Session 9 - Interpretation of Words and Phrases, Part 1 General and Particular Use of Words

Mataguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (1996) Joni (just added to the digest from the LegMeth book hehe)

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS:Director of Forest Development- issued order finding and declaring MLE to have encroached upon, and conducted illegal logging operations within the licensed or concession area of DAVENCORMinister ( now Secretary) of Natural Resources-  order of the Director of Forest Development affirmed. Subsequently issued Order of Execution against MLE and/or MIWPIRTC- MIWPI filed action for prohibition, damages and injunction. Issued a TRO restraining and/or enjoining respondent from enforcing the decision of the Secretary and the order of execution. Later granted the petition.CA- Reversed the RTC decision. Denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.SC- Petition for Review on Certiorari granted.FACTS:

-       Milagros Matugina, who was then doing business under the name of Matugina Logging Enterprises (MLE), a sole proprietorship venture, was a grantee of a Provisional Timber License (PTL).

-       She and petitioner Mataguini Integrated Wood Products, Inc. (MIWPI) executed a Deed of Transfer, transferring all of the former’s rights, interests, ownership and participation in Provincial Timber License to the latter for and in consideration of shares of stocks in MIWPI

o   Milagros Mataguina became the majority stockholder of MIWPI. She requested the Director for a change of name and transfer of management of PTL No. 30, from a single proprietorship under her name, to that of MIWPI.

-       Pending approval of the transfer, DAVENCOR complained to the District Forester at Mati, Davao Oriental that Milagros Matuguina/MLE had encroached into and was conducting logging operations in DAVENCOR’s timber concession.

-       The Investigating Committee and the Director of Forest Development both found in favor of DAVENCOR and held MLE liable.

-       Upon appeal, the Minister of Natural Resources affirmed the Director’s ruling.o   During the pendency of this case, Mataguina ceased to be a stockholder of

MIWPI.-       After the decision became final and executory, the Minister then issued a writ of execution

against “MLE and/or MIWPI”-       MIWPI filed the action for Prohibition, Damages and Injunction, in order to prevent the Minister

of Natural Resources from enforcing the Order of Execution against it.-       MIWPI argued that it has a distinct and separate personality of its own under the law, and was

never a party to the case before DAVENCOR and MLEL.-       The respondents cite Sec. 61 of PD 705 to establish MIWPI’s succession to the liability of

Milagros Mataguina/MLE, which, in part, provides: “the licensee, lessee or permitee shall be allowed to transfer or convey his license agreement, license, lease or permit…and the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor”

-       RTC rendered a decision granting the petition, which the appellate court reversed. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.ISSUES:

1.     Was the Petitioner denied due process when it was adjudged liable with MLE for encroaching upon the timber concession of DAVENCOR in the respondent Minister’s Order of Execution? YES

2.     Is the petitioner a transferee of MLE’s interest, as to make it liable for the latter’s illegal logging operations in DAVENCOR’s timber concession, or more specifically, is it possible to pierce the veil of MIWPI’s corporate existence, making it a mere conduit or successor of MLE? NORATIO:

1.     The writ of execution issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources clearly varies the term of his Decision, inasmuch as the Writ includes the MIWPI as party liable whereas the Decision only mentions Milagros Mataguina/MLE. The writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce.

2.     There is insufficient basis for the appellate court’s ruling that MIWPI is the same as Mataguina. The trial court found that: a) MLE did not execute acts or powers directly involving MIWPI b) MLE did not involve itself in transaction using both single proprietorship and MIWPI

Neither is MIWPI the privy or successor-in-interest of MLE, as the liability for the encroachment over DAVENCOR’s timber concession is concerned by reason of the transfer of interest in PTL.First, PTL remained in the name of Milagros Mataguina/MLE until it expired on June 30 1977. More importantly, even if it is mandated in Sec. 61 that ” the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor”, this does not mean that the obligations are assumed, indiscriminately.  When a literal interpretation would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to the spirit and reason, disregarding if necessary the letter of the law. The terms used in statutes are generally to be given their ordinary meaning to the end that absurdity in the law must be avoided. The term “obligations” is construed to mean obligations incurred by the transferor in the ordinary course of business. It cannot be construed to mean those obligations or liabilities incurred y the transferor as a result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal obligations of the transferor, and could not have been included in the term “obligations” absent any modifying provision to that effect.  Also, the language used in the letters of the Bureau of Forest Development regarding the approval of Mataguina’s request for the change of name and transfer of management implies that the ovbligations which MIWPI are to assume as transferee of Milagros Mataguina/MLE are those obligations in favor of the government only, and not to any other entity.

