liability in securities offerings

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Liability in Securities Offerings Underwriter and accountant due diligence Last updated 06 Feb 12

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Liability in Securities Offerings. Underwriter and accountant due diligence. Last updated 06 Feb 12. Securities Class Action. Investors. Plaintiffs Defendants Claims ’33 Act § 11 ’34 Act Rule 10b-5 Defenses. Montgomery Securities PaineWebber (lead underwriters). - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Liability in Securities Offerings

Liability in Securities Offerings

Underwriter and accountant due diligence

Last updated 06 Feb 12

Page 2: Liability in Securities Offerings

Securities Class Action

Software Toolworks(Issuer)

Deloitte & Touche(auditor)

DirectorsOfficers

Investors• Plaintiffs• Defendants • Claims

– ’33 Act § 11– ’34 Act Rule 10b-5

• Defenses

Montgomery SecuritiesPaineWebber

(lead underwriters)

Page 3: Liability in Securities Offerings

Section 11 Liability(’33 Act)

Prospectus• Issuer – strict• Ds / Os / UWs – due

diligence defense (reasonable investigation + reasonable belief true)

• Auditor (expert) – no liability

Financials• Issuer – strict• Ds / Os / UWs – not

believe false• Auditor (expert) – due

diligence defense (reasonable investigation + reasonable belief true)

Page 4: Liability in Securities Offerings

Rule 10b-5 (’34 Act)

Securities fraud• Material misrepresentation • Scienter (actual knowledge or reckless

disregard)• Reliance• Causation• Damages

Page 5: Liability in Securities Offerings

Securities Class Action• Underwriters (Montgomery

Securities and PaineWebber)– granted summary judgment on

Section11 and Rule 10b-5– what does this mean? – What do plaintiffs appeal?

• Accountant (Deloitte & Touche)– granted summary judgment on

Section 11 and 10b-5– What do plaintiffs appeal? – Why don’t plaintiffs appeal Section

11 judgment for defendants?Software Toolworks

(Issuer)

Deloitte & Touche(auditor)

DirectorsOfficers

Montgomery SecuritiesPaineWebber

(lead underwriters)

Investors

Page 6: Liability in Securities Offerings

Underwriter defense …

Page 7: Liability in Securities Offerings

Underwriter defense’33 Act § 11

•“after reas investigation, believed true” OR

(2) “no reason believe false”

’34 Act Rule 10b-5

No “actual knowledge” AND

No “recklessness (extreme departure ordinary care)”

Business – price reductions

• “Nintendo not subject to price reductions”• “customers do not have return rights”

Recognition of OEM revenue

• Korean manufacturer backdates contract• Law firm not give comfort letter on OEM contracts• Contracts were contingent

Contingent sales • Barron’s says slumping sales and bad accounting• SEC told that data not available• Late June sales were bogus

Page 8: Liability in Securities Offerings

Underwriter defense’33 Act § 11

•“after reas investigation, believed true” OR

(2) “no reason believe false”

’34 Act Rule 10b-5

No “actual knowledge” AND

No “recklessness (extreme departure ordinary care)”

Business – price reductions

• “Nintendo not subject to price reductions”• “customers do not have return rights”

Recognition of OEM revenue

• Korean manufacturer backdates contract• Law firm not give comfort letter on OEM contracts• Contracts were contingent

Contingent sales • Barron’s says slumping sales and bad accounting• SEC told that data not available• Late June sales were bogus

Page 9: Liability in Securities Offerings

Underwriter defense’33 Act § 11

•“after reas investigation, believed true” OR

(2) “no reason believe false”

’34 Act Rule 10b-5

No “actual knowledge” AND

No “recklessness (extreme departure ordinary care)”

Business – price reductions

• “Nintendo not subject to price reductions”• “customers do not have return rights”

Recognition of OEM revenue

• Korean manufacturer backdates contract• Law firm not give comfort letter on OEM contracts• Contracts were contingent

Contingent sales • Barron’s says slumping sales and bad accounting• SEC told that data not available• Late June sales were bogus

Page 10: Liability in Securities Offerings

Underwriter defense’33 Act § 11

•“after reas investigation, believed true” OR

(2) “no reason believe false”

’34 Act Rule 10b-5

No “actual knowledge” AND

No “recklessness (extreme departure ordinary care)”

Business – price reductions

• “Nintendo not subject to price reductions”• “customers do not have return rights”

Recognition of OEM revenue

• Korean manufacturer backdates contract• Law firm not give comfort letter on OEM contracts• Contracts were contingent

Contingent sales • Barron’s says slumping sales and bad accounting• SEC told that data not available• Late June sales were bogus

Page 11: Liability in Securities Offerings

Auditor defense …

Page 12: Liability in Securities Offerings

Auditor defense’33 Act § 11

(1)“after reas investigation, believed true”

Not appealed

’34 Act Rule 10b-5

(1) No “actual knowledge”(2) No “recklessness – no extreme

departure ordinary care”

Recognition of OEM revenue

• OEM agreements poorly documented• Management under “extraordinary pressure” • Deloitte only got oral assurances on some

contracts• No information on return policies

SEC letters • SEC told that June data not available• Sample OEM contract differed from actual

contracts

Page 13: Liability in Securities Offerings

Auditor defense’33 Act § 11

(1)“after reas investigation, believed true”

Not appealed

’34 Act Rule 10b-5

(1) No “actual knowledge”(2) No “recklessness – no extreme

departure ordinary care”

Recognition of OEM revenue

• OEM agreements poorly documented• Management under “extraordinary pressure” • Deloitte only got oral assurances on some

contracts• No information on return policies

SEC letters • SEC told that June data not available• Sample OEM contract differed from actual

contracts

Page 14: Liability in Securities Offerings

Auditor defense’33 Act § 11

(1)“after reas investigation, believed true”

Not appealed

’34 Act Rule 10b-5

(1) No “actual knowledge”(2) No “recklessness – no extreme

departure ordinary care”

Recognition of OEM revenue

• OEM agreements poorly documented• Management under “extraordinary pressure” • Deloitte only got oral assurances on some

contracts• No information on return policies

SEC letters • SEC told that June data not available• Sample OEM contract differed from actual

contracts

Page 15: Liability in Securities Offerings

The end(mercifully)