lgas and psd in eac

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND

PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Marcossy Albanie, PhD

D by D training 2016

MS-TCDC Arusha, Tanzania

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES

Essentials of Public Services

Poverty takes many forms, and demands a

corresponding breadth of responses.

Making services accessible to the poor is integral to the

effort to achieve the MDGs. (…hence fight Poverty).

Basic government services allow people to be productive

members of society; therefore, the provision of

fundamentals like agricultural support and irrigation,

roads, health, and primary education are essential for

accelerating attainment of the MDGs.

Public Services…

For citizens that face adversity, the provision of

social protection is particularly important.

Government services in the fields of economic

development and culture, for instance, are also

deemed to be ‘public goods’ that bring benefits

to individuals and communities.

Substantial improvements in the provision of

public services are key to achieving most of the

MDGs.

Public Services..

Most child deaths in developing countries could

be prevented through the implementation of

effective and low-cost public health

interventions, such as the provision of free

vaccinations.

As such, attaining the MDGs required financial

resources, although the solution was not just

about allocating more money.

Public Services…

Effective delivery is situation-specific and requires

tailored delivery arrangements that fuse the efforts of

state and non-state actors.

Each of these actors also needs to better assess their

challenges and determine suitable and sustainable

service delivery responses.

Additionally, effective delivery requires good

governance and performance management, so that

funds are directed quickly to the most urgent needs,

and incentives enable service providers to make good

use of available resources.

Public Services…

What are the main actors involved in public service delivery?

The national government is not the sole actor in public service

delivery.

The private sector, communities and civil society should all play

important roles in shaping demand, developing state policies,

and delivering services.

The relationship amongst these actors shifts as the state

consolidates or weakens, democracy finds roots, and citizens

become more assertive.

LGAs in PSD

In recent decades, national governments have increasingly

shared the responsibility for service provision with the

local governments;

In a variety of intergovernmental public arrangements that

aim to increase the accountability and responsiveness of

service delivery.

In a developing country context, governments have

experimented with different forms of decentralization to

bring service delivery closer to the people.

Facilitating PSD…

They have been assisted by a variety of development

partners, including the main multilateral and bilateral

agencies.

Some decentralization reforms include approaches that

increase the supply and quality of local government

services;

Others stimulate the demand for—and community

oversight of—local government services. Several of these

reforms are proving promising.

How can LGAs contribute to effective PSD?

Around the world, developing and developed countries alike have

observed that decentralized service delivery can result in quicker gains

than with centralized systems.

It is important to note that the national governments have several options

in this regard.

In many countries, central government ministries

responsible for service delivery have created field

offices and delegated more decisions and resources

to their local staff—a process referred to as

Deconcentration.

DECONCENTRATION VS DECENTRALIZATION

In principle, a well-deconcentrated government system is able

to increase the total amount of resources available for pro-poor

public services and can allocate these resources across the

national stage in accordance with where local needs are

greatest.

Yet while deconcentrated units are potentially able to

adopt more efficient management practices and link

more closely with local stakeholders, they are unable

to achieve the same degree of responsiveness and

downward accountability!!

DECENTRALIZATION TO DEVOLUTION

(GREATER responsiveness and downward accountability)

…that is possible in a public sector where public services aredelivered by elected local governments, HENCEDECENTRALIZATION!.

The strongest form of decentralization is achieved byemploying devolution;

DEVOLUTION IS A DECENTRALIZATION in which elected localgovernments are empowered, either by the acknowledgementof general competences in certain policy areas, or by thetransfer of specific service delivery functions AND DECISIONMAKING!.

Trends…

Devolution…and PSD

Where devolution is the chosen mode, central authorities

typically retain some involvement over the functions

assigned to the local level (for instance, by setting

national service delivery standards, supervising and

providing support);

Still CGs grant the local governments the main

responsibility of providing the public service.

The weight of public service responsibilities and the

degree of autonomy acquired by local government varies

greatly from country to country.

Devolution…

There is widespread acknowledgment that local governments arewell-situated, but need to be more empowered to make acontribution to the achievement in PSD in EAC;

In Kenya and Tanzania, Local governments that are large, urban, well-established and have a productive economic base are in the forefrontof this effort;

Conversely, new, small and poorly supported local governmentsstruggle to take on meaningful service functions.

Why haven’t local governments realizedtheir potential to enhance public servicedelivery?

Challenges to Effective Decentralization…

1. In some cases, national governments find it difficult to

develop and implement a coherent approach to

decentralizing the delivery of public services.

2. The ministry championing local government reform may be

able to guide decentralization initiatives though legislative

hurdles, but it is not unusual for sectoral ministries to resist

or reject the reforms.

3. The result is conflicting legislation and inconsistent

implementation across sectors.