HELD: Petition Granted.

Tan v. People (1998) Panganiban, J  Ria wait lang di pa to tapos kakain lang akoGR 115507Alejandro Tan, Ismael Ramilo, and Fred Moreno v. The People of the Philippines and

the Court of AppealsPetition for review on certiorari of decision of the Court of Appeals

Facts:- Petitioners were convicted by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, of a violoation of Sec. 68,

PD 708, which penalizes the possession of lumber without the necessary papers. - Tan is the owner of A&E lumber corporation, Ramilo is the caretaker and timekeeper, and

Moreno is the driver who was apprehended carrying narra and white sth

Petitioners aver:- They were carrying lumber, not timber. It is timber that is required to have papers under

Sec. 68, PD 708

Issue:1. WON lumber is not timber - NO, lumber is timber

Ratio:1. In the absence of legislative intent or definition of lumber, the ordinary meaning of

the word must be used. According to Webster's dictionary, lumber is the 'manufactured product of logs' or 'timber sawed or split into marketable form.' In short, processed timber. And since the legislature did not distinguish between processed and unprocessed timber (they just said timber), ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus - where the law does not distinguish, neither should we distinguish.

Held:Petition dismissed

-        Bernardo v. Bernardo, 96 Phil. 202 (1954) J.B.L. Reyes, J. ; JMOriginal Action in the Supreme Court for Certiorari

FACTS:

Enrique Bernardo, his wife and children, are the petitioners asking for a review of the CA Decision

CA Decision declared respondent Crisostomo R. Bernardo, who is the nephew of Enrique, as the “bona fide tenant or occupant” and thus entitled to preference in the acquisition of the lot in question

Based on Commonwealth Acts nos. 20 and 539 The lot is lot No. 4, block No. 26, of the Tambobong Estate plan, in Malabon,

Rizal Area of 208 square meters

Uncontested Facts: RP purchased from the Roman Catholic Church the estate known as “Capellania

de Tambobong,” under the provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 539

This Act authorizes the expropriation or purchase of private lands and that lands acquired thereunder should be subdivided into lots, for resale at reasonable prices to “their bona fide tenants or occupants”

Respondent Crisostomo applied to the Rural Progress Administration  for purchase of the lot

Petitioner Enrique contested the application RPA recognized respondent Crisostomo as entitled to preference

CFI and CA affirmed this decision CA additionally found that the house on the lot had been sold by Enrique to the

respondent, who is thus its owner

petitioners were allowed to stay on the premises because they were family, and out of the charity of respondent Crisostomo and his deceased parents who were the rightful lessees of the lot

ISSUE:

WON Petitioner Enrique is the “bona fide tenant or occupant” of the lot in question. Hell NO

RATIO:

No, the bona fide occupant is Crisostomo The term “bona fide occupant” has been defined as "one who supposes he has a

good title and knows of no adverse claim"; "one who not only honestly supposes himself to be vested with true title but is ignorant that the title is contested by any other person claiming a superior right to it"

The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.

The petitioner Enrique Bernardo falls short of this standard: for the precarious nature of his occupancy, as mere licensee of respondents, duty bound to protect and restore that possession to its real and legitimate holders upon demand, could never be hidden the Tambobong Estate, petitioner had already parted with the house that was his remaining link with the occupancy of the lot; and since 1945, even before the Government's purchase, he had been required to vacate.

Thus bereft of all stable interest in the land, petitioner nevertheless seeks to turn respondent's past deferential regard to his own advantage, and to exploit his gratuitous stay at respondent's expense for the purpose of ousting his benefactors and wiping out the investment that the latter, and their predecessors in interest, had established and preserved charged for the lot in question. That the law, in preferring "bona fide occupants," intended to protect or sanction such utter disregard of fair dealing may well be doubted.

