lse ideas changing waters towards a new eu asia strategy...eu strategy towards southeast asia and...

SPECIALREPORT SR021 April 2016

Changing Waters Towards a new EU Asia Strategy

LSE IDEAS is an Institute of Global Affairs Centre that acts as the School’s foreign policy think tank.

Through sustained engagement with policy makers and opinion-formers, IDEAS provides a forum that informs policy debate and connects academic research with the practice of diplomacy and strategy.

IDEAS hosts interdisciplinary research projects, produces working papers and reports, holds public and off-the-record events, and delivers cutting-edge executive training programmes for government, business and third-sector organisations.

The ‘Dahrendorf Forum - Debating Europe’ is a joint initiative by the Hertie School of Governance, the London School of Economics and Political Science and Stiftung Mercator. Under the title ‘Europe and the World’ the project cycle 2015-2016 fosters research and open debate on Europe’s relations with five major regions.

Editor Dr Olivia Gippner

Managing Editor Alexander Soderholm

IDEAS Reports Editor Joseph Barnsley

Creative Director Indira Endaya

Cover image source www.flickr.com/photos/gags9999/ (CC BY 2.0)

Changing Waters:Towards a new EU Asia strategy

The growth of Asian economies in the 21st century and the shuffling of the balance of power through the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia will increasingly ask the EU and its member states to take positions in the relations with their Asian partners. Chinese resurgence and its impact on the region in addition to increasing investment in Europe and Africa have changed the dynamic of the EU’s interaction with the Asia Pacific away from development assistance to cooperation (and competition) at eye level. This also means an overhaul of the EU’s Asia strategy of 2001. Besides creating continuity in a currently disconnected web of diplomatic and trade relations, a new strategy should provide a guideline for pooling resources, expertise and networks of EU-China relations under a joint umbrella which is especially beneficial for smaller member states.

This project puts forward analysis and concrete recommendations for an EU-Asia strategy along the main tensions of security and political relations, development cooperation and climate change policy. The three main recommendations are; (i) an increased cooperation through Asian multilateral fora and non-traditional security issues, (ii) that the EU position itself as a neutral arbiter in a volatile Asia Pacific, and, (iii) increased focus on public diplomacy.

iv | LSE IDEAS - Dahrendorf Forum Special Report. April 2016

Contents

ConTRIBUToRS vi

ExECUTIvE SUMMARyolivia Gippner

1

RALPH DAHREnDoRF AnD THE DAHREnDoRF FoRUMRobert Falkner

4

DEvELoPInG REGIonAL CAPACITIES

EU Strategy towards Southeast Asia and ASEAn yeo Lay-Hwee

6

EU Regional Strategy in South Asia: Moving Beyond the Role of a Trade Partner Garima Mohan

13

Towards a Strengthened EU Strategy towards Australia: Sharing values, Respecting Difference, Consolidating Policy DepthPhilomena Murray

19

Developing Regional Capacities in northeast Asia and Making Strategic Partnerships Effective: A Strategic Approach for the EU towards Japan, Korea and Taiwan May-Britt U. Stumbaum

28

China and EU Strategic Thinking on Asia: Towards a Strategic ‘Slim Down’Jan Gaspers and Bertram Lang

38

China-EU Relations: old and new Great Expectations yu Jie

49

EU Policy in Burma/Myanmar: A Personal AccountRobert Cooper

56

SPECIALREPORT SR021 April 2016

vChanging Waters: Towards a new EU Asia strategy |

CoRE AREAS oF CooPERATIon

Asia as Part of the EU’s Global Security Strategy: Reflections on a More Strategic Approach Michael Reiterer

62

What Place for Asia in the EU’s Strategy on Development Cooperation? Which Role for Europe in Asia? Any at all? Thomas Henoekl

71

Stepping up EU-ASEAn Cooperation in non-Traditional SecurityReuben Wong and Scott Brown

79

Shifting Dynamics of Cooperation on Environment and Climate Diarmuid Torney

86

ConCLUSIon

Updating the EU’s Asia Strategy?olivia Gippner

94

LIST oF ABBREvIATIonS

100

vi | LSE IDEAS - Dahrendorf Forum Special Report. April 2016

ContributorsDr Scott A.W. BroWn is currently Teaching Support Lecturer at the University of Dundee, Scotland. His research primarily focuses on EU-US-China relations, with an interest in comparative foreign policy analysis. He runs the Jean Monnet/Erasmus+ funded module ‘EU-China Relations’ (Decision no. 2014-1927). [email protected]

Sir roBert cooper is visiting Professor at LSE IDEAS and Senior Fellow of the Dahrendorf Forum. He is a retired British diplomat and former Advisor to EU High Representatives Javier Solana and Lady Ashton. Until 2016 he was the Special Advisor at the European Commission with regard to Myanmar. [email protected]

Dr roBert FAlkner is co-director of the Dahrendorf Forum. He is Associate Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economic and Political Science and the LSE’s Academic Director of the TRIUM Global Executive MBA, an alliance between LSE, nyU Stern School of Business and HEC Paris. [email protected]

JAn GASperS is Head of Research of the European China Policy Unit at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin, Germany. Previously, he worked as an Analyst with the RAnD Corporation, where he led a wide range of European and transatlantic foreign and security policy research efforts. [email protected]

Dr oliviA Gippner is a Dahrendorf postdoctoral fellow on EU-East Asia relations at LSE IDEAS. She holds a PhD in political science from Freie Universität Berlin and the Berlin Graduate School of Transnational Studies. Her research expertise is in climate policy, EU-China relations and Chinese policy-making. [email protected], @oliviagipp

Dr thomAS henökl is Senior Researcher at the German Development Institute in Bonn, working in research, teaching and policy advice in the fields of EU foreign and security policy, international cooperation and development, and more widely on comparative politics and organization theory. [email protected]

BertrAm lAnG is a Research Associate with the European China Policy Unit at MERICS. He studied Political Science, EU International Relations and Chinese in Freiburg, Aix-en-Provence, nanjing and Bruges. His research interests include European and Chinese foreign and trade policy, anti-corruption policies and civil society organisations in Greater China. [email protected]

Dr GArimA mohAn is a Research Associate at the Berlin based Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) where she focuses on the foreign and security policy of rising powers. She is an expert on Indian foreign policy and particularly EU-India relations. [email protected], @GarimaMo

proF philomenA murrAy is Professor in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. She is Research Director on Regional Governance in the EU Centre on Shared Complex Challenges, The University of Melbourne. [email protected]

Dr michAel reiterer is Adjunct Professor for International Politics, University of Innsbruck, and Principal Advisor at the Asia Pacific Department of the European External Action Service (EEAS). He contributes this paper in his personal capacity. [email protected]

Dr mAy-Britt u. StumBAum is the Director of the nFG Research Group “Asian Perceptions of the EU” at the Free University of Berlin and Editor of the Blog “The SPEAR – Security and Politics in Europe-Asia Relations”. Her research focuses on Asian security issues and implications for Europe at the interface of policy analysis and academic research. [email protected]

Dr DiArmuiD torney is a Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University, Ireland. He holds a DPhil (PhD) in International Relations from oxford University. He is author of European Climate Leadership in Question: Policies toward China and India (MIT Press, 2015). [email protected]

proF reuBen WonG is Director of Studies at the College of Alice and Peter Tan (CAPT). He also holds the Jean Monnet Chair (European Integration & Foreign Policy) and is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at the national University of Singapore. [email protected]

proF yeo lAy hWee is Director of the EU Centre, Senior Research Fellow at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and teaches both at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies in nanyang Technological University and the national University of Singapore. Her research expertise is in comparative regionalism and EU-ASEAn/Asia-Europe relations. [email protected]

Dr yu Jie is Research Associate and member of the Dahrendorf Forum EU-China Working Group. Her research specialises in the decision-making process in China’s foreign policy. She also runs LSE IDEAS China Foresight Project and worked as management consultant at the London office of Roland Berger Strategy Consultant, GmbH. [email protected]

1Changing Waters: Towards a new EU Asia strategy |

Executive Summary1 olivia Gippner

the growth of Asian economies in the 21st century and the shuffling of the balance of power through the uS ‘pivot’ to Asia will increasingly ask the eu and its member states to take positions in the relations with their Asian partners. chinese resurgence and its impact on the region in addition to increasing investment in europe and Africa have changed the dynamic of the eu’s interaction with the Asia-pacific away from development assistance to cooperation (and competition) at eye level. this also means an overhaul of the eu’s Asia strategy of 2001. Besides creating continuity in a currently disconnected web of diplomatic and trade relations, a new strategy should provide a guideline for pooling resources, expertise and networks of eu-china relations under a joint umbrella which is especially beneficial for smaller member states.

