local perceptions on international humanitarian intervention … · 2018-01-10 · international...

LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DURING

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE LRA AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA

Wetenschappelijke verhandeling

Aantal woorden: 15.299

Emilie Buyle Stamnummer: 20051259

Promotor: Dr. Judith Verweijen

Masterproef voorgelegd voor het behalen van de graad master in de richting Conflict en Development

Academiejaar: 2016 – 2017

Acknowledgement

Thank you to my Promotor, Judith Verweijen.

For your advice and thorough feedback.

Special thanks to Hotel Mama & Papa.

For my room, a whole year, free of charge. Luxurious arrangements included.

Special thanks to Abude, Alex, Christos and Emilie.

For letting me live like a modern nomad this year. For always providing me food, wine and shelter

when in BXL.

Special thanks to Rozemarijn.

For the second reading and feedback. Firm but fair.

Special thanks to Anaïs & Sarah.

Best classmates ever.

Abstract

This thesis examines local perceptions of former IDPs and local humanitarian workers on international

humanitarian intervention during the conflict in northern Uganda between the government and the LRA

(1990-2006). While numerous academic studies offers counterweight against the narratives that were used

by the Government of Uganda, little of these critical studies provides ample space for the perceptions and

narratives of those that were struck hardest by the conflict: the internally displaced Acholi population. This

study begins with an overview of the pivotal and for this thesis relevant perception studies and goes on to

presenting a historical context of the conflict in northern Uganda. Through the performance of focus groups

with former IDPs and face-to-face semi-structured interviews with local employees of NGOs, data was

gathered that showed contrasting findings with critical academic literature and the used narratives by the

government during the conflict. In order to clearly show the contrasting narratives and findings, each

discussed topic will start with academic literature, followed by contrasting findings and ending with the

data gathered during this research in northern Uganda. The themes that will be discussed are perceptions on

humanitarian aid with a possible hidden agenda, continuation of war and humanitarian complicity,

narratives about displacement and the cooperation between the army of Uganda and the humanitarian

sector. One of the main findings of this thesis is that former IDPs in Uganda were less critical towards the

humanitarian assistance, not only because they were living on ‘survival mode’, but also because the

international intervention helped them to survive when they felt abandoned by their own government. A

second important finding is that a more systematical study of grass roots perceptions provides added value

to existing academic literature.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1

2. Literature research: Perception studies ......................................................................... 3

3. Case Study: northern Uganda ....................................................................................... 7

4. Methodology ................................................................................................................... 9

4.1. Focus groups with former IDP’s .......................................................................................... 10

4.2. Semi-structured interview with local employees working for an NGO ................................ 11

4.3. Semi-structured interview with key figures ......................................................................... 12

5. Research results: local perceptions on humanitarian aid in northern Uganda ............ 13

5.1. Life in the camps ................................................................................................................. 13

5.2. International humanitarian aid and the hidden agenda of humanitarian NGOs ................. 14

5.2.1. Critical literature ...................................................................................................................... 14

5.2.2. Other literature......................................................................................................................... 15

5.2.3. Research findings .................................................................................................................... 16

5.2.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 18

5.3. The effects of humanitarian aid ........................................................................................... 19


5.4. Humanitarian complicity and the continuation of war ........................................................ 21




5.4.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 24

5.5. Narratives about the displacement ...................................................................................... 25




5.5.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 28

5.6. Provided security by the army: an attack on neutrality? ..................................................... 29


5.6.2. Other contrasting literature ...................................................................................................... 29


5.6.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 31

6. Discussion and conclusion............................................................................................ 32

List of Acronyms

ARLPI The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative

ACF Action Contre la Faim

GDNF Gulu District NGO Forum

GoU Government of Uganda

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IDP Internally Displaced Person

LRM/A Lord’s Resistance Movement / Army

MSF Médecins Sans Frontières

NRM/A The National Resistance Movement / Army

UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UN-OCHA United Nations - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UPDF Ugandan People’s Defence Force

UPDA Uganda People’s Democratic Army

WFP World Food Program

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1. Introduction

Beneficiaries of international humanitarian assistance are often perceived as merely passive recipients. But,

as research has shown, it is the contrary: they mediate and act. Their perceptions can shape behaviour and

thus influence the acceptance of humanitarian activities or principles in the field. Because there exists a gap

between the self-perception of humanitarian organisations and the perceptions of the target population, it is

crucial to understand what these different perceptions are and why they are that diverse (Dijkzeul and

Wakenge, 2010).

During the last decade, local perception studies have gained a proper place in the field of humanitarian

interventions and have changed their perceptions of beneficiaries as passive recipients to beneficiaries as

key informants (Nouvet, Abu-Sada, de Laat, Wang & Schwartz, 2016). Not only do these studies increase

transparency and respect for local populations, but they also improve the effectiveness and accountability

of the humanitarian sector. Next to these practical measurements in researching and evaluating

international humanitarian intervention, it is also crucial to understand local perceptions of its political role.

It were the perception studies that gave rise to the acceptance that ideas and narratives about conflict and

aid in a given humanitarian space are important practical and political forces (Abu-Sada, 2012). For

example, to what extend is it perceived as a Trojan horse with a (hidden) political agenda? Due to the fact

that we can see an entanglement between humanitarian aid and the political agenda of different

governments and the governments of donor countries, it is important to understand how this is perceived in

the eyes of the people (Stites, 2006).

The long-lasting conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda

(GoU) serves as a case to analyse grassroots perceptions of local stakeholders, the differences between

them and the perceptions of international humanitarian aid and researches and the importance of

understanding them. Even long before the LRA was seen as a significant armed group in northern Uganda,

the country was already plagued by violence launched by different government regimes and diverse rebel

groups. Nevertheless, the insurgency launched by the LRA against the government of the National

Resistance Movement (NRM), led by Yoweri Museveni that took power in 1986, has proven one of the

most devastating. One of the war dynamics, next to the government who went back and forth in negotiating

with the rebels and military operations against them, was the encampment1 of the entire Acholi population.

1 Following the example of Amnesty International, the term ‘camp’ is used in order to outline the history of

the conflict without any positive nor negative connotation. Government officials tend to use the term

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The government claimed their primary aim was to protect, but the encampment also dealt as a way to

separate the civilians from the insurgents. Because it was not able to provide in the basic needs of the

displaced people, the situation soon proved to become a vast humanitarian disaster. As a reaction on this,

the international humanitarian aid came to support (Allen and Vlassenroot, 2010). The World Food

Program (WFP) supplied emergency relief food, distributed by World Vision, Oxfam / Acord and the

Church of Uganda. UNICEF and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) supported in terms of medical aid. The

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was already active before the encampment and stayed

operative during the crisis situation too (IRIN, 1996). Different scholars (Dolan, 2005; Finnström, 2008;

Branch, 2009) challenged the existing narratives that were used by the GoU when communicating about the

conflict and especially the displacement and put forward a different one. These discrepant versions of the

conflict emphasize or befog the role of the different actors in the war, the humanitarian sector included.

Yet, little of these critical studies provided ample space for the perceptions and narratives of those that

were struck hardest by the conflict: the displaced Acholi population in the camps.

In the light of the practical and political importance of perceptions of humanitarian aid, it is remarkable that

few studies have focused specifically on the perceptions of the displaced Acholi population in northern

Uganda. Despite the fact that the camps were dismantled shortly after the signing of the Cessation of

Hostilities Agreement by the government and the LRA in 2006 and the LRA moving out of northern

Uganda, the conflict is still not completely over. Firstly, the failing of the peace agreement and the fact that

Kony and other LRA members fled instead of being arrested, translates itself in a very fragile feeling of

peace and the sustainability of it can be questioned. Secondly, former Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

faced and still face different difficulties and challenges while resettling and reintegrating. Land conflicts

and lack of access to primary education and health care are still daily issues for the Acholi population,

especially for the more vulnerable groups like widows and orphans. Thirdly, these daily problems and the

lack of engagement of the government to invest in and develop the northern part of the country, feeds the

feeling of deprivation and neglect of the Acholi’s. Therefore, it continues to be of relevance to look at the

perceptions of the formerly displaced population.

The central question of this research is the following:

1. What are the perceptions of former IDP and local employees of NGOs on the international

humanitarian aid during the conflict between the LRA and the Government of Uganda?

‘protected villages’, opponents of the government use ‘concentration camps’ when describing the camps,

terms that have a strong political connotation.

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The sub questions are:

2. Are there differences in local perceptions of humanitarian aid and the ways humanitarian aid is

described in scholarly studies?

