lnr

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http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/lnr 1/42

MANILA PRINCE VS GSIS

Supremacy of the Constitution – Filipino First Policy

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51%

of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm

Renong Berhad. MPH’s bid was at P41.58/per share while RB’s bid was at

P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the

winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RB’s bid

but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the

perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.

HELD: MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is inlight of the Filipino First Policy. Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos

which not only pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical

entities/personalities.

No. L-73002. December 29, 1986.*THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,ETC., respondents.

FACTS: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela , which ordered registrationin favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel,members of the Dumagat tribe .The landsubjects of the Land Registration proceedings was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & VeneerCo., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel both members of the Dumagat tribeand as such are cultural minorities

.I SSUE: Whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed infavor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973Constitution was already in effect,

having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domainexcept in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares

.RULING: The correct rule, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through hispredecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse orcompletion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the landsubject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.

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Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation'sholding or owning private land. WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgmentof the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed

Lee Hong Kok vs. David G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972

Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a

government grant.

FACTS:

This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant tohis miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Landsissued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which theUndersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. TheRegister of Deeds then issued an originalcertificate of title to David.

During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant

HELD:

Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agricultureand Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant toa void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, whocannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are notthe registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in thecadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property.

The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was inconformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it israised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality ofthe grant is a question between the grantee and the government.

IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:

http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/lee-hong-kok-vs-david.html



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The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int ehconcept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquireproperty under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held bythe State in its proprietarycharacter. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation anduse of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by theConstitution.

Sunday, September 19, 2010

CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R.No. L-2746 December 6, 1906MATEO CARIÑO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariňo went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his

inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of

Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The Stateopposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruledin favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be givento him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez& Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it forsome time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is stillthe absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has

not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it

for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificantportions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by thepetitioner for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves apossession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proofbefore the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did theState remained the absolute owner.

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Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest:Carino V. Insular Government (1909)212 U.S. 449 February 23, 1909

Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds)

Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution

FACTS:

Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because

the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application

For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held

the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding

cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)

1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail

1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him

but process only established possessory title

Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because

the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet amongothers from its operation

ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.

HELD: YES. Petition Granted.

http://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2013/05/us-jurisprudence-212-us-449-february-23.html



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Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.

Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be

sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." Forcultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.

Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him

or his father ever was made.

Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims

property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent

contrary proof.

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DENR vs YAP

These are two consolidated cases. In G.R. No. 167707, Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for

Declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling

purposes for the land they’ve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They

declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,

exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or

earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory

relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed

part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,”which was not available for disposition pursuant to

Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island

had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into

ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG appealed.

G.R. No. 173775

During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay

Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred

twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The

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Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roadsand

trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest landprotection

purposes. This was on May 22, 2006Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracaylandowners in

Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullificationof

Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights”

over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots inBoracay since

time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building

internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.

The OSG again opposed Sacay’s petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested rightover

their occupied portions in the island. Boracay isan unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section3(a)

of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimedportions of the island are inalienable and cannot bethe

subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title.It is only the executive department, not the courts,which

has authority to reclassify lands of the publicdomain into alienable and disposable lands. There is aneed

for a positive government act in order to releasethe lots for disposition.

ISSUES:

Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle forrespondents, and

all those similarly situated, toacquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.

HELD:

The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay etal. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of thepublic

domain belong to the State, that the State isthe source of any asserted right to ownership of landand

charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from

thegovernment, either by purchase or by grant, belongto the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required

. In keeping with thepresumption of State ownership, there must bea positive act of the government

,such as anofficial proclamation, declassifying inalienable publicland into disposable land for agricultural

or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation,executive order, administrative action, report,

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statute, or certification was presented. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the

portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the

land isalienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh in controvertible evidence, the Court cannot

accept thesubmission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before

2006. Mattersof land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. Also, private claimants also

contend that theircontinued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10)

years under Act No.926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership.

Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land

is alienable It isplain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public

Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption

that the lands are alienable and disposable. Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial

confirmation of imperfect title under CANo. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied

lands under the said law .There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete

title under CA No. 141, namely:(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation

of the subject land byhimself or through his predecessors-in-interest under bona fide

claim of ownership since time immemorialor from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as

alienable anddisposable land of the public domain.The tax declarations in the name of private

claimantsare insufficient to prove the first element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the

taxdeclarations in the name of private claimants wereissued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the

taxdeclarations are not sufficient to convince this Courtthat the period of possession and

occupationcommenced on June 12, 1945. Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have avested right in

Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millionsof pesos in

developing the island into a tourist spot.They say their continued possession and investmentsgive them a

vested right which cannot be unilaterallyrescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.The continued possession

and considerableinvestment of private claimants do not automaticallygive them a vested right in Boracay.

Nor do thesegive them a right to apply for a title to the land they

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G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990

FACTS:

Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the Bureau ofLands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-Generalfiled an action for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and thereforeinalienable.

CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not land is alienable

HELD:

The SC affirmed.

Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to

the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and

converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive

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act from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless

and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so

that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on

such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.

Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City G.R. No. 73974, May 31, 1995

Regalian Doctrine

Burden of Proof of private ownership rests on plaintiff

Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens title, exception

FACTS:

Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by virtue of which he was issued an OCT.

Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that the free patent acquired

by Petitioner was fraudulent. A case for falsification of public documents was filed by Petitioner was

acquitted of the crime.

Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against Petitioner, praying for the declaration of

nullity of the Free Patent and the OCT.

Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified public

forest land because by the approval of his application for Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land

was already alienable and disposable public agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small

portion of Lot 5139, an area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable public land

http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/republic-vs-register-of-deeds-of-quezon.html

http://scire-licet.blogspot.com/2008/06/republic-vs-register-of-deeds-of-quezon.html

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HELD:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are

presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are

not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution become private properties. In the

absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and

rendered open to disposition.

The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and

ultimately the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Classification of public lands is, thus, an

exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no

authority to do so.

Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming

the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant.

In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence to overcome said

presumption and to support his claim.

Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of no moment, notwithstanding the

indefeasibility of title issued under the Torrens System. The indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot

be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. Fraud here means actual and extrinsic --

an intentional omission of fact required by law.

Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that the land sought to be registered still formed part

of the unclassified forest lands.

Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest:

Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986)G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

http://www.philippinelegalguide.com/2013/05/jurisprudence-gr-no-73002-december-29.html



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FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from

Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land

possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by

Magellan

land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership

to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,

whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements

ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by

thegovernment when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela

donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES:

1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES

2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or

associations applies- NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

1. YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of

the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that

said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient

it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by

presumption

The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal

sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued

upon the strength of said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as

already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law

2. NO

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If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a

legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said

owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public

agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.G.R. No. 162243, December

3, 2009Chico-Nazario, J.:

Doctrine: A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.

Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No.

43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus

against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute

the IFMA contract of PICOP even as thelatter has complied with all the legal requirements for

the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, asamended, in to an IFMA.The cause of action ofPICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trialcourt is clear: the

government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then PresidentFerdinand Marcos,

to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

Issue:

Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by whichthegovernment may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)

Held: NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the

purviewof the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus berevoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not acontract, property or a property right protected bythe due process clause of the

Constitution.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No

lawimpairing the obligation of contracts shall be p assed." cannot be invoked. ThePresidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual

undertaking assuringPICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas.Such an interpretation wouldresul t in the com ple te abdi cat ion by the State in favor

of PICOP of the sovereign power to control andsupervise the exploration,

development and utilization of the natural resources in the area

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MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME114

SCRA 799DATE: June 29, 1982PETITIONER: Manila Electric CompanyRESPONDENTS:

Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV and Republicof the PhilippinesPONENTE: J.

AquinoFACTS:The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) with an

assessedvalue of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976, whohad

consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the 3 rd

of July 1947, theoriginal owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently filed for

theconfirmation of title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that was rejected by the Court of First

Instance. The Meralco consequently filed an appeal with the followingcontentions:1.

The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguingspouses for more than

thirty years had essentially been converted toprivate land by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

Thus, the constitutionalprohibition banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable

publicland is not applicable.2.

It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but forthe Piguing spouses

who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicialconfirmation of their imperfect title to the

landISSUES:1.

Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified to apply fora judicial confirmation

of an imperfect/incomplete title.2.

Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized.3.

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Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to private propertyis contingent on the

judicial confirmation of title.RULING:1.

NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the Meralco, as ajuridical person, is

disqualified from applying for the judicial confirmationof imperfect title. Furthermore, according

to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from

holdalienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to exceed 1000hectares in area. In

fine, only natural persons and citizens of thePhilippines are allowed to apply for confirmation

under the PLA.2.

NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private propertyis contingent upon (1)

fulfilling the necessary condition of possession by

the predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of 30 years; and (2)the judicial confirmation

of the title by the Court of First Instance. C.J.Fernando concurred with the decision, but accepted

that a conversionindeed took place.3.

HELD. This was maintained in the ruling of J. Aquino. C.J. Fernando, J.Abad Santos and J. De

Castro, concurred accordingly. J. Teehankeedissented and traced the line of jurisprudence from

Carino to Susi toHerico

which maintained that the conversion or acquisition effectivelyhappens by the operation of law,

ipso jure , as soon as it can beconclusively presumed, juris et de jure,

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that all the conditions for theconfirmation of the grant have been met. According to his

reasoning, uponthe fulfillment of the aforementioned conditions, the confirmation of animperfect

title is only a formality

Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; GR No. 113472, December

20, 1994

Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011

(Land Titles and Deeds – Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)

Facts: Petitioner and respondent disputed over a parcel of land. Respondent contends that she bought

the said land from a certain Ong Joi Jong, evidenced by a notarized deed of sale; and entrusted the

administration of the same to petitioner, a Chinese citizen and the brother of respondent’s husband.

Petitioner on the other hand claims that she bought the disputed land from the same vendor and the sale

is evidenced by a photocopy of a deed of sale.

Issue: WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale.

Held: No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that aliens, whether

individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands, hence disqualified also in

acquiring private lands.The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the

public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities ‘qualified to

acquire lands of the public domain’.

http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/author/piusmorados/



http://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/28/ong-ching-po-vs-court-of-appeals-239-scra-341-gr-no-113472-december-20-1994/





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I.

Local JurisprudenceRegister of Deeds vs. Ung Si Su TempleFacts:

The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for recorda deed of donation

executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipinocitizen, conveying a parcel of

residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2,block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record

No. 11267, in favor of the unregistered

religious organization “UngSiu Si Temple”, operating through three trustees all of

Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality,founder

and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latterand its

trustees. The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consulta to the IVth Branch of theCourt of

First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of the Rizal Register of

Deeds, stating that “…this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of theprovisions of the

sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of thePhilippines limiting the acquisition of

land in the Philippines to its citizens,or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum

of the capitalstock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act

No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds

of Manila, the deed of donation in question shouldnot be admitted for registration." (Printed Rec.

App. pp. 17-18).Counsel for the done UySiu Si Temple appealed to the Supreme Court,

claiming:(1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized

andpermitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as

follows: "SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations,

of whatever sort or denomination, whether incorporated in the PhilippineIslands or in the name

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of other country, or not incorporated at all, to holdland in the Philippine Islands upon which to

build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable institutions. "SECTION. 2.Such

religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three Trustees for the

use of such associations;. . ." (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.) and (2) that the refusal of the Register of

Deeds violates Article III, Section 1 (7) or the freedom of religion clause of the Constitution.

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Act No. 271,and the

decision of theSupreme

Court in thecase of

Krivenko vs.

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the Register ofDeeds of

Manila, thedeed of

donation inquestion

shouldnot be

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admitted forregistration."

(Printed Rec.App. pp. 17-

18).Counselfor the done

UySiu Si

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Templeappealed to the

SupremeCourt,

claiming:(1)that the

acquisition of

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the land inquestion, for

religious purposes, is

authorizedandpermitted

by Act No.

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271 of the oldPhilippine

Commission, providing as

follows: "SECTION 1. It

shall be lawful

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for allreligious

associations,of whatever s

ort or denomination, whether

incorporated i

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n the PhilippineIslands or in

the name ofother country,

or notincorporated at

all, to holdland

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in thePhilippine

Islands uponwhich to build

churches, parsonages,

oreducational

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or charitableinstitutions. "S

ECTION.2.Such

religiousinstitutions, if

not

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incorporated,shallhold the

land in thename of three

Trustees forthe use of such

associations;. .

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." (PrintedRec. App. p.

5.) and (2) thatthe refusal of

the Register ofDeeds violates

Article III,

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Section 1 (7)or thefreedom

of religionclause of the

Constitution.

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lnr

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