The first part of the report looks at the different regions of Asia and identifies the EU’s interests in each case in the light of a resurgent China, a natural starting point in the relationship between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAn). In her chapter yeo lay-hwee challenges EU policy makers to take off their Eurocentric lens when dealing with ASEAn, if it sincerely wants to further its interest in strengthening ASEAn both economically and politically. The EU can leverage its economic power and indeed plug into pressing ASEAn debates, for example on connectivity. on security the EU and ASEAn share a common interest in keeping competitive relations between the US and China at an even level. And yes, in order to strengthen the regional order the EU has to offer differentiated support for the different levels in economic and political development between the Southeast Asian nations – similar to the idea of cohesion programmes within the EU.

Garima Mohan in her chapter, cautions that there is an urgent need for the EU to update and develop its strategy towards South Asia. The region is crucial for European trade and also because of hotspots in Pakistan and Afghanistan directly affecting Europe in terms of security. Lacking a clear strategy so far, the EU should start with a needs assessment. Mohan argues that the EU’s real strength lies in providing norms, rules and regulations that it has already developed, for instance, on complex legal questions of cross-boundary resource sharing.

The relationship with Australia has shifted from trade disputes over agriculture towards realising joint interests. According to philomena murray, the Framework Agreement between the two actors will strengthen the all-of-government engagement by Australia with the EU and its institutions. It will provide the EU with a firm collaborator with similar interests and values in the Asia Pacific and a ‘critical friend’. In terms of security, Australia’s opposition to EU membership in the East Asian Summit shows a divided narrative on a security role for the EU in Asia-Pacific. In concrete terms, she recommends pragmatic cooperation on counterterrorism and crisis management. In order to ensure a strong foreign policy angle, the EEAS should monitor and aim to influence the ongoing FTA negotiations.

The main challenge for the EU in its policy towards northeast Asia is the fact that immediate crises generally tend to monopolise and divert EU capacities away from the region. However, May-Britt Stumbaum presents new data showing that neutral to positive perceptions of the EU in this region might actually open a window of engagement for the EU. She recommends focusing on capacity building as an instrument for more informed policy making and mutual exchange with the EU in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

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Moving to China as the kingpin of the Asia Pacific and East Asian rivalries, the report presents two perspectives on the EU-China relationship. Yu Jie emphasises the remaining conceptual gap between the EU and China and exhorts the EU to stop its democratization efforts vis-à-vis China. The lack of understanding on the European side about Chinese party and bureaucratic constraints poses a threat in itself. Reflecting the dramatic changes in Chinese foreign policy, Jan Gaspers and Bertram lang identify the EU’s interests to develop a coherent response. According to the authors, the EU should expand its role in China’s new international institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. on trade and FDI the EU should focus on negotiating package deals and avoid member state division. Finally, strengthening cooperation with Beijing in the fight against transnational terrorism is in both actors’ interests.

The country case studies conclude with a highlight on the EU’s role in the Burmese transition. Decades of EU involvement in Myanmar eventually bore fruit in just the past few years after the elections in 2010. Former British and EU diplomat Robert Cooper himself became instrumental in removing the EU’s sanctions by facilitating the release of political prisoners. To achieve this outcome the EU successfully seized an opportunity in discussions with Burmese counterparts when it appeared. Similarly the decision to dispatch an ad-hoc EU electoral observation mission in 2012 was an important symbol supporting the democratisation process. yet, he cautions that outside actors, even powerful ones like the EU, will have an influence only at the margin. The change in political life in 2011 came because local actors chose it, not because of EU and US sanctions.

The second part of the report follows a different logic. As the country analyses have shown for all regions the EU’s main attraction remains its economic power. Moving beyond this traditional focus the next section identifies several cross-cutting policy issues which will influence the interests and the priorities of the EU vis-à-vis this diverse region in the medium- to long-term.

Starting from a classic strategic angle, Michael Reiterer looks at the security and political dimensions of a new EU-Asia strategy. In line with this year’s review of the European Security Strategy, he advocates a joined-up approach, leveraging in particular the EU’s trade and development policies to contribute to regional stability in Asia Pacific. This could be achieved through

functional cooperation on four security priority areas: Asian regional security infrastructure, rule of law, global commons, and safeguarding EU interests in Central Asia.

The EU is phasing out development aid for many countries in the region. observing the declining credibility of the EU as a development actor, it has to work harder to include and streamline development issues into its other regional policies with Asian countries. yet, Thomas Henökl identifies the ASEAn-EU relationship as a key venue for ‘orchestration’, or ‘win-win’, of both sides’ preferences for a multilateral global governance architecture. Europe could take a leading role in improving the development focus of plurilateral trade agreements, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Asia, Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) or the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), and in promoting the respect of labour standards, workers’ and human protection, in particular women’s and children’s rights.

Moving away from these two traditional angles, the following chapter focuses on human security – an approach which fits well with the EU’s limited military capabilities – Reuben Wong and Scott Brown see particular opportunities for the EU to get involved in counterterrorism activities such as supporting law enforcement reform and to engage within the Asia Regional Forum. Another opportunity lies in cooperation on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in particular in the context of the refugee crises in both Europe and ASEAn. Here, the EU has specialist expertise to offer. An obstacle to the EU being taken seriously as an interlocutor is the missing perception as an international actor – participation in high-profile missions and exercises, such as the search for MH370 flight, might be a way to build its image.

on climate change the CoP21 climate conference in Paris delivered a landmark climate agreement. Diarmuid Torney explains that since then the landscape of global climate and environmental politics has been evolving rapidly, with the prospect of multiple focal points of climate leadership around the world. Against the backdrop of the end of development cooperation funding for China and India in particular, the EU needs to build cooperation that allows for mutual lesson-learning and joint technology development. The EU should also develop more robust mechanisms to manage trade tensions that are likely to grow more intense as more focal points of climate leadership emerge over the coming years. Faced with a unique alignment with


the US on climate change the EU should work with the US to build strategies of joint engagement with Asian partners on climate environmental issues.

The report concludes its analysis with concrete recommendations for an EU-Asia strategy along the main tensions of security and political relations, development cooperation and climate change policy. The three main recommendations are (i) an increased cooperation through Asian multilateral fora and non-traditional security issues, (ii) the EU to position itself as a neutral arbiter in a volatile Asia Pacific, and (iii) an increased focus on public diplomacy. Cross-cutting concerns remain the diverging concepts of sovereignty and multilateralism between the two regions and a lack of mutual understanding.

All chapters of the report emphasize the need to look at the needs of the countries in Asia-Pacific and to match these with EU capacities. This demonstrates the unique and still low-profile agenda the EU has vis-à-vis the region. Its most important interests are multilateralism, stability and institutional cooperation and integration. The contrast is stark to other strategic interests, like the refugee crisis in north Africa, which forces the EU to define very concrete interests in its relations. Under these circumstances a focus on the perception and needs of the other side can indeed become crucial for developing and communicating a clearer European strategy. ■

1 I am extremely grateful to all the contributors and the editing team at LSE IDEAS and the Dahrendorf Forum that helped me put together this report. I would also like to thank Angga Airlangga, Sonali Campion, Frédéric Catrice, Jan Gaspers, Alfonso Martinez Arranz, Lachlan McKenzie, Cristian nitoiu, Imke Pente, Wang Shichen, Diarmuid Torney, Uwe Wunderlich, and yu Jie for their valuable comments on previous versions of the report. My special thanks go to Robert Falkner, the co-director of the Dahrendorf Forum, and Michael Reiterer, for their invaluable input when developing the report concept.


