logic of the self-evident

LOGIC OF THE SELF-EVIDENT

Mark Sheldon

Indiana University-Purdue University, U.S.A. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the College of Letters and Philosophy Department of Wesleyan University, Connecticut. I would like to thank Philip Hallie for his com- ments.

The purpose of this paper is to establish a framework in which talk and thought about God can be considered meaningful. The first par t will deal with the inadequacy of Ayer's view of language, and the second part will be concerned with what might be called the logic of the self-evident. While it is not my inten- tion to make any assertions concerning the nature of God, I do want to ~how that such assertions have significance in relation to interestingly open questions.

Ayer's view of language actually has two aspects. On the one hand, he claims language has two uses, the cognitive and the emotive, and, on the other hand, that the basis of meaning in language is its literal significance. I would first like to discuss the two category aspect of language use.

While the cognitive includes tautologies and empirical hypotheses (mathematics and science), the emotive category contains language which expresses emotion (ethics, aesthetics, theology, and metaphysics). The cognitive category consists of s ta tements of fact, and of s tatements that assert the manner in which statements of fact should be considered. Sta tements of the emotive category express feelings about the objects considered but make no assertions of fact about them. One of the problems, of course, is to find a place for philosophy in this schema. Significant language fits in the cognitive category and consists of either s tatements of fact or tautologies. Philosophi- cal s tatements are not in competition with scientific statements and, so, are not instances of empirical assertions. Ac- cording to Ayer, philosophy that a t tempts this kind of work

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ends in m e a n i n g l e s s metaphys ics . It seems, then , t h a t ph i losophica l s t a t e m e n t s , to be s ign i f i can t , m u s t be tautologies, since these are the only other kind of s tatements tha t are considered meaningful. If this is the case, however, then what is to be said to the objection tha t one tautology has no pr ivi leged perspect ive on another? Tha t is, how can philosophy say anything about the significance of mathematics or logic? It seems to be the Idealist's problem of determining whether any part of the system can make any meaningful s tatement about the status of the system as a whole, or even of any other parts. It would seem that something outside the system would be required to judge its status, to see its meaning. And it would seem that only the whole could judge the status of a part, and not another part. These are, of course, precisely the kinds of speculations and questions Ayer wants to delete from critical philosophy. Yet Ayer's strict stipulation for significant statements, and his argument tha t mathematics, logic and by implication, pilosophy, are tautologies, make such inquiries inevitable.

A n o t h e r problem follows from the conclus ion t h a t philosophical s tatements are tautologies. That is, tautologies say nothing whatsoever about the world, nothing at all about any mat ter of fact. The problem, then, is determining how that which has as its concern no matter of fact whatsoever can even begin to stipulate rules for a proposition that does very deft- nitely, have as its concern a matter of fact. Ayer writes that analytic statements (tautologies) "...enlighten us by illustrat- ing the way in which we use certain symbols...call at tention to linguistic usages...reveal unsuspected implications in our assertions and beliefs. "1 But how it is that these statements, which contain no information about any matter of fact at all, guide us in the empirical search for knowledge is not clear. There seems to be a qualitative difference between the two classes of statements, precluding any logical connection between them. It is unclear not only how but also why analytic statements must have bearing on empirical assertions. For instance. Stephen Korner suggests two aspects of empirical discourse: " ..(a) the inexactness of many empirical attributes and (b) the non-transitive character of perceptual equality... ''2 These both seem to foreclose on anyth ing but a result ing idealization which follows from the application of tautologies

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to the empirical. Consider, for instance, the second feature. Mathematical thought and logic are transitive. That is, if A equals B and B equals C, then C equals A. However, for the empirical this is not necesarily the case. For instance, an inch measure shows tha t A is 4 inches, B is 4 inches, and C is 4 inches. It seems, logically, tha t A equals B, and B equals C, and so, C equals A. But this is not necessarily true since a measure graduated in eighths of inches might show tha t the three lengths are, in fact, different. The possibility of infinite varia- tion of the empirical precludes a relation of transitivity. It seems, then, difficult to understand Ayer's claim, that analytic statements can be meaningfully applied to empirical discourse. It is as if there were two languages, each of a different world.

