SUBMISSION No 991\SINKING OF

LHMAS SYDNEY

HMAS SYDNEY IN:lUIRY 1998

SUPPLEMEtTARY SUBMISSION

BY

JOHN OCOlWl

'END SECFECY ON SYDNEY'GROUP

'ES-O-S'

2981

PINQ.SUBS.013.0004

~--,

'END SECRECY ON SYDNEY I GROUP

'ES-O-S'

INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SINKING OF H~~S

SYDNEY

Defence Sub CommitteeJoint Standing Committee On Foreign Affairs

Defence &TradeParliament HouseCanberra ACT 2600

HMAS SYDNEY INQU!RX

Supplementary Submission, John Doohan

Page 2

officially unfavoured presenters (again,I am one affected) is notconducive to accurate fact finding by Inquiry, morally should notenjoy Parliamentary protection and also suggests agendas not solelythose of,Poniew~erski/Winter.

Here,I refer Committee members to attached ASIO and AFP classified­Secret and Confidential file documents from both agencies' falselycreated and covertly, maintained dossiers on myself as a social andpolitical activist. (See Appendices 2,3 &4).

Until revealed in 1983 that I had unexpectedly obtained a number ofthese secret ASIO/AFP documents, from early 1970's it has alwaysbeen officially refused admission that I ~m subject of covert polit~

ica1 false record. (Certainly, I have no criminal or "gang" member ­ship record as intimated by Poniewierski/Winter).

As a first point for' raising the ASIO/AFP issue to members' and rea­ders' attention,neither ASIO nor AFP will ever admit to keeping suchrecords on Australian citizens legitimately challenging HK~S SYDNEYcoverup; or,in my own case,additional official coverups requiringcredibility 'blockers' within offici.al internal systems.

As second relevant point and catalyst for the first, Committee membersand readers should be aware that South Australian former LutheranPastor Ivan Wittwer (his Statutory Declarations appearing as hisshort submission appended to my Basic Submission) has formally swornto ASIO's involvement in very significant SYDNEY/KORMORAN history; aclaim which ASIO's Submission to Inquirv concedes may be correct, atsame time suggesting earlier des~ruction of ASIO historical relevantrecords and denying any current knowledge of the issue (regardingalleged KORMORAN crew member Gerhardt Grossmann's allegations of Jap­anese sinking of SYDNEY and subsequent murder of SYDNEY survivors.Grossmann,incidentallv,with other Nazis rescued bv AOUITANIA, craverecorded evidence in November 1941 which sicrnificantly supports Ivanl'littwer's reported account to ASIO,in 1951; , evidence which also dem­olishes the official story).

Quite sirnplv,ASIO has lowered the boom on l'littwer by activating itscone of silence; not, please note,denvina the accuracy or truth of hist:.:lb1ic statementsand sworn Declarations. (See attached Appendix S'ASIO·Sucrnission,vol.8,pr771) .Here,I request Inquiry Committee to allow,at Perth Hearing;my testimonyon oath t~at I have in no way influenced rvan Wittwer's account, norany other person's account,as erroneously a1reged in public Submissiono~-Poniewierski/l'linter.

John Doohan,'ES-O-S'Supplementary Submission by

Dear Committee

This SupplementarY,should be better titled 'Divide and Conquer' forsome of the reasons set out below.

Regardless of individual submissions being scholarly,contentious,self serving or just plain ridiculous - nearly all presenters tothis Inquiry have refrained from unfounded character assassinationof other persons submitting what they have been formally invited tosubmit; i.e.,all information they believe may throw light on allcircumstances in sinking of H~S SYDNEY.

Attempt to subvert this Inquiry into a public bun fight between ind­ividuals will only achieve what opponents of genuine HMAS SYDNEY'investigation would wish the Inquiry to be; a low-key Non Event,selfdestructed by division and acrimony engendered among presenters ofmaterial significant enough to warrant greatly extended scope of inv­estigation.

Inquiry itself, a long-sought public interest event, requires muchmore time and resources than are allocated prior to generally expect~

ed dissolVing of this Parli~~ent; meaning that significant materialwill be either inadequately - if at all - addressed,or disposed of in'the 'black hole' of Dissolution.

It is doubtful that all Inquiry Committee members have a clear und­erstanding of even the official-version SYDNEY story,let alone somepowerful alternative evidence submitted by persons under credibilityand character attack; this writer one of those persons.

Sub Committee Chairman,Hon Senator D.J.McGibbon,has publicly enunc­iated a view which appears to say that only the official story isacceptable. (Perth 'Sunday'Times',15 February 1998,p.23;Appendix ~).

Against that uncertain background,the officially sponsored relevanthistorian Barbara Poniewierski/Winter's unfounded and dangerous att­ack on integrity,credibility and even 'mental stability' of certain

2982

PINQ.SUBS.013.0005

HHAS SYDNEY INQUIRY

Supplementary Submission, John Doohan

P.3

Poniewierski!Winter's incorrect allegations,uncorrected,could serious­Iv influence Corr~ittee when evaluating quality of infor~a~ion and evi­dence; particularly when such statements emanate from someone whoclaims to have " .. the best knowledge in Australia ... probably the bestsuch knowledge in the world" of subject l'1atter not fully known by theCommittee,itself.

Credibility of allegedly psychologically maladjusted,in a neuroticWestern gang of 'standover' characters with access to The Press (Perth'Sunday Times),must feasibly be at risk when subjected to diagnoses ofsomeone who apparently spends considerable periods o~ time with psych­iatrists soecialising in certain types of aDnormalit~es.

Peoole with ASIO covert false records may unknowinglv end up with Pon­iewierski!Winter's medical assessments on their files;esoecially asher assessments are produced in a Parliamentary publication of note.

Grasping the nettle,some corrections ofPoniewierski!Winter's state­ments to Committee are in order,as are corrections to some of her *pub­lished SYDNEY!KORMORAN professed history.(See lines 9 & lO,p.294,Vol.2).

Reginald E. Lander Ivas not "worked over" by me at an~ time (p.33~,Vol.

2). To so clearly indicate that a Statutory Declarat~on was obta~ned

by my 'working over' of Reg Lander suggests to me an agenda not solelythat of Barbara Poniewierski!Winter;an agenda already in the mind-setof Australian Federal police.

As for Reg Lander,he and I met for first time on 1st February,1997, atH~ffiS SYDNEY Forum 1997 which I convened at Fremantle.His Statutory Declaration material re HF/DF tracking of KO~!ORAN was,almost word for word,recorded in 1991 in interview with SYDNEY resear­cher John Mc!-\rthur, senior staff member at Maylands police Academy, Perth,and who some years later gave me copy of the interview.Reg Lander permitted me to use the transcript of interview as his Sub­mission to Incuiry; at the same time voluntarily providing me with geo­graphical and 'technical description of HF!DF facilities in 1941 exist­ing at Rose Bay and Holsworthy Army Remount Depot,Ingleburn.His relevant sworn evidence is supported by,among other sources,Austral­ian Archives documentation and records.

Until the identity of KORMORAN was made publicly known in December 1941Reg Lander did not know the tracked German :aider'~ n~me or other det­ails. (See his Statutory Declaration,my Bas~c subm~ss~on,Vol.9).

At 1991 H~S SYDNEY Forum,when relating brief detail of that tracking,Reg Lander referred only to a German raider; as he did in his originalinterview.Naturallv,in 1991 he was well aware of KOR~ORAN,the raider's name oftenmentioned at that Forum and many years previously. .Poniewierski/Winter interpreted his words out of context,to not onlydetract from Recs credibilitv but,also,to ridicule everyone of us whochallenges the ~azi stories.-Reg,fai=ly dea: in 1991 (as .now] was not unduly concerned wi~h th7 .raider's name, nlv that Poniewierski/Winter seemed to be hav~ng d~ff~c­

ulty in unders anding differences between Radar and High FrequencyDirection Fi~d ng of the relevant age.

298-1

H~~S SYDNEY INQUIRY

Supplementary Submission, John Doohan

P.4

For several reasons,one being ti~e,it iH no~ pract~cal in these Sub­missions to minutely exa~ine every alleaation and statement of ponie-wierski/Winter; or any others for that matter. ,However,because she is officially highly regarded, with others,as the'last word' in SYDNEY/KOJllWRA~J alleged hisl:ories, I submit that herofficially endorsed Histor iC"'.l Reference publica tion 'H1"AS SymJEY:Fact,Fantasy and Fraud' be checke3 for accuracy (with others']in thelight of significant more recent information.My further comment will necessarily be brief. For abbreviating Ponie­wierski/Winter to symbol P!W,my only motive is brevity itself.

Rationale for requesting accura~; check on'H~ffiS SYDNEY:F,F and F.'

" •• Most of it is still valid." (P/W,Vol.2, p.294];

"(If] I am wrong,which I am in a few olaces .. "[P/W,Vo1.2,p.294] ;

" .. on the evening of Sunday, 23 November, naval wire­less stations were ordered to call SYD~E~ ..The nextdav,search aircraft went from pearce .. "(P!W,Vol~~95]. See also Submission,Minister for Defence,~.H.Straczek, 'After the battle';Vol.8,p.1844:"Aninitial air search was commenced PM 23 November •• 7

based on Rottnest Island ..The following-day anotherair search was carried out,again based on RottnestIsland.Both of these searches failed to locate thevessel.On completion of these searches the aircraftwere moved to- Gerald ton. 11 -

See also Report bv WRfu~S 3rd Officer Westhoven to DNICommander R:B.~.Long,October 1945:'The search forH~mS SYDNEY survivors' ,File No.2026.3.598,p.2,DraftCooy; " •. on November 23rd, an air search was carried .out from (deleted"Fremantle"] Rottnest." (APpendixi/n .(That oart of Westhoven's Report was deliberatelyaltered bv Richard Summerrell:'The Sinking Of H~~S

SYDNEY',Australian Archives Guide No.3,Januarv 1997,0.17. See this Supplementary Submission,Appendix, 8"--T. I

See also Statutory Decla=ation sworn by Gp.Cptn (~;P

ret'd)C.A.V. Bourne,my Basic Submission,Vol.9.See also'The Bourne Papers' by Gp.Cptn (RAAF ret'd)C.A.V.Bourne (in possession of H~ffiS SYDNEY Inquirycommittee.

'KORMORAN's War-Diarv--Loq:Kriecstagebuch;Translationbv Barbara [Foniewierski] Winter:significant errors in recording daily movements andpositions of KOfu~OR~~ and significant misrepresentation~: operational ability and description of KORMORAN'sMotor Torpedo Boat (MTB),LS3; those errors detrimentalto accuracy of her Historical Reference'H~~S SYDNEY:Fact,Fantasy and Fraud."[For confirmatory comparisons,see 'HMAS SYDNEY:F,Fand F','The Raider KO~lORPu.~' by Theodor De~mers,1959

and KOfu~ORPu.~'s Kriegstagebuch;P/W Translat~on].

2985

PINQ.SUBS.013.0006

HMAS SYDNEY INQUIRY

Supplementary Submission, John Doohan

P.5

" .. the Allies never knew the location of a raider byreadinq its signals (as claimed by] John Doohan .. Ifa[raider's] signal was,however,intercepted it couldbe recognised that it was from a raider because ofits format .• Anyone claiming [navy's knowledge ofKORHORAN's location] because we [read] the code isgrossly ignorant in this field."(P/W,Vo1.2,p.337].

"High Frequency Cathode Ray Direction Finding fixed araider's position strictly by its intercepted andrecognised brief electronic signal.It was not at allnecessary to read the raider's code to obtain posit­ional fix.lt was-necessary only to recognise a raider.A two point interception by the AIl~es world-wide HF/DF network of a raider's brief (one second] acknowl­edgement of a command or message sufficed to generallyfix its position (atmospheric and other conditionspermitting] .Professional operator will be attendingInquiry's Perth Hearing. "

The above 'signals' reply to P/W is by this writer,John Doohan.

All the official histories need to be subjected to Inquiry's closescrutiny of recognisable inaccuracies and even deliberate misrepres­entations. The true circumstances of 645 H~~S SYDNEY deaths will onlybecome known by publication of an accurate,or as accurate as possiblehistory.

For obvious reasons,only the few examples above can be shown in thisSupplementary. .However, attached hereto, Appendices.9 i:il 42. ,are 34: pages of relev­ant and associated examples of the conflicting histories,extractedfrom this writer's as yet unpublished (and unfinished) narrative,''with friends like these .. ',some already published in Basic Submission,'End Secrecy on SYDNEY'Group,Inquiry Vel.No.9).

Barbara P/W at p.1360,Inquiry Vol.6 slates Jack Sue for relating aclaimed account of alleged death of the fourth KORMORAN Chinese,demand­ing that JacK Sue " .. should be asked for his evidence ,or was it just astory produced at an overly festive Anzac Day gathering ?"We,here in the West,are sure Jack told the story exactly as he heardit in 1941 and would like to set Barbara's mind at ease by my inclus­ion of the story in this Supplementary,with my copy.See Appendice 43

Returning to ASIO/AFP documents (APpendicesl/3/~ )and thOSE Agencies'involvement. with this SYDNEY case, I have included a~ditional copiesof Parliamentary and other documents indicating what those Agencies'false covert records can do [and are doing] to Australian citizens whoS~

only crimes are to seek truth and justice.As I earlier commented,my own such 'crimes' include probing of otherserious Public Interest matters additional to SYDNEY cover up;one ofthose matters concerning proven official covert 'tapping' of my hometelephone .[i1ppendty 1-3.AJThose additional copies demonstrate that H~~S SYDNEY-involved citizenssuch as Pastor Ivan Wittwer may never see what ASIO/AFP have on paperabout themselves,unless,like me,they come by them on chance,enablingquestioning,at least,in the Parliament. [See Appendices f4!1,jf6 ].

298h

HMAS SYDNEY INQUIRY

Supplementary Submission,John Doohan

P.6

A great danger in those Agencies' dissemination of falsely compiledrecords is that they often find their way to the monopoly Press, asmine seem to have done.A couple of significant examples appear below:[See Appendices 47/f8/~JfjO:J

However,those journalists who blew the whistles also include a fewother media employees and one or two politicians who are prepared touphold their personal ethics, preserving us from complete cynicism.[See AppendicesSij5dj53] .

Also included here, for ongoing record,is evidence of this Group'sendeavours to obtain the cooperation of German Government in thisInquiry. No great luck, it seems. [Appendices '1/55"/5"6] .My question to Inquiry Committee: What has been attempted in thatregard,particularly as KORMORAN former crewmen are domiciled in Aust­ralia and able to be questioned on basis of their Interrogation evid­ence of 1941-42 and various statements since ?

'ALL THAT GLITTERS IS NOT GOLD! '

APOLOGY

In my Basic submission (Inquiry Vol,No.9,Appendix 52,p.2l39) I am inerror as regards a Fremantle Port Authority document'showing' shipp­ing arrivals at Fremantle in November,194l,as it concerns HMT AQUIT­ANIA

That document,its 1942 origin not shown,was inadvertently obtainedfrom Australian Archives (W.A.) and included,as a 'wind-fall',in mySubmission at a very late juncture. The 1942 Arrivals document hadapparently been 'paired' with a genuinely 1941 Departures document and'showed' AQUITANIA arriving on 18 November,ostensibly 1941.

I naturally accepted that arrival as entered in advance in the arrivalsrecord,as at that 1941 time,we in the fleet oiler KURUMBA were on noticeto refuel the trooper and I suspected no reason to look further.

As it stands and certainly stood then,she would have actually been inFremantle on that 18 November,194l,if she had not been kept back inSingapore for eight days,and that's a fact.After six days of full cruising speed'her depleted fuel would haverequired 'topping up' ,which is why she always called at Fremantle.A simple fact cannot be denied,that she was actually passing Fremantleon 25 November,194l,eight days late,and the error of presenting the1942 document will not alter that geographical position.

Absolutely,there is no need for me to change my Basic SubmissionAQUITANIA account in any way,except to acknowledge that I have incons­equentially referred to an incorrect document.That is a lesson to me,once again; 'never take things at face value !'

I have everv reason to be confident £Qout the 3 pages of StatutoryDeclaration- by AQUITANIA' s Signalman, J. C. Dredge. (Appendices5"1.rs/5~]'

j/ulw.~v

298',

PINQ.SUBS.013.0007

HMAS SYDNEY INQUIRY

Supplementary Submission, John Doohan

P.7

Anyone who cares to refer to 'End Secrecy On SYDNEY' Group Basic Sub­mission (Inquiry Vol. 9) will read my stated belief that AustralianGovernments,both Labor and Conservative ,have always resisted any att­empt to determine true circumstances of HMAS SYDNEY's loss.

Spokespeople for those Governments have always insisted there is onlyone officially 'accepted' account;which is the collection of unbeliev­able Nazi stories.Therefore,this writer has serious doubts that this Inquiry has supportof either Government or Opposition genuine resolve in this bi-Partisanuneasy truce in the SYDNEY/KORMORAN Affair.

'ES-O-S' Group latest efforts to obtain answers from the two PartyLeaders have not been acknowledged. [Appendices6ql61!6~J.

Neither has it been able to ascertain if Democrats Senator AndrewMurray has put on. Notice our. relevant Parliamentary Questions toPrime Minister. [Appendix 65 ].However,we have understood the loud and clear message that InquiryCommittee itself seems not to have understood the extent of WesternAustralian interest in the H~AS SYDNEY coverup.

The Perth Hearing venue initially selected was the W.A. LegislativeCouncil Committee Chambers, Committee Room No.4. [Was that venue arr­anged with local consultation;if so,may we know specifically with whomit was arranged ?

Committee Room No.4 accomodates 36 people, including Committee members,Committee staff,Hansard operator/s with equipment, print Press and Tel­evision media,witnesses and their material, support witnesses.No space is available for general public at this pUblic hearings venue.

There are no meal facilities within convenient distance [presumably,Committee members were intended to be guests at nearby ParliamentHouse dining room] and no near parking, except for limited-tim~ meterson designated 'Clearways' at peak periods.

This writer's immediate 'follow up',to Canberra, on the unacceptablesituation included request for advice as to how public could attend.

[It is a matter of record that there h~s been consistent public relevantinterest and consistent media ('Sunday Times') relevant coverage inWestern Australia over the last eight years,with very little from theother States. See Barbara Poniewierski/Winter,Inquiry Vol.2,p.314,Item 7, (2). It is,incidentally,surprising that the Committee i.ntendsto not 'follow through' Barbara's accusations against a section of theMurdoch press].

Response to (telephoned] complaint to Canberra, about inability of gen­eral public to access hearings, was that Committee believed public int­erest in this State was not high enough to warrant obtaining publicspace,or to place media pUblic advertisement.

During the telephone contact,one of this writer's responses was that'ES-O-S' would need to consider-withdrawing from this political Inqu­iry if general public continued to be excluded.'ES-O-S' would continue its efforts via parliamentary questioning andAttorney General's responsibility to 645 dead Servicemen.

Committee [Secretariat] staff reaction was to immediately put the init­ial arrangements on hold whilst endeavours were made to have Committeeagree to alternative satisfactory Perth venue.

298~

H~ms SYD~EY INQUIRY

Supplementary Submission, John Doohan

P.8

Secretariat successfully arranged much more satisfactory inner-cityhotel conference rooms, but by now the Perth Hearings had been reducedfrom claimed two days,down to one day on Thursday 16th and three hourson Friday 17th,only one hour of Friday schedule dealing directly withSubmissions.Because of advised intention to not advertise the Perth venue, thiswriter caused that information to be published in local 'Can youhelp' columns of April 6th and 'Sunday Times' article of April 5th.[AppendixM J.

With absolutely no criticism of the excellent journalist who wrote it,in regard to that 'Sunday Times' article I make two necessary comments:

(1) I informed, rather than threatened, of probable 'ES-O-S'withdrawal if public was to be excluded from Perth venue.

(2) As for being instrumental, I merely played a part inforcing Inquiry,as the record shows.

Certainly I have made clear my belief in correspondence with formerand current Ministers,in Parliamentary Questions,in these Submissionsand to 'Sunday Times' etc.,that Australian Establishment itself wantedneither evidence nor Inquiry on loss of HMAS SYDNEY.

I have similarly stated a belief that such evidence [and that of someothers] will be exposed to the least possible public circulation inany Inquiry which might be forced into existence;particularly whenmedia selective discrimination has long been confirmed in cases of myself and any community effort with which I may be involved;in thisinstance, 'End Secrecy On SYDNEY' Group.That conviction was strengthened last year and very recently by twoABC Channel 2 programmes dealing with the SYDNEY/KO~~ORANAffair,bothrelated to activities of this Inquiry. ['Lateline',23 April 1997;Australian Story', 19 March 1998] .Six to seven public-financed hours of interviews and filming [of mysal: :~r 'ES-O-S'J ~~~=l~i~; 5~;~~:icn~~ S~~~~~ cc~~= ~~ ~Jt~=~~l w~~c

completely excised and rejected before both Channel 2.programmes wentto air. (For indication of ABC attitude, see AppendixjO ] .

On Sunday, 2 February 1997,the 'ES-O-S'-convened 'HMAS SYDNEY Forum1997'was disrupted and brought to untimely finish,on its second day,by Executive Committee members and supporters of HMAS SYDNEY Foundat~

ion Trust (Inc.).National media then purported to general public,by omission of refer­ence to 'ES-O-S',that Forum 1997 was an operation of that IncorporatedTrust,an organisation enjoying direct political support of Deputy PrimeMinister Fischer,Opposition Leader Beazley,Minister for Defence McLach­lan and lesser bi-Partisan politicians.[For example of media relevant reporting, refer Murdoch Group's 'AdelaideAdvertiser',31 January 1997].By pure coincidence, following the forced alteration of Perth venue achange of Inquiry daily programme hours w~s instituted, thereby length­ening the first hearing day by l~ hours (~.e.,9arn to 5'~5 pm) andreducing the second 'day' by three hours (i.e.,9am to 12 pm).[See original schedules;Appendices6'7'64!67].Unfortunately, fellow researcher Group Captain (RAAF,ret'd) 'Ric' Bour~e

has been placed 2nd last on 16 April Inquiry list, at ~·OO pm for abrief half hour [an astoundingly short time for one so significantlyinvolved in 'hands on' operations of the SYDNEY/KO~~ORAN Affair] ,with

2983

PINQ.SUBS.013.0008

HMAS SYDNEY INQUIRY

Supplementary Submission, John Doohan

P.9

Here endeth t~is first Supplementary Submission of 'End Secrecy OnSYDNEY· Group ..

myself a very poor last at 4'30 pm to 5'45 pm, a time when all mediawill have retired, public audience mostly departing or already gone;Group Captain Bourne and I by Inquiry Committee instruction alsoineligible to further participate in two-hours-Iong question and ans­wer free period on the following day.

Obviously, there have to be a couple of disadvantaged 'tail-end Charlies'in such a drastically revised programme and,perhaps,an explanation maybe forthcoming as to reason for that change.

Inquiry Committee Chairman Senator David MacGibbon has correctly told'Sunday Times' that every Submission presenter will be qiven opportun­ity to speak;which should have been satisfactory arrangement in orig­inal 9 am to 4 pm announced programme.

