1

INSIDE THIS ISSUE PAGE

Pollution 2

Cargo 6

Dangerous goods supplement 9

Risk management 17

Stowaways 18

Admiralty 19

Fines 19

Legal 20

Crew matters 21

Club initiative tacklesdangerous goods

LP NEWSLOSS PREVENTION NEWS MARCH 2006 ISSUE 18

The need for actionThe frequency and severity of incidentsinvolving dangerous goods haveprompted the UK P&I Club to launch a setof four guidebooks with supportingtraining material on the workings of theInternational Maritime Dangerous Goods(IMDG) Code. Under the collective titleBook it right and pack it tight theguidebooks are aimed respectively atshippers and forwarders; shipping linesand booking agencies; consolidators andshipping container packers, includingmanagers and supervisors; and fork liftoperators and cargo handlers.

Code complianceThe IMDG Code is a set of globallyaccepted rules that provide a frameworkfor packaged dangerous goods to becarried safely by sea. But non-compliancewith these rules is a continuing problem.The UK Club believes significantimprovements in Code compliance can bemade through practical, and easy tounderstand, training packages such asBook it right and pack it tight.

Easy to use

Each book focuses on how roles and keyduties within a particular group’soperations relate to the Code. The aim is toenable readers to quickly identifyrequirements and to access full technicaldetails in the Code itself if more detailedinformation is needed. A reference sectionon dangerous goods classification isstandard to all. Copies are being mailed toUK Club Members with containerships.

For more details, see the accompanyingLP News Dangerous Goods supplement.

2

UNITED KINGDOM

Lessons to be learnedfrom oil pollutionprosecutionA recent oil pollution prosecution broughtby the Maritime and Coastguard Agency(MCA) against the owners of a Swedishregistered chemical tanker serves as areminder to vessel owners and operatorsof the need to have sufficient shipboardcritical alarm systems and adequateoperating procedures in place whenroutine onboard fuel oil transfers areundertaken.

Facts of the prosecution

The MCA brought a prosecution in respectof an oil pollution incident that wasalleged to have occurred in British waters.The prosecution was brought under S128and S131 of the Merchant Shipping Act1995 (the MSA).

S131(1)(a) of the MSA provided that:“the owner or master shall be guilty of anoffence if oil or mixture containing oil isdischarged into United Kingdom nationalwaters which are navigable by sea-goingships.”

The penalty for conviction of the S131offence is a fine upon summary convictionof up to £250,000 and upon indictmentan unlimited fine.

Incident details

The pollution incident arose as a result ofa routine transfer of ship’s bunkers fromtwo wing storage tanks to the fuel oilsettling tank shortly after the vesseldeparted a British port. Under normaloperations, when fuel oil is transferred bythe fuel oil transfer pump, the pump cutsout when the level in the settling tankreaches approximately 98 per cent. In thisinstance, this did not happen. Instead,when the settling tank was filled tocapacity, it over flowed back to a separatecentre fuel oil storage tank. Unfortunately,the capacity available for transfer in thewing tanks was in excess of the free spacein the centre fuel oil storage tank and aquantity of fuel oil overflowed from thecentre fuel oil storage tank, on to the

vessel’s deck and through the deckscuppers into the water.

Cause of overfilling

When the matter was initiallyinvestigated, it became apparent thatprior to the fuel oil transfer operation,routine cleaning of the fuel oil transferpump suction filter had taken place. Toisolate the pump, the pump control hadbeen switched from the automatic tomanual mode. Unfortunately, when inmanual operation, the settling tank highlevel pump cut-out was isolated allowingfuel transfer to continue unchecked. Thecontents in the wing tank weretransferred into the settling tank whichoverflowed into the centre fuel oil storagetank resulting in fuel oil being spilled onto the deck.

Quantity of oil spilled

At the hearing of this matter, the vesselowners pleaded guilty to the offenceunder S131 of the MSA. It was a strictliability offence.

In an attempt to mitigate the offence, itwas the owners’ case that very little, if any,oil had entered the water resulting fromthe spill on deck.

The vessel’s chief engineer had carried outdetailed quantity calculations to showthat the amount of fuel oil transferred,spilled and recovered, meant that only avery small quantity of oil had in factpassed through the vessel’s deckscuppers, and given the prevailingtemperature at the time of the incident itmay have been the case that the fuel oildid not enter the water at all.

The judge’s decision

The judge imposed a fine of £20,000upon the owners and ordered the ownersto pay the prosecution’s costs.

Notwithstanding the argument that onlya very small quantity of fuel oil hadentered the water, the judge criticised theowners for not having an adequate criticalsystem in place for preventing such anincident from occurring. Although therewas a system in place whereby any fuel oiloverflowing from the settling tank couldbe diverted into the centre fuel oil storagetank, the operation of the fuel oil transferpump in manual meant that if fuel

transfer was left unmonitored, fuel oilwould eventually overflow from thecentre fuel oil storage tank on to thedeck.

Lessons to be learned

In this day and age of criminalisation ofthe seafarer in respect of oil pollution, itis imperative that onboard systems andoperations relevant to the transfer of fueloil provide a high degree of safeguard toprevent incidents like this occurring.

Vessel owners and operators mustensure that appropriate critical alarmsystems are employed within fuelsystems and that measures are taken toremove the risk of oil spill incidences. It isundesirable that critical alarm systemscan be overridden and not reinstatedduring periods of routine maintenance.

In this case, the root cause of the oil spillstemmed back to the isolation of the fueloil supply pump cut off switch when thetransfer pump was selected to manualoperation during routine maintenance. Ifa situation like this arises, then sufficientprocedures (such as an appropriatepermit to work system) should be in placeto ensure that systems are returned tonormal. In addition, as a furthersafeguard during fuel transferoperations, the contents of all tanksshould be continually monitored toremove the risk of the ‘unexpected’ fromoccurring (in this case, the shipboardprocedure required continualmonitoring of fuel transfer operationsbut this was not being carried out at thetime of the incident).

Having considered the inherent criticalalarm systems within the fuel transfersystem on this particular vessel, it wasevident that further, relativelystraightforward additions to the alarmsystems (independent fuel oil settlingtank/overflow tank high level alarms)could have prevented the incident.

This case demonstrates the importanceof vessel owners and operators ensuringthat adequate procedures and systemsare in place. It also sends out the clearmessage, that even when relatively smallquantities of oil are spilled in Britishwaters, the MCA will invariably exerciseits powers to investigate and prosecute,with the potential of significant finesbeing levied by the courts.

POLLUTION

3

WORLDWIDE

Oily water separator –maintenance andoperationalrecommendations

In the last three years, the Club has had17 incidents in the USA (including the US

Virgin Islands) where the authorities havealleged irregularities in both the set upand use of the ship’s 15 ppm oily water

separator (OWS) system. Only four ofthese incidents have resulted in a fineand none in a criminal conviction.

However, the expenditure ofinvestigating these incidents anddefending the crew is in excess of

US$1,600,000, which is an average ofaround US$94,000 per allegation.

To help Members avoid incurring suchcosts the Club’s ship inspectors offer thefollowing advice.

It is recommended that the vessel’splanned maintenance system (PMS), and

company’s standing instructions, includeinspection and cleaning of the OWS unitand all associated piping at least every sixmonths. It has been suggested that the

equipment filters should be cleanedmonthly where possible, especially priorto a prolonged period of coastal voyages.

We advise that this work should not becarried out immediately prior to enteringport, as it may be construed as suspicious

by PSC or MARPOL inspectors. The oilcontent meter should also be testedannually and calibrated by a factory

technician at least once every five years(this is now a requirement in Canada andwill possibly be adopted by other

countries).

Manager’s

instructionsand servicemanuals

concerning theOWS andrelated

equipmentshould be

maintained on the ship. It is mandatory

that proper operating instructions andan operating diagram are posted on the

instruction that the entries in the ORB areonly made by the chief engineer after

cross referencing the engine log book,PMS records and sounding records of allrelevant tanks.

The OWS should be operated duringnormal engine room working hours.Engineers should not operate the OWS

at night apart from during their regularwatches. Units of measurement ofvolumes, rates and capacities used in the

engine room should be consistent. Forexample the units of measurement usedin tank sounding tables should be the

same as those used in recording volumesprocessed in the OWS. Care must betaken to ensure that the quantity of

water discharged overboard in anylogged period does not exceed thecertificated capacity of the OWS unit. If

any such discrepancy should occur, a fullexplanation should be recorded in the oilrecord book.

Tank and equipment titles used in theORB and in logbooks should match

those of the tanks and equipmentidentified in the ship’s international oilpollution prevention certificate (IOPP).

On one ship a tank was variouslydescribed in log entries as ‘bilge holdingtank’, ‘bilge collecting tank’, and ‘BCT’.

Bilge tanks should also be identified bytheir location (frame number) andcapacity as well as their correct title.

OWS unit. These should be as clear andsimple as possible. It is a STCW

Convention requirement thatengineering officers receive themandatory minimum training required by

the provisions of Annex 1 of MARPOL 73/78.

It is illegal under MARPOL to sail from a

port without a functioning OWS unit andit is a requirement that sufficient sparesfor the OWS must be maintained

onboard.

All work performed on or around the

OWS and oil content meter should becarefully logged in the PMS and in the oilrecord book (ORB), entries in the ORB

being made under code letter ‘I’ (generalremarks). A log entry could read asfollows:

“Opened and inspected OWS unit, filterscleaned/renewed as required. Valves andpiping on discharge side of OWS opened,inspected and cleaned as required. Aftermaintenance OWS and oil content meterchecked for proper operation.”

All log entries should be checked as

accurate and countersigned by the chiefengineer and the master. Consecutivelogs should be kept onboard so that the

full history of the equipment can beverified if required. It may also bebeneficial to have a company wide

4

Mandatory requirements for ballastwater management (BWM) and reportingare in place for ships visiting ports andterminals in Brazil. The regulations,which came into force 15 October 2005,require vessels to exchange ballast waterprior to arrival in Brazil using either thesequential, flow through, or dilutionmethod.

Every ship that uses ballast water isrequired to have a BWM plan,establishing safe and efficientprocedures for that purpose. Brazilianvessels and ships chartered to Brazil*must have their BWM plan approved by a

WORLDWIDE

Port State Controlconcentrated inspectioncampaign

The Parismemorandum ofunderstanding(MOU) on PortState Controlauthorities started

a concentrated inspection campaign on 1February 2006 focusing on howrequirements for preventing marinepollution from ships (MARPOL73/78,Annex 1) have been implemented. Thethree month inspection campaign endson 30 April 2006.

