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Libyan Election Breaks Arab SpringPatternRonald Bruce St JohnPublished online: 14 Sep 2012.

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Libyan Election Breaks Arab SpringPattern

Ronald Bruce St John

In landmark elections, Libyans went to the polls for the first time in 60

years to elect a General National Congress which will form an interim

government, oversee the writing of a constitution, and supervise polls for

an elected government based on the new constitution. Taking place only

nine months after the successful conclusion of the 17 February

Revolution, the elections were widely hailed as an extraordinary achieve-

ment. The election results were a surprise to many observers as Libyan

voters largely supported moderate parties and candidates, reversing a

regional trend in support of Islamists.

Keywords: constitution, elections, Islam, political parties

Elections for a 200-member General National Congress (GNC) that is to name a

new interim government, oversee the drafting of a new constitution, and schedule a

new round of elections were held in Libya on 9 July. In the first nationwide

elections involving political parties since 1952, a unique political dynamic was

in play with the candidates and the electorate alike sharing a steep learning

curve and extremely high expectations. In generally free and fair elections, seasoned

observers were impressed with the professional way in which the elections were

conducted and surprised both with the voter turnout of around 1.8 million Libyans

or 65 percent of registered voters and the landslide victory of the National Forces

Alliance.

Pre-election concerns

Eighty of the GNC’s 200 seats were allocated to political parties and 120 to

independent candidates. The 80 seats were filled by proportional representation

among competing party lists, alternating male and female candidates. The use of

Ronald Bruce St John is an independent scholar. Email: rbstjohn@comcast.net

The International Spectator, Vol. 47, No. 3, September 2012, 13–19 ISSN 0393-2729 print/ISSN 1751-9721 online� 2012 Istituto Affari Internazionali http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2012.724945

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proportional representation for the 80 seats improved the electoral prospects of

smaller political groups which would have been sidelined in a strictly majoritarian

model. Alternating gender representation on the party lists helped boost the repre-

sentation of women. The 120 independent seats were filled in first-past-the-post,

individual candidate elections.

Pre-election polls suggested that most Libyans thought the country was moving

in the right direction, citing new freedoms, a flourishing civil society, and small

improvements in local security; however, many respondents also complained that

progress was too slow. The positive attitude to the current direction of post-

Qadhafi Libya was reflected in voter registration levels with some 2.7 million

people or 80 percent of eligible voters registered to vote. It was also reflected in

the large number of candidates participating in the election. The High National

Elections Commission (HNEC) declared 2,500 independent candidates, including

85 women and 2,415 men, and 1,202 political association candidates eligible to

stand, including 540 women and 662 men. With women making up more than

half of Libya’s population and 45 percent of registered voters, the low number of

women standing as independent candidates reflected a decision on their part to

concentrate their efforts on election to the party lists.

In the run-up to the election, security remained the primary concern of most

Libyans. There were no serious security incidents during voter registration, and to

reduce the possibility of violence during the period of campaigning, 35 political

entities, including the main political parties, issued a joint statement on 18 June,

agreeing to a 15-point code of conduct drawn up by the HNEC which called on

candidates to avoid conduct that fostered conflict, hurt national unity, or sowed

hatred. In the end, the election was conducted with only scattered violence dis-

rupting voting in a very few areas of the country.

Concern about potential foreign involvement also proved to be exaggerated. The

NATO intervention resurrected old debates in Africa and the Arab world about the

motives of the Western powers in a region of global strategic interest. As a result,

the issue of Western engagement hung over dialogue about the future course of

Libya’s political transformation. In response, most Western governments, working

through NGOs or the United Nations (UN), limited their involvement to educat-

ing the electorate in areas like organising a political party, conducting effective

political campaigns, and writing constitutions. On the other hand, several Arab

states, notably Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), were more involved,

actively promoting Islamic ideas and candidates.

Main contenders

The Justice and Construction Party (JCP), led by Mohammed Sawan, a former

political prisoner under Qadhafi, is the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.

