lopata on lt foreign policy

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Recent Lithuanian Debates on Lithuania‘s Foreign Policy

«Recent Lithuanian Debates on Lithuania‘s Foreign Policy»

by Raimundas Lopata

Source:

Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review (Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review), issue: 22 / 2009, pages:160-171, on www.ceeol.com.

http://www.ceeol.com/



http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=d1e91a38-03f5-4166-a958-30489ae8fdfd




160

RECENT DEBATE

ON LITHuANIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Raimndas Lopata *

George Bernard Shaw once spoke about two kinds of tragedy: “There aretwo tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart’s desire. The other is to gainit.” It is this truth that Henry Kissinger reminded about after the USA had

won the Cold War.1

At any time one must consider both the strengths andthe weaknesses of the nation.It could not be said that Lithuania is oblivious to this truth. In the last

analysis, its history abounds in both types of tragedy. Not surprisingly, in thepresent-day Lithuania we would encounter at least several such instances thatare directly related to the country’s foreign policy.

The first instance dates back to 1993-1994 when, upon restoring its inde-pendence, gaining the world’s recognition, and making alien troops withdraw,

Lithuania rejected an array of visions of neutrality and set a course for Euro- Atlantic integration and development of good-neighbourly relations. This stra-tegic line by no means meant that the debates on the country’s foreign policy had died off. There were collisions on “the Baltic way” to Europe or “Polishspringboard” to the Euro-Atlantic space as well as efforts to control attemptsat destruction of the aforementioned integration altogether.2 All this seems tohave been crossed over in 2004. That year the strategic goals were achieved.“The success story” caused a stir both in Lithuania and in the world.

Yet in 2003, prior to the official membership in collective Euro-Atlantic

structures, NATO and the EU, voices were heard asking whether “the successstory” would be a happy one and would not turn into a tragedy.3 By doing sothey did not appeal solely to the specific form the international relations took:

* Prof. Raimndas Lopata is a Professor at Institute of International Relations and Political Science,Vilnius University. Email: [email protected] Kissinger H. Diplomatija (Diplomacy). Vilnius: Pradai, 2003, P. 18.2 Lopata R., Žalys V. „Lietuvos geopolitinis kodas” (“Lithuania’s geopolitical code”) Politologija, 1995,Nr. 6, P. 17–18.

3 Lopata R. Lopatologija: apie politinį popsą (Lopatology: on political pop), Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2005,P. 146–159.



161Recent Debate on Lithuania’s Foreign Policy

at the basis of those relations lay uncertainty, ambiguity, indeterminacy of the

concepts of friends and enemies, disappearance of many state insignia, etc. Attention was paid to a number of peculiarities of geopolitical planning. Forexample, it was argued that there might be at least four patterns of behaviourLithuania could follow upon its accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions.

One of them saw Lithuania as a stronghold for the West and at the sametime, its periphery. This role would reveal itself through maximally rapid andfully legitimate integration in Western structures and encouraging, as far aspossible, the then Western CIS States (Ukraine, Belarus, and perhaps Moldo-

va) to be geared to the West thus forming a certain embankment, which wouldenable Vilnius to move further away from the periphery boundary.

According to the second pattern, Lithuania was to encounter itself in aprivileged position between the West and the East. This would enable Lithua-nia to conduct active regional policy and possibly to transform the East, i.e.Russia itself.

On the other hand, note was made of the fact that the situation that wasforming at the time could mean something different from what the projected

patterns implied. Lithuania’s accession to NATO and the EU seemed to serveas evidence to the prospect of a stronghold to the West. However, opening agate to the Russian transit, eagerness of Russian energy capital to find a way into the West, the “political activities”, frequently overt, of this and similarcapital, cyclic hot lines Moscow-Washington, Moscow-Paris, and particularly Moscow-Berlin, gave food for the thought that Lithuania was becoming acertain overlapping area for Western and Eastern structures, a bridge that wasby no means the outcome of solely Lithuania’s will. Historians entered the

debate to immediately remind that Lithuania experienced a similar situationin the 18th century when Europe’s need for Russia resulted in Lithuania be-coming a wayside inn.4

In addition, it is in this context, albeit influenced by serious events inCentral Europe, that a discussion concerning the role of the so-called geopo-litical status of Lithuania arose.