The Paris MOU press release explains that,in practice, the concentrated inspectioncampaign will mean that during every PortState Control inspection within the ParisMOU region, the oil filtering equipmentand record keeping shall be verified inmore detail for compliance with theinternational standards. This campaignwill be carried out in parallel with theTokyo MOU on Port State Control.

The inspections will be mainly focused onthe equipment located in the engineroom. Illegal by-passes of the oil filteringsystem (OFE) and illegal overboardconnections from sludge tanks haveregularly been found in past inspections.On many occasions the oil record bookswere not properly kept. In 2004 a total of

3646 MARPOL Annex 1 deficiencies werefound during inspections.

During the campaign, Port State Controlofficers will use a list of 13 selected itemsfor inspection, some of which are relatedto:

● OFE alarm and automatic stoppingdevice

● Discharge to reception facilities

● Sludge capacity for intended voyage

● Illegal by-passes or connections.

It is expected that approximately 4,500inspections will be carried out during theconcentrated inspection campaign. Ifdeficiencies are found, the Port StateControl officer will conduct an in-depthinvestigation into other aspects of theMARPOL area, including operationalperformance by the responsible crew.

When deficiencies are found, sanctionsby the Port State may vary from recordingthe deficiency and instructing the masterto rectify within fourteen days, to thedetention of the ship until all deficiencieshave been rectified. If detained, the shipcould face the risk of further inspectionsin other Paris MOU ports and publicationin the monthly list of detentions issuedby the Secretariat of the Paris MOU.

The twenty-two maritime authorities ofthe Paris MOU include EU members plusCanada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, andthe Russian Federation.

BRAZIL

Ballast water management requirements

classification society recognised by theDirectorate of Ports Coasts (DPC). There isno requirement for foreign flag vesselstrading to/from Brazil to have the BWMplan approved.

Capacities of equipment and serialnumbers noted on the IOPP certificateshould be verified. It was found on one

ship that the rated capacity of anincinerator on the ship’s IOPP certificatewas different from the capacity stamped

on the incinerator’s identification plate. Itis suggested that the certificates issuedby flag state or class are checked to

ensure they match the capacities statedin the vessel’s manuals and if there is adiscrepancy a request be made for the

certificates to be amended accordingly.

Ships’personnel should be instructedthat if they are asked questions by PSC orMARPOL investigators they must give

honest answers.

If a ship is boarded by government

investigators and it becomes apparentthat the inspection has been extendedbecause of problems arising from the

training of ship’s personnel,documentation or equipment, the Clubshould be notified immediately. The crew

should never be instructed to withholdinformation from investigators. In theUSA however they may be told that the

law does not require them to speak toinvestigators if they choose not to andthat they are entitled to the presence of a

lawyer during questioning.

A recent development in the USA is for

officials to scrutinise the E/R alarm bookand compare the times recorded for bilge/ sludge tank alarms and subsequent

pumping out with the ORB times ofpumping bilges overboard, checking forany discrepancies.

5

Ships must be at a distance of least 200nautical miles from the coast, and in awater depth of at least 200 metres whenexchanging ballast. When this is notpossible, the exchange is to be made asfar as possible from the coast but not lessthan 50 nautical miles, and with a waterdepth of at least 200 metres. When it isnot possible to exchange the waterballast at sea, the ballast is to be retainedonboard.

Ships entering the Amazon River frominternational voyages or from otherhydrographical regions will have toundertake two water ballast exchanges.The first is to be as detailed above; thesecond, to reduce the salinity of thewater ballast, between the isobaric of 20metres and Macapá. When the ballastvolume is less then 5,000 cubic metresthe limit will be the Jari River. In thissecond exchange it will be necessary onlyto pump the tank volume once.

Ships entering the Para River frominternational voyages or from otherhydrographical regions are also requiredto undertake two ballast waterexchanges: the first must be as detailedabove; and the second must be between70 nautical miles from Salinópolis andthe Light of the Ponta do Chapéu Virado(Ilha do Mosqueiro).

A vessel will not be required to deviatefrom its course or delay its voyage inorder to conduct a ballast waterexchange. A ship may be exempted if themaster considers that an exchange mayimpair the ship’s safety and stability orthe safety of the crew and passengersonboard. However, failure to conduct aballast water exchange will result in apenalty unless the vessel is exempt due tosafety, voyage constraints or specificallyexempted from the regulations.

A ballast water report form is to becompleted and forwarded by the ship’smaster or its agent, to the port captaincytwenty-four hours before arrival of theship. A water ballast history is to bemaintained onboard for a period of twoyears. Ships arriving in Brazilian ports andterminals, for loading discharging or anyother reason will be inspected to ensurecompliance with these requirements.

* Chartered to Brazil means a ship that has a licenceto operate between Brazilian ports.

WORLWIDE

HNS Convention andOPRC-HNS ProtocolThe number of incidents involvinghazardous and noxious substances (HNS)is low in comparison with those involvingoil. Nevertheless, the InternationalTanker Owners Pollution Federationattended two incidents in 2004 in whichchemical tankers exploded resulting inloss of life as well as the loss of chemicalcargo, and another two incidents in2005 where significant quantities of aflammable and toxic cargo were spilt.Also in 2005 there were at least ten otherincidents where HNS was either spilt orhad the potential to spill, thus dispellingany notion that this kind of event neverhappens.

It is perhaps of interest to know that aframework of preparedness andcompensation for HNS incidents hasbeen created, under the auspices of theIMO, in the form of two new legalinstruments; the HNS Convention1 andthe OPRC-HNS Protocol2.

The main aims of the HNS Conventionare to ensure adequate, prompt andeffective compensation for damage topersons and property caused by HNS

substances. A European Council decisionhas set a deadline of June 2006 for all EUmember states to become parties to theHNS Convention.

The OPRC-HNS Protocol mirrors theprinciples of the OPRC Conventionrelating to oil spill preparedness andresponse. In addition to oils, the Protocolwill apply to substances such as liquefiedgases, dangerous materials in bulk,liquid and in packaged form. Parties tothe OPRC-HNS Protocol will be requiredto establish measures for dealing withpollution incidents, either nationally orin co-operation with other countries.Ships will be required to carry a pollutionemergency plan onboard to dealspecifically with incidents involving HNS.As of 31 December 2005, 13 States hadratified the Protocol, which will enter intoforce 12 months after 15 States haveratified.

1 The International Convention on Liability andCompensation for Damage in Connection with theCarriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances(HNS) by Sea 1996.

2 International Convention on Oil PollutionPreparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990.

6

CARGO

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Alumina loadingWe have been advised of several recentincidents where ships loading alumina inWestern Australia have been rejecteddue to uncleanliness of holds. Alumina isa refined product and any form ofcontamination is considered a problem.

The following recommendations toowners, loading this cargo, in this area,have been received from localconsultants:

Cargo residues

The holds including hatchcovers,coamings, deck beams, side frames,frame brackets, horizontal surfaces,ventilator trunkings, ledges, grills, ladderflanges, pipe casings, spar ceiling andwood sheathing, should be free of allresidues of previous cargoes.

It is particularly noted that cement, lime,salt, phosphate, sulphur, coal and allferrous residues are especiallyundesirable.

Rust scale

All loose rust scale must be removedfrom the hold prior to loading, withparticular attention being given to theunderside of the hatchcovers, thecoaming faces, the underdeck spaces atboth ends of the hold, the undersides ofthe topside tanks, the inner surfaces ofthe ship’s shell plating, the ‘hidden’flanges of the frames and the upper andlower frame brackets, the bulkheads,ladder flanges, ventilator trunkings,ledges, grills and all hard rust scalemust also be removed from the tanktop, lower hopper sides and lowerbulkhead areas.

Flaking paint

All flaking paint scale must be movedfrom the hold prior to loading, withparticular attention being given to theunderside of the hatchcover, thecoaming faces, the underdeck spaces atboth ends of the hold, the undersides ofthe topside tanks, the inner surfaces ofthe ship’s shell plating, the ‘hidden’flanges of the frames and the upper andlower frame brackets, the bulkheads,ladder flanges, ventilator trunkings,ledges, grills and the tank tops.

General

Where applicable, the outer/upper sidesof the hatchcovers should be clean andfree from flaking paint, residues or loosescale which could fall into the holdduring loading and discharging.

Bilges and wells

Bilges and bilge wells must be coveredwith hessian/burlap or similarpermeable materials in such a manner asto prevent the entry of alumina into thebilge or well, but to permit the entry ofwater. The hessian/burlap or permeablematerial must be sealed around thecrown with a good quality marineadhesive tape or cement.

Comments and conclusion

The above information should beadhered to when preparing the cargoholds for an upcoming upliftment ofalumina in bulk. In addition, andalthough briefly described under‘General’, all hatchcover track-ways areto be free of any contaminatingmaterials (usually rust scale from thehatchcovers) that will inevitably be‘blown into the holds’ on thecompletion of loading, when the ship’screw clean the hatch track-ways prior toclosing the same.

Vessels that have recently discharged aquantity of bulk cargo (especially clinker)must ensure that the exterior surfaceareas on the deckhouses, cranes, timberstanchions (permanent and/orcollapsible), grabs and main deck areasare free of any loose residues.

There have been many occasions wherevessels on completing a discharge of‘clinker’ in Kwinana, then have toprepare their cargo holds for anupliftment of alumina in Kwinana orBunbury. Quite often, and despite allefforts and good intentions of the ship’screw, the time period between thecompletion of discharge and theinspection for alumina is too short. It isthe view that three days of good andproper cleaning, is needed to properlyclean a 5-hold vessel.

The Carefully to Carry newsletter,February 2005 (page 26) Hold cleaning:bulk cargoes, may also be of assistancein this matter.

7

WORLDWIDE

Carriage of fluorsparcargoesFluorspar is a mineral cargo which hasbeen shipped from Chinese sources inpast months. The mineral is mined andthen is subjected to a washing process.The mineral as shipped consists of finelydivided particles and generally a highmoisture content, of the order of 9 to 10per cent. In such a form the mineral isthus liable to liquefy during oceantransport and this liquefaction may resultin shift of cargo. Under extremecircumstances this shift of cargo mayresult in capsize of the carrying vessel.

We are aware of several incidents ofcargo shift during the carriage offluorspar. In one instance the vesselcapsized, in another the list was so severethat the vessel was abandoned and latergrounded, and another leaned againstthe quay wall during loading.

The IMO Code of Safe Practice for SolidBulk Cargoes lists materials which mayliquefy. Fluorspar is not included, but theCode stresses that the list is notexhaustive. The Code describes tests todetermine the flow moisture content ofthe material and then the calculation todetermine the transportable moisturecontent. The Code states that:

“Ships other than specially constructedor fitted ships (see 7.2.2. and 7.2.3.)should carry only those cargoes having amoisture content not in excess of thetransportable moisture limit as definedin the Code.”