4. The lag in the implementation of sound sectoral

decentralization reforms often contributes to service

outcomes that are far from what is expected.

5. Even when the national level government is consistent and

supportive, the introduction of a sound local governance

system meets with other daunting challenges.

6. Elected officials or the executive officers of local

governments may lack experience, or they may be tied to

certain groups and interests, and therefore fail to act in

the public interest.


7. The advantage of proximity to the people may be

neutralized by the absence of mechanisms for involving

citizens, communities and community-based

organizations.

8. Typically, local governments also struggle to have their

challenges placed on the national agenda.

9. In many countries, meager resources are provided to

the local governments, and there are wide variations of

resources and capacities among the local communities.


These elements present considerable obstacles to the

effective analysis of common challenges, and make it

difficult to mount effective communication and advocacy

initiatives for the national policy and programming

changes that could serve to strengthen local governments

in their service provision roles.

Decentralization has not proven to be an easy route to the

improvement of public services.


Conclusion

Need for Advocacy?

The failures are a consequence of the partial steps taken,

but also speaks of the complex factors that influence the

quality and reach of services.

Despite this reality, some notable successes

indicate that progress can be made, particularly

when the supply and demand sides are addressed

simultaneously.

Evidence Based Advocacy?..

There are evidences that national frameworks areimportant in fostering dynamism at the local level;

National involvement, if poorly handled, can also stiflelocal potential (tha Case of Tanzania, Kenya andUganda).

Donors and supporters must keep in mind that capacityfor decentralized service delivery needs to be directedat both national and local levels.

Increasingly, local governments need to be givenmandates that recognize their diversity and maximizethe possibilities of self-government.

Public Service in EAC

Attempts to reform public sectors swept across Africa in

between 1990s to 2000s, and as late as 2010-15 in Kenya.

Generally, they are significantly different from those of

the immediate post-independence period.

The earlier reforms aimed at shaping a public

administration that could spearhead national

development, albeit in the mould of the colonial age.


Current reform efforts aim to reduce the costs and refocus the

activities of the public sector;

To change the way it works, and

To promote the role of the market and nongovernmental

actors both in service provision and in the economy at large.

This time around, reforms are driven by pressures from

economic crises and structural adjustment, donor imposition,

domestic demands for change amplified by growing political

pluralism, and emulation of reforms in other Countries.


Early in 2000s the EAC states were said to be overextended to

the point that reductions and refocusing of its activities were

needed.

This meant to improve macroeconomic stability as well as

efficiency.

Moreover, stronger incentives for performance were to be put

in place.

Many, although far from all, of these initiatives were inspired

by New Public Management (NPM) concepts (Hood, 1991; Larbi,

1998).


More specific and direct capacity-building measures have been

far less emphasized.

Improved accountability in the conduct of public affairs is

another reform objective of many countries in and outside

Africa (Batley, 1999; Olowu, 1998:619ñ620; Wright, 1997).

Accountability involves both the political justification of

decisions and actions, and managerial answerability for

implementation of agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of

performance


Among the instruments are NPM-inspired

measures such as performance-based

management, value for money and various

approaches to empower users vis-‡-vis service

providers.

In practice, there is generally less emphasis on

accountability than on efficiency.

In Tanzania,

The main objectives of civil service reform, which also

reflect a general approach to change in most sectoral

and local government reform efforts in the countries

were to:

re-define the roles and functions of the Government with a

view to hiving-off functions not considered to be core

functions, reducing the scope of government operations to an

affordable scale, and

restructuring its organisation and operations to achieve

efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services

(Government of Tanzania, 1996:17).

In Uganda,

The key concepts used to describe the “vision” (a frequently

used word in the official reform documents) for the reformed

civil service included “improved service delivery”, “smaller”,

“more efficient and effective”, “performance based”,

“responsive”, “fully accountable for outputs” and “transparent”

(Ministry of Public Service, 1993).

There are several reasons for such similarities.

Uganda…

The symbolic functions of the official language of

reform are undoubtedly important, serving to

“sell” reforms by seeking to convince intended

domestic and external audiences that change is

taking place, is desirable, or “failing that”

necessary or inevitable (Hood and Jackson, 1991).

Public Service Performance

Most independent observers agree that public sector

organizations in poor African countries perform badly,

even considering the difficult circumstances they operate

in.

To varying degrees they suffer from a number of well-

known bureaucracy, pathologies inefficiency,

centralization, fragmentation, poor leadership, lack of

capacity, patrimonialism, rent seeking, corruption, and

poor accountability and legitimacy

Performance…

The need to improve efficiency and accountability is

therefore obvious;

Most reforms in developing countries actually focus on

these two issues;

Rather different diagnoses are, however, offered as to why

these problems abound.

Some view the problems of the public sector in Africa as

being largely institutional.

