Jose Homeowners,

Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc." filed before the

Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus,

SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent

for representing conflicting interests, docketed as

Administrative Case No. 4783. iatdc2005

In her Report 4 dated August 3, 1998, Investigating

Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission

on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) made the following findings:

. . . Respondent failed to observe candor and

fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well

that the Montealegre case was adverse to the

Complainant wherein he had previously been not

only an active board member but its corporate

secretary having access to all its documents

confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling

the implementation of the writ of execution against

its developer and owner, Durano and Co. Inc.

Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the

substituted defendant Durano and Co. Inc., Lydia

Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between

the latter and the Complainant became so

revealing and yet Respondent proceeded to

represent the former.

xxx xxx xxx

For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch

as the same wasn't controverted by the

Complainant which was his first offense;

Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt

to rectify his error subject to the condition that

should he commit the same in the future; severe

penalty will be imposed upon him. 5

The Investigating Commissioner recommended

dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that

respondent should observe extra care and

27 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold

its dignity and integrity beyond reproach.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved

the report and recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner, which we noted in a

resolution dated March 8, 1999.

Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent

continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez

before the Court of Appeals 6 and this Court 7 and

even moved for the execution of the decision.

Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against

respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999

Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his alleged

deceitful conduct in using the title "Judge" although

he was found guilty of grave and serious

misconduct.

Respondent used the title "Judge" in his office

letterhead, correspondences and billboards which

was erected in several areas within the San Jose

Subdivision sometime in October 2001.

In his Comment and Explanation, 8 respondent

claimed that he continued to represent Lydia

Durano-Rodriguez against petitioner despite the

March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still

pending when the second disbarment case was

filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a

rehash of the first disbarment case from which he

was exonerated. Concerning the title "Judge",

respondent stated that since the filing of the instant

petition he had ceased to attach the title to his

name. CaAcSE

On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP

for investigation, report and recommendation. 9

Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.

reported that respondent did not violate the

admonition because it referred to future cases only

and not to cases subject of A.C. No. 4783. Besides,

petitioner never questioned the propriety of

respondent's continued representation of Lydia

Durano-Rodriguez on appeal until the case was

terminated.

The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed

that respondent was deceitful when he used the

title "Judge", thus creating a false impression that he

was an incumbent.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended

thus:

In view of the foregoing considerations, this

Commissioner respectfully recommends the

following penalty range to be deliberated upon by

the Board for imposition on Respondent: minimum

penalty of reprimand to a maximum penalty of four

(4) months suspension. It is further recommended

that in addition to the penalty to be imposed, a

stern warning be given to Respondent in that

should he violate his undertaking/promise not to

handle any case in the future where the

Complainant would be the adverse party and/or

should he again use the title of "Judge" which

would create an impression that he is still

connected to the judiciary, a more severe penalty

shall be imposed on him by the Commission.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

The IBP Board of Governors approved with

modification the report and recommendation of

the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein

made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and,

finding the recommendation fully supported by the

evidence on record and the applicable laws and

rules, and considering Respondent's violation of

Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, Atty. Roberto Romanillos is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)

months with a WARNING that should he violate his

undertaking/promise a more severe penalty shall

be imposed against him.

Undoubtedly, respondent represented the

inconsistent interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted by

Lydia Durano-Rodriguez and the Montealegres.

Respondent was admonished yet he continued to

represent Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI. SDEHIa

It is inconsequential that petitioner never

questioned the propriety of respondent's continued

representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack

of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long

as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two

(2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating

his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer

shall not represent conflicting interests except by

written consent of all concerned given after a full

disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for

respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C.

No. 4783.

28 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

We agree with the IBP that respondent's continued

use of the title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01

of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting

a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and

from using any misleading statement or claim

regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-

judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring

to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear

attempt to mislead the public into believing that

the order was issued in his capacity as a judge

when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege.

AIDTSE

Respondent did not honorably retire from the

judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during

the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where

he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious

misconduct and would have been dismissed from

the service had he not resigned.

In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal

solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party

litigant. We, ruled thus:

Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge

Roberto B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of

grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity

and honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of

dismissal. However, respondent, in an obvious

attempt to escape punishment for his misdeeds,

tendered his resignation during the pendency of

this case. . . . Consequently, we are now precluded

from dismissing respondent from the service.

Nevertheless, the ruling in People v. Valenzuela (135

SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge

likewise resigned before the case could be

resolved, finds application in this case. Therein it

was held that the rule that the resignation or

retirement of a respondent judge in an

administrative case renders the case moot and

academic, is not a hard and fast rule. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding

that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave

and serious misconduct which would have

warranted his dismissal from the service had he not

resigned during the pendency of this case, and it

appearing that respondent has yet to apply for his

retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the

Court, consistent with the penalties imposed in

Valenzuela (supra.), hereby orders the FORFEITURE

of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges

to which herein respondent Judge Romanillos may

be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement

and/or reemployment in any branch or

instrumentality of government, including

government-owned or controlled agencies or

corporations.

SO ORDERED. 10

The penalty imposed upon him in said case

included forfeiture of all leave and retirement

benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled

with prejudice to reinstatement and/or

reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of

government, including government-owned or

controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the

use of the title 'Judge' is one of such privileges.

We have previously declared that the use of titles

such as "Justice" is reserved to incumbent and

retired members of the Supreme Court, the Court of

Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may not be

used by any other official of the Republic, including

those given the rank of "Justice". 11 By analogy, the

title "Judge" should be reserved only to judges,

incumbent and retired, and not to those who were

dishonorably discharged from the service. As

correctly pointed out by the Investigating

Commissioner, the right to retain and use said title

applies only to the aforementioned members of the

bench and no other, and certainly not to those

who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary,

such as respondent. HIETAc

Membership in the legal profession is a special

privilege burdened with conditions. 12 It is

bestowed upon individuals who are not only

learned in law, but also known to possess good

moral character. 13 Lawyers should act and

comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a

manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the

public's faith in the legal profession. 14

To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and

respect the law is to state the obvious, but such

statement can never be overemphasized.

Considering that, "of all classes and professions,

[lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the

law," it is imperative that they live by the law.

Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and

engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the

legal profession. 15

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary

sanction. We are mindful that the power to disbar

must always be exercised with great caution, for

only the most imperative reasons, 16 and in clear

cases of misconduct affecting the standing and

moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the

court and as a member of the bar. 17

29 | L e g a l P r o f e s s i o n F i r s t s e t o f a s s i g n m e n t

This is not respondent's first infraction as an officer of

the court and a member of the legal profession. He

was stripped of his retirement benefits and other

privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos. 18 In A.C.

No. 4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition.

Considering his previous infractions, respondent

should have adhered to the tenets of his profession

with extra fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the

contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our

mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the

laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his

office and unworthy of the trust and confidence

reposed on him as an officer of the court. His

disbarment is consequently warranted.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court

provides:

SEC. 27.Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by

Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of

the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his

office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any

deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in

such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason

of his conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he

is required to take before admission to practice, or

for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a

superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing

as an attorney for a party to a case without

authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at

law for the purpose of gain, either personally or

through paid agents or brokers, constitutes

malpractice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos

is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN

from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this

Decision be entered in respondent's record as a,

member of the Bar, and notice of the same be

served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and

on the Office of the Court Administrator for

circulation to all courts in the country. IaEACT

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,

Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ.,

concur.

||| (San Jose Homeowners Association Inc. v.

Romanillos, A.C. No. 5580, June 15, 2005)