light - soviet policy in the third world

8/11/2019 Light - Soviet Policy in the Third World

1/19

Soviet Policy in the Third WorldAuthor(s): Margot LightReviewed work(s):Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 67, No. 2(Apr., 1991), pp. 263-280Published by: Wiley-Blackwellon behalf of the Royal Institute of International AffairsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2620830.

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2/19

Soviet

olicy

n the

Third

World

MARGOT LIGHT

MargotLight rgues

hat hedramatic

hange

n

Soviet Third

World

olicy fter

1985-away from upportor

wars

of

national

iberation'

nd

loyal maintenancef

socialist-orientedlient

ountries,

owards

iplomaticxpansion,

conomic

xpediency

andfacilitating

ast-West trade

nd

technologyransfer-was

ot

byproductf

the nd

of

the

Cold

War,

but precondition

or

t. She

examines ecent oviet

policy

n

Cuba, Afghanistan, ngola

and in the

Gulf

crisis. he

writes hat

conservative

pposition

an

have

little

ffect

n

thenew

policy,mainly or

economic

reasons.A returno theold role n the ThirdWorld s impossibleow.

Ten

or

fifteen

ears ago,

a

Soviet

veto would

probably

have

prevented

he

Security

Council

from

deliberating

n the

Gulf

crisis.

Agreement

within the

Security

Council about

a

response

o

Iraqi aggression

n

the Gulf would have

been

impossible,

and

UN-sponsored military

action

against Iraq

would

certainly

ave been inconceivable.Whatever

misgivings

he Soviet

leadership

might

have felt

privately

bout Saddam Hussein's

activities,

he

Soviet-Iraq

friendship reatywould have precluded public criticism. iplomatic relations

between

the Soviet Union and Kuwait would not have

counterbalanced

oyalty

to

Iraq.

In

any

case the two

superpowers arely ooperated

within

he

Security

Council,

and

particularly

ot on issueswhere one or the

other,

r a

major ally

of

either,

was involved.

f war had

occurredwithout

pecific

UN

approval,

the

Soviet

press

would have been oud in itscondemnation f

Western ntervention

and the chances are that the

Iraqis

would have been

resupplied

with

Soviet

arms.

The Soviet

response

to the Gulf crisis

llustrates, herefore,ust

how

much

Soviet

foreign policy

has

changed.

But

is

it

merely

an isolated

example

of

cooperation

within the UN to

embody

the

many lofty

declarationsmade

by

PresidentGorbachev

and

President

Bush

about the new world order' of the

iggos?

In

other

words,

is it a

manifestation

f

the new

East-West

detente,

r

does

it

reflect

more

general

hift

n

Soviet

policy

towards the

Third

World?

This article

rgues

thatthe

changes

n

Soviet-Third

World

relations

xtend

well

beyond

the Middle East

and

the

mmediate risis

n

theGulf.

n

fact,

oviet

estimations

f

political

and

economic

developments

n

the

Third

World

had

International ffairs 7, 2

(I99I)

263-280 263


3/19

MargotLight

begun

to

change

a

number of

years

before

Gorbachev became General

Secretary

f the

Communist Party

of the

Soviet Union (CPSU)

in

I985, and

policy began to alter verysoon afterhe came to power. The improvement

n

East-West relations,however, and the unexpected dissolutionof the Soviet

bloc eclipsed the changes

n

the

Third

World, which were less dramatic nd far

slower. Yet

it can

be argued

that

neither f thoseevents ould have takenplace

if

Soviet policy in the Third World had not begun to change first.After ll,

Soviet activism

n

the

Third

World had been one of themajor causes of the

deterioration

n

detente from the middle

of

the I970s. And

if

East-West

relations

had not

improved

so

radically,

it

is

unlikely

that

the Soviet

government

would have abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine that

the socialist

communityhas the rightof interventionn the territory f any one of its

members

whenever forces hostile to socialism threaten its

ideological

alignment-in

Eastern

Europe.

It

is

not too

far-fetched,herefore,

o

suggest

that

the

key

to

the much

vaunted

new

world order'

lay

in

Soviet-Third World relations.

he

desireto

re-establish ood

relationswith the West

was

an

important, ut by

no

means

the sole reason why

the new Soviet

leadership egan

to reassess ts

policy

n

the

Third

World.

This

analysis

of

Soviet-Third World relations will

begin,

therefore, y considering

n

part

one the mix of motives hat

ontributed

o

the

reappraisal.

n

part

two the

precepts

f the

new

political thinking' bout the

Third World

will be

examined,

since

they give

some indicationof what

the

new

leadership

wanted to

achieve.

Part three urns o

policy itself,

o

examine

how those

precepts

have

been

translated nto

practice.

In the last few

months it has become

clear, first,

hat there s

domestic

opposition

to thenew

policy and, second,

that

here re constraintshat

prevent

the Soviet

Union from either

disengaging ntirely

rom

previous partners

r

expanding rapidly

in

new directions.

The article will

end, therefore, y

considering he nature nd strengthftheoppositionwithin he Soviet Union

to

the

new

policy,

and then

turning

to

likely

future

policies given

the

constraints

nd

the

present

uncertainties

bout the future f

perestroika.

i.

The

motives for

change

On the face

of

it,

Soviet

foreignpolicy, particularly

elations

with

the

Third

World, seemedextremely uccessful y the end of the

I970s.

A new wave of

revolutionary

movements

had

swept through

the Third

World, bringing

changes

of

regime

n

I4

different

ountries.

Although

the new

governments

were

by

no

means

all

Marxist-Leninist,many

of them

turned

to

the Soviet

Union

for

moral and material

support.' By

that

time

there

was

general

agreement

that the Soviet Union

had

caught up

with the

United States

in

For a discussion of the revolutions

of

the 1970s, see

Fred Halliday, The making fthe SecondCold War

(London: Verso,

I983),

ch.

4.

264


4/19

Sovietpolicy n the

Third

World

nuclearweaponry, o that here

was roughparity etweenthetwo superpowers.

As

a

result f the buildup

n

military trength

nd

the acquisition

of new Third

World allies, Soviet

leaders

began

to claim that the correlation f forceshad

changedin favour of socialism.2

Western

eaders eemed to share

this

ssessment,

nd

when the Soviet Union

and

Cuba intervened

n

Angola

in I975 and in

Ethiopia

in I977 there was

mounting

distrust

of

the

way

in which

the Soviet Union seemed

to

be

exploiting

detente

n

Europe

to

expand

into

new

areas

of

the

Third

World.

In

any case, by

then

the

ncreasing

mportance

ccorded

to

human

rights

ssues

n

international elations

nd

the

poor

Soviet record

n

observing hoserights

ad

begun

to

erode East-West relations. he invasion

of

Afghanistan y

the Soviet

armyin December

I979,

seen by many in the West as the extensionof the

BrezhnevDoctrine beyond Europe,3 ffectively

erminated etente. t also soon

put an end to Soviet optimism bout

the

direction

n

which the correlation

f

forceswas really moving.

The invasion

of

Afghanistan

ost the Soviet Union dear.

Apart

from

the

human and financial osts

of the war4 and

the

oss of a

higher-priority

oreign

policy goal (detente),

when Brezhnev

tried o

improve Sino-Soviet relations n

I982,

the

Chinese government

made the removal of

Soviet troops from

Afghanistan

ne of the three

preconditions

orthe normalization f

relations.5

The invasion lso cost the SovietUnion support ntheThirdWorld. The Non-

Aligned

Movement

objected

to the

invasion of one of its

members,

and

fundamentalistslamic movements

and governments upported the Afghan

rebels.Furthermore,

ithin

Afghanistan

here

was

very

ittle

ublic

support

or

the

Babrak

Karmal

government

nstalled

y

the Soviet

army,

nd

the mujahidin

were

more united,

better

rmed and

seemed

in

I985

even

further rom

defeat

than

they

had been

in

I979.