Unfortunately the masters of the vesselsin the incidents of which we are awarewere not presented with certificatesrelating to transportable moisture limit,but received certificates of the totalmoisture content only. They were notable to determine if the cargo was safeto carry in accordance with theinformation provided to them and asrecommended by the IMO Code of SafePractice.

Shippers of cargoes liable to liquefynormally test their production at regularintervals to determine the transportablemoisture limit. The properties ofminerals from the same mine or seamwithin that mine should be fairlyconstant, and this would include thetransportable moisture limit. However, ithas been noted that there can be avariation of the transportable moisturelimit within a particular cargo providedfor shipment. These variations havebeen observed in tests for transportablemoisture limit, screening behaviour,appearance, etc.

To ensure safe shipment of thesecargoes the master should demandcertificates relating to transportablemoisture limit and total moisturecontent of the cargo immediately beforeit is loaded to his vessel. If the actualmoisture content is in excess of thetransportable moisture content, thecargo should not be loaded unless thevessel is specially constructed or fitted.

WORLDWIDE

Petcoke hold washingsFollowing several recent enquiries onwhere petcoke hold washings can bedisposed of, we offer the followingadvice from Steamship Maritime.Petcoke, as a material, is solid, 95 percent carbon, wholly insoluble in waterand contains no oil in liquid form.Petcoke has also been analysed and isshown in the Gesamp/EHS Composite listof Hazard Profiles which is an IMOpublication. This states that it has nobioaccumulative effects, is non-hazardous to marine organisms andhumans (oral intake or skin, eye contactor inhalation). Finally petcoke does notreduce the value of amenities (egif petcoke is washed ashore after adischarge the beach does not need to beclosed due to hazardous effects).Thisanalysis is obviously not applicableto petcoke in its dry form where its dustcan be hazardous to humans.

It therefore follows that petcoke holdwashings properly fall under Annex V ofMarpol and not Annex I. Within the'Guidelines for the Implementationof Annex V' hold washings are classed as'operational wastes' and, with theAmendment to Annex V (MEPC 51/22)such discharges must now be recorded inthe vessels garbage record book.Thisamendment simply changes the formatof the record book and does not changethe Marpol definitions of 'cargoresidues' or 'operational wastes'.

8

In a recent incident a chemical declared tobe ‘Thiourea De’ was found by chemicalanalysis to be thiourea dioxide. This haddecomposed violently in a container,producing highly toxic sulphur dioxidethat contaminated the contents of othercontainers. A heavy sulphurous residuecovered the surfaces of the hold and itscontents. Expensive decontaminationand cleaning operations were required.

Thiourea dioxide is a white to pale lightyellow crystalline powder. It is an IMDGClass 4.2 material that is normallyshipped in sealed drums. It readilyoxidises in air and in contact with readilyoxidisable organic material may causeignition and a fire. In contact withmoisture or water it may generate heat,causing ignition. In contact with acids itwill produce highly toxic sulphur dioxide.High humidity, contamination andimpurities are believed to be factors thatindependently, or in combination, cancause the material to decomposeviolently at normal ambienttemperatures.

‘Thiourea De’ and ‘Thiourea D’ are notrecognised shipping names. If suchmaterial is offered for shipment, anydeclaration made to the effect that it isnot thiourea dioxide should be treatedwith circumspection. Thiourea dioxide isbanned from carriage on many Members’ships.

CHINA

Illegal shipments ofthiourea dioxideA US court has recently found anAmerican manufacturer 100 per centliable for losses arising from one of theworst containership fires (the DGHarmony) because of insufficientwarnings being given as to the risk ofexplosion in a shipment of calciumhypochlorite.

There are several recent incidents whereshippers have been found shippinganother chemical – thiourea dioxide –under another name and even declaringthe substance as not dangerous.

In recent months chemical productsmanufactured in China under the nameof ‘Thiourea De’ and ‘Thiourea D’ havebeen offered for shipment. The materialsafety data sheet provided by onemanufacturer of ‘Thiourea De’ describesthe product as a white solid that maydecompose on exposure to moist air. Thechemical formula is stated to be veryslightly different from thiourea dioxide.A declaration originating from themanufacturer describes the chemical as awhite crystalline powder that is verystable and it appears to suggest that thematerial does not decompose explosivelyin contact with moisture.

WORLDWIDE

Bird flu and its effect onthe shipping industryIn recent weeks several European countrieshave reported cases of H5N1, otherwiseknown as bird or avian flu. This deadlystrain of the flu virus originated in SouthEast Asia several years ago. Thousands ofbirds across Europe are being slaughteredin an attempt to contain the virus whichappears to be spreading very quickly acrossthe globe. Although H5N1 usually onlyaffects birds, scientists fear that the avianvirus could mutate to allow easy human tohuman transmission. They also warn that,because people have very little immunity toit, it will spread rapidly.

So what will the impact of this potentialpandemic be on the shipping industry?Clearly those involved in the poultrybusiness and the transport of birds will bemost affected. On 21 October theEuropean Commission extended a ban onthe import of pet birds and feathers tomost of Russia after another confirmedcase of bird flu. It is predicted that similarmeasures to those taken during the SARscrisis will be imposed throughout theworld. China has already enforced controlson travellers following the culling of100,000 birds after an outbreak of H5N1in Mongolia. Travellers now face infra-redbody temperature checks and shoesterilisation. It is highly probable that othercountries will shortly follow suit. Greecehas already demonstrated how it will dealwith the virus at a port level: the impact ofthe recent case of the Mary Ann has so farbeen played down, but shows that crewsaboard vessels may come into contact withinfected migratory birds and are thereforeat risk of contracting H5N1. The Mary Annwas en route to Piraeus when she wasstopped near to the port so the crew couldundergo medical checks. The alarm wasraised after finding suspect, dead andliving migratory birds onboard. Medicshave advised that those working ‘in closeproximity’ to birds are at risk of catchingthe virus. Clearly this includescrewmembers. Advice given to those at riskis to wash their hands thoroughly aftercontact with infected birds.

A fuller discussion of bird flu, its impact onshipping and measures to deal with it, canbe found on the Club’s Members’ websitein the Encyclopaedia.

9

PowerPoint training course. Thisenables training officers and managerswho are not experts in the IMDG Code toteach staff their key duties under theCode, and how the guidebooks work.This is to raise awareness of theguidebooks in the workplace andovercome the perception of employeesthat the IMDG Code is too complex forthem to understand.

Also in the package is a DVD – Any FoolCan Stuff a Container. This DVD focuseson:

● Choosing a container

● Checking the container

● Making a packing plan

● Packaging cargo

● Packing containers

● Container security

● Receiving containers.

Before explaining the guidebooks indetail, it may be of interest to describethe causes of dangerous goods incidentsand non-compliance with the IMDGCode, and explain why the Club is takingdirect action to improve IMDG Codeunderstanding and compliance.

What isthe IMDGCode?The IMDG Code isa comprehensiveset of globallyaccepted rulesthat enablespackaged (ie non-bulk) dangerous goodsand marine pollutants to be carried safelyby sea.

Around 10 per cent of all containercargoes contain dangerous goods,so virtually all container shipservices fall within the scopeof the rules of the Code.

DANGEROUS GOODSA LOSS PREVENTION NEWS SUPPLEMENT

IntroductionThe Club, with the support of severalMembers, has launched Book it right andpack it tight – a set of four guidebookson the workings of the InternationalMaritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG)Code. They are designed to provide busyoperational people, who are not expertsin the IMDG Code, with a quick referenceand practical everyday guidance to theIMDG Code rules.

Uniquely, each of the four guidebooks isdedicated to the requirements of one ofthe principal parties involved inconsigning packaged dangerous goods:

● The shipper

● The shipping line booking agency

● The cargo consolidating companies(managers and supervisors)

● The fork lift operators and cargohandlers – those that actuallyphysically pack the containers.

Each of the parties above has key dutiesunder the IMDG Code, and failure tocarry out those duties may lead to

undeclared dangerous goods beingloaded in a ship, an unsafe containerload, or unsafe stowage, all of which leadto an unnecessary increase in the risk ofcarrying dangerous goods by sea.

IMDG Code training package

The guidebooks come in a boxed set offour. They are part of a complete IMDGCode training package. Each book issupported by its own editable

10

Why is the IMDG Code socomplex?

The Code has evolved from a set of brieffacts and instructions for marinersthrough more than six decades ofcommittee discussions by experts, to atwo-volume document with asupplement, a total of over 800 pages.

The rules are now set about withexemptions and exceptions. Industrieshave successfully lobbied for special rulesfor particular products, such as paints,alcoholic beverages and aerosols, andrule makers must make allowances totake advantage of benefits from newtechnologies in products and packaging,as well as more accurate technicalinformation about the behaviour ofhazardous substances. As in all things,the rules of the Code must be flexible, orthe system becomes commerciallyrestrictive and discredited.

So, the Code must draw a balancebetween being easily understandable fornon-technical operational people, and atthe same time comprehensive andtechnical enough to take into account allmanner of special considerations.

The Code is wide-ranging and there willalways be sections that are not applicableto a particular party. It is now so lengthythat some operational personnel are putoff from trying to understand it. In fact,the Code is a well-designed document,and ordinary operational people justneed guidance to understand itsstructure and their key duties. That is thepurpose of the Book it right and Pack ittight guidebooks.

The scope of the Code

Many are surprised to learn that the bulkof the Code applies to activities carriedout ashore by the shipper, consolidatorand packer concerning the preparationand documentation of the load, not toshipboard activities. The Code is complexbecause it provides rules that apply toactivities taking place right at the start ofthe transport chain and then throughoutthe carriage by sea.

The Code requires the shipper to providea description of the product andclassification of any hazards. It sets limitson the type and size of packaging,specifies warning marks and labels,establishes rules for the types of hazardsthat can be co-loaded into one container,and devises a documentation system thatrequires shippers and packers to certify inwriting that they have followed the rulesof the Code.

Only when all of these things have beendone does the Code turn its attention tostowage and segregation aboard ship.As examples of this, shipboard stowagedoes not appear until the last section ofthe main document, and the emergencyinstructions for dealing with dangerousgoods incidents aboard ship do notappear in the Code proper at all, but inthe Supplement to the Code, (sometimescalled Volume 3),

Daunting for new users

The length and density of the text is apsychological barrier to learning forpeople whose first language is English,or one of the main world languages intowhich the Code is translated. How muchmore difficult is this for users reading theCode in a second language?

✔

A typical illustration from the guidebookshowing good practice for drum packing.

Obstacles to knowledge

This problem can be overcome if theemployer sponsors IMDG Code training.