Ralf Dahrendorf and the Dahrendorf Forum

In 2010, the Hertie School of Governance, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and Stiftung Mercator launched a joint initiative to honour Lord Ralf Dahrendorf’s legacy as a leading sociologist and public intellectual with a passionate commitment to the European idea.

Writing in 1969, Dahrendorf famously defined the role of the public intellectual thus: “to doubt everything that is obvious, to make relative all authority, to ask all those questions that no one else dares to ask”. It is in this spirit that the Dahrendorf Forum promotes critical thinking on the public policy challenges that Europe faces.

For Dahrendorf, the central challenge for modern societies is to negotiate and balance the unavoidable tensions that exist between the competing values of justice, liberty and economic wellbeing, and between economic efficiency, identity and security. How can European societies become just, open and prosperous? How can they aim for efficient economies where people have a sense of community and enjoy internal as well as external security?

Identifying Europe’s latent and manifest tensions at these different levels, their conflict potential, and the options that present themselves for managing and resolving conflicts – that is the essence of Dahrendorf´s approach. The Dahrendorf Forum will pursue this approach through research, engagement and debate, and in doing so seeks to honour Lord Dahrendorf’s intellectual legacy.

Robert Falkner

Developing Regional Capacities


EU Strategy towards Southeast Asia and ASEANyeo Lay Hwee

key points:

1. The EU needs to understand and recognise ASEAn for what it is, and not what the EU wishes ASEAn to be;

2. The EU needs to take a multi-pronged approach in engaging ASEAn and its member states; and finally,

3. The EU needs to leverage on its strength, in particular its economic power, to build the foundation for a strategic partnership with ASEAn.

the european union’s (eu) strategy towards Asia needs to be far more nuanced and differentiated. Asia is, after all, an immense and heterogeneous entity. its sheer size and diversity in political systems, in stages of socioeconomic development, in cultures and religions constitute a set of circumstances that makes it difficult to devise any one policy prescription for or description of the entire region.

Even in a sub-region such as Southeast Asia, the differences and diversities are immense. Hence the EU needs to adopt a multi-pronged and flexible approach in engaging with the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAn) and its member states. It must seek to understand the strengths and weaknesses of ASEAn, and devise a strategy that can support ASEAn and its member states in an appropriate way that allows ASEAn to grow in strength and not be torn apart by centrifugal forces, which would add to uncertainties in the Asia-Pacific region.

The EU is still primarily seen as an economic actor in Southeast Asia, and its core interests and influence would be to see the building of a more cohesive ASEAn that is more integrated economically and ready for business. A more cohesive and economically strong ASEAn would in turn increase its ability to partner with the US, China and other major powers to work together in securing the regional order.

The EU must leverage on its economic power and strengths in certain soft security issue areas such as climate change and conflict management to sustain its engagement with ASEAn and its member states. It should not insist only on a bi-regional approach in all issues, but should participate selectively in different policy priorities of ASEAn member states and help build national capacities and competencies which would in turn feed towards a better functioning of ASEAn as an entity.

For instance, it could work with Singapore in the area of infrastructure financing and seek sound long-term infrastructure investments in the less developed ASEAn member states as a way to help close development gaps. It could also work more closely with ASEAn countries in the Mekong sub-region on issues of environmental protection and sustainable development. only with this more pragmatic and flexible approach will the EU become a welcomed player in the region.


An overvieW oF eu-ASeAn enGAGement

In the 1994 European Commission’s Communication ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’, the EU acknowledged the longstanding relationship that it had with ASEAn and saw EU-ASEAn relations as a cornerstone of its dialogue with the broader region. While the potential for a more fruitful EU-ASEAn relationship was touted, the reality up until the 1st decade of the 21st century was a long-standing partnership that never fully blossomed.

EU-ASEAn relations started off low-key in the 1970s, and then went into an acrimonious phase over democracy and human rights issues in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War. The Commission tried to ‘reinvigorate’ the partnership with ASEAn in 2003 with its Communication ‘A new partnership with Southeast Asia’, recommending that the EU and its member states should adopt a pragmatic approach towards Southeast Asian countries and ASEAn, and forge relations at both bilateral and inter-regional levels. This pragmatic turn coincided with the period of ASEAn’s search for a framework of deeper regional cooperation in response to the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis and the rapid rise of China.

In the bid to ‘reinvent’ itself, ASEAn borrowed the EU lexicon of ‘community building’ and regional integration. This led the EU to scale up efforts in engaging ASEAn, in particular in the area of providing support for capacity building towards integration with programmes such as the ASEAn Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS), from 2003-2010, to the current ASEAn Regional Integration Support from the EU (ARISE).

However, despite such efforts, EU-ASEAn relations continued to be plagued by disagreement over developments in Myanmar and how to engage the country. It was not until Myanmar’s election in 2011 that set in motion a credible reform process (see the chapter by Robert Cooper in this report), and the US Pivot to Asia changed the geopolitical undercurrents in the region that the EU re-examined its relationship with ASEAn.

In the May 2015 Joint Communication, the EU acknowledged that it “has a strategic interest in strengthening its relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian nations”, because “ASEAn is at the heart of the efforts to build a more robust regional security order in the wider Asia-Pacific”.1

A pArtnerShip With A StrAteGic purpoSe?

What does the EU really mean when discussing an EU-ASEAn partnership with a strategic purpose? And what processes can the EU initiate with ASEAn that would truly strengthen regional processes in the region, and make ASEAn a robust partner in strategic cooperation on multilateral conflict resolution processes?

For the EU to have a truly meaningful relationship with ASEAn, the first thing it needs to do is to remove its Eurocentric lens. It wrongly assumes a kind of automatism by which all regional processes would become more institutionalised, and that the EU model would serve as an inspiration for other regional entities. It needs to understand the different historical and geopolitical contexts that led to the founding of ASEAn, and accept ASEAn for what it is, and not for what it wishes it to be.

The first thing the EU needs to do is to remove its Eurocentric lens. It wrongly assumes a kind of automatism by which all regional processes would become more institutionalised...

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Secondly, the EU needs to focus on its core interest in the region and prioritise, not embark on an overly ambitious laundry list of goals and objectives.

Thirdly, the EU should have a clear assessment and appreciation of ASEAn’s role in the broader Asia-Pacific region, and then decide if and how it can work with and support ASEAn to strengthen regional stability.

“the nAture oF the BeASt”

In trying to place the EU in the context of nation states versus international organisations, the EU is often derided as neither fish nor fowl – it is neither a federated state like the United States (US), nor is it a classical organisation of sovereign states like the United nations (Un). Hence, some political scientists argued that the EU should not be expected to behave and be judged by standards governing nation states or international organisations.

Similarly, for the EU to have a good working relationship with ASEAn, it has to understand the nature of this beast. In his chapter in the upcoming ‘Oxford Handbook on Comparative Regionalism’ Amitav Acharya argues that “while the EU is built around the concept of integration, regionalisms in the non-western world (and I would add in particular ASEAN) is built around the idea of autonomy”.2

There is no transfer of sovereignty and there is nothing supranational in ASEAn. ASEAn, as emphasised by a Singaporean diplomat, “is an organization of sovereign states who act through their respective governments”. As an “inter-state organization that works by consensus between its member states, ASEAn is not a substitute for national political will, national competence and national capability.”3

The EU is finally beginning to realise that ASEAn is not going to become like the EU in the foreseeable future despite all the talks in ASEAn about community building. The EU is therefore following a multi-pronged approach towards ASEAn – engaging ASEAn not only at the inter-regional level, but also increasingly engaging individual or a cluster of ASEAn states within the ASEAn or EU-ASEAn framework.