3. How can we explain these differences?

This thesis starts with a literature research about perception studies, followed by a short history of the

conflict in northern Uganda. After a general overview of the life in the camps, based on focus groups with

former IDPs, the work continues with a critical comparison of different literature and researches and the

data gathered during the fieldwork for this thesis. The presented literature and data is grouped around four

topics: International humanitarian aid and the hidden agenda of humanitarian NGOs, the continuation of

war and humanitarian complicity, the narrative about displacement and the the provided security by the

army. The four topics and the relevant literature about them, will show contrasting differences between the

findings of critical academic studies, more practical research and the grassroots perceptions of former IDPs

and local employees of international NGOs. In the final concluded, it is attempted to explain these striking

differences in perceptions.

2. Literature research: Perception studies

The importance of including the local perceptions on humanitarian efforts has been increasingly recognised

over the past decade and assumes a participatory program design and delivery, transparency, respect for

local communities, security, sustainability, effectiveness and accountability. The lived experience of those

people who came in contact with humanitarian aid as beneficiaries, neighbours to projects or local

employees for international humanitarian organisations has become increasingly valued by the

humanitarian sector in preparing, monitoring, evaluating and (re)designing humanitarian intervention

(Fortcoming in Nouvet, Abu-Sada, de Laat, Wang & Schwartz, 2016).

Next to the practical research of humanitarian aid, it is important to also understand their subjective

perceptions. Because the perceptions of local beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance can influence their

attitude towards humanitarian aid, it is crucial to research them in order to understand if and when aid is

perceived as legitimate and effective and when not (Dijkzeul & Wakenge, 2010).

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Despite the existence of numerous studies that stress the importance of understanding local perceptions,

many of them avoid to actually document them. By only showing a particular aspect or consequence of

some of those perceptions, they fail to validate or detail them. Dijkzeul and Wakenge (2010) state that one

of the most important outcomes of analysing and understanding local contexts and political dynamics is to

understand if and how strong the humanitarian intervention is perceived as having a (hidden) political or

economic agenda. If research would show that the humanitarian sector is perceived as working with a

hidden agenda, it would mean a derogation of the traditional humanitarian principles of neutrality,

impartiality and independence and thus result in the weakening of its legitimacy and effectiveness

(Dijkzeul & Wakenge, 2010).

In their critical study of fifty-nine different perception-related documents, Nouvet, Abu-Sada, de Laat,

Wang and Schwartz (2016) state that the growing distrust and even rejection of humanitarian aid in many

parts of the world was the main driver for the rise of perception studies. The image damage the industry

faced was the result of particular events, such as Kosovo and Rwanda where the humanitarian agencies

failed to protect the lives of the ones in need. Furthermore, the new paradigm of the “War on terror”

resulted in the association of the humanitarian sector with Western countries, militaries and interests and

caused the politicization of humanitarian aid like never before (Nouvet, Abu-Sada, de Laat, Wang &

Schwartz, 2016).

These conclusions are mainly based on two monumental and original perception studies that are done by

the Feinstein Institute and MSF. The first conducted perception studies between 2005 – 2009 in twelve

countries that were affected by the “War on Terror”. One of the main findings of the perceptions studies

done by Feinstein (2008) is the crisis of the humanitarian sector in the post 9/11 world. There is a strong

link between international intervention to protect the ones in need and maintaining the security and political

agenda of the West. Despite this evolution, humanitarian aid provides essential support for people in need

of nurture and protection. Even when political affiliations between the humanitarian sector and the political

agenda of the donor governments were suspected, they were perceived as a major concern to the

beneficiaries, except when the political baggage affects the quality of the provided assistance and

protection. When people find themselves in life-and-death-situations, assistance will be accepted, no matter

where it is coming from. The work showed that the nature of the giver only began to matter after time,

mainly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Darfur. It was also in those countries were a very clear link

between the given aid and the anti-terrorist legislation of this donor countries. Those suspicions and actions

following from it, made it dangerous for the aid workers to be active in those countries, but also caused the

refusal of assistance. Not because the local population did not need it, but because they mistrusted the

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association between aid and the agenda of the donor countries. It has shown that political context, national

and international, does influence the image of humanitarian actor. Because of historic, political and social

differences and the behaviour of humanitarian actors, NGOs active in the Middle East were perceived as

having a hidden agenda (Donini, 2008). Like never before, the humanitarian sector is instrumentalised and

needs to balance between principle and pragmatism. Other evolutions in the post 9/11 world are the

proliferation of need, the globalisation of the awareness of need and the humanitarian sector that has

become a multi-billion-dollar enterprise (Donini, Fast, Hansen, Harris, Minear, Mowjee & Wilder, 2008).

The second monumental study is the 11-country Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Perceptions Study

(Nouvet, Abu-Sada, de Laat, Wang & Schwartz, 2016). The 3-year ‘Perception Project’ by MSF came as a

result of the killings of five staff members in Afghanistan in 2004, an attack that made them question their

assumed solid reputation after being active in the country for twenty-five years. With the perception

research, MSF sought to understand how they were perceived by the diverse stakeholders they encountered

and how they could optimise the implementation of medical projects. The study was also seen as critical to

maintain their status of independency, impartiality and working free from religious, economic or political

interests. The research findings showed an influence of the new paradigm of “the war on terror”. It showed

that a politicisation of humanitarian aid was perceived by the population in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq

and the occupied territories in Palestine. Respondents in these countries believe the international

humanitarian assistance depends heavily on the political agendas of the countries that give aid. The analysis

of perceptions in the Middle East and all other researched contexts has shown that NGOs are being

suspected of working with a hidden agenda. Respondents in Kyrgyzstan considered humanitarian aid as a

“Trojan horse” for political activities (Abu-Sada, 2012).

Apart from the perceptions studies done in countries that were affected by the “war on terror”, Dijkzeul and

Wakenge’s research (2010) focussed on the local perceptions on two international medical humanitarian

organisations active in Congo. Their research has shown that aid recipients do not always perceive aid to

have political agendas, but rather highlight the needs that it addresses, and that there can be pronounced

differences in perceptions between different stakeholders, such as local civil society organisations and the

people receiving aid. The beneficiary population believed that humanitarian action is necessary to save

people’s live and reduce their suffering, but that it is far from perfect. The population on the receiving end

highly appreciated the aid, when their health needs were being fully addressed. Although they noted

problems in the execution of aid and communication between the organisations and the people, they

believed the NGOs had good intentions. In general, the beneficiaries thought that both organisations

succeeded well in remaining neutral with regard to the armed conflict and inter-group tensions. When

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asked if they suspected the humanitarian organisations to operate with a hidden political or economic

agenda, 56% to 88% (depending on which of the two NGOs) of the population that was questioned, stated

the organisations did not have any hidden goals and only 0-8% suspected they did. The perceptions on this

matter differed significantly with those of the medical civil society organisations. 60% of them blamed the

NGOs to have a hidden agenda and only 40% did not. When the perceptions of non-medical civil society

organisations and local authorities were taken into account, they proved to be even more critical (Dijkzeul

and Wakenge, 2010).

The case study of the conflict in northern Uganda shows similarities and differences with the researches

described above. The war in northern Uganda has also been influenced by the “war on terror”, given that

the Ugandan government has been branding the LRA as a “terrorist organisation” from 2002 on to try to

ensure more American support for the war. Because the United States included the LRA on their ‘USA

Patriot Act Terrorist Inclusion List’, the GoU could freely focus on military operations as the preferred

strategy instead of the softer strategy of peace negotiations and an amnesty process. Despite the similarities,

however, the humanitarian assistance in northern Uganda is less directly influenced by the global war on

terror than other countries. Although the research of Feinstein (2006) has shown that NGO staff noted the

closer monitoring of their activities, it was not seen as having significant impact in the larger humanitarian

sector (Stites, 2006). It also does offer a different national and international context than countries like Iraq

and Afghanistan, where the conflict is marked by international geopolitical agenda’s and where

international humanitarian aid often comes from the same countries that take part in the war.

Another phenomena that raises the question of the militarization of aid is the provision of protection of the

humanitarian aid and its employees by the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), the official army of

Uganda. This cooperation could affect the efficacy and neutrality of the aid sector. Although ICRC and

MSF principally refused to be linked to military cooperation, other big players like WFP and its

implementing partners were known to rely on military escorts. WFP was known to operate under heavy

military protection that even included members of the “Black Mambas”, a group of elite soldiers that were

responsible for protecting the president of Uganda. Although this entanglement can be criticised, WFP was

often the only humanitarian organisation who was able to access all of the IDP camps, even in times of

increased insecurity (Stites, 2006).

These similarities and differences raise the question: to what extent do aid recipients in northern Uganda

perceive aid to be politicized? And, like in the study of Dijkzeul and Wakenge (2010), are there also

differences between aid recipients and local NGOs?