Petitioner tries to equate “bona fide occupant” with “actual occupant” This cannot be so Two powerful reasons nullify this contention

The first: is that section 7 of Act 1170 of the old Philippine Legislature,

employs the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that "actual" and " bona fide " are not synonymous, while the Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide occupant", thereby emphasizing the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with legitimate tenure.

The second reason: is that in carrying out its social readjustment policies, the

government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution. It is safe to say that the term "bona fide occupants" was not

designed to cloak and protect violence, strategy, double dealing, or breach of trust.

RULING:

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

-        Malanyaon v. Lising, 106 SCRA 237 (1981); MiggyMalanyaon v Lising (1981)         Abad Santos, J.Nilo Malanyaon – petitioner-appellant  Esteban Lising (Judge of CFI of Camarines Sur) and Cesario Goleta (Municipal Treasurer of

Bula, Camarines Sur) – respondents – appelleesPETITION to review decision of CFI of Camarines SurFACTS-The late mayor Pontanal was accused for violating RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.- After hearing, he was suspended from office and during his incumbency he died. Due to

his death, the charge against him was dismissed.- Pursuant to Sec. 13 of RA 3019:Suspension and loss of benefits – Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution

under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the RPC on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits, which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

- Cesario Goleta, the Municipal Treasurer of Bula, Camarines Sur, was said to have disbursed funds in favor of the heirs of the Pontanal for salaries corresponding to the period he was under suspension and other benefits

- Nilo Malanyaon, formerly a member of Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer of Bula, to Venancia Pontanal, widow of the late Mayor Pontanal, in the amount of P5,000 representing a portion of the salary of the late Mayor.

- Respondent judge dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal, due to his death, amounted to acquittal.

ISSUEWON the death of Pontanal, and the dismissal of the case, amounted to his acquittal - NORATIO-When the statute speaks of the suspended officer being “acquitted”, it means that after due

hearing and consideration of the evidence against him, the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

-Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal

- In People v Salico:Acquittal=based on merits= evidence does not show that guilt is beyond a reasonable doubtDismissal= does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty

= proceeding is terminated because either 1)court is not of competent jurisdiction; 2) evidence does not show the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court; 3) complaint or information not valid or sufficient in form and substance

           HELDPetition GRANTED and declared illegal the payment of municipal funds for the salaries of

late Mayor Pontanal during his suspension from office and ordered the respondent treasurer to retrieve payments that were disbursed

NOTESRespondents invoked Art. 81 no. 1 of RPC: “Death of the accused pending appeal

extinguishes criminal and civil liability” but the Court said this was irrelevant in the case at bar.

Associated Words(a)          Noscitur a sociis              - Aisporna v. CA, 113 SCRA 459 (1982); JR

Aisporna vs Court of Appeals (April 12, 1982) De Castro, J.

Petition for Certiorari to review the judgement of the Court of Appeals

Summary of Proceedings:Trial Court-petitioner accused is found guilty for violating Section 189 of the Insurance ActCA-judgement affirmedSC-judgement reversed

Facts:-appelant's husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance Commission as

agent to Perla Compania de Seguros and she got a Personal Accident Policy with Ana M. Isidro as beneficiary

-the insured died by violence during the lifetime of the policy-wife of Rodolfo was charged with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for feloniously

acting as agent in the solicitation for insurance without securing a certificate of authority

Issue:WON a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the

Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section. -NOThe first paragraph prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the

solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section and the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for it's violation. In the definition of who is considered an agent, it is an essential element that one must receive a compensation to constitute a violation of the first paragraph. It was established that the petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation. Thus, petitioner-accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Held:The decision of CA is reversed.

Notes:

The doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.

SECTION 189. No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, subagent, or broker, in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance any commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of persons desiring such authority such application being approved and countersigned by the company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he many require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event after the first day of July of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application of the company.

Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject.

Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as agent, subagent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such convicted person.

             

- Dai-Ichi Electronics Manufacturing Corporation v. Villarama, 238 SCRA 267 (1994); JRDai-Chi Electronics vs Villarama Jr. (November 21, 1994) Quiason, J.