However,speaking to Committee without public audience or [even a reluc­tant] media in attendance will be similar, in~, to 'End SecrecyOn SYDNEY'Group unintentionally being heard in camera.

In case of Group Captain BOurne's evidence prepared in the public int­erest,he too has the opportunity to speak, but in a brief 30 minutesthe public still remaining at venue will not have the opportunity tohear much detail of what he has to say about official si~nificant mis­information in the SYDNEY /KORMORAN Affair '[~'S.,nl'l'£/lJ),e£';.'6B16'170/1f7:J173/1'fJ

Relevant criticism by this writer is directed at identified major media,which has the obligation, by its own Code of Ethics,to report withoutbias matters of interest arising in this Inquiry.

In that regard, Committee has correctly informed this writer that it hasno control over what media wishes to report,or ~ to report.Therein lies the concern and the complaint !

Faithfully,

fU~ (John Dcohan;convenor 'ES-O-S')21 Bartlett StreetWILLAGEE 6156 WA.

15 April 1998

29:)0

PZlml fc.JNcYJ.y 7iYl?t1' ; 16/~/'lJ" /?~:f

War sinking' crimepr<?~e is rejectedByJIM KELLY

THE parliamentary com~tteeproblng the sinkingoC HMAS Sydney has ruled out opening a crtmlnalInvestigation Into Australla's worst maritime wartragedy. . . . ~ 11'! w ,,,' : •

• The request for the new probe by the WA-basedEnd Secrecy on Sydney Group was rejected by thecommJttee When It met In Canberra last Frlday. •

Group convenor John Doohan claimed evidence·In sworn statements by the famlUes of 17 service- ~men who died In the tragedy warranted a crimJnalprobe.. 'I • • •• , I.. ' .

But conunlttee chairman Senator Davld MacGlb­bon sald lt was not the commJttee's role to pursuepossible crlmlnB1 charges. " , .

"At this stage It Is quite out of the question," hesaid. "It Is notoart of our tenns of reference, It Is amatter or e omey- enenu,

FederaJ Attorney-General naryl WlUlams hasalready ret\lsed to consider a crlmlnallnvestlgatlon,claJmlng the committee IiiqulIY made It unnecess·ary and Inappropnate. , . .

The claIm IS not accepted by Mr Doohan"who,said he ,would demand that the Attorney·Generalreconsider the ruUng, ", . P, ., ..,. •

"The commti,tee's .declSlon throws the questionof a cnnunat mqulrv back Into the Jap oi the

, Attorney·Oenerill." he said."He Is duty bound to deal with It."Meanwhile. Senator MacGlbbon has warned that

the committee's mqulry will not provIde the, ;answers to the Sydriey mysterY that many,want.

"There are still Pjlople who Just cannoVcceptI. what naooened to tne'Sydney. he said. ~ ..' "We. ,wlll never,)ii1ow .:exact\y •.what, occurred

. "because we don't have any eyewitnesses. ..

... , "We,can onlY forecast a llkely senes oC events," ,HMAS Sydney sank wJth the loss oC all 645 hands

alter a battle with a German raider otrthe WA coastIn 1941. 1,111. flU""' • J :

. The End Secrecy group claims the official record'of the sinking Is part of a contlnulng cover·up, ' •

Senator MacGlbbon· sald the commlttee' hopedto complete Its lnqulry by the middle of the year,

298i

')3 fER1"H 'SUI'frYi-j' 1/fY/£( .'' "" 1f0./tf'f? _

Sydney crlme~i

pr~be su·nk '... ~By JIM KELLY , ::.

I • '-,

THE parliamentan, committee probing the sinking:of HMAS Sydney has ruled out opening a criminal,Investigation Into Australia's worst marlt,~m~,waS!tragedy. .,": . " I <1'

The request Cor the new probe by the WA-based.End Secrecy on Sydney Group was rejected by th~icommIttee when It met ln Canberra last Friday. ' ft

Group convenor John Doohan claimed evidence;In sworn statements by the Camllies of 17 servlce-.:men who died In the tragedy warranted a crlmlnal~probe '-', - ~.. .' \ - . , .. "·1 ~ .. ~ '';"But~o~~Jii.e~chairman seriaio;'Davld M"3cGlb',j

bon siud It was hot the commlttee's role to pursue]possible ~rllllllla[ cmll geS, I Si

"At thJS stale JE IS QUIte out oC the question;" hejsaid. "lE IS no Part of our.terms of reference: It Is a,matter lor ttie Att6rney·Generw.. . '" . r~

Pederal AEEorney·OeneraJ Daryl WUllams has:already refused to consider a crlmmallnvestlgation,;claJming the committee InQwry made It wmecess::!BJY ana mapproPrIate.. .' ." . It,The chum IS noe accepted by Mr Doohiln:,who:

saJd he.would demand that the Attomey'Cienerll;!.reconsider the ruling.. r, I ",. "', \,.: Ill: i ::;

"The commIttee's declslon throws the questionof a comma! mquWe back mto ehe lap of th~iAtlorney~Generai. e SaId. . . " 1;:\

"He Is duey bound to deal with It." . , . : !;:MeanWhile. Senator MacGlbbon has ed that~

the comnu ee s. Ul UU"Y WI no r ejnswers 0 e y ney mys ery a m " ","T ere are se I eOD e W 0 use cannot acce t.

wha appene 0 le y ney, e Sal • : t','\ve wJli never Know exact.iy what. occurrea;

because we don't have any eveWItnesses, ' c.'.... • i :J:"We can only forecast a likely senes of events.': ~HMAS Sydney sank Wldi ehe loss of aUM5 hands;

aner a battle with a German raider off the WA coast;in 1941. I, • • .11.', J:;~: ~~

The End Secrecy group claims the offiCial rec.ordof the sinking Is pare of a contmulng cover~up. ,':

Senator MacGlbbon said the committee hoped!to complete Its inquiry by the middle ofehe year: - ;

PINQ.SUBS.013.0009

.......- a=:-s=oooa-=--_-=_.....==--o:..o-=-==-=="""'"""'_===~-

Ministerial Correscondence from ~~. J.w. DOOHAN

The AttomeyoGeneral

CORRESPO{\"DENCF: FRO,lf Hr John W. Doohan - Activities -\if A.S._.O. I

~lW-k fot ~\-

~- -83 Jll-$

lJ .eok~A-5

The mached p'pers in connection wIth the above-mentioned correspondence are submitted for consideratione......,...J~ (,

," Lw ~\';-: 1.. --,\j~:~:>. ..:~......-.<-"--.,' '% /VV(f\

~'-t".... :"'. -' (G.V. HALLIDAY) 1- .J~, "':;: - ~.~ for S~cr~tary

\~. i' ~~t~inb'~r~'977

f

~~,\ '':'('e',. . "

., \'

January 1978

The Secretary,AttorneY-General's Department,Administrative Building,CANBERRA. A.C.T. 2600

" .- -

" "' G ......~

•... t .0'. "'C.t".OU"foIt

;'

.:.

3

J,.

Please refer to your letter·of 8 December 1977on this snbject.

2. We have examined Mr. DOOHAN's letter of 28 November1977 to the AttorneY-General. Mr. DOOHAN has not providedanything of substance in this letter or his earlier letter of17 June 1977,

There is good reasonto believe tha~ Mr. DOOHAN is also eccentric in nature. Wecannot add anything to the advice given in paragraph 5 of ourletter 6117 of 23 August 1977.

?~131/f'V\.€bt"~iDlRECTOR-GENERAL

2992

..-

PINQ.SUBS.013.0010

/

Ref 3947

l~ovember 1997

SUBMISSION No 91

299:1

17?1

Australia.n Security Intelligence OrganizationGPO Bo' ZI ,6 C,obm, CIt~· ACT 2601 Telephone 06 249 6299 F,cSlml!c 06 2F 4;01

)ennis Richardson),rector·General of Security

'lease contact me if I can be ofany further assistance.

ASIO has carried out a thorough search ofall its records and has been unable to locateany reference to the sinking of the Hl\IAS Sydney

\lternadvely, if the interview was conducted by ASIO it may have been decided at theime that the matter was not ofconcern to ASIO and the records associated WIth the~!erviewmav have been transferred to the predecessor of the present day Department,fDefence

Hi\-L\S SYDNEY INQUIRY

-\s you may be aware, ASIO was approached by both the Australian Archives and The.~:30 Revort in June of tills year for access to the record or an alleged ASIO interviewwluch took place in 1951, which Involved a tormer gunner on the Second World War­German ship Kormoran. At that time ASIO carried out a thorough search 01 an ItS

records and was unable to locate any reference to the alleged interview. It is pOSSIble:~at such an intemew dId take place and ihe record was subsequently destroyed pnor~o the operation of the Archives Act 1983. Prior to the introduction nfthe J/rc/l/v;,s{ct, there were no guidelines or regulations affecting how or when Commonwealth'Jgencies destroyed their records.

71

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a submission to the inquiry into the sinkingof the lThlAS Sydney on 19 November 1941. ·1 would like to make the followingsubmission with regard to the first term of reference - 'the extent to which all availablearchival material has been fully investigated and whether any relevant material has beenmisplaced or destroyed'

Dear Senator MacGibbon

Senator D J MacGibbonChairmanDefence Sub·CommitteeJoint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and TradeParliament HouseCanberra ACT 2600

)rrlce: of the Director-General

·_~---~-- ._.:-.-.. • ..,.1._:, ItI Cr.JtIlG II'Jn:Ll(GE'iV.C~~ -.JI I

:CON F I D G: 1\1 ! ~ A. t.; 4. '. - ,.. :.... ,.

2994

.~:·trict of :'c~ ~cr:1. ··u,..trnliL"~

1~.2.7e

/~d6:-:L-: /(J J:,. ST:l:iTC!I)

:\ctintS Dotectivo ->O:1io:o Sor::c:'-'1t

C'-'::"::li:'loicnc:'CanI,er-::c,

5. DurinG ~ converc<'.tion '..11th !:C:O<,..,\H I formed the opinion that no uocfulpurpooe lfould be c~ino<l lJ:r :u;'the:o contaot Hi th hiD ao he ,'liJpoo.:oed n:ental1;:rt.:.'1stabla :lnd it :·:ot.lld be a w!l.s:c of ti:.:o b~' t!:ic ?orce to hU!;";:)l\:' !.::'::1 b'JIl:Jtenlnc tc hi:::: =.11cG'2:tio:~::.

! .,

I1I

I

IIj

Iir.:C~·""7:' -".

III

III

I

{fOf'KD Gp('..... ~~ I

4. .~1'ter listening to DCOH"?l'o ra:nblinc. convorsation for a oO:loic!erablo timoin -tihich ha ouUined a nUl:lbar of griov:J1Ices, I oue-goatod to him th<lt, in theli::h~ of his U.'1!lucosocful atte:-pts to , it tlould. ba::.-oasol1:\blo to a::eume th.....t ASIO \,'Oul<l !Ulve So fils conosrning hi::l. P.e statodthat he h.1d uOc.!:l vhy activo ill the wti-Vietr..:'.lJ !<or:ltorium da,ys il.'1cl t!\atthis liould be the Toucon for their interost in hilJ acrtivitie:J. It H<l!l thent:Ult I n:v.ed hi::! hio attitudes to the r:l1ni:J:l" of uranium 2.!J at th~t partic\:lilrtbo it wae very pro::llnorr; In the p::-oso. !:e e;Qlainocl that ho tlno ~:2inotit e..'1cl went on at ~ongth to c:q:!.nL'l l'Iby. ':'hi:; 'Jil!l a ptzrely co.ou0.1 cr··v;lotio:1on I:fY part but it appeC'.::'s tnllt roCIIAH hno [;(Hzod on it as an uttempt by tboauthorities to cor~ect hi~ ~ith ~~ttoro of national sec~ity.

PINQ.SUBS.013.0011

sydney l

-------- "l '-d' ~L.. \ \" ,,). J\"vll1

[m/,AS "SYDNEY" departed Fremantle on the llth of N....vember, 1941, .:.

escort~ng H. T. "ZEALANDIA"". A nd that was the last voyage of

-

'l'HE SEARCH FOR

HUAS "SYDNEY"

SURVIVORS. (this famous cruiser, because w;lile on this job she was sunk by the

German Raider, "KOR1!.ORAN".r- .L-There were no survivors from this ill fated engagement, and no

tz'ace of a:ny wreckage was ever found, despite an exhaustive search.

[Exact details of. the fate of ID/AS "SYDNEY" wq.l probably never

be .-110wn.· A complete story of the action has been built up

Hl!AS "SYDNEY" was pieced "ogether.

. ~hen WAS "SYDNEY" left Fremantle, she was to escort HT

"ZEALM1IlIA" to ren<.ezvous in the vicinity of sunda Straits at

a signal was sent ,,0 Na~J Board, and on/November 23rd, an air. ?

search was carried. out from ;rocca:oxtiIt Rottnesv.- •

L-And from. then on until November 29th, when the search was

abanconed, ships of th~ Royal ~ustralian Navy, Royal Netherlands

NavY, "he Merchant Navy, and allied aircraft scoure~wide area of

a thorough examination of these men, they could not, or would not,

throw any light on the actual sinkinglltf of HMAS "SYDNEY".

l Accordir.g to them, the last that was seen of "SYDllEY" was when

she a~sappeared over the horizon at dusk, November l~th, burning

fiercely.

z=A chronological account of events of the days from November

~lst to Nov~~ber 29th, gives an idea of how gradually the fa~e of

But despite

She was tohen to

Wh~n'she had not arrived on Nv.~~bs:- 2~st,

B 0 I clock on tohe ;;;::-:::"::g of ~:ovemoer 17th.

from interrogatoion of survivors of the "KOflMORAN".

~.\ ':

i::~..~".

, '.,.. \

rt\·

the India.'1. ocean.

PINQ.SUBS.013.0012

Australtan Archlt,ts Tilt StlJklU) of HMAS S~dH(Y -/lItrodflct'''H

8J",'UQry 1997 ~ 30.

2998

HF/DF directio finder is signific­

prop ty;it was remote, it

CHAPTER 8 ~. t' Indian

Australian and Allied awareness of KCN~OR~i'S presence ~n neOcean and,by indication,the pacific is officially if not publicly docu-

mented as will be shown in some detail., intimately known to

It is now apparent that her physical appearance was - .~. with SYDNEY ~n Novem-

our Intelligence Services well before her mee~~ng

ber and that they knew she was the ship launched as STEIEro1ARK,known to

'us' as Raider 'G",Ship 41-. l' d b 'our' peocle,that her raiderIt has alwayS been publ~cly c a~me , y •

h t of her crewidentity was virtually unknown to 'us' until t e cap ure

technicians. "

"The siting of

ant because it was

was elevated

"HF/OF stations Thursdayunders nd at Pearce,W.A.Groote Eyla

They oper ed on,to the bes of my me 6·540 Megacycles .~ '~r n r~Qse statio~s ~_re ~~ .~d 24 hours a day and operated.. --- 7 ...- bear.lngs,but hat did not apI;ly to the RF/DF a<:only on request for r~

kf'u'll-ti technician on duty on the remote rec-Ingleburn. There was a •the / OF which was only a short distance away •

eive~s and he activated)3 . t and tJ••~._ /DF was done by M'IA and its"The installation of Aeradio equ~pmen

PMG Head Office in Martin Place, Sydney. Also,a direct 'phone,as well

as a PMG telegraph Key Line.""There were four remote control and patching control

the various facilities. Message through in code on t

and transmitted mostly to th coastal radio station in NThe receiving and HF/OF eq pment was ontrolled by us.

I can only remember the ames of three personnel,pl myself,who worked

on the station. The 0 ice/'1n Charge was a Mr Ja Christie who was

stationed at ~?a~cot He oversaw t~erations ~. Mascot and Rose Bay.

~I Bullivant,a te egraphist ~ecnd~from th P~G, and a Mr John Smithwho was discha ed from the join C· il'Aviation Department.

He was subse ently recalle~ the RAAF af~'r the outbreak of war and

a sunderlan~uadron in nglatd.P

"The whQ e exercise ~\(.tSj Bay was ost ;!satiSfactory and ine

and ter the sinkin~.~f the RAN was abandoned some

What happened ~ ~leburn I n onl;tzard a guess.

I was transfer~ 'to the ae al radio statio~ ~t Kururnb

of the Norman River in th Gulf of C rpentar~a •

'THE SEARCH FOR HMAS SYDNEY SURVIVORS

HMAS Sydney departed Fremantle on the 11 of November 1941, escorting HT Zealandia.And that was the last voyage of this famous cruiser, because while on this job she wassunk by the German Raider Komlorall.

There were no survivors from this ill fated engagement, and no trace of any wreckage}Vas ever found despite an exhaustive search. Exact details of the fate of HMAS Sydneywill probably never be known. A complete story of the action has been built up frominterrogation of survivors of the Kormoran. But despite a thorough examination of thesemen, they could not, 9r would not, throw any light on the actual sinking of HMASSydney. According to them, the last that was seen of Sydney was when she disappearedover the horizon at dusk, November 19th, burning fiercely.

A chronological account of events of the days from November 21 to November 29, givesan idea of how gradually the fate of H1'v1AS Sydney was pieced together.

When HMAS Sydney left Fremantle, she was to escort HT Zealandia to rendezvous in thevicinity of Sunda Straits at 8 o'clock on the morning of November 17. She was then toreturn to Fremantle. When she had not arrived on November 21, a signal was sent toNavy Board, and on November 23 [in fact November 24] an air search was carried out t

.-from Rottne~t. - -

And from~ until November 29, when the search was abandoned, ships of theRoyal Australian Navy, Royal Netherlands Navy, the Merchant Navy, and allied air-craftscoured a wide area of the Indian ocean.

On the 23 of November, Hr Aquilania picked up 26 Germans on a raft. However, wordwas not received of this until PM on the 27. On thelSame dav that Aquitallia picked upthese men, H1'v1AS Sydney was urgentlY instructed to report her estimated time of arrivalat Fremantle:

The first definite news came on November 24, when the British Tanker MV Trocas pickedup 25 Germans from a floating raft in position 24 degrees 06 minutes South, 111 degrees40 minutes East, which is approximately 150 miles north west of Carnarvon. Theyrequested an armed guard. On the same day 6 Hudsons carried out an air search to adepth of 300 miles, with negative result, however.

On the same day, too, Group 53, composed of HMAS WyraIIalz, H1vlAS Yandra andHMAS Olive Cam sailed from Fremantle. WyraIIah and Yalldra with orders to interceptTTocas and search for any survivors, Olive Cam was instructed to search for survivorsonly. Hermion, Pan Europe, Saidja, HeTSleill, Sunelta and CelltallT, all ships of the merchant

Commander Long accepted the recommendations and advised Rycroft accordingly0)A copyof ltis reply to Rycroft appears opposite.

'"Though by no means a ~omplete, nQI..!!l~i!Y.S~.:.l:!~lIy ilc~ur~~ 'account, the entire text ofThird Officer Westhoven's nine £age account is quoted oelmv both as an indication of thecontinuing sensItivIty with which the authorities regarded the disclosure even of the mostinnocuous information about the SydllI?lJ, and as a record for those not familiar with the story?f the engagement.

D .,,>L

~'AustraJianArchIves (Vie): 66121, 165P - Sydll<)J- Kormar"" action slgn.ls etc==- ....

'5

"

•

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

298b 1i

PINQ.SUBS.013.0013

31. ';Iin November 1941. However,that claim is challengeable for a number of

reaso~s, one being that six days after the Raider's entry into the

Indian Ocean allegedly on 1st/2nd May,1941,British Navy had covertly

ct?tured two small German Naval vessels, one of which was the submarine

U.110 co~~lete with her'secret'ENIG~~.cypher machine and 'secret' codebooks ,including cyphers for rendezvous with Raiders and Supply Ships.

ConsequentlY,reliant on contact with home and supply she was surelY

known to'us' via that captured information,and possibly from additi;nal

German Intelligence available to 'us' in 'our' ability to read variousENIG~m codes via the Br~t~sh Top-Secret u~TRA.

It is apparent that KOPMORAN WIT traffic was intercepted at times bv~ -

Fleet Radio Unit Mel~ourne (FRUMEL) and FRUMEL's American senior part-+.

ner Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (FRUPAC),both created in 1940.

FRU~£L was set up by the Americans,in conjunction with FRUPAC, as a

joint Australia/U.S. facility, including some New Zealand and British

involvement. It was set up to intercept and study 'secret' Jfpanese

Naval and related communications , although Australian Intelligence,

with expertise of Royal Australian Navy's Eric Nave had been doing

that well before Japan entered the Second World War, as made known in

these earlier pages. Australian Intelligence,post-war, has tried to

maintain the charade that KORMO~~'s codes and cyphers could be read

only by London.

.~other reason why 'we' should have known of KOPMO~.N is that crews of

Raider PINGUIN and her supply ship ALSTERTOR, both sunk by Royal Navy

long before the SYDNEY/KORMORAN encounter,had previously been in close

company with KORMO~~N and had first-hand knowledge of her appearance,

armament and other details.

Under British interrogation and in ps¥chlogically confusec state many

of those prisoners gave minute and accurate detai~s of the German raid­

ers and,contrary to official denials, some revealed what they knew aboutKORt!OPAN's aE-pearance, as 'we' certainly did knew what she looked

like before the 19 November intercertion by HMAS SYDNE".

On 2 July,1941,when Navy was definitely reading U.IIO's captured Raider

and supply ships' codes and cyohers Caotain Detrners,for the claimed

s~cond time,changed his disgui~e to th:t of the Dutch ship ST~T IUlliA­

KKA. His fi!st claimed adoption of ST~~AT MP.LAKKA took place on 23 April

1941as he prepared to enter the Indian Ocean.Of necessity, on both occasions he would have advised Germany of the

changes in his ship's appearance, Germany in turn warning submarinesand supply ships of KOPJ~ORAN's new disguise.

32. \,.......,-

It cannot be mere coincidence that/in the sa~e ~onth of July/the ~

in Australia and New Guinea were issued with three photographs of

~TRAAT MALAKK"., a ship which did not operate within the patrol areas of

the RAAP and which did not enter Australian air-patrol areas untilMay of 1942,when Dutch East Indies had fallen to the Japanese.

In other words,ST~~T ~.LAKKA ~ STRAAT ~~LAKYA would hold no special

interest for RAAF or NavY,but KORMORA~ disguised as ST~~T ~~LAKKA cert­ainly would!

In that respect it is timely to note that on 23 June,two ~/ee):s prior

to issue of STRAl-:r MAL.'U<KA photographs, sUPFly ship ALSTERTCR 'Jas sunk

on her way home to Germany and her cre\. captured.

Before leaving Indian Ocean for home ALSTERTCR met with and was refuell­

ed by KOre10RAN - from 14th to 17th May,as recorded by Barbara Winter,

and on 12th May as recorded by Australian Navy's historian Tom Frame, in

his 1993 alleged history: 'IlMAS SYDNEY;loss and controversy',10.

