lgc case digests

8/12/2019 LGC Case Digests

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GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:

Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. On February

16, 1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation

of the operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested the company

to show to the office of the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayors permit, and

Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the companyfailed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without notice, caused

the padlock of companys plant premises, effectively causing stoppage ofits operation. Technology

Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injuction

against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower

court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is within the power of the Mayor to order the closure of private business operation

within his territory?

HELD:

The Court held in the affirmative. The Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge

investment in this dollar-earning industry but it must be stressed however, that concomitant with the

need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential

imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the

pollution of the environment.

3. CHUA HUAT vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-53851 July 9, 1991

DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:

Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested Manila City Engineer and Building Official Manuel del Rosario to

condemn the dilapidated structures located in Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. The said

official issued notices of condemnation to petitioners based on Inspection Reports showing that the

buildings suffered from structural deterioration of as much as 80%. The condemnation orders stated

that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore

condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by Section 276 of

the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. It was stated that the notice was not an order to

demolish as the findings of the City Engineer are still subject to the approval of the Mayor. The Mayor

confirmed the condemnation orders.

More than 3 months after the issuance of the condemnation order, petitioners protested against the

notices of condemnation on the ground that the buildings are still in good physical condition and are

structurally sound.

Later, the City Engineer issued a demolition order. The petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition, with

PI or TRO against the City Mayor, City Engineer, Building Officer and Manuel Uy and Sons Inc.

The Court issued the TRO and required respondents to comment. Respondents prayed that the petitionbe dismissed claiming that: (1) the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila


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falls within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276 of

its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances 1600); and (2) the power to condemn and

remove buildings and structures is an exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila

to promote public safety.

ISSUE:

WON the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Official;

HELD:

The Court held in the affirmative. The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila

falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the

Building Officials. The Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila and the National Building Code,

also provide the authority of the Building Officials, with respect to dangerous buildings. Respondent

City Engineer and Building Official can, therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation

and demolition orders. This is also true with the Mayor who can approve or deny the condemnation

orders as provided in Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.

4. HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners,vs.

HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

G.R. No. 92389

September 11, 1991

PARAS, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner passed a resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program initiated

by the office of the mayor, of extending financial assistance of five hundred pesos (500.00) to a

bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal

treasury. This resolution was re-enacted again by a subsequent resolution.

The dispute arose when respondent issued an order disapproving the disbursement of the City's funds

pursuance to the said resolution.

The COA argued that there is "no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to

be attained under the assailed Resolutions, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the

inhabitants of Makati."

Also COA alleged that the resolution violate the prohibition that government funds must be disbursed

for public purpose.

Moreover, COA alleged that there was violation of the equal protection clause, since classifying pauper

residents would be an invalid classification since there is not substantial distinctions form the other

residents of Makati.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the resolutions are within the power of the Sanguniang Panglungsod of Makati.

HELD:


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The Court held in the affirmative. Municipal corporations are clothed with authority to "enact such

ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the

responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the

health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote

the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the

protection of property therein."

As to the first defense of COA- it does not hold water since COA tries to re-define the scope of policepower by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of

Makati."

It has been ruled by the court that police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been,

purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding

to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides

enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the

greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, butnot to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and

convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and,

in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It

covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,

security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is

broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the

people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the

preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt

to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

As to the second defense of COA- COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is

not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly

pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared

towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social

justice, as well as human dignity and respect for human rights.

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been

an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

As to the third defense of COA- there is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying

paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive

varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare

of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,

emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

Note:This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal

governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or

otherwise.

Note further:

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporationmay exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the


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repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from

express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and

as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose

of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and

statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the

things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. The so-called

inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in

express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipalcorporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its

creation by exercising such powers. Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies,

must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental

functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. Thus, not only does the State

effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they

are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to

carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary

and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the

inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein."

5. TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC207 SCRA 157

G.R. No. 40243

11 Mar 1992

FACTS:

Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of

Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the

operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then

appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental

fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the

people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said

warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to

respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No.

13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in

the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of

houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends

that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and

void?

HELD:

The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article

694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac

in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a

valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not beunfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate


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trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The

purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the

primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

6. RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMINvs.

COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE MEDINA and FORTUNATA ROSELLON, respondents.

G.R. No. 97477 May 8, 1992

ABATEMENT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE

FACTS:

Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment of

respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga

del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that during the

mayor, the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that they should

vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the rentals religiously

until 1967. They refused to vacate the said land despite the efforts of the government since money isallocated for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction

could not continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under

Article 694 of the Civil Code?

