liberal pluralism, radical orthodoxy and the right tone of voice

Sophia, Vol. 45, No. 2, October 2006. Copyright �9 2006 Ashgate Publishing Limited.

LIBERAL PLURALISM, RADICAL ORTHODOXY AND THE RIGHT TONE OF VOICE

DAVID CHEETHAM Department o f Theology and Religion, University o f Birmingham

Elmfield House, Selly Oak Campus, Birmingham [email protected], uk

This paper considers two diffbrent tones of voice in philosophy and theology ('liberal pluralism'in contrast to 'radical orthodoxy') and relates it to a discussion about the theology of religions. 'Tone of voice' in this context is intended to denote the affective potency (or not) o f a theological perspective as it impacts and influences religious attitudes. In addition, at a related level "tone of voice' is used when speaking o f first-order or second-order perspectives: for example, a first-order confessional tone in contrast to a second-order notional tone. The paper proceeds to critically engage with John Hick's pluralism and John Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy particularly from the point o f view o f considering the tone adopted by both perspectives. The conclusion is that both views are inadequate: Hick's pluralism - as a second-order meta-theory - lacks the first-order power that is heeded to affect "hearts and minds ', Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy has rhetorical power but is an "unfounded' narrative which lacks the ability to rationally engage with the real world. In the end, the suggestion is that the 'right tone o f voice ', in a religious context, ought to combine a realistic enquiry concerning the order-of-things with a first-order rhetorical strength.

Introduction

This paper considers two different tones o f voice in theology and relates it to a discussion about the theology of religions. 'Tone of voice' in this context is intended to denote the affective potency (or not) of a theological perspective as it impacts and influences religious attitudes. In addition, at a related level, 'tone of voice' is used when speaking of first-order or second-order perspectives: for example, a first-order confessional tone in contrast to a second-order notional tone. The two forms of approach chosen for consideration are prominent types in theological thinking and, although they address different issues, each represent major directions that are, and will be, significant in the future. They are Radical Orthodoxy and liberal pluralism. For the purposes of this paper we shall be focusing mostly on their key representatives: chiefly, John Milbank and John Hick. We shall be

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critiquing both approaches, but will be more concerned with interrogating the kind of liberal pluralism represented by Hick whilst contrasting it with the assertive tone adopted by Milbank's radical orthodoxy. Moreover, we shall ask if this more assertive tone is the sort of voice that liberal pluralists like Hick need to adopt if they are to influence the changes in religious attitudes towards 'the other' that their pluralistic ontology calls for. However, in suggesting this, the tensions within liberal pluralism will be highlighted. Ostensibly, radical orthodoxy and liberal pluralism share a latent similarity of purpose in that both speak about 'peace' and 'harmony' (Milbank as an ontology itself, Hick as one of the goals of pluralism) 1 and seek to offer prescriptions that have sucfi ends in view. With radical orthodoxy it is a clarion call to Christians to recognise their authentic ontology of love (and for sociologists, generally, to recognise theology); for liberal pluralism it is that people in all faiths should realise that mutual reeognition is the key to peace: both epistemological and ethical.

Liberal Pluralism: A 'Second-order' Tone of Voice

In his preface to the edited volume, The Myth of Christian Uniqueness - Towards a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, Paul Knitter writes that 'because of this new experience of pluralism, Christians are feeling the need for a more productive dialogue and co-operation with other religions, a new attitude toward them. 'z This new attitude is not just a sentimental recommendation by pluralists but clearly involves the call for profound theological change. For example, Gordon Kaufman, who contributes to the same volume, says that: 'If Christians are to take other faiths, other life orientations, with full seriousness, it is necessary for them to re-examine certain theological claims they often make.' 3 Moreover, John Hick famously calls for a 'Copernican revolution' in theology that removes Christianity from the centre and places it alongside other faiths in revolving around 'the Real'. 4 Showing particular aversion towards the assertion of a single- tradition exclusiveness, Rosemary Radford Ruether complains that the idea that Christianity is uniquely superior is 'an outrageous and absurd religious chauvinism. '5 Instead, a pluralistic view is one that does not privilege a single religion and wishes to uphold the equal validity of the world's major religious traditions. In this way, with a change in theological orientation, it is argued that Christians can be released into more generous and positive relationships with other faiths. It is through the re-evaluation of theological claims (Kaufman) in light of religious pluralism that we cultivate a 'new attitude' (Knitter) towards other faiths. We must, to quote the slogan of

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The Myth, cross the 'theological Rubicon' (the uniqueness of Christianity) and embrace a new pluralistic reality. This involves changes in the way we see doctrines and creeds that in turn effect changes in relationships and attitudes towards 'the other': changes in hearts and minds. It is assumed that such theological changes characterise the necessary manoeuvres to bring more harmonious perceptions (mystical, philosophical and theological) and more constructive inter-relationships and politics. We might say that here the adopted tone of voice of pluralism is exploratory, reconciliatory and comparative. It is about making room for greater tolerance and mutual enrichment between religions, or about expunging claims to have 'the only' right answer. It is in this sense that I suggest that it prefers a second-order tone of voice - one that eschews first-order confessions of ' t ruth ' . Moreover, because of this aversion towards exclusivist assertiveness the liberal pluralist stance is not 'designed' to take the form of a strong apologetic on its own behalf.