The training problem is compounded ifshippers and packers operate hundredsof miles from the sea and have no naturalcontact with maritime affairs. Thesituation is even more difficult if theoperation is located in a state or regionwhere business culture is undeveloped,and regulatory compliance is not apriority.

The Club recognises the existence ofthese knowledge gaps, and seeks toaddress them by making the new IMDGCode guidebooks available throughshipping lines to their customers.

Causes of dangerousgoods incidentsBefore looking in detail at how theguidebooks work, it may be useful tolook at the nature of dangerous goods,and at the main factors that causedangerous goods incidents. Then therelationship of compliance with theIMDG Code to risk reduction becomesapparent.

The hazard and risk factors

The IMDG Code requires shippers toidentify cargo as dangerous goods if itpossesses a known hazard such asflammability, toxicity etc.

The IMDG Code rules enable the carriageof dangerous goods to be acceptableunder managed risk conditions. Forexample, the carriage of flammableliquid is never without a fire hazard, butprovided the ship is fully aware of the

Hanjin Pennsylvania.

11

hazard, the packaging is adequate andintact, and the stowage and segregationis done according to the IMDG Coderules, the ship should be able to dealwith an unexpected incident. The risk isrecognised, measurable, minimised andcommercially acceptable.

Unplanned risk factors

The substances below are examples ofcommonly carried dangerous goods witha history of causing serious incidents onships. Remember, it is not the productbut the failure to comply with the IMDGCode that causes incidents.

● Calcium hypochlorite, widely usedfor water treatment, has a badreputation for spontaneouslyigniting in a ferocious way

● Barbeque charcoal has done thesame in a less violent way, resulting insmouldering block stows on deck

● Thiourea dioxide, a substancewidely used in the paper, leather andtextile industries, was not listed asdangerous goods until a number ofshipboard incidents caused theexperts to classify it as a self-reactivesubstance.

Why do incidents onboardoccur?

Events and circumstances far from theship can sow the seeds of incidentsarising from:

1 Mis-declaration or non-declarationby shippers

2 Quality and selection of thepackaging

3 Provision and accuracy ofdocumentation

4 Professionalism of the containerpacking

5 The completely unexpected

6 Human factors – regional andcompany attitudes.

1 Mis-declaration ornon-declaration by shippers

There are many ways in which chemicalscan be combined to make newsubstances. Dangerous goods not listedby name in the IMDG Code DangerousGoods List must be tested by the shipperto check for hazardous properties, then

shipped under a generic hazardclassification.

It is possible for hazards to not bedeclared under these circumstances,either because of lack of time to test, lackof test facilities, making falseassumptions, lack of productknowledge, lack of knowledge of therequirement to make an IMDG Codedeclaration or how to make one, or evenwilful withholding of information toavoid dangerous goods surcharges.

2 Quality and selection of packaging

Like a time bomb, defective orincompatible packaging may fail andrelease product at any point in a voyage.Defects are difficult to spot until thepackage fails.

In the example illustrated, new UNstandard steel drums failed becausesmall pieces of clinker (mill scale) wererolled into the sheet steel from which thedrums were made. During the voyage,the mill scale broke out leaving holes in

Photos above: These allegedly UN standard drumsfailed because of a steel manufacturing fault.Examination showed also that the internal surfacesof the drums were not painted and were heavilycorroded before filling.

Top photo: When mechanical handling systems dropcontainers, cargo can be badly damaged while thecontainer remains unmarked.

Lower photo: When this container was dropped,several drums were badly distorted. If the containerhad not been inspected but simply loaded to the ship,the likelihood is that many drums would have burstduring the sea voyage.

the drums. The IMDG Code specifies thequality of packaging, and failure to meetthat standard was the cause of thisincident. Fortunately the cargo wasdeclared and stowed according to IMDGrules and the crew were able to deal withthe problem appropriately.

Beware of reconditioned drums

There is a market in low-cost secondhand and reconditioned steel and plasticdrums. They are often used for low value,low profit substances such as tar oils andcreosotes. Reconditioned steel drumshave been known to fail because ofbrittle metal fracture. The process ofcleaning and reconditioning, which mayinvolve fitting new top and bottomheads, puts stress on the materials thatwas not anticipated during original drummanufacture. Much depends on qualitycontrol.

The IMDG Code does not requireshippers to notify the ship of use ofreconditioned drums for dangerousgoods. Beware, they are anotherunknown risk factor.

12

3 Provision and accuracy ofdocumentation

The IMDG Code requires shippers toprovide self-certified documentationdescribing the identity of the dangerousgoods, the nature of the hazard, thequantity and the type of packaging.This data from the dangerous goodsmanifest is used to stow the ship and isavailable for dealing with onboardincidents.

There is a serious lack of knowledgeabout the content and purpose ofdangerous goods documentation in thetransport chain between the shipper andthe ship. The knowledge gap may beexpected to grow in proportion to thedistance from a port, with shippers beingleast well informed, but regionalattitudes also have a strong influence.

However, the maritime industry must facethe fact that many employees of shippingcompanies, forwarding agents andcontainer packers are not as wellinformed about dangerous goodshazards and IMDG Code requirements asis consistent with risk reduction.

Unfortunately, it is the ship that bears theadditional risk, and once the container isloaded, the ship can do nothing tocorrect the mistakes of others.

Many dangerous goods documents ofvery poor quality pass through thetransport chain. How is this so? Either theparties who should identify the errors areinstructed to wilfully ignore anyproblems, or they simply don’t know anybetter.

4 Professionalism of the containerpacker

Cargo securing inside containers is stillas fundamental now to successfulmaritime transport as it ever was ingeneral cargo ships. The lack of propersecuring of cargo in containers remains asignificant cause of damage, anddangerous goods leaking from brokenpackages is an all too frequent additionalrisk factor.

The IMDG Code requires the packer tosign a packing certificate stating that anydangerous goods have been safelysecured for sea. Despite this, out-turn

Typical information required in an IMDG Codedeclaration (other products may require different data)

Packaging data required for each substance:

Number and typeof packages: 180 x 200 litre steel drums

Quantity data required for each substance:

Net mass/volume: 17,600 kg

Gross mass/volume: 18,600 kg

Identification data required for each substance:

Proper Shipping Name: Acetyl Chloride

Class: Class 3 Flammable liquid

UN Number: 1717

Supplementary identification data that may be requiredfor some substances:

Packing group: PG II

Sub-risk: Class 8 Corrosive

Flashpoint: (5ºC c.c.)

Marine pollutant: (not applicable for this substance)

Control temperature: (not applicable for this substance)

Emergency temperature: (not applicable for this substance)

The shipper isrequired to providethis standard ofdetail in a certifieddocument for eachdangerous goodssubstance he offersfor shipment

The shipper signs adeclaration confirming to theline that all the products arecorrectly described, packagedand presented according tothe IMDG Code and allapplicable regulations

Who signed for this one?

Photo: A container packing certificate has to besigned by the person responsible for packing andsecuring the load as safe for sea.

This was the condition of a stow of plastic drums ofcorrosive product after a 50 kilometre road journey tothe port. The sea journey had not yet started.

reports at container cargo spillageincidents produce a familiar roll call ofdefects in cargo stowing and securing:

● Unsecured packages rolling andtumbling to self-destruction insidevoid spaces in the container

�

�

Shipper’s Declaration

I hereby declare that the contents of this consignmentare fully and accurately described by the ProperShipping Name, and are classified, packaged, markedand labelled/placarded and are in all respects inproper condition for transport according to theapplicable international and national governmentalregulations.

Company name of shipper: ABC Chemical Company

Name/status of declarant: Sam Shipper/Exportsupervisor

Place and date: Manchester19.08.2005

Signature of declarant: Sam Shipper

13

● Cargo crushed and collapsed bybeing overstowed by heavier cargo

● Point-loading damage to cargo bypallets caused by lack of horizontalsupport between tiers

● Collapse of flimsy and badly madepallets causing stow instability

● Penetration of cargo, particularlydrums, from protruding nails infloors, pallets, dunnage and brokenpallets

● Direct physical damage to packagescaused by fork lift trucks

● Ram-loaded packages split by forcingthem into the container by fork lift.

5 The completely unexpected

From time to time people do unusualthings to containers – tip them from roadtrailers, shunt them into railway buffers,or drop them from cranes. After such anevent, in an ideal world IMDG Codedangerous goods warning placardswould compel conscience to overcome

carelessness and check the cargo beforeloading on a ship, but this is not alwaysthe case.

6 Human factors – regional andcompany attitudes

IMDG Code rules, like any laws andregulations, only have meaning inproportion to the degree to whichpeople respect and comply with them.We have looked at the physical failures

and vice versa. Here are just someimportant areas:

● Company rules, standards andresources

A large multi-national company canapply ready-made templates foroperational safety standards thatinclude the IMDG Code, and havecompliance officers to plan trainingand maintain standards. By contrast,managers of small companies oftenhave limited resources, and these aredirected towards managingproductivity and everyday problems.

● Business ethics

There are employers in all societiesthat encourage employees to regardregulations as ‘red tape’ and barriersto productivity. Operators with thismindset find it easy to push aside theIMDG Code, when it is convenient todo so, by simply not declaring cargoas dangerous goods. Again it is theship that is bearing the risk, not them.This is primitive business thinking,but often prevails, particularly insmall companies.

The container packing industry isvulnerable to this attitude. Considercontainer packing at its most basic. Itonly requires the rental of a fork lift

�

Container/vehicle packing declaration

I hereby declare that the goods described above have been packed/loaded intothe container/vehicle identified above in accordance with the applicableprovision.

Must be completed and signed for all container/vehicle loads by personresponsible for packing/loading

Name of Company: XYZ Cargo Packing Co.

Name/status of declarant: Peter Packer / Supervisor

Place and date: Southampton22.08.2005

Signature of declarant: PPPPPeter Peter Peter Peter Peter Packerackerackerackeracker

Packing certificatesWhen dangerous goods are packed into containers for sea, the IMDG Coderequires a signed certificate from the packer, confirming that the packages weresound and the load was packed, secured, marked, labelled and placarded allaccording to the IMDG Code rules.

Photo: Containers subjected to handling methods such as this should be opened andinspected for damage before loading to a ship – does it happen?

that create problems, but it is peoplewho drive policy, manage companies,operate production plants, createdocuments and load containers.

Why do people fail tocomply with the IMDGCode?Individual actions are influenced byorganisational procedures and cultures,

14

truck, the construction of a simplecontainer access ramp and use of apiece of land by a roadside to set upbusiness as a container packer. Thereis not even a requirement for abuilding. It is an easy entry-levelbusiness for a budding entrepreneurwith limited funds, and he may noteven be aware of the IMDG Code.

