lessons learned west sumatra recovery-enhancement of the recovery quality - arwin soelaksono

8/6/2019 Lessons Learned West Sumatra Recovery-Enhancement of the Recovery Quality - Arwin Soelaksono

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Enhancement of the Recovery Quality through Joint Effort and Combined Strategic Program

Enhancement of the Recovery Quality through

Joint Effort and Combined Strategic ProgramLessons Learned from West Sumatra Recovery

Arwin Soelaksono1)

Website:http://www.disaster-response.ccEmail:[email protected]

December 2010

Abstract

In the wake of the 2009 West Sumatra earthquake there weremore than 75[1] international and national agencies works on

recovery. Every agency has their experiences, approaches and

expertise. It is rich variation on the way each agency undertakethe recovery works. On the other hand government has their ownperspective, policy and has already developed plans and budget.In the beginning it was difficult to find all efforts that can beintersected. All recovery stakeholders were firm on their

decision on how the recovery effort should be implemented.

4 months after the disaster, international, national non-governmental organizations (NGO) and United Nations (UN)agencies that worked in shelter / housing program, started ontaking initiative to harmonize their programs with the

government plan. During that time serious study on thegovernment plan had been carried out. The government quiteopen for inputs and both party NGOs and government established good relationship and mutual respect.

The joint effort and combined program in housing programcaused other good implication. Other programs then interested to

replicate this initiative. NGOs that joined in working groupssuch as Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Livelihood and otherworking groups tried to find synergies amongst them. The resultcan be sharing resource, joint funding and combined program.These initiatives surely increase recovery pace and enhance the

quality.

Keyword: earthquake, West Sumatra, reconstruction, shelter,coordination

I. INTRODUCTION

Agencies who work in West Sumatra following the

2009 earthquake disaster mainly have previous experiencein relief and recovery works in Indonesia. The bigger partsof them are those who have the experience on Aceh and

Yogyakarta relief, recovery and rehabilitation andreconstruction. Agencies who took part in Acehreconstruction generally learned hard from the experience

of competition amongst agencies. In Aceh following thetsunami 2004, it was reported there were several cases that

agencies competed to win beneficiaries to implement theirprogram

[2]. Based on this past experience, many of

agencies are quite aware of the potential problem. In termsof funding, there is a huge difference between Acehinterventions and West Sumatra assistance. The funding

for West Sumatra was relatively very small compared toAceh. Thus during West Sumatra recovery, competition ofprograms were rare situation. Nevertheless, in March2010, such competition due to overlapping working area

was reported to happen in Padang Pariaman duringTemporary Shelter construction, though the problem wasimmediately resolved by those agencies with mediation byShelter Cluster Coordination Team[3].

To move forward, NGOs that coordinated by WestSumatra Recovery Network United Nations Office of

the Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator (RN UNRC/HC)sought opportunity beyond avoiding competition. Less

funding compared to Aceh could be a problem as well asopportunity for cooperation. Compared to Yogyakarta,

less skilled technical people for construction would be anobstacle to housing recovery progress

[4]. However, the

needs of skilled technical people open the opportunity on

sharing resources.

The joint effort and combined strategic programbecome one of the uniqueness of West Sumatra recovery.This section will elaborate how agencies and governmentperceived joint effort. These initiatives which started fromthe Shelter Cluster then continued with the Shelter

Working Group (SWG) then replicated with other

working group and other programs.

II. CHALLENGES

It is likely that the most suitable disaster response andrecovery is replicating the success story of Yogyakarta.

High cooperation amongst all stakeholders combined withsufficient skilled technical persons made the recoveryprocess completed considerably rapidly. This success then

inspired the government to produce JUKNIS (PetunjukTeknis) or technical guidelines for the housingrehabilitation and reconstruction [5]. In the JUKNIS

government put the methodology on how therehabilitation and reconstruction should be implemented.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1)June 2010 - current: Deputy Coordinator of West Sumatra Recovery

Network at United Nations Office of the Humanitarian / Resident

Coordinator (UNRC/HC)February 2010 - May 2010: Shelter - Early Recovery Advisor at

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)
http://www.disaster-response.cc/http://www.disaster-response.cc/http://www.disaster-response.cc/mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.disaster-response.cc/


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The affected households should follow the mechanism so

that they can receive government assistance.