Held:

Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that Art. 694. A nuisance

is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which: hinders

or impairs the use of the property. Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance

affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of

the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be equal.

Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance:

1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance2. Civil action3. Abatement without judicial proceedings In the present case, the municipality chose to file

a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the PR.

Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance

before summarily abate a public nuisance.

Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would

have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the private respondent.

7. Greater Balanga Development Corporationvs.

Municipality of Balanga, Bataan (1998)

G.R. No. 83987 December 27, 1994

FACTS:


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The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the public market in the Municipality

of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is registered in the name of Greater Balanga Development, Corp.,

owned and controlled by the Camacho family. The lot was part of Lot 261-B, formerly registered in the

name of Aurora Banzon Camacho, which was later subdivided into certain lots, some of which were sold,

others donated. Five buyers of the lot filed a civil case against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles.

Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of the Mayor of Balanga but failed

to mention the existence of the civil case for partition and delivery of titles. The permit was granted theprivilege of a real estate dealer/privately-owned market operator. However, the Sangguniang Bayan

(SB) passed Resolution No. 12 s-88, annulling the Mayor's permit issued to Petitioner, on the ground that

the issue as to the ownership of the lot caused anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the

stallholders and traders in the lot, and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit to operate a publi c

market. The Mayor then revoked the permit through EO No. 1 s-88.

Petitioner filed this petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction or

restraining order and to reinstate the Mayor's permit and to curtail the municipality's collection of

market and entrance fees from the lot occupants. He alleges that: 1) it didn't violate any law, thus, there's

no reason for revocation of the permit; 2) Respondents failed to observe due process in the revocation;3) the collection of market fees is illegal.

On the other hand, Respondents assert that the Mayor as the local chief executive has the power to

issue, deny or revoke permits. They claim that the revocation was due to the violation by Petitioner of

Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code when it: 1) made false statement in the application form,

failing to disclose that the lot was subject to adverse claims for which a civil case was filed; 2) failed to

apply for 2 separate permits for the 2 lines of business (real estate and public market).

ISSUE:

W/N the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid.

HELD:

NO. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi jurisand any doubt or

ambiguity must be construed against the municipality. The authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is

premised on a violation by the grantee of any of its conditions for its grant. For revocation to be

justified under the Balanga Revenue Code, there must be: 1) proof of willful misrepresentation, and 2)

deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is always presumed.

In this case, the application for Mayor's permit requries the applicant to state the type of business,

profession, occupation, privileges applied for. Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form. It is

only in the Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's lines of business appear. Revocation is not justified

because Petitioner did not make any false statement therein.

Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation. The second

paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two permits for their conduct of two or more

businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. Granting, however, that

separate permits are actually required, the application form does not contain any entry as regards the

number of businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.

The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for expansion of the Balanga Public

Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't actually maintain a public market on the area. Until


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expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the

landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.

Of course, the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to

municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already issued may

be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]), but the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the

stallholders and traders doing business on a property not owned by the Municipality cannot be a valid

ground for revoking the permit of Petitioner.

Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right to due

process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the

order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation. Moreover,

Respondent Municipality isn't the owner of Lot 261 B-6-A-3, and thus cannot collect market fees, which

only an owner can do.

8. ALFREDO TANO, et. al.vs.

HON. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, et. al.G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997

FACTS:

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality

of:(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled:

"AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA

CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR

OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending

to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the

articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayors and authorizing and directing

to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out

from Puerto Princesa and,

(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THECATCHING, GATHERI

N, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC

ORGANISMSThe petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due

process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation

of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor

had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. They also claim that it

took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers

Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering

"into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a

successful conclusion Public respondents Governor Socrates

and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2,

Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare

clause; they likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection

clauses of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional

HELD:


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10.FRANCISCO U. DACANAYvs.

MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., et. al.

G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992

FACTS:

An ordinance was issued designated certain city and municipal streets, roads, and other public

areas for sites of public markets. Pursuant to this, licenses were issued to market stall owners to putup their stalls in certain streets. Thereafter, the OIC mayor of Caloocan has caused the demolition of

the stalls, which was upheld by the trial court, saying that the public streets are part of the

public dominion and is not open to the commerce of man. Then there come about a change in

administration of the city. The next mayor did not continue the demolition of the stalls. Using the

trial courts decision, here now comes petitioner asking for the demolition of the stalls.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a public street may be subject to commerce of man?

HELD:There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents market stalls are

sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside

the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease

or other contract.

The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The

interests of the few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community.

11.Macasiano vs. Diokno211 SCRA 464

G.R. No. 97764

August 10, 1992

FACTS:

Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz,

Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. This

was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority

on July 20, 1990.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract agreement whereby

the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets and/or vending areas in the

aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government

of Paraaque.