But it

was

not

ust

in

Afghanistan

hata

friendly overnment

id not

seem

to be viable withoutSoviet military upport.There were similar ituationsn

Angola

and

Ethiopia, where, despite

he

participation

f

Cuban

troops

and the

supply

of Soviet

arms,

civil

wars

were

still

raging.

In

Mozambique

the

governmentwas struggling gainst

n

insurgency

movementthathad

revived

and seemed to

grow stronger.Apart

from he

cost

of the

ncreasingmilitary

id

these

governments equired,

here

was a

danger

that the Soviet

Union

would

be

drawn further

nto

nsoluble

regional

conflicts

nd,

as American

upport

for

the

opponents

of Soviet client

regimesgrew

with the

adoption

of the

Reagan

2

See, for xample, .

I.

Brezhnev, eport f

he

CPSU

Central ommitteend he mmediateasks f he

Partyn home nd

oreign

olicy, XVthCongressf heCPSU (Moscow: Novosti, 976), p. 20.

See, for example,

Mark

Katz,

'The

evolution

of the Brezhnev Doctrine under

Gorbachev', in Kurt

M. Campbell and S.

Neil MacFarlane, Gorbachev's

Third Worlddilemmas London: Routledge, I989),

pp.

36-65.

Compared to American

losses in Vietnam, the 13,000 Soviet casualties n Afghanistanwere rather

low. See Geoffrey ukes,

The Soviet armed forces

and the Afghan war', in Amin Saikal and William

Maly, eds., The Soviet

withdrawalfromfghanistan

Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press,

I989),

p.

83.

Yuri Makarov

(Izvestiya,

17 Oct. I990) estimated

that

the financialcosts

were 6o billion roubles.

The othertwo conditions were a reduction n the

number of troops on the Sino-Soviet border, and

the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.

265


5/19

MargotLight

Doctrine (the policy

of

supporting counter-revolutionary

orces against

communist

governments

around

the

globe),

that this

might

lead to

confrontation

ith

the United States.

It was not only the costsand dangersof thesewars thatworried Soviet

policy-makers. y I985 the economic condition

of Third

World

socialist nd

socialist-oriented

tateswas

also

cause

for

grave

concern. Brezhnev's ntention

to base Soviet dealingswith the

Third

World on

sound

commercial

principles

had come to nothing: therewere huge outstanding ebts

to

the

Soviet Union

from ts Third

World

allies.

The

Soviet

economy

could

scarcely fford he

aid

required by the Third World

socialist

countries Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam,

Laos,

North

Korea).

And

the

newer

socialist-oriented

ountries

were,

for

the

mostpart, mongstthepoorestand leastdeveloped countriesn the world. It

seemed extremely nlikely

hat

they

would be able

to

progress

from socialist

orientation

o

socialism,

he

course

prescribed

orthem

by

Soviet

development

theory,

withoutmassivematerial

id far

beyond

themeansof the

Soviet Union.

The Ethiopian famine

of

I984-5

served to

highlight

both the catastrophic

poverty

f the

country

nd

the

nability

f

the

developed

socialist tates o offer

even

the kind of

disaster elief

hat

was

required.

In

short,by

the time Gorbachev

came to

power

it must

have been obvious

that the claim that the correlation

f

world forces

was

moving

in favour of

socialism

was

emptyrhetoric.

here was a

greatdeal

of

evidence

to suggest hat

Soviet

policy

towards

the

Third

World

had

failed

and that

retrenchment as

urgent.Although

t was obvious when the draft

f the

revisedprogrammeof

the Communist

Party

was

published

that

the

Third

World had been

downgraded

in

Soviet

priorities,'

t was a while before

open

and detailed

criticism

was

permitted

f

past foreignpolicies.

The new

leadershipbegan by

adducing

the domestic reform

rogramme

s the

primary

eason for

change.

In

July

990

Gorbachev, replying

o the commentson his

report o the

28th

Congress of the CPSU, maintainedthat without a new foreignpolicy we

would

not

have been

in

any

condition

to

change

our own

country'.'

He

was,

in

fact,repeating

he standard

xplanation

offered

y

Soviet

politicians

ince

I985:

the

highestpriority

was accorded to

the

domestic reform

programme,

and the

purpose

of Soviet

foreign policy

was

to

create the

international

conditions

n

which t

could

be

implemented.

t

was

not

difficulto understand

what the adverse effectswere

of

Soviet

policy

in

the Third

World

on the

domestic

economy,

and the connections

between

the reform

rogramme

nd

theproposednew foreignpolicywere straightforward.

The economic reform

equiredcapital

nvestmentsn the civilian

economy,

and

that

implied making savings

elsewhere. At

the most

basic

level,

Soviet

foreign olicy,particularly

owards

he

Third

World,

was too

expensive;

t

had

to become more

profitable.

But

it

also had to be more diversified o that

6

See 'Programma Kommunisticheskoi

Partii

Sovetskogo Soyuza: Novaya redaktsiya', Izvestiya,7 Mar.

I986.

'Iz

vystupleniyaM. S. Gorbacheva

po

itogam obsuzhdeniya politicheskogo otcheta TsK KPSS

XXVIII s ezdu partii', Vestnik inisterstvanostrannykhel SSSR,

31

July 1990, p. 3.

266


6/19

Sovietpolicy

n the

Third

World

mutually

beneficial

relations could be established

with a wider

range

of

countries.8

n

the Third

World,

that

mplied mproving

he economic terms f

relations with socialist

and socialist-oriented

tates,

as well as

establishing

diplomaticcontactwithcapitalist evelopingstates.

There were other, less direct but equally important ways

in

which

the

domestic economic reformdictated

change

in

Soviet activities

n the Third

World.

As

we

have

seen,

Soviet-Third World

relationshad

been

one of the

reasons why East-West tension had increased from the middle of the

I970S

onwards.

Adopting

a new

policy

in

the Third World would,

it was

hoped,

lower the tension

and

contribute

to improving Soviet relations with the

advanced capitalist ountries.

hat

might

make t possibleto cut Soviet defence

spending,which would free apital and expertise orthecivilian conomy. But

it mightalso have beneficial ffects

n

East-West trade relations,

n

particular

by inducing

relaxation

f

the CoCom

list' and

making

t

easier

to

import

he

sophisticated

Western

echnology equired

for

conomic reform

nd

moderniz-

ation. Furthermore,

ne

aspect

of the perestroika rogramme envisaged the

encouragement

of

direct

foreign

nvestment n

joint

ventureswhich would

offer asy profits

o

the foreign

irmswhile bringingmuch-needed apital and

industrial

xpertise

o the

Soviet Union.

Since the

West

had

responded

to the

invasion of Afghanistan y applying

economic sanctions against the Soviet

Union,

the

relationship

between Soviet

policy

in the Third

World

and

economic relationswith the

West

musthave beenabundantly lear to the new

Soviet

leadership

n

I985.

Thus domestic economic requirements

nd the

failures

nd

dangers

of

past

Soviet

policies

all

pointed

to the

need

fora

reappraisal

f

Soviet-Third World

relations.

he new

politicalthinking rovided

the theoretical

nderpinning

n

which

it

could be based.

2.

New

thinking

about the Third World

The

aspect

of

new

thinking

hatmost

directly

oncerns he

Third

World

has to

do with economic development, nd

it

s

n fact

hardlynew. Disappointed

with

the

ack

of economic and

politicalprogress

n

the socialist-orientedtates

f

the

Third

World,

Soviet theorists

had

been studying the problems

of under-

development ince the

I970s.

They

concluded that their

previous assumptions

about the

speed

and

relative ase of economic

development

n

countries

hat

adopted a non-capitalist ystemhad been simplistic nd mistaken. ater,some

of these theorists

egan

to

reach conclusions

that

represented

considerable

revision

of traditionalMarxist-Leninist

hinking

nd the

way

it had

been

applied

to the Third

World.