More importantly, the EU should also realise that engaging ASEAn means that the process is as important, if not more important, as the goal. “Working by consensus means ASEAn often privileges form over substance”.4

If the EU thinks it is important for it to be seen in the region, then it needs to engage in this diplomatic dance. However, if there are very specific and concrete goals that the EU wants to achieve, it is best then for the EU to be more flexible and to identify like-minded players within ASEAn, and work with some of the members first rather than insist on a strictly region to region approach. The EU has begun to realise this, and started a much more differentiated strategy as seen in the suspension of the EU-ASEAn FTAs in pursuit of individual bilateral FTAs with ASEAn member states that are ready to ‘take the plunge’.

In contributing to the national capacities of the various ASEAn member states, the EU is indirectly strengthening the foundation for ASEAn regional cooperation.

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Moreover, the EU-Singapore FTA was concluded in 2013 and the EU-vietnam FTA has just recently been concluded. However, both FTAs will not enter into force until the European Court of Justice issues a ruling on the competence over investments.

The EU has also opened negotiations with Malaysia and Thailand, though both are not progressing well because of domestic political problems, and, for Thailand, this includes concerns over use of trafficked labour in its seafood industry.

In any case, the more pragmatic strategy of the EU is revealed in its latest Joint Communication where it acknowledges that “taking EU-ASEAn relations to the next level will build on and complement the already rich and varied bilateral ties between the EU and individual ASEAn member states”, and putting special priority on working with ASEAn countries in the Mekong Sub-region to reduce the intra-ASEAn development gap and to connect these countries.5

In short, in the areas of functional cooperation, the EU needs to creatively align different interests and different priorities and work with different constellations of ASEAn member states. In contributing to the national capacities of the various ASEAn member states, the EU is indirectly strengthening the foundation for ASEAn regional cooperation.

eu’S core intereStS in SoutheASt ASiA

What are the EU’s core interests in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region? As noted in the Joint Communication, ASEAn as a whole is the EU’s third largest external trading partner (after the US and China), and the EU is ASEAn’s second largest trade partner (after China).6

The EU has also invested significantly in the Southeast Asian region accounting for almost a quarter of total foreign direct investment in ASEAn, and is in fact the number one foreign investor with an investment stock of €153 billion. ASEAn’s investment into Europe is also growing and reached a total stock of over €57 billion at the end of 2013. Judging from these numbers and the growth trajectory of the ASEAn member states, the potential of ASEAn as a market for European goods and services is yet to be reached. Hence, the EU needs to focus its attention on engagement with ASEAn and its member states that can lead to the realisation of mutual benefits of increased trade and investments.

Compared to the 1990s and early 2000s, where support for globalisation and free trade was high, there is now an increasing questioning of the neoliberal consensus in the face of crises, rising inequalities, wage stagnation, and high unemployment in many parts of the world. This has led to the rise of economic nationalism and the temptations toward greater protectionism. As the world’s biggest trading bloc, the EU has an interest to keep protectionism at bay and this is certainly an area that the EU should work with ASEAn and its member states. Hence, the EU needs to focus attention on growing the potential of EU-ASEAn trade and investment relations.

Closely related to trade and investments is the issue of connectivity, which has become a buzzword in ASEAn and the Asia-Pacific. The EU should position itself to partake in the opportunities arising from the infrastructure developments, the shaping of regulatory and institutional frameworks to promote connectivity, with an eye also to other initiatives proposed by China such as the one Belt one Road initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (14 out of the 28 EU member states are founding members of the AIIB). The EU thus needs to find ways to work with its own member states, other international partners, and multilateral financial institutions to support infrastructure projects that can be profitable and at the same time drive economic development and integration in Southeast Asia.

Beyond trade and economics, the EU has been pushing the climate change agenda. It has already invested in the area of forest governance and management of peat land, an increasingly important issue for ASEAn as the region continued to face recurring haze year after year from forest and peat land fire. Data from the World Resources Institute7 noted that on the worst days, the daily carbon emission from the forest fires in Indonesia exceeded that of the entire American economy. Deforestation in many parts of Southeast Asia, and in particular Indonesia, needs to be addressed, and the EU experience in managing its natural environment and protecting its forests can be shared. The EU will have to strengthen its engagement with ASEAn countries through the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade voluntary Partnership Agreements (vPAs). Through the EU-funded Sustainable Management of Peatland forests in Southeast Asia (SEApeat), the EU should capitalise on the recent strong sentiments on the haze pollution, worsened by the El niño effect, to work with Indonesia to manage its peat land.


eu’S StrAteGic intereSt in the ASiA-pAciFic reGion

In its 2015 Joint Communication, the EU asserts that “A strong, cohesive and self-confident ASEAn proceeding with its own integration is good for regional stability, prosperity and security and creates new opportunities for cooperation on regional and global challenges”.8 Hence, it is important for the EU not only to invest economically in ASEAn, but also politically: “Deeper engagement with ASEAn is key to developing a more rounded Asia strategy”.9 The EU has expressed strong interest in engaging ASEAn on the issue of sea lanes of communication and maritime security, in view of the fact that much of the EU’s trade with Asia is shipped via the South China Sea and Malacca Straits.

ASEAn’s role in the different regional forums in the Asia-Pacific region is unique, in that it is a recognition of its relative weakness vis-à-vis the major powers. But it is precisely this weakness that allows ASEAn to have the ‘convening power’ to bring the different major players to the tables of these loose forums.

ASEAn is now caught in the midst of the rising tensions between China and the US, and increased shrillness also in the bilateral relations between China and some of the South China Sea claimant states, such as the Philippines and vietnam. Concerns are growing over potential cracks in ASEAn’s unity and coherence. only a more coherent ASEAn can continue to play an important convening role to bring the US and China to the same table and contribute to the management of the strategic competition between these two powers.

The EU shares the same strategic interest as ASEAn in keeping competitive relations between China and the US on an even keel. Managing a rising power such as China requires sustained attention; with the EU engulfed in several crises in its own backyard, the pragmatic way for the EU to be involved strategically in the

Asia-Pacific is to work in partnership with ASEAn, where China is a central reality that looms large.

It is therefore in the EU’s interest to support the building of a cohesive ASEAn that can continue to play this convening role. The EU needs a long-term sustained strategy, and not the current rather piecemeal and ad hoc approach. To support regional coherence, the EU firstly needs to build up the national capacities of the different ASEAn member states.

With huge diversities in the socio-political and economic developments amongst the ASEAn member states, it is only sensible that the EU seeks to understand the different priorities of the ASEAn member states and adopt a differentiated strategy in building national capacities and competences in order to close the development gaps in ASEAn. This should be done with the understanding that strong national institutions are necessary to complement region-building in this part of the world, and that a more integrated and coherent ASEAn will be a key factor for continued peace and stability in the region.

Beyond this broad remit, an area that offers great potential for EU-ASEAn partnership is the sharing of experiences in conflict prevention and crisis management (see the chapter by Wong and Brown in this report). Several ASEAn states remained plagued by religious and ethnic tensions – from the long-standing tensions in South Thailand to the outbreak of violence in the Rakhine state in Myanmar. There is a need for ASEAn to be equipped with a full set of tools, from quiet diplomacy to mediation, for building sustainable peace. The EU could use existing channels, such as its participation in the ASEAn Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) to engage in this policy exchange. The ARF in particular, with its focus on preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention, is an ideal platform for the EU to be engaged with ASEAn on these issues.

An area that offers great potential for EU-ASEAn partnership is the sharing of experiences in conflict prevention and crisis management.

‘

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concluSion

Since the 1990s, the EU has recognised the need to strengthen its engagement with a growing Asia. Driven initially by economics, the growing interdependence between the EU and Asia, and the aspirations of the EU to be a global actor as it develops its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), has the EU seeking to be a far more comprehensive actor in Asia - rather than being limited to pure economic pursuits.

Southeast Asia, one of the most dynamic regions in Asia, and ASEAn, a regional entity that has enjoyed a relatively successful role in underpinning security regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, deserve attention from the EU.

For most of the 1990s and 2000s, the EU has been obsessed with China. In addition, the EU’s sanctions on Myanmar and its reluctance to engage the military junta in Myanmar has to some degree impacted the development of EU-ASEAn relations.

