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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Lessons Learned from Past Accidents:
Why May Accidents Like “Costa Concordia” Still
Happen in 2012 ?
Prof. Jeom Kee PAIK, Dr. Eng., FRINA, FSNAME
Doctor Honoris Causa of The University of Liège
President of The Ship and Offshore Research Institute
Director of The Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Research Centre of Excellence
Pusan National University, Korea
In Association with Doctor Honoris Causa of The University of Liège
Friday 23rd March 2012
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Contents
1. Introduction of Korea, Busan City, and PNU
2. The Costa Concordia Accident
3. Lessons Learned from Other Past Accidents
4. Paradigm Change for Design, Building, and Operation
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
- South Korea is the world’s leading (No.1) ship manufacturer and has been consistently ranked at the top in terms of its order book and building quality and capacity. - South Korea accounts for more than 40% of the global market for shipbuilding. - South Korea accounts for more than 70% of the global market for offshore platform construction.
Population = approx. 50million
GNP = 20,000 USD
-Samsung Electronics
-LG
-Hyundai Motors, Kia Motors
-Hyundai Heavy Industries -Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering
-Samsung Heavy Industries
-STX Europe
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Metropolitan City of Busan, Korea
-The second largest city in South Korea
-Population = 4 million
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Main Campus of Pusan National University
-Total number of students = 31,000
-Total number of NAOE students = 380(undergraduate)/120(graduate)
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Organization of The KOSORI
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Research Staff (as of March 2012) Research Staff Number Remark
Faculty Member 4
Chair Professor 1 Former Deputy Minister, Ministry of
Science and Technology, Korea
Visiting Professor 1 von Karman Chair Professor, University of
California at Irvine, USA
Research Professor 2
Research Engineer 6
Master 19 Graduate
Student PhD 13
Technician 1
Administrative 3
Total 52
National Advisory Committee Members (as of March 2012)
- Mr. M.S. Kim, Technical Director, Lloyd’s Register Asia
- Mr. J.H. Park, Senior Executive Vice President, Samsung Heavy Industries
- Mr. H.S. Bong, Senor Executive Vice President, Hanjin Heavy Industries
- Mr. T.H. Park, Senior Executive Vice President, STX Offshore and Shipbuilding
- Mr. J.S. Shin, Executive Vice President, DSME
- Mr. J.B. Park, Executive Vice President, HHI (Offshore & Engineering Division)
- Dr. K.B. Kang, Senior Vice President, POSCO
International Advisory Committee Members (as of March 2012)
- Dr. F. Cheng, Head of Strategic Research Group, Lloyd’s Register, UK
- Dr. A.K. Thayamballi, Senior Principal Consultant, Chevron Shipping, USA
- Prof. S.N. Atluri, Chair Professor, University of California at Irvine, USA
- Emeritus Prof. N. Jones, University of Liverpool, UK
- Emeritus Prof. O.F. Hughes, Virginia Tech., USA
- Prof. R.E. Melchers, University of Newcastle, Australia
- Prof. R. Snell, Oxford University, UK
- Prof. Y. Bai, Zhejiang University, China
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Textbooks
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Editor-in-Chief of International Journals
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Editor-in-Chief of UNESCO Encyclopedia
Encyclopedia Of Life Support Systems (EOLSS)
6.177 Ships and Offshore Structures
UNESCO, Paris
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Editorial Board Members of International Journals
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
others 19%
foundering
27%
missing 1% collision
11%
grounding
24%
contact
4%
fire/explosion
15%
Causes of Maritime Casualties – Ships
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Costa Concordia Grounding on January 13, 2012
The Costa Concordia, 290.20m long, with a beam of 35.5m and a draught of 8.2m.
Service speed = 19.6 knots (19.6km/h) and maximum speed = 23 knots (43km/h)
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Costa Concordia Grounding on January 13, 2012
On evening of January 13, 2012, the Costa Concordia partially sank after grounding off
the coast of Italy, while sailing off Isola del Giglio. Of the 3,229 passengers and 1,023 crew
Known to have been aboard, seven are missing and 25 are confirmed dead.