The condition of West Sumatra recovery falls betweenthe Aceh and Yogyakarta. Skilled labors in West Sumatra

are better than Aceh but still insufficient compared toYogyakarta. This condition applied to the engineers aswell. It does not mean that the West Sumatra have limited

technical person which graduated from their university.But the graduates usually migrate to bigger cities such asJakarta or any other city in Java Island. This condition becomes a challenge on achieving Build Back Better,

which requires quality as the most important component.Therefore, to achieve the expected result through

mechanism as written in JUKNIS would not be simple.The monitoring team, which consists of people withtechnical and social skills background, should besufficient. Otherwise, the rehabilitation and reconstruction

would not have adequate support from trained people.This may create quality concern.

Actually, this condition would be an opportunity for

agencies to provide assistance to the government and thecommunity. However, the problem is the JUKNIS wasreleased in April 2010, when most of the agencies were

closing their housing programs. For many agencies, thereis a greater challenge to gain funding for longer programin West Sumatra. Aside from the Haiti earthquake in

January 2010 which deviated donor commitment, thedisaster in West Sumatra was already declared only as aprovincial disaster. Consequently, the opportunity tointersect the government program can only be carried outby a small number of agencies.

The other challenging situations for agencies are

difficulties in modifying their program. They have alreadyagreed proposal to implement certain programs such asconstruction of temporary shelter, build semi permanent

house or core house etc. To change or add program, suchas training for facilitator of housing reconstruction, wouldnot be easy since they have to report to the donor. Theproblem is getting bigger since the government programsare initiated not in the same area as the agencies. It wouldnot be easy for the government to move their program tothe agencys working area or the other way round. For

example one agency plans to support the government

program by providing monitoring team or constructiontrainer near the agency working area. When thegovernment program still does not reach that area, the

agency most certainly will leave the project sites as soonas their mission completed.

III. ADDRESSING GAPS

Government plan

Based on JUKNIS mechanism, the government willsend cash assistance in 2 stages. The amount will bedifferent and it depends on the type of house damage. For

each moderately damaged house, the affected householdwill receive cash assistance for the amount of IDR 10million, while the each severely damaged house will

receive IDR 15 million. The money will not be transferred

directly to the affected households but it will betransferred to the group that the community has formedthemselves. The group which consists of 20-25 familiesknown as POKMAS (Kelompok Masyarakat) will open a

bank account to which the government can send themoney. The mechanism of cash disbursement is shown onthe table 1:

Disbursement

Stage

Requirements

1st Stage:

50% Official Document of POKMAS formation Copy of contract signed by Budget

Controller

Pokmas account details Activity Plans and Budget Plans

2nd Stage:50%

Average physical progress of housingreconstruction has reach 30%

Letter of confirmation that POKMAS isable and will complete reconstruction ofhouses

Document which states that POKMAS hasapplied for housing construction permit

Activity plans for completing thereconstruction

Government defines 3 expected goals to be achieved by

engaging POKMAS system i.e.: Strengthening the community so that they can

use their local knowledge in terms of how they will

rebuild their houses, decide on the priority of who will besupported first, and resolve internal problems if mayappear.

The reconstruction efforts will mobilize localresource, which affect the local economic growth.

The government will support the POKMAS by

providing facilitators to ensure that the rebuilt or repairedhouses will be earthquake resilience. Government also putIMB (building permit) as the prerequisite to receive thefull cash assistance.

To ensure that the houses will be built or rehabilitatedproperly, government provided 1 technical facilitator to

assist 40-50 affected households or 2 POKMAS,depending on geographical and local conditions.

Gaps identified

Later on during the early phase of government Phase 1(pilot project), which serves 7,636 families

[6], SWG found

gaps between actual field implementation and thegovernment plan.