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3. Case Study: northern Uganda

Acholi-land, a term to describe the region in the northern part of Uganda, and its inhabitants have endured a

long history of suffering and deprivation. Violence during the government period of the first head of state

Oboto (I), his overthrower Amin and the second reign of Obote (II) marked the first period after

independence from Britain. Once in power, Amin killed many Acholi soldiers in the army, marking the

hostility between the current and former governments as a tribal issue. Also during the second reign of

Oboto and the coup d’état by President Okello, an Acholi, tribal issues kept emerging between Acholi and

Langi ‘tribes’. Deep-seated grievances among Acholi’s were reinforced by the coming to power of

Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) after failed peace reconciliations and the ousting of

President Okello (Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010).

On top of the violence caused by the different governments, diverse rebel groups were active in northern

Uganda. After the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) entered into negotiations with the

government of Museveni and surrendered in 1988, a part of them who did not want to give in, joined other

rebellious groups. All of them inspired by the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena and the idea of

being possessed by spirits. One of those groups was a rebel group, centred around Kony, the LRA. From

1990 on, the LRA was the only significant armed group that was fighting in Acholi land. Carrying out a

guerrilla campaign against the government, they targeted everybody they assumed to be collaborating with

it (Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010).

The government’s response to the insurgency of the LRA went back and forth between negotiation with

those rebels and military offensives against them, the latter provoking even more violent reactions from the

LRA. In 1990, one of the tactics of the government to distinguish civilians from rebels and to sabotage

collaboration between them was the encampment of the former (Allen and Vlassenroot, 2010).

The number of IDPs cannot be explained in a single or simple pattern. From the offset of the war between

the LRA and the GoU, the number of IDPs had risen and fallen depending on the level of safety and areas

(Amnesty International, 1999). Since the beginning of the 1990’s, most of the Acholi people were

concentrated around big towns in the North (Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010). Amnesty International traces the

displacement of people back to different phases. Many of the IDPs fled ‘spontaneously’ from the rebels

into the camps. A second group felt the authorities left them no choice than to leave their house and

livelihoods. A last group reported to be physically forced by government. What the three groups have in

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common is their aversion of the life in the camps and the fact of being trapped (Amnesty International,

1999).

The period between 1992 and 1993 marked the alleviation of the conflict and the start of formal peace talks

between the two sparring parties. Although the future looked hopeful, the treaty collapsed in 1994 and as a

reaction, Kony retaliated against the Acholi people. While always having used violence during the war,

1994 meant the start of intensified violence, wide spread terror and the rise of abduction as a recruitment

strategy (Doom & Vlassenroot, 1999). Because of these atrocities and the increase and intensification of the

attacks, the LRA quickly lost the support of the local community (Stites, 2006).

From September 1996, the encampment by the government in established camps sites was applied more

systematically and the number of IDPs increased at a significant rate. During the peak of the war, the

camps consisted out of about one million people, the entire rural population of Acholi sub region (Branch,

2009). Next to separating the civilian population from the rebels in order to clearly distinguish them from

each other, the government justified this decision based on being able to protect the former in the camps.

This was foreseen by the UPDF and ‘local defence units’, reporting to the official army (Allen &

Vlassenroot, 2010). Once in the camps, cultivation and access to their former land was impossible and the

people did not receive any food or support to build a shelter from the government. Within a month after the

inception of the camps, a vast humanitarian disaster was about to erupt. From then on and fairly late after

the onset of the conflict, the government of Uganda requested international humanitarian aid, a request

responded by the WFP from 1996 on. Although different humanitarian organisations doubted participating,

because of the forced displacement, the donated aid of WFP paved the way and relieved the doubts of the

other ones (Branch, 2009).

Reports from Amnesty International state that the displacement of the Acholi population from their own

homes, is one of the most difficult parts in their struggle to survive. Displacement is allowed under

international law when it happens for people their own safety or other military reasons. The rights and

protection of those people on the other hand has to be ensured. They have the right to expect protection.

Not only the protection of their human rights, but also in terms of the basic necessities in life, such as clean

water, food, sanitation and water. Following from the extreme violence of the LRA against civilians,

Amnesty International poses it does not believe the encampment is intrinsically a violation of international

human rights or humanitarian law by the Uganda Government. It does state that they are not convinced that

the government took adequate steps to minimise the displacement and the provision of food and basic

rights once displaced. The situation in the camps in northern Uganda was especially worrisome because

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people suffered from human right violations from both side of the LRA as the UPDF and the lack of

provision in basic physical needs. Adding the shortcoming of the government to try to end the situation that

caused the displacement, Amnesty International questions whether the displacement remains consistent

with international humanitarian law (Amnesty International, 1999).

From the very beginning, food stock in the camps has been a problem. Although WFP came to support

from late 1996, the food supply only improved in 1998. The delivery of food and aid could vary because

some camps were more difficult to access due to insecurity. WFP and its implementing partners provided

food, the UN and NGOs provided health care and sanitation (Amnesty International, 1999). Despite the

effort of the international humanitarian organisations to foresee the inhabitants of the camps of a basic diet,

three-monthly nutritional surveys conducted by Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and Oxfam in 1996, showed

that 50% of the children under five were stunted and 30% underweight (Dolan, 2005).

The humanitarian aid effort in northern Uganda has not been left without criticism. Trying to provide the

IDPs in their basic needs and averting a humanitarian crisis is argued to make the situation of encamping

the people sustainable. By providing the people in their basis needs, popular revolt was suppressed

(Branch, 2009). Despite the fact that humanitarian aid helped people as much as possible in providing for

their basic needs, the encampment meant the control of the civilian population in one place. The

displacement put civilians at the heart of the conflict, a place that made them extremely vulnerable for

human right abuses by the UPDF as the LRA (Amnesty International, 1999). Yet within this criticism,

these scholars (Branch, 2007, 2008, 2009; Finnström 2003, 2008; Dolan, 2005, 2013) provide little

concrete empirical examples of perceptions of aid recipients-to what extent did those receiving aid share

these criticisms? Did they also perceive humanitarians aid to prolong the conflict and worsen the

population’s condition?

4. Methodology

To answer the principal question of this research, “What are the local perceptions on international

humanitarian intervention during the conflict between the LRA and the Government of Uganda?”, I

conducted field research in northern Uganda between April and May 2017. A qualitative research design

was used. The data collection consisted of ten focus groups with IDPs, ten face-to-face semi-structured

interviews with local employees that worked for an NGO during the conflict and face-to-face semi

structured interviews with three key informants.

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This approach is in line with other perception studies about humanitarian aid, in using multiple qualitative

methods to gather and analyse the expectations, accounts and assessments of humanitarian organisations,

projects and practices trustby local populations. Perception studies are used as one of the many feedback-

gathering mechanisms in the humanitarian sector. During those sessions, interviewees can provide detailed

accounts of their experiences in the researched setting (Nouvet, Abu-Sada, de Laat, Wang & Schwartz,

2016). Important to take in account while researching, analysing and understanding perceptions is that they

do not refer to an ‘objective reality’, but rather to a personal and culturally diverse thus subjective

interpretation of events (Dijkzeul, & Wakenge, 2010).

The limitations of perception studies that are described in literature study, are argued to be intrinsic to

qualitative research. First of all it can be quite difficult to assess the reliability of the given date and the

representatively of the sample. Secondly, perception studies take a lot of time and require the participant to

thrust the researcher. The context can offer an extra difficulty in building this relationship. More

specifically, the literature pinpoints the difficulties of doing perception studies in conflict zones that are

tense and can even be hostile towards international NGOs (Nouvet e.a., 2016).

4.1. Focus groups with former IDP’s

Focus groups are an important tool to gather data by interaction between the participating respondents. Not

only is this method suitable to explore a certain topic and to understand views and experiences, but the

group dynamic makes participants reflect on their own opinion and possibly reconsider it, a mechanism that

can lead to a deeper discussion of the subject (Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls & Ormston, 2013).

The five villages where the interviews were conducted, were selected based on mutual agreement with the

local research assistant and selected because of their proximity and the fact that they used to be the centre

of busy IDP camps with a huge population. To assure women could speak freely and to examine possible

gender differences in their perceptions, the focus groups were divided per sex. In each of the five selected

villages, two focus groups were carried out: one consisting of six females and one consisting of six males,

adding up to a total of sixty respondents. All of them lived several years in the IDP camps and all of them

were already grown up during the time of the conflict.

When asking about perceptions on humanitarian aid, the term humanitarian aid or – intervention was kept

vague in order to avoid reducing the information that could possibly be gathered. The first questions

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included an overview of the life in the camps and the organisations the respondents had contact with while

living there. These rather general questions were beneficial to create an image of the way of living during

the conflict, to pick up unexpected data or stories and to make the participants feel at ease.