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It was the largest and best organised of the parties. Presenting itself as a moderate,

progressive religious party, it argued a parliamentary system was best suited to

Libya, supported decentralisation, and opposed federalism. While it expected to

receive a boost in the polls following the election to the presidency of Egypt of a

leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, the JCP emphasized its independence

from Muslim Brotherhood groups elsewhere in the region.

The National Forces Alliance (NFA), a coalition of around 60 political parties,

some with a very small membership, and around 200 civil society groups, was

supervised by Mahmoud Jibril, a former prime minister in the interim government.

Jibril was not on the ballot because election rules blocked former members of the

interim government from running for the GNC. Technically a political entity as

opposed to a political party, the NFA stood as a single body in the elections. Widely

viewed in the Western press as being toward the ‘liberal’ end of the political

spectrum, the NFA presented itself as a moderate Islamic movement that recog-

nised the importance of Islam in political life and favoured Sharia as the basis of

law and the main source of legislation.1 It was a strong supporter of decentralisa-

tion, supporting local council control of areas like education, healthcare and trans-

port, but did not support federalism. The NFA did not take a position on the issue

of a parliamentary vs presidential form of government, saying only that it wanted

to avoid any system leading to a monopoly of power or political gridlock.

The Union for Homeland Party was founded by a number of people of whom

Abdurrahman Sewehli, the grandson of Ramadan Sewehli, one of the founders of

the 1918 Tripolitanian Republic, was best known. Throughout the campaign, it

argued that the election was not about socioeconomic issues, but about what would

go into the new constitution. The Union for Homeland Party supported a mod-

ified presidential system, similar to that in France, and decentralisation but not

federalism.

The Nation Party (Al-Watan) was founded by Ali Sallabi, a leading Islamic

cleric, and Abdel Hakim Belhadj, the former head of the now defunct Libyan

Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and recent head of the Tripoli Military Council.

It enjoyed the support of the Emir of Qatar, and critics charged it was funded by

Qatar, an accusation the party strongly denied. It supported a parliamentarian

system and decentralisation but opposed federalism. The Nation Party presented

itself as an inclusive religious party with a progressive approach.

The National Front Party, formed by former members of the National Front for

the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), was led by Muhamad al-Magarif, former head of

the NFSL. It supported a parliamentary system and decentralisation but rejected

federalism. It viewed Islam as providing a broad guideline for state affairs, but did

not promote the implementation of Sharia law.

1Islam was the official religion of the state and Sharia was a main source of legislation in the monarchical,1951-69, and Qadhafi, 1969-2011, regimes.

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The National Centrist Party was led by Ali Tarhouni, a US-trained economist

and former professor at the University of Washington, who served as the oil and

finance minister in the interim government. The party platform of the National

Centrist Party made no reference to Sharia law, identifying Libya simply as a

moderate Muslim country.

The Al-Asala Gathering was a Salafist Islamist grouping led by Abdul Bassit

Ghweila. It argued that political parties were un-Islamic, which is why it referred

to itself as a ‘gathering’. The Al-Asala Gathering put forward some female candi-

dates, picturing them in full face covering on campaign posters. Of uncertain size

and influence in Libya, some observers predicted Salafist elements would produce a

surprise electoral result as happened in Egypt.

Based on the above, the GNC was expected to have a strong Islamist contingent

but also include local and tribal representation, creating a somewhat disjointed and

localised GNC. On key policy issues, all of the major parties supported decentra-

lisation but rejected federalism, and most of them also supported a parliamentary

form of government. As for their future, all of these nascent political groupings

were national in scope and interest, but most of them had little or no regional or

local organisation; consequently, their potential impact on local elections was

unclear.