For

example,

some

of

them

rejected

he dea that

8

Shevardnadze sed theterm profitable'

o

explain

how

foreign olicy

had to

respond

o

perestroika

in

a talkhe gave

to a

meeting f Soviet

diplomatsn 1987,published

n

Vestnik,

6

Aug. 1987,

pp.

30-4.

The intentiono diversify

ovietrelationsn theThirdWorld was included n thenew edition

of theParty rogramme: ee

Programma' note6).

'

Coordinating ommittee orMultilateralxportControls,which rganizes he ist f strategic

advanced echnology oods debarred rom

xport o communistountries.

267


7/19

MargotLight

underdevelopedcountries ould, with aid from the established ocialist tates,

progress directly from feudalism to socialism without going through the

capitalist tage

of

development. They maintainedthat although theoretically

possible, t had happened only rarely n history in Soviet Central Asia and

Mongolia) and that t required ubstantial id not from he established ocialist

states

as their

ormer

heoryhad maintained),

ut

from hemetropolitan entre

which had colonized the

country.'0

heoristswere

not

explicit,however,

bout

what

this

mplied

for he

future

evelopment

f

existing

ocialist-oriented

tates

and how

they

would

manage

the transition o

socialism.

Doubts about

whether

stage

of

development could be skipped

led

some

theorists o question

the

whole concept

of socialist

rientation.

As

early

s

I982,

well before he themes fthe newpolitical hinkingwerearticulated, number

of

well-known

authors

including eading academics

and

senior

officials

n the

Central Committee

apparatus)

had

pointed

to

the

long

and

arduous

distance

between

socialistorientation nd socialism.

Later,

under

the nfluence f

the

new

political thinking, ther

theoristswere

emboldened

to wonder

whether

the

second-generation

ocialist-oriented

tates,

hose

thathad

adopted

the

path

in

the I970s, were

really

socialist-oriented. r had Soviet

acceptance

of

their

socialist-oriented

tatus

been the product

of

the

wishful

thinking that

characterized heory during the Brezhnev era? Afterall, they were very

differentoth

from ne

another

nd from he

first-generation

ocialist-oriented

states.The new

political

thinkerswere

sharply

ritical f the

gap between the

previous theory

of

socialistorientation

nd the

empirical vidence available in

theThird

World,

and the

failure

f

Soviet

theory

o admit or

explain

the

newly

industrialized ountries.'2

Although

these

doubts

were

by

no means

universally hared,'3

nd

although

those

who

expressed

hem

urged

that states hat had

already adopted

socialist

orientation

hould not be

abandoned,

the erosion of the

concept discouraged

any search for potentialnew volunteersfor socialist orientation. And as

perestroika

n the Soviet

Union

developed

into democratization

and

the

establishment

f

elements

of a

plural political system, ogether

with

plans

for

privatization

nd the

introduction

f a

market,

ocialist-oriented

tates

were

urged

to shed the features hathad marked

hem s

socialist-oriented

n

the

first

place

and

to

adopt

similar reforms. t can be

argued

that doubts about the

efficacyand

even the

existence)

f socialist

rientation,

hile

not

mplying

hat

10

See, for example, G. I. Mirsky,

K

voprosu o vybore puti

i

orientatsii azvivayushchikhsya tran',

Mirovaya konomikamezhdunarodnyetnosheniya,

o. 5, I987, pp. 70-8I.

1

See

the analysis n

Elizabeth Kridl

Valkenier, Revolutionary change

in the Third World:

recent

Soviet reassessments',World olitics8: 3, April I986,

pp.

415-34.

For

the debates

about the

Third

World before perestroika, ee

her

The Soviet Union

and

the Third World:

an

economic ind New York:

Praeger,983), andJerry ough, The struggle

or

heThirdWorld: oviet ebatesndAmericanptions

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,

986).

12

See, for example, Aleksei Kiva, 'Socialist orientation: reality nd illusions', International

ffairs

(Moscow), No. 7, I988, pp. 78-86; G. I. Mirsky, Sotsialisticheskayaorientatsiyav tret'em mire

(Nekotorie problemy issledovaniya)',

Rabochii lass sovremennyir,

o. 4,

1988,

pp. 118-29.

13

See A. Kaufman and R. Ulyanovsky, 'K voprosu o sotsialisticheskoi rientatsii svobodivshikhsya

stran', Aziya i

Afrika

egodnya,No. 5,

I988,

for

an

example

of

an angry rebuttal

of

this

kind

of new

thinking.

268


8/19

Sovietpolicy

n

the Third World

the Soviet Union had no special responsibility

or Third

World

Marxist-

Leninist

regimes,

rationalized the search

for

better relations

with

capitalist

developing

states nd with

newly industrialized

ountries.

In the field of international elations, lasnostwas reflected ot only in the

freedom

o

question

old shibboleths nd

engage

in

theoretical ebates,but

also

in encouragement o re-examinethe past. Published criticism f past policies

began

to

appear

in

newspapers

nd

ournals.

Revisionist

nterpretations

f the

causes of the Cold War werepublished,

or

xample,

n

which the Second Cold

War

was blamed

largely

on

'the

expansion

of Soviet

influence

n

Africa,

he

Middle East

and

other

areas' and

the

Brezhnev

leadership

was accused

of

mistakenly ssuming that Soviet national nterest ay 'in the pursuitof small,

essentiallynominal gains connected with leadership coups in individual

developing countries'.

4

Later, once the Supreme Soviet had begun vigorous

debates about domestic

and

foreign policy

and

the press

had

become even

bolder,

bilateralrelationswith

ndividual

countrieswere

sometimes

ubject

to

published

censure.'5

On

the

whole, however,

academic

work

on Third World economic and

politicaldevelopment oncentrated

t first

n

criticism f

past precepts

nd the

setting

of

new

research

gendas.

But

politicians

nd theorists lso

began

to

recognize

the existence of

a

North-South

gap (called

a

simplistic,

rtificial

division

n

the

past)

and the

widening

of

that

gap. Moreover, they

no

longer

held the capitalist ndustrializedtates olelyresponsible or losingthe gap.

The

problems

of Third

World

poverty

nd

indebtednesswere

categorized

s

global

problems, which defied piecemeal

solutions

and required

a coordinated

approach

from the world

community

s

a

whole.'6

Other

aspects

f

the new

political hinking

ad

profound mplications

or he

Third

World. The acceptance,

for

xample,

that

ecurity

ould

not

be achieved

unilaterallyor entirely by military means,

and that international

ecurity

requiredbotha decrease n the evel of armsheldby thetwo superpowers nd

political ooperation

between

them, pplied primarily

o East-West relations

n

Europe.

But it also

meant

that the

Third World should

no

longer

be an

arena

for zero-sum

competition

and confrontation etween the two

superpowers.

Those Third World governments whose military

and

economic support

derived from the

competition

between their

superpower patrons

would be

severely

affected

by

a new

international

nderstanding.

he

new

thinking

about

regional

conflict

pelt

this

out

with

great clarity.

The wars in Afghanistan, thiopia and Angola, and the difficultiesoviet

allies were

having

in

defeating nsurgencies

n

Nicaragua

and

Mozambique,

14

V.

Dashichev,

'Vostok-Zapad: poisk

novykh otnoshenii', Literaturnayaazeta,

i8

May

I988.

15

For articles critical

of Soviet policy in theThird World see, for

example, Dmitry Yevstafyev,

Dollars

and debts', New Times, No. 29, I990, pp.

I8-I9, on relations

with Libya; and the polemical exchange

of views about

Iraq by Yu. Georgiev and Yu. Dakhab, 'Ob Irake bez stereotipov', Argumenty

fakty,

No.

21, 1990, pp.

6-7.

16

On

the North-South

gap see,

for

example, V.

L.