The interviews were carried out in Acholi, the maternal language of the respondents because the majority

of the respondents did not master the English language. In order to ensure the translator and the moderator

of the interview precisely understood the topic and interview questions, a mutual session was organised

before starting the first focus groups. Nevertheless, one of the aspects that has to be taken into account

when analysing the data is the ‘filter’ and contamination of the respondents’ answers with the explanation

of the interpreter.

Because the focus groups and interviews rotated during the period of my research, I constantly contrasted

the views of the IDPs and the NGOs and I could ask the respondents of the NGO group to share their

thoughts or explanations on data that I found during the focus groups.

4.2. Semi-structured interview with local employees working for an NGO

A literature study about the conflict and the international humanitarian aid during the conflict in Uganda,

made it possible to become familiar with the NGOs that were active during that time. I started the selection

of relevant local employees that worked for an NGO during the conflict by inviting the head of an NGO

umbrella organisation in Gulu, Gulu District NGO Forum (GDNF). By participating to a whole day

workshop with the participating NGO’s that were still active in Gulu, I was able to present myself and to

ask volunteers to cooperate with my research. All of the respondents that I interviewed still worked for an

NGO in Gulu district, the center of the humanitarian influx for many years.

The first volunteers led to other respondents based on snowball or chain sampling. This approach made it

possible to locate information-rich informants. Simply asking relevant participants to bring me in contact

with other peers, made it possible to make the snowball bigger and to accumulate new information-rich

interviews. When a few key names or incidents were mentioned repeatedly, that was a sign that they could

be highly useful for the research (Patton, 2002). The support of the local research assistant was especially

helpful when some of those key names were not motivated to do an interview or when it was difficult to get

a hold of them by myself.

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Despite having a structured list of questions, the interviews were done in a rather informal way, making it

possible not to stick to the order of the questions and to follow the respondent in his story. In order to make

the respondent feel at ease, no recording machine was used, only pen and paper. During some of the

interviews, some respondents were very careful and sometimes even whispering when the government was

mentioned, what was a confirmation that this old-school way of registering made it possible to access as

much data as possible. Because the respondents were fluent in English, interviews were done face-to-face,

without translator.

4.3. Semi-structured interview with key figures

During the literature study about the conflict in Uganda, key figures were identified. The first selected

respondent, was and is a member of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI). They did not

only play a crucial role in raising international awareness about the conflict, but also in the peace process

between the LRA and the GoU.

The other two key figures were camp commandants. The function of camp commander was implemented

by the international humanitarian organisations in order to bypass the corruption by the local council

system that was in place. Camp commanders were elected by the IDP people and functioned as the link

between the local people in the camp and the employees of the international NGOs, especially when

communicating issues with the donated aid.

Despite the expectation of the added value of these three interviews, little relevant or different information

than the one obtained during the focus groups could be retrieved.

The interview with one of the members of the ARLPI did not produce added value, because the respondent

took complete ownership of the interview and repeated the very same information that was published on

the website of the organisation. Also the fact he needed to see the interview questions before we actually

started to perform the interview, gave him the leading role in the interview, only answering the questions he

preferred and leaving no time or space to intervene or ask more critical questions.

The opinions expressed in the interviews with the two camp commanders were almost completely in line

with the perceptions of the former IDPs. Despite the expectation that their perceptions would possibly be

different due to a more extensive contact with the employees of international humanitarian organisations

13

and because they are the ones who communicated reported issues by the IDPs to the NGOs, no relevant

differences were found.

5. Research results: local perceptions on humanitarian aid in northern Uganda

In order to obtain some additional insight into the research context, this section starts with a general

overview of life in the camps, based on the stories of former IDPs. Next, I aim to formulate an answer to

my research questions. The presentation of the research results is subdivided into four themes, based on

rather surprising discrepancies between critical literature and the versions of people on the ground. The

four themes consist of international humanitarian aid in general, humanitarian complicity or the

continuation of war, ‘forced’ displacement of people in IDP camps and the cooperation between the

military and the humanitarian.

5.1. Life in the camps

According to all interviewed IDPs, life in camp was difficult for the displaced Acholi people due to

multiple reasons, ranging from immoral behaviour to famine and to a lack of security.

Immoral behaviour consisted of alcohol abuse and gender based violence, but also of profligate sexual

behaviour that led to widespread sexual transmitted diseases and child pregnancies. Next to the STDs, the

overpopulation led to the epidemic spread of non-sexual diseases like cholera. Life in the camp also meant

the erosion of the Acholi culture as they knew it. Especially the youth supposedly lost its connection with

the Acholi culture. Disrespecting the elderly and disobeying the parents were reported frequently. The

majority of the elderly believed the youth became lazy because they became accustomed to received food

without working for it.

Famine was a daily hurt felt by the Acholi people in the camps due to scarcity of food and the lack of food

stock or access to their land. A few times, the army allowed them to go to their former land, but those

opportunities were rare and decreased soon. People had to rely almost completely on the donated food aid

by international donors. They provided food and cooking utensils, blankets and beddings, clothes,

psychosocial aid and limited education. The donated food aid meant that people ate differently than they

would under their normal diet. An extra difficulty reported in several focus groups was the corrupt practices

14

of some camp commanders that consisted out of keeping more food or other aid for themselves, family

members or favoured people.

Their safety concerns were caused by the rebels as well as the government soldiers. While the first

terrorised the population trough abduction, general attacks and looting of humanitarian aid, the latter

regularly mistreated and (sexually) abused them. The majority of the people that participated in the focus

groups reported having children abducted. Virtually none of them ever returned home. Different

respondents explain that they were not even allowed to have the lights on at night in the camp. Disobeying

this rule could result in heavy beatings by the soldiers as punishment. Another example of the poor safety

situation in the camp, was the fact that the soldiers were housed in barracks in the middle of the camp while

the IDPs had to fill out the rest of the space around that centre, acting as a human shield against possible

attacks of the LRA.

As one former IDP summarises the life in the camp: We were starving every day. When we received

food, we were forced to eat things we normally do not eat in our culture. We were constantly scared

of the possible attacks and abduction of our children by the LRA. And even in the camps we were

beaten by the soldiers if we let the lights on at night. The conflict brought psychological torture in

the lives of many.2

5.2. International humanitarian aid and the hidden agenda of humanitarian NGOs

5.2.1. Critical literature

Dolan devotes different chapters of his PhD thesis (2005) to life in the camps. Based on interviews with

IDPs, he describes the daily situation, challenges and practical organisation of and in the camps. The

provision of food aid, but also education, health care and diverse other topics are discussed. Despite the

added value of these personal insights, the data extracted from the IDPs is focused on very practical topics

and issues, like the division of food or the quantity that was donated (Dolan, 2005). Based on this data, the

reader does not learn about the more subjective perceptions on humanitarian aid. Was the international

humanitarian aid welcomed by the people? Were IDPs suspicious toward the international intervention?

What were the perceptions on the motives of donating aid?

2 Male respondent in focus group in Ched-Kan, May 2017.

15

Branch (2007) expresses skepticism about the humanitarian sector and the work they have done in northern

Uganda. He states that the humanitarian complex reduces the people they help to aggregate statistics,

passive recipients of aid and passive victims of the war they had to face and thus normalize the fact that the

beneficiaries are helpless individuals. Because the people find themselves in a struggle to survive, they

cannot challenge this compartmentalisation. He adds however that the idea of the passive victim is not

fixed and can erupt because it demands a complete passivity by the people that is not possible to maintain.

Following from this, he states the humanitarian sector needs the use of violence to maintain the conformity

of the people as passive recipients (Branch, 2007).

Branch (2007) also mentions in his research cases where humanitarian aid was outright rejected by the

local population in the camps. Those events show there did exist resentment towards how the humanitarian

organisations treat them and the possibility of the refusal of the aid coming from governmental or

humanitarian agencies. Their non-acceptance is also based on the refusal to accept the victim identity that

the humanitarian aid forces on them. One of the cases mentions the reaction of people on a cholera

outbreak in one of the biggest camps in the North. Although the international humanitarian organisations

quickly had the situation under control, they could not prevent the widely-accepted idea that the given food

caused the outbreak. As a result, people refused to accept food or other given benefits from the NGOs

(Branch, 2007). While the findings and examples of Branch are definitely important to take in account, it

must be noted that his findings do not seem to hold across the board. Mentioning confidential interviews as

a source of these examples, he did not conduct a systematic study of across all the camps.

5.2.2. Other literature

Nibbe follows the critics on humanitarian aid, stated by Branch (2007) and Finnström (2003) but, as

explained in her work, she experienced different perceptions on the ground. Based on conversations with

people who lived in the camp, she has no doubt that for many Acholi the humanitarian (food) aid was

existential for them and consequently their first and only worry (Nibbe, 2011).

Research done by MSF in Uganda suggests that the majority of the people associated humanitarian aid with

charity. They described MSF and other humanitarian actors and the work they do as an example of

“goodness”. They are often perceived as being neutral and impartial, qualities that Acholi people perceived

as divine (Abu-Sada, 2012).

