LEVE~~4STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

US ARMY WAR COLLEGECARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

c 9ACN 78057_ -

LESSONS OFILLIED INTEROPERABILITY:A PORTENT FOR THE FUTURE I

0 ic' "'c 1

___ , ILIARY SUESAS CM'EMON W.

I AESEARCHX

D DC

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: E ,T23a 98 The views, opinions, and/orAppeWo' for public releae; U J findings contained In this reportstrfnlnutio n t Dare thoe of the author and

should not be construed as anofficial Department of the Armyposition, policy, or decision,unles so designated by otherofficial documentation,78 10 17 50

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTEUS ARMY WAR COLLEGE

C&dlise Barradvg, Pennsy.vunim

LESSONS OF ALLIED INTEROPERABII.TY:A PORTENT FOR THE FUTURE?

by

B. Franklin Coolingand

John A. Hixson

10 August 19 ,S

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT:Approved for public rekim;d&stribuion unlmimt

78 lO

DISC LAII4E f

Thec views, opinions, and or tindin,, iwortalned in this irporl err thoseof the authors and should not he ^onstrUed as an Of'liil D~epartment ofthe Arniv pitrown. ptlc) m 0 de~iin, unkses wo dicplated by othCl

FOREWORD

This mremciandu;,i l.lu. palui ui WAd Way II for potentsof value to the nation's present and future leadership concerned withallied Interoperabilty. 'Me authors assert that the leasons of World War11 provide a matrix for analysis of command and control, logistics,uperationa, educzllon. doctrine. and training within which can beascertained inter'.perability components like "toftware" procedures,SOP'&, and hani.booms, as well as "hardware.' weapons and equipment.They conclvde thai standardization of equipmnt, antunitlon,doctrine, ar.d ipal procedum as a means for eliminating the problem3of Interoperabdlity is a highly desirable goal.

The ftllatry Issues Research Memoranda programn of the StrategicStudies Institute, US Army Wax College. provides a means for timeiydissimination of tnalytical papers which ire not necessarily constrainedby format or conformity with institutional policy. These memoranda2re prepared on subjects of current importance in areas related to theauthors professional work or Interesti.

This memorandum was prepared as a contnbution to the field onational security research and study. As such, it does not reflect theolncia view of tie Colege, tle Department of .he Arny, or theDepartlment of Defense.

DeWIrc C-SMTMajor General, USA

, _. Is Commandant

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AOtAAPHICAL SKkLTCUL OF IHk AUTHORS

)R b.NJAMIN V ('OOLIN( it Aestant Limtol ffor |UItoi,|a Servjca, JISArmy MWary History Inslitute and has bwen part of that orprinhtn vinne1970. Its holds a bachelor'& degree in htatocr from Rulptl Univmity as wall asthe matter*& and doctor's dagree. in the sum disciMin from the Uitvetty, of10asylvani. A prolific writer in thte flWd of historical sapects of mttlay affairs.he aw as Ve IPttaldwi of tiw Amoricas MW"aiy Itetitata, tNe nationsprofnihonaI usocation of mWtaary hlto ians.

UEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A. HIXSON has been Chwl. Otral IllatorySeclion, US Army Military I'satry Institute Lint 1976. Pniviousty, he served InvVitau'ts a s wnts In CONUS, USAREUR, and Southeast Ala a as AsstantPrufeor of Hlstay, ULS MIItary Acwmy. ('lone[ Hixrsn graduted from thteVS Militury Academy and tamed a master's dilre In hiltory from RlieUnIversityI. He is ato. a g 'utst of the Command aind (Genral Staff Collep.