The second aspect of Ayer's view of language which I would like to discuss is his claim that the literal is the basis for meaning in language. This seems very vague, but I think this is so because what Ayer intends "literal" to mean is vague, even though he puts so much burden on the word. For instance, he writes, "...no sentence which purports to describe the nature of the transcendent God can possess any literal significance, ''3 and "...the sentences which the theist uses to express such ' truths' are not literally significant. TM Earlier in Language, Truth and Logic, there is a passage which exhibits the meaning of the word a little more clearly, Ayer writes:

For the fruitfulness of at tempting to transcend the limits of the possible sense-experience will be deduced, not from a psychological hypothesis concerning the actual con- stitution of the human mind, but from the rule which determines the l i teral significance of language. Our charge against the metaphysician is not tha t he at tempts to employ the understanding in a field where it cannot profitably venture, but tha t he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant. Nor are we ourselves obliged to talk nonsense in order to show that all sentences of a certain type are necessarily devoid of literal significance. We need only formulate the criterion which enables us to test whether a sentence expresses a genuine proposition about a mat ter of fact, and then point out tha t sentences under consideration fail to satisfy it. 5

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He then goes on to formulate the criterion of verifiability:

We say tha t a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express - - that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. G

At this point, before I go on to discuss certain problems involved in the use of the word "literal", I would like to put forward an objection to the criterion of verifiability itself. In effect, this objection is based on a point I made earlier, tha t the logic of tautology and empirical s ta tement have no strict relation. Nor do they have the loose relation of probability. This objection is especially relevant in view of the fact tha t Ayer is supposedly a Humean, and, as such, recognizes no logical basis for induction. My point is as follows: the observations, which one considers in accepting a proposition as true or in rejecting it as false, are derived through a process of induction; hence, it is never possible to state for certain which observations are actually relevant. There is also no basis for adding up prob- abilities. Consider, for instance, the following statement: the lion which has come to my bedside the past ten nights has only been part of my dream. This has been arrived at after careful consideration of the fact that I am still alive, in one piece. I compare my still being here to what I have viewed in movies and read in newspapers concerning lions' behaviour toward human beings. By considering all the evidence and adding up all my experience, I believe that I h a v e , basis for concluding tha t the lion was unreal. However, what I do not realize is that it w a s , indeed, a real lion that came every night to my bedside, not just a hungry one. In this case, the verification criterion, tha t he would have eaten me, is beside the point. There is no way to ensure its relevance, This results from the fact that the verification criterion was chosen inductively. Also, simply because we do happen to pick a criterion that does support our original statement, and which increases our confidence in it, still nothing follows concerning the logical quality of probability.

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Another approach~ worth mentioning, to the requirements of the criterion of verifiability, is taken by John Wisdom, in his combination essay and dialogue ~The Logic of God". Wisdom seems to have writ ten the piece with the following passage from Ayer in mind: "We say tha t a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express - - that is, if he knows what observations would lead him under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. ''v Wisdom's protagonist, towards the finish of the dialogue, says: "It has been said tha t once at least a higher gift than grace did flesh and blood refine, God's essence and his very s e l f - in the body of Jesus. ''s This, I am sure, would be very uneasi ly received by Ayer. The protagonist goes on: "Whether this s ta tement is true or false is not now the point but whether it's so obscure as to be senseless. Obscure undoub- tedly it is but senseless it is not.. ''9 And later, she says, ~The question calls for investigation but it also calls like every other question for thought, reflection, reason... The question is large, slippery, subtle. But it is not true tha t nothing is more relevant to it than another, so tha t nothing supports one answer more than it supports the other...the existence of God. And to this question every incident in the history of the world is relevant - - whether it is the fall of a sparrow or the coming of the harvest, the passing of an empire or the fading of a smile. ''1~ Wisdom, then, declares tha t in considering the question of God's existence, every observation is pertinent. He does not so much accept or reject the criterion of verifiability, as show tha t the question of the existence of God is much larger than such criterion. If anything, he does accept the criterion and, by so doing, displays inadequacy as a means of distinguishing the meaningful from the senseless.