Sheinis, Razvivayushchiesya strany

novoc

politicheskoe

myshlenie', Rabochiiklass i sovremennyi ir,No. 4,

1987, pp. 77-90. In his speech to the

UN

(Soviet

News, 14

Dec.

1988) President Gorbachev

listed

underdevelopment

as a universal

problem

and proposed international ooperation

to deal with Third World

debt.

269


9/19

MargotLight

contributed o a radicalreappraisal n the Soviet Union of the nature nd danger

of regionalconflict.According to the new analysis, ven if a conflict egan by

being very

ocal

there

was a

propensity

or

t to spread,both

from

one issue to

others nd geographically romone area to others. n a hostilebipolar world

this was particularly angerous because of the tendency for two sides in a

conflict o seek aid and supportfromopposing superpowers.As a result here

was

always

a

possibility

hat ocal

conflict

ould

spread

nd

become general, nd

at

the ame timethat t might scalate,drawing

n

the superpowers. ven a local

conflict, therefore, carried the threat of sparking superpower nuclear

confrontation.

The way

to

avert

this

danger,

it was

suggested,

was

to prevent regional

conflictsrombecomingviolent.Everyefforthould be made to find political

settlement cceptable to both sides. The two superpowerswere held, by virtue

of

their tatus,

o

have

a

specialresponsibilityo sponsor nd support he policies

of

national reconciliationnecessary

to

achieve

a

political settlement.They

should also be preparedto guarantee ny settlement hat was reached, nd to

prevent

xternal

ntervention.17

It soon became clear thatwhat had previouslybeen called wars of national

liberation' which were therefore eserving

f

socialist upport)would now be

classified

s

regional conflicts,

nd that Soviet

support

for effortso win

them

by military

means would be more

difficulto

achieve.'8 And it

was in

relation

to the

regional

conflicts

n

which the Soviet Union was involved that

concrete

evidence

of

the new

political thinking

n

the Third World was most

striking.

Let us turn

now

to the record

of

Soviet

policy

in the Third

World.

3.

New

thinking

in

practice

Gorbachev declared

his ntention o

diversify

oviet

foreign

elations

n

many

of hisearly foreignpolicyannouncements. oviet foreignpolicywould cease

to be dominated

by

relationswith the United

States,

nd all

policy

would no

longer be

viewed

through

the

prism

of

the East-West conflict.

nevitably,

however,

once President

Reagan began

to

respond

to

the

changes

in

the

Kremlin,

Soviet-American

relations

layed

an even more dominantrole than

they

had before

perestroika.Nonetheless,

PresidentGorbachev

and

Foreign

Minister Shevardnadze

also

managed

to

extend

the

range

and

number

of

countries

with

which

the Soviet

Union

has

diplomatic

relations.

Retrenchment

in the socialist and socialist-orientedThird World, therefore,has been

accompanied by expansion

and

diversificationlsewhere.

How should this

be

interpreted?

as

there

been

a change

in

Soviet

policy

in

the Third

World,

or

have old

allies

merely

been

replaced by

new

ones?

17

A. I. Kolosovkiy, 'Regional conflicts nd global security',

n

Steve Hirsch,

ed., MEMO: New Soviet

voices nforeign nd economic olicy Washington, DC: BNA Books, I989),

pp.

503-15. For a spirited

defence of the new thinking

on

regional conflict, ee Shevardnadze's pressconference

n

Izvestiya,

17

Mar. I990.

18

See, for example, the discussion

The

USSR

and the Third

World',

International

ffairs

Moscow),

No.

12, I988,

pp.

135-46,

in which the national liberation struggledoes not

receive

a

mention.

270


10/19

Soviet

policy

n

the Third World

A usefulway to assesshow much Soviet foreignpolicy

has altered, nd to

classifythe kinds of change that have occurred, is to use

the distinctions

suggested y FrancisFukuyamaand to examine change at

three ifferentevels.

The most superficial evel is a change in style,detected in the practice of

diplomacyand thenature f propaganda. More significantre

changes n tactics,

or

the means by which long-termgoals are pursued n the

present.According

to Fukuyama, tactical changes would be reflected n the

kind of stateswith

which the Soviet Union now

seeks diplomatic relations,

nd in

the costs and

risks t s prepared o bear to achieve ts objectives. n udging

whether he new

policy should be taken eriously, owever,themost mportant evel to examine

is

strategichange:have the long-termgoals changed? Will

the Soviet Union

continueto expand itsinfluence n the Third World, and ifit does, will the

expansion

be based on

ideology? 9

The styleof Soviet foreignpolicy changed as soon as new

personnelbegan

to

take

up

their

positions

n the

Ministry

f

Foreign

Affairs nd the

Central

Committee

n

I985. The most

striking spect

of

the new

style

was the

active

use made of public relations

nd

the mass media to present he new

political

thinking

nd the

new

policies

to

domestic

and

foreign

audiences. But this

represented

more than

dopting

modern

communications kills

nd

technology

to

convey

old

messages.

As we have seen

above,

the

content

f

the

message

had

changed. Essentially

t had

become less

deological,

more idealistic.

n

relation

to the

developing world,

a

less

deological message

meant the

downgrading

of

the

priority iven

to the

Third

World

and the

ntention o

practise

more

even-

handed

policies,distinguishing

essbetween

socialist-oriented

nd

socialist

tates

on the one hand and

capitalist eveloping

states

n

the other.

t also meant a

firm ntention o

disengage

from

Third

World

conflict.

Another

indication of

changing style

was the

way

that Soviet

diplomats

became more

cooperative

and

far more

outgoing.

It

certainly

eemed

as if

diplomats broad werebeingallowed to takemore individual nitiatives. his

may

have reflected he shift hat was

taking place

in Moscow in the locus of

foreign policy decision-making,

s

the

Ministry

of

Foreign

Affairs nd its

minister became more influential

nd

the Central Committee

apparatus

progressively

ess

mportant.

Other

signs

of a new

style

ncluded the extensive

and

frequentpersonal diplomacy

conducted

by

Mikhail

Gorbachev,

first s

General

Secretary

f

the CPSU

and

later

as

President,

nd

the

vast

amount

of

foreign

ravel undertaken

by

him and

by Foreign

Minister

Shevardnadze

to

establishnew diplomatic links, to consolidate old and trusted ties and to

persuade

Western

eaders

and

publics

that

perestroika

nd

the new

political

thinking

mbodied a

genuine

transformationf the Soviet Union.20

If

foreign

ravelwas

a

change

in

style,

he nature

of

the countries

isited

n

the Third

World

and

the

resulting

inks established

went

beyond style

to

19

Francis Fukuyama, Gorbachev nd thenew Soviet agenda n the Third World,R-3634-A

(Santa Monica,

CA: Rand Corporation,

I989),

p.

31.

20

One

of the earliest

complaints

Soviet people expressed privately bout Gorbachev,

in

fact, was that

he

spent too much

time

abroad and consequently neglected domestic problems.

By I99O the criticismhad

become

open. See,

for

example,

the interview

with

Shevardnadze

in

Argumenty

fakty,

No. 43, 1990.

27I


11/19

MargotLight

provideevidence of the econd evel of tactical hanges n Soviet foreign olicy.

Of

course,visits

ave also

been paid

to

socialist

nd

socialist-oriented

tates,

nd

their eadershave been received n Moscow. Moreover,efforts ave been made

to consolidate Soviet relationswith long-standingnon-socialistThird World

friends, or example India. But more importantfrom

the point of view of

change

were

the ourneysundertaken y Shevardnadze

o

countries

with

which

the Soviet Union had previouslyhad tenuous or no

links,

or

where relations

had

previouslybeen strained, nd the reciprocalvisitsreceived n Moscow.