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LESSONS OF ALLIED I.WEROPERABIUTY:A PORTENT FOR THE FlrrURE

Every important conflict of the Twentieth rentury tnvolvingAmerican participation has been an allied effort. Any similar conflict inthe foresmeable future will undoubtedly follow this pattern. From theBoxer Rebellion in 1900 through Viet Nam, allied inteoperability hasbeen both a problem and a challenge for American militaryprufessionals, True. allied experiences date from the time of ancientGreece and Rome. Yet, one really need search no farther than th-Second World War perhaps the greatest coalition war in history-forauguries or portents of value to the nation's civilian and inilitaryleadership faced with interoperability issues in the future. I

Today, the focus is upon Europe and NATO. Not surprisingly themost graphic and relevant experiences of allied interoperability inWorld War II emerged from this geographical area. While historians haveconcentrated upon studying the highest levels of coalition warfare, thefunctional, pragmatic issues of allied interoperability have sufferedneglect. These issues derive less from the victorious sweep of Alliedforces from the Channel into Germany in 1944-45, and more from theearlier campaigns in North Africa, Sicily. and Italy, ms well as theAxis-Russian Armageddon in the east. The final drive to victory was thlesummation of allied interoperabllity lessons learned on caterbattliedleld.

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How should we define the elusive term "Interoperability?"Semantics provide one of the fundamental subissues and problemswithin the subject. Approved DOD/NATO definitions such as "theability of systems, units or forces to provide service and accept servicesfrom other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchangedto enable them to operate effectively together" seem inadequate wheitviewed from the perspective of historical experience.2

"Interoperabilit;" must be stretched to encompass virtually everyaspect of the ov,.rall experience of coalitions in military operations.Only in this fashitn can the subtleties and innuendoes of the fullspectrum of progres.s from national force to integrated force beappreciated by junior and senior leaders in the international system.The "lessons" of N,th Africa, Italy, Southern France, and Russia fromWorld War II provido the matrix for analysis of General Environment,Command, Staff, and Education/Doctrine/Training. Within this matrixcan be ascertained the components of interoperability, includingpersonnel, "soft-ware" procedures, SOP's, and handbooks, as well as"hardware" weapons systems and equipment.

Following the allied debacle of 1939-40 (which showed how lack ofprewar allied interoperability could quickly lose most of westernEurope to a Nazi German empire), the Allied Tunisian campaign of1942-43 provided a testing ground for a subsequent Anglo-Americanalliance in the Mediterranean and European theaters. Subsequent Alliedoperations in Italy reflected some application of the lessons learned inNorth Africa to ensure more effective, functional cooperation. But,time was available for the adjustment. The nature of operations favoredconduct of an integrated allied force. With the exception of a fewlimited counteroffensives, the Germans fought a defensive war. Onlythe two pursuit phases from Rome to the Amo River, and from theAmo River to the Po valley, varied the pattern of the difficultengagements of the Italian campaign, which more closely resembled the"set piece" battles of World War I (including winter lulls) than thebattles of maneuver seen as characteristic of other Allied-Axiscampaigns of 1944-45.

For the Axis, however, this element of time was not available insimilar degree. In North Africa and Italy, but more especially Russiaand the castermf.,€-^" the Axis allies of Nazi Germany also learned thehard lesson that interoperability required large amounts of time andpatience to achieve close training, coordination, planning, and assemblyof necessary logistical support. These same "lessons" (which

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Anglo-French leaders loaomed at such high coat at the start of World W&:11). %vre hammered home to the Axis from the Rhone to the Rhine,and the Don to the EbeN. Successful interoperablibty -the centralingredient of modem coalition warfare was nol mac.

Historically. the problems of into roper ability have beensolved when they have been solved &t all primarily through trial andeffror during actual combat operations over an wzendcd periodI of timeThus trial and enor proved always ito be a costl) process, in terms ofmen, mnaterial, and fime 1.ich' a -u&Wkxoi may Ne lacking in future wars.The proble-ts of operating with allies require comnmand and staffawareness of their existence, arid detailed planning to mteet themn, as doother urgent minitary nuinaw a'nd requirements. Diflevnt national,political, and strategic objectives may, howevri, limit the level ofinltropetabllity that may be achieved in the future just as in the past.