Myanmar’s reforms and the growing strategic importance of the Southeast Asian region, in the context of US-China rivalry, has led to the EU’s increased attention on ASEAn and Southeast Asia. The Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on ‘The EU and ASEAn: a partnership with a strategic purpose’, released in May 2015, is a reflection of this shift.

However, for the EU to truly engage ASEAn, it needs to have a better understanding of how ASEAn actually works, and adopt a more nuanced and differentiated approach to ASEAn and its member states, in order to enjoy a more fruitful and rewarding partnership of mutual benefit. ■


noteS

1 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU and ASEAN: a partnership with a strategic purpose (Brussels, 18 August 2015), p.2.

2 A. Acharya. ‘Regionalism beyond EU-centrism’ in T. Risse and T. Borsel (Eds.) Oxford Handbook on Comparative Regionalism (forthcoming).

3 Statement made in the opening speech titled ‘A Cow is not a Horse’ for the youth Model ASEAn Conference. The Singaporean diplomat, Bilahari Kausikan, exhorts that ASEAn remains an ill-understood organisation and that criticisms of ASEAn often amounts to accusing a cow of being an imperfect horse. See B. Kausikan, ‘Asean is a ‘cow, not a horse’’, The Middle Ground, 6 october 2015, available at http://themiddleground.sg/2015/10/06/asean-cow-not-horse-bilahari-kausikan/.

4 Kausikan, ‘Asean is a ‘cow, not a horse’’.

5 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘The EU and ASEAn: a partnership with a strategic purpose’, Brussels 18 May 2015, 3-4.

6 Ibid, p.4.

7 See: The Economist, ‘Indonesia’s forest-fire haze’, 6th november 2016, available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/11/daily-chart-3.

8 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘The EU and ASEAn’, p.2

9 Ibid, p.3.


EU Regional Strategy in South Asia: Moving Beyond the Role of a Trade Partner Garima Mohan

South Asia is quickly emerging as a pivotal region of the world. it boasts rapid economic growth, is a conduit through the indian ocean to a large share of the world’s trade, has states in various stages of transition to democracy and faces a number of developmental and security challenges. And of course, it is home to rising powers such as india.

key points:

■ There is an urgent need for the EU to revise its South Asia strategy, given the region’s economic importance but also for the security of the European continent.

■ The EU-India partnership has grown stagnant despite shared foreign policy goals because it is set within an old, outdated template that hinders effective cooperation. The EU must prioritise areas where it is clearly perceived as an important actor by Indian elites such as climate change and energy.

■ In promoting regional integration and democracy in South Asia, the EU has many interesting policy templates to offer, but these must be based on a ‘needs assessment’ with South Asian partners.

While the United States and EU member states such as Britain, France and Germany have recognised the potential of the region in economic and security issues, the EU is hardly visible as a strategic actor in South Asia. In spite of longstanding partnerships with many South Asian states, the EU is viewed mostly as a trading bloc and not as a political or security actor in the region, despite spending a large amount of aid funds in various sectoral allocations. The EU certainly has an ‘image problem’ in South Asia, and yet the region’s importance has not been duly recognised in recent discussions on the EU’s global strategy1 and the EU’s approach to important partners such as India is outdated, lacking of innovative policy responses.2

This chapter will argue that there is an urgent need for the EU to revise and update its South Asia strategy. The EU is not yet an important player in South Asia, but the region is of increasing importance to the EU – not only for economic reasons, but also for the security of the European continent. Indeed, not only does the EU rely heavily on the Indian ocean to secure its position as a major actor in world trade, but instability in regions like Afghanistan and Pakistan directly

impact European security through their links to home-grown terrorism and similar threats.

This chapter will demonstrate that the EU has not yet formulated a strategy for its actions in South Asia, even with regard to important actors like India. To maximise its impact, the EU needs to conduct a ‘needs assessment’ that helps it to understand South Asia’s evolving needs and to distinguish itself from other actors such as the US and EU member states.

This chapter also argues that the EU’s real strength lies in providing norms, rules and regulations which it has already developed through its historical and institutional experience, for instance, on complex legal questions of cross-boundary resource sharing.3 In addition, it needs to refocus its bilateral partnerships on the common threats and challenges it shares with South Asian states.

The following sections will analyse the EU’s relationship with the region by looking at the EU’s relationship with India, its attempts at promoting regional integration through South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and finally its aim of promoting democratic consolidation in countries like


Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Each of these sections will provide policy recommendations on how to reconfigure these relationships by identifying common risks and threats, as well as identifying the EU’s unique strengths and capacities in dealing with some of the challenges South Asia is facing.

eu–inDiA cooperAtion

The EU–India Strategic Partnership presents a great paradox. In rhetoric, the partnership is based on a solid foundation of shared values and beliefs, such as the shared commitment to democracy, pluralism, rule of law, and multilateralism in international relations. In practice, however, the partnership has stagnated, with very little to show in terms of strategic cooperation.

The EU–India summit, the official bilateral platform that was to be held on an annual basis, had not taken place between 2012 and 2016. Even under the new narendra Modi administration, which has assiduously focused on foreign policy and on reviving India’s ties with its strategic partners, the relationship has not seen drastic improvements. Brussels was initially dropped from his European itinerary in April 2015.4 Furthermore, the partnership has routinely been held hostage to single issues, such as the detention of Italian marines by India or the Free Trade Agreement negotiations.5

The EU–India Strategic Partnership has grown stagnant despite shared foreign policy goals and values partly because it is set within an old, outdated template that hinders effective cooperation. For example the Joint Action Plan, which is the roadmap of the Strategic Partnership, is a set of statements broadly outlining possible areas of cooperation; it is

not a strategic document for joint action and has not been revised since 2008, despite changing priorities on both sides.

The recent EU India summit which took place in March 2016 added a new document Agenda 2020 which narrows down cooperation priorities to a few strategic areas. However, the modalities of cooperation have not been specified still.

Such a broad framework inhibits cooperation on many issues and reduces the ‘strategic’ partnership to mere dialogue. A larger problem is that the EU is mostly invisible in India; it is crowded out by member states in important areas such as security cooperation. EU officials often complain of not being taken seriously by the Indian government, which prefers to work in bilateral partnership arrangements instead.6 overall, the partnership has focused largely on technical assistance and development projects in India, particularly in areas such as health and education. In that sense, the focus has not evolved much beyond the origins of the EU–India partnership, which lie in the provision of development aid and technical assistance to India.

To overcome this gap, there is an urgent need to update the Strategic Partnership according to the changing needs and priorities of both India and the EU, in addition to making it qualitatively different from India’s bilateral partnerships with the member states by focusing on areas where the EU’s expertise is recognised. This can be achieved by following a two-fold criteria that identifies the most pressing policy needs in India and determines whether the EU can offer templates to address them, and vice versa. Based on these criteria, the areas that show a high potential for cooperation are climate change mitigation

Instability in regions like Afghanistan and Pakistan directly impact European security through their links to home-grown terrorism and similar threats.

‘

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and adaptation, maritime security, and technology transfers and capacity building across a number of strategic areas where India is actively seeking policy expertise or has already identified the EU as a model to be emulated.

Climate change is one such area where policymakers in India not only recognise the need to learn from templates from abroad, but also view the EU as a global leader.7 Furthermore, India has already incorporated policies to deal with climate change effects in its core development strategy and the national Action Plan for Climate Change (nAPCC), demonstrating a readiness to work on this issue.8 Despite differences in their normative claims in global climate debates, as well as over legally binding greenhouse-gas emission targets, there is space for stepping up cooperation on several issues within the EU–India partnership.

This is particularly the case for renewable energy, for which the Modi government has made a massive push in recent years, putting forth a number of renewable energy targets to reduce dependence on coal. While the government has formally allotted budget funds to achieve these goals, India needs more investment, particularly in research and development, to reach these targets. The Indian energy market is constantly growing and is one of the most developed markets in the world today.9 Thus, there is potential for the EU to not only invest in renewables and clean energy, but also share policy expertise to facilitate development planning and decision-making in this area.