Performance…

Others point to the importance of the marginalization of

Africa in the global economy, which contributes significantly

to the extreme resource scarcity of public sector operations

and to their poor performance.

Moreover, many problems of performance are due to the

inherently difficult developmental tasks in poor countries.

Social Accountability

Social/Political accountability is about those with authority

being answerable for their actions to the citizens, whether

directly or indirectly.

Thus a polity is democratic to the extent that there “exist

institutionalised mechanisms through which the mass of the

population exercises control over the political elite in an

organised fashion” (Moore, 1998:86).

Accountability…

Furthermore, Day and Klein (1987:26ñ27) make an

important distinction between social and managerial

accountability,

The latter being about making those with delegated

authority answerable for carrying out agreed tasks

according to agreed criteria of performance.

The main problem with present thinking about

accountability in relation to public sector reform is,

however, that it is not realistic.

Accountability…the state of facts

The accountability problem is complicated by deficiencies in

the political process itself.

Civil servants may have legitimate reasons to override the

decisions of their opportunistic, self-serving and

irresponsible political masters. Such problems of

accountability are generally deeper in the countries

considered here.

They arise, for example, when governments ignore or

transgress social ethics and constitutional and legal

provisions in conducting public affairs;

Accountability…the facts

Administrative systems are fragmented; tasks to be performed

are so complex or unspecified that it is difficult to identify who

is responsible for what; activities are underfunded so that

implementation is very difficult or impossible;

Knowledge about what works in relation to set objectives is far

smaller than knowledge about what does not work; and

Systems of checks and balances are weak, both internally and

in relations between the state and civil society;

Accountability…the facts

Activities are hidden and those involved are encouraged to be

secretive or are prohibited from informing about them;

Corrupt practices are widespread; special interests and

bureaucratic power often dominate; political and personal

loyalty are rewarded more than merit; and

Public participation in running public affairs is low and the

opportunities for legal redress against wrongdoing are poor

(Oyugi, 1990).

Dependence…?

The second unrealistic assumption about accountability

concerns aid-dependent countries.

The exercise of citizen’s influence over state revenues and

expenditures is an important component of effective

democracy.

But in aid-dependent countries, of which all are in the region,

donors are de facto an integrated part of both the policy-

making and the budgetary processes.

Dependence…?

Typically, donors require that recipient governments are

accountable to them for the use of aid funds.

This further weakens already fragile institutional accountability

mechanisms.

Moore (1998:85) argues that the influence of aid on

accountability is even more fundamental.

Kenya

The scope and depth of reforms in Kenya have, so far, been

modest.

The country has experienced sluggish economic growth for many

years.

Moreover, general government consumption per capita fell

between 1987 and 1995 ;

Kenya did not meet any of the aggregate expenditure reduction

targets (as percentage of GDP) agreed with the IMF between

1985 and 1995 and government employment actually grew.

Kenya…

A voluntary retirement scheme did, however,

result in the exit of some 35,000 people by mid-

1997.

It was carried out without a functional analysis of

staff needs (Kitamonge et al., 1998), presumably

as a cost saving measure.

Kenya Security

Military spending trends are ambiguous (but military

employment grew), while real per capita spending on health

and education rose by around 1 per cent per year during the

period more than total government expenditure

Law and order functions are increasingly carried out by non-

state actors, but more by default than by design (Anangwe,

1995).

Tanzania

The Tanzanian economy grew modestly in the 1990s, but

general government consumption in real per capita terms fell

significantly.

Donor dependence is high, 33 – 40%;

By 1998 government employment had dropped to 264,000 down

from 355,000 in 1993 and 299,000 in 1988 ;

Removal of some 16,000 ghost workers plus retrenchment of

some 69,000 employees, which took place almost exclusively

among lower-level staff, but was gender neutral, account for

most of the reduction.

Tanzania…

Employment levels are now effectively controlled, so that the

aggregate wage bill is kept within the budget (2 per cent over

budget in 1996, against 40 per cent in 1994).

The wage bill share of GDP may have decreased slightly.

Uganda

The economy of Uganda grew by more than 30 per cent in real

per capita terms between 1986 and 1996, although the poor may

not have benefited substantially from this.

Fiscal stability was achieved, substantial decontrol of the

economy took place, the public sector was reduced and

transformed and there was a shift from private to public

expenditure.

Uganda…

The latter was partly financed by increased aid and by extra

revenue raised by the fairly successful autonomous revenue

authority established in 1991

Compared to the preceding decade, these are remarkable

changes for Uganda.

What is the situation today?

Group reflections!

Has anything changed with the coming back of Multi-party

politics in your Country?

Group 1: Uganda,

Group 2: Rwanda,

Group 3: Kenya,

Group 4: South Sudan, and

Group 5: Burundi.

What happened through GP IV to GP V in Tanzania?

lgas and psd in eac

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