World War 11 indicated that the demiids of prolongedcombat -espcially defensive combhat wil cause ant allied force tobecome progressively more integrated in its cornpositiwi. The exacttimetable of such inieglratior. and how it Nwill occur defies 1'rediton.lFurth4nuiore. there appears to be a stage in this integrative processwhen amialgamation of alliedi units/elemeni will Nei to excrcise adegrading influence on the off~ensive capability of the lorce as a whole.A case in poan! was mixing ol inexpenened~ aitied units on the scaleattempted in the early part of the Tunisian camnpaigi. In the face of ast [k"itge eruenly. 1he , nd result would most likely have been even moredisastious than that narrowly averted at Kasserine '?ass

The personality of commtnanders and Itff officersi s, togethet withplanning lor interopefablty, the most impurtant factor in thee'stablishment of effective coimbined 01 'rations. Those who cannot, orwill not, work harmoniously with allies must he ruthlessly moved out-Lieutenant General D~wight 1). Eisonhower (Allied Commander biC'hief) and Geneial Sir Harold Alexander (Brish 'oiniander in C7hiefMiddle Last) weic an Anglo-American teamn, but su~'or~instes likeMajor Geineral lloyd R. lFredendall. commanding L!", 11 Corps, andGoirral Sir Kennreth Anderson. :omniizdiaig the British First Army.proived intractable with other allied eleoets in their piedoitinurl)national commnands and were replacvd before their presence destroyeditititoporabilimy. A spirit of mutual respct and cooperation must beinstilled and masintainred throughout the comimandmi A parochial ornationalistic attitude on the part of a commiander will soon be ini:rordby lIn start' and subVUidsiats.

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TFhe clostr nAtiur.al cleinents of any affied forcv resemble oneanother in orgintzation. dc~tirine, equpmenit, thc less likely they amz toexperlente miajor priA'Iem in iteroperabiiy. This element of

*ratinaliz i. tandaiiifiatioti, and mnterope Iability" was present inWkwtld Wag I 11 haus ot the over-wheiung presence of Amencauimaterici and weeponis like the Shennaii tank throughout the alliedfui..c LaiguWg dit~sai) b1) itwit i~s not ant insumiotmitable problem otiititopcribility. But :onunosnahi)ti t allied widerstandini requitshiiguisvi and niulary tedinicall vtcat~ular) not ntormally apprieciated ia puiel) national forve enviimnit. Traditiounul liaison1 teamaprroa~hes tj res(lve that issue may sulipl) be insufficient in today'ssetting. This must be a pnmc .jtinssdetation~ in future t&a otganuhatlil.

Individual &nJ unit inexpenenCe militate against the rapidestablishment of effective military coopematlun. (Xnuianders in WorldW'ar I1 found such inexpenence not only with respect to 3peratnig withallied foiniatiuns. but within national units themselves. "New" unitswiU be ivolved iitially un the shaketlown process of solving their owninternal problens. Contacts vnt.N allies dunng this peniod often translateinto perceiveJ char.ttset istics of each national component by an allywvuh, in turn, tend to become exaggrated, usually suimiewhatderoptury, and, therefoic on srtitute a bar to midl undorstaniding.

Bni4 uply personnei in North Atnca, for exarrple, itve, ovetcamethe it disgust with the spendthrift style of attached American units with

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COMMAND

To say that conmmanders must attempt to understand the politicaland military objves of their Llies ha.; always been a fundamentaltenet of the hs~host level of leadetship in coalition&. Such an "ixionV'of inieroperability was present from the start of Supreme Alliedlieadquarters. Eisenhower told Field Marshall Itastip Ismay. BritisMhef of the Imperial General Staff in October 11443:

i £nrtkdpate that as flistij develop% in the neu iheate, there Will oe i&15)tims thai detachments of both iti Unitrd S:atcz and Bittish forces arvdeflniit" irripilied [Ski but I have mntilt) endeavored to maintainin all niy tviUuons~iia wAnh thre Ontisti tovegnnvnt aLd Armed Sorvices.nih the American Wai L"ej'nt. and wilts my stla Wtruordsnse

kxonittunders that we arc unsdriiaktriji a "ler unifie effot in purwit ot acoenmon otoect stated by the tw,, L-vemrits't . thii foi theattainient of this obrject out ss-ic endeavorr must be to uw C.er) revoutt-vand acr (,)r ?.he common god

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Yet, principle at the top often falls apart in practice at the firing line.Interoperabllity in command can profitably begin with clarity and

simplicity of ordets and directives. Such is not merely a principle, but acommandment. Combined operations which include complex schemesof maneuver, intricate fire support plans and close timing are, ingeneral, fated to be less than successful. This is especially true of thosesituations in which one or more of the major allied components of theforce is inexperienced.