On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along

G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of

the flea market.

Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the

assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag.

ISSUE:


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WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease & use

of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid.

HELD:

No. J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local roads used for

public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of

the local government devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control

of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of publicproperties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles

already established by law.

The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from

public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended/necessary for public

use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned

and only then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets

available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public propertydevoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it

to private persons.

Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be considered approved

by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance with the conditions it imposed for the

approval of said ordinance.

The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by the Constitution and

laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance

the public health, safety & convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity

of the inhanbitants pf the local units.

As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition of the illegally

constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the respondent municipality have the

corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific

public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable during its time.

12.MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.GR 135962

March 27, 2000

FACTS:

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its

private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day,

respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would

be demolished. Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the

issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting

the demolition of the perimeter wall.


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ISSUE:

WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state

endowed with police power.

HELD:

A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has

substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a

political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitantsof its territory (LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the

sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and

appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its

inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers]

provided under the Code.

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike

the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA toenact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro

Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authorityand not a political unit of government since it

is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not

an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet

member.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs,

acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the

opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

13.Moday vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 107916

February 20, 1997

Municipal CorporationEminent DomainDisapproval by SP of SB Resolution

FACTS:

Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed

a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of

Modays land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor

approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which

disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other

lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the

expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution

which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan?

HELD:


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Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a

fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate,

in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently

possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local

governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the

government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The

only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order

invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the councilor president making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that

there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB

resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

14.PROVINCE OF CAM SUR vs. CA222 SCRA 137

GR 103125

May 17, 1993

FACTS:On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a

Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the

provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural

crops and a housing project for provincial government employees Pursuant to the Resolution, the

Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation against

Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for

their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of

Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount

provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the

event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to

take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions

were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be

dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines

Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26,

1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that

an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to

issue a writ of injunction.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that

under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by

the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent

domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must

first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of

petitioners for use as a housing project.


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The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to

take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended

motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after

the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of

Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from

agricultural to non-agricultural land.

ISSUE:WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of

the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

HELD:

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate

agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first

applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of

these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the

Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or

public use.

Resolution No. 219, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local

Government Code, which provides:

"A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian

exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or

purpose."

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure

the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-

agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is

no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of

agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The

closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the

Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use

of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative

policy.

Ratio:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside

insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession

of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings;

and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian

Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural

use.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court,

denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.SO ORDERED.


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15.Municipality of Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate CourtGR L-72126

29 January 1988

Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur

FACTS:In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with the Office of the

Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a

width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by TCTs 215165 and 37879. The fencing of

said property was allegedly to enable the storage of PMC's heavy equipment and various finished

products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge

components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost

housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R.

Legaspi, passed Resolution 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the

respondent's parcel of land covered by TCT 37879. An opposition to the resolution was filed by the

PPMC with the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee of fourmembers to investigate the matter. On 10 March 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the

Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no

genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use

as a public road. On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution 238,

Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of

Meycauayan. The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the

permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 21 October 1983, however, the Municipal Council of

Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution 21, Series of 1983, for the

purpose of expropriating anew PPMC's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid

resolution on 25 January 1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14 February 1984, filed

with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation.

Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine

National Bank, the trial court on 1 March 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the municipality.

On 27 August 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful and

appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to

ascertain the just compensation for the property. PPMC went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on

petition for review. On 10 January 1985, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.

However, upon motion for reconsideration by PPMC, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The

appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road

as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the

proposed public road. The court, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined

that the land is more ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished

products. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the municipality went to the Supreme Court

on petition for review on certiorari on 25 October 1985.

ISSUE:

Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMCs property for the purpose of a connecting

road, in light of other appropriate lots for the purpose.

HELD:

There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for public use uponpayment of just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor. The


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foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that

necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the

public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the

power to require into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine

whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. The government may not capriciously choose what

private property should be taken. With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the

particular property to be taken and how much Constitutional Law II, 2005 thereof may be condemned

in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise ofsuch competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal

protection clause will not allow. The Special Committee's Report, dated 10 March 1976, stated that

"there is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid

property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandizing Corporation for use as a public road. Considering

that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the

lot in question and lying idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was found by the

Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced

together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be

very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the

Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully andbetter attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without

causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to

expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to

attain decongestion of traffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought

to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not suffice to improve and

decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area." There is absolutely no showing in

the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not

been the subject of the municipalities's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for

another connecting road.

lgc case digests

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