For example,

in

I986 and I987 Shevardnadze

visited Mexico, Brazil,

Argentina and Uruguay, as well as a number of

ASEAN states, ncluding

Indonesia,

and Australia. n

I989

he visited

Egypt,

ran and

Jordan,

nd

went

to China to arrangethe historic ummitmeeting.Gorbachev finallywent to

Beijing in May

I989,

though the summit was completely overshadowed by

studentprotestwhile he was there nd the Tiananmen

massacre

oon

afterhe

left.

n

I990 Shevardnadzewent

to

Namibia for he ndependence elebrations,

and then

visited Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe,

Mozambique,

Tanzania and

Nigeria.

Back

in

Moscow

during

those

years

Gorbachev and

Shevardnadze

received vast number

of

foreign eaders,many

of whom had

never

visited

he

USSR before.

Of

course, they

also

both

ourneyed

to

Western

capitals,

and

Shevardnadze went

to

Japan.

The diplomaticfruits f this activitywere considerable.Links have been

consolidated with

those countrieswhere

diplomatic

relations

lready

existed

but where there

had

previously

een ittle

high-level

ontact.

The Soviet

Union

established

r renewed

diplomatic

relations

with

a

number of

countries

n

the

Third

World:

for

example, Oman,

the United

Arab

Emirates, Kiribati,

Vanuatu, Qatar, Namibia, Chile, Albania, Bahrain,

Saudi

Arabia,

Honduras

and

South Korea. Gorbachev

and Shevardnadze were

prepared

to risk the

displeasure

of traditional

allies

in

return for the

perceived advantages

of

initiatingnew contacts. Consular relationswere establishedwith Israel,for

example, despite

the

disapproval

both of the

traditionalArab clients

of the

USSR

and

of eaders

of

Gulf states

with whom relations ad

only recently

een

established.

Similarly, despite

African

misgivings,high-level

contacts

took

place

between South Africa

nd the Soviet

Union

during

he

negotiations

ver

Angola,

and

Shevardnadze

nd President e Klerk

met

face to face

n

Namibia.

The

rapprochement

with

South

Korea and

Shevardnadze's

xpressed

mbition

to resolve the Korean

problem

not

only produced

a

calculated

snub when he

stopped

off t

Pyongyang

on an

Asian

tour,

but also

sent

Kim

I1Sung

to

China

for

reassurance

f

support.2'

There is

evidence, therefore,

hat with

regard

to

diplomacy

considerable

change

has

occurred

t the tactical

evel.

Soviet

intentions, owever,

extended

beyond

the

establishment

f mere

formal

diplomatic

relations

with

a

range

of

new

partners.

An

importantunderlying

im

was

to

expand

Soviet

foreign

21

See Shevardnadze's article, Pozitivny peremen', Izvestiya, Oct. I990,

and

the intcrview

he

gave

to

Argumenty

fakty,

No. 43,

I990.

L.

Mlechin,

'A return o Seoul', New Times, No. 41, I990, pp.

13-14, reports Kim I1Sung's reaction.

272


12/19

Sovietpolicy n

the Third

World

trade with capitalist evelopingand newlyindustrializedountries, o thatthe

economic basis of Soviet-Third World relations would become more

advantageousto the USSR. In this

respect

he results

were disappointing.High

hopes and good intentionswere expressedon all sides, and many agreements

were signed,but they

were seldom fulfilled. he countries f Latin America are

a

good example of

the

general problem concerning oviet economic relations

withthe Third World:

not only

are

most

Latin

American countries ied into

the economy of the

United States, but there is

a

basic

lack

of economic

complementarity etween them

and the

USSR

which

reduces

the

scope

for

exchange.22 And

although

trade relations

with

South Korea

preceded

diplomatic recognition,

nd it was

hoped

that formal ies would enable

them

to expand, particularlyn the fieldof technology, ne commentator emarked

sadly

that South Korea 'does not have

all that

great

an

interest

n the

Soviet

market,

which

as such does not

yet

exist'.23 In

any case,

the

extraordinary

difficulties,ncertainties

nd

shortages

n

the Soviet

economy

at

present

make

it unlikely that foreign rade will be able to expand very much

in

the near

future.

According to one Soviet

journalist, during

his

journey

around Africa

Shevardnadze

hoped

not so much

to

expand

trade as

to

explain

to

existing

tradingpartners hat

cooperation had,

at

last,

to

bring

some benefits o the

Soviet Union as well' and to

persuade

hem to considerhow

[they]mightpay

back at

least part

of theirdebts'.24 The

scale

of

foreign

ndebtedness

o

the

Soviet Union was made

public

for he

first

ime n I990.

The Soviet Union was

owed

a

total of

85,000

million roubles. The

greatest

ebtorswere not

in

fact

African ountries;nor were

they second-generation'

socialist-orientedtates.

Cuba, Mongolia

and

Vietnam,

classified

n

the Soviet Union as

fullyfledged

socialist Third World

countries,

were

among

the

top

five

debtors, owing

I5,490.6

million,

,542.7

million nd

9,I3I.2

million

oubles

espectively.

he

other two were India

(8,907.5

million roubles) and Syria

(6,742.6

million

roubles).

But

Angola

and

Mozambique

also had

huge outstanding

ebs 2,028.9

and 8o8.6 million roubles

respectively),

nd

Zambia, Nigeria and

Tanzania

owed lesser

ut

substantial mounts.25Whetheror

not

Shevardnadzehad

really

wanted to call the

debts

in, it

is

unlikely

that

his

journey through

Africa

persuaded

him that

t

was a

realistic

hope.

Public reaction

n

the Soviet Union

to

foreign

ndebtedness

ointed

to the

domestic

opposition

which

might seriously mpede

the

aim of

expanding

economic relationswiththe Third World iftrade s to depend upon extending

22

See Nicola Miller, Soviet relations

withLatin America, 959-1987 Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press,

I989)

for an analysis of the problems.

In India and the Soviet Union: Tradeand technologyransfer

(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 990), Santosh Mehrotra points out that

although India is

not tied into the American economy,

lack

of

complementarity

s a

growing problem

in Soviet-Indian

relations.

23

Mlechin,

'A

returnto Seoul', p.

I4.

24

M. Yusin, 'Novy vzglyad

na

Afriku',

Izvestiya, 0 Mar. I990.

25

The list of debts

was

published

in

Izvestiya,

Mar. I990.

With regard

to the socialist Third World,

Shevardnadze said in an interview

a

few months

ater

(Argumentyfakty,

No.

43,

I990) that although

every effortwas being made to improve

the

situation,

t the time relations

were

establishedno

attempthad been made to base them on the principle of mutual benefit.He predicted

that

improvement would be

slow and

painful.

273


13/19

MargotLight

credits.

And the

annuallydecreasing

mount

of money allotted o grantsmakes

it abundantly lear thatexpansion certainly

ould not occur through he offer

of

aid. The

I989

budget

allotted 2,500 million roubles for aid.

In

I990

the

amount provided foraid was reduced to 9,300 million roubles. n the recently

approved

I99I

budget,

t

has fallen o

only

400

million

roubles.26

In

short, lthough therehave been manifest hanges n Soviet policy in the

Third

World

at

thetactical evel,

n

so far s thenew

policy

aimed at

improving

Soviet economic

relations,

uccesshas been limited.But a

number

of traditional

tacticshave

been

employed

n

Soviet relationswith the

Third

World

in

the ast

few

years,particularly

with

regard

to the Asia-Pacific

region.

These include

proposalsfornuclear-free ones and for

disarmament, orregionalconfidence-

building measures, conomic security greements nd a Helsinki-type rocess

for he Asian-Pacific rea.

Although

none of themhave

caught

the

magination

of

the

people

to whom

they

were

addressed, they

have not been

dropped

entirely.

Moreover the

proposals

have

not,

as

in

the

past,

been confined to

rhetoric. he

withdrawalof Soviet aircraft rom

Cam

Ranh

Bay military

ase

in

Vietnam it is projected

that ll

Soviet forces

will

have withdrawnfrom he

base

by

I992)

can be

interpreted

s the first

tep

in an

attempt

o realize

the

various proposals.27

Attempts

to broaden relations have not led to the

complete neglect

of

traditional ies

n

the

Third

World.