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Costa Concordia Grounding on January 13, 2012
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
It is premature to make any conclusions as to
the cause of the Costa Concordia accident and
design lessons to be learned until after a full
technical investigation being carried out by the
Italian Authorities is completed.
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Some maritime safety experts think that the accident is due to the design of
the new generation of massive cruise ships, in which their high structures
make them prone to tilting, especially in shallow waters and with strong side
winds, or when taking in water after damage or in rough seas.
Their large size makes them slow to respond to the controls and when, like
the Costa Concordia, they are not equipped with azimuth thrusters they are
difficult to manoeuvre. They are also difficult to evacuate because of
the crowded outdoor deck space and the old-fashioned lifeboat systems that
cannot be lowered when the ship is tilting heavily.
Modern escape capsules or free-fall lifeboats allow safe operation under tilt
and are quicker to use.
Other experts claim, however, that the design and operation or modern
cruise ships are well regulated and that these ships are extremely safe.
Since 2005, more than 100 million people worldwide have taken cruises, and
until the Costa Concordia disaster there have only been 16 fatalities.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Costa_Concordia_disaster).
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
The Costa Concordia ran aground, hitting a reef, while operating
at forward speed, resulting in the rupture of its bottom structures,
water ingress, and eventual capsizing. From the structural design
point of view, the lesson to be learnt is that, like in double hull oil
tankers, cruise ships must also apply relevant technologies for
double-bottom structure designs to increase safety and structural
integrity in the event of a grounding accident.
Rock Embedded in Port Side Bottom of Damaged Hull
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Titanic Accident on April 15, 1912
One of the best-known accidents in the history of shipping is the sinking of the Titanic Liverpool,
269.1 m long with a beam of 28.2 m. The maximum number of passengers and crew was 2,300 and her
maximum speed was 24 knots (44.9km/h). On April 10, 1912, she left the port of Southampton, England,
one her maiden voyage to New York City. 2,200 passengers and crew were on the voyage. Four days
into her journey, at 11:40pm on the night of April 14, she struck an iceberg on the port-side bow.
The ship’s speed at the moment of collision was reportedly 23 knots (43km/h), which is an amazing speed
for passenger ships even today. The consequence of the collision with iceberg was catastrophic,
because the bow structure was fractured, and icy water soon poured through the ship.
Because of the accidental flooding, the ship was subject to a large bending moment, and when
five watertight subdivisions and one boiler room were flooded, her back broke entirely in two.
This year is the 100th anniversary of the Titanic accident.
Movie directed by James Cameron
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
James Cameron’s Movie: Behind Story
Titanic Accident on April 15, 1912: 100th Anniversary
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
James Cameron’s Movie: Behind Story
Titanic Accident on April 15, 1912: 100th Anniversary
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
James Cameron’s Movie: Behind Story
Titanic Accident on April 15, 1912: 100th Anniversary
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Hull Form and Compartment Definition of Titanic
[Ref.] J.W. Stettler and B.S. Thomas, Flooding and structural forensic analysis of the sinking of the RMS Titanic,
Submitted for publication in Ships and Offshore Structures, 2012.