In newly emerging industrial societiesworkers may transfer, overnight, fromtraditional agricultural work toindustrial processing involvingdangerous chemicals. There will be atime lag before such societies developthe instinctive understanding ofindustrial and chemical hazards thatcomes from experience. The IMDGCode has evolved over six decades,but it is a new concept to manycompanies now manufacturing andpacking dangerous goods in newlydeveloping regions. They will needhelp and training to assimilate theIMDG Code into their industrialcultures.

● Communication

In addition to coping with theindustrial culture gap, manydeveloping regions are doingbusiness with the world in a secondlanguage, usually English. This addsanother barrier to perfectunderstanding. Consider the extractfrom a safety data sheet below, whichis taken from a Far Easternmanufacturer’s website. In the list ofhazardous properties it says “Dangerof Explosion: Not applicable,” but in

the next line under “Fire Hazards” itsays, “Material is shock sensitive andpotentially explosive.” Lost intranslation? The company had ahighly technical website advertisingsophisticated speciality chemicals butmade an error in translation of thesort that can easily be made on ashipping document.

● Individual skills and attitudes

It should not be forgotten thatindividual employees make decisionsthat affect outcomes, albeit againsttheir organisational background.Many people are trained to perform anarrow set of technical skillsrepetitively, quickly and semi-automatically to achieve businessproductivity – for example to createdangerous goods documents on acomputer, process a cargo booking,pack a container or book containersthrough a dock gate.

For such individuals it is more difficultto apply the IMDG Code rules than toignore them. Employees who aredisaffected, poorly trained, or poorlysupervised will take short cuts andbreak the rules to get the job donewith least effort. That may meanignoring the IMDG Code.

IMDG complianceshould mean fewerincidentsWe have seen that there are manypotential hidden causes of dangerousgoods incidents, and many obstacles tothe observance of the IMDG Code. Whilethis situation prevails, the risk to shipsfrom hazardous cargo will remainunnecessarily high.

However, if all dangerous goods areshipped under the IMDG Code rules, therisks will be considerably lower. If shipsknow the nature, the hazard and theidentity of the cargo, it can be stowedand segregated appropriately, andincidents handled confidently. Dealingwith a deck fire involving a knowncommodity is altogether different fromdealing with an unknown commodityburning below deck.

Accepting that increasing IMDG Codecompliance is at the heart of the solution,how can this be achieved? The Clubbelieves that a significant improvementcan be brought about if shippers andcontainer packers in all regions could beprovided with practical IMDG Codetraining aimed specifically at theiroperational requirements. The result isthe Book it right and pack it tightguidebooks and training set.

Book it right and pack it tight

The Club hopes to make a contributionto boosting global understanding anduse of the IMDG Code with the Book itright and pack it tight pack ofguidebooks and training material.

The quickest way to get into business:

1 Hire a fork lift truck

2 Make a ramp

3 Rent some land by the side of the road

4 You’re in business as a container packer!

Lost in translation?

Extract from manufacturers Product SafetyData Sheet

Flashpoint: Not applicable

Flammability: Not applicable

Ignition Temperature: Not applicable

Danger of Explosion: Not applicable

Fire Hazards: Material isshock sensitiveand potentiallyexplosive!

Illustration from Book it right and pack ittight, of a typical damage scenario.

15

The guidebooks look at the role of theshipper, the shipping line booking agent,the freight consolidator (manager orsupervisor), and the fork lift operator andcargo handler who physically loads thecontainer, and identify the key duties ofeach. The party concerned, instead ofhaving to search through the 800 pagesof the Code looking for his instructions,starts by consulting his guidebook.

The guidebooks explain in simple termswhat duties the IMDG Code requires,with colour illustrations andphotographs. Each duty described in theguidebooks includes a reference thattakes the reader directly to the text in theCode where the full technical details arefound.

What the guidebookscontain

Guidebook 1 in the series is for shippers.It explains the shipper’s key duties such as:

● Classifying the hazard – theguidebook explains how the UNclassification system identifies all thedangerous goods details about aparticular hazardous substance

● Documenting the hazard – indicatesthe details that the IMDG Coderequires be notified about dangeroussubstances, and how the IMDG Codedraws them together into a commonglobal format for documentation. Theguidebook includes examples of howthe shipper must make out a shipper’sdeclaration for different types ofdangerous goods, and how theyshould be presented on thedocument, together with an exampleof a completed dangerous goodsdocument

● Documentation checklist – this bookincludes a checklist for use by shippersand others to ensure that all therequired details have been includedon a dangerous goods shippingdeclaration

● Legal obligation – the guidebookexplains the meaning of the legal textthat appears on each dangerousgoods declaration, and thecommitment the shipper is makingwhen he presents dangerous goodsfor shipment by sea

● Package selection – the guidebookoutlines the IMDG Code rules that

shippers must follow when selectingpackaging that is suitable fordangerous goods, and an illustrationof the type of UN code that appearson packages that have been testedand approved for filling withdangerous goods

● Use of different types of packages– the guidebook has colourillustrations of different types ofpackaging used for dangerous goodsincluding the construction ofcombination packages made up ofinner receptacles contained withinouter wrappers

● Marking and labelling – theguidebook explains and illustratesthe shipper’s prime duty to applyspecific warning marks and labels toeach package to give clear anddecisive information about thecontents of each package.

Guidebook 2 covers similar ground fromthe point of view of shipping lineemployees. Its purpose is to assist cargobooking staff to check the informationprovided by shippers at the earliest stage,by asking shippers the right questions,and to help shippers to get the basicsright.

Guidebook 3 is aimed towardsmanagers and supervisors of cargoconsolidation depots where dangerousgoods are packed into freight containers.It summarises the shipper’s duties in lessdetail, and concentrates on theadditional factors that come into playwhen packing dangerous goods intofreight containers. Examples ofadditional key factors for consolidatorsexplained in Guidebook 3 include:

● Segregation of dangerous goodswithin a container – the guidebookexplains how both the hazard andthe risk of an incident are escalated ifthe container packer ignores IMDGCode segregation rules and packsincompatible dangerous goods in thesame container. The guidebook thenshows how the segregation shouldbe checked either manually orelectronically using internet orproprietary computer-aided systems

● Marking and placarding ofcontainers – the guidebook explainsthe packer’s duties regarding the

Illustration of package marksand labels that must be appliedby the shipper.

CORROSIVE LIQUIDACIDIC, ORGANICN.O.S. (caprylyl chloride)

UN 3265

ETHANOL

UN 1170

16

application of warnings to freightcontainers

● Packing certificate – the guidebookexplains the legal responsibilities ofthe packer that are encapsulated inthe packing certificate

● Securing cargo against movementinside containers – the conventionalmethods of blocking and bracingpackages of cargo inside freightcontainers are illustrated in a series ofdrawings covering drum stacking, useof pallets, stacking intermediate bulkcontainers (IBCs) and using timberand other materials to prevent cargofrom moving.

© T

ho

mas

Mill

er P

&I L

td 2

005

Do you know who receives dangerousgoods into your site?

Are they trained to checkdocumentation and package marking?

Does anyone keep a record ofdangerous goods on your site?

Is the record kept up-to-date?

Is the location recorded?

Do your personnel palletise/re-package/shrink-wrap dangerousgoods packages, or put put them intooverpacks?

Have they been trained to mark andlabel the packages to IMDG rules?

Are shipping container load plansprepared?

Do you know who controls loading ofdangerous goods into shippingcontainers?

Do they have access to the IMDG Coderules?

Have they been trained to understandIMDG Code segregation?

Do you know who supervises theloading of dangerous goods intoshipping containers?

Do they have access to the IMDG Coderules?

Have they been trained to understandthe IMDG Code?

Is anyone responsible for checkingshipping containers before loading?

Have they been trained in what tocheck for?

Have fork lift operators been trained inIMDG Code segregation?

Have fork lift operators receivedtraining in loading dangerous goods andnon-hazardous cargo into containers?

Is anyone responsible for ensuring thatpackages have been secured inside theshipping container?

Have they been trained to secure cargo?

Are timber, plywood sheet and securingmaterials available?

Are tools available for cutting timberand plywood sheets?

Are people trained to use them?

Are container manifests prepared?

Are manifests checked to include all thedangerous goods?

Do you know who is responsible forapplying hazard warning placards?

Have they been trained?

Is the stock of placards adequate?

Are seals applied and seal numbersrecorded?

Are packing certificates completed andsigned?

Do you know who signs them?

Have they been trained and do theyunderstand the legal significance ofpacking certificates?

This is a checklist to confirm that you havesound operating procedures.

Tick ✔ as appropriate:

Consolidator’s dangerous goods training andprocedure checklist

Practical and accessible

The guidebooks are not intended as areplacement for the IMDG Code, but aseveryday guides for ordinary operationalstaff to find their way around it. It is notintended that these guidebooks sit onbookshelves in the company library, butthat they are issued as everydayoperational guides on desks in themanufacturer’s shipping office, thefreight booking office, the warehousesupervisor’s pocket, and the fork liftoperator’s mess room.

With this in mind the guidebooks arerobustly made to survive heavy handlingand spiral bound so they open flat forphotocopying.

Operational checklists

The books include three checklists, onefor completing shippers declarations,one for identifying training requirementsin container packing facilities, and onefor packing containers.

Also in the training package:

● Four PowerPoint trainingpresentations on CD

The guidebooks aresupplied in a trainingpackage consistingof the four guidebooksin a slip case, and PowerPoint trainingpresentations, one for eachguidebook. The purpose of these is toenable company managers with only apassing knowledge of the IMDG Codeto confidently introduce employees tokey aspects of the IMDG Code, and theguidebooks themselves and how touse them.

● DVD

Also included is a DVD version of AnyFool Can Stuff a Container

The Club together with several Membershas made a major commitment to shipsafety by producing this package. Webelieve that the pack will be of greatassistance to shippers and packers lookingfor practical IMDG Code guidance, and toshipping lines seeking a means to providesuch assistance to their customers.Especially those operating in thedeveloping regions beyond the reach ofnormal IMDG Code training, andnewcomers to dangerous goodseverywhere.

Dangerous Goods is written byRichard Masters

For further information contact:

Karl Lumbers, Loss Prevention DirectorThomas Miller P&I LtdInternational House, 26 Creechurch LaneLondon EC3A 5BA

Tel: +44 20 7204 2307

Fax: +44 20 7283 6517

Email:karl.lumbers@thomasmiller.com

.

▲

▲

▲

▲

Taken from an illustration on blocking and bracingtechnique.