At this point, I would now like to say something briefly concerning Ayer's concept of the "literal". The word appears many times in Logic. Truth and Language. Consider, however, only the following passage: "...no sentence which purports to describe the nature of the transcendent God can possess any literal significance. T M I will now offer a view of metaphor which, I think, makes Ayer's talk of the "literal" problematic. I would like to suggest tha t location of the literal, as opposed to the metaphorical, is. in many interesting cases, extremely difficult, if not, in principle even, impossible.

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The view tha t I would like to develop of metaphor sets it apart as distinct from simile. That is, as I have said, the conventional definition of metaphor, tha t is implied comparison (instead of the out r ight comparison of simile), is inadequate and deletes a particular dimension of meaning. For instance, consider the following case where I am speaking of God. I say, "God is the sky and water, the wind and stars, and the fire and earth." Am I speaking literally or metaphorically? Analysis pointing to simple substitution or comparison (implied simile) will not work here and the question remains open. As ] stated above, Susanne K. Langer suggested tha t metaphor occurs where the evidence described is too complex for the literal. But it is not clear that this is what has happened in the above example, because, as I said, it could be the case tha t the language is literal. This open question, then, presents a diffi- culty for Langer's explanation of metaphor, and for Ayer's view of the literal. He views the literal as exclusive. But is it? In another example I am in a boat on a lake, with a fishing rod, and I say, "I fish for perch, bass and sleep." Have I spoken literally or metaphorically? Again, the question is open: I can ask whether it even matters if I know in which mode I am speaking. Also, as I tried to point out concerning the passage from Eliot, the symbol cannot be separated from the object, so in what sense can the symbol be seen as "conveying the object", as Langer claims it does.

The significantly interestingly instance, then, is where it cannot be de te rmined whe the r a s t a t emen t is l i tera l or metaphorical . And this is precisely why f inding a l i teral paraphrase for a metaphor is impossible. What would count for a literal statement, as opposed to the metaphor, is not clear. Even locating the metaphor is difficult. In a sense, it seems to encourage a kind of literalness of its own, or the line between literal and figurative becomes ambiguous. The result is that metaphor, as I view it, precludes the exclusiveness of the literal, thus causing a problem for Ayer's claim tha t ~...no sentence which purports to describe the nature of the transcendent God can possess any (my emphasisl literal significance. ''12 I have argued that in certain instances it is an open question whether a s ta tement is literal or metaphorical. Thus, a statement can be ;n part literal or entirely literal~ even though it appears figurative.

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Before concluding this section, I would like to make an important distinction between analogy and metaphor. Analogy differs from metaphor in that an analogy is formal: that is, it is plain what is being said to be analogous to what. This is not the case with metaphor. As I said, even locating the metaphor is a problem since it is not always clear whether a metaphor is present. An analogy, then, is an extended simile: instead of single terms there is an explicit parallelism or model. Finally, to make the distinction between metaphor and analogy more complete, I would like to make a point which may be obscure, but which at present I do not know how to make more clearly: no idols are created in the metaphorical use of language because there is nothing on the other side of a metaphor; that is, a metaphor is in terms of itself, a statement. Analogies, on the other hand, are always for a purpose beyond themselves, e.g., demonstration, explanation, illustration. This remark about the distinction between analogy and metaphor is made with those philosophers in mind who argue that nothing analogous can be said of God. While it may be true that nothing analogous can be said of God (this is not the issue here), it does not follow that nothing metaphorical can be said.

In the final part of this paper, I would like to discuss what I call the logic of the self-evident. The philosopher I would like to work with primarily is Spinoza.

At the beginning of Ayer's discussion of theology in Lan- guage Truth and Logic he writes, "This mention of God brings us to the question of the possibility of religious knowledge. ''13 I would like to suggest that one possible view of religious knowledge is that it is self-evident knowledge and, as such, is not subject to any implications of Ayer's argument. Ayer argues as follows:

It is now generally admitted, at any rate by philosophers, that the existence of a being having the at tr ibutes which define the god of any non-animistic religion cannot be demonstrably proved. To see that this is so, we have only to ask ourselves what are the premises from which the existence of such a god could be deduced. If the conclusion that a god exists is to be demonstrably certain, then those premises must be certaim for, as the conclusion of a de-

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ductive argument is already contained in the premises, any uncertainty there may be about the t ru th of the premises is necessarily shared by it. 14

The first thing to note about Ayer's argument, so far quoted, is tha t he assumes knowledge to be the result of deductive argument, tha t he, in fact, conflates the two. What I hope to show is that, while what Ayer calls a metaphysical utterance cannot be proved to be true or false, it does not follow tha t it is not true or false. I will argue that a self-evident s tatement is not dependent on proofi This is the main point I want to make about its logic.