Some essentially stated that the country might assume the role of a re-gional leader that would be ensured by “special relations” with the USA (at

4 Lopata R. – Op. cit., P. 148.



162Raimundas Lopata

that time it was seen as comprehensive aid to Washington in its war with

Iraq). Others preached that Lithuania could just well be a “golden provinceof Europe” (these kindly reminded of the words of France’s President JacquesChirac on the missed opportunity to keep silent).

It should be acknowledged that the debates of the time that emerged inLithuania’s official foreign policy left a large footprint still discussed.

In spring 2004 the country’s temporary President Arturas Paulauskas an-nounced the beginning of a new approach to Lithuanian foreign policy which,by means of an agreement of the country’s political parties “On the country’s

major foreign policy goals and objectives for the period 2004-2008” was for-malized in October of the same year, when the country already had Valdas Adamkus as its new leader.5 The negotiations over the text of the agreement, which took place at the VU International Relations and Political Science In-stitute, though insipid, with more active involvement of the country’s diplomatsand representatives of the academic community, nevertheless demonstrated thatthe Euro-Atlantic membership program had already contributed to realizationby the majority of political forces that the boundary between home affairs andforeign policy was no longer distinguishable. The work was to be continued,

although it would hardly become an idea mobilizing the nation, let alone en-suring further progress of the country. This gave rise to commitment to Lithua-nia as an active and respected modern state. In particular, the parties agreedthat “Lithuania can achieve this goal by becoming an active and appealingcentre of interregional collaboration that disseminated Euro-Atlantic values,the spirit of tolerance and collaboration, a centre that unites cultures andcivilizations”.6 Implementation tools were also foreseen.

For instance, Lithuania’s active institutional involvement in collective Euro-

Atlantic structures was advocated as well as its engagement in active supportof the EU and NATO enlargement policy, and fostering collaboration betweenRussia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the South Caucasus on the one hand

with the EU and NATO on the other, etc.

5 Speech given by Temporary President A.Paulauskas at Vilnius University “The new foreign policy of Lithuania” 2004 05 24, <http://paulauskas.president.lt/onephtml?id=4994>; an agreement of thepolitical parties of the Republic of Lithuania “On the country’s major foreign policy goals and objec-tives for the period 2004-2008”, Vilnius, 2004 10 05.

6 Agreement of the political parties of the Republic of Lithuania “On the major goals and objectivesof the foreign policy of the country for the period 2004-2008”, Vilnius, 2004 10 05.




To tell the truth, a more careful examination of the aforementioned tools

and their balance revealed that the agreement was an attempt to outline theguidelines that would facilitate Lithuania’s quest for a specific niche in Euro- Atlantic structures. The implementation of Lithuania’s foreign Eastern policy was essentially to become the main guideline: it was sought to raise questionspertaining to the domain of Eastern policy in the main Western structuresand to find effective influence mechanisms towards Russia. Specifically Lithua-nia sought to lessen its vulnerability by enhancing integration ties betweenEastern European states on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the

other, while at the same time “harnessing” Russia and weakening its influencein the post-Soviet space.It has to be acknowledged that Lithuanian politicians of the time took little

interest in the quest for this particular niche, or at least the content of the“region centre”. In other words, it was not fully realized, for instance, what itmeant to trust in the common EU competency, to withdraw from foreign af-fairs and to engage primarily in the resolution of one’s own internal problems(seriocomically, to be “a golden province”) and what an alternative to such

withdrawal from the EU foreign affairs meant – to find in them a niche and

establish oneself in it (taken more seriously, to be the “center of the region”).This was not to mean that there was no discussion on individual events in