Maritime security, especially in the Indian ocean region, is of increasing importance for both the EU and India. Both actors are affected by non-conventional security challenges in the Indian ocean – notably piracy, human and drug trafficking, and maritime terrorism. As a major actor in global trade, the EU has a vested interest in maintaining and securing the vital sea lines of communication in the Indian ocean. India has also recognised the importance of the region, which features prominently in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015). Despite these threats and the rise of new naval powers in the Indian ocean there is no effective multilateral cooperation on maritime security in the region.10

Currently, the most relevant forum is the Indian ocean naval Symposium, which is an Indian initiative and includes a number of coastal states. This represents an important opportunity for both the EU and India to explore multilateral cooperation and to build upon the substantial synergies visible already between the

EU’s Blue Growth Strategy and India’s Blue Economy Plan,11 as well as in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy. The Indian ocean region may be too disparate to replicate the EU model, but given that India aims to be a ‘net security’ provider in the Indian ocean region, it is in its interest to forge a multilateral consensus around common non-traditional security threats in the region and to replicate the multi-agency and -sectoral coordination seen in the EU’s strategy, especially in the Bay of Bengal region.12

Finally, even though India is experiencing rapid economic growth, it still faces immense developmental challenges. The country may not be a traditional development aid recipient anymore, but it still seeks technical cooperation and technology transfers to secure its economic growth. There is great potential for cooperation in initiatives such as Clean Ganga, Smart Cities, solar farms and renewable energy projects – precisely where India seeks policy templates and where the EU has a great deal of experience and technical prowess to offer. Since the member states have crowded out the EU in other strategic areas, the EU’s real strength lies in technology transfers in these specific sectors.

promotion oF reGionAl inteGrAtion

In its interactions with SAARC, the EU primarily seeks to promote regional integration in South Asia in order to “consolidate the ongoing integration process through its economic influence in the region, its own historical experience of economic and trade integration and of dealing with diversity.”13 In practice, the EU has focused on trade by promoting the harmonisation of standards, raising awareness about the benefits of regional cooperation and promoting business networking in the SAARC area.14 While this focus on integration through trade is important, the EU’s approach faces serious impediments due to several South Asian regional peculiarities and the institutional structure of SAARC.

The region is among the least integrated in the world, largely because of India’s hegemonic position as well as present and historical tensions between neighbouring states. Furthermore, ‘institution building is front loaded in the EU but back loaded in SAARC,’ 15 as the latter lacks principles of subsidiarity and has a focus on sovereignty rather than federalism. While other regional organisations like ASEAn are ‘state driven’ and have actively sought models for emulation, including the EU, SAARC has been described as ‘state stalled.’16 It is limited


by its purely consultative nature and the in-built limitations of its charter, which prevent it from being effective at regional integration.

Due to these various impediments, there is only limited demand or will in the region, despite the longstanding partnership between SAARC and the EU, to take up on what the EU is offering – namely, learning on regional integration. Since ‘interregionalism’ and interregional cooperation have emerged as an important component of EU foreign policy and external relations,17 it needs to realign its focus to have a more effective partnership with SAARC. In this case, the real potential of the EU lies in exporting regulation, since it has already worked out solutions to many of the pressing problems faced by the South Asian region. These go beyond trade and include legal questions of cross-boundary river and water sharing arrangements, resource sharing, common market, environmental issues and energy grids, and longstanding border disputes. While there is little political will for full integration in South Asia, cross-border resource sharing poses problems that are pressing for most South Asian states. If the EU cannot export institutions to South Asia, it can certainly promote policy transfers and export of regulatory frameworks by training bureaucrats and undertaking capacity building for SAARC institutions in these areas. Moreover, it is key for the EU to recognise that the goal of longer-term regional integration will be difficult in South Asia, and that SAARC certainly does not have an ASEAn-type growth trajectory. But SAARC needs policy templates to be an effective actor in the region – and here, the EU can play an important role.

enGAGinG in DemocrAcy AnD humAn riGhtS

The EU has channelled development aid into many South Asian countries, but there remains much work to be done to consolidate democracy and promote institution building in states like Pakistan, nepal, Maldives and Bangladesh, and to promote human rights in Sri Lanka. To be a strategic actor in South Asia and to ensure the efficiency of its development aid to the region, the EU needs to develop broader policies that go beyond sectoral cooperation, particularly in view of all the threats and various potential destabilising forces confronting the region.

The conundrum faced by the EU is most visible in its relationship with Pakistan. The country is of immense relevance to the EU, primarily because Pakistan is the pivot around which the success of the EU’s efforts in Afghanistan revolves. Pakistan was important for the security of European troops in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and continues to be so for the security of the European continent. Moreover, Pakistan embodies at least five of the key threats outlined in the European Security Strategy (ESS) – namely terrorism, proliferation of WMDs,18

regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.19

Given the scale of the problem and the EU’s interest in stabilising the region, its policy response in Pakistan has been disproportionally small. Since a cornerstone of EU foreign policy is democracy promotion,20

its relationship with Pakistan has traditionally been based on promotion of human rights, good governance and the rule of law. Under these priorities, the EU has engaged in activities like support

The EU also needs to recognise that pushing the goal of integration in South Asia is not the most effective strategy.

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for civil society, human rights monitoring and election observation – the latter probably the best-known EU instrument in the country.21 The impact of these efforts, however, is bound to remain minimal, for democratic institutions have been severely damaged after years of interference from military rule in Pakistan. The army elite has developed an economic empire and devoted much of the national budget to foreign and defence policies.22 Thus far, it is unclear if the EU has a strategy for dealing with these systemic problems in the country as part of its democracy promotion efforts. It is obvious that these fundamental problems need to be addressed in order for the EU’s other sectoral approaches and aid streams in Pakistan to succeed.

2012 marked the start of the strategic dialogue between the EU and Pakistan. This could be the opportune platform for working on a range of security issues and for increasing collaboration between the two actors on rule of law, counterterrorism and counter-proliferation. The EU is virtually absent in the field of security sector reform in the country, except for some counterterrorism and police-training programs, which limits its potential influence on Pakistan. Brussels should consider investing in security sector reform, building upon its experience in reforming the security sectors in Central and South Eastern Europe as well as the Western Balkans.23 The ESS advocates security as a precondition for development, which is particularly applicable for Pakistan, where the democratic transition would falter if the deteriorating security situation gives the military new opportunities to intervene in the government.

When it comes to other countries in the region, the EU has often included democracy and human rights approach in its trade policy. This carrots-and-sticks approach is not so effective in third countries and is often perceived as intrusive.24 South Asian countries are signatories to several international conventions and charters on human rights and democracy that are overseen by specialist institutions monitoring compliance. As a result, there is little need for the EU’s trade policy in the region to have democracy and human rights monitoring mechanisms as well. Here, many recommend an alternative approach that can be tailored to the individual requirement of each country.25 Given the large amount of development aid already being channelled by the EU into South Asia, the EU should prioritise political dialogue and capacity building in the region by working closely with South Asian partners.

concluSion

South Asia is an important region on the global stage. It is characterised by massive economic growth rates and emerging markets. At the same time, it is the centre of global security concerns, from securing the oceans to combating terrorism. Interestingly, while the US and China have been increasing their engagement with the region, it continues to be a blind spot for the EU.

The EU’s partnerships in the region are based on an old development and technical assistance model, which tends to ignore the strategic significance of the region and changing political realities. This demonstrates an urgent need to revive and reset the EU’s partnerships with South Asian states and with the SAARC. To increase its impact as an actor in the region, the EU needs to focus on areas where it is recognised as a policy leader and where there is demand from the South Asian side to learn from the EU’s historical and technical experience. At the same time, there is a need to recalibrate EU strategy to take into account threats and challenges that it shares with the South Asian region.

In the case of India, the EU needs to distinguish its strategic partnership with the country from India’s bilateral relationships with EU member states, in order to avoid being crowded out by the latter. To do so, the EU needs to reset its partnership with India and sharpen the focus of the Joint Action Plan. Cooperation in climate change and renewable energy, maritime security, and capacity building and technology transfers could be a good starting point, as India already recognises the EU as a leading actor in these areas.