Some of the more prominent criticisms of the pluralistic perspective in the last decade have centred on questioning the actual epistemological and ontological status of the pluralist perspective itself That is, rather than occupying a neutral ground 'between' faiths, pluralism can, in the words of Gavin D'Costa, only be 'a form of exclusivism and that nothing called pluralism really exists. '6 That is, it exhibits a liberal modernistic 'tradition' in its own right that effectively excludes other discourses. This criticism was directed towards, and has provoked an interesting response from, pluralism's chief and most well known architect, John Hick. Hick refuses to concede that religious pluralism is a 'tradition' in its own right. Instead, he argues that pluralism makes claims which do not assume a confessional religious status themselves - which would place pluralism alongside other religious perspectives which are competing for wholehearted acceptance; rather, pluralism is a hypothesis which seeks to make sense of conflicting religious commitments. He constructs a Kantian-influenced religious epistemology and seeks to create a second-order explanatory pluralistic hypothesis. That is, he adapts Kant's division of phenomena from noumena and suggests that religions are different, culturally-specific, human responses to the same 'Real' - the ontological postulate of his hypothesis

- that is their noumenal ground. The Real is a trans-categorial concept that is beyond description and is not apprehended directly, but through one of the many 'faces' that represent the various historical religions. This important notion of the pluralistic perspective as a second-order proposal is a feature that is often overlooked. So, Hick's hypothesis does not actually propose to merge religions together. Hick would reject well-intentioned pluralistic slogans that 'we are all the same really'. Moreover, he would

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not understand 'the Real' as an actual object of worship and veneration or the focus of a new pluralistic religion. Instead, as we said, his pluralistic hypothesis might be understood as an explanation of religious pluralism. The fact that it is an explanatory theory is so that it can stand removed, though not in a superior sense, and allow people to be different. 7 Thus, in response to D'Costa, Hick writes: 'Pluralism is thus not another historical religion making an exclusive religious claim but a meta-theory about the relations between historical religions. Its logical status as a second-order philosophical theory is different in kind from that of a first order religious creed or gospel. '8 This description of his pluralism is somewhat similar to a viewpoint expressed by Harriet Harris who, when speaking of the status of liberalism in Christianity, says: 'Liberalism is a mode of believing (rather than a set of beliefs) that keeps a critical eye on things. It is not a church tradition so much as a critical approach. . . ' .9 Or else, there is a distinction between one's full-blown tradition and what might be called one's outlook. In this sense, Hick's second-order pluralistic hypothesis is meant to be worn lightly; or else, a coat that is carried around to supplement one's personal first-order garb. 1~ Nevertheless, his sophisticated philosophical expression of religious pluralism as a 'second-order' discourse is, I will argue, a clue to pluralism's inner tension if it aspires to be a practical theological viewpoint, l i This tension essentially emerges out of the need for pluralism to change its tone of voice and, contra Hick's defence, to actually become a confessional discourse in its own right. That is, the necessity to advocate a viewpoint in order to cause more than a notional assent to its explanatory perspective - the need to make an impact at the religious level. If, as Knitter has said, we need a 'new attitude', then what fruitful purpose is served by a merely notional second-order theory?

Pluralists are sending out a confused message. On the one hand, pluralism can be portrayed as a second-order philosophical explanation or empirical observation which sits behind-the-scenes (Hick); on the other, it heralds a bold crossing of the Rubicon which calls for doctrines to be altered and for the profound re-examination of theological claims (Kaufman, Knitter). What is pluralism meant to sound like? Is it a cautious ghost-like tone of voice or a passionate call for change?

Radical Orthodoxy: An Assertive Tone of Voice

Widening the picture beyond D'Costa's critique, the claim that religious pluralism needs to become a confessional discourse could be seen as the logical outworking of a response to the case against it (or, specifically,


against the secular-ridden discourse of theological liberalism) that has arisen out of the Radical Orthodoxy of John Milbank, perhaps the chief exponent of this school of theological thinking. 12 Radical Orthodoxy represents a distinctive and powerful voice amongst the many that are critical of theological liberalism. The project, as championed by Milbank, seeks to rescue theology from the secular; it maintains that secularism has been the dominating (but alien) paradigm within which all theology is undertaken. Milbank argues that, because of its lack of transcendent reference or origin (found in theology), the secularist 'ontology' is characterised by chaos and nihilism, or what Milbank calls ontological violence: a clash of competitive and opposing wills without telos. Discourses, including theological ones, which align themselves to secularism can only expect to suffer the same nihilistic fate. This means that various liberal and post-modern theologies cannot be ultimately satisfactory as they are the offspring of a basic ontological violence and disharmony. Using an Augustinian model, Milbank contrasts this secular 'city' (civitas terrena) with the alternative - the City of God (civitas dei) - which, because it is 'grounded' not in nihilistic chaos but in God, is ultimately characterised by an ontology of peace and harmony. Thus, the Radical Orthodoxy project is one that seeks to return theology to its central place as 'Queen of the Sciences' and to banish the nihilistic secularism which has long called the shots. Consequently, there emerges a new, confident and assertive theology which itself becomes the framework in which other discourses are considered rather than being the thrall to a foreign, secular framework. It is important to highlight the fact that Milbank does not construct the authority of his approach from a 'rational' process - this might be to fall back into an acceptance of the secular metanarrative - rather it is a matter of engaging in powerful rhetoric. Here, above all, the tone of voice is important. That is, Radical Orthodoxy seeks to present the Christian narrative as a fully attractive antidote to nihilism and thus 'out-narrate' other competing narratives, particularly the secular. Further, given Milbank's acknowledgement of the post-modern critique of universal reason, 'one cannot resuscitate liberal humanism, but one can try to put forward an alternative mythos, equally unfounded, but nonetheless embodying an "ontology of peace", which conceives differences as analogically related, rather than equivocally at variance. 'x3 Here, difference should be read in accordance with the Christian 'coding' rather than the secular. This coding is centred on 'the triune God, who is transcendental peace through differential relation. '14 Thus, Christianity 'exposes the non-necessity of supposing [ . . . ] that difference, non-totalisation and indeterminancy of meaning necessarily