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Ship Collision with Iceberg at Port-Side
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
BR 6
D-Deck
Fwd
E-Deck
Scotland Rd
Blr Casing 56
C-Deck
Main
C-Deck
Focsle
B-Deck
A-Deck(Promenade)
Boat-Deck
Blr Casing 34
D-Deck
Aft
F-Deck
Above BR 6
F-Deck
Above BR 5
F-Deck
Above BR 4
CB b
CB X,Z,a
CB T
CB S,U,V
Shell Door
FP Hold
Hold 1Hold 2Hold 3CB Y(s)CB W(s)BR 5
BR 4 and
Coal Bunkers
Fr 80f
10 ft S
Fr 104f
20 ft S
Fr 106f
20 ft S
Fr 113f
CL
Fr 142f
CL
Fr 113f
15 ft P+S
BR 3 and
Coal Bunkers
CB’s connections removed for
BR3 and 4 for brevity
0.1 ft2
0.1 ft2
0.1 ft2 0.1 ft
2
10 ft2
10 ft2 10 ft
210 ft
2
10 ft2
10 ft2
10 ft2
10 ft2
10 ft2
10 ft2
Port Holes
10 ft2
10 ft2
10 ft2
Port HolesWindows
Windows Windows
Hull
Breach
Hull
Breach
Hull
Breach
Hull
BreachHull
Breach
Hull
Breach
Fr 36f
5 ft PFr 58f
20 ft P10 ft
210 ft
2
Fr 52f
20 ft P
10 ft2
Fr 82f
20 ft P
10 ft2
Fr 74f
15 ft S
10 ft2
Fr 40f
CL
10 ft2
Fr 40f
CL
10 ft2
Fr 40f
CL
10 ft2
Fr 40f
CL
10 ft2
10 ft2
BR 1-3 and
Remaining F-
Deck Not
ShownFr 28f
15 ft P
10 ft2
6 Openings
Fr 64f & Aft
2.5 ft2
8 Openings
Fr 71f & Aft
2.5 ft2
1 Opening
Fr 46f Portside
27 ft2
[Ref.] J.W. Stettler and B.S. Thomas, Flooding and structural forensic analysis of the sinking of the RMS Titanic,
Submitted for publication in Ships and Offshore Structures, 2012.
Progressive Flooding in Compartments (Subdivisions)
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
[Ref.] J.W. Stettler and B.S. Thomas, Flooding and structural forensic analysis of the sinking of the RMS Titanic,
Submitted for publication in Ships and Offshore Structures, 2012.
Titanic’s Condition with Progressive Flooding at 80 Minutes
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
[Ref.] J.W. Stettler and B.S. Thomas, Flooding and structural forensic analysis of the sinking of the RMS Titanic,
Submitted for publication in Ships and Offshore Structures, 2012.
Titanic’s Condition at the Point of Maximum Bending Moment, Trim = 23deg.
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
[Ref.] J.W. Stettler and B.S. Thomas, Flooding and structural forensic analysis of the sinking of the RMS Titanic,
Submitted for publication in Ships and Offshore Structures, 2012.
Titanic’s Condition at the Point of Maximum Bending Moment, Trim = 23deg.
Mmax = 1,790,000 ft.lton (Boiler Room 2)
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
[Ref.] J.W. Stettler and B.S. Thomas, Flooding and structural forensic analysis of the sinking of the RMS Titanic,
Submitted for publication in Ships and Offshore Structures, 2012.
Titanic’s Condition at the Point of Maximum Bending Moment, Trim = 23deg.
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Buckling Phenomenon
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Progressive Collapse Analysis of Titanic’s Hull at Boiler Room 2
Sagging Hogging
ALPS/HULL Simulations
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
[Ref.] J.W. Stettler and B.S. Thomas, Flooding and structural forensic analysis of the sinking of the RMS Titanic,
Submitted for publication in Ships and Offshore Structures, 2012.
Collapse of Titanic’s Hull – ALPS/HULL Simulations
Mu = 2,333,600 x (1.0-0.28) = 1,680,192 ft.lton (Effect of riveting)
Mmax = 1,790,000 ft.lton
Mu/Mmax = 1,680,192/1,790,000 = 0.94
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Lessons Learned from the Titanic Accident
1. Steel tends to become brittle at low temperatures.
2. The impact velocity at the moment of the Titanic’s
collision with the iceberg is reported to have been
23knots (or 11.8m/s).
3. Accidental flooding most likely altered the hull girder
load distribution and amplified the maximum hull
girder bending moments.
4. Because the water ingress following the collision
with the iceberg subjected to the ship to the bending
moment in the boiler room, the large axial
compressive loads bearing on the structures led to
their buckling and collapse.
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Hull Collapse of Anonymous Capesize Bulk Carrier at Harbor
The back of an anonymous Capesize bulk carrier broke at the harbor during the unloading
of cargo. This photo shows the ship after the breakage of her hull girder.
Because of the shallow depth of the harbor, she did not disappear beneath the water
after breaking into two, but her mid-section reportedly touched the bottom of the pier.
Evidently total loss was the outcome.
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Lessons Learned from the Bulk Carrier Accident
1. The poorly executed unloading of cargo can amplify
the maximum hull girder bending moments to the
extent that exceed the maximum load-carrying
capacity of the hull structures.