Guidebook 4 explains the problems,responsibilities and techniques ofpacking dangerous goods intocontainers from the point of view of thefork lift truck operator and cargo handler.It includes photographs of damagedpackages to illustrate what happens tocargo that is not effectively secured fortransport by sea.

Each book also has a common referencesection that briefly explains classification,technical terms and common ‘problemareas’ such as limited quantities andrules for aerosols.

Simple guidance

There are over 800 pages of the IMDGCode, so the details in the guidebooksare selective. Each topic has at least onereference to a part, chapter, section orsub-section of the main body of theIMDG Code text, taking the readerdirectly to the full details of that topic.The aim is to enable the reader to identifyhis key requirement in the guidebook,see an example of what is required, thenif he needs more information easilylocate full technical details in the Code,using the guidebooks as a chart.

Serious purpose

Each book ends with a series ofphotographs of the fire aboard theHanjin Pennsylvania, intended tographically bring home to shore sidepeople that even the most moderncontainer ships are vulnerable toundeclared dangerous goods incorrectlyand inaccessibly stowed below deck. Themessage is that the IMDG Code is not redtape, or pointless regulations, but aserious document whose sole purpose isto protect shipper’s cargo, ships andmariner’s lives.

17

SCOTLAND

Health & Safetybreaches: Time for achange in culture?In light of two recent Scottish courtdecisions, it should be consideredwhether culture change rather thanincreased criminalisation is a moreeffective tool in delivering improvementsto health and safety.

No one is likely to dispute that whateversteps can be taken should be taken toavoid a repetition of tragedies such asthe Herald of Free Enterprise, PiperAlpha, or the Hatfield rail crash. But doesincreased criminalisation assist in theprevention of such tragic loss of life, ordoes it simply put in place a mechanismfor apportioning responsibility after sucha tragedy? The former seems to be by farthe more desirable, yet there is clearly aplace for those criminally responsible forloss of life to be held to account by thelaw. ‘Prevention is better than cure’ maytrip off the tongue easily, but criminalsanctions for those responsible do notgenerally amount to cure for the victimsor their families, and certainly cannot beguaranteed to cure future accidents.

The Scottish courts have recently handeddown two significant fines inprosecutions under the Health andSafety at Work Act. Firstly, Shell was fined£900,000 in respect of the death of twoemployees on the Brent Bravo platformin the North Sea. Secondly, and muchmore significantly, the gas pipelinecompany Transco was fined £15 millionhaving been found guilty of breaches ofthe Health and Safety at Work Actresulting in a catastrophic explosion inwhich four members of the same familydied. This level of fine marked the court’sfinding of management failures over along period, and Transco’s apparent lackof contrition. Whilst these fines have hitthe headlines, the ability of the court tolevy fines of this level has long been thereunder the Health and Safety at Work Act,and is also available in appropriate casesin much of the criminal sentencesavailable for breach of merchantshipping legislation.

The use of risk assessment has beencommon in the workplace, onshore andat sea, for well over a decade now for, asits very name implies, the assessment ofrisks in the business of everyday workinglife. The key to its effectiveness is howthose risks are identified andsubsequently managed. The draftCorporate Manslaughter Bill in Englandrecognises this by defining the offence ofcorporate manslaughter with referenceto “the way in which any of theorganisation’s activities are managed ororganised by its senior managers.”

Risk assessment and subsequentmanagement is not, however, a tick boxexercise. It requires real life appraisal ofdaily operational activities, followed byappropriate action – be that in terms ofphysical modifications, changes tooperational guidelines, or training ofstaff. A well-respected and successfulfisherman told of how he had carried outa risk assessment as required byregulations, introduced in 1997, signedit off and filed it neatly on a shelf. Thenone day, as he described it “the pennydropped.” He realised he had to carryout the whole exercise again, walkinground his vessel with his crew identifyingthe risks and working out with themwhat they could do to eliminate, reduceor manage them. For him, that exercisewill, in one sense, never be completed ashis risk assessment is a living document.

An offence of corporate killing will nodoubt focus the minds of seniormanagers and shareholders. A changewithin the culture of an organisation, atall levels, would, however, seem to be thekey deliverer of the prevention of futuretragedies. The culture of an organisation

needs to encourage the identificationand management of risk, and althoughsenior management who control theorganisation’s finances clearly have a roleand a responsibility in delivering change,responsibility for good and safe practiceshould, however, permeate all those whooperate vessels within an organisation.

The culture of blame which presentlyexists is a product not only of the desireto have a person or organisation foundresponsible under the criminal law, andpunished, but also of the civil law whichrequires there to be either negligence orbreach of the statutory duty in order for aclaim by relatives of a deceased tosucceed.

The current draft English Bill sets a veryhigh test for the charge of corporatemanslaughter, requiring theorganisational failures to have causedthe death and have been a gross breachof the relevant duty of care – a conceptwhich may be more familiar in civil lawrather than in criminal law (althoughcriminal law does recognise recklessconduct). Even under the new Bill,therefore, whether in England and Walesalone or with a separate Bill in Scotland,the hurdle for conviction is likely to behigh.

The answer to the problem that everyoneis committed to solving, lies inencouraging an open culture of learningfrom mistakes, safety and riskassessment, rather than allowing theculture of blame to flourish andaccidents to continue to happen.However, the jury is still out – andprobably will be so for some time – onhow best that may be achieved.

RISK MANAGEMENT

18

SOUTH AFRICA

Befriending stowawaysA recent incident in Durban, South Africa,involving stowaways allegedly forced offa vessel in the harbour has receivedworldwide coverage.

The facts of the matter were that sevenstowaways hid onboard the vessel whilstshe was at Mombasa and the stowawaysthen made themselves known to the crewafter the vessel had sailed from that port.The vessel was on route to Durban.

The crew followed the IMO guidelineswith regard to stowaways found onboarda vessel. The stowaways were kept inconfinement and given three meals perday. They were given clothes and wereallowed 30 minutes of exercise each day.They were also given bathroom facilities.However, the master failed to notify theowners of the presence of stowawaysonboard the vessel. The crew then brokethe cardinal rule when it comes tostowaways in that they allowed thestowaways to befriend them.

Stowaways will always seek to befriendthe crew in the hope that the crew willfeel sorry for them. They will tell the crewgruesome tales of life in their homecountries and that the reason they arestowing away, is to get to Europe orNorth America in order to seek out abetter life for themselves.

Crews should be advised not to befriendstowaways, as stowaways are not their‘friends’. The case of the vessel at Durbanis such an example.

The crew felt sorry for the stowaways andthe master failed to report the presenceof stowaways onboard the vessel to theowners. Had the owners been aware ofthe fact that stowaways had boarded thevessel they would have reported thematter to their P&I Club who in turnwould have contacted the local P&Icorrespondents to assist in having thestowaways removed from the vessel andarranging for their repatriation.

When the vessel arrived in Durban, thestowaways were not declared to the port

authorities and the crewagreed to allow thestowaways to sneak off thevessel at Durban, since thevessel was not heading to whatthey would term a favourabledestination. The crew listened tothe stowaways rather than followingthe proper guidelines. In order toavoid detection by port securitypersonnel on the quayside, thestowaways climbed off the vessel by wayof a rope, fixed to the offshore side of thevessel, and dropped down into Durbanharbour where they planned to swim to amore remote quayside, no doubt insearch of the next vessel to stow away on.

However, the plan was not executed aswas envisaged, and as result two of theseven stowaways drowned. The fivesurviving stowaways made it to thequayside where they then alleged thatthey had been forced off the ship. Thepolice were called in and the master andthree crewmembers were arrested.

The stowaways made statements to thepolice, which they subsequentlyelaborated on in a later statement madeto the prosecuting authorities. Thestowaways subsequently became thevictims and the crew the accused.

The stowaways turned on thecrewmembers who they had befriendedon the way to Durban in order to get offthe vessel. Although the vessel was onroute to South Africa, the stowawayswould most probably have used the sametactics if the vessel were going to Europe.Stowaways befriend the crew in the hopethat the crew will feel sorry for them andwill then help them to get to where thestowaways want to go.

The incident in Durban turned into atragic accident. The plan went horriblywrong and two stowaways died. Thecrewmembers were charged and werearrested, interalia, with murder. Thischarge was subsequently dropped toculpable homicide. Culpable homicide inSouth Africa is also known asmanslaughter in other jurisdictions.

The crewmembers subsequently agreed aplea bargain. They were in a foreign

country and weremiles from home. They hadno idea about their futures. They werefrightened and scared. No doubt variouspeople who met with crewmembers toldthem rather grim stories about SouthAfrican prisons. They missed their familiesand their support bases and English wasnot their first language. They foundthemselves in a very difficult situation.

We urge all Members to inform crews ofthe IMO guidelines with regard tostowaways. Once stowaways are foundonboard a vessel the incident shouldimmediately be reported to the ownersand the crew should never think of thestowaways as being their friends.Stowaways will not be the crew’s friendswhen something goes wrong. In fact, asthis case clearly illustrates, they will turnagainst the crew as quickly as theybefriended them.

The crewmembers in this matter wereheavily fined and received suspendedprison sentences in terms of the pleabargain.

We would like to further warn shipownersthat since this recent incident the policenow attend on all vessels arriving atDurban with stowaways and theyquestion the stowaways to ascertainwhere and when they boarded the vesseland how the crew have treated them. Inview of the above it is essential that themaster and crew follow the IMOguidelines for handling stowaways andfurthermore ensure that the masterproperly documents all actions takenwithin those guidelines.

STOWAWAYS

19

AUSTRALIA – QUEENSLAND

Anomaly in collisionliability – 19th centurylaw still appliesUntil recently, lawyers in Queenslandhad operated on the basis that, indetermining damages between shipsinvolved in a collision between twoships where both vessels were in someway at fault, liability would beapportioned according to the degree offault. However, the 3rd edition of Davies& Dickie’s text, Shipping Law, (Sydney:LBC, 2004) has demonstrated that this isseemingly not the law in Queensland.Instead the general maritime 50/50apportionment rule must be applied inrelevant cases.

The authors have highlighted astatutory provision which haslanguished unnoticed in the darkrecesses of Queensland’s Judicature Act1876. That section was relocated (but,importantly, not re-enacted) in 1995and is now found as s. 247 ofQueensland’s Supreme Court Act 1995stating:

“In any cause or proceedings fordamages arising out of a collisionbetween 2 ships if both ships shall befound to have in fault the rules hitherto

in force in the High Court of Admiraltyso far as they have been at variance withthe rules in force in courts of commonlaw shall prevail.”

As it was not re-enacted, it has been inforce since 1876.