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imply arbitrariness and violence. '15 This is an interesting contribution from the point of view of the encounter between faiths. According to Milbank's interpretation of the Christian ontology, 'differences' are not so much disquieting equivocations that give rise to nihilistic anxieties which are in need of resolution by a some kind of imposed ontology of Sameness. Instead they ought to be viewed from within a different vocabulary: a language of Christian peace which is ontologically rooted in the Trinity - God in relation, or perhaps, God in difference. Notice also that Milbank says that his distinctive theological project is 'equally unfounded'. Here he is eschewing the idea that there is a basis for Radical Orthodoxy in foufidational reason or rational dialectic, instead it claims to be a narrative (the Christian logos) that in a post-modern world of 'truths' and multiple legitimate discourses is no less entitled to its voice. Or rather, we might say that Radical Orthodoxy is not a theology that has been assembled 'scientifically', rather it 'mingles exegesis, cultural reflection, and philosophy in a complex but coherently argued collage. '16 So, concluding his seminal article, 'The End of Dialogue', Milbank comments that Christians should 'simply pursue further the ecclesial project of securing harmony through difference' and converse with other faiths not according to assumptions of Socratic neutrality but with a peaceable 'mutual suspicion' which, he admits, probably entails 'continuing the work of conversion'. 17 For Milbank, therefore, Christian theology should engage in vigorous contestation with the secular, and other, narratives; the out-narration of alternatives in order to move towards the Christian civitas dei of peace and harmony. As we have seen, there needs to be a change of 'coding': from the secular to the Christian. But Milbank does not seek to present a confrontational picture, if the Christian perspective is persuasive, 'then this should be a persuasion intrinsic to the Christian logos itself.' ~8 The resultant Christian sociality that is advocated 'is but the continuation of ecclesial practice, the imagination in action of a peaceful, reconciled social order...,.19 In all this, we might also say that Milbank is speaking with a 'confessional' tone of voice. That is, he is concerned to advance the distinctive and unique language of (his reading of) the Christian tradition rather than attempt to inhabit a neutral philosophical scheme. Moreover, his style is not to act as an arbiter to both sides of a debate, instead it is more a case of one side being 'defeated' by the other (but not in the 'violent' secular sense). It is this assertive tone o f voice, not just as a style of writing but as a theological approach, that has been one of the targets of the critics of Radical Orthodoxy. We shall return to this momentarily.


L i b e r a l P l u r a l i s m : C a n it C h a n g e i ts T o n e o f V o i c e ?

In light of his anti-modernistic stance, it is unsurprising that Milbank associates the pluralism of Hick and others with modern liberal Western values and that - when it comes to a proper understanding of other faiths - he encourages us to aim towards uncovering authentic 'practices relatively uncontaminated by Western influences. '2~ Thus, adopting Milbank's rhetoric, we could say that pluralism commits a form of 'violence' against the very diversity it seeks to champion for 'the recognition of other cultures and religions [by pluralism].. , is i tse l f . . , none other than the moment of total obliteration of other cultures by western norms and categories...,.21 In similar vein D'Costa, as we mentioned earlier, sides with Alasdair MacIntyre by situating western religious pluralistic theories within the modernistic Encyclopaedic tradition of western liberalism. Pluralism's aspiration to be a theory which stands in a neutral space and plays host to the world's religious traditions is really a product of a modernistic craving for a dominating universal account that eschews particulars. Thus, D'Costa provocatively speaks of the 'liberal intolerance' of Hick's pluralism. 22 Moreover, the claim to neutrality that characterises pluralistic theories of religion, is untenable due to the inevitable locality of all claims (and therefore their inherent exclusivity). Pluralism "is a 'master discourse '23 that seeks to subsume other discourses within its own liberal, globalising, generosity of spirit. Thus, D'Costa and others are claiming that, despite appearances, pluralism takes an exclusivistic form.