Integration of forces may give the commander a capability he didnot previously enjoy with solely national forces. Still, he may alsoacquire a liability. Only personal visits by commanders and their staffswill generally provide an adequate picture of his allies' capabilities,needs, assets. Constant assessment of such a personal nature will beabsolutely necessary. Such visitation should establish a commandatmosphere sponsoring "positive criticism." This will provide anopportunity for subordinate allied unit commanders and their staffs tooffer constructive suggestions and vent their feelings. Uaison alonecannot suffice in this regard.

This is not to denegrate the value of liaison-the traditional approachto coordination in national sector, coalition warfare. Experience hasshown that units train A and equipped for liaison, such as artillery unitsor corps troops, do a better job of working harmoniously with alliesthan units whose mission does not normally require or include liaison.The message for commanders here is that units can be trained to workwith allies if such is made a part of their normal nission, functions, andcombat organization. Liaison requirements beyond normal, standardexchanges are difficult to foresee, but the conduct of operations by anintegrated allied force will inevitably exceed anticipated requirements.

Integration of combat units at the division level can be effectivelyaccomplished, given adequate time for the concerned units to preparefor it. Units perform best under the commanders and staffs with whichthey have trained. It is certainly not desirable to integrate units of onenational force Into another on a piecemeal basis. Combat formationsbelow the division level generally do not integrate well into anotherforce although battalion-size combat support elements can be sointegrated due to organization, equipment, and training. In any case,when placed under another formation, a longer period of time must beallowed so that more detailed preparations can be made to counterpossible confusion arising from lack of mutual understanding.

Commanders must be conscious of the fact that formation of

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"reprisentative" combat units because of "political desirability" In acoalition may present treat problenu due to time, available equipment,stocks of clothing and expendable supplies, as well as forcerequirements. For example, in the Italian campalgn rehabilitated Italianarmy units withAhe allies proved far more useful as Zogistical troopsthan as combat forces. Brazilian Expeditionary Forces in this sametheater were successfully amalgamated in both roles. Of course.political clout at a postwar peace table was not a factor In the Braziliancae.

The prerogatives of commanders, where units may be involved Inintegrated operations, should be firmly established early by commonagreement. Further refinement on the ground will undoubtedly occur,since conflicts of authority are a natural accompanyment of coalitionwarfare. Only in this fashion can inevitable criticism of allies-howeverunacceptable on the part of major commanders and staff officers-becircumvented to ensure a spirit of cooperation.

STAFF FUNCTIONS

The focal point for traditional allied interoperability has been with acommander's staff. By necessity staff officers have had to be asinformed and politically sensitive as the commanders they supported.There is no reason to see any change in the future. Yet frequentpersonal liaison and information-gathering visits by staff officers atevery level will be even more essential to understanding alliedintentions, capabilities, and feelings, As at the command level itself,simplicity must be the key. Constant efforts must be made, in planningand in actual conduct of operations, to find ways to eliminate sourcesof confusion and misunderstanding, and staff officers play a central rolein this facet of allied interoperability.

There can be no substitute for a staff officer possessing a firm graspof allied organization, operational doctrine, and philosophy of war, Thestaffer must accord all units equitable treatment and exposure in anintegrated force. He must recognize that a policy of associationbetween combat, combat support, and combat service support units,when adopted early, will assist materially in reducing interoperabilityproblems. Particularly sensitive will be information flow in anintegrated allied force as opposed to a homogeneous national force.Such a situation may force creation of vertical liaison systems, andplace additional requirements on communications monitoring elements.

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Still, there can be no avoidance of the centnity of "liaison" U aprnlnay staff mission in ailled interoperablity. The exchange of liaisonofficers or parties should not be viewed as the sole or complete,olutlon. Depending upon duration of operations, size and compositionof the total integrated force, size and composition of the staffs of thesubordinate Integrated elements, similarlties/dlssmllaritles in languageand administrative or logistical procedures, and the nationality of theunit commnder-It may be necessary or desirable to Institute someform of a cotnbined command and staff arrangement. In addition, thelessons of the Italian campaign taught that once the Integrated portionof an allied force reaches one-third to one.half the total strength of theforce, its presence will begin to be felt in all functional areas. Normalliaison exchange, although still necessary, will no longer suffice alone.In Italy, four combined staff concepts resulted from such aphenomenon, Including Integrated, incremented, and mission, as well asthe traditional liaison.