The High Court of Admiralty Rule inforce in 1876 required a 50/50apportionment of liability where bothships were at some fault. The textconcludes that this rule still governswhere there is a collision in Queenslandwaters involving a ship outside thescope of the (Commonwealth)Navigation Act 1912, namely:

● Trading ships on intra-Queenslandvoyages

● Australian fishing, or fleet support,ships on intra or interstate voyages

● Pleasure craft and inland waterwaysships.

The alternative apportionment regime,laid down by the Navigation Act, doesnot apply to these vessels, but – as aresult – liability resolutioncomplications can be expected to arisein the case of a collision betweenvessels of this type and vessels fallingunder the Navigation Act. No judicialinterpretation of the position has arisenyet to provide clarity.

RUSSIA – NOVOROSSIYSK

Carriers' improperdeclaration to customsauthoritiesIn October 2004 amendments to theRussian Federation Code onAdministrative Violations regardingcustoms violations were adopted. Andsince then, container and ro-ro carriershave been facing problems with theNovorossiysk customs authoritiesconnected with declaration by carriersof information about weight, quantityand description of the cargo delivered incontainers and vehicles carriedonboard.

In accordance with clause 74 of theRussian Federation Customs Code thecarrier shall present to customsauthorities the above mentionedinformation. If there is a discrepancy inthe declared information about cargodescription, weight and quantity andthe actual cargo in a container or avehicle, then administrativeproceedings are brought. The minimumfine stipulated by the above clause isRUR 50,000 (approx US$1,800).

The customs authorities used to bringadministrative proceedings even incases of clerical errors in documents ordiscovery of advertisement materialsabout the goods delivered. The aboveactions of the customs authorities donot correspond to the RussianFederation Law, as well as to theInternational Conventions signed bythe Russian Federation in the customscontrol sphere.

However, some carriers used to followthe path of least effort and pay the fineinstead of appealing to court or to asuperior body against the Novorossiyskcustoms actions. In cases where thevalue of the cargo misdeclared exceedsRUR 250,000 (approx US$9,000)criminal proceedings are institutedagainst the master of the vessel whichhas carried the misdeclared cargo. Theinvestigators are insisting on theirallegation that the master must, and hasopportunity to, check the contents of

ADMIRALTY FINES

20

ENGLAND AND WALES

House of Lords’decisions“JORDAN II” [2004]Jindal Iron and Steel Co Limited andothers v Islamic Solidarity ShippingCompany Jordan Inc [2004] UKHL 49

Since the last edition of LP News, theHouse of Lords’ decision on the Jordan IIis now out. The cargo interest had earlierlost their claim against owners in boththe High Court and the Court of Appeal.

The cargo interests were the sellers andpurchasers of steel coils. The goods wereshipped from Mumbai under two bills oflading issued on behalf of owners. Thebills incorporated a voyage charterpartywhich provided by Clause 3 ‘Freight to bepaid at ...the rate of $US .. per metric ton.F.I.O.S.T. – LASHED/SECURED/DUNNAGED..’, and by Clause 17 that‘Shippers/Charterers/Receivers to putthe cargo onboard, trim and dischargecargo free of expense to the vessel’. TheHague-Visby Rules were applicable to theshipment.

The cargo interests brought proceedingsalleging that the cargo had beendamaged by rough handling. Apreliminary issue arose as to whether theagreement in the charterparty, evidencedby Clauses 3 and 17, which purported totransfer responsibility for loading,stowage and discharge from the owners

to shippers, charterers and consignees,was invalidated by Article III r.8 of theRules.

The House of Lords dismissed the appeal.The applicable principle was that thewhole contract of carriage would besubject to the Hague-Visby Rules, but theextent to which loading and dischargingwere brought within the carrier’sobligations was left to the partiesthemselves to decide. Thus, if the carrierhad agreed to load, stow or dischargethe cargo, he would have had to do soproperly and carefully, subject to anyprotection which he might enjoy underArticle IV. The Rules, however, did notinvalidate an agreement transferring theresponsibility for those operations to theshipper, charterer or consignee.

The dictum of Devlin J in Pyrene Co Ltd vScindia Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1954] 2All ER 158 at 163 and GH Renton & CoLtd v Palmyra Trading Corp of Panama[1956] 3 All ER 957 was applied and thedecision of the Court of Appeal [2003] 1All ER (Comm) 747 was affirmed. TheHouse of Lords was very muchinfluenced by the fact that the rule inRenton had been consistently applied for50 years without any criticism. Certaintyin all mercantile transactions isimportant, more so, it seems than a literalreading of Article III r.2.

“THE RAFAELA S” [2005]JI MacWilliam Co Inc v MediterraneaeShipping Co SA (2005) UKHL 11

The House of Lords’ decision on this casehas also been issued since the last

LEGAL

20

the containers. The clause of the RussianFederation Criminal Code (contraband)under which the master is called toaccount, stipulates sanctions from a finein the amount of RUR100,000(US$3,600) to imprisonment up to fiveyears. When such criminal proceedingsare brought, the master is disembarkedfrom the vessel and has to stay in Russiafor the whole period of the investigationwhich can last up to six months.

Our recommendation to the masters ofthe vessels is to be extremely attentivewhile presenting to the customsauthorities the information about theweight, quantity and description of thegoods carried in the containers andvehicles. Our recommendation to carriersis to appeal to court or higheradministrative bodies against thecustoms authorities actions as thereare enough grounds for defence of theirposition.

We are informed that there are severalcases listed under appeal in front of theKrasnodar Region Court of Arbitration.As soon as these judgements are handeddown, we will advise further.

21

INDIA – MUMBAI

100,000th examinee forUK Club's PEMEProgramme

The UK P&I Club's Pre-EmploymentMedical Examination (PEME) Programmeobserved a key milestone in its expansionwhen its 100,000th seafarer passedthrough the doors of the scheme'saccredited Blue Shield Medical Clinic inMumbai, India on 28 December 2005.

Padman Motchaiah Lobo, a 26 year-oldgeneral seaman, achieved the standardslaid down by the world's most exactingregime of its kind. Mr Lobo is employedaboard Sanko Prelude by Executive ShipManagement, which has been amember of the PEME Programme sinceMarch 2003. In that time, 918 ofExecutive Ship Management's crew andofficer posts have been examined underPEME's auspices at two clinic locationsin India.

Established in 1996, PEME's aim is tominimise shipowners' exposure to claimsarising from crew medical conditionsexisting prior to employment and toprovide seafarers with a clean bill ofhealth before going to sea. Since then,the scheme has steadily increased itsnumber of accredited clinics at keycrewing centres around the world as wellas the annual throughput of examinees.

Less than a decade on, PEME has becomeone of the UK Club's most successful lossprevention initiatives. Since its inception,the scheme has identified more than4,400 crew as medically unfit foremployment at sea. If all rejectedcandidates had incurred average claimscosts of about US$7,000, the bill wouldhave been around US$30 million. Clearly,not every rejected candidate would havegone on to make a claim but asubstantial proportion would. At anaverage of US$82, examinations havecost just over US$8 million. Whilst it isimpossible to be specific about savings,the management believe they amount tomillions of dollars.

The past year has seen particularlymarked growth for PEME, with theaddition of 15 new members, includingthree without ships in the UK Cluband seven new clinics – three in Croatia,(two in Split and one in Rijeka), two inSouth Africa (Durban and Johannesburg)and one each in India (Goa) and Ukraine(Odessa). Further clinics are beingconsidered according to members'needs.

Today, the needs of 43 owners oftankers, bulkers, passenger ships andother vessels, as well as crewmanagement companies, are catered forby 32 accredited clinics around theworld. Most fleets enjoy protection &indemnity cover from the UK P&I Clubbut a few have continued to supportPEME while placing their ships with otherclubs. As yet, no one has leftthe Programme.

There are now seven clinics each in thePhilippines and India, four in SouthAfrica, four in Croatia, two in Australiaand one each in Indonesia, Hungary,Ireland, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, the UKand the USA. Locations are Manila, New

CREW MATTERSedition of LP News in which we reportedthe Court of Appeal’s decision. Theissue before the House was whether a‘straight’ bill of lading, not made out toorder or assigns or bearer, and so nottransferable by endorsement, was ‘a billof lading or any other similar documentof title’ within Article I(b) of the Hague-Visby Rules. The Court of Appeal haddecided that it was.

The carrier had issued a set ofdocuments described as bills of ladingin relation to the carriage of goods bysea. Subject to the fact that it could notbe transferred by endorsement, the billsof lading contained the usual terms tobe found in a bill of lading.

The goods were damaged and therespondent buyers’ case was that thecontract for the carriage of the goodswas covered by ‘a bill of lading or anysimilar document of title’ within themeaning of the Carriage of Goods bySea Act 1971 s.1(4) and the Hague-Visby Rules Article 1(b), which weregiven the force of law in the UK by s.1(2)of the 1971 Act, so that the claim wasgoverned by the more generouspackage limits prescribed in Article IV r.5of the Hague-Visby Rules. The appellantcarrier had argued for the application ofthe US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act1936 which provides for a lowerlimitation.

The House of Lords, upholding theCourt of Appeal’s decision, held that anexpansive interpretation of theexpression ‘a bill of lading or any similardocument of title’ in the Hague-VisbyRules Article I(b) was appropriate andwas apt to cover the document issued inthe instant case. There was no reasonwhy it should have been intended toexclude straight bills from the scope ofthe Rules. The document was also adocument of title given that on itsexpress terms it had to be presented toobtain delivery of the goods.

The wording of Article I(b) aside, theHouse of Lords was also influenced bythe fact that the named consignee,being a third party not involved in thenegotiation of the carriage contract,would otherwise have no rightsand protection under the Hague-VisbyRules.

Dr Belani, Medical Director of the Blue Shield MedicalClinic in Mumbai, congratulates general seamanPadman Motchaiah Lobo on being the 100,000thseafarer to undergo examination through the UK P&IClub's PEME Programme.

22

WORLDWIDE

ImmunizationThe UK Club has recently dealt with severalcrew illness cases arising from diseasesthat are readily preventable. The averagecost of medical treatment and repatriationin such cases is about US$10,000, butmore serious cases can sometimes giverise to costs of ten times that amount. Inaddition, owners may incur the expensesof substitution of the sick crewmemberand loss of hire if the vessel is delayed.

Two recent cases include a crewmembersuffering from hepatitis and anothersuffering from typhoid fever. Bothincidents occurred in the United States,resulting in expensive medical costs bothat the discharge port and on return totheir respective home countries. Bothillnesses – together with polio, yellowfever, tetanus and tuberculosis – arereadily preventable at relatively low costprovided the crew have regularimmunizations.