D'Costa's charge that religious pluralism is actually 'tradition-specific' - a brand of liberal modernism - is targeted at the alleged pretense that pluralism stands in some neutral territory. This neutrality, of course, suits the pluralist location and so D'Costa seeks to interrogate this by claiming that the ideal or hope for a neutral vantage point is deluded and impossible. Given the located-ness of all traditions, including pluralism, the whole idea of pluralism might as well be abandoned and one seek to develop coherent strategies towards other religions from within one's home tradition (like Roman Catholicism in D'Costa's case). Nevertheless, although D'Costa appears to score logically against the assumption of neutrality in pluralism, it does not necessarily follow that the proposal that is represented by Hick's liberal pluralism need be rendered wholly meaningless. If D'Costa shows up the epistemological status of the pluralistic hypothesis for what it is, he does not necessarily defeat its account of the global religious landscape. To say that its account fails to be properly 'pluralist' in a formal sense, is not to say that it is implausible. However, the point is that pluralists fail to properly acknowledge the actual logical status of their position. Moreover,

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in order to be effective in the arena of the religious imagination, I would suggest that pluralism has to discard its 'neutrality' - a paradoxical move.

It is possible that Hick's defence of pluralism as a second-order discourse is actually a retreat in an unproductive direction. Moreover, his argument for the second-order status of his hypothesis makes it more Kantian than was initially his intention. 24 He has always maintained that his religious epistemology only resembles Kant's distinction rather than being identical to it. Thus, whereas Hick postulates a noumenal Real behind its phenomenal representations, it is possible that Kant's noumenal realm is not real but ideal. Or, as Paul Janz points out, Kantian noumena function as regulative concepts wttich 'reason itself posits in order to ensure "the proper use of reason"'. 25 So, when Hick reconfigures his hypothesis as a meta-theory there is a sense (if we make Hick more authentically Kantian) that the underlying ontology of his pluralism (the Real) is not a thing-in- itself, but a regulative conceptual ordering of religious diversity with no independent reality of its own. 26 Thus, Hick can maintain, contra D'Costa, that pluralism is not aptly described as 'tradition-specific' if this evokes some kind of confessional, historical, community-driven discourse centred around the worship of 'the Real'. However, even if we grant Hick's point, I would argue that the effect of this is potentially catastrophic. The result of his manoeuvres is that pluralism is drained of ire and ends up becoming a purely conceptual proposal which is less religious, less theological, a passion-less exercise with no concrete expression and devoid of the intensity that commonly characterises actual religious commitment. The wrong tone of voice?

This, then, helps us to isolate the pluralist's dilemma because the logical consequence of Hick's second-order pluralism is that it can change nothing at the confessional level of the different religions. But in order to 'collide' meaningfully with the exclusivity of religious truth-claims; that is, in order to change people's attitudes towards religious commitments that are different from their own, pluralism must have some tangibility. That is, in order for a religious pluralist to change, what we might call, heart attitudes towards 'the other', it is necessary to provoke more than a purely notional or cognitive assent to the proposed pluralistic reality. It is necessary for pluralists to fully recognise that the nature of religious persuasion which is needed to affect the kind of changed attitudes that they seek is something far more 'whole' than merely an intellectual recognition of the philosophical coherence of an idea. Something of its explanatory power has to be felt in terms of its emotional and experiential impact. The imagination has to be captured in terms of its spiritual promise and vision. 27 Thus, it seems necessary to maintain that liberal pluralism must become a confessional,


first-order, discourse if it is succeed as any kind of practical suggestion regarding the relations between diverse religious communities.

In light of this, perhaps the correct response of the pluralist is not to entrench further into more qualified (and abstract) versions of pluralism designed to bolster up the notion of a neutral, sterile space. Instead, pluralism might accept the charges of 'tradition-specific-ness', turn the tables on the post-liberal critics from the Radical Orthodoxy genre, and maintain that pluralism is the better narrative: thus out-narrating other (more exclusivist) options. In this sense, pluralists like Hick should not characterise their pluralism so much as religious neutrality but as religious maturity. That is, they might claim to have arrived at a more mature stance which is conducive to the peaceful encounter with other faiths: a better option than the exclusive rhetoric of the radical orthodox stance: the 'contesting of cultures'. Such a pluralist narrative could be presented as an ontological outlook that harmonises the 'differences' within the various religious perspectives and thus points towards an eschatologically convergent vision of peace and harmony. In this regard, if Milbank's claims for the Christian narrative - an ontology of love - are composed on the basis of 'unfounded' rhetoric then the choice for the radical orthodox vision, as opposed to the liberal pluralist, is effectively his word against theirs. Moreover, the liberal theologian Mark Chapman, in an article where he seeks to rehabilitate the Enlightenment project, 28 argues that there is a certain religious immaturity in the rhetorical 'clash of absolutes'. For him, theological thinking that flows from the Enlightenment is not so much a theology that is thrall to a foreign discourse, but a mature grown-up one that has broken free of the old dogmas and is led by a sense of personal responsibility. Chapman further maintains that if we leave aside the usual slogans of the post-modernist critique of the Enlightenment - universalising tendencies, the idea of universal reason, the 'myths' of pure objectivity and so on - then there is also the commendable tendency to understand the boundaries of human understanding, to move away from unthinking dogmatism and towards less parochial thinking.