Lithuania’s foreign policy. For example, there were debates over Ukraine’sOrange Revolution and relevant Lithuania’s actions in the late 2004, over thedecision of the country’s President in May 2005 not to go to Moscow, overthe Nord Stream gas-pipe in 2005-2006, and so on. All this meant that there

were no paradigmatic discussions over Lithuania’s foreign policy. The afore-mentioned issues were dealt with following the earlier momentum to defend

a national interest, i.e., integration into the collective Euro-Atlantic structures.7

Since about 2007 considerations of specific issues of Lithuania’s foreign poli-cy have started to transcend into the paradigmatic domain.

So what has stipulated the revival of the interest in foreign policy?One of Lithuanian politicians has given the following answer: “It seemed

as if we had to rejoice back in 2004 – we had joined NATO and accessed tothe EU, while our relations with neighbours were demonstrated everywhere

7 See, for example, Janeliūnas T. „Gegužės 9-osios problema saugumizavimo teorijos ir komunikacinio

saugumo požiūriu”, (“The 9th of May issue” from the perspectives of securitization and communi-cative security”) Politologija, 2005, Nr. 2 (38), P. 3–30.



164Raimundas Lopata

as an example of a well-established policy. Therefore foreign policy was un-

doubtedly a success. One might think that all there was to do was to carry on... but there was nothing to carry on, for the strategic objectives as definedby Sajudis had been accomplished. Let us say, the project has been executed.In recent years politics has become more complicated: NATO and the EU didnot fulfill or did not fulfill instantaneously the expectations of well-being andsecurity, the relations with neighbours turned out to be changing quickly dueto changes in those neighbouring countries. Nobody had developed a new foreign policy strategy, and those who had to were busy with trifles and anal-

ysis of individual cases…”

8

One must do justice and note that Lithuania’s foreign policy strategy, acomprehensive albeit rather academic, document, was indeed created. Some of its components were even being considered at several round-table discussions.

Although the document itself had never been publicized, questions pertainingto the domain of Lithuania’s Eastern and Western policies as well as their in-tercorrelation, Euro-Atlantic and European policies and ultimately, the idea of the region centre gave rise to a great number of discussions. However consid-erations grew in scale when several tendencies became clearly manifest.

It was in the latter half of 2006-early 2007 that the political situation inLithuania aggravated. This aggravation was brought about by the death of theLithuanian state security officer V. Pociūnas in Belarus. It soon became aconvenient pretext for not only settling internal political accounts, but alsofor drawing them into the context of the country’s foreign policy.

On the other hand, a few years were enough to better understand theparadigm “both NATO and the EU”. It was not though like frying eggs fromtwo eggs; NATO was not a security guarantee, and the EU was not like patch-

ing holes. Yet it was a permanent decision of two loyalties whose criterion wasnot a formal, but a factual withdrawal from the sphere of influence of theEast. However, the active regional policy Lithuania had been conducting inthe East since spring 2004 started to raise doubts in the public space in thelatter half of 2006, the concern being whether this policy was not merely acourse “back to Russia”, a covert sacrifice of Lithuanian interests to Euro-

Atlanticism, i.e. essentially to US interests. Let us note in passing that it was

8 Vareikis E. „Vasario 16-ajai artėjant. Kokios užsienio politikos mums reikia?“ (“In the run-up to

February 16th. What foreign policy do we need?”), 2009 02 08, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=20479127>.




in the mid-2006 that the relations with Russians aggravated after Russians

had decided to interrupt oil supply to Mazeikiai, and Lithuania had airedconsiderations on discontinuing transit to the Kaliningrad region of RussianFederation.

