lessons from the financial crisis. paul de grauwe
TRANSCRIPT
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Lessons from the Financial Crisis.
Paul De Grauwe
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Causes of the financial crisis
Basics of banking Banks borrow short and lend long This creates inherent fragility No problem in normal times, i.e. when
people have confidence Problem when confidence disappears Confidence disappears when one or
more banks experience solvency problem (e.g. bad loans)
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Causes Then bank run is possible : liquidity crisis involving other, sound banks (innocent
bystanders) A devilish interaction between liquidity crisis
and solvency crisis arises: sound banks have to sell assets to confront deposit withdrawals
Fire sales lead to asset price declines reducing value of banks’ assets leading to solvency problem and further liquidity crisis
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Causes
The bank collapse of the 1930s and the ensuing Great Depression had introduced some institutional changes aimed at making banking system less fragile
These are Central bank as lender of last resort Deposit insurance Separation of commercial banking and
investment banking (Glass-Steagall Act 1933)
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Most economists thought that this would be sufficient to produce safety and
to prevent large scale banking crisis It was not Why? In order to answer question we first
have to discuss “Moral Hazard”
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Moral Hazard General insight: agents who are insured
will tend to take fewer precautions to avoid the risk they are insured against
The insurance provided by central bank and governments (LoLR and deposit insurance) has given bankers strong incentives to take more risks
To counter this, authorities have to supervise and regulate
They did this for most of the post-war period but then something remarkable happened.
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The new paradigm of efficient markets
The efficient market paradigm became very popular also outside academia
Main ingredients Financial markets efficiently allocate savings
towards the most promising investment projects thereby maximizing welfare
Prices reflect underlying fundamentals; therefore bubbles cannot occur
Financial markets can regulate themselves thereby making regulation by authorities unnecessary
Greenspan: “authorities should not interfere with pollinating bees of Wall Street”. Regulation is harmful
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Efficient markets paradigm captured by bankers
Efficient markets paradigm was very influential
It was captured by bankers to lobby for deregulation
Bankers achieved their objective Banks were progressively
deregulated in US and in Europe Culmination was the repeal of the
Glass-Seagall act in 1999 (Clinton-Rubin)
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This allowed commercial banks to take on all the activities investment banks had been taking Underwriting and holding of securities and
derivatives They became universal banks Thus banks were allowed to take on all
risky activities that the Great Depression had thought us could lead to problems
Lessons of history were forgotten
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Other factors: financial innovations Process of deregulation of financial
markets coincided with process of financial innovation and was also pushed by the latter Financial innovation allowed to design
new financial products. These made it possible to repackage
assets into different risk classes and to price these risks differently
And to sell these: “securitisation”
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Other factors: financial innovations
It was thought that these complex products would lead to a better spreading of the risk over many more people (efficient markets)
thereby reducing systemic risk and reducing the need to supervise
and regulate financial markets A new era of free and unencumbered
progress would be set in motion
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Note on securitisation
Securitisation allowed banks to sell repackaged loans (e.g. mortgages) in the form of asset backed securities (ABS)
They then obtained liquidity that could be used to extend new loans
that later on would be securitized again Thus credit multiplier increased outside
the control of the central bank This undermined control of central bank
on total credit
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Are financial markets efficient?
Promise of deregulation was predicated on theory of efficient markets
But are financial markets efficient? Bubbles and crashes are endemic
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Are financial markets efficient?
Let’s look at the stock markets first; Take US stock market (DJI, S&P500) (same story can be told in other
stock markets ) and exchange markets and housing markets
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Dow Jones and S&P500
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US stock market 2006-08
What happened between July 2006 and July 2007 to warrant an increase of 30%?
Put differently: In July 2006 US stock market capitalization was
$11.5 trillion One year later it was $15 trillion
What happened to US economy so that $3.5 trillion was added to the value of US corporations in just one year?