Radical Orthodoxy: First-Order Role Play?

It is far from clear that liberal pluralism should be quite as bashful in the face of this 'radically orthodox' challenge as some might argue. From the point of view of a negative assessment, this is because it is possible that the polemic of the Radical Orthodoxy movement is rather too shrill and, in fact, commits many of the errors that it claims are in modernism. 29

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Thus, the idealised historiographies 3~ of the erudite advocates of Radical Orthodoxy seem to contain just the kind of ahistorical or a priori assertions that Enlightenment or modernist thinkers are criticised for. The association of pluralism with the secularist liberal project has meant that, through the eyes of Radical Orthodoxy, pluralism is seen as an alien discourse (covert liberal secularism) that disrupts the Christian story. But why is the secular and its relationship to Christianity to be interpreted this way.'? Simon Taylor takes issue with this because he draws attention to the possibility of another understanding of 'secular' in light of the original meaning of saeculum. Taylor points out that: 'At its root saeculum, meaning the Oresent order, is contrasted with aeternum, the everlasting order. '31 Thus he concludes: 'Theology is secular because it is a discipline conducted within time, rather than one conducted within eternity. '32 That is, rather than seeing the secular as a violent ontology which pushes theology aside it is, instead, something which can speak of the modest character of theology as a project which has a finite and temporal limitation this side of eternity. In this light, Radical Orthodoxy looks rather like hubris: exalting theology to a transcendent status, a narrative of ontological peace and harmony that 'interrupts' the material world. Moreover, the problem is that authors like Milbank, intentionally or not, have a tendency to imply that Christianity is a singular self- contained tradition that is polluted by external, 'pagan', and foreign narratives (in this case 'secularity', or 'liberal modernism'). This becomes clear from the telling quote earlier when Milbank calls for religions to be studied in their 'relatively uncontaminated' state. That is, secular culture and theology are presented as separate worlds. However, in the words of one critic: 'is it accurate to depict the Enlightenment as an alien invasion of theology? '33 Oliver Davies further questions the implication latently present in Radical Orthodoxy that there is a single tradition that is in need of purification from its Enlightenment or pagan infiltrators. Surely the Christian narrative is, he asks, 'a complex interplay of narratives: Catholic and Protestant, Greek and Latin, Medieval and Modern, conservative and liberal? '34

Has the Radical Orthodoxy approach merely exchanged one problem for its antithesis? That is, has it rebuked the notion of commensurability between traditions in favour of what Paulo Goncalves describes as 'another chimera of strongly differentiated identities'? 35 It may well be that the emphasis on difference rather than commonality represents a necessary corrective move, but the assertions of incommensurability between different traditions appear, for some critics, to be an odd position to maintain for an approach which claims to replace the ontological violence and nihilism


of the secular with a Christian ontology of peace and harmony. 36 Thus, Steven Shakespeare wryly comments that: 'The irony is that the picture of the world that is created [by Radical Orthodoxy] is one of incompatible, competing discourses, locked in a war to the death - precisely the kind of agonistic account of reality for which secularism is condemned. '37 Moreover, Radical Orthodoxy's response to discourses that lie outside the Christian narrative resemble, argues Graeme Smith, 'a colonising power sweeping aside the "paganism" of indigenous religion and culture. '38 Thus, as a riposte, it might be maintained that the alleged violence and imperialism of western liberal meta-narratives is more than matched by the rhetorical self-obsession of Radical Orthodoxy.

Nevertheless, Radical Orthodoxy does have a striking tone of voice. The kind of voice that resonates with the language of religious commitment, and which vigorously presents its Christian logos of love as something that provokes a decision for or against its own narrative. In this sense, it appears to have first-order substance. But does it? In a recent critique, Paul Janz charges Radical Orthodoxy with taking 'labyrinthian intellectual shortcuts '39. By this he means that Milbank and others create theology out of a flurry of poetic intellectual virtuosity. They exhibit a kind of gnostic sophistry and present idealised historiographies in the context of formidable and intimidating learning. Interestingly, Janz characterises the brilliance of Milbank's rhetorical theology as being something akin to Kierkegaard's aesthetic - an appealing narrative which seeks to bypass the ethical straight into the religious. By 'ethical', Janz is meaning various dutiful intellectual virtues such as 'clarity, logical consistency, argumentative integrity, modesty, economy, circumspect self-critique, avoidance of grandiloquence...,.40 According to Janz, Milbank's unfounded theology appears to flout such virtues and opts for what he calls 'a tactical game of free-floating hermeneutics '41 rather than pursuing a more rigorous, if painstaking, route which is grounded in a critical intellectual realism. In this sense, Radical Orthodoxy, despite its rhetorical profundity, does not take the world with it. It inhabits its own self-made discourse; a discourse which does not appear to communicate intelligibly with those 'outside', presuming that 'to learn one language well it is necessary to refuse to understand any other...'.42 It leapfrogs over the traditions of natural theology - which are not solely associated with a secular liberalism by any means; traditions that would help to engage in meaningful dialogue and exchange with other competing claims about the order-of-things. So, perhaps its confessional tone of voice is a mirage; or else, a case of impressive first-order role play?