Petition for review on certiorari of the orders of the RTC

Summary of proceedings:RTC-dismissed complaint of petitioner for lack of jurisdictionSC-orders of RTC set aside and ordered to continue proceedings

Facts:-Petitioner alleged that respondent violated paragraph five of their Contract of Employment,

stating the employee within two years after termination shall not be connected or employed directly or indirectly with any business engaged in a business similar to or in competition with that of employer.

-Petitioner claimed that respondent became an employee of Angel Sound Philippines Corporation, a corporation engaged in the same line of business of petitioner within the two years.

-Petitioner sought to recover damages in the amount of P100,000.-RTC dIsmissed the case for lack of jurisdiction citing Article 217(4) of the Labor Code.

Issue:WON petitioner's claim for damages one arising from employer-employee relations. -NOPetitioner did not ask for relief under the Labor Code. It seeked to recover damages agreed

upon in the contract as redress for private respondent's breach of contract. Cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law and jurisdiction belongs to the regular courts.

Held:RTC decision is SET ASIDE and is ordered to continue with proceedings.

(b)          ejusdem generis (Where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind, accompanied by words of a generic character; the generic word is usually limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated)

              - Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., 234 SCRA 255 (1994)

Petitioner: Mayor Pablo Magtajas and Cagayan de Oro CityRespondents: Pryce Properties Corp. and PAGCORPonente: J. CruzGR. No. 111097 July 20, 1994Petition for review on decision of CAFacts:1. Pagcor, having obtained funds due to success of its operations in different cities, decided

to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City in 1992. In line with this, it leased a portion of a building from Pryce Properties Corp. to renovate and equip into a casino by Christmas season. The Sangguniang Panlungsod reacted to this by enacting Ordinance 3353 on December 7, 1992. The Sangguniang issued another ordinance (Ordinance No. 3375-93) on January 4, 1993 which expressly prohibited the operation of gambling casinos within the city.

2. The ordinance was assailed by Pryce in a suit which was joined by Pagcor as intervenor. The challenge was successful and the CA declared the ordinances as invalid on March 31, 1993.  The CA also issued a writ of prohibition for the enforcement and later on denied the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:  Whether or not the CA erred in holding that:1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does

not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City’s territorial limits.

2. The phrase “gambling and other prohibited games of chance” found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1)-(v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean “illegal gambling”

3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point.

4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.

5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues presented in this present case.

Ratio:1. Pagcor according to Basco case ruling- Pagcor was created by PD 1869 to regulate

and centralize games of chance including casinos in all land and sea territories of the country. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.

2. Nature of gambling- the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.

3. Validity of Ordinances- the only justiciable issue in the case. This can be determined by test of valid ordinance. For an ordinance to be valid, it must comply with substantative requirements:

·         It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.·         It must not be unfair or oppressive.·         It must not be partial or discriminatory.·         It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.·         It must be general and consistent with public policy.·         It must not be unreasonable.4. Definition of “gambling and other prohibited games of chance”- Congress has

passed laws that prohibit games of chance such as jueteng and monte but legalized lotteries, cock-fighting and horse-racing. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. since the word “gambling” is associated with “and other prohibited games of chance” the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed. Under this assumption, it can be understood that gambling in this provision pertains to illegal gambling and not to gambling as a general concept.

5. Flaw of ordinances- Petitioners argue that PD 1859 is not repealed by Administrative Code but modified “pro tanto (for so much)” meaning the Code has shorn Pagcor of all its powers to regulate and centralize casinos. This cannot stand as Pagcor has been mentioned as source of funding of two newer laws: RA 7309 (Creation of Board of Claims under DOJ for the victims of violent crimes, unjust punishment or detention) and RA 7648 (measures for solution of power crisis). This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the country.

SC Ruling: Petition denied and CA ruling upheldNotes:

ORDINANCE NO. 3353- AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO

SECTION1.·That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits.

SECTION2.·That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling activities.

SECTION3.·PENALTIES.·Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit: Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day.Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day. Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and subsequent offenses.

SECTION4.·This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93: AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF

CASINO WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;  WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of CASINO; WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO; WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral welfare of the community.