During

his

Middle

East

tour,

for

example,

Shevardnadze

visited

Syria

and

Iraq.

A

great

deal of attention

as been

paid

to

India.

Shevardnadze

was

the

highest-ranking

oviet official ver

to

go

to

Nicaragua,

and

he

and

Gorbachev visitedCuba.

It

is almost

certainly

he case

that Soviet leaders have tried

to

persuade

their Third World socialist and

socialist-oriented riends

o

adopt

economic

and

political

reforms.

Many

have

done

so,

but Vietnameseeconomic

reforms,

or

example,

have not been

very

successful

nd

they

have not

been

accompanied by

much

political hange.

Both

the Sovietpress nd theMinistry fForeignAffairs avebeenunambiguous n

their riticism f the Vietnamese

government.28

he

Vietnamese Communist

Party

has been

equally

critical f

the reforms

n

the Soviet Union and

Eastern

29

Europe.2

Although

Soviet

policy-makers

how little enthusiasmnow

for

socialist

Third World

states,forcing

hem to reform eems to be

impossible.

On

the

other

hand, eaving

them

entirely

n

the

urch

s

proving

to be

equally difficult,

26

Strong criticism

f

Soviet aid policy can be found

in A.

Kortunov and A. Izyumov, 'The Soviet

Union

in

the changing world', International

ffairs

Moscow), Aug. I988, pp. 5i-6.

The

I99I

budget

was published in Izvestiya,

s

Jan.

I

99 I.

In July

990

Gorbachev issued a decree calling for mutual

advantage

and

mutual interests

n Soviet

economic cooperation with developing

countries, nd stating

that n future economic assistance hall be given with due account of our country's

actual

possibilities'. Izvestiya, 4 July 990.

27 For the

various

disarmament proposals

made

by Gorbachev, see Roy Allison,

The

Soviet Union and the

strategy f Non-Alignment

n

the Third World

Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, I988), pp.

ios-I i.

Many

of

the securityproposals have recentlybeen reiterated y Shevardnadze in 'Pozitivny

peremen'. On

the

withdrawal

of Soviet

troops,see

Suzanne

Crow, 'Will the Moscow-Hanoi alliance

survive aid

and

arms cutbacks?', Report

n the

USSR, Radio Liberty

2:

45, 9 Nov. I990,

pp.

I4-I7.

28

For the Ministryof Foreign Affairs ssessment ee 'The foreign and diplomatic

activity of the USSR',

International ffairsMoscow), Jan. I990, p. 74. More critical views can be found in

Izvestiya,4 Feb.

I990.

29

Suzanne Crow, 'Will the Moscow-Hanoi alliance survive'.

274


14/19

Sovietpolicy n the Third World

whetheror not they have adopted a reformprogramme nd whateverviews

their leaders express about perestroika. The case of Cuba illustrates he

dilemma.

On

the face of

it, Cuba's economic dependence

on

the Soviet

Union

should

give Moscow tremendous everage over Fidel Castro's domestic and foreign

policy. Not only does Cuba get its oil from the Soviet Union at subsidized

prices, ut t sells ts urplus o earn hard currency.Moreover, the Soviet Union

buys Cuban sugar at about four imesthe world marketprice and accountsfor

nearly8o per cent of Cuba's total trade.30As we have seen above, Cuba is the

Soviet Union's largestdebtor. Yet Castro has made no secret f

his

mplacable

opposition to perestroika.He demonstratedhis opposition to

it

in I986

by

adopting a Rectification Programme which increased centralizationand

abolished existing market mechanisms

n

Cuba.

In

I989

his

fear of

political

reformwas reflected n the execution and imprisonment f some of his most

trusted dvisers.3'He also banned the distribution

f

Moscow

News

and Sputnik

in

Cuba.

As

far as Cuba's

foreign policy

is

concerned,

Gorbachev

was

informed

duringhis

visitto Havana in

April

I989 thatCuba would continueto

support

revolutionarymovements nd countries. his stancemakes

an

improvement

n

Cuban-American

relations mpossible (this

would not

only

relieve Cuba's

economic predicament

but also suit the Soviet

Union). Although

Castro has

refrained rom ttackingGorbachev personally,

e

has been scathing bout the

events

n

Eastern

Europe

and vociferous

n

his determination

hat

nothing

can

stop Cuba

from

moving along

the

path

to

socialism.32Yet

Cuba's total

dependence

seems to make

it

difficult or

the

Soviet Union

to

retaliate

by

cutting iescompletely.Many commentators

who

criticize

oviet

aid policies

argue

in

relation to Cuba

that

it

would be

unworthy

to

forget

traditional

obligations

nd Soviet

'responsibility

..

for

the

present

tate

of affairs

here

.33

There hasbeen economicpressure,nd Soviet domesticproblemshave affected

deliveries

particularly

f

oil)

to

Cuba, causing great hardship.

But assurances

have been

given

that deliveries

will

continue.34

The leaders

of

the socialist-orientedtates,however, may

well feel

that

they

have been abandoned, because

it is in

relation

o them that the most

dramatic

events

have occurred

n

Soviet Third World

policy, representinghange

at

the

strategic

evel.

The

new

thinking

bout

regional

conflict as been

assiduously

applied

in

Afghanistan

nd

Angola and,

less

successfully

o

far, n

Ethiopia

and

Cambodia. In Afghanistan,Soviet participation in the UN-sponsored

negotiation

was

direct,

while its role was

more

indirect

in

the

Angolan

settlement.

n the

case of

Ethiopia

and

Cambodia,

the Soviet

Union

plays

a

30

Paul Goble,

'Is Moscow about to

cut

Castro

loose', Report

n the

USSR,

Radio

Liberty

:

2, I2

Jan.

I990,

pp.

4-5.

31

Douglas Payne, 'Fidel Castro versusperestroika', eport

n

the

USSR,

Radio

Liberty

:

2,

I2

Jan. I990,

pp. 6-IO.

32

Vladimir

rlov,

Moscow

News,

No.

IO,

I990.

33

Vitaly Sobolev,

'Mutual

liabilities',

New

Times,

No.

8, I990, pp. I2-I3.

See also

Vladimir

Razuvayev,

'Between geopolitics

and

ideology'

New

Times,

No.

i9, I990, pp. I6-I7.

34

The

Guardian, I.

Dec. I990.

275


15/19

MargotLight

backroom role, supporting nd encouragingpolitical

solutions o the conflicts

but

not participating

n

the negotiations. ut all fourcases fulfil he criteria or

strategic hange,because the Soviet Union has been prepared o withdrawfrom

established ositions n stateswith Marxist-Leninist overnments.35

The effortso end the civil war

in

Afghanistanncluded applyingtechniques

of

'national reconciliation' for example by co-opting

non-partypeople into

central

nd local government,moderating fficialttitudes o religion, eplacing

Babrak Karmal by Mohammed Najibullah in the hope that government

legitimacywould increase,unilaterally nnouncing

ceasefires

nd

offering o

share

power

with the

mujahidin

n

a

coalition

government).

In

the

end,

however, when the Soviet Union abandoned all its preconditions nd signed

the Geneva Accordsin April

I988,

the conflictwas seemingly till nsoluble.

When the ast Soviet

troops

withdraw

n

February 989,

the civil

war

did not

end; nor did

Soviet

military upplies to the Afghan

army (and

American

supplies

o

the mujahidin)

o

prosecute

t.36

Two years ater

peace

talksbetween

the two sides

had not

yetreached satisfactoryonclusion nd the

superpowers

had not yet agreed not to supply arms.

As

far

as

ending

the civil war

in

Angola

is concerned,

t

was

a

question

of

persuading

Cuba as well as the

MPLA

regime

to

negotiate.