Detrners,in 1941,claimed that two days before meeting ALSTERTOR for the

refuelling operation he had briefly dropped the first STRAAT MALAKKA

disguise ,for that of Japanese SAKITO ~;RU,changing his alias to Japan­

ese KINKA ~~RU on 5th June and,finally,~ad6~tingSTRAAT ~~AKKA on

2nd July.Eowever,this writer contests the claimthat SAKITO MARU was ever imitated

as will be later discussed and that KOPMO~~N met ALSTERTOR in disguise

of STRAAT /olALAKKA •

Truth of KORJ.'10~~N's various dis<juises is imj;ossible to determine, apart

from KINKA MARU and his very firSt aiias of L;eC€.mc,2r :9~C - t~e !?:':3.s=-3.~

1lYACEESLAV MOLOTOV -, because of Captain Detmers' greatly fabricated

written and oral 'record' and the manner in which the 'record' was

incorporated, by alleged historians,into their alleged histories.

It has to be remembered that the whole pUblicly disseminated 'knOWledge'

of KORMORAN,her disguises and her activi~ies is derived from what the

Germans chose to tell our interrogators in 1941-42 and what the interr­

ogators chose to release to the public.The officially 'accepted' history was compiled by F.B.Eldridge in hisClassified Secret' Re~&i:t on Loss of !'JL=\S SYDNEY', requested !:y Director

of Naval Intelligence and submitted by Eldridge as a completed 'history'

on January 28,1942; only nine weeks after the destruction of SYDNEY

and KO~'!ORAN.

The Eldridge aeport,compiled almost single-handedly and almost entirely

from the Western Australian interrogation 'evidence',embodied all the

German fabrications and 'J:'ed herrings'.

3001

PINQ.SUBS.013.0014

33.

It was,nevertheless,immediately and unquestioningly 'accepted' by the

Nilitary Intelligence systems and GoJ~rnments of Australia,Britain,U.S.and Canada.

The Eldridge Report,referred to again from time to time,herein,is the

first officially 'accepted history' of loss of SYDNEY and her 645 men.

Royal Australian Navy's (RA~) Hermon Gill,who as Navy's war-time ChiefCel1sor supported official policy ef secrecy in the SYDNEY/KORMORAN

Affair, in 1957 compiled the official history of the PAN in l"Iorld \'Jar 2

and very briefly disposed of SYDNEY's loss, almost totally on the 'casis'

of the Eldridge Repert,the German stories up to that date and official'acceptance' of them.

In 1959,two years after Gill's SYDNEY/KORMOF~~ 'history',the German

Captain Detroers published his post-war personal acb~unt of the Raider's

alleged cruising and battle with SYDNEY, that account conflicting beyond

belief with his and his crew's already discredited 1941-42 'evidence'to

Australian interrogators.

There has been no critical comment or suggestion of historical reexamin­

ation by authorities of the former Allies,or of Germany; rather,there

has been a noticeable 'closing of ranks'.

In 1984 the Australian claimed historian,Barbara Winter, published her

'H~~.S SYDNEY;fact,fantasy and fraud', an elaborated interpretation of

the SYDNEY/KORMORF~ Affair,widely perceived as defensive of the involved

Germans and mainly based on the 1941-42 and 1959 accounts of Captain

Detmers and his crew,and on the 1942 Eldridge Report.Based en these sources,Winter's 'history' recognisably incorporated

the German fabrications and misrepresentations;despite her ?raface adv­

ice that she had attempted " .. to eliminate as many errors as possible.",Some three years before Winter's offering,Michael MontgomerYJ son of

SYDNEY's navigator who disappeared with the cruiser, published in 1981

his pioneering 'Who sank the SYDNEY?'

Montgomery's was the first serious effort to disprove the official

'historv' - the German stories - and,despite errors apparently due tofaulty ;esearch and non-sighting of so~e official doc~~ents'Rut f~rw~rda widely read,generally reaso~able argument for the alternat~ve v~ew.

The public impact of his book was such that this writer believes

Barbara Winter's promotion of the German stories was officially endor­

sed to counter the interest generated by 'who sank the SYDNEY?'

This writer believes that was also the case when,finally,in 1993 aRoyal Australian Navy former historian,Tom (T~omas R.) Frame,publishedhis1Saccount of the SYDNEY/KORMORAN Affair, basing his I history I on the--

300~

34.

GerMan stories of 1941-42/ 1959,the Eldridge Rerort,Hermon Gill andDarbara \')in ter.

Like Winter,in this writer's belief,he presents his case in such manner

that officially suppressed events are not canvassed and,therefore,notpublicly recognised as contradictions of the Official Version.

Strangely enough,his account - strongly condemning of critics of the

official version - also in places seriously contradicts tiinter and,more

strangely, expresses great doubt as to truth cf KCR!'IOR!\~1 Cerman stories.

Nevertheless,seemingly placing his bets on all options Frame still

comes down on side with Government and Navy 'accepted history'.

Considering above circumstances those surviving SYDNLY/KO~lORfu~ allegedhistorians,Frame and t"Jinter,rnust be prepared to publicly re-examine

their shared German-sourced information in light of revealed - but not

new - evidence that their accounts are significantly flawed.

At this stage of narrative,we are s~ecifically interested in Detmers'

contradictory stories of adopted disguises,in the belief that his many

relevant inconsistencies betray desperate intent to rebut possible

charqes that SYDNEY's Captain Burnett,before 19 November encounter,was16. • h - ... d" , "aware t at the Outc.. STRAAT MAL~KKF. was a ~sgu~se o~ KOR~ORAN

and was,therefore,not taken by surprise.

Accordingly,therefore,this writer attempts examination of alleged

adoptions and changes of Detmers' aliases without confusing the readeror himself.

Accordina to Detmers - and this sce:us to oe t:rue - KOP.NOR.~-,'l adopted.17: ..

her f~rst disguise en 11]"ece~bEr 1940,immediately uson her breakoutfrom Germany into the North Atlantic.

She took on the identity of Soviet merchant ship VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV

and retained that pose until 23 AJ~il 1941,when - at that ti:ue - she is

recorded by Detmers and,consequently,by Winter and Frame as changing

the Russian disguise, which had been a non-descript paint job and two

sets of Samson posts,to the Dutch vessel STR&~T M.ALA~KA ~y repaintingin that ship's Company colours and adding another two: samson sets.

A Dutch appearance was appropriate for the Indian Ocean where KOR!10RANwas soon to be heading. On the debit side,KOfu~ORAN was nearly 3,000

tons larger than STR&~T MALAKKA,which ship had a pronounced counter

stern as against the Raider's obvious cruiser stern.

Decision to L~itate STRAAT MALAKKA wa;Jrnade during Detmers' 19 April,

1941,South Atlantic rendezvous talks with Captain Rogge in the Germanraider ATLANT!S,which had just vacated the Indian Ocean.

300,5

PINQ.SUBS.013.0015

of DetmersApril. - one

in 'U.S. Naval

heading: "The

34 (a).

Hcwever,there are two contradictions of the accounts

maintaining the VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV disguise until 23

found in Richard S.Pattee's academic Paper pUblished

Institute proceedings',December 1950 issue,under the

German Raider KORMORAN - SYDNEY's Nell'esis".

Richard S. Pattee, a graduate of Harvard University's Class of 1948,

enlisted man in U.S. Naval Reserve 1945-46 and for some years the

research assistant to Captain Samuel Eliot Morison V.S.N.R.in compil­ing of multi-volume 'History of V.S. NavalOperations in World War 2',

at p.1299 of 'U.S. Naval Institute proceedings' records in part that:

"Ship 41 (KORMORAN) left German waters on..!. December 1940. Moving •• up

the Nor~egian coast to Stavangar she turned Westwards •• out to sea.

Two days after leaving Stavangar, Ship 41 adopted her first disguise •.

••• (Detmers) steamed directly south until he reached the latitude of

the Cape Verdes. Here••• he began his raiding oper~tions.

Before doing so,however,he discarded his ship's alias, since a Russian

ship in the South Atlantic ~ou~d hardly have passed without question".

The Cape Verdes area at latitude 15 degrees North,reached by KORMORAN

on 30 December 1940, is where Pattee records Detmers' discarding of

VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV disguise at that time; not at latitude 26 degrees-- 0

44 minutes South on 23 April 1941,as Detmers' DailyZwar Diary claims.

Pattee doesn't record the new alias supposedly adopted!

Neither does he relate where his information comes from that the

Russian disguise came to an end in 1940, 30 December, but his source

would have to be KORMO~~ (Detmers) documentation, if Pattee and the

1~.S. ~aval Institute P~oceeci~gs' we=e telling the truth.

If nothing e~se, that American account emphasises the total unreliab­/

ility of almost everything official, or quasi-official,c1aimed to be

SYDNEY/KO&~ORk~ events.

Richard S. Pattee and 'V.S. Naval Institute Proceedings' feature

again in these later pages, where Detmers in 1950 attempts to turn to

his ~wn credibility advantage two of Pattee's 'U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings' erroneous 1950 Reports about twc 2€ritish Armed Merchant

Cruisers,AMC ~~~TON and .~~C SHENKING.

3004

35.

Winter, recording the dropping of the VlACHESLAV MOLOTOV 'front',has

this to say at p.?? of her 1984 book,where she relates Detmers' 1941official description of the new Dutch d{sguise:

"KORMCRAN was now clearto proceed to the Indian Ocean ... So they could recamouflage ~uickly as

Japanese in the Indian Ocean, the hull was painted black, the superstruc­

ture brown. The red ring on the funnel was replaced with a yellow one

and she assumed the identity of STRPAT MALAKKA, on passage from Rio deJaneiro to Batavia."

In the guise of STRAAT MALAKKA " •. KORMORAN rounded the Cape of GoodHope .. on her way to Australia Station."

On p.68 of his 'HMAS SYDNEY;loss and controversy',Tom Frame advises

thus: At 19 April South Atlantic rendezvous with Rogge's AT~~TIS,

" .• Detmers and Rogge agreed that KOR}!ORAN would head North-east (from

the rendezvous area) on 22 April when her~ would be painted before

she sailed two days later for the Indian Ocean. On entering the Indian

Ocean, the hull of KORMORAN would be painted black,the superstructure

would become brown and the red band on the funnel was to be paintedyellow•. "

Perhaps as a consequence of having already read Detmers' 1959 account,as well as his 1941-42 stories, Frame might be accused of having a two­

way bet on the present and future tenses of the verb 'to paint'.

Detmers himself, not having had the opportunity to read Frame,recorded

in 1959 a version entirely different from the one he entered in hisDaily Nar Diary on 23 April 1941:

"In the Indian Ocean the bad weather quickly disappeared .. "

He gives no date of rounding the Cape. " •. We had been cruising around

for a few days when a message reached us to the effect that •• PINGUIN

had been sunk .• and we were given orders .. " to rendezvous with the

supply ship ALSTERTOR at " •• 70 degrees East by 20 degrees South.

On the way to the rendezvous I decided to change our camouflage, because

here in the middle of the Indian Ocean was an unlikely spot for a ship

with the name of VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV. We had been so fortunate in that

guise that it was not easy to change it, but circumstances had changed

and we had to adapt ourselves to them,so from the VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV

we now became the SAKITO ~;RU,a Japanese vessel."

"The whole ship had to be repainted;the hull grey and the superstruct­white with yellow funnel~.•.With the Japanese flag painted on our hull

on each side under the bridge I think we looked the part to perfection.

The Jaoanese markincs were authentic, too - we had taken care to takethem with us when we put out (from Germany) knowing that we might needthem".

3005

PINQ.SUBS.013.0016

c

36.

Obv~ously,Detmers' 1959 account of entry into the Indian Ocean as

VYACHESLAV MOLO~OV,with direct change to SAKITO MARU,is not compatible

with his Daily War Diary record of 1941; that,in the South Atlantic,he

had gone straight from the Russian disguise to the Dutch STRAAT MALAKKA,';Z'h 'd' ,~n t at ~ ent~ty enter~ng the Indian Ocean.

Before even entering the Indian Ocean,great differences between

Ivinter's and Frame's German-inspired accounts become recognisable from

19 April,1941,KOro10RAN/ATLANTIS South Atlantic rendezvous,and it is

appropriate to remark on them before continuing attempt to unravel

Detmers' 1941/1959 disguises fabrications - for fabrications some mustbe !

Notable example of discrepancy,p.GS of Frame's book,is his claim that

on 21 April,at the ATLANTIS rendezvous, " •. KORMO~~N completed takingon provisions from DUQUESA.... ,a GeI:1llan supply ship.

However,in contradiction of Frame,Winter at her p.59 records that DUQU­

ESA was scuttled by the raider PINGUIN in February,a week before

KORMORAN's meeting with PINGUIN on Febrary 25 and two months beforeKO~~ORfu~'s 19 April rendezvous with ATLfu~TIS.

Winter, quoting Detmers' War Diary entries for FebruarY,1941,relates:

.... In the afternoon of Februar~ 25,PINGUIN steamed up to the rendezvous

with KORMORAN at 26 degrees South,2 degrees 30 minutes West .. having at

last scuttled DUQUESA •• "

Detmers,in his 1959 account, seriously confounds his 1941 War Diary

'h~~~c~y'/a~d Wi~ter's rec0rdin~ of it;for. DUQUESA1s scuttling.

Detmers' first mention of DUQUESA,a captured British freezer ship used

by the GeI:1llans as a supply vessel,is at his p.99 description of KOro1-,O~~N's 7th/10th February 1941 rendezvous with the German fuel tanker

NORD~L~RK,when he informs that he duly met the tanker at position " .• 27degrees' South by 17 degrees West .• There was another big ship with (NOR­

D~_~~~} .. the British refrigeration ship DUQUESA•. loaded with refrigerated

foodstuffs. We .. supplemented our stores from her .. taking aboard a hund­

red quarters of chilled beef and 216,000 eggs .. and ultimately when her

stores were exhausted the DUQUESA was sent to the bottom of the

Atlantic. "

Winter,at her p.49,quotes Detmers' 1941 official entry of the NORDMARK

7th/10th rendezvous position as different from Detmers',her position

given as .... 25 degrees 30 minutes South,14 degrees West." She also

records that KORMORAN at this meeting, for the first and only time, took

supplies - including a piano - from DUQUESA, .... soon to be scuttled:

meat,eggs;~iano and all .• lf it (the piano) caused disagreements,it

300b

37.

could follow DUQUESA to the bottom."

Detmers,at his 1959 p.p.102 to 104 informs that, two weeks after takingon his beef,eggs and piano,n .. On February 25 we made rendezvous with

the auxiliary cruiser PINGUIN.. " He records that PINGUIN was aloneand makes no mention of DUQUESA.

At his 1959 p.p.133-134,Detmers then brings DUQUF.SA back to life at

his later meeting with ATLA::TIS,which both Frame and :Iinter record as

occurring on 19 April:

"On April 20th we arrived at the rendezvous point

anc. found .. FITLANTIS •• already present •. The NORDMA~~ and the DUQUESA

were there too,of course .• We turned our attention to the DUQUESA and

replenished our diminished stocks of food, primarily meat and eggs."

Frame,as earlier related,supports,at his p.68, Detmers' account of the

second bite at the DUQUESA cherry in April, just as his p.62 records

the Raider Captain's first DUQUESA harvest on 7th-10th February.

Frame and Winter's. differing DUQUESA incidents - all from the same

enemy source - clearly show their separate reliances on the German

1941 and 1959 accounts,and also highlight continuing mutual failure to

co-ordinate their research with result that they come up with two very

different'histories' as these pages further reveal:

On the~ 21st April, the day of DUQUESA's alleged second supply,

Frame claims ,at p,6S,that Detmers conferred in ATLfu~TIS with Captain

Rogge about matters relating to KORMO~~I's change of operational areas,

i~=luc~~~ accptic~ of a Dut~h disqlJise; whereas Winter,at her p.76 r

insists that the conference took place on~ April.If it is thought this writer is splitting hairs, he reiterates that

both Winter and Frame are put forwa;d as competent historians in these

historically important issues; that they are sharing the same German

fountains of knowledge, yet cannot surface with the same stories !

Therefore,they are valid subjects for the criticism they have heaped

on those who have different view from their own.They must be prepared, as we should all be prepared, to re-examine their

work as reasons, for doing so,are presented or arise.

Further serious cor.tradictions occurring in both Frame's and Winter's

accounts of KO~~ORfu~'s deparLure for the Indian ~cean are recorded,first at Frame's p.6S again where he has KO~IORAN headed North-easton 22 April to a quiet spot where her paint camouflage would be altered

to represent a different ship from VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV; but Frame stopsshort of identifying the new identity as ST~;AT ~~LAKKA,even though the

black,brown and yellow~olour scheme he describes makes it obvious the

300'(

PINQ.SUBS.013.0017

39.38.

Dutch vessel is the new disguise.

lVinter,on the other hand,at her p.77 claims I\ORMORAN " .. steamed~-

east .. to repair her makeup .. " and that she became STRAAT MALAl\l\A forthe first time.

~t Frame's p.69 an equally disturbing discrepancy appears as to arrival

of KORMORAN in the Indian Ocean,when Frame records that " .. she roundedthe Cape on 24 April 1941."

lVinter states categorically at her p.77 " .. on the night of 1-2 May

KORMORAN rounded the Cape of Good Hope and entered the Indian Ocean."

However,the contradictions and doublespeak which characterise the SYD­NEY/KORMORAN Affair had only just begun.

Concerning Detmers' initial 1941 record of first change from Russian

to Dutch disguise prior to leaving the South Atlantic,followed by his

1959 tale of KORMORAN rounding the Cape as VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV, at his

p.69 Frame merely remarks that " •• Detmers decided •• (immediately he

arrived in the Indian Ocean) •• he would try his luck initially on the

shipping route between Fremantle and Cape Town disguised as the Japan­

ese ship SAl\ITO ~;~u. The change of identity was prompted by informat­

ion that the line which operated the KINKA MARU,the initial choice of

disguise,operated only older ships in that part of the Indian Ocean."

Frame's S~~ITO ~~RU explanation is not convincing. In the first place,

Detmers' own 1959 statements confirm that even before leaving Germany

he had intended taking on Japanese identity in the Indian Ocean.

Ccnsequently,it is certain that the International Shipping Register

was diligently researched ,in conjunction with German Intell~gence

Services,to ensure that disguises selected were generally suited to

the Japanese vessels imitated,as far 'as ship types and localities oper­

ated in.Those precautions were essential to survival and success of the Raider.

Japanese authority would certainly have cooperated with relevant advice

and information.As Detmers rela~es,he had taken with him all the authentic markings;

i.e.,Coropanies' insignia and ships'~ displayed in Japanese charac

ters.That preparation should have been standard procedure,as typical

German military thoroughness.Therefore,it should not be doubted that the alleged initial choice,

KINKA MARU,met those requirements and it was not necessary to substit­

ute with SAKITO MARU

In fact,KINKA MARU,besides meeting the appearance requirements of

KORMORAN,was almost identical with·~AKITO ~~RU.

300&

I~Also,as later discussed/it is credibly established that KORMORAN didin June,1941,appear as KINKA HARU,sinking the steamers VELEBI13imdMAREEBA while so disguised,whereas there is no evidence - apart from

German stories - that SAKITO MARU was ev~~ adopted as a cover for KOR-1-1ORAN.

winter; p.90, informs that the Raider " .• recamouflage(d) on 5 June,

for the radiomen listening to calls made by Japanese ships reported

that the line to which SAKITO MARU belonged were using only older

steamers_ in the Indian Ocean. with very little repainting l\ORMORAN •••

(allegedly disguised as SAKITO MARU) ••• became KINKA MARU •. " of a diff­

erent Japanese Company.

The fact that Winter,with Frame - via Detmers - is recording that the

two Japanese ships were 'look alikes' is why we seek a credible reason

why SAKITO MARU~ to exis-t at all as a cover for the Raider.

As already remarked,information pertinent to Japanese disguises would

have been obtained from reliable German and Japanese sources; not by

KORMORAN's " •• radiomen listening to calls .• " on the chance they might

'pick up' such important information at the last moment in foreign/

oceans.

But again - at his p.p.7C/71 - Frame clashes with ~inter's and his

olom earlier claims; this time, that Japanese USE of " .. older steamers •. "

~as th~ r~ason for change of the SAKITO alias.

At those pages,Frame relates that " •• On 5 JunE .• Det:mers was not altc­

gether happy with the disguise'SAKITO ~.RU',~ the company whichI

operated her .. rarely operated in the western Incian Ocean."

He,therefore,altered to l\INKA MARU,which cOMpany"did operate in these

waters with ships of similar appearance to KOR/olORfu'l."

The reader is here reminded of Detmers' statement that he " •. had

brought .. from Germany .. " all the paraphernalia 0: Japanese disguisefor imitating ships necessarily German-researched as to their operat­

ing areas and appearance of the nazi Raider.

Significance of the STRAAT MALAKKA disguise is that Detmers' story at

all times,in 1941-42 interrogations and his 1959 published account,has been that KORMORAN was masquerading as that Dutch ship when inter­

c~pted b~ SYDNEY and that Captain Burnett,fooled by her appearance,took his ship alongside the Raider,which then mortally crippled

SYDNEY before being herself sunk b~ the Australian cruiser.'-

PINQ.SUBS.013.0018

40. 2.0,Of course,if on 19 November Burnett was aware he was confronting a

raider already tracked to that Indian Ocean position by Hr/OF; thatKORMORAN/STEIE~~~~'Sand STRAAT MALAKKA's phoCdgraphs had oeen circ~

• ;25".ulated to h~m - as ev~dence proclaims - Detmers' and his crew's stor-

ies about SYDNEY's 19 November behaviour are shown to be total fabric­

ation, and there must have been very deep motivation to warrant such

fabricating, with deep criminality the probable reason;that aspect

later addressed at appropriate stage of 19 November encounter.

After all,the Germans were not aware they had been HF/DF tracked - as

STEIE~ARK,Raider 'G',Ship 41 - during November or any other time.

This writer contends that,during his interrogations and right up to

his 1947 release from POW status,Detmers was unsure as to whether ALS­

TERTOR survivors had described his disguise as STRAAT MALAKKA - as

critics of his story believe it was -and consequently invented the

brief existence of SAKITO MARU at ALSTERTOR rendezvous, intending to

'tough it out' in event of any later suggestion that his 'I fooled the

SYDNEY'story was untrue.26.

As he clearly knew and stated, there was no possibility of a living

survivor from SYDNEY - therefore no one able to contradict him - and

ALSTERTORsurvivors'post war memories of KORMORfu~'S appearance could

conveniently become 'uncertain'; particularly if covert pressure was

applied by Nazis once more back in control in the 'new' Germanv.

Detmers himself records his relief and ~~rprise that his 'inte~rogat­ors' displayed no great desire to closely question him on the alleged

action itself.

internment, he constantly feared charges of war crimes in connection

with disappearance of SYDNEY and he~ entire Company.Was guilty fear the reason,in 1945,he with his officers tugXelled and

temporarily escaped from their victorian POW camp when it was obvious

that Germany and Japan were defeated ?Why was such desperate action deemed necessary after nearly fouryears of not uncomfortable existence and the certainty that they were

to be back home in Germany in the not too distant future ?And again,what need for such action when Detmers and his officers knew

that 'we' had officially - pUblicly,at least - 'accepted' everyone

of their unbelievable stories ?~~ong the many Oetmers told, the SAKITO MARU improbable tale has never

been officially queried. Why ? Is it because the entire official- German - public account rests on SYDNEY's Captain Joseph Burnett

not knowing that STRAAT MALAKKA was known or suspected to be a disg-

uise of the Raider KORMORAN ?