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Ugandan aid personnel seemed to be more critical. Among them, there lived a widespread suspicion about

the hidden agenda of Western agencies. Despite the fact that this belief was widely accepted, it was not

perceived as a serious problem that could possibly impact the work of the aid organisations. The aid

workers themselves assigned the differences in perceptions between the two groups to the fact that the

people that were actually living in the camps were on ‘survival modus’ and consequently had less attention

for the political nuances of the humanitarian intervention (Stites, 2006).

5.2.3. Research findings

During the focus groups with the IDPs, they unanimously expressed the opinion that the humanitarian aid

that came in during the conflict, was greatly appreciated. Although all of the groups pointed out

shortcoming of the aid (not enough food aid, donation of bras to men, spoiled food), the respondents never

expressed negative opinions about the humanitarian support. The majority of them argued that it is because

of the international humanitarian aid that they are still alive today and consequently see the West as a

generous and merciful actor in this conflict. They did not only appreciate the delivery of food and shelter to

survive, but also the psychosocial aid. Despite this positive attitude towards the aid, most of the

respondents expressed that the aid stopped too soon and should not have ended yet. It stopped when people

were allowed to go back home, but at that point - and still today - they felt helpless and needed further aid

to get them back on their feet.

R2: We didn’t feel any better after the given aid. Because many of us were too weak, we couldn’t

construct our homes. A lot of us also lost our children and spouses to the rebels. It was difficult to cope

with the aftermaths of the conflict Even now, we still need assistance. We still have difficulties to

provide in our food.3

Following from this topic, it was tried to distinguish if the Western aid was also suspected of having a

hidden agenda. No answer contained a grain of criticism when talking about why the support came in.

When more directly asked if people had an idea why those countries gave aid, it was unanimously

answered that they wanted ‘to do good’, they wanted to help the people that were in need. Men were more

inclined to include the weak government as a reason why international aid had to come in. Even when

coming back later on this question and directly ask if the donors could have a hidden agenda, this was

firmly denied.

3 Female respondent in focus group, Alokolum, May 2017.

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When asked if people had a preference about were aid is coming from, it was mostly answered with some

disbelief. None of them had any preference were the aid was coming from. Concerning the time of the

influx, people explain that the aid came only in the middle of the insurgency, but at the right time when

needed. The first contact with international humanitarian aid was only once people were already encamped.

It was clear that the women groups were more aware of the practicalities (for example listing the different

active NGOs) in the camps than men were. This was confirmed by both sexes who explained regularly that

the humanitarian aid focussed on women and children and a lot of men resorted to alcohol abuse because

they felt bypassed in their role as responsible for the family.

The same question asked to the local employees of international NGOs produced less individual centered

answers. According to them, the international humanitarian intervention was necessary for the coordination

of the diverse incoming aid, assistance and the funds. All of the local employee respondents mentioned the

inability of the state and the incapacity of local NGOs. One of them mentioned that the government system

was destroyed by the conflict and did not get back on its feet until 2014. That is why the humanitarian aid

had to take over and ensure the provision of social services. All of the respondents explained that the

international humanitarian aid was beneficial, because without they would have died, it was thus not only

necessary, but vital.

NGO respondents confirm that the international humanitarian aid came fairly late, but blame the

government for concealing the conflict and refusing to declare the situation in their country as a disaster.

The whole country had become ungovernable, people were killed and abducted and the basic services and

facilities did not work anymore. On top of that the GoU was keeping their media silent. Different reasons

were given for why and how they made the conflict public. Several respondents explain the role of the

priests who accompanied children sleeping in bus stations at night, searching for a safer place to sleep. It

were the religious leaders who announced the crisis to the outside world. Others believe the government

was the one who reached out for help to the international community. Despite those different explanations,

all respondents claim that the international community cannot be blamed. Their own government kept the

conflict quiet and the international aid was sooner taking care of the people of Uganda than their own

government did. Several respondents point out that the ICRC was already present before the peak of the

conflict, but that they did not have enough capacity to handle the huge amount of people packed in camps.

18

Also among the local employees, it was unanimously agreed upon that the international humanitarian sector

comes in with the first and main motive of giving aid. They came in when needed, when the government

could not prevent their own people from dying. Especially the two respondents who worked for the ICRC

strongly believed in the goal of the organisation and its ability to stay neutral. It was also those two

respondents who put more questions marks about the role of the UN bodies instead of the strict

humanitarian organisations.

Next to the main goal of giving aid when needed, respondents mentioned some secondary goals, like that

donating countries would benefit economically and more specifically the work opportunities it created for

the humanitarian sector.

One of the respondents demonstrated his opinion with an example: … For example, when donating

food… If Belgium helps Uganda with food, it will benefit economically from it. But the intention is to

help, the economic gain is a side effect and is logic, because there was no food stock available in

Uganda. It is normal that countries gave the food that they have in stock instead of cash. It was a

food insecure operation with the only intention to help.4

This believe about work opportunities was mainly based on the fact that the respondents found it difficult to

understand why expats would travel to a dangerous conflict area to help people and the fact that the

majority of the employees of the humanitarian sector were Western people who were paid way more than

the local people they worked with. Even when motives were suspected, it did not change anything in

accepting aid and people still preferred the international given aid coming in over the national one. This

was due to quality, advocacy and capacity.

5.2.4. Conclusion

It is difficult to find more information about the perception of IDP people on international humanitarian aid

in academic literature. The relevant research comprised either very practical information about aid or was

either based on anecdotes that described events where humanitarian aid was rejected.

The more practical researches of MSF and Feinstein provide more insights in the subjective experience of

the international humanitarian intervention by local stakeholders. Specifically focused on the situation in

4 Interview with former local employee, Gulu, June 2017.

19

northern Uganda, research had shown that the IDPs understood the humanitarian aid as an act of kindness.

This finding is in line with the accomplished research done for this thesis. The data gathered from the focus

groups with former IDPs confirmed the work of humanitarian actors as a deed out of goodness. Because of

the given aid, the sector was unanimously perceived as merciful and kind. All of the respondent appreciated

the aid and claimed they thank their lives to the aid. Especially because their own government could not

support their own people. There was no suspicion of a possible hidden agenda. Not only did this not come

out spontaneously during the interviews, but even when asked directly, this statement was firmly denied.

The perceptions of the local employees of international NGOs have shown to be more critical about the

motives of the humanitarian sector. However, even when being more suspicious, all of the interviewees

believed the humanitarian aid came in with a main goal of helping the people and. Possible hidden agendas

or motives were believed to be only secondary and even when those did exist, none of the respondents

believed it had any impact on the work of the aid organisations.

A possibly explanation for the softer and less critical opinions of the former IDPs is the fact that they were

in a survival mode during the conflict. Being encamped and completely dependent on humanitarian aid in

their struggle to survive, made them focus on the basic necessities in life: shelter, food and protection and

left less room for less individual centered perceptions. Their history of feeling deprived by their own

government, the lack of the latter to properly protect and provide for them and the perceived lack of

motivation of the government to end the conflict certainly influences their acceptance of the one actor who

did help them: the humanitarian sector.

The perceptions of the local employees on the effects of humanitarian assistance have shown to be very

inconsistent with the perception of former IDP. Because of their relevance, their perceptions and critics are

presented in the next topic on effects of humanitarian assistance.

5.3. The effects of humanitarian aid


Where former IDPs indicated that the humanitarian assistance stopped to soon to stand on their own feet,

local employees of NGOs were more critical about the given aid. They saw it as problematic to simply give

food to the people, because they believe it made the (former) encamped people dependent. Not only during

their time in the camps, but also after it. Different respondents label this phenomenon as the “dependency

20

syndrome”. As different respondents explain, a lot of people had to be even ‘decongested’ from the camps

when they were dismantled because they did not want to go back home.

The humanitarian aid was now the main supplier of food during the conflict, paid fees to get the children to

school and took care of the sick. Despite the well-intended assistance, it made the Acholi men feel

bypassed in their cultural role as head of the family. On top of that, the humanitarian aid focussed on

children and women and left the men excluded. Women were the ones who received the food tickets and

could go when food was distributed. These frustrations led to alcohol abuse and gender based violence. The

international intentions did with other words, not match with the cultural set up.

R: The cost of providing relief is too high and is not sustainable. It had to be provided for only a

short period of time, people got used to it. The war lasted 20 years, it will take at least 20 years to

change the mind-set of the people.5

R2: Humanitarian aid bred a society of dependent people.6

Next to the humanitarian side of the aid, one of the respondents also questions the developmental aspect

of humanitarian intervention. Giving food does not do anything for the development of the country. On

the contrary: it made people lazy. When people went back home, they were not acquainted with farming

anymore. Not only did the people become lazy, but also the government because the humanitarian

sector took over their responsibilities and removed them from their responsibility to develop the

northern part of the country. It became negligent for its own responsibilities. Following different

respondents, the problem with humanitarian aid is that it does not work with a time line. The recovering

period after the international aid focussed on food aid, but neglected basis services like education and

health.