Winners and losers

The final results for the party vote amounted to a landslide victory for the NFA,

which took 39 of the 80 seats available to political parties, more than twice as many

as the 17 seats won by its nearest rival, the JCP. Other parties that secured a place in

the GNC included the National Front Party, which took three seats, and the Union

for Homeland Party, the National Centrist Party, and the little known Wadi Al-

Hayah Party for Justice and Development, which each took two. Fifteen other

parties took one seat each. In a surprise development, the Nation Party failed to

win a single seat. The election results were in sharp contrast to regional trends in

which Islamist parties took power in both Egypt and Tunisia.

Buoyed by preliminary election results, Mahmoud Jibril called for all political

parties in Libya to join the NFA in a grand coalition to create a national dialogue.

Initially, the JCP rejected his offer; however, Mohammed Sawan later indicated that

it might have to collaborate with the NFA in order to avoid being relegated to the

opposition. If such a grand coalition is formed, it will inevitably dominate the 200-

person GNC.

Election results for the 120 individual seats are less clear than those for the party

seats. Candidates linked to parties other than the NFA, together with genuine

independents, won a majority of these seats, giving them considerable – albeit

uncertain – influence over the future congress. With all political parties eagerly

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courting independent candidates, many of whom were elected on the basis of local

connections, reputation, and social standing as opposed to ideology, it is unclear

how many of these individual winners will pledge support to the NFA, as opposed

to other parties, or form their own bloc of independent delegates. Political man-

oeuvring in the world’s newest democracy is expected to go on for weeks, if not

months.

Several factors combined to explain why the JCP and other Islamic-based parties

did not fare better in the elections. Historically, the Libyan people have never

displayed any appetite for the radical Islam advocated by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda

or its North African affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Moreover,

the Qadhafi regime for years actively suppressed all Islamic parties, including

moderate ones like the Muslim Brotherhood, so there was little in the way of an

organised base for parties like the JCP to draw on. In recent years, the Brotherhood

had reached a political accommodation with the regime which was also criticised by

some Libyans. At the same time, Libyans in the post-Qadhafi era, having been

burdened for more than four decades with Qadhafi’s Third Universal Theory as

embodied in The Green Book, were suspicious of any effort to impose a new

ideology or political agenda upon them. Related to this point, there was concern

among many Libyans that Islamic parties like the JCP and the Nation Party were

under the influence of forces outside Libya. Based on these considerations, women

voters, in particular, strongly supported the NFA. Finally, most Libyans after a long

period of isolation desired a more open socioeconomic and political system and

were afraid the Islamists would once again close them off from the outside world.

Libya is a homogenous Islamic society with over 95 percent of the population

Sunni Muslim. Conservative in outlook and deeply religious in nature, the Libyan

people have never shown any real attraction to the more extreme, radical strains of

Islam. Moreover, the general public over the last year has shown little interest in an

Islamist alternative to the non-ideological 17 February Revolution. Most Libyans

expect and want Islam to play a role in political life, but opinions vary widely as to

exactly what this means. There is support for a separation of religion and politics,

but little consensus on the exact boundaries of this separation. Similarly, most

Libyans agree that the new constitution should draw heavily on Sharia, but a

debate rages as to whether it should be based solely on Islamic law or whether

Islamic law should only be an important reference among others.

Unfinished business

There was a strong sense in Libya that the election would end the chaos and

uncertainty that had dominated the country since the fall of Qadhafi. Most

Libyans viewed the polls as a fresh start; unfortunately, they are unlikely to be

the panacea hoped for. Absent both a strong police force and national army, the

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GNC and the new government it appoints will be as reliant on a mosaic of

revolutionary forces and militias as was its predecessor. Symptomatic of the prob-

lem, the extensive security system established to safeguard the voting was entrusted,

not to the army or police, but to the Supreme Security Committee (SSC), a new

force consisting almost entirely of former militiamen. To entrench the nascent

political system and the new freedoms that spawned it, security must be restored

throughout Libya.