3010

41.

Would the official - German - 'history' survive if it were to bepublicly revealed that in May,194l,ALSTERTOR took fuel from the

'Dutchman',not from SAKITO MARU, and,moreover,that 'we' were aware of

that situation, regardless of how 'we' were informed?

Quite apart from the ALSTERTOR May rendezvous the reader should recall

that,in February 1941 whilst in the Russian disguise,mainly paint,

KORMORAN met and for two days lay alongside visiting the Raider

PINGUIN,that ship's crew also very familiar with her appearance and

her identity as both KORMORAN and STEIERMARK and her Kriegsmarineicentification 'Ship 41'.

We know that about a week after KORMORAN is claimed to have entered

the Indian Ocean,PINGUIN further North in that body of water was inter­

cepted by Royal Navy's heavy cruiser HMS CORNWALL and blown into frag­

ments by an eight inch shell in the 130 mines she carried.

Despite the disintegration of that raider,84 men survived from her'GO

members of her crew ,the remainder ~erchant seamen prisoners of th:Germans.

Demoralised PINGUIN survivors, incredulous to find themselves still

alive,were immediately interrogated aboard CO~~ALL and gave correct,

detailed information about other raiders. Although they had been

closely associated with KORMORAN less than three months before,we are

expected to believe that they could not describe that Raider which

so interested 'us'.

PINGUIN's survivors should have no more refused to inform about KORM­

ORAN than they would other raiders - which they and ALSTERTOR's men

described in detail.

Therefore,it should come as no surprise that,in addition to the July

photographs of STRAAT MALAKKA,at beginning of October,194l,BritishAdmiralty issued to all warships - including SYDNEY - a good photo

h d. h 29.grap an s~l ouette of STEIERMARK,confirming that Captain Burnett

was conversant with the Raider's physical characteristics, including

those which could not be altered by disguises.

The STEIERMARK photograph had been in British possession a few months

before World War 2 began, taken at completion of Baltic Sea trials in

late 1939. British Intelligence Services were aware of all large vess­

els under construction,or completed,in German shipyards and were alsoaware that,although she was entered in Lloyd's International Register,

STEIE~~RK was not put into normal service and,instead,was 'earmarked'

for priority conversion to Auxiliary Cruiser, or Armed Merchant Raider.

British espionage informants in those German yards need only have been

3011

PINQ.SUBS.013.0019

42.

at shipyard labourer level for 'us' to be provided with detail of

major changes in the new KORMORAN's superstructure appearance; those

cosmetic alterations co~sequ~ntly included in British Raider Identific­

ation charts,so that competent and battle-wise officers like those

under the very efficient Captain Burnett should not be deceived.

The accompanying illustrations, of STEIERMARK at completion of trials,

STEIE~~RK converted as KORMORAN and of the genuine STRAAT MALAKKA asshe always appeared, should make apparent that Burnett,apart from other

Intelligence he possessed, could not have been deceived by Detmers'imitation.

Credible evidence strongly indicates that KORMORAN's movements and loc­

ations included the Japanese Pacific area and were not as recorded in

her Captain's relevant documents,or his and his crew's interrogated

testimony.

with regard to the Raider's reported presence in the Western Pacific,

two of her crew members,one of whom was Shu Ah Fah - a captured seaman,

volunteered to serve as KO~~ORAN'S officers' steward and laundryman -

1. .30.

to d ~nterrogators that she had been in the Caroline Islands area and3/.

several others admitted her presence in the Timor Sea.

Historical fact is that, prior to 1942,all the German raiders in this

part of the world moved pretty much as they liked from one ocean to

another and the Carolines area was officially known to be their Japan­

ese support base for nearly one and a half years before Decewber 7 and

Pearl Harbour.That known situation ridicules claims by defenders of Captain Detmers

and his Nazi crew that,in 1941,there could not have been operational

A8gtSeg~ne~~Rn naval forces and Japan,because there was no common code

or communication between the military forces of those two nations whict

allowed operations at that time.Therefore,they declare - as does Barbara Winter - that German raiders

like KORMORAN could root rendezvous,operate or co-ordinate covertly

with the Japanese.Simply, those claims are just not true,with specific incidents referred

to in these further pages. 3Z.By September,at latest,1940 Germany and Japan had already begun a work­

ing arrangement ,whereby Hitler's raiders were fuelled and provisioned

from Japan In the generally safe 'neutral' areas of the Japanese

Pacific Mandates,particularly the Carolines.

The Mandates,South of and reasonably close to Japanese Home Islands,

3012

4 3.

were far more convenient for rendezvous wlth the free-ranging Indian/

Pacific Oceans raiders,than risking unarmed slow ,heavily laden supply

ships and their priceless cargoes into enemy-patrolled waters thous­ands of miles further afield.

Furthermore,the conveniences of island bases in those Japanese milit­

arised areas were alsc made available to and used by the Ger~an auxil­

iary cruisers and their supply ships for fe?fit,repair and maintenance.Allied seamen captured by these raiders were being sent to Japan asprisoners of war as early as 1940!

In those circumstances a communication medium clearly was essential

and obviously existed; making it all the more reasonable to accept a

presence in German raiders of Japanese liaison personnel, as reported

by British prisoners of German a~xiliary cruisers.

There was very close covert military involVEment between the Raidersand Japan for well over a year before Pearl Harbour.

Why,then,is belief of a KORMORAN Japanese/Pacific involvement rejected

as an unacceptable 'conspiracy theory'? +

Officially documented evidence of Australian and Allied awareness of

STEIERMARK/KORMORAN's specific presence in the Indian and,apparently,

Pacific Oceans before November 19, 1941 is confirmed below, but why the

month of March is mentioned has not been explained. That our Intellig­

ence Services knew she was STEIERMARK confirms their earlier knowledge

of her appearance:

The 'WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT' of september 26,1941 reads in part;

"Raider 'G' ,official number believed to be 41. Believed to be ST;:'IER-"~mRK,9,400 tons .• and was reported in the Indian Ocean in Xarc~ 1941.

In the last September 1941 issue,a )'leek later,the 'WEEKLY INT:::LLIGENCE

REPORT' informed in part that: " •• it is probable that a raider is in

this area and will soon resume operations."

By this date KORMORAN was the only raider known to be actively operat­

ing in the Indian Ocean region. It seems our Intelligence Services

were expecting her to mount a local operation in the foreseeable fut­

ure.The South West Area Combined Headquarters (SWACH) Logbook records on

October 17,1941 that: "Important message from CNR (Central War Room)'phoned from Pearce; ••• Consider 2 enemy units now in western Pacific.

Raider 'G' repeat 'G' which may be Pacific raider is probably German

STEIERMARK,9,800 tons."

How significant is it that Centra~ War Room in a 'Most Secret'report

is prepared to concGde r,lro!:lab1.e presence of Raider 'G' -S'l'EIE~1\R1\ -

30 1:~

PINQ.SUBS.013.0020

44.

-Hie

.ttin Western Pacific on October 17 and yet reject,out of hand,ChineseSh' Ah F h' 't 3~.~ a s ~n errogat~onev~dence that KORMORAN left the Western Pac-Carolina Islands area on October 22 for the Indian Ocean/five days

later,after spending time with a supply ship in these Carolines.

This writer suggests the subsequent disappearance,of Shu Ah Fah and

another two Chinese KO~IORAN volunteer crew members, from Austral­

ian Army/Navy close custody after sinking of the raider may be conn­ected with embarrassing evidence of those Chinese.

The official'record'alsc claims that,on 17 October,KORMORAN for a

greatly contradicted number of days commenced taking on fuel and pro­

visions from German supply ship KULMERLAND,but that this meeting tookplace in Southern Indian Ocean.

However,various events and circumstances alleged to be associated

with the KULMERLAND 1941 rendezvous are so greatly contradicted by

Detmers' 1959 account and by Winter - who,at her p.p.IIO to 113,quotes

his 1941 Daily War Diary - and by the account of an Australian seaman­

prisoner in KORMORAN at the time, that the Southern Indian Ocean locat­

ion appears highly implausible.

Those points are addressed more fully in these later pages.

There is no doubt in this writer's mind that ,:OID!ORAN ,as other

raiders,was under Allied WIT surveillance for a great deal of her

orerating life. At the time she first entered the Indian Ocean, hex

arrival and her specific identity were known and noted,as recorded in

the Report of September 26. As to why the month of :'!arch is recorded,

that is just one of the numerous KORMO~~~.contradictions,buther real

Her WIT traffic to and fro~ Germany in regard to her own operations,

including arrangements for supply bl KUh~ERLAND operating in the Pac­

ific out of Japanese 'Kobe,did r.ot escape interception by the powerful

tracking systems operated by Britain,U.S.A., Australia/New Zealand

and the Dutch on Java.

As earlier related, this writer was refused Arohival documents as rec­

ently as 6 March,1992,for the official reason that KORMORAN's 'secret'

codes and cyphers had been intercepted and read by Fleet Radio Unit

Melbourne (FRU~ffiL) and that release of that half-centur~~~nformationwould reasonably constitute " .• t.~eat to national security, relations

with foreign government, defence of the Cowmonwealth."36.

However,one otherwise entirely censored fo1io,which ~ releasedwith the refusal, unintentionally revealed in its Distribution List

tha~ a U.S. Navy Japanese code-breaking Unit,designated'OP.20 G.'and known to this writer,was involved with FRUMEL in deciphering of

3014

45.

the~ Raider's WIT traffic.

In summary, the hitherto unadmitted factors,therefore,are that KOR~OR­

AN's movements were,to significant degree, known to us,and alse her.

co~munications probably in their entirety; that an American decoding

Un~t - OP.20.G. - sr-ecia1i~ing in Japanese codes was also involved

in decoding traffic to and from KORHORAN and that National Security

is invoked as reason for exempting that information frem public scrut-iny.

Of particular relevance to that current official censorship is the

fact that of four current categories of Defence Notice - 'D' Notice ­

in force in Austra1ia,material to do with codes and cyphers,or inter­

ception,and decoding of codes and cyphers is regarded by Defence

Department and Australia Government as threat to National Security,

even though those codes and cyphers are useless,today,against modern

technology of computing systems.

As the reader may be aware,a 'D' Notice is a voluntary restriction

placed on media so as to prevent certain officially selected inform­

ation from reaching the general public.The material on KORMORAN's codes and cyphers, refused this writer, is

exempted from the pUblic arena not just for the foreseeable future;

it is officially exempted for all time - forever !

Hew significant is it that nobody in Government is prepared to discuss

JO~~f a~~it~ed reading of those codes and cy~hers and 'our' ap?arent

ability to plot various movements of the Raider KORMOR~N before it

was eventually decided she should be 'taken out' by SYDNEY?J

When former Prime Minister Paul Keating was asked in the AustralianParliament - on direct behalf of this writer - by Green's Senator

Christabel Chamarette's 17 August,1993 Senate Question #507 to denyor confirm Reg.Lander's evidence on the HF/DF tracking of KORMORAN in

November, 1941, Foreign Affairs Minister Senator Gareth Evans,replying

on behalf of the Prime Minister,refused to answer any part of thatQuestion dealing with Reg.Lander's evidence; or,indeed,any other partof the very long Question,~Xcept to publicly concede that significant

aspects of SYDNEY's loss are still classified Secret today.

'Replying' to Senator Chamarette's October 5,1993 further SenateQuestion #638 - again on direct behalf of this writer - Senator Evans,

still representing the Prime Minister,rnade it clear that the Austral­ian Government will continue refusing answers to any Parliamentary

Questions on the SYONEY/KORMORAN Affair.

3015

PINQ.SUBS.013.0021

61.60.

should have denoted a significant Naval U 't t .n~ ry~ng to Communicate.

Risking further confusion,Frame at p.191 continues with " ..While it isextremely unlikely that SYDNEY would have sent an action signal in

plain voice (unencrypted) on an unguarded frequency .. " he had already

stated at p.190 that " .. the Applecross Wireless Station relayed mess­ages from ships at sea to the District Naval Office in Fremantle.Th~e were usually encrypted except in emergencies."

SYDNEY's last situation was the ultimate emergency !

In continuing comment on official 'ignorance' of KO~~ORAN'S officially

recorded'existence and movements, we return to interrogation state­ments of Shu Ah Fah,laundryman and officers' steward.

Shu Ah Fah's evidence was partly tersely ~~jected as "discredited"and

ordered to be destroyed,although other tturce indicates the order may

have been counterm~nded; nevertheless,another section of his officially

alleged suspect testimony was accorded credibility, apparently because

it,in part, conveniently supported the action 'evidence' of KORMORAN's

Unter Leutnant Wilhelm Bunjes and of earlier logged movements in SouthAtlantic.

22..Bunjes' three different accounts so greatly conflict,with each other

and with other German 'evidence',that they can~ot be regarded as cred­

ible. His stories will be examined and compared at appropriate stageof SYDNEY/KORMORAN actual encounter.

2..J,over that identity of 110 AGH when it was completed and occupied inthe following year,1942.

The ex-Army unit still stands in use today, renamed Gascoyne Souse,

in the Mental Hospital Grounds, A December 1941 photograph of the

three Chinese shows them standing together ,with that clearly recog­

nisable building behind them.

From the very beginning,the official version reduced the number of

KORMORAN Chinese survivors to " .. only two •. ",claiming that the "third"

was killed during the alleged action with SYDNEY.

Existence of the "fourth" was ignored by the Germans and the Austral­

ian interrogators alike.

Falsely again,it was publicly informed - particularly in Winter's

account, Frame avoids it altogether - that th0l3e "two" Chinese surv­

ivo~~AImmediatelY questioned and released upon coming ashore at Fre­

mantle ,on 30 November, and given 10dgings~Fremantleby the RoyalAustralian Navy itself: when,in reality, the three of them were secret­

ly under Army Guard at 'Davies Road' until they abruptly disappeared

from there at end of December 1941.

21-. . cl .. C lthShu Ah Fah is reported to have been quest~one aga~n,~n ommonwea

custody in 1942, after which there appears to~o further trace.Also not publicly known, apart from the nursing staff and Army personn­

el,is that l32~OR~ORFR German survivors - official record claims 19 ­

were also confined,separately from the three Chinese,within the same

Army hospital unit where they were all secretly, but not at all dilig-

by KORMORM1,signed a contract,with the Raider's Captain Theodor Detmer~,

which paid them an allowance aboard ~hip and deferred pay when the

Raider returned to Germany. According to the Germans, they then becamepart of KORMOR~'s crew.

Soon after the November 19 alleged action,one of the four met his

death in manner never satisfactorily determined,or even inquired into.The remaining three were rescued at sea with German survivors and then­

although it has all this time been officially suppressed from the

record - separately confined in a newly built special Army HospitalU . ~ f d ,23. . d'" , 1n~~,re erre to as Dav~es Roa , ~ndepenaent of the State s C are-

mont Mental Hospital Administration and operated by the Cowmonwealth

under strict military security within the restricted area of the MentalHospital itself.

Claremont Mental Hospital staff referred to the Army unit simply as'Hospital',but its actual official identity was 110 AGH. Hollywood

Repatriat~on Hospital,quite a distance from the Mental Hospital,took

301()

S~~ ~_~ Fa~ an~ t~e ct~er three Chinese haa,subseguent to their capture ently,interrogated.7he o~~icial rec~rj

were in Fremantle Hospital,which again is not true.

In fact,one of those Gerrnans,Erich Gustav Heinrich Meyer remained at

that Army Unit and died there on 24 March,1942,buried next day in

Karrakatta Cemetery's Lutheran Section,with full military honours but

with Cemetery records showing his place of death simply as Nedlands,

with no indication it was an Army Unit in the Claremont hospital for

the insane, and with Meyer described simply as "a German seaMan".His body was exhumed 15 years later,on 22 August 1957. Nearly 40 years

later his burial plot remains unoccupied.Torpedoman Meyer was at least recognised in death by Australia,which

is far more -than Australia intends to do for the SYDNEY Martyr aband­

on Christmas Island ! Why ?

301'(

PINQ.SUBS.013.0022

63.

62.

Returning to KORMORAN's three Chinese survivors, if examined publicly

Shu Ah Fah's interrogated evidence has po~ential to upset the whole

officially-favoured accounts of KOfu~ORAN's movements in the weeks

before the alleged engagement with SYDNEY; those German-provided

'~ovementst underpinning the officially sponsored argument that there

was no possibility of Japanese involvement or co-operation with KORM­

ORAN before, during or after the fateful meeting of 19 November.

Purported rationale of that argument is that lack of a mutual code

system prevented any German integration or co-operation with Japanese

naval units or supply bases. Therefore,KORMORAN could not have been

operating with Japanese at those times.

On the e;ve of Pearl Harbour 'we' would not have wanted Japan to sus-·

pect that 'we' might know otherwise.

with regard to claimed German inability to cowmunicate or operate

with Japanese units or supply bases,it is worth while remarking that

when,on 6 December ,1940 the Pacific Raiders KOMET and ORION were

co-operating in sinking the S.S.TRIONA in vicinity of Nauru,KOMET's26. • h d' 11'radio officer - allegedly German - oroaacast a lengt y ra ~o ca ~n

fluent Japanese,successfully jamming TRIONA's QQQ and position signals.

Was the KOMET's radio officer fluent in Japanese Morse (KANA) signall­

ing,or was KOMET carrying a Japanese W!T operator?27.

On approximately 1 August 1940,ORION transmitted messages to a ~apan-

ese shore receiving station on ordinary internaticnal ~ave band and,

post-war, recorded no difficulty in having done 50.

There were other kno~~ German Co-operacion contacts with uapanase

units in the Marshalls and Carolines Mandated Islands from 1940 on­

ward,during the periods when Germa~ auxiliary cruisers were in the

Paci~ic.

Approximately 17/18 October 1940,the raiders KOMET (disguised as

MA~~O MARU),REGENSBURG (Fue1g:anker),ORIO~ (MAEBASI MARU) made ~end­

ezvous at an atoll in the Carolines (pOSSIbly Lamotrek Atoll) w~th

the raider supply ship KU4~ERLAND and a genuine Japanese ship,PALAU

MJ\RU. ;z.9.After a few days at the atoll they were joined by a Japanese naval

inspection vessel,with no communication problems encountered at any

time.

3016

The official but publicly non-advertised 'accepted history' of KORMORAN's

movements after entering the Indian Ocean on 1/2 May until 19 November

1941 is recorded in a 'Mg~i Secret' classified chart of her alleged locations and

operations, as compiled by Australian Naval Intelligence in January 1942 and

forming a major 'basis'of F B Eldridge's "Report on Loss of HMAS SYDNEY",

The chart is under the Heading 'Approximate Track of Raider KORMORAN;

Considered to be Raider 'G' or STEIERMARK • No 41 ... MOST SECRET', and

is contained as a Folio in Australian Archives Navy Filt!64M. The document is "t/61j.11

10 be more fully addressed further on, when this wrtler expands his arguments

Ihat the chart is almo~t wholly fabricated, apparently by 'us' as much as by the

Germans, and even though obviously another 'red herring', is greatly

contradictory of the publicly released officially 'accepted' German story.

The chart is reproduced at later stage of this narrative, With another three charts

constructed by this wrtler showing the greatly conflicting 'histories' of

KORMORAN movements and events as recorded separately by Detmers,

Winter and Frame.

Shu An Fah's "discredited" evidence that KORMORAN had vacated the

Japanese Pacific ca16fines area on 22 October,1941. gained credence by the

Central War Room's report of 17 October that one of "2 enemy units now in

Western Pacific ... is probably German STEIERMARK, 9800 tons,"

The Australian naval interrogation court never established, nor seriously

attempted to establish, that KORMORAN had not recently returned from the

Japanese Western Pacific area prior to her interception by SYDNEY; even~Z.

though that was one of the stated main objectives of that naval court,

PINQ.SUBS.013.0023

64.

Furthermore. Shu Ah Fah's "discredited" evidence where il suited us was

accepted. Where it did not suit. it was "discredited".

It seems, therefore. that continuing presence of the surviving three Chinese

may have constituted an embarrassment 10 our official 'history makers' and a

glimpse oflhe Chinese' precarious positions may oiler a clue to thal.

As already briefly stated, the four Chinese seamen had been picked up by

KORMO~N when the raider sank their ship EURYLOCHUS in the Atlantic on

Ja.nuary 1 1941. At that time it appeared that Germany was winning tr.e war.

8nce aboard KORMORAN. Shu Ah Fah and his three companions threw in

their lots with the Germans; Shu Ah Fah becoming officers' mess and

wardroom steward. with the other three manning the ship's laundry. Their

status, if not regarded as that of wartime deserters should have been at least

that of en~my prisoners of war after their November capture by

Australian forces, despite Shu Ah Fah's insistence that they had joined the

Germans only at pistol point. The fact that they were regarded by the Germans

as c~ew members weighed heavily against their cries of innocence. They must

have thought themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea, with a

strong possibility they couid be shot as traitors if they failed to demonstrate they

were anti-German and that the Germans would/treat them similarly if they did.

when Germany became the victor in a few more months as the KORMORAN

crew believed.

Therefore. Shu Ah Fah's interrogation story could easily have been a desperate

'two way' bet: ie, to t~'1 a very possibly truthful account of KORMORAN's

presence in the Pacific Japanese Mandate area. and on the other hand support

as far as he was able. the obViously fabricated German accounts of the alleged

SYDNEYiKORMORAN action and its shrouded aftermath. Without observing

'-

- .

the situation al first hand il is most improbable Ihat Shu Ah Fah knew enough to

i~form thal raiders were using Japanese submarine bases in the Carolines and

Mariannas for periodic refits and for making rendezvous with resupply vessels

sent from Japan: thal arrangement known to British and American Intelligence

as early as September 1940. 11 is even more unlikely Ihat he WOUld. even

generally. know the sequence of various German raiders' visits to those places.$.

as he professed to know. It is also unlikely that he could describe, as he did.

KORMORAN's procedures and speed in mine laying unless he had observed

them in a<:~lon. If the story told by Shu Ah Fah was partly correct, it revealed a

direct Japanese involvement with KORMORAN immediately prior to her taking

up station where she inadvertently encountered SYDNEY. What stories his

compatriots told we may never know. because there is no record that they were

ever questioned.

Australian naval authorities' reluctance to accept Shu Ah Fah's S ta;t:e ­

rnents lndlcaJi']3 JapaneselKORMORAN co-operation seems no

more curious than their failure - on the record. at any rate - 10 investigate much

more sinister sounding German allegation against the characters of the four

KORMORAN Chinese.

It appears possible that the Germans may have thought they possessed a

WO"""" I" h"lri ""0' Iho rhi"oco whif'h wQuld ensure their new untried loyalty......_,., .., 0,.;..... to _ I lit v , ••

to Germany. and that they may have thought the lime had come to use it when

Shu Ah Fah began to tell his stories about the Carolines and KORMORAN's

alleged provisioning by the Japanese; particularly as Japanese pro\lisions had

been found in KORMORAN's lifeboats and rafts.

At any rate. a German campaign to discredit the Chinese appears to have

begun· after, unknown 10 the Germans. they had already disappeared· When a

3021

PINQ.SUBS.013.0024

66.