Delhi, Goa andMumbai,Johannesburg, CapeTown and Durban,Rijeka, Split andZagreb, Brisbane andMelbourne, Jakarta,Budapest, Dublin,Barcelona, Bangkok,Odessa, London andLas Vegas. Thethroughput at theseven Manila clinicsaccounts for morethan half of theworldwide total, whilethat for Las Vegas as asource for cruise staffin gamblingand entertainment isonly 20 a year butexpected to grow.Clinic selectionis driven by the geographicalrequirements of supporting members.

The steady expansion in clinic facilitieshas meant a greatly increased workloadin researching, assessing, interviewingand negotiating arrangements with newclinics; and an expanded role in

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Reasons for unfitness

Num

ber o

f cas

es

Hep

atit

is B

Hea

ring

def

ects

Abn

orm

al li

ver f

unct

ion

Hyp

erte

nsio

n

PTB

Oth

er

Abn

orm

al lu

ng fu

ncti

onD

iabe

tes

Gal

lbla

dder

dis

ease

Kid

ney

dise

ase

PEME worldwide statistics

663

546

439

381348

277

183 172 158

113

monitoring and discussing performanceof accredited clinics. Independentmedical quality auditing takes place everythree years for each clinic and involvescomprehensive inspections of clinicfacilities, thorough discussion with clinicstaff and extensive audit questions.Recommendations for enhanced

facilities and best practice suggestionsare sent to each clinic following the audit.

Seafarer candidates are given anextensive examination supplemented byadvice on vaccinations and lifestylechanges as necessary. Successfulcandidates must embark within threemonths or their clearance is no longervalid. Each clinic is fully accountable forexcluding examinees if there is any doubtabout fitness.

The main reasons for rejection haveconsistently been hepatitis B, followedby hearing problems as seen in thegraph.

Having provided applicants with a freehealth check, clinics give advice onappropriate treatment for those foundunfit. When they recover fully, they areeligible to resubmit themselves forexamination.

A PEME brochure and updated details ofthe programme are available on theClub's website (www.ukpandi.com), witha range of other loss prevention materialaddressing shipboard safety and crewissues.

Members are encouraged to ensure thatthe crews of their ships have allappropriate immunizations up to datebefore being assigned – particularly toships trading to areas where suchdiseases are prevalent. Routineimmunizations not only protect theindividual crewmember but everyoneelse onboard as well.

Many operators requirecurrent immunization for alltheir crewmembers. It is a prudentloss prevention/risk managementstrategy. According toinformation from the Club’sPEME program, the cost ofimmunisations vary, but

average around US$100, with somecountries offering vaccines for free.

Please contact the Club PEMEdepartment for further information onthe costs of inoculations at the Club’sPEME clinics around the world. e-mail:peme.ukclub@thomasmiller.com

23

safety concerns have been adequatelyaddressed to permit such testing, but nolater than 8 hours after the incidentoccurs.

When a marine employer determines thata casualty or incident is, or is likely tobecome, an SMI, the marine employermust ensure that the following alcoholand drug testing is conducted:

Alcohol testing

Alcohol testing must be conducted oneach individual engaged or employed onboard the vessel who is directly involvedin the SMI.

● The alcohol testing of each individualmust be conducted within 2 hours ofwhen the SMI occurred, unlessprecluded by safety concerns directlyrelated to the incident.

● If safety concerns directly related tothe SMI prevent the alcohol testingfrom being conducted within 2 hoursof the occurrence of the incident,then alcohol testing must becompleted as soon as the safetyconcerns are addressed.

● Alcohol testing is not required to beconducted more than 8 hours afterthe occurrence of the SMI.

Alcohol-testing devices must be usedaccording to the procedures specified bythe manufacturer of the testing device andby this part.

If the alcohol testing required in the firsttwo bullet points above is not conducted,the marine employer must document onform CG–2692B the reason why thetesting was not conducted.

The marine employer may use alcohol-testing results from tests conducted byCoast Guard or local law enforcementpersonnel to satisfy the alcohol testingrequirements of this part only if the alcoholtesting meets all of the requirements ofthis part.

Drug testing

Drug testing must be conducted on eachindividual engaged or employed onboardthe vessel who is directly involved in theSMI.

● The collection of drug-test specimensof each individual must be conductedwithin 32 hours of when the SMIoccurred, unless precluded by safetyconcerns directly related to theincident.

● If safety concerns directly related to theSMI prevent the collection of drug-testspecimens from being conductedwithin 32 hours of the occurrence ofthe incident, then the collection ofdrug-test specimens must beconducted as soon as the safetyconcerns are addressed.

If the drug-test specimens required in thefirst two bullet points of this section werenot collected, the marine employer mustdocument on form CG–2692B the reasonwhy the specimens were not collected.

Marine employers are relieved of therequirement to carry alcohol testingdevices onboard if the trade of the vessel issuch that it can receive testing from ashoreside testing facility within 2 hours ofan SMI. Where alcohol testing devices arerequired, they must be of a type listed onthe most current versions of either theNHTSA Conforming Products Lists ofEvidential Breath Measurement Devices orthe NHTSA Conforming Products List ofAlcohol Screening Devices.

www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/ebtcpl040714FR.pdf

USA

Serious Marine Incident– alcohol and drugtesting requirementsAmendments to the US Coast GuardMarine Casualties and Investigations;Chemical Testing Following SeriousMarine Incident regulations come intoforce 20 June 2006. The amendments tothe regulations requiring testing fordrug and alcohol use by persons involvedin serious marine incidents (SMIs),requires that alcohol testing of peopledirectly involved in the incident beconducted within 2 hours of itsoccurrence. This rule also requires mostcommercial vessels to have alcoholtesting devices onboard and authorisesthe testing of saliva as an acceptablespecimen for alcohol testing. A 32-hourtime limit for the collection of specimensfor drug testing following a seriousmarine incident has also been included.

Coast Guard regulations currentlyrequire marine employers to take allpractical steps after an SMI to have eachindividual engaged or employedonboard a vessel in commercial service,who is directly involved in the incident,chemically tested for evidence of drugand alcohol use. The amendment nowrequires tests to be performed within 2hours of the SMI but if the alcoholtesting cannot be conducted within thattimeframe because of safety concernsdirectly related to the casualty, alcoholtesting is to be conducted as soon as the

24

USA

Crew must take US visarestrictions very seriously

Loss Prevention News

Editor: Peter Jackson, Area Director

Editorial assistant: Jacqueline Tan

Tel: +44 (0)20 7204 2548

Fax: +44 (0)20 7204 2106

e-mail: peter.jackson@thomasmiller.com

Published by:

Thomas Miller & Co Ltd

International House, 26 Creechurch Lane

London EC3A 5BA

Tel: +44 (0)20 7283 4646

Fax: +44 (0)20 7282 5614

www.ukpandi.com

LP News on-line

This newsletter and earlier

editions can be viewed on

the Club’s website:

www.ukpandi.com

Whilst the information given in this newsletter is believed

to be correct, the publishers do not guarantee its

completeness or accuracy.

A warning about the need for totalcompliance with crew visa requirementsin the United States has been issued bythe UK Club.

The US Customs and Border ProtectionService and the US Coast Guard have setup standard operating procedures toidentify high risk crewmembers andensure effective security measures are inplace so they cannot leave the vessel onceordered detained.

The following is a recent case thatillustrates how sensitive US agencies areover visa issues:

A foreign crewmember does not need avisa to sail to the US but he or she will notbe able to leave the vessel without one.On arrival at Houston in a Club-coveredgeneral cargo vessel, none of the Thaicrew had a visa. Consequently, the USCustoms and Border Protection Officercleared the vessel but ordered the crewdetained onboard.

Shortly after, stores and provisions forthe vessel were delivered to the dockalongside. As the stevedores were takingtheir lunch break, several crewmembersbegan loading the stores and provisionsonto their ship while another hooked upthe fresh water pipe from dock to vessel.All this took less than 30 minutes. Thecrew returned onboard and stayed therefor the remainder of the ship's stay in theUS. However, a Customs and BorderProtection Officer had observed theloading from a nearby vessel. A notice of

intention to fine under the Immigrationand Nationality Act was issued to thevessel's agent. It named thecrewmembers and assessed a substantialpenalty for failure to detain alien crew.Fortunately, the vessel had already sailedor security would have had to bedeposited to allow departure.

A written defence on behalf of the shipowner and agent pointed out that theviolation was inadvertent, that the actionstaken concerned the immediate needs ofthe vessel and that there were no otherincidents involving vessel and crew.

The Customs and Border ProtectionService acknowledged the circumstancesand the lack of specific intent to violatethe law. They refused to withdraw the finebut reduced it substantially.

Aliens from 25 countries have beenidentified as warranting additionalmonitoring in the interest of US nationalsecurity. Crewmembers from thesecountries may well be ordered detainedonboard as high risk, requiringappropriate security. Extra measures, suchas providing guards, should be taken byowners, operators, masters and agents toprevent crewmembers gaining entryillegally into the US.

Early notification to the Club of apotential incident is essential to enable adetailed investigation by P&I attorneysand other experts carefully chosenaccording to individual caserequirements.

Acknowledgements

Lessons to be learned from oil pollutionprosecution: Iain M Butterworth, Solicitor,Andrew M Jackson, Solicitors, Hull, UK

Oily water separator maintenance: John Giffin,Keesal Young & Logan, Lawyers, USA

Port State Control inspections: Paris MOU,www.parismou.org

Ballast water requirements. Brazil: CarlosAugusto, Representacoes Proinde Ltda, Brazil

HNS Convention: Andrew Tucker, InternationalTanker Owners Pollution Federation, www.itopf.com

Alumina, Western Australia: ACME MarineServices International Pty Ltd, Freemantle,through Cocks Macnish, West Perth, Australia

Petcoke hold washings: Robert Hill, SteamshipMaritime Co Ltd, Colchester, UK

Fluorspar cargoes: Cliff Mullins, Minton, Treharne& Davies Ltd, Cardiff, Wales, UK

Thiourea dioxide: Dr Chris Foster, Dr J HBurgoyne & Partners LLP, London, UK

Bird flu: Nick Shaw, Partner, Shipping Group,Richards Butler, Solicitors, London, UK

Fines for Health & Safety breaches in Scotland:Duncan MacLean, Partner, Brodies LLP,Edinburgh, Scotland, UK

Befriending stowaways: Michael Heads, P&IAssociates (Pty) Ltd, Durban, South Africa

Anomaly in collision liability: Bruce A Virgo,Special Counsel, Roberts Nehmer McKee,Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

Improper declaration of cargoes – Novorossiysk,Russia: Delavshok & Partners Limited, MaritimeLawyers, Novorossiysk, Russia

US alcohol and drug testing requirements:Freehill Hogan & Mahar, LLC, USA