Thus in January 2007 the editorial staff of the weekly “Akiračiai” (“Hori-zons”) suggested discussing the following: was the division between Lithuaniaand Western Europe countries becoming increasingly evident due to the East-ern policy implemented by our country, and was Lithuania’s internationalisolation so apparent? Is the development of democracy in the East a prob-

lematic issue due to the fact that this space does not belong to Western civi-lization? To what extent does Lithuania take into consideration US interestsimplementing Eastern policy, and to what extent does it consider its owninterests, and are not the latter neglected for the sake of US interests? Shouldthe policy toward Russia be modified, i.e., should our policy become “moretender”?9 The impetus that gave rise to these questions can be found in thearticle “Naujoji Lietuvos užsienio politikos vizija” (“The new vision of Lithua-nia’s foreign policy”) published by historian and political scientist ČeslovasLaurinavičius in the aforementioned “Akiračiai”.

Laurinavičius criticized the vectors of Lithuania’s Eastern policy, viz., tocontribute to the development of democracy in the CIS space and to directthe political organisms that had formed, particularly in the Western part of that space, to the West, i.e. to encourage their alienation from Russia. In hisopinion, such Vilnius’ efforts have significantly deteriorated relations withMoscow. Regarding Lithuanian policy as an attempt to destroy Russia, Mos-cow has intensified its imperial pressure. The West also started to look atLithuania’s efforts with a jaundiced eye, having regarded some of the state-

ments by Lithuanian leaders about the Eastern neighbour or West-Russiapartnership as scandalous. This is why it is quite arguable whether the forcesin the Western and Eastern fronts have been distributed correctly. Similarly,from the long-term perspective, the goals set for Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia,let alone Belarus, can hardly be accomplished. Therefore, the state should

withdraw from active regional policy altogether and maintain pragmatic rela-tions with Russia.

9 “Ar Lietuvai reikia naujos užsienio politikos?“ (“Does Lithuania need a new foreign policy?”), Akiračiai ,2007 m. sausio mėn., Nr. 1.



166Raimundas Lopata

Shortly speaking, it was suggested that Lithuania and its national statehood

should organically refrain from Russia’s issues, in a manner similar to that of Finland and Turkey. This suggestion also rested on a historical interpretation,according to which Lithuania’s will to identify itself with Russia’s issues hadonly brought tragedies onto Lithuania: after the collapse of the Kievan Rus,dukes of the Lithuanian state essentially started to compete with Moscovianrulers on who would unite Russia and lost; following the Union with Polandintentions were made to subject Russia to the West. This war of civilizations

was also lost in the late 18th c. In the first half of the 20th c. a version of the

national state through ties with Russia (USSR) again turned a failure; and therestored Lithuanian statehood in the late 20th c. once again is adjacent toRussia’s problems.

This critique garnered approximately the following response.10 The strate-gic goal of Lithuania’s foreign policy is life in Europe that is good, secure andrespecting human dignity. It is only argued about how to attain it. Somemaintain that the highroad to better life is through integration in the EU by means of a better disposition of funds and perfect financial prospects. Others

state that there may be traffic jams even on highways, thus failures absorbingEU financial flows make one give preference to roundabout routes, for instance,through Ukraine, Moldova, and finally, through Belarus and South Caucasus.However, Lithuania announced many a time that the main objective of thestate was to project and disseminate security and stability, and essentially topromote the expansion of democratic structures beyond its (EU and NATO)borders. This meant that primarily Lithuania had to be a democratic stateitself, and, by means of this valuable existence, it would oblige other demo-cratic powers to provide it with defense and protection. Yet besides values, the

world is also based on interests. This is why being a democratic state Lithua-nia had to be useful, too. It could be useful only provided that it paid itstribute to the expansion of democracy to the East, primarily, to the territory of the former USSR, or the so-called sphere of Russia’s historical influence.