In his discussion, which I interrupted above, Ayer goes on to claim that, "What is not so generally recognized is tha t there can be no way of proving that the existence of a god, such as the God of Christianity, is even probable. 'u'~ The point here, however, is tha t the mode of probability is irrelevant to the self- evident. I would now like to turn to Spinoza and examine, first, his theory of knowledge, since presently under discussion is Ayer's remark about the possibility of religious knowledge.

The threefold classification of knowledge presented in The Eth ics is as follows: (1) opinion or imagination (and memory), (2) reason, and (3) intuition. While imagination is a possible source of error, reason and intuition are necessarily true. That reason is necessarily true follows from the fact tha t there are ideas common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things. Intuition issues not from the ideas of the properties of things, but from the connection between the adequate ideas of the particular essences of God's attributes and the knowledge of things. This connection inheres in the network of correspondence and coherence which follows from the fact that, whatever God thinks, is. I will say more about correspondence and coherence shortly.

The concept of uni ty is essential to Spinoza. What God thinks, is. An interesting way to approach Spinoza is to consider the question whether the mind knows itself. This will bring us to Spinoza's central concern, God, and will exhibit the interesting self-evidence of his thought.

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Spinoza writes tha t the idea of the mind is an idea of an idea without reference to an object. This means that if a man knows anything he knows tha t he knows it, and knows tha t he knows tha t he knows it, and, etc., into infinity. Spinoza, then, does not say that the mind simply knows itself, but it knows itself knowing itself. This is a very different position from De- scartes', and involves a different logic of self-evidence. When Descartes says, ~I think, therefore I am", TM he is claiming tha t the self can be known. Spinoza, as I tried to explain, says tha t the self can be known knowing. Two problems, I think, are involved in Descartes' statement: (a) what Descartes claims to be a self-evident s ta tement is actually a deductive argument, of the kind Ayer claims to be illegitimate, and (b) the premise does not provide means of arriving at the conclusion. Descartes has actually said: I th ink tha t I th ink tha t I think, etc, into infinity. Therefore, ~'I am" can never be established because it can never be reached: infinity would have to be traversed. And, even if one thinks tha t he is thinking tha t he is thinking, it is still another mat ter whether he therefore knows tha t he is (existed). The only possible solution, at which Descartes can arrive, which is self-evident, is "I think I am". For Spinoza, on the other hand, the mind does not know itself except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body. And the mind does not know external bodies except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body. Spinoza, then, does not require tha t knowledge depend on knowledge of self or mind. Rather, knowledge depends on God. This, of Course, is radically different from Ayer's position. While Ayer argues for the impossi- bility of religious knowledge, Spinoza claims tha t God is what makes knowledge possible, and that all knowledge is religious. This brings us to the question of what we can know, and this question for Spinoza, I think, comes in the form of what we can know to be true.

The traditional correspondence theory of t ru th is usually formulated as follows: '~To say that something is true is to say tha t there is a correspondence between it and a fact. ''17 The usual formulation of the coherence theory of t ruth, on the other hand, is ~...to say tha t what is said.., is true or false is to say tha t it coheres or fails to cohere with a system of other things which are said... "18 Spinoza, I think, works out a combination of both these theories, using as his basis, as I will try to show,

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self-evidence, or t ru th itself. According to him, all ideas which refer to God are t rue since all ideas in God agree with their objects. This follows, of course, from the fact tha t what is thought by God necessarily is: what God thinks, is. Therefore, a t rue idea is one that fits into the order of all other t rue ideas which agree wi th t h e i r objects. Spinoza, t hen , posi ts a corrspondence theory of t ru th within a coherence theory of t ruth.

