Jorge Salamero Sanz

Lions, Tigers and Deers:

What building zooscan teach us aboutsecuring microservices?

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Jorge Salamero Sanz

<jorge.salamero@sysdig.com> @bencerillo

@sysdig• Working on OSS last 12 years

• Working on OSS+Cloud last 5 years

• Working on monitoring last 3 years

• Technical Marketing geek @sysdig

Sysdig

Open Source system troubleshooting

with native container support(htop, vmstat, netstat, lsof, tcpdump…)

Monitoring, alerting,

troubleshooting tool for

Docker, Kubernetes, Mesos,

RancherOS, GCE, ECS

Traditional deployment

Full host OS

kernelsystemdsyslogd

App services

MySQLNginx

OpenSSLJava

App A

App B

App C

Ops Devs

Containerized deployment

Full host OS

kernel

+Docker

MySQL App A

Ops DevOps

Nginx + OpenSSL App B

Java 8.0 build XXX App C

How to secure this?

Containerization is not something new to us...

• Establish trust boundaries

• Identify, minimise, and harden attack surfaces

• Reduce scope and access

• Layer protections and defenses

From Aaron Grattafiori presented “The Golden Ticket: Docker and High Security Microservices

Securing Microservices

Defense in depth Microservices

Single responsibility principle:

• Principle of least privileges

• Principle of least surprise

• Principle of least access

Container Security Techniques

• New workflows (docker pull vs previous apt update/yum update)

• CI/CD Pipeline (Jenkins, Openshift, etc: rebuilds, rolling updates)

• Access management, logging & auditing (Kubernetes, Openshift:

user roles, namespaces, centralized logging, authn & authz, etc)

• Trust boundaries (do you trust entire Docker Hub? Image signing, Docker Notary)

• Simplify container OS, tons of useless stuff (RancherOS, Atomic,

CoreOS, Alpine Linux, etc)

• Network security (Weave, etc)

• Secret management (Vaults instead of environment vars, etc)

Docker Security Techniques

• Drop privileges

• Limit capabilities

• Do not run as root! containers are not VMs!

• cgroups

• Limit resources share, not access restriction

• namespaces

• Useful for not complete security model

• User namespaces

• Kubernetes/Openshift security contexts

• Host security and access (Docker bench, RO access, etc)

Scanning

What are my containers doing?

• Static scanning

• Dynamic scanning

Static Scanning

Yay, this was soo easy to deploy! I Docker Hub!(your developers too, actually they were already using it :P)

uhm… wait, is someone maintaining this image?

RUN apt-get install -y wget build-essential python python-dev python-pip python-virtualenvRUN wget http://nodejs.org/dist/node-latest.tar.gzRUN tar xvzf node-latest.tar.gzRUN cd node-v* && ./configure && CXX="g++ -Wno-unused-local-typedefs" make && CXX="g++ -Wno-unused-local-typedefs" make install

• Static Scanning:

• CoreOS Clair, Docker Nautilus, Red Hat CloudForms, etc

Image Vulnerability Scanning

• Scan contents of images looking for software versions with known defects

• Container image layering can make this efficient (exploits immutable nature of images)

Ubuntu: 14.04

Apache: 2.2

Wordpress: 4.6 PHP: 7.0

Image Vulnerability Scanning

• Scan contents of images looking for software versions with known defects

• Container image layering can make this efficient (exploits immutable nature of images)

•

Ubuntu: 14.04

Apache: 2.2

Wordpress: 4.6 PHP: 7.0

Image Vulnerability Scanning

• Scan contents of images looking for software versions with known defects

• Container image layering can make this efficient (exploits immutable nature of images)

•

Ubuntu: 14.04

Apache: 2.2

Wordpress: 4.6 PHP: 7.0

Image Vulnerability Scanning

• Scan contents of images looking for software versions with known defects

• Container image layering can make this efficient (exploits immutable nature of images)

•

Ubuntu: 14.04

Apache: 2.2

Wordpress: 4.6 PHP: 7.0

Container Security Techniques

OK, no known vulnerabilities, still secure?

Containers are black boxes exposing a behaviour, is something misbehaving?

• Dynamic Scanning:

• Seccomp

• MAC (Mandatory Access Control)

• Behavioral Security Monitoring

Seccomp

• Seccomp: application system call “sandboxing”

• Create filter (BPF program ) with lists of allowed syscalls

• Each syscall matched against filter

• Failures-> log message, error return, and/or kill process

• Docker runs containerized process under a seccomp profile

• Notable disallowed syscalls:

• clone (creating new namespaces)

• reboot (reboot the host)

• setns (change namespaces)

Mandatory Access Control

• SELinux or AppArmor

• Same mechanisms: kernel-level interception/filtering

• features++ && complexity++

• Above syscalls:

• Actors (process)

• Actions (read/write on files/sockets)

• Targets (files, IPs, ports)

• But what if I only want to put some surveillance in?

Behavioral Security Monitoring

• Auditing vs enforcement• detect intrusions instead of preventing intrusions

• Build rules that define suspicious/anomalous behavior

• Match rules against activity on a system

• Auditd (SELinux logger)

• Falco (with container capabilities)

Sysdig Falco

An anomaly detection system built on top of the sysdig engine

Sysdig ContainerVision

Kernel

Docker

Container1

Container2

Container3

App Apprkt LXC

Kernel moduleInstrumentation

What is Sysdig Falco?

• Detects suspicious activity defined by a set of easy rules

• Uses sysdig’s flexible and powerful filtering expressions (in userspace)

• Container support (Docker, Kubernetes, Mesos, etc)• Flexible notification methods• Open Source

Quick Examples

A shell is run in a container container.id != host and proc.name = bash

Overwrite system binaries fd.directory in (/bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin) and write

Container namespace change evt.type = setns and not proc.name in (docker, sysdig)

Non-device files written in /dev(evt.type = creat or evt.arg.flags contains O_CREAT) and proc.name != blkid and fd.directory = /dev and fd.name != /dev/null

Process tries to access cameraevt.type = open and fd.name = /dev/video0 and not proc.name in (skype, webex)

Falco Rules

• .yaml file containing Macros, Lists, and Rules

- macro: bin_dir condition: fd.directory in (/bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin)

- list: package_mgmt_binaries items: [dpkg, dpkg-preconfigu, rpm, rpmkey, yum, frontend]

- rule: write_binary_dir desc: an attempt to write to any file below a set of binary directories condition: bin_dir and evt.dir = < and open_write and not package_mgmt_procs output: "File below a known binary directory opened for writing (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name)" priority: WARNING

Alerts and Outputs

• Events that match filter expression (rule) result in alerts• output field used to format event into alert message• Sending to:

• syslog• file• stdout• shell (e.g. mail -s "Falco Notification" alerts@example.com)

• Sysdig Cloud

Falco Demo

Remember

Container behaviour security monitoringshouldn’t be difficult...

Learn More

Thank You!