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:SECTION1.·The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby

prohibited.SECTION2.·Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties:Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or

corporation undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof; Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO.

SECTION3.·This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of general circulation

              - PBA v. CA, 337 SCRA 358 (2000); MiggyPBA v CA (2000)PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of CAFACTS

-Petitioner PBA received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of deficiency amusement tax amounting to P5,864,260.84.

- Petitioner contended that·         PD 231 or the Local Tax Code of 1973 transferred the power and authority to

levy and collect amusement taxes from the sale of admission tickets to places of amusement from the national government to the local governments.

·         BIR Memorandum Circular No. 49-73 provided that the power to levy and collect amusement tax on admission tickets was transferred to the local governments by virtue of the Local Tax Code; and BIR Ruling No. 231-86 which held that "the jurisdiction to levy amusement tax on gross receipts from admission tickets to places of amusement was transferred to local governments under P.D. No. 231, as amended."

LOWER COURT RULINGS-Petitioner contested this but the Commissioner denied their protest; upon petition

for review, the CTA dismissed petitioner’s petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, CTA once again denied the motion. CA affirmed the decision of CTA. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE1.       Is the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games a national or local

tax? To whom should petitioner pay amusement taxes- IT’S A NATIONAL TAX; THEREFORE, IT SHOULD BE PAID TO THE NATIONAL GOVT  

2.       Is the cession of advertising and streamer spaces subject to the payment of amusement tax? YES

3.       Should the BIR Circular and ruling be binding on the government? - NORATIO1.    Sec. 13 of the Local Tax CodeAmusement tax on admission – The province shall impose a tax on admission to be

collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement

è Given this, a reading of the phrase “other places of amusement” does not include professional basketball games based on the principle of ejusdem generis. Therefore, the payment of amusement tax on tickets of PBA games is not within the ambit of the local tax code.

o   Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Thus, in determining the meaning of the phrase "other places of amusement", one must refer to the prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic expression as their common characteristic. Professional basketball games do not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming.

On the other hand, a reading of Sec 44 of PD 1959 (see notes) makes it clear that "proprietor, lessee or operator of xxx professional basketball games" is required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%) of their gross receipts to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax.

2.       In Section 1 of PD 1456, it is said that “For the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts’ embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or

operator of the amusement place.” The law is clear that the definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of advertising and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place.

3.       Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.HELDPetition DENIED; Decision of CA AFFIRMEDNOTESPD 1959a) "SEC. 44. Section 268 of this Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read

as follows:Sec. 268. Amusement taxes. -- There shall be collected from the proprietor, lessee or

operator of cockpits, cabarets, night or day clubs, boxing exhibitions, professional basketball games, Jai-Alai, race tracks and bowling alleys, a tax equivalent to:

‘1. Eighteen per centum in the case of cockpits;‘2. Eighteen per centum in the case of cabarets, night or day clubs;‘3. Fifteen per centum in the case of boxing exhibitions;‘4. Fifteen per centum in the case of professional basketball games as envisioned in

Presidential Decree No. 871. Provided, however, That the tax herein shall be in lieu of all other percentage taxes of whatever nature and description;

‘5. Thirty per centum in the case of Jai-Alai and race tracks; and‘6. Fifteen per centum in the case of bowling alleys of their gross receipts,

irrespective of whether or not any amount is charged or paid for admission. For the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts’ embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. Said gross receipts also include income from television, radio and motion picture rights, if any. (A person or entity or association conducting any activity subject to the tax herein imposed shall be similarly liable for said tax with respect to such portion of the receipts derived by him or it.)

‘The taxes imposed herein shall be payable at the end of each quarter and it shall be the duty of the proprietor, lessee, or operator concerned, as well as any party liable, within twenty days after the end of each quarter, to make a true and complete return of the amount of the gross receipts derived during the preceding quarter and pay the tax due thereon. If the tax is not paid within the time prescribed above, the amount of the tax shall be increased by twenty-five per centum, the increment to be part of the tax.