O.German prisoner wrote a 'Ieller' Irom his prison camp. to an obviously non·

existent Australian girl named "Mavis". the 'letter' seemingly a task allolled to

him by his senior officers for execution. 11 seems to have been a fairly clumsy

altempt. The 'Ielter', written by Wilhelm Schmitz and received normally by the

camp Australian military censor was ostensibly intended to be an account 01 the

SYDNEYIKORMORAN action - the official version· but qUite a deal 01 it was

devoted to the four Chinese. In part. it read: "Then he" (referring to

EURYLOCHUS) "stopped. Now, Mavis, he'd got a Chinese crew. And these

bloody ha~-casts steered their lifeboats without their British officers and left

their ship. The crew was 93 men, 53 Chineses and 40 white officers. Now the

ship was burning and his officers was forced to jump down into the water and to

save their lives. They tried to reach their lifeboats and when such a poor fellow

reached the board of a boat, the Chineses shot him and killed him. Therefore,

we'd only saved 6 Men. Only as the Cruenyand the hate from the Colared­

People against the White had done this. In future time our Captain, a real

gentle man, intended to send these Chinese a/l to a British Court of

Justice... n

11 seems very odd that no hint of AustralianiBritish investigation of those

ailegations was ever raised in our pUblic domain at the lime, or later. The

question has been preViously asked of us: Why would the Germans have

allowed the four Chinese to live. after the alleged SYDNEY action, if they were

risks to the German cover stories regarding KORMORAN behaviour? Why not

just drop them over the side to join the 645 SYDNEY men and the lO-odd

Germans clJmed by Detmers to have "drowned" after the raider was

abandoned?

3022

Gl

A logical suggestion is that. if the surviVing 316 Germans were gUllly . as already

alleged in various forums· of piracy and war crimes in the cases of SYDNEY.

BRITISH UNION, EURYLOCHUS, VELEBIT and possibly other victims of

KORMORAN. Ihey may have considered it to be expedient - when capture seemed

certain alter the raider's sinking - to have corroborating testimonial. from non

German 'prisoners'. that there was nothing below board in the total

disappearance of SYDNEY and her 645 Company. It might have seemed to them

that the Chinese, already deserters to the enemy and alleged murderers of their

own officers, would support completely the German story for the price of German

silence. After all, the Germans were certain they would soon win the war: and

clearly, the three Chinese had thought so as well.

Report of the alleged death of the mysterious fourth Chinese after coming ashore

North of Carnarvon, is important enough to be included here, if only to record the

bizarre circumstances in which it reportedly occurred: bizarre enough to be almost

unbelievable in any other circumstances, excepting the 'coverups' of the

SYDNEYIKORMORAN affair.

. The 'fourth Chinese' survived the encounter with SYDNEY. That seems to be

confirmed particularly by KORMORAN's Surgeon Commander Lienhoop who

attended to all the raiders' casualties of the alleged action, listing categorically four

dead and four wounded. all of them German.

One of the three Chinese who finished up in the Davies Road Army Unit sustained8.

a badly burned arm and was picked up by the merchant ship CENTAUR, with

Doctor Lienhoop in Captain Detmers' lifeboat. The other two Chinese of Davies

PINQ.SUBS.013.0025

relevant written. statement,

08.

Road were picked up, by HMAS YANDRA. in an unbelievably overloaded lifeboat

0172 men.

~It officially appears in the interrogation records that all four Chinese were confined

below decks in the laundry when KORMORAN went immediately to Action Stations

upon sighting SYDNEY. Apparently it was decided by all (?) parties. at that stage

of the interrogation. that the 10urth Chinese' should not further appear in the

'inquiry' record. From that time he officially no longer existed and, just possibly, this

may be Why:

Fairly recently. the wrITer spoke with Mr Jack Sue. an Australian of Chinese

descent and well known as a significant member of World War lI's famous 'Z' Force

which operated independently behind Japanese lines. Currently operating his own

professional diVing business, Jack Sue's personal word and credibility are beyond

doubt.

Jack recounted an event occurring one morning at end of November 1941. before

he joined the Australian Armed Forces himself. His Perth family's next.door

neighbour was a Sergeant in a Militia Provost Unit which was urgently despatched.

on November 25, to take into miiiiary custody the German survivors who came

ashore in lifeboats at Red Bluff and 17 Mile Well, North of Camarvon.

A few days later. on his return to Perth. the Sergeant visited the next-door Sue

family, WITh whom he was very friendly, at breakfast in their kitchen and told them10.

of an amazing incident while the Germans and one unnamed Chinese were being

transported in Irucks 10 Camarvon.

30 9 :.... 'i

--

52.

Evidence continues to accumulate that,well before November's fatal

encounter,STEIERMARK was fairly well known to 'us' and that R~F

hunted her by name and description. Further,our knowledge was great­

ly assisted by interception of her lilT transmissions and receptions.Enough evidence has been garnered to strongly dispute official insis­

tence that no signals were received,froe either the Raider or SYDNEY,

immediately before,during or after the action allegedly involving

only those two ships.

Of that,one of most significant refutations is a claim made sOme

years ago to authoress Barbara Winter a~d subsequently to West Aust­ralian 'SYDNEY Research Group', by former RAN writer Robert ('Bob')

Mason.,He has b~ated that,starting duty in Canberra's HMAS HAfu\~N'sship-to-shore communications station during the first night watch

on 19 November 1941,a telegraphist colleague informed him that SYD­

NEY, a short time before, had signalled HARMAN to effect that she

had encountered a suspicious ship and was attempting identification.

Another SYDNEY signal followed,informing she was " •. about to open

fire. "A further signal followed,but Mason states it was indecipherable.

Ee went on to relate that when he returned to duty next morning,

gapers ~ere being destroyed amidst an atmosphere of deep gloom andhe Mason cuestioned personnel there with: "SYDNEY's gone,hasn't she?"

, , - /2..The same morning everyone except Mason was sworn to secrecy about

the incidents which he has described.

Jer; recently,Bob Mason made his personal file available to SYD~r.Y

?9searc:., G!:'Ol.1p revealing further detail of SYD~rEY' s cJ aimed last

signals. This writer has a copy of

t!:erein.

Interestingly,Barbara Winter - to whom Mason in 1984 reported his

experience - has never publicly mentioned him or his revelations

until oublication eleven years later - 1995 - of the biography

under ~er name: 'The Intrigue Master;Commander Long and Naval Intel1-

igence 1913,1945'.

This writer does not understand why ~vinter,at p.ll? of 'The Intrigue

Master',describes as "~" What Bob Mason - a claimed witnessto HA~~;N happenings that night - told her, as his professed fact,

when he became aware of What she had written at p.236 of her'HMAS

SYDNEY; fact, fantasy and fraud'.There,IVinter referring to "rumours" about the SYDNEY/KORMORAN all::g­

ed action comments that a rumour (ed}" •. :~rr:EKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT

PINQ.SUBS.013.0026

54.53.

published an exchange of radio signals between SYDNEY and the ~adio

base HARNON (sic)."

Winter goes on and repeats the particular exchange to which thealleged Weekly Intelligence Report refers:

'Ex SYDNEY~~TRANGE VESSEL IDENTIFYING ITSELF AS STRAAT ~~LAKKA CON­FIRW'.

'Ex HJI.R.\!ON' (sic) !'STRAAT NALAKKA NOT REPEAT NOT YOUR VICINITY ACK­NO\~LEDGE" •

(That,incidentally is how such a genuine signal should have read) •

Winter immediately asks: "Which Weekly Intelligence Report? These

are now available in Archives,but this signal is not in them. How­

ever,at approximately the~ date an exchange of similar signals

occurred. For SYDNEY~ DEVONSHIRE; for STRAAT MALAKKA, POLYPHEMUSThese related to the sinking of ATLANTIS."

What Winter appears to be suggesting is that the 'rumoured' \·:eekly

Intelligence Report signal - specifically naming SYDNEY and STRAAT

MALAKKA - be accepted as,really,signals to Admiralt9~}r§~~N'DEV­

ONSHIRE dealing with that ship's interception and sinking of POLYPH­

EMUS (disguise of Raider ATLANTIS) in the Atlantic Ocean on~Nov­

ember, 4 days after SYDNEY/KORMORAN encounter.

Fact that Winter so specifically quoted the texts of that alleged

signals exchange clearly indicates that she read it,or someone toldit to her.

She doesn't tell us the source of such Fotentially explosive inform­

ation. One would think that,in keeping with those complete texts,

the source would have recordec.,also,Timesand Dat:e of lodge­

ments and transmissions of that exchange allegedly bet~een SYDNEYand HAR.'1A..'il.

Winter, as usual ,prefers to accept the word of KORMORfu~'s Nazi pers­

cnnel that SYDNEY sent no signals which they,in any event,werewaiting to 'jam' with their own warship's powerful signals-suppress­

ion equipment.Without their own knowledge,however,those same personnel failed to

suppress the QQQ signals of more than one simple merchant ship. in

Atlantic and Indian Oceans during KORMORAN's 1941 cruise.

In relation to Barbara Winter's statement that the SYDNEY/HAR."lAN

signals are "not in" Archives,that does not prove they were never

sent or received because, like the Christmas Island Carley float13.

and its corpse records,which Navy a~~ittedly destroyed, they may

have been similarly destroyed and never sent on to Archives.

~!Tom Frame at p.197 of his SYDNEY/KOR~ORAN account informs us that

" .. it is very true that naval records relatinq·to·SYD~r~were not

created,managed or passed by the ~avy to Archives in an orderly

fashion .• " and that " .. SYDNEY Research Group would find that naval

records are not as complete or comprehensive as they seem to expect.

At his p.198 he goes further,that " .. it is an unfortunate fact •...

that sometimes records, the ~ stuff from which history is made, arede~icient,lost or non-existent."

That being the case, why does Winter ~with such finality dismiss

claimed signals from SYDNEY and HARMJI~ as probably being betweenHMS DEVONSHIRE and British Admiralty,in a different Ocean,on a

different date,at different time of day and with the differentRaider ATLANTIS ?

In relation to signals from SYDNEY on 19/20 November 1941,this

writer understands the official claim is still that no signals

were rce.eived from her after she departed Fremantle on 11 November.

The official 'history' has maintained that claim from Day One!

Winter,throughout her SYDNEY/KORMORAN 'history',relates that after

leaving Fremantle on that 11 November ,the cruiser kept unbroken

radio silence. At her 1984 p.121 she categorically confirms thatSYDNEY sent no signals;

"A few minutes before she left, (Fremantle) SYDNEY sent a signal

which made no sense except to the person to whom it was addressed:

'(A) NO (B) SHIPS.' These '"ere the last words to be heard from

SYDNEY." Winter was merely repeating d~nia15 contained

in the official material released for inclusion in her 'fact,

1antasy ar.d·~raud~

Frame,however,at his p.190 referrin5 to SYDNEY Research Group

allegations thRt Navy had denied the existence of 19/20 November

signals from SYDNEY,just as categorically as Winter insisted that:

"The Navy has,in fact,denied nothing.It has simply stated that

copies of such signals cannot be found ... "

There seems to be no end to the contradictions of SYDNEY/KOR.~ORAN

Affair !

.=\nother non-"rumour" refutaticn of the "no SYDNl::Y signals" claim

is contained in the public Statements of Gordon Laffer,a RAJl2

Serviceman honourably discharged at the conclusion of World War 2.Laffer,a member of SYDNEY Research Group, as is this writer,hascome under heavy attack by F~me,directlY and by Winter, indirectly,because of his own belief of tbverur of SYDNEY/KORMORAN history.

3027

PINQ.SUBS.013.0027

55.

While a temporary member of RAAF Intelligence Section staff,in 1945,

at the old CML Building,St George's Terrace,Perth,Western Australiat th . . t' f h' '. IS: 'a e ~nv~ta ~on 0 ~s sen~or off~cer.Laffer examined the Classif-

ied Secret file labelled H~~S SYDNEY.

He described the file's initial folio as a message on a signal fermbeginning," SYDNEY CALLING DARWIN SYDNEY CALLING DARt'IIN ON FIREFORE AND AFT PREPARING TO ABANDON SHIP .•. "

Incomplete degrees of latitude/longitude followed.

The file's second folio dealt with Intelligence interviews with a

number of Service and non-Service people,iome'of whom were RAAF

personnel in a small group in a Geraldton Hostel on night of 19/20

Novemb;r, testifying that .' they had heard and understood the

clear-language Morsed message from SYDNEY over a short-wave radioset.

Laffer believes that file and others were sent to Canberra and'lost'.

In his Paper presented to 1991 FMAS SYDNEY Forum at Fremantle Marit­ime Museum,he also remarks on WIT signals ostensibly received from

SYDNEY on November 25,1941, seen by eX-R~ Lt C'm'dr Ean McDonald

while he was serving as Signalman's rank in HMAS PERTH,on that datein Port Phi~p Bay area of Victoria.

McDonald had previously served in SYDNEY. He now believes the sig­

nals seen in the radio shack aboard PERTH were hoax messages sim­

ilar in intent to Classified Secret sicrnals,suspected first by this. 1 . I . h J 16.. d b

wr~ter as A l~ed Inte l~gence .oaxes recorded as transm~tte y

Australian Naval Board Melbourne to Cor.~ander-in-Chief,ChinaStation,Singapore· on the same ~0vernbcr 25,19~1.

For convenience, the Australian Naval Board/China Station Singapore

signals are, hereinafter, referred'to as the 'Crystal Ball' signals

because they,in detail, described certain SYDNEY/KORMOR-

an important events many hours before they actually occurred.

This writer holds to the opinion that those hoax signals were early

part 0: the SYDNEY/KORMOR;N coverup,the'Crystal Ball' possibly

meant for interception by Japan whose Pearl Harbour naval strike

?orce was then in the Kurile Islands on 'readiness notice' to sailfor Hawaii the following day,November 26; and he suggests, because

they appear to serve no other recognisable purpose, the 'CrystalBall' were intended to convey to Japanese interceptors Australian

'belief' of strictly German involvement with SYDNEY, amidst thealleged absence of non-German information about the action.

I~ regard to the PERTH signals,McDonald remembers that they were

3028

56. 39in ~very similar,protably identical,witn those read by Laffer~perth RAAF

Intelligence Section in 1945.

No rumour there! Laffer and McDonald ewphatically insist that the con­

tent of signals seen by them is as they have consistently describedthem - especially Laffer who,today,recalls his sighting word for woxd

Frame concedes that Navy's unsatisfa=tory creation and manager-ent of

such records raises valid doubt that those claimed signals were passed

to Archives in manner ensuring retrieval for stUdy and research.

He informs that Naval records It .. are not as complete or comprehensive"

as expected for purpose of historical research, and that "raw" Intellig­

ence ,such as those signals,are " .. sometimes deficient,lost or ~_existent. ",Nevertheless,although Frame shows no hesitation about g~v~ng 'thQ~s

up' to Detmers' and his raider crew's wild contradictions and fabric­

ations directly concerning officially unexplained and " •• controvers­

ial.. It disappearance of one Australian cruiser and 645 bodies - the

only documented 'ccrroboration'being KOR~ORP~ falsified 'records' ­

he at his p.195 denies any credibility to 'returned from active

service' Australians who legitimately question the truth of the enemy. 17: . .. • . th...."storiesao Frame,they are " •. rev~s~on~sts ana consp~racy _ecr~s~s.

Frfu~e simply dismisses the files and signals seen by Laffer and McDon­

aId as " .. personal recollections with little or practically no indep­

endent or docQ'l1entary corroboration, all unreliable sources. It

will the independent corroboration of 'Bob' Mason's SYDNEY/HAR~~N

signals come. under Tom Frame's personal attack? This writer believes

no~. Such action would bring che issue of 57:~EY's

the open and public scrutiny

On March 28,1993 David Young,son of the late Crawford Young, eX-R!Ui

Petty Officer Telegraphist, provided a Statement to SYD~~Y Pesearch

Group testifying t~at his father related to him that,whilst Naval Sig­nalman in the tug uca on November 19,1941 on passage between Darwin

and Frer.1antle he had intercepted " .. the last message/s from SYDNEY

before she was destroyed."P.O.Crawford Young told his son that he had made no reply to the mess­

age/s because of r-ossible submarines nearby,and he had been ordered

not to break radio silence,It .• the action was not far away."David Young testified that his father " •• had carried a burden of guilt

for not replying to let them know that they had been heard."

David Young further informed that he was also told that when UCO

302~j

PINQ.SUBS.013.0028

58.5i.

reached Fremantle" ••~o Log,or Signal Pad,recording the message/swas immediately confiscated by the Navy." Cavid Young provided furth­er detail in a full written Statement to the Group.

It is a matter of record that Navy did take possession of the Signal

Pad which,as far as this writer is aware, has since not been availablefor public examination.

Frame,at his p.194 confirms that " .. In the first instance,it was the

signal pad that was taken by the Navy. The word 'confiscated' has been

used to describe its removal but this is much to strong a word for

what actually happened". He fails to go on and describe "what actuallyhappened".

4t,Interview notes relate how,on February 2a,1993,HHAS SYDNEY Research

Group's John McArthur and Ean McDonald recorded an interview with ex­

RAN Signalman,Malcolm Young. (~ot to be confused with Petty OfficerCrawford Young.

This account also is not a "rumour"and,as far as this writer is aware,although Signalman Malcom Young is not rersonally known to Writer'Bob'

Mason they appear to be generally reviewing the same shared experience.Ok I~

L~. e Mason,Malcolm Young recalls that in the first night watch of Nov-

ember 19,194l,whilst on duty in the Staff Office of HMAS LEEUWIN

Naval Depot,Fremantle,he received a signal via Applecrcss Radio infor­

ming that SYDNEY had come across an enemy surface war vessel and was

and transmitted from NOCFND (Naval Officer Commanding Fremantle Naval

commencing action.

other agencies,

message,to SYD­out from Fremant-

involving SYDNEY and

a Navy shore station

November 13,two days

Still dealing with last signals

it seems in order to cowment on

NEY,at 9 minutes past Midday on

le on her final voyage.

The signal,via teleprinter, is Classified Confidential - not Secret -

In the unexplained absence of the senior naval officer from his LEEU­win post that night, Signalman Malcolm Young immediately reported the

signal to the Duty Chief Yeoman,Petty Officer Rowley Roberts,and can­

not recall the sequence or detail of events occurring thereafter.

EX-Petty Officer Rowley Roberts died some time later of a terminalillness.

Earlier,inhis same p.194,Frame has remarked that " •. While it is true

that the logs of ships •• " which picked up KORMOR.l\N surv.ivors " •• arebland and provide little detail of their involvement in aftermath of

SYDNEY-KORMOR&~ action,it needs to be remembered that war-time regul­

ations prevented the inclusion of information such as position, course,

speed and local defence procedures in ship's logs ••• " in case of capt­ure " ••by enemy raiders."

" .• It is noteworthy," continues Frame,"that the UCO log does not includeo --

any signals of an operational nature, either before or after she inter-

cepted the garbled QQQ signal from KORHORAN." (There were ~ QQQ's!)

Well,of course,Admiralty's war-time regulation,AMSI 221,prevented the

inclusion of that informat~~n the log. It should have been recorded

in the signal pad of UCO's RAN Petty Officer Crawford Young,and that

being the case, Naval Intelligence should have known some time on 22nd

~overr~er/from Petty Gf=icer 7e~egraphist Crawford >OW!g if not from

earlier source,about the signals his son reports on, including the18. I

intercepted QQQ signals from 'STR&~T MALAKKA'jKORMORAN.

P.O.Crawford Young should certainly have reported those interce~tions

immediately UCO tied up in Fremantle.If they did not appear on his signal pad, for which reason did Navy

confiscate that pad ?

Winter,at her p.172 flatly states:" •. The Navy confiscated the signal

pad. "She states again at p.235:"Radio signals are not recorded there, (inUCO's log) but in the signals pad. That was I.hat the Navy confiscated".

No "rumour" there,at all, and credible independent corroboration for

all those persons who reported SYDNEY signals.

as a totally secure code.If intercepted and broken - and our Jower grade Navy codes were being

intercepted and broken,by Germany and by Japan - the impression gained

would have been that SYDNEY was on a routine timetable run,to be back

in Fremantle,on time, early on Nove~~er 20th;almost a training cruise!

The message read: "R.A. N. RATINGS Al"PROPRIATED"H.L\lAS SYDNEY"TO"CERBER­

US" FOR OFFICERS TR.l\.INING COURSE 20TH NOVEMBER AT THE L.~TEST.

ACTING ABLE SE&\~~ REES ORDINARY SE~~~ EDENBOROUGH FARR&~D RU~ALL

SIVEY IHLSON SIGNALMAN COX".

This writer,aware of the ridicule he assuredly risks, indulges in some

conjecture - which, after all,is no worse than basis of the official

'history' .His first option is that,if enemy-intercepted, the signal would indicate

that SYDNEY was on a 'milk run';not after a raider on the return trip.

"-30JlJ 3031

PINQ.SUBS.013.0029

59. 42, 4t"n John! Copies sent to Ean McDonald & Mike McCarthy. Regards,Jack Sue.

Second option is that if SYDNEY was not hunting STEIEP~~RK/KORMORAN

after handing over the small troo[ship ZEALA~DIA ,at Sunda Strait, and

rrerely returnir.g to Fremantle - as official version r.as it - the Naval

Officer Corrmanding,Fremantle, for a number of Administrative reasons

should have felt concern as to wh'l the signalled Officers Training

College Draft was not available for departure to HMAS CEPDERUS on

the 20th " .. at the latest .. " as,ostensibly,arranged at Navy senior

level.

Therefore,it is most logical to believe that when SYD~EY-alleg

edly due back on 20th A.M.- had not arrived by late afternoon of that

date, the NOCF should have sent off a short signal of inquiry to SYD­

NEY; paLicularlyas is claimed she was,more or less,on a 'shakedown'

cruise and,moreover,was expected to be already in safe home waters.

We are expected to accept that,if those were the real circumstances,

there was no radio inquiry,with consequent official serious concern;

that not until three days later, 23rd November,was that concern arous­

ed in Fremantle or Melbourne,resulting in the air-waves being bombard­

ed with radio signals calling SYDNEY to break her radio silence.

It seems obvious that the Officers Training College Draft - which had

to be on its way to CERBERUS on November 20th " •. at the latest .. " ­

was no loncer an issue by afternoon of that date.

It has not been mentioned in the official 'history'. It appears only

as routine words on a Naval Message Form.

vlith the yet-to-be-discussed 'Crystal Ball'messages in mind,this writ-

genuine; or just another hoax ?

At his p.189 Frame earlier informs that " .. \'ihile it is possible that

the District Naval Officer 'in Fremantle may have received information

from other sources which should have given him reason to believe that

SYDNEY was involved in some action it has not been~ that heobtained any such information by the usual methods of naval corrmunic-

ations. "Frame then postulates that " .. It is also possible and one suspects

probable ... " an atterrpt would have been made to send some signal

during the action,and promptly offers four examples why those " .. poss~

ible" and " .. probable" signals may not have been understood by Navy

or other interceptors. However, just one of SYDNEY's POWerful trans­

mitters breaking through on a Naval frequency, even in garbled form,

3032

THE ELIMINATION OF J<ORtlORAN' s CHINESE COOK

"The dogs were barking the announcement that HMAS SYDNEY had been sunkby a surface raider hours before the official news was released thruradio and newspaper outlets of the day.According to the dogs the German ship was masquerading as a Norwegianship when intercepted by SYDNEY.