Thus active engagement does not limit the expansion of democracy in theEast; rather, it increases Lithuania’s reliability in the democratic world. It isnot by accident that both NATO and EU Eastern policy makers pay great

10 Lopata R. „Apie Lietuvos santykius su Minsku“ (“On Lithuania’s relations with Minsk”), Veidas,March 29, 2007, Nr. 13, P. 29.




attention to Vilnius’ opinion. In the past Russia posited threat to Lithuania

because of its restorative-imperial goals; this is why aid to states found in-between the EU and Russia to a certain extent forestalls Russian imperialismand assists Russia in locating the boundaries of its own state. Lithuania’s effortsto share its experience are favourably met in Moldova, Ukraine and eventu-ally in the South Caucasus. In the last analysis, while demanding to maintainpragmatic relations with Russia, the main principle of such relations has tobe remembered, viz., equality of interests in exchange for that of impendingthreats. “Neutral” from the value point of view, this principle never reveals

the motives and reasons determining the commonality of interests. This is why it becomes impossible to define “values” of individual interests and henceto recognize one’s own “true” interests, which it would be worthy to keep andadvocate. This is why it is not surprising that interdependence networks builton this principle are dangerous for they can “burst” anytime and anywhere.

Besides, these considerations were aroused by history as a phenomenonthat modernizes, europenizes, and expands its spacial coordinates.11 The ac-tivization of the heritage of Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) has become

its basis and a juxtaposition to ethnocentrism: both a network and a move-ment of the aristocracy (witnesses of the “past of the alive” for Lithuania andGDL that symbolized a new identity of open Lithuania; a quest for the scat-tered Lithuania’s heritage in Poland and Eastern and Western Europe as wellas support of the virtual restitution or, to put it in other words, cultural part-nership not only with Scandinavia, but also with Poland as well as Ukraineand Belarus (Guda); the meaning of the GDL component for the geopoliticaltrend of Lithuania towards Ukraine, Belarus and Poland, laying the path forGDL to become a geopolitical agenda. Paradoxically, but even the opponentsof this view acknowledged that, from the theoretical viewpoint, drawing Be-larus and Ukraine to the Western camp could be of great significance forLithuania. In this way it would be possible to project gas and oil pipelinesfrom Azerbaijan via Georgia, the Black Sea, Ukraine, and Belarus to Lithuania.There would even be no need for Poland. The maximum version of GrandDuchy of Lithuania would be restored. Yet “recognition” did not come easy.The main problem, the opponents argued, was that the implementation of

11 Bumblauskas A. „Senosios ir naujosios Lietuvos susitikimai”(“Meetings of Old and New Lithuania”),Kultūros barai , 2007, Nr. 6, P. 6.



168Raimundas Lopata

this endeavour was sought not through the geopolitical code “Westward ho!”

but rather through the code “back to Russia”.It is this discussion that was shortly labelled as the debate between the

adherents of “the center of the region” and those of “the golden province”. Itis obvious that at the core of the debate is the issue of the geopolitical func-tion (or role) of Lithuania. It is also obvious that attempts are made to resolveit. At first glance this is done in the traditional manner, i.e. in the context of the geopolitical axis West-East. Below are a few more recent examples.

Example 1. “Lithuania may distinguish itself in that so far it is the only

Baltic State that has referred to itself as the “center of the region” and announcedintentions to enhance these positions. Natural neighbourhood with both Cen-tral and Northern Europe let us employ far more instruments to disseminate“Eastern” interests in the “West”, and “Western” interests in the “East”. Ac-cording to our terms, “the region centre” is a peculiar geopolitical function

which will be vital as long as CIS countries are lively interested in the EU.European attraction (if not dimmed by other attraction centres) is our greatestally. From here follow our other declared interests, viz., that the EU is united

and is strong both politically and economically, while its doors are open”.