‘In case of willful neglect to file the return within the period prescribed herein, or in case a false or fraudulent return is willfully made, there shall be added to the tax or to the deficiency tax, in case any payment has been made on the basis of the return before the discovery of the falsity or fraud, a surcharge of fifty per centum of its amount. The amount so added to any tax shall be collected at the same time and in the same manner and as part of the tax unless the tax has been paid before the discovery of the falsity or fraud, in which case, the amount so assessed shall be collected in the same manner as the tax." (underscoring ours)

b) "SECTION 1 of PD 1456. Section 268 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

‘Sec. 268. Amusement taxes. -- There shall be collected from the proprietor, lessee or operator of cockpits, cabarets, night or day clubs, boxing exhibitions, professional basketball games, Jai-Alai, race tracks and bowling alleys, a tax equivalent to:

xxx.....xxx.....xxxof their gross receipts, irrespective of whether or not any amount is charged or paid

for admission. For the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts’ embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. Said gross receipts also include income from television, radio and motion picture rights, if any. (A person, or entity or association conducting any activity subject to the tax herein imposed shall be similarly liable for said tax with respect to such portion of the receipts derived by him or it.)"

(c)          Expressio unius est exclusion alterius              - Centeno v. Villaton-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197 (1994); RaymondREGALADO

Facts:The officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel.

Issue:

Whether charitable purposes should be construed to include a religious purpose - NO

Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others.

It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words "charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that "charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation."

All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term.

Making it a violation would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused. For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.

Whether solicitations for religious cannot be penalized under the law - NO

It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and, consequently, solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. It is not implausible that the regulatory powers of the State may, to a certain degree, extend to solicitations of this nature. Considering, however, that such an activity is within the cloak of the free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution.

Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.

To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

HELD:Decision reversed and set aside. Petitioner ACQUITTED.

             - Malinias v. COMELEC, 390 SCRA 480 (2002); Inigo

SARIO MALINIAS vs. COMELEC, TEOFILO CORPUZ,ANACLETO TANGILAG and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ

October 4, 2002FACTS:

On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for governor and congress representative positions, respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department against Victor Dominguez, Teolfilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag and others for their violation of the following laws:1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and 2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881. Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province.Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building.  Malinias and Pilando further alleged that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol grounds.

Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant to COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace and order around the vicinity of the canvassing site. Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is to prevent some groups who were reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such a response was not unwarranted as this has already happened in the past, wherein, in fact, the petitioners were among those who conducted the rally.COMELEC’s Ruling:After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against the respondents for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for review on certiorari on this case.ISSUE:Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause for alleged violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232(1) of  B.P. 881? NORATIO:No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found the conduct of its investigation and ruling on the case to be in accord with its jurisdiction and duties under the law. In this case, COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as there is nothing capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari.On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfully presented by the petitioner is the mass-affidavits of his supporters, which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted by the court thus, the same are not enough to prove his claims. Also, the allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646and Sec. 232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts defined as punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively. Here, Sec. 25 merely highlights one of the rights of a political party or candidate during elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232,which enumerates the persons who are not allowed inside the canvassing site, can only be subjected to an administrative disciplinary action and cannot be punished by imprisonment as provided for under Sec. 264 of the same law. Moreover, it is clear in the defense of the respondents that they did not violate Sec. 261 (i), a criminal offense, which prohibits any officer or employee of political offices or police force from intervening in any election campaign or from engaging in any partisan activity except to vote or maintain public order.In the said defense, the respondents said that setting up the checkpoints was done to enforce the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and not to prejudice any candidate from participating in the canvassing. As such, the actions of the respondents are deemed lawful and not in excess of their authority.Ruling related to Statutory Construction:Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act."It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied, Expressum facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.Decision: the instant Petition is DISMISSED.  Notes:

“There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.Expressum facit cessare tacitum is a legal maxim that means “what is expressed makes what is implied silent.” This form of construction is used while interpreting statutes, contracts and deeds. When a matter is clearly provided in a document, the clear and precise meaning is to be adopted. The implied meaning need not be adopted when a clear meaning is provided. For example, when a condition is provided that a contract should be fulfilled on a certain date, the tactic construction that the contract should be fulfilled within a reasonable time need not be adopted. When an express date is provided for repayment of a debt, the creditor cannot demand payment before that date.