World War II liaison officers were usually selected more forconvenience than by any criteria posed by their intended mission. Thesubsequent marginal performance was not always the fault of theindividual. Dispatching headquarters frequently Inhibited the liaisonoficers or missions by failing to provide adequate training. throughbriefing on each mission, and sufficient personnel and equipment forthe assignment. Liaison officers often became mere messengers, notauthorities on allies, and frequently lacked access to variousheadquarters staff sections.

A checklist for headquarters staffs involved in Interoperabilityshould include recognition of the following:

Counterintelligence problems are increased in an allied force. Thisis especially true in those cases in which the allie& force containselements representing several nations, and operations are beingconducted within or adjacent to one or more of these nations.

Variations in organization, tactical doctrine and differences ofequipment will likely lead not only to operational, but also toadministrative and logistical problems.

If an allied unit is weak in certain combat, combat support orcombat service support capabilities, then it Is necessary to supply thatdeficiency from the resources of an ally, and the units so transferredshould then come under the command of that allied unit.

The formation of "ad hoc" forces, i.e., forces formed from piecesof various units and from two or more allied forces, should be limited

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to ca s of transcendent necessity because of their disruptive effect onparent organizations, complexities in conmimnd -id control, logisticalproblems, matid the lengthy time required to sort out the units followingthe percd of employment.

As far as possible divisions shotild be employed intact. When partsof a division sie taken away for a specific task, they should be returnedto the parent unit as soon as possible. If it is essential to break updivisional organiation. It appears that nothing less than a brigade-sizedforce with adequate combat service support should be so detached.

When it is necessary to regroup allied forces already engaged inbattle, le following must be considered.

(I) The time necessary for orders to reach subordinate formationand units.

(2) The condition of a formation to be attached I* difficult toanseti except by z personal visit by the gaining conummandet.

(3) Establishment of close liaison with the appropriateadministrative and logistical staff to ensure proper support.

(4) Time for the estabihiniaent and coordination ofcommunications.

(5) Time required for reconnalance..ombat support units (tank destroyei battalions, field artiliery

batt iions/gi oups/brigades, separate tnk battalions, etc.) camii morereadily and effectively be attached to allied formalions than unitsorganic to divisions. The) will experience little loss in combatefficiency so long as they are employed in accordance with their owntactical and logistical doctrine. The same would also appear to be trueof separate combat service support units.

A high degree of coordination in artillery (Fre support) opcitionsis both reqwured and feasible, especially in counterbattery/mortaroperations. Infenonty to opposing force artillery strength/capabilitymakes this coordination even more imperative.

Great care must be exerciied in hiding the boundaries betweenadjacent allied units and in providing for observed fire support alongthese buundanes.

Actually, the greatest problems facing allied staffs may well concernsupply and logistics. Host nation agreements, national ecornomies andaccountability fo: shared materiel, as well as the functionalarrangements for supply, will all prove troublesome, if the westernallies and the Axis never rally addressed host nWtioi quetioni 0f theNATO variety, the Anglo-French- Belgian operations of 1939-40 did.

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and the debacle of May and June 1940 could be attributed in part tolack of adequate provision beforehand. Lend.lease solved much of theaccountability problem as the war proceeded, and with a world engagedin conflict, questions of national economics for smaller or minorparticipants in coalition were not the same as today.

Yet, in the theater itself, staff officers faced major considerationsleading to valuable lessons for the morrow. Close control must beexercised over critical items of equipment and special units, forexample, in order to ensure ,"fair distribution," availability, andmaximum effective utilization. Combat Service Support must beprepared to support, within their capability, all allied units operating intheir area of responsibility. Transportation coordination andmovements control proved a major logistical headache in North Africaand Italy, requiring early planning and constan supervision to ensuresuccess. Ultimately, the problem of supply in any allied force will bedifficult. The more varied the force composition in nationalities andequipment, the more complicated will be the problem, especiallydietary requirements.