American-Soviet

cooperation

worked better nd more

quickly

n

Angola

than

n

Afghanistan,

perhapsbecausethe ndependence f Namibia couldbe gained ntheprocessof

ending

the war. But here

too, negotiating

he withdrawalof

Cuba

and

South

Africa

proved

easier than

effecting

he

national reconciliation

within

Angola

that

heresolution

f

regional onflict

alls

for,

nd the conflict

as

not

yet

come

to an

end.

Direct Soviet

influence

n

relation

to

Ethiopia

and Vietnam is less

visible,

although Soviet support

for the

negotiations

s clear.37But so far

reconciliation

eems even more

elusive here than elsewhere.

Soviet leaders

have

proposed

their

technique

for

dealing

with

regional

conflictn situationswhere theSovietUnion isnot directlynvolved.But it is

in

relation o

the conflictsn

socialist-oriented

tates,

where

the Soviet

Union

has been

directly

nvolved

and

where the

end of

the conflict lmost

certainly

means

the end

of a

Marxist-Leninist

egime,

that

strategic hange

in

Soviet

policy

n

the

Third

World

can

be

observed. For it s here that

hanges

n

Soviet

long-termgoals

can be

registered.38

While

Iraq

does

not have

a

Marxist-Leninist

egime,

oviet

policy

n relation

to the Guif crisis

epresents

distinct

trategic hange.

The Soviet

Union found

itself

n an

awkward

situationwhen

Iraq

invaded Kuwait

in

August

I990.

On

the one

hand,

the

traditional

Soviet

support

for the

sanctity

of

existing

35

The most

resounding examples

of

strategic hange occurred, of course,

not in the Third World

but in

Eastern urope

n

I989

and

990.

36

On

the otherhand, expectations

that the government

would fall as soon as Soviet troops were

withdrawn

were confounded. For

a

detailed analysis

of the negotiationsof the Geneva Accords

and

the events thereafter,

ee Amin Saikal and William Maly, eds., The Soviet

withdrawalfrom fghanistan.

37

See,

for

example,

Shevardnadze's interview

n

Izvestiya, 7 Mar. I990,

on the negotiations

n Ethiopia,

and his Pozitivny

peremen' on Cambodia.

38

The

seemingly

easy acceptance

of results

f

the Nicaraguan elections

and

the reception

of Mrs

Chamorro

in

Moscow

also

perhaps

fits nto thiscategory of change.

276


16/19

Sovietpolicy

n

the

Third World

international ordershad become

more urgent nce

the

revolutions

n Eastern

Europe had rendered uropean

borders esscertain. here could be no question,

therefore,

f

condoning

the nvasion.

Moreover,

demonstratingupportfor he

Westernpositionwould prove Soviet reliabilitys a partnern the new world

order.

And as we have

seen,

the

Soviet

Union had

recently

established

diplomatic

relationswith some of the Gulf states and

hoped

to extend this

policy. Thus therewere strongreasons

for

voting

for the UN resolutions hat

called for

raq's

withdrawal

and

imposed

an

embargo.

On

the other hand, Iraq

was a long-standing oviet ally, with whom

a

friendship reatyhad been signed

n

I972.

Although arms deliveries

had been

suspendedduring

the

ran-Iraq war, they

had

subsequently

een resumed

nd

there were about

200

Soviet military dvisers n Iraq and

5,000

other Soviet

citizens.

Furthermore,

he

presence

f Western

troops

n

the Gulf would

bring

them

larmingly

lose to

the southern orders f the Soviet Union.

In

any case,

the conflict eemed ideal for

applying

the new Soviet method of conflict

resolution.

Supporting

the

use

of

force,therefore,

as a less

easy decision

to

make.

After ome hesitation, he

SovietUnion votedin favourof the resolution o

use force. There seemed

to be no

question

of Soviet forces

participating

n

military ction. Although Shevardnadze

uggested t one stage thatthe Soviet

Union mightcommit troops to a UN force,Gorbachev carefullydid not

mention the

possibility

n

public.

Under the

new

constitution

ending troops

abroad

requires

decision

by

the

Supreme Soviet,

and

it

is extremely nlikely

that

approval

could have been obtained.

The

conservative

Soyuz group

of

deputies objected

to

Soviet

policy

in

the

Gulf,

while more radical

deputies

remembered

the lessons of Afghanistan.39oth before and after UN SC

Resolution

678 (which

authorized

he

use

of'

all

possible

means'

to ensure

raq's

withdrawal from Kuwait),

strenuous efforts

were made to negotiate a

settlement.vgenyPrimakovembarkedon two roundsof shuttle iplomacy n

October,

and later wo

deputyforeign

ministers isitedvarious Arab

capitals.40

The

Soviet

leadershiphoped

to

negotiate

n Arab solution to the crisis.When

that

failed,

n

increased

United Nations role was

suggested.

And

thoughthe

Soviet

leadership

denied

any

kind

of

linkage,

therewas

strong upport

for the

idea of

a

Middle

East conference

t

which

all

the

outstanding

onflicts

n

the

area could be sorted

out.4'

Soviet efforts o find

a

political

solution continued even after

he

war

had

For the

objections

of Soyuz,

see 'Ne

mozhem

otnesti

eto k

dostizheniyam

nashei vneshnei

politiki',

Literaturnaya

ossiya, 2

Nov.

I990,

and the

comment

by

Yuri

Makarov,

'Za kem

ne pospevayut

politrabotniki',

Izvestiya,

7 Oct. I990.

The

radicals,

on the other

hand,

criticized

the

government's

reluctance

to withdraw

Soviet specialists.

See

Susan

Crow,

'Soviet

Union

pursues

dual

policy

on

Iraq',

Report

n

the USSR,

Radio

Liberty,

:

40,

5

Oct. I990,

pp.

6-8.

40

Primakov,

a

Middle

East expert

with

a

long-standing

nterest

n conflict

resolution,

was

a member

of

the

Presidential

Council

and travelledas Gorbachev's

personal

envoy.

See the interview

with

him

in

Literaturnaya

azeta,

7 Nov.

I990.

There

have been

suggestions

that

Shevardnadze

took

a harder

ine

towards

Iraq

than Gorbachev.

See Suzanne Crow,

'Soviet

Union

pursues

dual

policy

on

Iraq'.

41

This

was,

in

fact,

n old

Soviet

proposal

thathad

been

revived

by

Gorbachev

in the early

days of

the

new

political

thinking.

277


17/19

MargotLight

begun.

On the

eve of

the

ground

battle

Gorbachev

conducted

dramatic nd

intensive egotiations

o seek a

compromise

thatwould make the

ground

war

unnecessary.Since Gorbachev seemed prepared to negotiate with Saddam

Hussein and to acceptthevalidity f some ofhis conditions,many nthe West

began to question Soviet intentions although both PresidentBush and Prime

Minister

Major

were

publicly

careful

not to

impute

devious

motives).

But did

Gorbachev's

eleventh-hour

ntervention

eally

reflect

major

switch

n

Soviet

policy

Military

and Communist

Party

conservatives

certainly put pressure

on

Gorbachev,

as

they

had on

Shevardnadze

at the

beginning

of the

crisis.

Moreover, they

were

in a

considerably tronger ositionby

the

beginning

of

February han they had been in August when Iraq invaded Kuwait. In early

February,a Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU appealed to

Gorbachev to renew his

diplomatic efforts o end the war. Criticism of

American policy in the Gulf War-and of the Soviet government for

supporting

that

policy-couched

in

the language of the Cold War was

published

not

only

in

conservative apers ike Sovetskaya ossiva nd Krasnaya

zvezda,

but

also

in

Pravda.42

enior political generalswent so faras to hold a

press conference n

I3

February to denounce the war. It is not difficult o

imagine

how much alarm

the vivid demonstrationof American military

technologymust

have

caused among

the

military. here was an increasing ear

in the

Soviet Union that Saddam Hussein's collapse would create a power

vacuum that would be filled

by

the United States.

t

is

clear, therefore,

hat

Soviet

support

for coalition

policy

was under

ncreasing

ttack.