However, it is important to realize tha t Spinoza may be seen as saying something else in addition to the above. He states tha t t ru th reveals itself, and this seems to imply tha t no standard of corrspondence or coherence is, in the end, required. And, actually, what possibly can be the s tandard of t ru th but t ru th itself?. If we t ry to devise a test to test for t ruth, what will tell us tha t the test itself is t rue or valid? Infinite regress ensues. Coherence and correspondence, then, are involved in t ruth, but t ru th remains its own standard and it alone reveals itself, makes itself evident. Someone, at this point, may object tha t Spinoza appears to be arguing that there is a necessary connection between self-evidence and the t ruth. But Spinoza, I think, does not argue in this manner. Instead, I th ink he is claiming tha t t ru th can only be involved in our thought in a self-evident way, ra the r than it necessarily is. It seems to be more than just a logical assertion, but also an assertion of fact.

Falsity, Spinoza thinks, is a result o f" the privation of knowledge. ''19 This, I think, is what an idea, tha t does not cohere, involves. An idea will agree with its object (which satisfies the correspondence requirement), but it must also fit (the coherence requirement) with other ideas which must agree with thei r objects in a totality, or God, to be wholly true. What Spinoza means, thenl by an ~'inadequate ''2~ idea is one that corresponds and coheres. And an "adequate" idea is one tha t corresponds but does n o t cohere. Adequacy, involving coherence and correspondence, is both a "necessary and sufficient condition of t ruth. T M Correspondence, by itself, is a necessary but not sufficient condit ion of t ru th . The example which Spinoza gives of an adequate idea is what men usually refer to as "free will". It is true, I think he would say, tha t the idea of free will may correspond to an object, the appearance of human choice, but it is an inadequate idea in tha t it does not cohere in a universe determined by God.

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I hope tha t this is a sufficient description of what I th ink can be called the logic of the self-evident. Though Descartes is considered to work in these terms, I hope tha t I have shown why he actually does not, that what he considers a self-evident s ta tement is, in reality, an inference. On the other hand, I hope tha t I have shown tha t Spinoza does work with self-evident statements. I am not certain whether Ayer does escape the charge tha t infinite regress is involved in his method of justifi- cation, the verification principle. He claims tha t concern for the concept of t ru th is the result of linguistic confusion, of not seeing tha t the words "true" and "false" function in a statement as "marks of assertion and denial". 22 He argues that the verification principle is not a test for t ru th ("truth" is an illegitimate problem), but a method of displaying meaning. Yet, what is the "meaning" of the verification principle? The status of this principle is not clear. Again, this relates to what I suggested earlier about the problem of locating the place of philosophy, even when defined as critical thought.

In any case, I have tried to use Spinoza to exhibit the logic of the self-evident, to show that there is a basis for arguing tha t there can be s ta tements which are true apart from there being a way to verify tha t they are. Such logic avoids the problem of determining the status of the verification principle, and, in the vely least, leaves it an open question whether statements, incapable of verification in Ayer's sense, are true. I hope it is clear tha t Ayer's argument is without implication for Spinoza's position: being self-evident, t ru th is not an illegitimate problem for Spinoza; it is no problem whatsoever. The t ru th of the judgement is contained in the judgement itself since whatever God thinks, is.

It is interesting to note that metaphor, also, is a species of the self-evident. Being in terms of itself, as I tried to point out in the distinction made above between metaphor and analogy, metaphor is not amenable to proof through correspondence or coherence criteria. Also, I do not th ink it can be said to be linguistic confusion, or a category mistake.

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References

1. A.J . Ayer, Lallguage, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952), p.79.

2. Stephen Korner, Fundamental Questions in Philosophy (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), p.77.

3. A .J . Ayer, op. cit., p.115. 4. Ibid., p.118. 5. Ibid., p.35. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid 8. John Wisdom, '~The Logic of God", Paradox and Discovery

(Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universi ty of California Press, 1970L p.19.

9. Ibid.,pp.19-20. 10. Ibid., p. 21. 11. Ayer, op. cit., p. 115. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., p. 114. 14. Ibid., 15. Ibid., p.115. 16. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans, A. Wollaston

(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1960}, p.62. 17. Alan R. White, Truth (New York: Anchor Books, 1970},

p.102. 18. Ibid., p.l l0.

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logic of the self-evident

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