The most graphic illustration of staff difficulties with alliedinteroperability emerges from the Italian supply situation-a true operabouffa of World War II. US Quartermaster historians declared after thefact:

Supply procedures for the Italian Armed Forces were published on 23November [19431. Italian units were divided into three categories: BR-ITI,Italian units under British command; US-ITI, Italian units under UnitedStates command; and ITI-ITI, Italian units controlled by the Italian WarMinistry. The Fifth Army was responsible for the supply, maintenance, andevacuation of all US-ITIs in the Army area regardless of assignment orattachment and for the supply, maintenance, and evacuation of allIT-IT's operating with ",e Fifth Army. It shared its responsibility forITI-ITI's with the British. the supply of medical equipment and fuel was aFifth Army responsibility; and the supply of clothing was a jointresponsibility. The US-ITI's under Fifth Army command were controlledand administered by the 210th Italian Infantry Division, which wasattached to Fifth Army special troops.4

EDUCATION/DOCTRINE/TRAINING

Allied in'eroperability demands early attention to education,training, and clarification of doctrine. Logically it should begin inpeacetime, or at least prior to embarkation upon large-scale operations.

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Bytaditit hasnot, it theinterod prib e ween the worldwanas ;tikig eampe o inttetio tofuntioalimplications of

inteopeabdty: ngl-Frnchallis lrgey wstednin mothsof the"phoey ar"befre he Bittirig o 190. Een n Aeriathe tone

was aet by Eisenhower's mentor, Major General Fox Conner. when hetold a US Army War College audience in !939:

Dosilingj with the entimy Is a amnple and stialghtforward matter wherncontrasted with aecurins close crkpwation with an ally By the Me* loiter.no small part of out War College studies sh~ould be dvvoted to an endeav(to (oeebe exactly what to expe .l and how to reduce a friction ilhould wehave Allies, which may Cid forbid. in the nextI war5

Given tihe atmosphere of the times both in Europe and Americ~a,Corners prejudice (reflected in his final phrase) undoubtedlyovershadowed his mtain point that US military education needed to giocmore attention in peacetime to allied interoptisbility. Today this slimeeducational system has no evident pro~rzm of progressive instructionon such topics. All of this imposes added training reqwrements foroperationall units and headquarters staffs for American forces stationedabroad. In effect, it also fosters ai bifurcated military force- ahome-iltatiues institution traditionally national in focus, with over::V.garrisons by trecessity oriented to service au an ittegrated allied force.

Current US service doctrine inadequately identifies or makesprovision for probiemns associated with in te roperlability. Combinedtraining exerciss regardless of the size of units involved, have alwitysbeen vital to creating a spint of cooperation and increasing theawareness of all personnel that allies have peculiar needs and mindar'ls.Yet the absence of any underfining of interoperability in nationalservice doctrine mitigates against achievemrent of such a goal in sonmehour of need. It has been so in the past and continues to suggest Itselffor the future.

Based on past experience, what should be sought through escalatedinteroperability training? Exercises involving lnmegrated units should bestructured to place maximum strain in all parts of the force in allfunctional areas. Failure tu do this nmay conceal nialor problenms ofinteroperability which cannot be corrected r only at great cost oncethe battle is joined. This is particularly true : logistics. Differences inallied organizatioa, d~ctuine, language and tem~inology will contiinue topuss problems, and emrhaiee the need for t alned liaison offlcers andan allied educitional program. Thiese problenvis can be well addressed by

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discernment during traning rather thin amazemrent when they occurduring wartime.

A unit which is to act as part of on integrated allied force shouldtrain with the others, it possible, and receive extensive Instruction. notonly on the otganuition and staff methods of thcir allies, but also onthe organization and general principles of their tactical employment.Only in this way can the debilitating effect which differences inlanguage, vocabulary. doctrine, and cqwpiiwnt have on allied 4.utiibateffectiveness be overcome, or at lest reduced.

Training fo.- allied ground-air cooperation ;.s alho essential. The quicksnd accurate idtintification of allied troops~equipment/l atrcraft and thecoordination of air defense are serious jotnt/combined problems of longstanding which defy easy solutions. Any solution, however, mustini~orpcrate within it an intensive tramiing program fur both air crewsand ground combat personnel. Electrto-mechan ical devicas alone willnot solve the problems.