The EU also needs to recognise that pushing the goal of integration in South Asia is not the most effective strategy – instead, building SAARC capacities on instruments such as cross-boundary resource sharing, for which there is political will, might prove more effective and eventually lead to greater regional integration. Finally, as a security actor, the EU needs to do much more in countries like Pakistan and promote democratic consolidation in other South Asian states. Here, sectoral cooperation has to give way to a far more holistic push for democratic institutions to make EU aid more effective and to translate its trade presence into political influence. ■


noteS

1 For instance, background documents for the ongoing consultation exercise on developing an EU global strategy (such as Missiroli (Ed), Towards an EU global strategy – background, process, references (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2015)) hardly mention South Asia, except for references to Afghanistan and maritime security. But here, too, the trend is to view the latter as isolated issue areas and not to link them comprehensively to South Asia–wide trends.

2 See the recent studies within EU–India literature, particularly Jokela-edited volume The Role of the European Union in Asia (2016).

3 This draws upon the idea of EU “external governance” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009), which conceptualizes the transfer of EU’s rules and policies to third countries and international organizations, arguing that EU norms and rules may gain prescriptive qualities towards third countries without purposeful policy transfer on the part of the EU.

4 According to official Indian sources, the visit was cancelled because the EU did not respond in time to the Modi government’s call for a visit in 2015.

5 Reuters reported that the case of the Italian marines hurt EU–India relations. Sources also attribute it as one of the reasons for the cancellation of the EU–India summit in 2015. http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/03/16/india-eu-italian-marines-idInKBn0MC1CD20150316.

6 Author Interviews with EU Delegation in Delhi, September 2014 and november 2015.

7 Author Interviews with policymakers in India, September 2014 and november 2015.

8 See “India’s push for renewable energy: is it enough?” http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/09/140919-india-modi-renewable-energy-science-world-wind-solar/.

9 Ibid.

10 See L. Cordner, ‘Progressing maritime security cooperation in the Indian ocean’, Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 (2011): 68 ; Potgeiter 2012.

11 v. Sakhuja, ‘Blue economy: an agenda for the Indian government’, Center for International Maritime Security, September 19, 2014.

12 See n. Srivastava, ‘Multilateral maritime cooperation in the European Union: can IoR borrow the template?’, in v. Sakhuja et al. (Eds.) Partnering Across Oceans (new Delhi: national Maritime Foundation, 2016) for more details on the templates that the Indian ocean region can borrow from the EU.

13 European Union External Action, ‘EU Relations with South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC)’, accessed 21/3/2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/saarc/index_en.htm.

14 Ibid.

15 K. K. Bhargava and A. Mukherjee Reed, ‘The European Union, South Asia and democracy in development: Dialogue and partnership’, International IDEA (2009), http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&pageid=35009.

16 S., Kripa and T. C. A. Srinivasa-Raghavan, Regional Cooperation in South Asia and Southeast Asia (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007).

17 For details, see B. Hettne and F. Söderbaum, ‘Civilian power or soft imperialism? EU as a global actor and the role of interregionalism’, European foreign affairs review 10, no. 4 (2005): 535-552.

18 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).

19 For details, see G. Chappell, ‘Pakistan: What Role for the European Union’, Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) Working Paper, 2009, http://w ww. swp-berlin. org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/chappell_Pakista n_format_ks.Pdf.

20 The principles are described in the European Parliament resolution of 22 october 2009 on democracy building in the EU’s external relations, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TExT+TA+P7-TA-2009-0056+0+DoC+xML+v0//En.

21 Ballesteros-Peiró, The EU-Pakistan relationship: looking beyond the trading partnership, Real Instituto Elcano, 2015 http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLoBAL_ConTExT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/asia-pacifico/ari26-2015-the-eu-pakistan-relationship-looking-beyond-the-trading-partnership21 For details on similar suggestions, see Shada Islam and Gareth Chappell (2009).

22 Ballesteros-Peiró, The EU-Pakistan relationship.

23 For details on similar suggestions, see Chappell, ‘Pakistan: What Role for the European Union’.

24 See S. Kelegama, Trade Policy and Democracy Building in South Asia (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2010).

25 See Ibid. for details.


Towards a strengthened EU strategy towards Australia: Sharing values, respecting difference, consolidating policy depth1Philomena B Murray

key points:

1. Have more summitry and meetings of senior officials;

2. Consolidate cooperation based on shared concerns and values; and

3. Rely on Australian pragmatism and positioning in the Asia Pacific.

the relationship of the european union (eu) and Australia is at a critical turning point that firmly places engagement on the level of a strong partnership, one that could not have been envisaged by either party in the last century. the old – and tired – focus on agricultural trade disputes has faded. the reliance by many in the Australian policy community on a ‘uk prism’ to comprehend the eu has diminished significantly.2

Both the EU and Australia have moved, in recent years, towards a strategy of broad and multifaceted engagement; for example, there is a pooling of resources and capacity in the field of development assistance. Moreover, there is a regional Asia Pacific dimension to the relationship, especially since 2008. There is however scope for increased pooling of resources and capacities of each interlocutor, in functional policy terms and multilaterally, not only in the Asia Pacific context.

Although the past still resonates in the relationship, changes to the range of both interests and values have resulted in a more mature engagement. What is now needed is recognition of the diverse and distinctive narratives and perceptions held by each side, which could still undermine or strengthen further progress. This will entail, for example, the EU restraining from suggesting that it is a template or model for the Asia Pacific, or indeed for Australia in regulatory or normative terms.

Australia has never featured significantly on EU external agendas. It is not a recipient of development aid and it is not a conflict zone. The EU had in the past focused its attention on the

transatlantic relationship, successive enlargements and relations with its neighbours, and development relationships with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states well above Australia in its own hierarchy of interests.

This neglect has been mutual. The Australian focus on the United Kingdom (UK), the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the priority of relationships with the United States (US) and the Asia Pacific region resulted in the EU being relegated to a low position in Australia’s hierarchy of interests. This was despite the fact that the EU has long been the first or second trading partner of Australia across the trade in goods, services and investment.

tAcklinG hiStory AnD GeoGrAphy, policy AnD reGion

Both history and geography have featured prominently in the relationship. There have been differing experiences of war and peace, and of understanding of the EU as a peace project, for example. History – and memory – have framed the Australian opposition to the CAP, since the UK accession to the then EEC in 1973, when Australia lost its privileged access to British markets.3


In terms of geography, there has long been a sense of distance and lack of engagement. This has been complemented by a third factor: a commitment of both the EU and Australia to their own immediate region. All of these factors continue to feature in the relationship.4

Despite a tyranny of distance, to coin a phrase regarding Australia’s geographical distance from many parts of the world,5 there has also been, to an extent, a bond based on the appreciation of sacrifice in wartime. yet distance has remained, in many ways, a backstory of the EU-Australia relationship; a distance from each other’s concerns and values, a geographical distance and a gap of perceptions and understandings.

Ludlow’s comment that Australia was, in the past, regarded by the EU as ‘too far away, too rich and too stable’, still has some resonance. It was a country that was “geographically distant, relatively prosperous and lacking in great political clout”.6

There remains a perspective in Australian policy circles and much of the domestic media that the EU is neither admirable nor a success. The perception must be kept in mind in developing the EU’s ‘Global Strategy’.

This paper focuses on how Australia might feature and ‘fit’ in the Global Strategy regarding Asia. It suggests that the relationship with Australia is not solely a regional one involving cooperation in the Asia Pacific region, although that is increasingly substantial, but is multilateral. It further suggests that the development of extensive functional policy cooperation will be very productive in future engagement.

nArrAtiveS

The relationship is currently characterised by a narrative of a strengthened partnership. In 2008, then Prime Minister Rudd committed to an engagement that would be “a new economic partnership, a new security partnership, a new development partnership and a partnership on climate change”.7

The “hostile rhetoric of the Howard government” was replaced by a narrative of “multilateralism, partnership and common strategic objectives” in the field of climate change8 and other issues of policy confluence. Symbolically, too, the Rudd apology to the indigenous Stolen Generation of Australia contributed to Australia being regarded in Europe as a like-minded country with common values.

yet there remains little enthusiasm about the EU in the Australian media and among many politicians – and this is also the case in new Zealand. The EU does not feature as a key partner in most official documents, and when it does there is also reference to the member states. Despite impressive cooperation among senior officials, there remains a reluctance to regard the EU as intrinsic to Australian national or regional interests.