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Pluralism: Tongue-tied?

Let us imagine for a moment that pluralists adopted the radical orthodox game of out-narration. Might they seek to present liberal pluralism as an attractive 'grown-up' alternative counter-narrative to a provocative and shrill dogmatism? On his own terms, Milbank cannot really object to this rhetorical strategy given that his Radical Orthodoxy is, as we have seen, a rhetorical exercise - an 'equally unfounded' mythos - which seeks to advance itself as the most attractive option. This being the case, Milbank cannot cry foul if pluralists seek to persuade others - not on specifically Christian ontological grounds of peace and harmony, but no less on the pluralist goals of peace and harmony - towards a more pluralistic outlook. It might be argued that pluralism as a logical stance presents conceptual paradoxes, but reinvented as one of Milbank's 'equally unfounded' narratives (perhaps genealogically connected to a liberal mythos) it may make pretty decent rhetoric, nonetheless. Admittedly, all this is according to the methodological or 'rhetorical' terms set by the radical orthodox agenda and it is not clear that the liberal pluralism of Hick, rooted as it is in a critical realist empiricism, could or should be moulded into such an approach. However, the crucial question is whether more passionate, assertive versions of pluralism can be assimilated to the raison d'etre of the pluralist vision without contradicting it?

Can the pluralist actually adopt a much more confessional tone? 43 As has already been suggested, it is probable that such a tone would be self- defeating. That is, it could be argued that in order for pluralism - as a structure for understanding the religious landscape - to be appropriately purposeful in initiating change in hearts and minds, it cannot operate at a level of the purely notional but should be presented as a full-blown 'religious' assertion in its own right. That is, the idea that pluralism should only content itself with being an ineffectual philosophical suggestion concerning plurality without a confessional power makes it impotent as a theory designed to change religious attitudes towards each other. This is demonstrated if we analogously contrast the merely notional effect of alleged 'proofs' for the existence of God with a wholehearted religious assent involving life-change, a new attitude etc. That is, the proof may be full-proof, so to speak, but it impacts at only the notional, cognitive level and therefore does not necessarily create an existential affirmation or real faith. Living faith occurs not just when second-order notional requirements are satisfied, but when people are captivated by a narrative, an experience and an account of the world that feels satisfying and emotionally complete in its significance. Pluralism cannot be just a notional proposal if it hopes


to inspire change in religious attitudes, as a perspective it has to feel satisfying, emotionally complete and significant - it has to be confessed. However, peculiarly, a pluralist like Hick chooses only to advance his theory at a second-order level - it is not a creed or a 'gospel'. He knows only too well that a confessional, first-order pluralism would be a kind of logical suicide. I f this is representative, it makes the pluralists' case rather half- hearted, or without force. They cannot proselytise, so to speak; they cannot recommend that one 'become a pluralist'. For this, then, takes the form of the type of advocacy that seems at variance to the overall spirit o f pluralism as a discourse which aspires to embrace all traditions and foster dialogue between them rather than replacing them with its own discourse. However, if it is religiously necessary for pluralism to be advocated as a tradition in its own right, then this surely compels the pluralists to adopt the kind of evangelistic tone that they see as problematic and undesirable in a multi- faith landscape. Maybe, as we have said, part of the attractiveness of such a narrative includes the fact that it leads to a greater communication between faiths and promotes the universal common ethic so necessary at this time, or perhaps it is the best interpretation of the multi-religious data, or represents a maturer outlook? But, even so, the problem is that one cannot positively argue that these things compel a pluralist viewpoint and at the same time retreat back into a second-order no-man's land. So/here is the rub: it is not just, as D'Costa claims, that pluralism faces a question of logical form, but that it is religiously necessary for it to contradict its desired status. The pluralist becomes rather tongue-tied. The tone adopted by Radical Orthodoxy - taking the role of powerful advocate or rhetorician - does not really suit the pluralist's temperament. That would be to cross the pluralist's Rubicon. It is more comfortably situated within a 'comparative' theological approach, an open dialogical model of inter-religious exchange or engagement, that is contrary to the spirit of a single-tradition assertiveness. 44 In the end, being anodyne has to be the pluralist's tone of voice.

The Right Tone of Voice?

Like Radical Orthodoxy, liberal pluralism might also be a kind of short cut, though for different reasons. In Hick's Kantian version of pluralism, the different truth-claims in the religions are rendered mythological, or else, they are softened so that the differences are less hard-edged or real. This being so, pluralism could be characterised as a philosophical tranquilliser which soothes or deadens the pain of religious diversity and truth-conflict. It provides a quick fix to inter-religious conflict because it does not appear to