5 Interview with former employee, Gulu, June 2017. 6 Interview with former employee, Gulu, May 2017.

21

5.4. Humanitarian complicity and the continuation of war


Different scholars blame the humanitarian sector to be cooperation with the cruel strategy of the

government and sustaining the encampment with their support.

Finnström (2003) describes in his work the entanglement between the humanitarian sector and the forced

encampment. He accuses the sector of only focussing on treating the symptoms of the war instead of

understanding and working on the political aspect and deep-seated grievances of it. Although the

government calls the camps protected camps, he stresses the inability of the government to protect its

people against diverse rebel attacks and providing basic support. Therefore, Finnström labels the so called

protected sites ‘enforced domination’ (Finnström, 2003).

In Dolan’s (2005; 2013) analysis of the role of different actors in the continuation of the war, he claims that

not only the visible actors, the Government of Uganda and the LRA are players in this conflict, but among

them also the less visible actors like multilateral organisations and NGOs. By making the comparison with

doctors in a torture situation, he sees humanitarian actors as complicit bystanders because they enabled and

prolonged the inhuman situation of and in the IDP camps. Because of the horrible living conditions in the

camps, he labels them as sites of social torture. He understands the encampment as the key instrument of

subordinated inclusion of the people by the government. “The protected villages were no longer just a

feature of the war zone: for the majority of the population, they were the war zone” (Dolan 2005; 2013).

Another critique on the humanitarian aid during the encampment comes from Branch (2008; 2009). He

states that they should not enjoy unaccountability based on their presumed neutrality and beneficence.

Despite the fact that they were working against the violence and suffering of the people, they were

enabling, even if unintentionally, the very cruelties they were fighting against. Therefore, they should be

held accountable. Especially because the forced mass displacement is illegal under humanitarian and

human rights law7, the humanitarian sector helped enable and sustain this situation that the Government of

Uganda has created. Branch argues that the humanitarian aid supported the Ugandan government’s strategy

through the essential material and symbolic support that aid has provided in the process of mass forced

displacement and internment. He claims that the humanitarian aid came in at the conception of the 7 Despite the statement of Branch, international law does allow for people could be displaced for their own

safety or for military reasons, but that does not mean the tactics by which this displacement occurs should

be left unquestioned (Amnesty International, 1999).

22

internment camps and that the latter thus could only be created because international aid organizations were

there from the beginning to supply the people in the camps with relief aid. His reasoning to hold the aid

agencies accountable is based on the idea of their role in creating and prolonging this human disaster, in

particular their direct complicity in creating and sustaining the camps through providing aid to their

inhabitants (Branch, 2008; 2009).


The research of Feinstein confirmed the role of various actors in regard to their role in the continuation of

the war, highlighting economic interests in the perpetuation of war and international aid. These actors are

the GoU, the UPDF and the international community. The fact that large sums of money went through the

Government of Uganda is considered to have perpetuated the conflict. Following the respondents in the

Feinstein research, the government lacked engagement to come to a compromise with the LRA and actually

end the conflict. A second argument is the failure of the government to apprehend Joseph Kony and his

commanders over the past twenty years. Lastly, respondents perceive the continuation of the war as an

economic opportunity for the government and army officials (Stites, 2006). These arguments reflect the

research of Dijkzeul and Wakenge (2010), which found that local NGOs and authorities argued that

humanitarian organisations are depended on a war or conflict to become active and stay active. Shorty said,

they believe the humanitarian sector in a way benefits from conflict (Dijkzeul & Wakenge, 2010).

A large portion of the Western aid goes through the Government of Uganda, which according to some

observers, has not actively worked towards ending the conflict. Following from this, the question can be

raised whether the donors contribute to the continuation of the conflict, because their funding benefits the

government, but they fail to push it to actively work on the peace process. If research in the field would

lead to this conclusion, it would mean that the traditional humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality,

impartiality and independence would not only be harmed but would also damage the legitimacy and

effectiveness of the work of those organizations (Stites, 2006).


With one exception noted, all of the former IDPs who talked about the continuation of the war, denied the

statement that the international humanitarian aid prolonged the war. The actors that were perceived by the

majority to have prolonged the war, were the rebels and the government, as the two main actors. Next to

23

these, some mentioned the government as the only actor responsible and only one respondent claimed that

only the rebels prolonged the war. The argumentation for the denial of the possible complicity of the

humanitarian sector was the fact that they are perceived to have played a substantial role in the peace talks

between rebels and the Ugandan government. By contrast, the government was seen to lack a willingness to

negotiate with the rebels, thereby prolonging the war. One of the reasons for this refusal could be the

feeling of being defeated when negotiating with rebels. Another mentioned reason is the fact that tribal

issues were dominating the whole conflict and the lack of interest of the government to defend the interests

of the Acholi population. A last reason that was mentioned several times is a possible cooperation between

the government soldiers and the rebels. The former would assumedly have provided uniforms and

equipment to the rebels.

Following on these explanations, it was repeatedly mentioned that the humanitarian sector only wanted to

relieve the lives of the people in need. That they only wanted to do good and had in no way any part at

prolonging the war. What people did mention was the fact that rebels looted humanitarian aid, but they did

not connect this to prolonging the war.

Very similar perceptions were heard when interviewing the local employees of NGOs. More than half of

the interviewed NGOs believe there were only two guilty actors in the conflict: The Government of Uganda

and the LRA.

The main thing they blame the government for is their failing in locating and catching Joseph Kony. 8 out

of 10 of the interviewed NGO employees claimed that it is impossible to accept the idea that the

government indeed was incapable of arresting the rebel leader and his commanders. They believe the

government was capable of succeeding: they knew were the rebels were, they had the capacity and they

knew with how many the rebels were left. Other also stated the government was reluctant to negotiate with

the rebels, in turn just starting military operations (Operation Iron Fist, Operation Lightning Thunder, …).

Their reluctance for dialogue and their preference for hard military tactics prolonged the war.

Different respondents claim the government had a hidden agenda in benefitting and prolonging the war.

The first is land. Several interviewees mentioned that the two parties were in negotiations about the land

and how to divide it while people were trapped in the camps. Several people believe the government even

supported the rebels with uniforms and equipment. An idea that was made public by some returned rebels

themselves. The government wanted to be the owner of the land and make their own people slaves of that

land. According to them, the war is still going on today, a silent war far away from the eyes of the West.

24

The war and the encampment was a strategy of acquiring land. Proof of this thinking exercise is the fact

that 80% of the court cases that are handled by the Local Counsel Courts concern land conflicts. Another

reason for the government to prolong the war was the money that came in and the government could spend

on the active soldiers to prevent them from causing problems.

The LRA and more specific its head commander, Joseph Kony, is also seen as a responsible actor of

prolonging the war, because he was spiritually possessed and consequently impossible to talk or negotiate

with the government. Only two of the ten interviewed NGO employees believed the humanitarian aid

prolonged the conflict situation, although they did not believe it was their main goal. Their main goal was

to help and protect the people of Uganda. Their secondary motive was to keep their organisation running,

wanting to keep their job. Proof for this statement was the fact that when the rebels ceased the hostilities

and left to Sudan, the international community went to Karamojong to give aid to people in that conflict

situation. The second respondent also saw a prolonging of the conflict by the international community,

believing the United States of America would be easily capable of locating and arresting Kony and his

commanders. Motives for this are related to continuing the humanitarian aid and the employment

opportunity for the sector.

5.4.4. Conclusion

In critical literature on humanitarian aid during the conflict in northern Uganda, we clearly see an

accusation of the humanitarian sector for being complicit in the military encampment strategy of the

government. Because the sector only focusses on the symptoms of war instead of the actual causes, it can

be perceived that their job availability is directly linked to the existence and thus continuation of war.

Because the life conditions in the camps were that inhuman and the humanitarian sector actually kept this

situation alive, they were in a way enabling the very cruelties they were fighting against.

These attributed selfish motivations contrast strongly with how the people in the IDP camps perceived the

humanitarian workers and industry. In their eyes, the primary actors of relevance were the rebels and the

government. Argumentations for these statements are the government’s lack of motivation to enter into

peace talks and come to an agreement, alleged cooperation between government soldiers and rebels and the

neglect of the rights of Acholi’s as a tribal issue. Every possible affiliation with the humanitarian aid was

strongly denied. People believed the humanitarian aid only wanted ‘to do good’ without having any hidden

agenda. Consequently, they also did not conceive them as wanting to prolong the war and the suffering of

the IDPs.