On the other

hand,

the

attempt

o

negotiate

n end

to

the war can

hardly

be

seen

as a

reversal

f

policy.

There had been several

previous ttempts

efore he

air

attack

began.

Soviet

support

for he

use

of

force,

irst

n

connection

with the

embargo

and laterto ensure

raqi

withdrawal

from

Kuwait,

had

been hesitant

and reluctant.A political solution was entirely n keeping with the 'new

political thinking'

about

regional

conflict.

But

this s

not

to

argue

that the

attempt

was

entirely

ltruistic.

orbachev

would have

gained

a

great

deal

if his

final nitiativehad succeeded. Conservativeoppositionto his policies might

have

been

stemmed,

nd a new demonstration f his

important

nternational

position

would

have

helped

him in

his

power struggle

with

Boris Yeltsin

and

the

radical

opposition. Finally,

the Gulf

War

threatened he

loss

of the hard-

won Western

recognition

that the Soviet Union had

legitimate security

interestsn the Middle East. IfGorbachev'sdiplomacyhad succeeded,Soviet

participation

n

the

peace process

would have been assured.

The

Soviet Union's

reputation mong

the Arab

supporters

f Saddam

Hussein would

have

risen.

Can

one

talk

of

strategic hange

fthe Soviet

Union not

only

did not commit

troops

to

the coalition

forces

ut

seemed,

n the

end,

to act

against

he coalition

in

trying

o end the

war?

Despite

theabsenceof Soviet

troops,

nd the

eagerness

to find

a

political

solution before

raq's complete destruction, comparison

between

Soviet

behaviour

in

previous

nternational rises

particularly

n

the

Middle

East)

and

the

present ooperation

reveals

a

substantial

hift n

policy.

278


18/19

Sovietpolicy

n the

Third

World

Though regretwas expressed

that the chance of averting

the land war was

missed,

herewas no outcry

n the

Soviet press.

oviet

policy

n

the

Gulf

might

have been less successful

han

other

efforts o

end regional

conflict, ut on the

whole Soviet conductduring he war reflectshe general hift hathas occurred

in

Soviet policy towards

the Third World.

4. Future prospects

This account

of

Soviet

policy towards the Third World since

I985

makes

it

clearthat herehavebeenchangesthat xtend well

beyond the exigencyof the

Gulf

crisis. t is also

apparent

that while Soviet

activity

n

the Third World is

influenced y the need for betterEast-West relations, he changes represent

general

shift

in

Soviet

policy

towards that

area

and are not

simply

a

manifestation

f East-West

detente.

Furthermore,

n

considering hesignific-

ance

of the new

policy,

we have noted change at

the evels of style, actics nd

strategy,

hich

suggests

hat henew

political

hinking

s not

merely

he

pursuit

of traditional

oals using

new

techniques.

On the otherhand,

the record ndicates hatSovietpolicyhas been successful

at

some levels

and

disappointing

in

other

respects.

One reason for the

disappointments

s

the constraints nder which

Soviet

foreign olicy operates.

With

regard

to the

declared

aim of

developing

even-handed, economically

beneficial

elations

with a

variety

f

Third

World

countries,

or

xample,

there

are

both

economic

and

political

onstraints

hich

hamper

hedesired

xpansion

of trade. Economic constraintsrise

fromthe structure f the Soviet

economy

and the lack of

complementarity

between

it

and

many

Third

World

economies:

both

are

primarily

xporters

f

raw

materials,

oth need modern

technology,

oth

have

scarce

currency

esources. hese constraintsre

unlikely

to disappear

n

the short

r

medium

term,

nd

they

will continue o

hamper

he

expansionof relationswith the Third World.

Besides

energy,however,

the Soviet

Union

does

have arms to sell

abroad,

and it

is not

yet

clear whether he

past painful xperiences

hat resultedfrom

supplying

rms

will

serve to deter

future

ales.

If

the USSR does

curtail

rms

sales,

this

may

act as

a

further

onstraint,

ince

Third World customerswould

look for

other

uppliers.

ronically,

n the ast

couple

of

yearsperestroika

tself

has become

a

constraint.

he

present

conomic

and

political

chaos

in the Soviet

Union

and the

uncertainty

bout the futuremake

foreign

rade difficult

nd

deter any furtherxpansion.A further onstraint n the kind of expansion

envisaged by

the Soviet

leadership

arises from

past

commitments.

Both

Gorbachev

and Shevardnadzereassured

he

people

of the socialistThird World

states

hat

lthoughthey

would

like to work towardsa more

balanced and fair

exchange relationship,

hey

will not

renege

on their raditional

artners.

he

resulting

conomic and

opportunity

osts to the Soviet Union

will

constrain

expansion

elsewhere.

It

has become obvious

in

recentmonthsthat there s

opposition

within

the

Soviet

Union to the new

policy.

This acts as

an

additional constraint.

n fact

279


19/19

MargotLight

opposition comes fromtwo differentirections. here is considerablepopular

oppositionto the expansion

of

Soviet

relationswith

the Third World, based to

a large extent on the view

that

charitybegins

at

home' and

that

the Soviet

Union has been disadvantagedfor ong enoughin its relationswiththe Third

World.43

The increasingly ocal conservatives epresent he second direction from

which opposition s expressed o the new Soviet foreign olicy. They object to

the surrender

f old

positions,

nd

although

their

primary omplaints

oncern

Germany,

Eastern

Europe

and arms

reductions, they

also

question

the

withdrawal from Afghanistan nd Soviet policy

in

the Gulf. Although the

military re

generally areful

n what

they publish

about

foreignpolicy,the

speeches of militarydeputies in the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of

People's Deputies

are

frequently

illedwith

fiery riticism. he Soyuz group of

deputies,

nd

particularly

olonels Alksnis and

Petrushenko,

have

begun

to

publish theirviews.44Shevardnadze's resignation peech

in

December I990

made

it

clear

how

strong

he

believed

this

opposition

to

be. The next few

months

will

indicate whetherhe

was

right.

If he was right,

what will

be the consequences

for

Soviet policy

n

the Third

World?

And if

perestroika urvives,

what are

the

ikely

trends

n

Soviet-Third

World relations?

n

fact,

t s

probable

that

domestic conomic

debility

will

act

as a constraint n Soviet policy

in the Third

World even

if

there s

a

return o

old

thinking. The

Third World

may,

of

course, become

an

arena for

competition

nce

again,

but the Soviet Union

will

have

very

ittlewith which

to compete.

In

any case,

even if the clock is turned back in

Moscow,

it

is

unlikely

that

t will be turned

back elsewhere.

Those

socialist and socialist-

oriented ountries

hathave

already dopted

democratic

reforms

will

probably

be

unwilling

or unable

to

revert o

previous

methods.

And while

those

that

have

not

adopted perestroikawill,

as

now,

be

heavily dependent

n

the Soviet

Union, it will have littlemore to offer hem than at present.The activist

policies

of the

I970S

are

unlikely

to recur

n

the foreseeable uture.

The

same constraints

will

operate

if

perestroika

urvives. n

other words,

the Soviet Union

will

continue o

diversify

ts relations

with

the Third

World,

but domestic conomic

problems

nd a lack of

economic

complementarity

ill

put

limitson the

expansion. Perhaps

the

real

okers

in the

pack

are

the

likely

Third

World policies

of the

I5

successor tates o the

Soviet Union.

42

US policy

was

attacked

in

Pravda on 8

and

I6

Feb. I99I; Krasnaya zvezda and SovetskayaRossiya

published criticisms f Soviet support for US policy on i6 Feb.

I99I.

43

There are many examples

in

the stenographicreports

of

Supreme Soviet

and

light - soviet policy in the third world

Documents