While GDP increased by only 5% ($650 billion)
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The answer is: almost nothing Fundamentals like productivity growth
increased at their normal rate The only reasonable answer is:
excessive optimism Investors were caught by a wave of
collective madness that made them believe that the US
was on a new and permanent growth path for the indefinite future
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Then came the downturn with the credit crisis
In one year time stock prices drop 30% destroying $3.5 trillion of value
What happened? Investors finally realized that there had
been excessive optimism The wave turned into one of excessive
pessimism
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Nasdaq :similar story
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Similar story in housing market
Little happened with economic fundamentals in US
warranting a doubling of house prices in six years
Prices increased because they were expected to increase
Also fuelled by credit
Which itself was the result of the bubble
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Source: http://www.newsneconomics.com/2009/05/housing-bubbles-around-world-looks.html
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Similar story in foreign exchange market
DEM-USD 1980-87
1.3
1.8
2.3
2.8
3.3
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Euro-dollar rate 1995-2004
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1,1
1,2
1,3
6/03/95 6/03/96 6/03/97 6/03/98 6/03/99 6/03/00 6/03/01 6/03/02 6/03/03 6/03/04
Since 1980 dollar has been involved in bubble and crash scenarios more than half of the time
While very little happened with underlying fundamentals
Market was driven by periods of excessive optimism and then pessimism about the dollar
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Bubbles and crashes are here to stay
Bubbles and crashes are endemic in capitalist systems
They are the result of uncertainty and herding behaviour Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and
Crashes: bubbles and crashes have existed since capitalism exists
And will continue to exist
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Banks ride on bubbles
Because of deregulation banks became fully exposed to the endemic occurrence of bubbles and crashes in asset markets
They could now hold the full panoply of assets that regularly are gripped by bubbles and crashes
Their balance sheets became extremely sensitive to these bubbles (hi-tech bubble, housing bubble, general stock market bubble)
that inflated their balance sheets
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Asset bubbles and bank credit correlate and interact
Growth rate of total bank loans (left) and Stock price index(right) in euro area
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
2003Jan 2004Jan 2005Jan 2006Jan 2007Jan 2008Jan
% c
han
ge
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
ind
ex
Loans
Stock price
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The reverse is also true Banks’ balance sheets became
extremely vulnerable to crashes The downward trigger was the crash
in the US housing market But this was only a trigger The crisis was waiting to happen
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Other part of efficient market theory was also wrong
Financial markets are unable to regulate themselves
Rating agencies were supposed to take a central role in auto-regulation
How? They rate the quality of banks and their
products They have to protect their reputation That’s why they will take neutral and
objective stance
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They did not: they greatly underestimated risk
There was massive conflict of interest Rating agencies both advised financial
institutions on how to create new financial products
that they would then later on give a favourable rating
Now they greatly overestimate risks
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mark-to-market rules
The other piece in the belief that markets would regulate themselves was the idea of mark-to-market If financial institutions used mark to market
rules the discipline of the market would force them to price their product right
However, if markets are inefficient and create bubbles and crashes mark to market rules exacerbate these movements
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Mark to market in a world of market inefficiency
Thus during the bubble this rule told accountants that the massive asset price increases corresponded to real profits that should be recorded in the books.
These profits, however, did not correspond to something that had happened in the real economy
They were the result of a bubble that led to prices unrelated to underlying fundamentals
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As a result mark to market rules exacerbated the sense of euphoria
and intensified the bubble Now the reverse is happening Mark to market rules force massive
writedowns correcting for the massive overvaluations introduced just a year earlier
intensifying the sense of gloom and the economic downturn
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A note
Bankers now complain about mark to market rules
now that the market goes down They did not complain during the
upturn As a result, their credibility is weak
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The role of academia in the development of the crisis
As I have stressed, idea of efficient market was an academic idea
Acedemia influenced the financial markets in more concrete ways
through the models used to compute a price for new financial products
Example: Black-Scholes model of an option contract
More generally for most derivatives and sophisticated financial products
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Fundamental assumption of these models: normal distribution
Returns on investment0
distribution
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Private insurance does not insure against tail risk very well
Normality implies that 99% of all observations are within a bound of + or – 3 standard deviations
There is one general feature in all financial markets: returns are not normally distributed
Returns have fat tails (bubbles and crashes): i.e. sometimes there are really very large changes
Implication: models based on normal distribution dramatically underestimate probability of large shocks
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Example: stock market (DJ)Dow Jones Industrial Average 1928-2008
-0,3
-0,25
-0,2
-0,15
-0,1
-0,05
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
02-1
0-19
28
02-1
0-19
31
02-1
0-19
34
02-1
0-19
37
02-1
0-19
40
02-1
0-19
43
02-1
0-19
46
02-1
0-19
49
02-1
0-19
52
02-1
0-19
55
02-1
0-19
58
02-1
0-19
61
02-1
0-19
64
02-1
0-19
67
02-1
0-19
70
02-1
0-19
73
02-1
0-19
76
02-1
0-19
79
02-1
0-19
82
02-1
0-19
85
02-1
0-19
88
02-1
0-19
91
02-1
0-19
94
02-1
0-19
97
02-1
0-20
00
02-1
0-20
03
02-1
0-20
06
Random normal process
-0,3
-0,25
-0,2
-0,15
-0,1
-0,05
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
02-1
0-19
28
02-1
0-19
31
02-1
0-19
34
02-1
0-19
37
02-1
0-19
40
02-1
0-19
43
02-1
0-19
46
02-1
0-19
49
02-1
0-19
52
02-1
0-19
55
02-1
0-19
58
02-1
0-19
61
02-1
0-19
64
02-1
0-19
67
02-1
0-19
70
02-1
0-19
73
02-1
0-19
76
02-1
0-19
79
02-1
0-19
82
02-1
0-19
85
02-1
0-19
88
02-1
0-19
91
02-1
0-19
94
02-1
0-19
97
02-1
0-20
00
02-1
0-20
03
02-1
0-20
06
Changes that are higher than 5 standard deviations occur once every 7000 years if returns are normally distributed
During the last 80 years there were 76 such changes
What should we conclude?