I was a fifteen Y7ar old at the time;living with my parents and young-­er brothers and s~sters at 99 Aberdeen Street, Perth. The area is nowknown as Northbridge.

101 Aberdeen Street was occu~ied by a Hr and Mrs John Knight. As Irecall,Knight was a warder at a corrective i.nstitution,possibly Frem­antle gaol.Following the outbreak of WW2,he enlisted as a military policeman (MP)with the Australian Provost Corps and it was in this capacity that hebecame involved in the SYDNEY/KORMORAN incident.

The following detaIls are as he related them to my parents,a conversat­which I overheard as Knight was .a fairly loud voiced individual.

After the KORMORAN survivors came ashore at varying points north ofCarnarvon - I don't recall that he mentioned Quobba Station, Red Bluffor any other location by name -- he was a party member of the militaryconvoy sent north to take the survivors into custody and escort themto Perth.

Knight claimed that each of the lifeboat crews that came ashore atvarying locations had an entirely different eye witness account of SYD­NEY's movements following the sinking of KO~10RAN. This fact was indel­ibly imprinted in my mind at the time.

John Knight claimed that among the prisoners was a handful of Chinesecooks,former members of prize crews taken by KORMORAN from the manyships she had sunk during her illustrious role-as a merchant raider.

During the convoy's journey south,one of the Chinese cooks in the backof a truck became involved in a discussion or argument with Germanofficers and stated his intention to disclose to Australian authorit­ies the true nature of SYDNEY's final moments. At the next stoDoverpoint the Chinese cook w:s found dead i~ the ba~k ef the t=u=~:h~vi~;been stabbed through the heart with a sharp pen.John Knight did not disclose to my parents how or when he came by thisinformation. He did appear to be very vocal about the incident.However,my mother's later attempts to engage John Knight or his familymembers in discussion on the SYDNEY/KORMORAN incident met with a .'strange stone-walling attitude.I remember well my mother remarking that"the Security boys" had obviously got to Knight and possibly other-'memb­ers of the convoy, escort.

Footnote: Some years ago Barbara Winters rang me prior to the publish­ing of her book "SYDNEY,F,F or F" re the foregoing and was most emphat­ic no such thing could have occurred. I found her attitude quItestrange." Signed:J.W.Sue;J.W.Sue DCM JP. Box 490 P.O. Kalamunda,6076. 7th June 1994.

Comment by John Doohan;11/3/199B:Above is the story related to me by

Jack Sue,professional diver,WW2 soldier behind Japanese lines,unadd­icted to alcohol or tall stories and respected by all credible peoplewho know him. He tells and writes the story as he well remembers hear­ing it from Knight,who seems to have heard it from other source at thetime and place;possibly from German/s escorted south in CENTAUR orHMAS YANDRA (?) It has as much chance of being true as any other of theJ<ORMORAN Nazi's stories accepted without question by Poniewierski/Winter.

~~ If/lip!:303,~

PINQ.SUBS.013.0030

1 articles retrieved.

DATABASE: WEEKLY SENATE HANSARD

Page

Questioner = vallentine*+doohan*QUERY:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Following is Federal Cmbuds~ar.'s Office 'Note to File',writtenin longhand,originally, by Peter Hall (?) or Hallet (?) and dealswith the release to Australian Telecommunications Users Group (ATUG)of C~~udsman Professor J.E.Richardson's December,1924, defensiveReport on his earlier misrepresentative 1981 Report of John Doohan'sserious complaints against Telecom Australia (WA).The original 'Note to File' was written on February 4 & 6,1985.

(Question No. 128)

The following answers to questions were circulated:Commonwealth Agencies: Allegations by Mr J. Doohan

28:02:198992(Question on Notice)128(Vallentine Sen J.)

WAIND

(Tate Sen The Hon M.C.)TAS(JUSTICE)ALP

'Note to File'; February 4, 1985.

, Mr Haggstrom phoned me from Sydney to say that the pUblicationin the S~~ ('Sydney Morning Herald') of the article on Doohan hadprompted a few complaints ar.d an enquiry from the executive of abody called Australian Telecommunications Users Grour- (ATUG) as towhether it could have a copy of the Crnbudman's Report ( Hr McMahon,02 223 1666 ).

My view - expressed tc rrr Haggstrom - was that the report wasessentially between us ana ~!r Doohan and the reguest should bepolitely declined. I said I wanted to discuss it with the Ombudsman.

After discussion* the Ombudsman directed that the report be madeavailable under S.35A of the ombudsman Act and no letter, however,to accornp~y the release was necessary. ------

*The ombudsman asked that Mr Flynn talk to Telecom about the body.Mr Flynn did. It is a respectable body - headed by Mr P.arold White ­former General Manacrer of eTC. Comprises big business interests ­who have an interest in satelli~and (?) co~~unications.Telecom said that the body didn't take on consumer complaints butmay be interested in interception policy.

I I phoned Hr Haggstrom to say a copy \.;ould be sent to S}·dney in thefirst available bag and he should let the ATUG know that it wasavailable to it on suitable identification. I also told Mr Haggstromthat any further requests would be looked at on a case by case basis

Advice from Mr K, Cmbudsman has decided to release Coohan report toATUG - Decision made pursuant to S.35A. No covering letter. Reportunlikely to get in bag today. Need some 1-D from person Ficking upreFort. Any further requects are to be referred to Mr F. for treatmenton ~ c~se cy case basis.

I spoke to ~tr McMahon at ATUG (222 1666 - this is the No. ,in the'phone booh). I told him that, in view of the circumstances surroundin<this complaint, the Cmbudsman had d~cided to exercise his powers underS.35A and would release his report to ATUG. I asked ~r ~c~ahon to ringme tomorrow re details.I pointed out that the ombudsman would normally keep nature of hisinvestigation confidential. I asked him what his main interest in thereport was. He said it was the referer.ce.to ~e fa~t that Teleccm~~n

oerform aural interception without advis~n subscr~bers. I asRed n~wet er or not e a rea t e Intercept~on Act; he said he had "someyears ago". I pointed out that s.7 was the relevant section ,:n~ ~hat

it provides Telecom with authority to conduct a range of act~c~t~es

such as connection of CRP/TBAX etc. without advising the subscr~Der.I told him I'd get hima copy of the Interception "\.ct.

(Signed: Peter Hall (?) or Hallet (?)

06/2/'85:No. 6 of 19841 No. 116 of 19831 No. 114 of 1903; No. 101,1979,No. 114, 1979.

Mr Mc~lahon picked up the Doohan report - I also provided !lr !!dlahonwith photocopies of the above 5 enactments which relate to interceptiol

(Signen: Peter Hall (?) or Hallet (?).

1­TITLEANSWERS TO QUESTIONSCommonwealth Agencies: Allegations by Mr J. DoohanHEADERIt DATEIt PAGEIITYPEItQNOItQUESTIONER

ItSTATEIt PARTY

ItRESPONDERItRSTNrEItRMINISTRYIt RPARTY

QUESTION

Senator Vallentine asked the Minister representing the Attorney-General,upon notice, on 20 November 1987:

(1) Did the Attorney-General's Office receive on 2 July 1987, from JohnDoohan of 21 Bartlett Street, Willagee, Western Australia, an Australia Postregistered letter, with relevant dooumentation requesting the~y-General to inquire into serious allegations, by John Doohan, ofillegal, impE£P.er actions by the Australian Securi~y IntelligenceC,::;u.:::"zat.::"cin (~..s!C) ar:.3. ::ithe:: A:l5~ra.liara C=.......on~·;ea~ ~~ ags:1c ies ~

(2) Did the Attorney-General receive, from Senator Jo Vallentine, 2 lettersdated 14 August and 8 September 1987, respectively, requesting theAttorney-General to ~gntly inquire into ~ohn Doohan's allegations referredto in (1) above?

(3) If answers to (1) and (2) above are yes, will the Attorney-Generalexplain why he has not answered_ the above referred to requests by JohnDoohan and Senator Vallentine?

(4) Did the Attorney-General on or about 9 July, decline to accede to arequest by the Director of Public Prosecutions, for copies of John Doohan'sletter of request for inquiry and relevant documentation, on theAttorney-General's stated grounds that his office was not aware of a~~

correspondence received from John Doohan; if so, for what reasons did theAttorney-General deny receipt of John Doohan's letter of request for inquiryinto serious allegations against ASIO and other named agencies?

(5) Did John Doohan's letter and relevant material allege that, for manyyears, ASIO and other named Australian Commonwealth agencies have beencovertly compiling and maintaining, on himself, medically~qualified

untruthfur-detrImental psychiatric and 'personal defect' assessment andopinion records; if so, will the Attorney-General confirm or deny" (a)whether any mental assessments or opinions ab~ut Jo~n ~oohan are conta~nedin any~port or record held now, or at any t~me, w~th~n ASIa, Austral~an

30343035

PINQ.SUBS.013.0031

Page 2

;.im not in a position to express any view on the medical opinion3d by Mr Doohan.[:(10) In accordance with the practice followed by success:ve3nts I will not comment on Mr Doohan's allegations~_~c~~n~Q9-hSlD,

ler an individual is or .!,.:L!!9J;...1!....n~!;J.Q.!lC!l.._~.!'!.s:.1l.:r;:..i..1:y-X")..s_Js.3 police documents referred to by Mr Doohan and attached to hisvere prepared in response to his inquiries and allegations of

303L

Page

t :lephone tap~lfThey are not criminal records.--rl) ~nan's allegation~ have been examined by ~he Dire:to: of PublicProsecutions and the Human R~ghts and Equal Opportun~ty Comm~ss~on. TheDi.rector of Public Prosecutions advised Mr Doohan that the material providedby him did not disclose anything upon which that Office could base aprosecution. The Attorney-General subsequently informed Mr Doohan that hehad been advised by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission thatthe material forwarded to it by the Department, which comprised copies ofthe documents forwarded to the Attorney-General by Mr Doohan, did notsubstantiate a breach of the International COVenant on Civil and PoliticalRights and, consequently, that the Comm~ss~on was unable to conduct any~ inquiry into his allegations.

I

3037

PINQ.SUBS.013.0032

16/54 Melville l'de.,South Perth. WA:6151 ~.

Nove~ber 10, 1984.

TO WaClv.i IT MAY CONCERN i

When John lloohan asked me to write this, I asked myself:"What could I say'?" But the real question was, where should

I start?John telephoned me shortly after I began working as

a j ournalis t with The West Aus-tralian~

His first words were a warning that I would be told todisregard him as unreliable - a nutcase.

I replied that this would not be so, and that I had received

no such direction.

A month or so later, John's words rang true.

I was told just that - disregard him; he is unreliable, not

to be used, and certainly not to be quoted in re newspaper stor~

The 'problem' stemmed from an article published many years

ago in The West Austr8.lian. It featured a;n interview with John,

quoting him at length.The problem was that John was at sea, many miles from shore,

at the time of ttie reported interview.

'tlb.en J ob.:l had the a.'.V3.a.ci ty to allege that the interview was

a fabrication, his name was forever banned from "The West".

It is a sad comment on the ~tate of the freedom of the Press

in A.ustralia when a newspaper advocating freedom of speech and

express.ion can institute its miD. ban on individuals ..

303u

4/<.1). f}/tf/Mj I IJkA-f<:I1wrr 3 Ct- S

John does have a worthwhile contribution to make.W'nen he speaks, it is often for others who cannot.'

I have seen petitions smuggled from jails, signed by prisoners

authorizing him to speak on their behalf; I have seen John

defend people when others have abaruloned them as no longernewsworthy, and I have seen his na~e blackened by a publication

that prid.es i-tself on being a newspaper of record.'

In August a pris oner died in ~'remantle maximum security .­

prison, in circumstances that were suspicious at the very least.

An inquest into that prisoner's death is now being held,

and .the lawyers representing that prisoner;s family have already

alleged that they can establish a prima facie case of assault.

John was the first to contact me with the news of the incident,

long be.LuJ.·e any of the authorities had made any announcement ..

Had I obeyed my editors' direction to disregard John, it is

possible that we would have s~Jply puolished a fe\i brief

paragraphs stating a few bland facts, and that an inquest,as usu,?-l would be held.;'

Justice for that prisoner's family may one day be done;

but I fear that justice, in John's case, may never be done.

It is to his credit, and an indicatioTl. of t:n2 Gtrel16t~1 of his

character that John has not be2::J. dis cour=.g2d fr'J.n -.vor::inJ fort~e good of others~

303 :1

PINQ.SUBS.013.0033

P,hJL nJvt<~,1-t /JJ.l~PffR'7 ); O~' ~ . Pr.\<.>i- fVlU~AA"l,

~iA(h S er-

only ·ulterior motivef

public what he sees

i'(

. Per-hap:3 I can best su.n up by saying ta3.t in th-e 3nor-tt~m,~ I ha7e been in. vies tern Australia, John has pr-oved oneof my. best contacts;

He d oesn I t play favourites, and his

has been to simply to ccmvey to the

when others have turned away:

At thA time of writing, I had known J ob.n f or a littlemore' th3.n six: lJonths. I hone 0\1'" fr;e d h' nd J~ - • n s ~p e ures much longer.

Yours sincerely,

C~CERIa F.2.LVEY.

17 December 1990

The Human Rights CommissionerGPO Box 5218Sydney NSW 2001

Dear Cow~issioner,

I Jennifer Anne Harris of 48 Gwenyfred Rd,Kensington, 6151, hereby declare that the following statement istrue but would like it to be kept in full confidence due to thefact that I am still working within the West Australian mediaindustry and the statement could affect my future job prospects.

Upon joining the West Australian newsroom of the ABC in Perth asa 4th year cadet fresh from the West Australian Insit.ute ofTechnology (W .A. I. T) now known as Curtin University as a graduatefrom the Journalism course, I was given the run down on variouslocal personalities who quite commonly would call the newsroomto provide information for stories. I joined the ABC in December1983 and worked there until August 1985 as both a radio andtelevision journalist.

It was quite common for senior journalists in the newsroom todiscuss the character of various spokespecple who would call .upin relation to issues and it was quite common for the seniorjournalists to pass jUdge.ment about the "credibility" of suchspokespeople. As an ABC cadet, I was informed about such localpersonalities and was warned about whom to pay attention to andwhom to avoid. One such activist who was well known in the socialjustice/civil liberties area was Mr John Doohan of Bartlett St,Willagee. I was told by senior journalists and I quote that MrDoohan was "a left wing lunatic" who had little credibility inmedia circles.

Such comments were particularly distnrbing as I often found thatthese personalties had interesting news leads to provide and Iwas informed that I should listen to them politely but not followup the story. I declare that this statement is true and correct.

3041

PINQ.SUBS.013.0034

~~ii:iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~~iSiiii!iiii~C'C~PERTH

DeceMber 20, 1984

To whom it may concern

September 9. 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

politicians and eve=y

years ago. But he hasn't,

I hope he continues to be a reliable funnel of information, when any other

way of gettin to the truth as 0 posed to the [f'cial ne seems out

of the guestion. I hope he continues to be obsessed.John's reliability, honesty and fra~kness are a breath of fresh air

in a world of people on the make. The demise of John Doohan will mean

that the "little people" with nobody will have lost everyboC:y.

up. Given the reactions of some reporters, many

government department, he should have faded away

I hope he never does.I hope he continues to be a thorn in the sine of faceless bureaucrats.

JOHN DOOHAN, of 21 Eartlett Street, Willage e , Ferth, Western Australia,

has been known to me for the past four years:In that time ~l~ge number of people have offered their opinions on

John's state of mind~_hQ~ c ed~B~li1~nd hi~ value as a contact in

the. journalistic sell?~·

Many of those people have never met John and have only talked to him

by telephone under sufferanc~. The problem is that if enough people say

the same thing often enough, they begin to believe it and so do others.

Fortunately for John, not everyone is like that.

I, for one, am happy to write this testimonial on his behalf.

I write it knowing that a number of colleagues, valued colleagues at

that, will think that I am beginning to behave like John Doohan. That is

their problem.John Doohan is obsessed. It is a magnificent obsession • ~very

journalist should have it. I happen to share it. It's a raginc belief

in right and a fair go for everyone, no matter what their station, and

equally a realis'tic view that w~e do no~ Ilv~ i;~ a :::r!'-=='t ·J!~:!"ld.

John's proble~, if indeer. it is a problem, is that he never giv~s

ALlSON FANSenior Reporter

contact for many

I have known Mr John D h f00 an or more than ten years and speak to him

frequently on a variety of issues including prison reform, Human

Rights, civil liberties and a number f .o maJor legal cases.

1 find him reliable, trustworthy and an important

stories I have covered for TVW7 National News.

,"

unsubstantiated detail.

Whenever I need to call on him for assistance and background for

a story -- I know he can be relied on to give me accurate information,

and he is very careful to point out what 1 bcou d e rumour or gossip or

I find his knowledge and experience a valuable asset in my

profession as the senior legal reporter with Channel 7.

He is a tireless and dedicated worker for Human Rights, Civil Liberties

and any cause he sees as an ;nJ' ust;ce '• • Hl our system.

Yours faithfully,

116 sift.. t..:f-a ..Alison Fan.

Osbornc Rood. Tuor1 Hill WeSfernAuslrolio PO Box 77. Tuart HIli, 6060 Cable leleVlewWA Telephone (09)34A07771elexAA9223~'I<O'o"I'\IOi"'O

T-I'!,' fnte'ptls<?s llmHed

Nartin Saxon,

Journalist,

PINQ.SUBS.013.0035

THE EVIDENCE ACT, 1906

STATUTORY DECLARATION(hfl1 j OF 1.

declare as follows:-

of 4, Tumut Road. Cl ty Beach

I, JOIIN CORDON EVANS

do solemnly and sincerely

that I have known John Doohan of 21 Bartlett Street, Willagee since the

early 1980's.

During that time I served as a Senator for Western Australia and was

approached by the said John Doohan On several issues of concern to

him as a civil rights advocate.

'END SECRECY ON SYDNEY' GROUP

'ES-O-S'

Bundes Chancellor, Or Helmuth Kohl

per favour His Excellency,Dr Klaus ZellerAmbassador to AustraliaEmbassy of German Federal RepUblicCANBERRA ACT 2600

And 1 make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the~same to be true and by virtue of

John Doohan prOVided me with copies of documentary evidence to

substantiate claims of alleged illegal and improper acts by civil

servants and others.

In my discussions with John Doohan and in reading his correspondence

and analyses of events 1 always found him to be rational. loeical,

intelligible and reasonable.

. .. (2.

FAX: (08) 9430 4778

Chancellor,

with all possible respect, again on behalf of this Group I refer youto my previous letters of (1) 2nd May,1997 and (2) 18th June,1997iboth directed, for initial attention,to Ambassador Dr Klaus Zeller,who has not in either case responded.

Those communications should be readily retrievable in your systems.Subjects cQncerned aspects of November 1941 sinkings of H~~S SYDNEYand HSK KORMORAN.I understand that on or about 4th May,1997 your staff sought adviceof Canberra on Australian Parliamentary Merobers' requests for polit­ically limited Inquiry into HMAS SYDNEY's loss.You should by now be aware that an Inquiry was formally announcedon 28th August,1997,to commence hearings on 27th March,1998.

Submission made to Inquiry on behalf of this Group particularlyconcerns the deaths,reportedly by drowning,of 75 KORMORAN personnelfrom a capsized inflated rubber float during the abandoning of theraider.

My unacknowledged 1997 letter of 2nd May requested your kind assist­ance to,particularly,obtain the German-recorded details of circum­stances causing deaths of the unfortunate 75 and a further 4 Kom1­ORAN personnel during the action itself.

Bereaved KORMORAN next-of-kin sure Iv should have been informed ofgeneral circumstances of how their family members were lost in suchnotable German-witnessed naval encounter.

Owing to official Australian long-term policy of discouraging publicawareness of those events,when many affected persons were availablefor consultation, and because we lack confidence that the policy isfully abandoned today,we look now to German official co-operation incurrent Inquiry attempting resolution of some of those historicalquestions.We should, therefore, appreciate earliest possible advice as to whetherGovernment of German Federal Republic has been requested by Austral­ian Government to provide the known details of KORMOPAN deaths,includ­ing the 75 identified above.

Tel: (081 9337 89523044

f}A.vIJ~~

~l:J';'r+- /1-." ;Jrt 7 t.::."1.. S """;

I am not a qualified professional in psychology or psychiatry, but

in my layman's opinion John Doohan's behaviour in his communications

with me has been normal - that is similar to that of the great

majoritv of people under similar circumstances with the exception

that his resilience and tenacity are well above normal.

Section 106 of the "The Evidence Act 1906",

DECLARED AT PERTH

jn the State of Western Australia

1this 12th day of

:'IAY 1989.

JBefore me

PINQ.SUBS.013.0036

2.

(Bundes Chancellor,Dr Helmuth Kohll

End Secrecy on SYDNEY Group)

For similar reasons we should be appreciative of an official responseto my letter of 18th June,1997,so that Australian Government may haveopportunity to test the Gerhardt Grossmann allegations in, hopefully,full Inquiry.

If in 1951-52 a German national had been deported from Australia backto Germany as a consequence of Australian Security (ASIO) investigat­ion,we suggest it probable that the record may be held in existingGerman archives.

Respectfully,therefore,we should be grateful for any advice in thatmatter also.

We hope that you will favourably consider the above requests.

We believe Pastor Ivan Wittwer's report tc be factual; that Grossmann alleged not only Jaranese involvement in SYDNEY's sinking,but also major falsities in the German official accounts of it.

Telephones:09 337 8952

FAX:09 430 4778

'END SECRECY ON SYDNEY' GROUP

'ES-O-S'

His rxcellency,Or Klaus Zeller

AITbassador to AustraliaEmbassy of redp.ral r;er!"an Re['ublicCanberra ACT 2600

As already expressed,on behalf of this Group in recent letter toJapanese Ambassador,Yukio Sato,our latest interest extends to re­ported supr-ression,by Australian Security Intelligence Organisat­ion,of the Gerhardt 'Eeinz' Grossmann-attributed allegations andASIO's reported concealment of the entire Grossmann-related situ­ations in which he claims,with other detail,mass murder of Aust ­ralian and British Services personnel by Japanese Naval Forces,inGerman/Japanese non-compliance with International code of warfare.

Excellency,

ResFectfully and further to my as yet unac)<nc~:ledgec. Hay 2nd',1997letter to Bundes Chancellor Or Helmuth Kohl, I bring to attentionof your Office and appropriate German Government authority relev­ant information contained in copy of May lst,1997 Eyre PeninsulaTritune,South Australia. ( Part 2 of this letter/FAX) .

24th March 1998

(John Ooohan;convenor 'ES-O-S')

21 Bartlett streetWILLAGEE 6156 Western Australia

Faithfully, f tJ.' (/. (I !7Z<7f-.-t..-----:' It" '<1t "

Continued Australian official refusal to publicly produce theGrossmann full record will intensify already lively public conjec­ture in the SYDNEY/KO&~O~~NAffair;as will German and Japanese=ailure to reauest Australian Government to test Grossmann's alle­~~t~=~s ~~ ~~iette=ed cFe~ !~quiry~

You are probably aware of Australian Parliamentary Members 'recentre~uests for politically limited Inq~iry into S~DNEY's loss.