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allow that there is any real or ultimate epistemological conflict on questions of truth. The pain of difference is soothed by the balm of ontological Sameness. But when such anaesthesia wears off, something else is required. Something that is less to do with either the aesthetic 'first-order' rhetoric of Radical Orthodoxy or the pluralist's muted calls for theological recasting and more to do with the basic development of good character. Less a case of finding a more effective loudspeaker or moving around the theological furniture and more about a simple affirmation of the necessary, but oft- avoided, hard work of loving the stranger - in their strangeness - in the real world. As we have suggested, speaking persuasively and engagingly is important in the religious sphere, but it is also important that the substance matches the rhetoric. In this sense, the liberal pluralism of Hick scores over Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy: as a critical approach it can claim to possess real substance because it proceeds from a critical empiricist methodology that attempts to compare its proposals with the world itself. But, strangely enough, given its liberal message it is not clear that it is allowed to bite. This is its problematic location. The Radical Orthodoxy of Milbank certainly bites but, because of the 'unfounded' nature of its rhetoric, such bite is 'realistically' weak. Perhaps, then, one conclusion is that the right tone of voice is one that not only sounds right, but is right? That is, a voice that truly speaks to the confessional religious imagination in first-order terms (contra Hick's pluralism) as well as seeking to realistically and reasonably correspond to the world (contra Milbank's Radical Orthodoxy); a voice which resonates with the whole of our experience. This doesn't involve anything more grandiose than highlighting the need for confessional rhetorical engagement as well as a realistic commitment to giving an accurate account of the order-of-things: that is, advocating the truth.

Endnotes

1 As Hick's ontological postulate (the Real) is trans-categorial, it is not possible (in the context of his ontology) to properly speak of 'peace' and 'harmony' in ontological terms. Nevertheless, one appropriate outcome of a pluralistic perspective is that it leads to greater peace and co-operation between faiths. For example, Hick writes about the benefits of embracing his philosophy of religious pluralism: 'Thus a mutual mission of the sharing of experiences and insights can proceed through the growing network of inter-faith dialogue and the interactions of the faith-communities [ . . . ] mutual enrichment and co-operation in face of the urgent problems of human survival in a just and sustainable world society.' Hick, J., 'A Philosophy of Religious Pluralism' in Badham, P., ed., A John Hick Reader, London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 177.

2. Knitter, R, 'Introduction' in Knitter, P. and Hick, J. eds, The Myth of Christian


Uniqueness, Maryknoll: Orbis, 1995, p.vii. 3. Kaufman, G., 'Religious Diversity, Historical Consciousness and Christian

Theology', in Knitter & Hick, The Myth, p.4. 4. This first appeared in Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, London:

Macmillan, 1973. For a full development of his pluralistic hypothesis, see also An Interpretation of Religion, 2nd Edition, London: Palgrave, 2004.

5. Ruether, R.R., 'Feminism and Jewish-Christian Dialogue: Particularism and Universalism in the Search for Religious Truth' in Knitter & Hick, The Myth, p.t41.

6. D'Costa, G., 'The Impossibility of the Pluralist View of Religions' Religious Studies, 32, 1996, p.225.

7. For a fuller discussion of this, see my John Hick: A Critical Introduction and Reflection, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, esp. ch.5.

8. Hick, 'The Possibility of Religious Pluralism: A reply to Gavin D'Costa' Religious Studies, 33/2. 1997, p. 436.

9. Harris, H.A., 'Podium: Does Liberal Christianity need Defending?' in Modern Believing, Vol. 42, No.I, 2001, p.47.

10. Hick himself makes this kind of distinction when he says that as a 'believer' he is a Christian, as a 'philosopher' he is a pluralist. See for example Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion, London: Macmillan, 1993, p.145.

1 l. I would argue that there is a practical requirement on the pluralistic view. It is not an adequate response to say that (Hick's) pluralism does not seek to be a 'practical' viewpoint (rather it is a 'philosophical observation'. . .) . Besides, we saw in note 1. that Hick - despite second-order pretensions here - saw his pluralism as an aid towards 'mutual enrichment' and 'co-operation'. The plausibility of a pluralistic perspective must surely involve an existential dimension. The theory is not just a matter of logical (rather than practical) possibility.

12. Milbank has had some influence on D'Costa's thinking, although D'Costa is more indebted to Alasdair Maclntyre - as is Milbank himself. However, D'Costa is critical of both thinkers: see the 'Introduction' to The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000.

13. Milbank, J., Theology and Social Theory, Oxford: Blackwells, p. 279. 14. Ibid., p.6. 15. Ibid., p.5. 16. Milbank, J., Pickstock, C., Ward, G., eds., Radical Orthodoxy, London:

Routledge, 1999, p.2. 17. Milbank, 'The End of Dialogue', in D'Costa, ed., Christian Uniqueness

Reconsidered, Maryknoll: Orbis, 1990, p. 190. 18. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 1 19. Ibid., p.6. 20. Milbank , 'The End of Dialogue', p. 178. 21. Ibid., p.175. 22. See ch. 1 of The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity (Edinburgh: T & T Clark,

2OOO). 23. See, for example, Gerard Loughlin's critique of Hick's pluralism in 'Prefacing

Pluralism: John Hick and the Mastery of Religion', Modern Theology, 7 (1990), 29-55.

