LESSONS AND OBSERVATIONS

International Studies Association Conference, San FranciscoApril 3, 2013

The Hunt for Joseph Kony and Members of the Lords Resistance Army

James J.F. Forest, Ph.D.Professor and Director, Security Studies, UMass LowellSenior Fellow, Joint Special Operations University

Background Who is Kony and the LRA

History, 1980s rebellion Source of “recruits” Periods of state sponsorship (Sudan) 25 years of terrorizing villages in northern Uganda and

surrounding region

Several efforts to solve this problem 2002-05 Operation Iron Fist 2006-08 Juba Talks 2007-08 Operation Lightning Thunder

Source: Conciliation Resources, 2012. http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/LRA-africa.jpg

Background2011: The US deploys 100+ SOF to the region

Political dimensions Invisible Children Kony2012 Enough Project Sentinel Project AMISOM (Somalia)

Military dimensions AFRICOM ACCE (base in Entebbe) “Light Footprint” Model for the future

Lessons and Observations4 “P”s

1. Preparations and Logistics

2. Perceptions and Expectations Management

3. Partnerships and Relationship Management

4. Policy and Politics

Data Sources = Field research, interviews in Uganda, Washington DC, AFRICOM headquarters; Documents

Lessons Learned #1Preparations and Logistics Figure out how things get done in the local context

NGO, Other countries’ forces, etc.

Technology may be of limited use

Minimize the amount of “stuff” you need (pack judiciously), yet be self-sufficient

Landing strips

Neighbors

Cash/currency

Health/medical

Lessons Learned #2Perceptions and Expectations Management

Manage your own expectations (what you can achieve, tyranny of distance and time, what “should” be) Local militaries’ NCOs, officers, etc.

Manage your partner nation’s expectations (what you can do, authorizations, false perceptions of capabilities)

Publicvisibility

‘Owning’victory

Lessons Learned #3Partnerships and Relationship Management Many kinds: Partner nations, NGOs, Mboro herders, etc.

Choose the right people for this mission; the wrong person can do far more damage than the right person can repair

Plan to invest time

Trust is the most important currency

Sharing hardships (vs. LOGCAP)

Development projects

Lessons Learned #4Politics and Policy Political Sensitivities

Legacy of colonization; honor, pride Regional dynamics (DRC, CAR, Sudan/S. Sudan) – especially

since this is where we are now tracking LRA

Local Politics Centralization of authority Informal power Some corruption

U.S. domestic politics forpremature departure?

Conclusion Brief sample of a much larger study

Overall objective: Inform pre-deployment training of SOF teams to sub-Saharan Africa There will be deployments like this in our future

Final report (unclassified) will be available August 2013 on JSOU website (https://jsou.socom.mil/Pages/Publications.aspx)