Given the large number of candidates and the structure of the electoral system,

the election may not result in the establishment of a strong central authority with a

unity of purpose anytime soon. The February 2012 draft election law called for the

election of a 200-member GNC, and based on population, 102 seats were allocated

to Tripoli and the Nafusa Mountains, 60 to Benghazi and the east, 29 to the south,

and 9 to central Libya, including Sirte. This spring, the entire election process was

thrown into uncertainty when the 60-seat allocation to Benghazi and the east was

unilaterally rejected by a meeting of eastern tribal leaders, militia heads and poli-

ticians, who argued any allocation of seats based on population would perpetuate

the discrimination of eastern Libya by the more populous western part of the

country. This group called for the adoption of a federal system similar to what

was in place in Libya in 1951-63, a demand immediately rejected by the NTC

chairman. A decentralised government, with the Economy and Oil Ministries in

Benghazi, the Culture Ministry in Zintan, the Finance Ministry in Darna and so

forth, would be popular with powerful regional constituencies (and their militias);

however, based on the earlier experience under the monarchy, it threatens bloated

bureaucracies and dysfunctional governance.

On 19 June, a federalist group set up a road block on the coast road from

Benghazi to Tripoli, demanding the interim government agree to an equal

number of seats in the GNC for the country’s three historic regions, Cyrenaica,

Tripolitania and Fezzan. Federalists later shut down three oil terminals in eastern

Libya, temporarily disrupting oil exports, but these were quickly reopened after the

election. In an effort to address concerns for decentralisation, the Oil Ministry on

7 June opened an office in Benghazi, the first ministry office to open in the city.

Broader use of this approach could satisfy regional demands without distributing

entire ministries throughout the country. In a subsequent effort to placate federalist

demands, the NTC immediately before the elections passed a new law under which

the 60-member commission which will draft a new constitution would no longer

be appointed by the GNC but, instead, elected directly by Libyan voters. In the

course of the election, the NFA later questioned the NTC’s right to take this

decision, suggesting it could be reversed.

In conjunction with its promotion of Arab nationalism, the Qadhafi regime

discriminated against ethnic minorities, like the Amazigh (Berber) and Tebu com-

munities; consequently, they were early recruits to the revolution. From the

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beginning, the central demand of the Amazigh community was official recognition

of its culture and language in the new Libyan constitution. The Tebu, a dark-

skinned Saharan race of uncertain origins, also suffered discrimination under the

Qadhafi regime. Since February 2012, members of the Tebu ethnic group have

clashed repeatedly with local gunman from the Zwai tribe in Al Kufra in south-

eastern Libya. Polling stations opened late in two Tebu neighborhoods in Al Kufra,

highlighting the ongoing uncertainty there. Recent clashes between the Tebu and

the Zwai, the Amazigh of Zwara and the Arab town of Riqdaleen, the Tuareg and

the people of Ghadames, and the people of Zintan and the el-Mashisha tribe have

mostly been attempts to settle old grievances or to adjust power relationships.

While Qadhafi was a recognised master at manipulating Libya’s tribes and

ethnic minorities to serve his political agenda, there is no reason to believe these

groups cannot be made to play a more constructive role today, especially in a

society in transition.

Conclusions

Going into the election, opinions varied as to what would constitute a credible and

successful election, with most Libyans agreeing high voter turnout, little or no

corruption, minimal security disturbances, and the elimination of former regime

members from positions of authority were good measures. On this basis, the first

nationwide election involving political parties in 60 years was an overwhelming

success with international monitors unanimous in their description of the elections

as transparent and well-conducted.

Regionally, the election in Libya reversed a trend in favour of Islamic parties in

neighbouring countries which also overthrew veteran rulers. In the wake of victories

by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia, the NFA’s landslide

victory challenged the narrative of rising Islamic power in the ‘Arab Spring’ coun-

tries. In so doing, it displayed the very different political dynamics in Libya which

in many ways separate it from other Arab states. That said, the election was only

the first step in the process of forming a new interim government, writing a con-

stitution, and holding new national elections some time in 2013, a process which

will test the strength of liberals, moderates and Islamists alike.

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