Stan durdizat ion of equipment, ammnluiton, doctrine. and signalprocedures, as a major means (or eliminating the problems ofinteroperabiiity, is a higly desirable goal. Thie experience of coa-litionwarfare would indicate, however, that it is a goal which will never beattatined. This fact of life, therefore, causes heavy responsIbility to hep!:-ced upo.im tlc duication/training baoe of a military Insitution likethe US i.rmy.

113wever, recent stepi taken by the United States indicate a majoreffort to elimintate S/I problems. Increased standardization andirteroperability of weapons and nilitary equipment within NATO isnow US Government policy. Section 802 of Public Law 94-361.enacted in 19 76, s ates:

ItI is the policy of tihe United Siates thai (quipment for ux of petiwnet ofthe Armed Forces of the United States statio-ned In l-urope under theterms vf the North Atlantic Treaty should be siandardiird or at W~aitinteroperable with equipment or tither nwrrberi of the No~th AttariiTreaty Ortianlratiori

The law :peciflcally directs the SeLretary of Defense to initiate andcarty out proctirersicnt procedures in pursuit of that ptlicy andautrits hint to waive "Buy American" price differentials Inprocuring equipment manufactured oultide the United States.

In March 11)77, the Derensc Department published a comprehensivedirective6 Imprlementing dcpartitientai policy on NATOsardizatiorn/i.erope rabilty. Subsequently each of the Military

De mej'nnts publid its own iml~mnenhn#[ inuctions. 71wdimclive stipuiaW, inter "da that DOD components will: ask NATOalmelme4nlgt on mitarlly operaltlinal Inds, flow vicaon systeml)

roquirernentt, and ach~edule for new wea4pons development andproduUon, bae on %feed NATO doctr'il and operationlzr conzcepts;employ mutually benef'lial licensbis ilfrowints with NATO llies toachieve tanlildardizationl or f'acBiiat Interoperability, c".,iuder NATO&Mle&' "}.tanu, sysk~em derivatives, subsystems aind components early intht developrment cycle: and. pursue a mutually cooperative and

NATO partners.A itrenil system for exchaning[ experiences among Whlet should be

estabbishad and cultivated at all echelons. In the final nlysis, thefundanwrntal "'lesson" or "morid" from putz experiences in World WarIf is plan, trai, orpanWz for -idied inte operability -or have it apq.-,./

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E"4NOTES

1. This paqw is bawnd upom two ,mudise cwotcted try te auathors in 1977 for(Comntmn4*ag G..wal US Army~ Euiop. to be pubad ua lnteopiblily ofAh*d Fom"t. with f~u do'cumsntatk~n lot consgulted wreL

2 US Depiteew of Defenue. Rmtioneaai*,NSgdgdiedR 14'LAI NATO,.99

3. ALed IFote Headquarters. C-3 (mTOAJ. History of A~kd FonxHeadqusirtm. Pwrr One, p 9.

4. Endota Ramsey ftcheddo and Sherman Allan, Quwtenrdirer Sgjpply inMe 16)ftA Army In h', NW, It. p. S6

5. Fox Conner. The A4id HigA Commad .nd Alie&d tUqir of D41retion. p. -6 !}epumemt of Dofenas Directive N umbor 2010.6, Much~ It. 1977,

Subect. Standardizatiol and lnteroperab~ity of Weapon Systems and LquipmentWithin the North Atlantic Tmtety Organdazeion (NATQO).

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DID UOCRAVPlY

Allied Fo~c Hftaad Army Group, Ikadquartars G-3 A UManierissmcycrpee. 9B@4on Opiratim n he he Itebwa Cmnaip~ I 94J.1945. 3943i

Alled Forcra. Mediterranean Theatc. History of .4 1214 Fan-es/end HnidqneiN,41OVS114 April 2. 1943

Allied Forces, Mediterr-anean Theater. Brit Historical Scton CefitalMedjtarraneian. Opertn of NONrtA. Iillma and Domatnionm bowres in leads. 3Srptrmberl1W3 to.,May 1943. &p.nd

Bal. Edmund F. Staff Officer With the Fifth Army'. Skity. Salerno. and AnnaN'ew Yorkt fipostkon Prosw 395&.