2. Deck panels or bottom panels should be designed
using ultimate limit state design methods so that the
ultimate hull girder strength is able to withstand
unintended scenarios of cargo loading and unloading
that cause uncertainties and subsequently affect the
structural design process.
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Oil Tanker Erika Accident on December 12, 1999
24-year-old oil tanker Erika broke up on December 12, 1999, causing the spillage of
some 7,000 to 10,000 tons of oil. Immediately before the accident, she was forced
with structural problem in very rough sea condition, which was reportedly a wind of
force 8 to 10 with a 6m swell. This photo shows the Erika as she sank.
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Lessons Learned from the Erika Accident
1. Rough sea conditions can amplify hull girder loads to
the extent that they reach or even exceed the
corresponding design values.
2. Such age-related damage as corrosion wastage and
fatigue cracking damage can decrease hull girder
strength.
3. An increase in applied hull girder loads, a decrease in
hull girder strength, or both, can result in the
collapse of the hull girder.
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Oil Tanker Sea Prince Accident on July 23, 1995
The oil tanker Sea Prince grounded as she attempted
to leave the port of Yosu in South Korea to a safety
bay to shelter from an incoming typhoon, causing the
spillage of 5,000 tons of oil of the 85,000tons that had
been loaded. The engine room caught fire as shown in
this photo, and presumably the bottom structures
suffered grounding damage. The remaining oil in the
cargo tanks was transferred to barges when the fire
was eventually put out on July 24. When the weather
conditions further improved on July 25, lighterage
and recovery operations were started and continued
for 19 days. The ship was eventually refloated and
towed out of Korean waters, but sank during towing. It
is believed that the ship sank possibly due to hull
girder collapse initiated by the failure of the damaged
bottom structures.
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Lessons Learned from the Sea Prince Accident
1. Accidents such as grounding or collision can cause
structural damage to the bottom or side structures.
2. Hull girder strength can be decreased due to
accidental damage, which means that the residual
strength of damaged hull may be lower than the
applied hull girder loads, causing hull girder collapse.
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Oil Tanker Doola No.3 After an Explosion on January 15, 2012
On January 15, 2012, the oil tanker Doola No.3 broke in two after an explosion in its
cargo tank during gas-free operation off the west coast of South Korea.
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Lessons Learned from the Doola No.3 Accident
1. This accident was the result of blast loads arising
from vapor cloud explosion, which caused significant
structural damage.
2. Whipping exceeded the limits of the design bending
moments, resulting in hull girder collapse.
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Total Loss Scenarios for Ships
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Exploration of New Ocean Energy Resources in Deep Waters
• The deep sea is a treasure house of energy resources such as
oil, natural gas, gas hydrate, minerals (rare materials).
• Renewable energy sources such as wind energy and current energy are available.
• World market size is growing with more than 500billion US$ in 2030.
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Offshore Production Systems in Deep Waters
Fixed type in shallow waters Floating type in deep waters
Ship-shaped offshore unit, Semi-sub, Spar, TLP
Pipeline infrastructure Multiple functions such as
production, storage and offloading
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Oil/Gas Leak Resulting in Explosion and Fire
Source: Health and Safety Executive, UK
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
July 7, 1988, North Sea
167 people killed
Property damage of 1.4billion US$
Risk based engineering became mandatory since the Pipe Alpha
accident
Pipe Alpha Accident
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
April 20, 2010, Gulf of Mexico
11 people killed, 17 people wounded
Environmental damage of approx. 30 billion US$
Deepwater Horizon Accident
Oil spill
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Deepwater Horizon Accident on April 20, 2010
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Selection of credible scenarios
involving PDF parameters of
leak and environment conditions
Selection of credible scenarios
involving PDF parameters of
gas cloud condition
Ex
plo
sio
n f
req
uen
cy o
f ex
cced
an
ce
(per
FP
SO
yea
r)
Overpressure (MPa)
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
0.00001
0.0001
0.001
0.01Large cylindrical vessels (Point 171 )
CAD model CFD model
Gas dispersion analysis
Explosion CFD simulation Design loads with exceedance curve Nonlinear consequence analysis under explosion
EFEF JIP Procedure for Explosion Risk Assessment and Management (2/2)
Latin hypercube sampling technique
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Selection of credible scenarios
involving PDF parameters of
leak and environment conditions
EFEF JIP Procedure for Fire Risk Assessment and Management (2/2)
CAD model CFD model
Fire CFD simulation Design loads with exceedance curve
Nonlinear consequence
analysis under fire Temperature(K)
Exce
edan
cefi
re f
req
uen
cy(p
erF
PS
O y
ear)
200 400 600 800 1000 1200
0.00001
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
Mean temperature
(Point20 and Point31)
Mean temperature
(Point41 and Point52)
Latin hypercube sampling technique
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Most of accidents are the result of a long chain of
human error, with such error responsible for
- 65% of all airline accidents,
- 80% of all maritime casualties,
- 90% of all automobile accidents, and
- 90% of all nuclear facility emergencies.