You may also have received press and other reports of this E5-0-SGroup,for past six years, requesting unlimited Inquiry into thesame matter.We have recently been assured of Senate assistance in bringingthe Grossmann and relevant H~~S S~DNEY issues before Parliamentin immediate future.Excellency,we respectfully request that '~ur Office will convey toGerman appropriate authority the import ;f this corr~unication.

30 ' .Lib

Thank you for your co~sideration.

Respectfully, ~jJ~ (Cc: Rt Hon John Howard MP.,

Prime Minister;

": Hon Kim Beazley MP.,Leader of the Oppositicn.

John Ooohan;Convenor/Secretary,21 Bartlett StreetWILLAGEE 6156 Western Australia.

18th June 1997.

PINQ.SUBS.013.0037

Botschaftder Bundesrepublik Deutschland

• Der Verteidigungsattache •

Embassyof the Federal Republic of Germany

- The Defence Attache -

119 Empire CircuitYarralumla, ACT 2600Canberra, AustraliaTel: (02) 6270 1928Fax: (02) 6270 1951

Canberra, 04.03.98

Mr John Doohan21 Bartlett StreetWILLAGEE 6156 WA

Dear Mr. Doohan!

On behalfof the ambassador, Dr. Klaus Zeller, I thank you for your letter, dated 24th March )998,which was received as a telefax on 30th March 1998. ,Unfortunately, the two previous letters dated May 2nd and June 18th, 1997, are not on our files.I, therefore, apologize for not being able to respond to them.I understand from your letter that your main interest is in obtaining information on the deaths of79 personnel ofHSK Kormoran, who lost their lives in the November 1941 encounter withHMAS Sydney.For this purpose I recommend that you approach the central archives of the Federal Governmentwhich administer all documents from the period of the former German Empire (Deutsches Reich).Its address is

Bundesarchiv-MilitararchivWiesentalstrasse 1079115 FREIBURGGermanyPhone: 49 76! 478 !70Fax: 49 7614781781

The Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv is an agency under tfJe Ministry of the Interior. Requests for papersand records or the study of documents should be directed to this agency directly.

I hope that this information will be helpful for your investigation.

Sincerel~

'4~Riidiger SchlemmLieutenant Colonel

3048

~~V~~J.-!J.il. (3-('0

.!J_~J1_~v emb e I' ,_l1.i.L

i\ I I' C r II r t c Cl r I' i er"HERME S" . The s I 00 p s

"I·I.M.S. CLIVE", "H.M.S, I'IECTOR"

We were told to stClnd by ready to leave

thew"AQJITANIA" Thesd orders were later

changed and myseJ fond Slgnalmon Stan

Bullock were to remain onboard, as crew

We sailed at 0600 1'01' SIngapore.

We lost o~r Port P/V and then the

starboard P/V was In trouble, but the

crew monaged 10 sa\le It. we went through

scme very rough weClther. We arrived at

Singapore at 1700. Anchored near the

novo 1 aock)'ords,

"AGVrTAt-IIA" entered the big dry dock for

a scrape. and I uSlld to watch the notlves

cleaning down the huge keel and was

shown a patch and bubble, which was caused

by hilling a bank, in Freetown.

There waS a f,lre i" the cordage locker

in the fo-castle, this was reported as

sabotage. Two flrd engines arrived and

put the fire out, but the heat had

buckled the plates, the dock '1/05 flooded

o t 0600 0 n d we mo v,~ d aut c t 09 J 0 , the

plates held we were not teklng In any

water. We embarked some sailors fro,,",

"H.M.A.S. VEN)ETTA" , "epo. ER.6. Herald

Newcombc, these ch'Jps experienced 0 lot

of bombing In Mol to and were all going bock

to Austral ia for s'Jme well earned leave,

We soiled. Our P/'I's were fixed and

running well,

30-19

PINQ.SUBS.013.0038

3051

eR,.-t J?o-<.<. :s-r C. ~')Iv'AX NAi'.CE.Justice of the Peoce.

J.C/L.RECGE I

• 0 I I 0 r s mu s t ha v e bee 11 1,\ 0 C t Ion ,,' I I h the

"SYCNEY" •

We sighted Cope Otwoy at 0600, then

Co pe Lip sIr 0 pan cl Wi Iso n s Pr orro n t cry

at 1300 hrs. Capt. Gibbons asked me

to pas s. the receded mes sage by ViS

to the shore stallon 1 t look r:;e ~

30 minutes to pass the 30 groups, eoch

group hod to be repected beck to ensure

correct receivIng.

We receIved 0 message f,om Admiral Ity

direcl'ino ships in pertlcular area to ~'./proceed to pIck up survivors, Iuler ranother W/T.message asking ships In

ore 0 (5) for In forma t Ion, we now

believed the Engll sh wership was lost

on account of this I anvlsed Caflt. Gibbons

10 break WIT silence, he delivered the

message and then destroyed his COpy.

Fortunately 1 hod 0 duplicate copy ond

gave it to hIm.1

tJ!

We berthed in Sydney, guards cor:;e cown

ond took the Germans awoy and I

d I s emb 0 r ked from the " ACIJ I TAN 1A". As I

was going out of the dock gcte, the Gote

keeper .old to m<! "hove you hcd any news

of the "SYCNEY" we believe she is rn[ssing"

laJI~. Ib-LltG'~b I() .J')

1.?th November, 1941

AS SIGNED 8EFCR~ ME

'Nen ~

'= -I'~ I Y • 1\ I '·S .·1 .....I ..... C j en

the off icer on watch, onc then

nice and quite, sea was (unning a bIt

at 0600 looked up 01 Ihe Crows Nest and

the lookout was wavIng his arms and

po i n tIn 9 jus t 0 if the s I orb 0 C r d bO'N / [ put

the telesr:ape up and sow two small dots

about two miles away and Imnedlalely called

clown and woke Capt. Gibbons. He

o 1 t ere d co U r sea ndos we c crne c 10 s e r

I co u I cl see two rub berr 0 f t s wit h

people on board. Copt. asked whot

mo d e 0 fit 0 r. d I tal d h Im the Y '\le r e

German sailors, he ;;oid hope not.

I waved to them wll';' my semaphore flogs

cnd they come alongside, we hod slopped,

The Slarboord cargo bays were opened and

c ccrgo ne ~ lowered over the s I de, they

mode the i r C'l;n .../CY u;: 'cu ~ ~hree he:: to be

helped, one had the calf of his left [es

shot o'vay, one hod severe burns cn

roc-e, bcc~ cnc cnes ~ arid one was sur fer lrg

from ex pas u re. Th ere 'lie r e 25 s a I 10 r sin

Germcn u:1tfcrns and two ir. circ!'crt unlfct"'i.:i

1 t too '< u s 4. 5 m 1n ''': ~ e 5 ~ 0 pie i< r netH up.

A steward cn the "ACUITANIA" spoke fluent

Ge rmc nonc CC t £ cl est:"' ~ e r p r e ~ e r fer the

CG::~alf'\. Th~y tclc us they we:-e ~unk by

en EnGlish worship, outsIde of Pet'~h/

t~ey hod 0 crew of 400 ond hod been adrift

fcr 3J dcys, tf>cy were ,,11 cleon shaven,

no growth.: I ate r one 0 f them ccml I t ed be i ng

ccrlft for II cays, they scld they sccred

hi Is on the English waohip from 15CO yards

ond scld they were wcltlng for the "ACUI TA.': lA"

bed the cruiser ccme first, Capt. GIbbons caul!

ner "'reak WIT silence ond did not report

pie kin 9 up the sur v 1v 0 rs / I 0 F r e eme n tIe

cs we hod lost our port P/V again, he

asked n'e to code and recade 0 sI n9,1 \ 0 f

3050

PINQ.SUBS.013.0039

'END SECRECY ON SYDNEY' GROUP

'ES-O-S'

Dear Sir,

Re: 'Inquiry Into Circumstances Of Sinking Of H~~S SYDNEY'

Telephones:(OB) 9337 B952

FAX: (OB) 9430 4778Hon Kim Beazley MPLeader of the OppositionParliament HouseCanberra ACT 2600

(via Electoral Office,western Australia)

FAX: Part 1 of 2.Telephones:(08) 9337 8952

FAX: (08) 9430 4778

'END SECRECY ON SYDNEY' GROUP

'ES-O-S'

?T HO~ JOHN HOWA~D MP

Prir::e ~:inister

pa=lia~ent Housecanberra ACT 2600

We should be most grateful for your earliest convenient response.

Sir,Re: 'Inquiry Into circum~tances Of Sinking Of H~~S SYDNEY';NoV.1941

Your office and Departmental correspondence records should show that,at much earlier dates, this Group and I have requested your formalassistance for investigation of circumstances of H~~S SYDNEY sinkingand,much more to the point, of unexplained and uninvestigated deathsof 645 Australian Naval and Air Force personnel.

Responses from your office and Department,on your personal behalf,inforn that you accept only the former NAZI-enemy uncorroboratedvarious stories of that time and that it is regrettable any attempt ismade to disturb that status-quo.

Therefore,we should like to know if this present Inquiry has the fullsupport of yourself and your Gover~ent to proceed,to com~rehensiveinvestigation of those 645 deaths ~f rec:-sonab~,e ~v~d~mce :s ~r<:,ducedto Inquiry - or other Government author~ty - ~nd~cat7n~ s~gn~f~cantfalsities and incredibility of former-NAZI-enemy/Off~c~alaccounts ofthe circumstances of overall m-1AS SYDNEY /HSK KORMOPAN Affair.

Your former Victori~ Park office records should show that,on 25thJanuary 1994,in corepany with SYDNEY-bereaved members of this GroupI sought your Parliamentary assistance to investigate circumstancesof H~~S SYDNEY sinking, particularly the unexplained and uninvestig­ated deaths of 645 Australian Naval and Air Force personnel.

You responded then that HMAS SYDNEY was lost over 50 years ago, therewere many more important other matters to address and that you didnot wish to hear further of HMAS SYDNEY.

However,bi-Partisan political/Corporate structured organisation, todayknown as HMAS SYDNEY Foundation Trust (Inc.),then obtained your ass­istance to pUblicly·fund commercial search for wreck of HMAS SYDNEY,but not to determine the truth of former NAZI-enemy uncorroborateddiffering accounts of alleged SYDNEY/K0ID10RAN action and deaths ofSYDNEY's entire Company.As you know, Australian governments have,without query, accepted onlythe enemy accounts.

As anticipated, reluctantly sanctioned current H~~S SYDNEY Inquiry isdue to go down the early election 'sink-hole' well before it could90Rsib1y comp. tn anything resembli.ng sati.sfactory conclusi.ons on allthe SYDNEY raised issues.Apart from negation by early election,we believe Defence Deoartmentand,currently,this Government are comm~tted by any other possiblemeans to avoidance of Inquiry conclusions which may open up far widerinvestigation into alleged unlawful killing of 645 Australian Servicepersonnel.

Government has kept to the minimum the Public's awareness of thisInquiry. Media,apart from Perth's 'Sunday Times past interest, hasbeen practically non-existent, and mi5-leading when it has occurred.Attorney General' 5 recent unloading, onto Inquj.ry, of SYDNEY-bereavedfamilies' and this Group's 29 AU0ust 1997 formal request for his in­vestigation of evidentiary circumstances directly associated withthose deaths,does not encourage belief that Attorney General intendsto accept that lawful responsibility.

(John Doohan;convenor 'ES-O-S')

21 Bartlett Streetwillagee 6156 WA

10 March 199B

Fai thfully, (j I , /~ l/11ft/ j!!/e-tti({l·t...

. .. /2.

3052305J

PINQ.SUBS.013.0040

FAX: Part 2 of 2

2.

(Hon K.Beazley/J.Doohan)'END SECRECY ON SYDNEY' GROUP

'ES-O-S'

In view of your current high-profile interest in HMAS SYDNEY andInquiry,with your reported January 1997 suggestion of a relevantRoyal Commission (Adelaide Advertiser,31 Jan.1997), we nov ask foryour assurance that,as Government or Opposition,you will supportreconvening of meaningful HMAS SYDNEY Inquiry,if this current briefshould be unsatisfactorily terminated.

We should be appreciative of your earliest possible reponse,please.

Faithfully,

(John Doohan; convenor'ES-O-S')

21 Bartlett StreetWILLAGEE 6156 WA

10th March 1998

3054

Telephones:

(08)9337 8S52FAX: (08)9430 4778

Senator A.!1urray to ask the Prime Minister:

1. In letter of 10 March,1998,did John Doohan,convenor of the 'EndSecrecy On SYDNEY' Group of WILLAGEE,Western Australia requestPrime Minister's clarification of his Government's intentions inregard to current Senate Sub-Committee Inquiry into Circumstancesof Sinking of HMAS SYDNEY;

2. At August 1997 announcement of HMAS SYDNEY Inquiry did the PrimeMinister and his relevant Ministers suspect the Inquiry might beovertaken and negated by early elections brought about by WIK orany other issue;

3. At August 1997 (a) what time frame was envisaged by the PrimeMinister and his relevant Ministers as nece~sarv to arrive atconclusions, satisfactory to all Inquiry-involved parties,in allcircumstances of sinking of H~~S SYDNEY; (b) what time frame isenvisaged now;

4. What is extent of resources,monetary and other, allocated to theInquiry in arriving at those mutually satisfactory conclusions;

5. Do the circumstances of sinking of HMAS SYDNEY include the unex­plained and uninvestigated deaths of entire 645 of SYDNEY;

6. If "No" ,why;

7. Has Government of German Federal Republic been requested by Aust­ralian Government to provide all known details of all KORMORANdeaths, including one Chinese and,particularly,of seventy five (75)wounded alleged to have drowned without trace from an inflatedrubber float after the alleged action;

8. If "No" ,will Australian Government request those details;9. If NAZI/Official various accounts'of circumstances of SYDNEY's

loss are indicated by all the available evidence to be untrue orunbelievable, will this Government initiate full investigation ofall circumstances of deaths of H~~S SYDNEY's deceased as reauestedof Attorney General,on 29 August 1997,by H~~S SYDNEY's bereavedfamily members;

10. If current Inquiry is overtaken and negated by early elections,will the Prime Minister give assurances now that,if re-elected,a new Coalition government will immediately re-convene H~~S

SYDNEY Inquiry ?

3055

PINQ.SUBS.013.0041

The Defence Sub.Committee, chaired by Senator David MacGibbon, will be holding public

hearings into the loss ofHMAS Sydney as follows:

Phone: (02) 62774629Fax: (02) 6277 2221

DEFENCE AND TRADE

HMAS SYDNEY INQUIRY

PUBLIC HEARlNG DATES

PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA

Additional dates will be advised.

The hearings are open to ~he public. Detailed pr~gr~s for the days listed above are available

from the Committee Secretariat on phone (02) 6~ 77 :-,13.

Parliament House, CANBERRA9.15am to 4.00pm

Friday 27 March 1998Parliament House, SYDNEY

9.30am to 4.30pmFriday 3 April 1998

Committee Room 4, 1110 Hay Street, 9.00pm to 4.00pmThursday 16 April 1998

PERTH

Commiltee Room 4, 1110 Hay Street,9.00am to 3.00pm

Friday 17 April 1998PERTH

JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

PARliAMENT HOUSE, CANBeRRA, ACT. 2600

Defence Sub-Committee

HMAS Sydneyprobe threatByJIMKELLY

THE.End Secrecy·on·Sydney Group is threateningto WIthdraw from the parIJamentary probe intoAustralia's worst maritime dJsaster.

Group convenor John Doohan. who was Instru·mental in forcing the inquiry, said he was notconvinced the committee wanted to hear evidencecontradJcting the official record or the 1941 sinkingof HMAS Sydney. .

"r belleve they do not want to hear my eVidence,"he said. "There wiU not be any opportunity to throwin evidence to destroy the official story or RMASSydney."

Committee chairman Senator David MacGibbonsaid everybody whO had presented submissions tothe inquiry would be given the opportunity tospeak.

WA is the only State where two days or hearingswere planned.

The committee has also taken the unusual step orinViting observers' comments.

Hearings in Perth are due to be held on April 16and 17.

The venue for the hearings was changed to the]\'fprt:l!r~ hate! !~ Pc:th a.a~~!" M~' DvvhQ..a com­plaJned that the 3D-seat parIJamentazy committeeroom would not be large enough.

HMAS Sydney was sunk off the WA coast afterintercepting the German raider Kormoran.

The! official version shows Sydney went downwlth all hands alter being surprised by the ralderbut doubters claim the record is riddled withcontradictions wWch suggest another explanation.

R..-:'t?T1-I I S V N!> 4-'1 71".,,~ I

P.30 atlRIJ... S 1938

rnCANYOUHELP?Aju( srr~'IC( jlJl' f'rfJl'/~ rultmelII/ormIJlfeJ1' about fh~"!a",,/,t' (und 1,ICflIIlIsror,v or o'Jr~r tltnr] flf ,IllU(f(

Jr>: Ju.!,ces OI{C!e eace In the,:Stlrllng·Wannerooarea are inviled to a meeting on Wednesday. 7.30pm.Two Justice Ministry representatives will talk aboutlhe changes to the Justices Act and Magistrates Act.Non·members are welcome at the meeting at the War·wick police station canteen. Cor-tact: Colin Phillipson.phone (08) 9375 2068.TOOTH: News of the whereabouts of John NormanTooth ("Jackie") is sought by his cousin in England.Jackie came to WA as a child soon after 1927. Con· ....tact: Leslie Tully, Westgate. Benton Green -Lane. 'Berkswell. Coventry, England. CV7 7DB.VETERANS: tOFP and/or Detachment t;OI'P Vie'·n"m: TlIere wlil be a reUnton In Melbourne on theAnzac Day long weekend. Veterans. including thosewho cannOI make it, should contact: Tonv Flanagan,phone (08) 9401 6662. or Colin Cross (08) 9342 6208.WAAAF wireless telegraphists: World War 11WAAAF telegraphists and other former airforcefriends are invited to a reunion lunch on Wednesday.Apnl 15, to renew friendshIPS with Margaret Lamont(nee George) who WIll be visillng Perth from Can·berra. Contact: Edna WHson, phone (08) 9444 2444.Royal Air Forces Ex·Prisoners of War Associarlon:All former alTcrew who were pnsoners of war. orevaded or escaped capture. al'e Invited to the annuallunch to be held on Friday. May I. Concact: HerbDawson, telephone (08) 9402 5202.24 Coy AASC: Former members. dependants andWIdows, are Invited to the next reun,on lunch at AnzacClub. Perrh on FT/day. May 8. at llam. Contact: AlexWHson. 14 Haynes Str..t, North Perch 6006. Tele·phone (08) 9443 1415.This column is a free service. Send l'our requests toCan You Help? The West Australian, Private Bag 54.GPO. Perth 6001. Fax: (08) 9482 3830. EmaH:westinfolg'wanews.com.3u •

ADDRESS UNKNOWN: Th,s column would like to ~hear from Nicole ,"'arle Barr (ma,den name). or hermother. Lelgh. They were hving In Margaret Street.Bassendean. in 1981. Contact: telephone(08\ 9482 3382 (w/k).FMRBRIDGE BOOK: In her book. Flo: ChildMigrant from Liverpool. Flo Hickson tells the slory ofher dally life at Fairbridge. to where she was sent as aseven·year·old in t 928 - leaving behind a sister and ahttle brother. When she returned to Fairbridge in1987. she was expecting a joyful reunion. but shewrites. "instead. as I walked into the Church of lheHoly Innocents. Ihe wall that was around my heartbroke as the horror of so many children beingdeprived of home and family was brought home tome". The book has been published in England. Cost:$32. Comact: Plowright Press. PO Box 66. Warwick.England CV34 4X E.HAMILTON: Information relating to the architectErnes! H. Hamilton ("Snowy"). wllo was born about1870. is sought for a conservation plan of St Mary's

. ~~r.f~~ L~~~~rvJlle',S:?~!';t: !~~~ Taylor, telephone'

HMAS SYDNEY INQUIRY: The End Secrecy onSydney Group advises members and the public thatthe inquiry into the circumstances of the sinking willbe held In the OreHa and Georgiana conferencerooms. Mercure Hotel. 10 lewrn Street. Perth. onThursday, April t6 (9am-5.30pm), and Friday, April17 (9am·lpm). No admission charge. Contact: tele·ohone (08) 9337 8952.

305'('305b

PINQ.SUBS.013.0042

PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA

JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADEPARLIAMENT HOUSE CANBERRA ACT 2600

Defence Sub-Committee

HMAS SYDNEY INQUIRY

PERTH PUBLIC HEARINGS

HMASSYDNEY

PUBLIC HEARING PROGRAM: PERTH

Thursday 16 April 1998

CHANGE OF VENUE

The Defence Sub-Committee will be holding public hearings in relation to the inquiry intothe loss ofHMAS Sydney, in Perth Oil Thursday 16 and Friday 17 April 1998. The venue forthe hearing has changed from that previously advised, and will now be:

The Orelia and Georgiana Conference RoomsThe Mercure Hotel

10 Irwin StPerth

A program for the ht:arings is encius~u.

There will be an Open Forum session on the second day, and those not already called to giveevidenc~ will have an opportunity to address the SubLCommittee briefly on any issue theyfeel is relevant to the inquiry.

For further information:

Joanne TownerSecretaryPh: (02) 6277 4629

3.058

9.00 am

9.45 am

10.15 am

~O-l.oopm1.00 pm

1.45 pm

2.30 pm

3.00 pm

3.15 pm

4.00 pm

4.30 pm

5.45 pm

Friday 17April 1998

9.00 am

10.00 am

12.00 noon

Western Australian Maritime Museum

MrERyding

HMAS Sydney Foundation Trusi[jr~SJ

Lunch break

Mrs Glenys Macdonald

MrW OIsen

Mr Bill Loane

Afternoon tea

LCDR Ean McDonald (Rtd)

GPCAPT C A V Bourne (Rtd)

Mr John Doohan (End Secrecy/on Sydney Group)

Adjournment

Ms Cecily Miller and Mr Hayden Jones (Gascoyne Historical Society)

Open Forum tor discussion

Adjournment

3059

TELEPHONE: (02) 6277 2313 FACSIMILE: (02) 6277 2221

PINQ.SUBS.013.0043

HMAS SYDNEY INQUIRYSupplementary Submission, John Doohan

'The Hired Gun'

Today, March 14 1998, while compiling this SupplementarySubmission I received in the Weekend Australian a copy of the'Australian Magazine 'of same date.

An article "The Sinking of HMAS Sydney" written by journalistsMike Safe and David Kennedy presents once again the official(Nazi) version of the alleged SYDNEY/KORMORAN meeting, actionand aftermath, relying heavily on a KORMORAN ex-crew man's 26years old letter (1972), written 31 years after sinking of bothships.(1941); the author, Hans Koblitz, deceased nearly fouryears ago.

Although Kennedy does make brief mention of other "versions" andof "conspiracy" theories regarding SYDNEY's loss, the thrust ofthese further official 'revelations,' hidden by 26 years' dustof a forgotten letter, is left to the "eye witness account" ofthe one man who claims he saw everything "from the beginning tothe bitter end".