12

Example 2. “The idea of Lithuania being the region centre and leader israther megalomaniac. Even though this is a foreign policy idea, it is prima-rily intended for exclusively internal use... Lithuania declares itself as the regioncentre. Yet suffice it to ask whether there is a single country of the “region”that sees Lithuania as “the region centre”, and it will be clear that this idea isbut a myth... Lithuania can hardly find supporters of its ideas in the Euro-pean Union, and, to tell the truth, it does not really know how to look forthem. Eastern policy and relations with Russia in particular are of great im-portance to Lithuania. However, the basis of Lithuania’s foreign policy has torest on its policy towards the West”.13

Please bear with these lengthy quotations, as they indeed adequately dem-onstrate the present direction of the debates over Lithuanian foreign policy.Of course, details can be added: is policy towards Georgia substantially reason-

12 Talat-Kelpša L. „Ar tikrai metas laidoti regiono centro idėją?“ (“Is it really time to bury the ideaof the region’s centre?”) 2007 11 19, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=15049673>

13 Nekrašas E. „Kritiniai pamąstymai apie Lietuvos užsienio politiką” (“Critical considerations onLithuania’s foreign policy”) Politologija, 2009, Nr. 2 (54), P. 139, 142.




able and “just”,14 can Lithuania have pragmatic policy towards Russia, and

how could it get the relations between Vilnius and Moscow back to normal,15

what is pragmatism and values in foreign policy (as if the classical definitionof pragmatism by William James – worth, performance and usefulness - hadbeen forgotten),16 does Europe understand Lithuania,17 what role does his-tory play in the country’s foreign policy?18 Yet this is not going to change thecore of the matter.

14 Makaraitytė I. „Pragmatiška užsienio politika. Kas tai?“ (“Pragmatic foreign policy. What is it?”),2008 10 08, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=18804212>; Girnius K. „Vertybėmis“ grin-džiamos politikos klystkeliai”, (“Misguided paths substantiated by “values”) 2009 02 11, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=20517419>; Misiūnas T. „Pragmatizmas. Su kuo tai valgoma?“ (“Pra-gmatism. What’s it about?”) 2009 03 20, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=21084486>; Si-rijos Gira V. „Keturi klausimai būsimam prezidentui apie Lietuvos užsienio politiką”, (“Four questionsto the prospective president on Lithuania’s foreign policy”) 2009 04 01, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=21265070>; Landsbergis V. „Kabutės – Kiberkaras”, (“Quotation marks – Cyberwar”)2009 04 20, <http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/10269418/?KabutesKiberkaras=2009-04-20_13-55>15 Kasčiūnas L., Dambrauskaitė Ž. „Ar įmanoma pragmatiška politika Rusijos atžvilgiu?“ (“Is pragma-tic policy toward Russia feasible?”) 2009 01 12, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=20030816>;Ronkaitis G. „Kokios užsienio politikos mums reikia?“ (“What kind of foreign policy do we need?”)

2009 02 11, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=20520054>; Laurinavičius M. „Du pragmatikų veidai”, (“Two pragmatists’ faces”) Lietuvos Rytas , 2009 07 11, Nr. 28 (821).16 For a discussion between Secretary of Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Laimonas Talat-Kelpšaand political observer Kęstučio Griniaus as well as its assessment, see: Lopata R. „Apie trumparegystęir drąsą Lietuvos Rytų politikoje”,(“On short-sightedness and bravery in Lithuania’s Eastern policy”)2008 03 15, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=16315699>17 Karosas J. „Apie lietuvišką charakterį ir „vertybinę“ politiką (I, II)”, (“On Lithuanian character and“value” policy”) 2009 03 09, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=20906532>, 2009 04 06,<http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=21341703>; Landsbergis V. J. „Karosas siūlo reviziją”, (“Ka-rosas proposes inspection”) 2008 05 27, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=17185921>; Digryte