The gaps can be detailed as follows:

Concern on quality due to limited number of

facilitators.a. 1 technical facilitator has to supervise 50 houses.The question is: in every site visit, how much

Table 1. Cash disbursement mechanism


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time does it take for each facilitator to check the

construction process? When will the next visit beconducted by the respective facilitator to checkthe progress of the construction? Will thefacilitator be able to rectify, in case of unsafe

construction, which might happen unintentionallywhile the facilitator is not present, since he/sheneeds to monitor a lot of houses?

b. 1 technical facilitator has to assist design andbudget calculation.It means 1 facilitator can have 50 house designs

and 50 budget calculation, since each familymight have different expectation. This couldpotentially lead to some overlook on design and

budget miscalculation. Concern on time implementation since it is

difficult to recruit facilitators.As mentioned in the challenge section above, there is

insufficient number of engineers or constructionsupervisor in West Sumatra. Many of them are working

outside the province; therefore, the number offacilitators that are managed to be recruited are much

less than needed. Insufficient local resource to achieve build back

better practices.

The intention to mobilize local resource might lead toanother problem due to improper common practices onconstruction. It is not easy to change old practices

which were perceived as the proper constructionmethod by the local builder. Sometimes the builders areeven more insistent than the house owner and thefacilitators, since they believe that they know betterfrom their long-term experience.

Impractical application of the constructionpermit.

The government required all POKMAS members toprocess construction permit as a prerequisite prior tosecond cash disbursement. In normal condition, it

would be difficult to process the permit in short time.During the pilot project, the requirement is thenchanged to just submitting documents that show that theaffected household is now processing the permit. But at

the end this requirement was dropped because it isimpractical.

Agencies and government efforts on closing the gaps

SWG and BNPB-TPT found that these gaps should beaddressed immediately during the pilot project phase. The

government seeks more support and involvement fromagencies regarding the followings:

Training of facilitator that was conducted only by

government. Outreach in earthquake-resilient construction

practices and methodologies. Strengthening and empowering facilitators and

their operation at village level

To follow up the government initiatives, agencies and

government have agreed to conduct more in-depthdiscussion on the modality of the joint effort. BNPB-TPTSWG already carried out Workshop and Exhibition on

July 8th, 2010. This event, titled Through Coordinationand Collaboration, Lets Accelerate Community HousingRecovery in West Sumatra, was a solid proof of excellentcoordination and collaboration between Government ofIndonesia (represented by BNPB-TPT, West Sumatra

Provincial Government, and BPBD) and UNAgencies/NGOs (represented by SWG). One of the mostsignificant results of the Workshop was the agreement

between BNPB-TPT and SWG to eliminate the gaps,which may potentially emerge during Phase II of WestSumatra rehabilitation and reconstruction. During the 1st

Phase (pilot project), poor capacity of the housingfacilitators, lack of skilled workers, and lack of qualityconstruction materials have been perceived as the main

challenges. Since the government program in 2nd phasewill be 6 times larger than the earlier phase, BNPB-TPTand SWG are concerned that the challenges would bemuch bigger. Therefore, during the workshop it has been

decided that both parties will focus on how to strengthenthe field facilitators.

To follow up the workshop outputs, currently SWG and

BNPB-TPT are formulating the modality on how tostrengthen the housing facilitators at the field level

[7].

.

IV. JOINT EFFORT INNITIATIVE

Based on the diagram Fig. 1, it is clear that allstakeholders have their own challenges and they foundgaps during the implementation of their program. Allstakeholders perceived gaps on quality concern, minimumresource and time limitation. If all stakeholders or at least

government and agencies agree to see all the gaps ascommon gaps, and then all parties can move forward to

create synchronized effort.

Figure 1. Facilitation on joint effort among agencies


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The joint effort initiatives in SWG are then replicated to

other programs. In July 2010, RN UNRC/HC gatheredagencies who worked in DRR program to findopportunities on combined program. Learning from thesuccess of SWG and BNPB-TPT, all agencies are

interested in sharing resources and planned on jointprogram in form of trainings, workshops or DRRcampaign. The result was good and all agencies, which

have DRR program, formed a working group. Save theChildren was the focal point of the Disaster RiskReduction Working Group (DRRWG).