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The common thread in the focus groups with IDPs in general and more specifically around the four more

specific themes, is the finger pointing at the government and its responsibility in the hurt that they have

done and the lack of it in protecting their people and ending the conflict. The blaming of the government

for these various issues is also a common thread in the interviews with the NGOs.

5.5. Narratives about the displacement


This theme focusses on the different narratives that are used by diverse actors to describe the conflict

situation in northern Uganda and the encampment. A common assumption in academic literature (Branch,

2007, 2008, 2009; Finnström, 2003, 2008; Dolan, 2005, 2013) is the recurrent assumption that the

Government of Uganda (violently) forced the Acholi people in the camps. These scholars consistently use

the term ‘forced displacement’ when describing the encampment of the Acholi’s.

Branch (2008; 2009) recognises the violence of the government against its own people on three levels: in

forcing them in the camps, preventing them to leave and in repressing any political activities once confined.

He strongly states that the conventional idea that the people fled their homes voluntarily to trade the life

they knew for a life in the camps is false. They were forced in the camps without any support in the form of

food, supplies and had to build their own shelter. Because of the poor living conditions, people refused to

stay in the camps and preferred the relative safety of their own homes and wanted to face the violence that

wanted to keep them in the camps (Branch, 2008; 2009). Although Branch support his reasoning with the

IRIN Humanitarian Situation Report, the research also mentions the fact that farmers fear to return to their

land, because they fear attacks of the rebels or the possibility to be stuck in between the fighting between

the army and the rebels (IRIN, 1996). The humanitarian aid that came in, was according to Branch an

instrument to overcome the popular resistance to the encampment (Branch, 2008; 2009).

Nibbe (2011) states that a lot of official documents like the one of the UN-OCHA ignore the fact that the

conflict is not the defining actor for the forced displacement. She criticizes these narratives that leave the

reader assume that the Acholi fled voluntarily because of the conflict and that the government created the

camp as a way to protect its civilians. She states “Hence, I want to clearly assert in this section that the

displacement was not voluntary for most of those displaced in the Acholi sub-region – it was mostly a

forced action on the part of the Ugandan military to try to squelch the LRA” (Nibbe, 2011). Although she

26

underlines the critique of these scholars, she indicates that she experienced striking contradictions between

the narrative used by the government and international community and the narratives that live on the

ground, by the people who were confined in the camps (Nibbe, 2011).


When Jan Egeland, the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, visited northern Uganda in

2003, he reproduced the same particular story about the conflict as the Government of Uganda used.

Likewise, he stated that the war was responsible for the encampment of the Acholi people. It portrayed the

displacement as an event that happened as a natural, spontaneous response to the violence committed by the

rebels. A narrative put this vaguely leaves the reader assuming that there is only one responsible party in

the war and the displacement of the Acholi population: Kony and his LRA. This public statement about

who the villain in this story is and the ignorance about the role of the Government, was copied in diverse

official statements and in the international press to the outside world (Nibbe, 2011).

The previous topics have proven that the research findings of the Feinstein research (2006) seem to be in

line with the gathered data of this research. When it comes to the displacement topic, however, the

Feinstein research uses the same narrative as other academic research uses: “The Ugandan national army

(the United People's Defense Force or UPDF) began to forcibly move civilians into camps and “protected

villages” allegedly in order to cut the rebels’ food supply (Stites, 2006).” Because the displacement issue is

not further researched in the work of Stites, it seems they followed the general accepted assumption about

the forced displacement.


Despite of the above described difficult living conditions in the camps, little support was found for the

general acceptance that the government of Uganda forcefully removed all the civilians into the camps.

Nearly all of the respondents who answered this question understood this decision of the government.

Motives mentioned by the respondents were the ability to make a separation between civilians and rebels

and the protection of the people (against the abduction of their children by the LRA).

27

One of the respondents explains that: Moving to the camps meant that I could prevent the abduction

of my children. I had already lost 5 of my children to the rebels and I wanted to protect the last ones

that I had. When they had raised this safety concern to the government, it was them who helped them

moving to a safer place to take care of their lives. I am grateful for that. Without the camps, my

children and me would not be alive today.8

Many of the respondent state that they were not forced and that the government only used violence on ‘the

stubborn ones’. Both men and women state that they were safer in the camps than at their former home.

When respondents in the male group agreed with the statement that the government used force to move

them to the camps, they explained that the force came as well from the government as the rebels.

As one respondent states: The government only used force on people who were refusing to go to the

camps. They got beaten by them. It was a good thing because the rebels were killing the people

terribly. It was the only way for the government to save people.9

Most of the data gathered from the interviews with local employees, were in line with the above. Only two

out of ten stated that the people were forced in the camps and did not want to go. Two of the other

respondents confirm that people were forced in the camps, but do not see the government as the only actor

in the forceful displacement. They stress the role of the rebels as the forceful actor, together with the

government. 6 out of ten employees understood and agreed with the strategy of the government. The main

arguments for agreeing on the encampment, that were supported by the employees, was the provision of

protection against attacks and abduction by the LRA. It was explained that people lived very scattered and

the government army simply did not have the capacity to protect all the people while they were staying at

their own homes. A second reason was the ability to be able to distinguish the civilians from the rebels. Not

only could the government be sure they would not kill civilians when bombing the north, but also did they

want to make sure the civilians did not provide food and other aid to the LRA.

Although the majority of the respondents understood and supported the decision of the government, they do

blame them for the lack of provision of aid and protection when people were confined and the duration of

the encampment. Putting people in the camps was not the problem, but the life in the camps was.

8 Female respondent in focus group, Coo-pe, May 2017. 9 Male respondent in focus group, Unyama, May 2017.

28

As the first local employee that I interviewed, stated: The decision of the government to put their own

people in the camps was the best and only strategic move that could have be done. Otherwise, the

people would have been killed or recruited by the LRA to become rebels. I have read the critics of

international research, and I will never agree with their point (about the forced displacement by the

government). Over my dead body. The government and the military had to be able to separate the

common people from the rebels, otherwise they would kill common people too. They did not have the

capacity to protect the people when they lived to scattered. I do not blame the government for the

encamping, but I do blame them for not providing food and shelter for the people, once they were

located in the camps. Their second fault is that they should have ended this situation sooner and not

only after 10 years. Let me ask you, if you were the president of Uganda during the conflict, what

would you have done differently to protect the people?10

5.5.4. Conclusion

The narratives about the encampment have proven to be very contrasting with the perceptions of the former

encamped Acholi’s. From the focus groups with former IDPs, there was a vast majority that agreed with the

strategy of the government. While Branch substantiates his arguments with anecdotal events, this research

gathered data in a more systematic way. The principal reason for the support of the encampment was a

higher level of protection against attacks and abductions by the LRA. They support the idea that the

government did not have the capacity to protect the civilians who lived scattered in Acholi land and

therefore had to concentrated in big camps. Important to note is that the villages where the focus groups

were performed, are known to have suffered especially hard from the attacks of the LRA. Facing this kind

of extreme violence on a regular basis, can explain why people appreciated the protection that the camps

and the soldiers had to offer.

The support for the decision of the government is especially apparent, because each of the focus groups

also reported how unsafe the camps were, regular abuse by the government soldiers and ongoing attacks

from the LRA in the camps. Even despite these difficult living conditions and human rights violations, they

still believe they were better off in the camps.

Although the local employees criticized the decision of the government more than the former IDPs did, the

majority believes the government had no other or better option then encamping the civilians. Different

10 Interview with local employee, Gulu, May 2017.

29

respondents believed a lot of people were forced, but not only by the government. The rebels of the LRA

are believed to be equally guilty.

Despite the importance of academic work on this matter, the used narratives and the use of the term

‘forced’ encampment is very politically loaded and leaves the reader not much choice than to see the

government as a guilty actor. When talking about the displacement, academics do rely on different sources,

but is seems that these added examples are presented on an anecdotal basis and not on systematic data

gathering. Therefore, this small, but more systematic research can be very valuable to show another version

about the commonly accepted assumptions.

5.6. Provided security by the army: an attack on neutrality?


Despite the elaborated work on the entanglement of the humanitarian work and the other parties in the

conflict, little is mentioned about the cooperation between the UPDF and the humanitarian assistance.

Branch (2009) briefly describes the collaboration between the humanitarian organisations and the army of

Uganda. Not only escorted the UPDF the humanitarian food aid to ensure its arrival, but also to safeguard

the ‘good’ behaviour of people when aid was being distributed. Following from interviews with local

people, he states in his research that the local people in northern Uganda saw this collaboration as

problematic. Seeing the trucks of WFP accompanied with armed and uniformed government troops, was

locally not only understood as an alliance between the international community and the government of

Uganda, but also with other political actors as the United States and rebels of Southern Sudan. This

relationship meant that the aid agencies and government violence were interlinked in the eyes of many

Acholi people (Branch, 2009).