E. „E. Zingeris: Lietuvos Rytų politika – 1940-ųjų pamoka”, (“E.Zingeris – Lithuania’s Eastern pol-icy – the lesson of the 1940s”) 2008 05 27, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=17178730>.18 Ališauskas V. „Neįmanoma misija“ Europos centre”, (“Mission impossible” in the centre of Europe”)2007 06 13, <http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/140319/?Neimanoma.misija.Europos.centre=2007-06-13_15-11>; Vaitiekūnas P. „Diplomatijoje nebūna nei amžinos pergalės, nei amžino pralaimėjimo”, (“In di-plomacy there is neither eternal victory nor eternal defeat”) 2008 05 13, <http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=17013317>; „V. Adamkaus užsienio poezija”, (“V.Adamkus’s foreign policy”) Respublika,2008 12 03; Girnius K. „Donkichotiška užsienio ir saugumo politika”, (“Don Quichotes foreign anssecurity policy”) 2008 11 17, <http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/10236844/?Donkichotiska.uzsienio.ir.sau-gumo.politika=2008-11-17_08-14>; Girnius K. „Ar Lietuva Baltijos diplomatinis tigras?” (“Is Lithuaniaa diplomatic tiger of the Baltics?”) 2009 03 30, <http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/10266217/?Ar.Lietuva.

Baltijos.diplomatinis.tigras.=2009-03-30_07-50>; Saldžiūnas V. „Ko trokšta Lietuva?“ (“What doesLithuania wish?”) Lietuvos rytas, Nr. 27 (820), 2009 07 04.



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It looks like the answer to the question: what is Lithuania’s foreign policy

and what should it be like? - may be sought in several ways. Moreover, they have already been suggested.

One of them may be referred to as the Baltic-comparative answer, basedon the considerations of British analysts on the foreign policies of Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania that emerged in the autumn 2008 and later were usedby a Lithuanian political observer.

The Brits have defined the three countries as follows: smart Estonia (smallyet nimble; an e-state; the Nordic, North-European identity); modest Latvia

(historically logical), ambitious Lithuania (abnormally active; partnership withPoland; markedly pro-American). In the quest for differences that had stipu-lated the foreign policies of the Baltic States and paying particular attention toLithuania, the Brits explained that Lithuanian politicians of both the periodinterim the wars and after the end of the Cold War always sought to sustainthe GDL vision, while membership in the collective Euro-Atlantic structures

was but another impulse for the ambitious direction of the foreign policy. Uponpresenting these conclusions, a Lithuanian political observer stated the follow-

ing: “This is how it is. You decide whether it is good or not...”19

The second way may be referred to as classical, realistic. Since we are speak-ing about adequate foreign policy of any country, let us have in mind thedependence of this policy on objective parameters – the geographical situationof the state, its power, and political culture of the state that determines the

will of the state. It is these parameters that define what geopolitical code of the country will be implemented by foreign-policy-makers and executives.

Let me remind of the basics.20 The concept of the geopolitical code that

in practice is disseminated at the local, regional and global levels is close tothe concept of political orientation, yet frequently confused with the gravita-tion concept. In the first instance subjective phenomena dominate, i.e. thecountry’s perspective is primarily determined by the political will. In the sec-ond instance we are dealing with a historical complex of political and legal,social and cultural phenomena, which determines natural drift of the state. In

19 Račas A. „Lietuvos užsienio politika: hyperaktyvi, proamerikietiška ir nerealistiška”, (“Lithuania’sforeign policy: hyperactive, pro-American, and unrealistic”) 2008 09 18, <http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnis/

c88665>20 Lopata R., Žalys V. – Op. cit., P. 14.




an ideal world these processes coincide. However, the current debates over

Lithuania’s foreign policy demonstrate that this is the ideal that is being lookedfor, yet no there is no support found for that search. This key to the compli-cated character of Lithuania’s foreign policy may be (found) in the specificnature of national identity and foreign policy relations.21 An analysis of thisnature clearly demonstrates that (critically) adequate debates on the country’sforeign policy can disseminate only in and integrated society with a socio-political focus.

21 Laurinavičius Č., Lopata R., Sirutavičius V. „Kritinis požiūris į Lietuvos užsienio politiką: kas pa-

sikeitė nuo Augustino Voldemaro laikų?“ (“A critical look on Lithuania’s foreign policy: What haschanged since Augustine Voldemars’ times?”) Politologija, 2009, Nr. 2 (54), P. 91–122.

lopata on lt foreign policy

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