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Human error results from ignoring human factors and
ergonomics.
Ignorance of human factors is either the root cause of
or a major contributing factor to many maritime accidents.
Ignorance of engineering factors is primarily due to
a lack of knowledge and guidance at the design, building
and operation stages.
Accidents – Result of a Chain of Human Error
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Importance of Human Error Minimization to Protect Human Health and
the Environment and Ensure Safety
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Design Formula
Experimental Investigation
Past Experience First Principles
Deterministic Probabilistic
Mathematical Algorithm
21 1
!lim
! !
m n
xi j
n
r n rx x
Limit States/Risk Allowable Stress
Engineering
Traditional Future
Various Types of Phenomena Causing Structural Failure
Nonlinear structural
consequences
(Geometric & material
nonlinearities)
Initial
imperfections
(Initial distortion/
residual stress/
softening)
Abnormal wave/
wind/current
(Freak/rogue)
Dynamic
pressure
(Sloshing/slamming/
green water)
Low
temperature
(Arctic operations)
Cryogenic
conditions
(LNG cargo)
Elevated
temperature
(Fire)
Blast load
(Explosion)
Impact load
(Collision/grounding/
dropped object)
Age-related
degradation
(Corrosion/fatigue
cracking/denting)
Ultra-high
pressure
(Subsea)
New Paradigm for Engineering and Design
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
CFD Explosion Simulations
(barg)
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Gas Explosion Tests with or without Water Sprays - Importance of Risk Management
Source: © The Steel Construction Institute, Fire and Blast Information Group
Without water sprays With water sprays
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
0.0
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
700100 200 300 400 500 600
Time (ms)
TNO PI-10, Test 10, LDN Nozzles
TNO PI-10, Test 11, MV57 Nozzles
TNO PI-10, Test 12, No Deluge
Source: © The Steel Construction Institute, Fire and Blast Information Group
Gas Explosion Tests with or without Water Sprays (2/2) - Importance of Risk Management
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
HSE & E – Health, Safety, Environment & Ergonomics
IACS CSR/H-CSR
Advanced
Technologies
First-Principles-Based Direct Methods
Limit States-Based Methods
Risk-Based Methods
IMO GBS
ISO ISO 18072
International Rules and Guidelines
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Over the last decade, the likelihood and consequences of
marine casualties have certainly declined, in part due to
technological improvements.
However, accidents continue to occur while ships and offshore
installations are in service, regardless of the significant efforts
exerted toward eliminating them.
Furthermore, the public’s growing concerns and intolerance for
safety, health and environmental risk suggest that more has to be
done going forward.
The best way of achieving this goal is to reduce human error by
better understanding ocean environmental phenomena and then
apply human factor and ergonomic best practices to vessel design,
engineering, construction, and operation.
Paradigm Change for Reduction of Human Error
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DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
April 2012 Issue of Marine Technology, SNAME SNAME = The Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, USA
DHC ULG, Prof. J.K. Paik, March 23, 2012
Thanks to
The University of Liège
for conferring upon me the insignia of
Doctor Honoris Causa.
In Association with Doctor Honoris Causa of The University of Liège
Friday 23rd March 2012