5.6.2. Other contrasting literature

The cooperation between the humanitarian sector and the UPDF in northern Uganda is one of the topics

researched by Feinstein (2006). The former provided escorts and thus security to the latter during the

conflict, especially when delivering food or other aid. Organizations like ICRC and MSF did not work with

them because of their principles and policies, a strategy that was appreciated by the local community. Other

well know organizations as WFP worked under heavy security provided by the UPDF. Different national

30

and international actors criticize the cooperation between the UPDF and international humanitarian

agencies because it can influence the perceptions on efficacy and neutrality of the humanitarian

organisation. Focus groups done in Gulu district showed that the cooperation with the army did not change

the perceptions of the local population on humanitarian organisations. All of the interviewees agreed that

these measurements allowed the WFP to be able to deliver the food and aid without interruptions. Even

when the question about possible compromising of humanitarian principles because of the cooperation with

the army was asked directly, no respondent confirmed this. These findings are not yet tested in other

districts where the use of military escorts happened on a more frequent basis (Stites, 2006).


None of the IDP respondents questioned the neutrality of the humanitarian organisations because of their

cooperation with the UPDF. Arguments for their approval of military escorts are unanimously the ensuring

of the delivery of food aid and the protection of the lives of the humanitarian workers against attacks of the

LRA. Also during the distribution of the food, the army protected the humanitarian workers when they

faced challenges with the local community. This cooperation was not understood as the army having any

influence on the activities, standpoint or goal of the humanitarian organisations.

As one respondent phrases: The UPDF had no influence on the humanitarian aid whatsoever. They

were they to protect the people who worked for the international aid organisations. Not only against

the rebels, but also sometimes when food was distributed. It was a very good strategy to make sure

the rebels would not steal our food.11

The local NGO workers from their side, agreed on the practical advantages of military back up. Ensuring

the arrival of the food aid, maintaining access to the different camps and protection of local workers

justified this cooperation. One of the respondents worked for the ICRC what explains the refusal to work

together with the UPDF. Their strict neutrality and complementary reputation enabled them to be the only

international organisation allowed work with the government, IDP and the rebels.

As one respondent explains: The international organisations were neutral in their work and were

focussed on helping the displaced persons. Working together with the UPDF was a matter of escort

and providing security. It did not mean they were on the same side of the army, but they only wanted

11 Female respondent in focus group, Koro, May 2017.

31

to provide security for the aid employees and prevent the looting of the aid by the rebels. This

cooperation did not change the goal or objective of helping the displaced people.12

5.6.4. Conclusion

Working together with the rebels is not an issue for the local population, but one for the rebels. The

cooperation was perceived as choosing sides.

Although one could easily assume that the use of armed escorts compromises the independence of

humanitarian assistance, grassroots perceptions have proven that it is not applicable on the humanitarian aid

in northern Uganda. Instead of seeing the cooperation as a derogation of humanitarian assistance, it is

perceived as an asset to ensure the food and aid actually arrives at its destination and the deliverers are

protected against possible attacks. Not only did the former IDPs not see a problem in the cooperation, they

in fact endorsed it even as a good strategy.

Likewise, the perceptions and opinions of NGOs, who could be assumed to be more critical, were in line

with those of the formally displaced people. The delivery of that food and aid was their first life line and

people were completely dependent on it. Instead of questioning the cooperation, they perceived it as an

asset. The ICRC was regularly reported to be the only organization who refused to work under or with

army escorts in order to maintain their neutrality and independence. Their strict independence made it

possible to be perceived as neutral and made them the only international humanitarian organization who

had access to the rebels.

Therefore it is believed that in the case of northern Uganda, the security provided by the army was not a

problem for the IDPs, but it was for the rebels. In the eyes of the people, the army escorts meant an extra

guarantee for the delivery of the aid, but in the eyes of a rebel this cooperation was perceived as a political

choice and therefore as choosing sides, the side of their enemy, the government of Uganda.

12 Interview with former local employee, Gulu, June 2017.

32

6. Discussion and conclusion

A lot has been written about the devastating conflict between the LRA and the Government of Uganda.

Narratives about the war, the encampment of the entire Acholi population and the role of humanitarian

assistance have put forward different responsible actors and have evaluated certain strategies and decisions

very differently. While the Government of Uganda saw the LRA as the only villain actor in the war, critical

academic literature questioned the possible complicit role of the humanitarian sector in the continuation of

the conflict. The value of the work done by the discussed authors is undeniable, especially because it makes

the reader reflect about the role of the humanitarian aid. However, they did not provide ample space for the

perceptions and narratives of the group that was struck hardest by the conflict: the Acholi people that were

displaced in the camps.

After an in-depth preliminary literature study at home, it was surprising to hear the very contrasting

perceptions of the former Internally Displaced People. During the focus groups, performed in different

villages, the people confronted me with stories that differed strongly from the opinions, assumptions and

narratives that are common in critical academic literature. Despite the fact that this kind of literature is

skeptical about the humanitarian sector and assumes that the recipients of the humanitarian assistance are

too, this research has shown that the beneficiaries of the humanitarian aid were welcoming the support. Not

only were they very thankful, but they perceive the donors as merciful, kind and their support as an act of

goodness. While the formerly encamped people firmly deny any hidden agenda, the local employees of

international NGO were slightly more critical. However, even when stated that they suspect other motives

than providing aid to the people in need, they still believe helping people was the main goal of the

humanitarian intervention in northern Uganda.

One of the most striking findings of this research is the rejection of the idea that people were forced into the

camps by the government. Although difficult and inhumane living conditions in the camps were stressed by

all of the respondents, the vast majority of the respondents believed the government actually did them a

favor by concentrating them into the camps. The support for the decision to make people leave their house

and replace their former life for a life in the camps, became even more apparent when listening to the

stories of the respondents. All of the respondents explained the rough living conditions in the camp, the

abuse by the official government army and the insecurity, but still they believed they were better off in the

camps than in their own house.

33

But how can these striking contrasts be explained? In line with the conclusion of Dijkzeul and Wakenge

(2010), it can be concluded that needs matter most for the IDPs, the actual beneficiaries of humanitarian

assistance and presumably also the people who suffered the most during the conflict. When people live in a

life-and-death situation, they become adapted to living on a mode of survival. When constantly being in

danger and not being able to foresee in basic necessities, it is logic to understand that their wants and needs

drive their perceptions. The main goal in this survival mode is to keep their family safe and to have food

and shelter. This research has shown that people had practical complaints about the international

humanitarian assistance (Eg. it changed their eating habit and they sometimes received spoiled food), but

they unanimously welcomed and appreciated the aid that came in. Focussing on these simple but vital

needs, makes them question a possible hidden agenda or the relations on a more geo political level to a

lesser extent. The focus on their basic needs could probably also explain why the people did not perceive

the provision of security for the humanitarian workers by the army as a militarisation of the aid or a

possible derogation of the neutrality of the humanitarian sector. Providing escorts to the humanitarian

assistance for them only meant an extra security measure to ensure the (food) aid would arrive in the

camps. Following this stand point, it is normal that Western research, analyse the conflict from a more

distant and analytic point. It places them in the luxurious position to bring in the international context, the

entanglement between the humanitarian sector and the UPDF and philosophical questions when trying to

understand the conflict and its continuation.

When elaborating about the national and international context of Uganda, the country has been affected by

the “war on terror” because of the inclusion of the LRA on the terror list of the United States of America.

However, the tremendous difference between the context of northern Uganda and the context of

Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine, is the lack of the undeniable and visible connection between the

humanitarian aid that comes in from the same countries that occupy their countries in the battle against

terrorism. In northern Uganda however, the humanitarian sector is perceived as the saviour when their own

government abandoned them. The Acholi’s have already a long history of feeling deprived and

marginalised and also during the conflict they feel little has been done by the government to actually

protect them. Despite putting them in camps, the government was almost non-existing when it came to

supporting the people. An extra argumentation for this perception is the perceived lack of motivation from

the side of the government to negotiate with the rebels. Even today, the Acholi population cannot

understand why Joseph Kony and his commanders are still not located and arrested. In their eyes, it only

confirms the neglect of the Acholi’s by the government of President Museveni.

34

A final addition to this thesis is the emphasis of the importance of perceptions and narratives of the people

that were hardest by the conflict. When diverse scholar criticize the tendency of the humanitarian sector to

reduce people to aggregate statistics and very passive victims, scholars should prevent themselves of

following the same path. Despite the added value of the critical voices, it is believed that a more systematic

study of the perceptions of the Acholi people could provide added value to the performed research.

I

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