It may be asked why David Kennedy and Mike Safe have not asenergetically reported the sworn evidence of' a still-livingAustralian returned Serviceman who undoubtedly served in theteam HF/DF radio-tracking KORMORAN in November 1941; or thesworn evidence of still living RAAF Pilot Officer who not onlyflew in October/November searching for that known raider, butalso flew the previously officially denied 23 November single­aircraft secret search, for SYDNEY herself, [one day earlierthan officially claimed 24 November] as remarked by Kennedy and,much earlier, recorded in October 1945 Report of WRANS 3rdOfficer Westhoven. (Refer Appendix , this supplementary;also my Basic Submission; Reginald E.Lander and Group Captain(Ret'd) C.A. Bourne, Appendices APP.REL,1,2,3; APP6,7,8;APP13,14,15,16; APP9, 10, 11, 12).

For Kennedy and Safe, (also Barbara Eoniewierski/Winter) RegLander and 'Ric' Bourne should have been infinitely morereliable information sources than was "Lance corporal" HansKoblitz, dedicated NAZI Party member since 1932. Koblitz was notthe paragon he claimed to be.

Hans Koblitz claimed he was part of a three-man crew of theStarboard 3.7 cm anti-tank gun which allegedly played such animportant role by, among other feats, splattering Captain JosephBurnett and all his senior officers around the bridge of SYDNEYin the first few seconds of alleged battle.

Barbara Poniewierski/Winter at p.135 of her book, 'HMASSYDNEY; fact, fantasy and fraud,' enthusiastically places Kobli~z

as a partner on that murderous Starboard 3.7 gun - as does Dav~d

Kennedy - with Jacob Fend who later was awarded the Iron Cross

3080

First Class for his accuracy "and bravery" on that particulargun.

Barbara, post-war, spent a deal of time with KORMORAN friends inGermany and obviously believed every word they uttered. Sadly,they weren't all true! Below is small part of officialInterrogation Report on Jacob Fend, at Harvey Camp, WesternAustralia, 5th December 1941 (File 164M/MP1587).

FEND,Jacob Anton; Born 28 April 1921.Joined in Hamburg1st Voyage. A.A.Gun,Port amidships 3.7 cm. Did not fireduring fight,but was on deck. Saw cruiser only afterfight. Saw nothing of torpedos. Note: Questioningdiscontinued as prisoner sullen, answers unsatisfactory.

On the same day,at Harvey Camp, all Hans Koblitz revealed of thealleged action was that he was an "A.A.Gunner,No.2 Loader."(FileI64M/ MP1587)

That not widely-read file material was, nevertheless availableto both Kennedy and Poniewierski/Winter; in particularPoniewierski in her claimed-diligent research for quasi-official'HMAS SYDNEY; fact, fantasy and fraud' and her recent 'IntrigueMaster'; each aptly titled!

Why was it, with so much other material, ignored?

Be it as it may,anyone who was in WW2 gun crews at sea knowsthat he remained at his gun position until action was finishedand only then did he leave that position. Disregarding evidencethat he,as with Jacob Fend, was not on the starboard 3.7 cm gun,Hans Koblitz was therefore unable to observe ~ alleged actionoccurring immediately behind,on the opposite side of, or in anyother part of KORMORAN herself, outside his range ofvision;which was an admittedly clear view of everything abeam,forward of and to the quarter of the side he was on the portside. [DOCumented evidence denies the German stories of such anaction, anyway. Captain Detmers' 'Deck & Engine Room Log' is amajor surviving example)

Only KORMORAN's officers and signalmen on the raider's bridgewould be conversant at the time with activity Koblitz claims asimmediate knowledge to him:

"At the time the alert was given. KORMORAN had changedcourse. not.to the west coast [of Australia) but.toBatavia.~' [Java].

The official tale has KORMORAN altering course to the westwardin direction of Africa. Java lies directly to the north.

"SYDNEY came nearer. to question with flashlights, , .. Whatship ?', answered with 'Dutch ship STRAAT MALAKKA.. fromFremantle to Batavia.' Then more questions about thecargo and so on .. "

2 308i

PINQ.SUBS.013.0044

But only then according to Koblitz, the fateful questioncame, "Give your secret call."

The whole point of above is that those and other operationaldetails were unknown to Gunner Hans Koblitz and general crew ataction stations at the immediate time of occurrence, and forsome time after.

It seems clear that he was parroting one of the versions of the(KORMORAN] 'Officers' Story' drilled into the rank and filebefore and also during their eventual capture; those versionswere so contradictory as to be farcical.

Stan Gratte, (David Kennedy's Geraldton historian) apparentlybased his 1972 report [but not his own developed opinions] onthe claimed 'Brettschneider Story,' reportedly appearing at thefirst HMAS SYDNEY Association meeting at Sydney in 1949. Thedocument itself purporting to have been compiled by a formerofficer of the then Department of Interior (nick-named the'Spook's Department].

This writer has a copy of it with Senator Nick Bolkus' 1992letter advising him that its provenance can not be determined;but in 1949, it had to come from the 'Spooks' Dept., or Dept ofDefence, because much of its content was then pUblicly unknown.

Hans Koblitz appears to have favoured the 'Brettschneider'style:

"The picture was very peaceful, both ships going forwardslowly side by side ... SYDNEY [men] were standing at therails looking .•. so was the pilot of the airplane .••sitting in his cockpit."

The officially 'accepted' Nazi story is that KO~IORAN wastravelling at her relatively high speed of 14 knots with SYDN~Y

overhauling on the raider's Starboard side at 20 knots. Nothlng"slowly" there!

The airplane [a Walrus] was actually~ 3-man aircraft.Nevertheless, it would have had the pilot "sitting in hiscockpit" only with SYDNEY at Action Stations, when not a soulwould be"standing at the rails. SYDNEY in pursuit of a fleeingunknown ship would have been at Action Stations.

In fact, in a genuine large passenger-cargo type such as theSTRAAT MALAKKA,crew and passengers, [there were alwayspassengers even in war-time) would certainly have been on deckobserving with great interest the pursuit of themselves by anobviously British naval cruiser.

But in the Official KORMORAN story,apart from a couple ofofficers on her bridge, all decks were totally deserted, all menhidden at their posts just as SYDNEY should have expected araider crew to be. Nothing could have looked more suspicious!

3 3082

On that account alone, the German story never occurred, asKennedy by his own pUblished work and interviews with peoplelike RAN writer Bob Mason must at least suspect.

Kennedy should remember that this writer,at 1997 Fremantle HMASSYDNEY Forum, made it possible for him to address that Forum anddemonstrate his Bob Mason death-bed videoed interview.

A complete,public and honest examination of all the officialrecords is needed, many of which are available, but aregenerally unknown. [Interrogation File l64M/MP1587 is one] willleave no pUblic doubt as to the HI1AS SYDNEY cover up! Asimilar scrutiny of the pUblished histories - official andquasi-official - will tell the same story.

As far as this current Inquiry is concerned, proof of thepUdding will be in the eating. This writer believes indigestionwill be the probable result.

However, herewith a few more comments on Hans Koblitz "beginningto the end" story as viewed from his favourite 3.7 centimetregun:

"The target was 900 yards away."

Official and other record places the alleged action, distance asbeginning at 6 miles,S mil~s 4 ~iles right d?wn to KOb~itz's 900yards. The Raider'~ Capta~n, ,h~mself,gave d~stan~es d~~ferently

as 1 1/2 miles, 1 m~le, 1/2 m~le to 1200 yards. H~s off~cers

gave different estimates again. (None of them claimed the range­finding equipment was bought at a Woolworth's sale).

Some KORMO~~ gunners - and others - swore the whole allegedaction took place on only their Starboard side.

Kcblitz and others had tl'16 blazing s;'nkinc; SYD!ffiY dar~ing aroi..4n.GKORMORAN on Port and Starboard, like a dragonfly, attempting toram the raider.

German Captain Detmers 'secretly' records KORMOR~ as lying deadin the water, all four engines destroyed, First and SecondEngineers also dead, engine room an abandoned infe~no, the Portlifeboats (including at least one motor-cutter] belng loweredinto the sea; all that within 2 or 3 minutes of beginning ofalleged battle, Claimed by Detmers to have lasted 1 hour. Moreis to come from Hans Koblitz:

" ...As darkness began to fall (SYDNEY) burning from ?OWto stern, •.. covered in very heavy clouds of smoke st~ll

fired some machine guns at KORMORAN."

In the Official story,as darkness began tO,fall SYDNEY was 4 toSmiles awav. In conditions Koblitz descr~bes, no one could seemachine gun"fire. There would be no one alive to fire them and

430fij

PINQ.SUBS.013.0045

what would be the point at that range anyhow.

The Koblitz account of KORMORAN's "60" post-action deaths isfUlly discussed in this writer's Basic Submission to the currentInquiry. Enemy accounts of those deaths most certainly areuntrue and indicate deep criminality of some sort, protected bythe official story. It is officially 'accepted' that thosedeaths numbered 75 wounded, impossibly drowned from one inflatedrubber raft.

As for sharks eating them at that time, there were nonerecorded,or even mentioned,by the Germans until some sharks wereclaimed to have swum around that one boat some days later.[Poniewierski/Winter implies in her book that SYDNEY's survivorswere eaten by sharks, based on her belief that Shark Bay didn'tget it's name for nothing. (p.230)

The lifeboat carrying Koblitz was twice sighted by RAAF searchplanes, during the first 3 days of search, containing 40-odd men.When HMAS YANDRA reached that boat on the third day of searchthe number had grown mysteriously to 72 men in the final 2hours, fuelling belief that motorised craft had been quicklymoving about, and were finally scuttled by the Germans and thecrews dispersed among other boats.

Says Koblitz at cessation of the alleged battle:

"I found a place with 72 other comrades in a badlydamaged lifeboat ••. As daylight came, we in our lifeboatwere alone, no other boats to be seen ... "

The officially 'accepted' story records that at dawn Koblitz'sboat was in company with at least one other,which passed them asail, food and other assistance.

Also, as in the Royal and other disciplined navies, it wasagainst all German Navy practice for officers and men in s~rQldr

situation to abandon each other to their separate fates. Infact, Koblitz's boat, Lieut.von Gosseln in charge, [at leastwhen intercepted by HMAS YANDRA] remained not too far distantfrom the other boats drifting very slowly in the northwardcurrent until the morning of the 6th day, at least 160 nauticalmiles from the coast, at which time they immediatelyheaded, under sail for land, upon their discovery by searchingRAAF Hudson aircraft.

Koblitz has failed to inform that at least one of the boatslowered from KORMORAN was a steel-hulled cutter with a powerfulmotor, capable of towing boats to shore or even supplying themwith provisions as they drifted [doing what ?]; Lieut Meyer'sboat was known to be well stocked with food.

The motorised cutter, commanded by Chief Petty Officer Kohn, wasthe boat which landed near 17 Mile Well on Quobba station, foundby RAAF aircraft not far from Lieut. Meyer's steel boat which

landed at Red Bluff, also on Quobba Station property.

This writer believes that the motor of Petty Officer Kohn'sboat- which Australian naval authorities refused civilian accessto, was taken out by the Germans and dropped in deep water offthe beach.

This boat very soon disappeared from the beach,with no knownrecord of its fate; some saying it was carried by tide into deepwater,where it sank.

~ans Ko?litz's comments about KORMORAN heading for Carnarvon todrop mlnes" were surely made tongue in cheek. He knew the

raider was impatiently waiting for the 45,000 ton Britishtroopship, HMT AQUITANIA, then on her way south to pick upAustralian 8th Division reinforcements for Singapore, butneither he nor KORMORAN's Captain knew in 1941 that AQUITANIAhad been deliberately delayed in Singapore until 19th November.SYDNEY's anticipated successful interception of the raideroccurred on that date. [See this writer's Basic Submission toHMAS SYDNEY Inquiry, Vol. 9].

KOblitz, by 1972,was well primed to rebut that Japanesesubmarine/s "theory".

" .. I was questioned. in December 1941 by a commission ofAustralian Navy of officers .. [the speaker of Which] toldme. 'We cannot believe that KORMORAN sank SYDNEY alone ..there must have been other warships, perhaps a Japanesesubmarine around.

There is nothing in Koblitz's interrogation report remotelyresembling such an unlikely conversation between Australiannaval officers and a Nazi lance-corporal.

" •. I told them. I could not understand why SYDNEY (gotinto] such a dangerous position .• [They] then told me. anew officer (was] in command of SYDNEY. The former[commander] would not have made such a mistake."

,Nowhere in the record is there such a frank discussion with the3.7 cm Port gunner who had not fired a shot and had seen nothinguntil the alleged action had finished.

Concerning Japanese submarine/s involvement, that is a studywarranting far greater depth than this brief critique of adefenceless story by a lately recruited Nazi ex-gunner.

If there had been Japanese submarine/s, (and HMT AQUITANIA'soperation was at that time an enemy-perceived threat to theintended Japanese capture of Singapore) one of the last thingsJapan,or Germany,should have wanted would be the Captain andofficers of a German raider aboard Japanese submarine/so

[For Japanese involvement, see this writer'S Basic Submission to

53064

6 3065

PINQ.SUBS.013.0046

HMAS SYDNEY Inquiry, vol. 9].

And,of course,quite a few KORMORAN 'rank and file' would havefelt quite vUlnerable and 'let down' by any precipitous flightof their officers.

And again, there is still the 1951 Gerhardt/Grossmann/ASIOinterview description of a Japanese submarine sinking SYDNEY andmurdering her survivors; ASIO not denying the interview tookplace.

As for Hans Koblitz, someone has recruited the services of aNazi ex-gunner; trouble is it was the wrong gun !

G. P. CAPT. C.A.V. BOUl~.NEivffiE AE (ret'd)86 Wattle StreetTUART HILL WA 6060Telephone: 0893442248

24 March 1998

Mr 1. H. StraczekSenior Naval Historian and Archives OfficerNaval Historical SectionR-G-20 Russell HillDepartment of DefenceCANBERRA ACT 2600

Facsimile: 0262654723

Dear Mr Straczek

Thank you for your letter of 8 March 1998 replying to mine of 24 February1998. I am afraid that I must disagree with some aspects of it and set therecord straight on the Air Searches for H:MAS Sydney and survivors as carriedout bv the RAAF on Sundav 23 November 1941 and Mondav 24 November1941." As an RAAF pilot flying Hudsons in No 14 Squadron b~sed at Pearce, Itook part in Air Searches from Rottnest Island, Geraldton and Carnarvon.

You quote the source document you used for your sentence, "An inititJ,1 airsearch was commenced PM 23 November" ~s Attachment F, specifically, page1914 of Submissions Volume 8. This is the first page of the WA District NavalOfficer's report dated 11 December 1941. It only srates, "On Monday 24th

November 1941, air search to a depth of 300 miles between West and NorthWest Rottnest Island was carried out". Nowhere on that page does it say that..the decision to conduct an air search was made PM 23 November with theactual air search being initiated the following day".

However, of far greater importance significance are the actual words you use inthe first para, page 1844, Volume 8, Submissions \vhich I shall repeat here entoto. I shall underline key words and insert my comments within squarebrackets.

"An initial air search was commenced PM 23 November. Thissearch was [not these searches] based on Rottnest Island offFremantle. The following day another air search [a diverging search

7 308b 308'(

PINQ.SUBS.013.0047

Mr J. H. Strazcek 2 24 March 1998Mr J. H. Strazcek 3 24 March 1998

P1/24 using six Hudson aircraft] was carried out, again based onRottnest Island between bearings 270 and 240 to a depth of 300miles (whether statute or nautical miles is not known). [It iscommon knowledge that ships and aircraft navigate in nauticalmiles. Statute miles were only used for land travel in 1941]. Bothof these searches failed to locate the vessel. [Le. these earlysearches were for HN1AS Sydney only]. On completion of thesesearches [P 1/24 covers one search pattern of six tracks] the aircraftmoved to Geraldton."

This paragraph as you wrote it confirms that the Defence Department acceptsthat the first air search for HMAS Sydney was conducted on Sunday 23November 1941.

This fact is also confirmed in Third Officer Westhoven's 1945 Report, whichstates "and on November 23 an air search was carried out from Rottnest". ThisReport was referred to as being originally on Australian Archives File 1/1 5/2but it was subsequently removed to a Naval Intelligence File. Acting in yourrole of Senior Naval Historical and Archives Officer you downgraded this fileand its Westhoven Report from SECRET to UNCLASSIFIED on the 6 June1992 so you would have been aware of the above statement by Westhoven.

You are also probably aware that on page 17 of Guide No 3 "The Sinking ofHN1AS Sydney" A Guide to Commonwealth Government Records by RichardSommerrel1 Assistant Director, National Office, Australia Archives, hedeliberately altered Westhoven's statement by inserting in square brackets afterNovember 23 [in fact November 24] thus falsifying a Commonwealthdocument entrusted to the National Archives for safe keeping and historicalrecord.

An entry on page 20 of Guide N~shows that "As a result of the Decision b'y theDirector of Naval Intelligence, Third Officer Westhoven's account was placedon a Naval Intelligence Division file where it remained unpublished."

In fact as you may be aware I took part in that air search on Sunday 23November 1941 in Hudson A16-30 and am the only surviving member of thatcrew of Fit Lt R. Fletcher Capt, self 2nd pilot, Sgts 1. WiIliam, 1. TownsendWirless Air Gunners. I have made a Statutory Declaration on this matter whichhas been submitted in several ways to the Defence Sub-Committee Inquiry andam fully prepared to give evidence on oath before an open hearing of this Sub­Committee.

Reverting back to your letter of the 9 March 1998 wherein you state that yourstatement on page 1844, "that the initial air search commenced PM Novemberis incorrect" and you go on to say, "the decision to conduct an air search wasmade on PM 23 November ... " and this is quite correct.

3066

After landing in A16-30 at 1.30 pm on Sunday 23 November Fit Lt R. Fletchergave a negative sighting report to Operations Room RAAF Pearce whichrelayed it by secure means (probably by secraphone or courier) to DNOWA. Itwould also have been passed to SWACH. There is no official RAAF or RANrecord of this flight which is why your official Defence Departmentconfirmation is so important to the Inquiry.

Following this flight, the DNOWA is consort with the AOC HQWA decidedPM hrs 23 November 1941 that an air search was to be instituted the next day.

The first page of Appendix D to the RAAF Pearce Report on HMAS Sydneydated 4 December 1941, Pearce File 41/44/Air Australian Archives fileAA 1969/1 00/5 Item 105/30 Air shows on 23 November 1941:

"1630 Pearce received a message from ACH, Sydney 4 daysoverdue search to be initiated (14 Squadron notified).

This was confirmed by the next entry which reads:

"1735 Search orded by ACH to locate HMAS Sydney"".

Quite obviously, the details of this diverging search P1/24 using the PWSS onRottnest Island as Datum were piarmed by SWACH in conjunction with PearceOperations Room. Full details are shown in No 14 Squadron's OperationsRecord Book covering the period 1111/41 to 30/1 1/41.

In fact, there were two unrecorded RA.AI' Air Searches carried out on Sunday23 November 1943:

(i) /\16-30 Search Southward from Ronnest for HtviAS SY~!ley:

(2) Fairy Battle L5570 search for 2 German lifeboats are 24° 06'S11040'E.

In their subsequent interrogations, crews from Detmers and Gosseln's lifeboatsstated that they saw the large 4 funnelled Aquitania in the morning and werecircled by an aircraft in the afternoon of the same day. The only time and daythey could have seen the Aquitania was within 2 hours before or after 0600Hhrs Sundav 23 November 1941 at the above position. In later statements, it wassaid that it was a strange yellow and black aircraft. Lt Bunje said it was abomber. In Detmers' book, "The Raider Kormoran"and Barbara Winter'sbook, "HwlAS Sydney, Fact. Fantasy and Fraud" there is some deliberateconfusion.

On page 13 of the Information Booklet on the Inq~iry into the Circumst.an~es

of the Sinking of illvlAS Sydney are the followmg words, "a SubmiSSioncannot be withdra\vn or altered without the knowledge and approval of the

3068

PINQ.SUBS.013.0048

Mr J. H. Strazcek 4 24 March 1998

Subject: from dave kennedyDate: Tue, 21 Apr 199818:48:22 +1000

From: "Miller, Michael John" <millenn@matp.newsltd.com au>To: "~scfadt@aph.gov.au'"<jscfadt@aph.gov.au> .

Committee". Your letter attempts to alter the meaning of the DefencDeaprtment's Submission and I shall draw it to the attention of the Committee.

e

Your first sentence page 1844 Volume 8 should read, "An initial air search wascommence9 AM 23 November and completed PM 23 Novmeber".

It is for the Inquiry to decide whether you can change the meaning of your firstsentence and paragraph on page 1844 Volume 8. "

21/4/98

~ Jo~wner,~YCretary, Defence Sub-committee

Dear Ms Towner,

2 Urara RdAvalon 2107

Tel: 0299189593

SUBMISSION No 66E

Yours sincerely

C.A.V. Boume

3070

As discussed, I think it is suitable for illustrations forwarded with my original submission,and marked inadvertently as exhibits, to be included in the submission volumes. These areHeinz Hernnann's records with Transmarin; a head-shot photograph of him from Transmarin;his official service record based substantially on infonnation provided by his family; aphotograph of Hernnann in the Tokyo embassy wireless unit; a plan of the Kormoranshowing the underwater torpedo tubes in faint broken lines under the bridge area and a still ofKulmerland from a bad edit of footage taken during Kulmerland's mission with Komet andOrion in the Pacific in late 1940.

I thought I would take the opportunity to include introductory remarks to the proposed sub­committee hearing in Sydney which was postponed because of Senate commitments. Theyare as follows, with additional infonnation since my last submission:

My research into the Konnoran resulted from examination of all nine operational raiders, notfrom specific interest in HMAS Sydney. This wide spectrum afforded me a broad platfonn toview details. I believe we have been told, in documented and oral evidence since the war.what happened when Sydney and Kormoran came together.

The official version has Sydney encountering the bogus Straat Malakka that headed into thesun. Sydney would not have chased a strange ship for at least an hour without ordering her tostop. by waming shot if necessary; Captain Theodor Detmers initially being among thosewho said he was told to stop.

Konnoran wireless operator Hans Linke has said Sydney took a good look at Konnoran witha semi-circular sweep, including an approach from the west, then came in to take up a parallelcourse. Detmers said Sydney went to starboard to get a better view of purposely obscuredflags however Vice Admiral Harold Hickling. aboard the Glasgows of both wars, wrote inSailor At Sea that a captain wants to "overhaul his quarry" but "open A-arcs" to bring allguns to bear. If Sydney's Captain Joseph Bumett was chasing a suspicious merchantman,would he not have ordered the fleeing vessel to stop while veering off to examine it andbefore closing on the quarter?

Konnoran mines officer Heinz Messerschmidt recently told me that Sydney, when close,approached "very slowly" and Kormoran was making about "four or five knots" -- enough tomaintain way but getting slow enough to tire an underwater torpedo.

We were asked. officially, to believe that Sydney steamed parallel to, and nearly level, with asuspicious ship 1000 metres away at 14 knots. Then we were told that Sydney was hammered

3071

PINQ.SUBS.013.0049