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24. Hick distances himself from Kant. For example, see the recent exchange between J. Andrew Kirk and Hick in Studies in Interreligious Dialogue. Kirk maintains that Hick's pluralistic hypothesis is, if it follows Kantian idealism, atheistic. Kirk writes: ' In using Kant's epistemology, Hick has made himself a hostage to fortune, for his depiction of both the divine image and the ultimately Real, using the Kantian idealistic framework, ends up with linguistic signs without any signification.' ( 'John Hick's Kantian Theory of Religious Pluralism and the Challenge of Secular Thinking' 12/2002/1, p.29). Hick's response is to distance himself from Kant: ' I could have presented the pluralistic hypothesis without reference to Kant, but I wanted to give credit where credit is due.' ( 'A Response to Andrew Kirk on Religious Pluralism' 12/2002/2: pp.228-229).

25. Janz, R, 'Radical Orthodoxy and the New Culture of Obscurantism', Modern Theology, 20:3, July, 2004: p. 377. In their introduction to the 1998 Cambridge edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer and Alan Wood express Kant's view very well when they point out that for Kant the noumenal realm is not populated with 'metaphysical beings or entities whose reality is supposed to be demonstrable, but rather goals and directions of enquiry that mark out ways in which our knowledge is to be sought for and organised' p. 18. However, we should note that this does not preclude the notion of ideal realities either.

26. We have to be careful here, of course. Hick would probably not be happy with the statement that the Real has 'no independent reality'; nevertheless, it might make more sense of his claim for the second-order status of his hypothesis.

27. To illustrate this, we might draw a comparison with the nature of ethical motivation. For example, Richard Madsen and Tracy Strong argue strongly for a connection between moral commitments and the socio-historical context of the person. The notion that deep ethical allegiancies arise out of 'pure' dispassionate decisions is not really the case. Rather: ' In the ethical realm one does not so much adopt a particular perspective as manifest it.' 'Introduction: Three Forms of Ethical Pluralism' in Madsen and Strong, eds., The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003: 5. Moreover: 'Even if one changes one's beliefs, to the degree that one chooses an ethical framework that choice is less likely to be the results of pragmatic consideration than of some kind of conversion experience.' Ibid.

28. Chapman, M.D., 'Why the Enlightenment Project Doesn't Have To Fail', The Heythrop Journal, 39/4, October, 1998.

29. Thus Steven Shakespeare, in his excellent critique of Radical Orthodoxy, writes: 'Like the modernism it claims to oppose, radical orthodoxy conceives reality through a priori categories, ungrounded assertions and idealistic speculation. It is based on a faith in the power of narratives to deliver perfect, reconciling symbols - a faith prior to any specific Christian content.' The New Romantics: A Critique of Radical Orthodoxy', in Theology, Vol. CIII, No.813, May/June 2000, p. 175.

30. For example, many critics have drawn attention to the way in which certain thinkers - e.g. Aquinas and Kant - are interpreted by Milbank. See, for example, Lash, N., 'Where does Holy Teaching leave philosophy? Questions on Milbank's Aquinas', Modern Theology, 15:4 October, 1999 (Aquinas); Janz, op.cit.(Kant); and see also the collection of critical essays in Hankey, W.J., and Hedley, D, eds., Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy." Postmodern


Theology, Rhetoric and Truth, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. 31. Taylor, S., 'Keep Taking the Medicine: Radical Orthodoxy and the Future of

Theology' Modern Believing, 41/4, 2000, p. 38. 32. Ibid. p.39. 33. Goncalves, P., 'Religions and their Alien Invaders', in Goodchild, P., ed.,

Difference in Philosophy of Religion, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, p.l17. Emphasis mine.

34. Davies, O., in Hemming, L.P., ed., Radical Orthodoxy? A Catholic Enquiry, Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 123.

35. Goncalves, op.cit., p.116 36. Concerning this 'incommensurability', Milbank writes: '[ . . . ] no attempt to

define such a genus [i.e. religion] (or even, perhaps, delineation of an analogical field of "family resemblances") will succeed, because no proposed common features can be found . . . ' ; again: ' [ . . . ] Being - both cultural and natural - or "what there is," can get construed in sheerly different and incommensurable ways by the many religions." 'The End of Dialogue', p.176, 177. Emphasis mine.

37. Shakespeare, op.cit., p.167. 38. Smith, G., 'Mission and Radical Orthodoxy' Modern Believing, 44/1, 2003,

p. 45. 39. Janz, op.cit., p.401. 40. Ibid., p.366. 41. Ibid., p.369. 42. S. Shakespeare, op.cit., p. 165. 43. This argument is developed from an earlier versi'on in chapter 5 of my John

Hick and 'Religious Passion and the Pluralist Theology of Religions', New Blackfriars, May 1998.

44. Comparative theological approach?: For example, commenting on liberal theological traditions, Keith Ward writes: 'Non-exclusive interpretations of religious traditions make it possible for believers to reach wide areas of agreement and co-operation with many in other traditions [ . . . ] This might be said to define the liberal attitude to religious belief, rejecting interpretations of religious views which insist on rigid definitions of the boundaries between traditions and on preserving an unchanging truth which has nothing to learn from those outside its own system.' 'Comparative Theology: The Heritage of Schleiermacher' in Jobling, J., and Markham, I., eds., Theological Liberalism: Creative and Critical, London: SPCK, 2000, p.71, 72.

liberal pluralism, radical orthodoxy and the right tone of voice

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