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Bond, Brian. Ed. (7.-ef of Suaff Th#e Die Her of L"ieenant S;eel Str HenryPotw..all laen.n Connecticut Archon, 1973

Clarke. U- A. S. '-0' fi Northwest Africa." The Roael Arimnured Corps Joanwi.Vol IV. Jcnusry1930. pp 42-4 7

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iKlittf' Iesue ReeaarchLLSSONS OF ALLIED INTFPPInABILITY: A POIIE? mrandumFOUR UU? THE Fu e ioie 044 -a"oa -844

Dr. oinjamin F. Cooling

LTC John A. HiLaon

Stratelic Studies InstituteUS Ar y War CollegeCarlise Barracks. Pa, 170J

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Allied operations, coalition warfare, allied interoperobility, standardizatlon.rationliaaton, laisou, logistica, comand and control. doctrine, training,educatlom. World War II lesson&, leadership persoonlities.

Evez ry lporcent conflict of the tvv~tieth century involving the United

States has beem an ellied effort. Any similar conflict in the foreeable

future will undoubtedly follow this pattern. While allied experiences date

from the time of ancient Creece and Ior, one need search no farther than

World War II for portents of value to the notion's present aud future leader-

shi~p concerned with allied Interoperability.

loday. ZhM focus Is upon Europe and NATO. "U ust graphic and relevant

co

e 2. . . . . . . . . . .. . . .

aaPTIenca 'f allied intter orbtlLt In World War 11 emerged from this sameSeoraphtcal area, Mtatoraus have coutcentratvA upon the highest levels ofallied coalition wrf;re, neglecting functional. pragmatic issues at the oper-ational level. The camptgns of North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Iustia pr-ovidaso stdies in the problma and challengva of allied tnteroporabtlitv on thebattlefield.

Standard, accepted Department of Defonse/MT0 defltinttima of "interopr-ability" remain iusdequate. The term must encoipass virtually every Aspect oftlixary klperatton so a.s to incorporate the subtlstiep and innuendoes inhrrent

in any integrated force. The lessons of World War 11 in Rump* provtde a matrixfor analysis of command ant control, logistics, operations. education, training.and doctrine within which can be ascertained inteoroperability components like"s oftwore" proedurto, Sars, And handbooka. as well ams "hardware" of Weaponsand equipment. I

Ritstortcal, interoperability problems have been solved - if at all -through trial aVd error during actual combat over an extended period of time.Challengos ha ' involved not merely linguistic differences, but difforvnt tech-nical torino~ogy and phrasologyj not simply separate national aims, butdifferences ?n military doctrine. Cxnsmam and control variables have exceededmerely differences if oriantlation to embrace personalitles and philosophicaldiffoerncie, Traditional devices to exedite tnteroporablity such as liaisonnisatona ;d team have not pr-ven sufficient to endure the strains in alliances,partieuloyly at crucisl points in the battle. Various staff devices have beeninatitu%*d to overcome size and numbers of alliance participants, and the logis-tic Imenatties o? modern warfare, The inevitable ph'enomenon of modern alliedinteroperability - integration of units due to exigencies of combat crises -has defied traditional deterination to preserve national force sectors.

"'Approaches to allied interoperability prior to the onset of hostilitieshave been wesal and largely confined to top echelona. The inevitable result incombat has been near disaster such as rrance in 1940 and Kassertne Paws in 1943.Edecation, doctrinal inatruction, and rigorous training can ovorcome certainptfalls within national force avd RAW today. Traditional neglect of alliedinteroperabillty in peacetime education/traintn of military institutions cann longer obtain given the leasons of the past. While standardisation of equip-sait, ammunition, doctrine. communication etc. remains a highly doftrable Roalin\peacetime alliances like NATO, the oal will always seem elusive. Alterna-titv and supplemental devices must he inatituted and implemented.

' *he fundamental lesmon' or "moral" emerging from World War 11 axperiencewith value for the future is simplyi plan. train, organism for allied inter-operability, or haei

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