In order to maximize the impact of joint effort andcombined strategic program this initiative should be

supported by all stakeholders. It means this programshould carried out by government, NGOs and UNagencies altogether. The most viable means which wasproven to be succeed is through working groups. To

follow the success of SWG, DRRWG attempted the sameapproach which some of the achievements can be listed as

follows: Conducted 2 trainings on DRR for local

government and agencies including training for DRRfacilitators. The first training was funded by UNRC/HCand the last was funded by BNPB-TPT. In the last training

Mercy Corps and Jamari Sakato contributed their staffs asfacilitators. Still in the last training, other agencies, suchas World Vision, contributed their training equipment.

This sharing of resources and funding could be appliedwhenever stakeholders perceived crucial gaps could findthe best strategy to respond them together.

Agam district BAPPEDA requested inputs fromDRRWG on how to integrate DRR into their strategic

planning and budgeting.

V. RECOMENDATION

The joint effort and combined strategic program was oneof the uniqueness of West Sumatra recovery. Thisinitiative has proven its successes in building synergiesamongst humanitarian agencies to speed up their program

and enhance the recovery program quality and obviouslyreduce the program cost. In order to share this iniaitive tobe replicated in other area, these are some

recommendation which can be used for other program to

initiate joint effort:

1. All stakeholders should analyze to find the most

crucial common gaps that may impede the progress in thefuture. This can be achieved more effectively through anactive working group. This kind of working group can

help every agency to gain in-depth analysis to find themost effective strategy.2. The presence of local government willsignificantly increase the possibility on program success.In order to amplify agencies program, the working groupmember has to find ways to intersect with governmentprogram.

3. Joint effort or synchronized program can be seenas a success if the program can consist of initiatives whichcan be used in longer term.

ACRONYM AND ABBREVIATION

BAPPEDA Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (LocalDevelopment Planning Agency)

BNPB Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana(National Agency for Disaster Management)

BPBD Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah

(Provincial or District or City Agency for DisasterManagement)

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

DRRWG Disaster Risk Reduction Working GroupIMB Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan (Building permit)

JUKNIS Petunjuk Teknis (Technical Guidelines)NGO Non-governmental organizationPOKMAS Kelompok Masyarakat (A group of community

from the same village consists of 20-25 affectedhousehold depending on geographical and local

conditions)

RN Recovery NetworkSWG Shelter Working GroupTPT Tim Pendamping Teknis (Technical Support Team)

UNRC/HC United Nations - Office of the Humanitarian /Resident Coordinator.

REFERENCES

[1] RN UNRC/HC Padang, TPT-BNPB Monitoting form, August 25,

2010.

[2] Arwin Soelaksono, NGO and Donor Coordination to Speeds up

Reconstruction and Avoid NGO Competition, November 9, 2009,

http://www.sharefile.org/showfile-

2229/arwinsoelaksono_ngo_donor_coordination_9_nov.pdf

[3] Shelter Cluster Coordination Meeting, meeting notes, 17 February

2010.

[4] Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Bidang Perumahan Pasca Gempa

Bumi Sumatera Barat 30 September 2009, Sumatera Barat Masih

Membutuhkan 641 Tenaga Fasilitator Teknik Minggu, 25 July 2010

http://www.rrsumbar.com/berita/berita-130-sumatera-barat-masih-

membutuhkan-641-tenaga-fasilitator-teknik.html

[5] Badan Nasional Penangulangan Bencana Tim Pendukung Teknis

(BNPB-TPT), "Petunjuk Teknis Pelaksanaan Rehabilitasi dan

Rekonstruksi Sektor Perumahan Pasca Bencana Gempa Bumi

Sumatera Barat 20 September 2009 Tahap II, 25 October 2010,

http://www.rrsumbar.com/berita/downlot_juknis.php/petunjuk-

teknis-perumahan-tahap-ii-versi-25-oktober-2010.doc.

[6] Badan Nasional Penangulangan Bencana Tim Pendukung Teknis

(BNPB-TPT), Laporan Bulanan Kegiatan Rehabilitasi dan

Rekonstruksi Tahap I Pasca Bencana Gempa Bumi 20 September

2009 di Propoinsi Sumatra Barat Tanggal 28 April 2010, Tabel 4,

http://rrsumbar.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/7-laporan-bulanan-tpt-

rr-april-2010.docx.

[7] http://www.rn-unrc.org/activities/workshop

FIGURES

Figure 1. Arwin Soelaksono, Facilitation on joint effort among agencies,

June 2010.
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