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Was last October exceptional?
TABLE : Five Largest Movements of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average in October 2008
An non-Normal October (1)
Date Log-Return Average Frequency under Normal Law 07/10/2008 - 0.05242 Once in 8,038 Years 09/10/2008 - 0.07616 Once in 9,114,869,772 Years 13/10/2008 + 0.105083 Once in 165,017,584,680,094,000,000 (2) Years 15/10/2008 - 0.08201 Once in 597,973,260,906 Years 28/10/2008 + 0.103259 Once in 29,955,839,072,867,400,000 (2) Years
(1) Daily returns from 01/01/1971 – 31/10/2008 (= 0.03%, = 1.06%) (2) 10 18 = “Quintillion” in Western (Arabic) Numeral
= “Billion Billion” in US; modern British & Australian
Yes, if you have studied finance theory and believe returns are normally distributed
No if you have not studied finance theory
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As a result, there is systematic underpricing of risk (tail risk) creating a perception of low-risk environment
In addition, there were no incentives to price this tail risk because there was implicit expectation that if something very bad would happen, e.g. a liquidity crisis (a typical tail risk)
central banks would provide the liquidities This created the perception in banks that
liquidity risk was not something to worry about.
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Wrapping things up
Deregulation, absence of adequate supervision and application of wrong theory Financial innovation (securitisation) Moral hazard Led banks to take significantly more
risky assets on their balance sheets and tightly linked the banks’
balance sheets
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to bubbles (IT-bubble, stock market bubble, housing bubble, commodities bubbles) that are endemic in financial markets
but that efficient market ideologues told us could not arise
As a result banks’ balance sheets exploded
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until they crashed in 2008 threatening to bring down the whole
financial system
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Fundamental problem banks face today
balance sheets are massively inflated because of their participation in consecutive bubbles.
banks face a period during which their balance sheets will shrink substantially (“deleveraging”).
This process is will not be a smooth one
This is likely to create a further drag on economic activity.
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What can be done: short run
A return of Keynesian economics. Governments are forced to sustain
demand in the face of dwindling tax revenue
Thus massive budget deficits are likely and desirable
Attempts at balancing government budgets would not work, as it would likely lead to Keynes’ savings paradox.
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What can be done: short run
In the process of recapitalizing banks, governments will substitute private debt for government debt.
This also is inevitable and desirable As agents distrust private debt they turn
to government debt deemed safer. Governments will have to accommodate
for this desire. Otherwise Irving Fisher’s debt deflation dynamics will work with full force
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Private and government liabilities in eurozone(percent GDP)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
pe
rce
nt
Bank liabilities
Government debt
Household debt
Corporate debt
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What will happen in the absence of a government takeover of the private debt?
In that case the debt deflation process is not likely to stop soon. Output and income are likely to go down
further. This will negatively affect tax revenues and will
increase future budget deficits, forcing governments to increase their debt.
The substitution of private debt by government debt will then be stretched out over a longer period, and will make the recession more intense.
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Refusing to stop the debt deflation dynamics by issuing government debt today will not prevent the government debt from increasing in the future.
Thus choosing for higher government debts and deficits today is choosing for the lesser evil.
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Long-term reformBack to narrow banking
We have to go back to narrow banking Strict separation of commercial and
investment banking The classes of assets in which banks can
invest must be limited No securitization anymore Higher liquidity ratios And less leverage
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Investment banks can do all the sophisticated asset creation and management
but must fund these through the capital market with liabilities of same maturity.
No short-term funding possible No funding through commercial
banks
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Why is separation important
Banks are at the center of payment system
This creates strong links of complementarity: when one bank fails, other banks are in trouble
Contrast with non-bank firms, e.g. automobile where substitutability prevails: when one firm fails this is good news for the others
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Thus in banking system risk is linked (failure of one bank is propagated)
In addition, banks create a special kind of risk: liquidity risk, which is very sensitive to collective movements of distrust.
These collective movements can bring down the whole system
We cannot quantify these risks (uncertainty)
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Financial innovations (CDOs and CDSs) together with securitisation are techniques that spread the risks around
And thus increase the dependence of one bank’s risk on another
Systemic risk increases
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We do not have a science for this kind of risk
There is only a science of isolated (independent) risks that is normally distributed.
Conclusion: since banks create this special type of risk we have to prevent them as much as possible from taking on other types of risk (credit and market risks)
Mixing the two creates an explosive cocktail that we do not master
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Banking will become much less profitable
but less risky bankers are screaming And lobby hard to prevent any
fundamental change It looks like they may win and that the basic bank model that
brought us into the mess will be upheld
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But let us not dispair Some things can be done Create incentives that will reduce
bankers to take excessive risk Tax as a percent of total balance sheet Long term bonuses Higher liquidity requirements
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International coordination at setting new rules will be necessary
Otherwise race to the bottom leading to new deregulation
International coordination of rule setting is most challenging