In discussions of Australian foreign policy, the EU does not regularly feature.9 The approach towards the Asia Pacific in the Global Strategy will need to take cognizance of this and not assume that shared values in a multilateral context translate into assumptions of mutual trust and understanding in bilateral relations.

Almost 50 years of intermittent tensions have left a mark.10 More than 40 years of close relations with the UK after its accession to the EU suggest that this state remains Australia’s most important EU interlocutor, despite strong trade links with Germany and several other member states.

Shared values in a multilateral context translate into assumptions of mutual trust and understanding in bilateral relations.

‘

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Given that Australia still regards engagement with the EU as being both regional and bilateral, of institutions and states, an all-of-EU engagement (including of member states) with Australia will be important. A recent Australian government document spoke of “Australia’s foreign, trade and economic, development and international security policy interests and international standing” being advanced by “a stronger partnership with the European Union and key European countries and continued close ties with the United Kingdom”.11

An all-embracing cross-policy and all of government approach would encompass the European Commission’s ‘Trade for All ’ commitment, consolidated in a joint statement from Australian Prime Minister Turnbull and Presidents Juncker and Tusk, to commence a scoping study on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The ‘Trade for All’ document states that:

“Australia and New Zealand are Europe’s close partners, share Europe’s values and views on many issues, and play an important role in the Asia-Pacific region and in multilateral settings. Stronger economic ties with these countries will also provide a solid platform for deeper integration with wider Asia-Pacific value chains. Strengthening these relationships should be a priority.”12

The ‘Global Strategy’ and its approach towards Asia can be expected to continue the approach of broad agreements such as Framework Agreements. In the case of Australia, a Framework Agreement (FA) due to be signed in the first half of 2016 covers bilateral, regional and global concerns. It features cooperation on trade, investment and economic issues, development issues, scientific and technology collaboration, the rule

of law and the role of the WTo with an emphasis on non-proliferation, democracy promotion, climate change and education policy. This is a significant functional agreement, the product of extensive negotiation, with intensive policy and legislative socialisation, despite the Australian government’s concern about the essential elements clause regarding human rights.

on a regional level, the Global Strategy can be expected to continue its closer engagement with the Asia Pacific and to draw on the May 2015 Communication on EU-ASEAn relations, including seeking to be accepted as a member of the East Asia Summit. So for these reasons Australia - a potential supporter of that membership, despite little encouragement from Australia - is a key partner, as never before, for the EU.

The policy-regional nexus is evident in the Asia Pacific in a number of key areas. There is an opportunity for further enhancing development aid under the EU-Australia delegated aid agreement, which was announced on 5 September 2011 by then Prime Minister Gillard and then European Commission President Barroso.

on interregional cooperation, there is scope for the two parties, possibly also with new Zealand, to cooperate in the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) with possible issue-based leadership on focused themes. The EU may wish to more robustly seek Australia’s and new Zealand’s views on this joint leadership, especially regarding security cooperation and current counterterrorism discussions.

ASEM will also be a venue in which the EU will seek Australian support to join the East Asia Summit. The EU may wish to frame its case to Australia, like new Zealand, in terms of being like-

Common approaches to developments in the Asia-Pacific region including security in East Asia, the upcoming ASEAn Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Ministerial meetings

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minded states on issues relating to the region and their approach to ASEAn and other regional fora. The joint statement of HRvP13 Mogherini and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop in 2015 spoke of: common approaches to developments in the Asia-Pacific region including security in East Asia, the upcoming ASEAn Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEM Ministerial meetings14

There is little interest in the EU as a putative model in Australia and in the Asia Pacific; in fact there is criticism of the EU’s handling of the Euro crisis. There may be scope for the EU and Australia to work together in supporting both regionalism and democracy without presenting their own experiences as templates. This is because there is reluctance to regard the EU as a model in much of Asia and in Australia. This approach has been regarded as bordering on the arrogant and is perceived with considerable scepticism in Australia. This is particularly the case when the EU is itself dealing with a number of apparently insuperable crises, ranging from the Euro crisis to the refugee challenge.

There is considerable sharing of values, and the EU and Australia are increasingly becoming what can be termed ‘values partners’, with ideational commonality. over the last decade, there has been increased emphasis on the idea of the commonalities that draw the two together from ministers and officials of the Australian government, the EEAS, and European Commission. The joint statement of HRvP Mogherini and Foreign Minister Bishop in April 2015 referred to sharing “the same values in respect of democracy, human rights and a rules based international system”.15

There is a regional context to non-Traditional Security (nTS) cooperation of the EU and Australia in the Asia Pacific and in parts of Africa too. There is increased potential to work together on nTS issues such as food security, climate change and humanitarian assistance. A new agreement on civilian crisis management was signed in Brussels in April 2015.16 on counterterrorism there is meeting of minds and sharing of experiences, particularly since the first EU–Australian Counter Terrorism Dialogue in Brussels in november 2014. There is also regular discussion on refugee issues among senior officials.

A final contributing element to the Global Strategy is the consolidation of traditional security cooperation that already has been established in police cooperation. This includes the Europol agreement and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, a joint Australia-Indonesian initiative to enhance the expertise of South

East Asian law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and transnational crime, supported by funding from the European Commission and individual member states. The Australia-Europol agreement facilitates the exchange of strategic and operational information since September 2007. The security agenda currently features counterterrorism, the management of other international security issues, irregular people movements and migration issues.

Australian engagement in Asia Pacific regionalism continues to be constrained by its position in relation to the region’s great powers - the US and China. Then Prime Minister Gillard presented Australia’s future as being based on space ‘for a rising China’ and a ‘robust alliance between Australia and the United States’.17

Security dialogue between the EU and Australia is increasing across a range of bilateral, regional and multilateral domains. one important aspect that will be developed in the Global Strategy is the scope for the alignment of views on international challenges relating to Russia, Ukraine and the Middle East, including sanctions and measures to counter terrorism. There is collaboration on election observation and monitoring including in Fiji and Myanmar.18

There is scope to enhance the agreement on the Security of Classified Information of 13 January 2010, providing for the exchange of classified information, to “strengthen bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperation in support of shared foreign security policy and security interests” (EU/Australia, 2010),19 especially given the significance of the Framework Agreement and the broader remit of the Global Strategy.

recommenDAtionS AnD reFlectionS

The Framework Agreement will strengthen the all-of-government engagement by Australia with the EU and its institutions. It will provide the EU with a firm collaborator with similar interests and values in the Asia Pacific.

In many ways the strengthening of the relationship to this point is the result of significant drivers of the relationship in recent years – including key officials and individual political leaders. This is a significant step for both Australia and the EU. The High Representative may well wish to further enhance her individual relationships with Australian government leaders and ministers.


The FA will certainly reinforce key shared values. It serves to demonstrate Australia’s and the EU’s strong commitment to bilateral and international cooperation; and provide a treaty-level institutional framework as a platform to undertake joint activities on a broad range of issues.20

The challenge remains to develop this into a more strategic relationship with Australia where the Global Strategy perceives Australia as a partner with similar values. Indeed, outside of Europe, there are few states that share the EU’s commitment to multilateralism and international law and core values such as human rights. Australia is thus significant for the EU’s global agenda in advancing these values.

At the same time the Global Strategy needs to recognise that the Australian view of the EU remains more pragmatic than ideational, more material than ideological. The perception of the EU as an economic actor, but not a key player in the region will need to be closely examined in the development of the Global Strategy. For example, there is no evidence that Australia supports the EU request to join the EAS. Australia will continue to carefully consider whether to support the EU on this issue. There is little evidence of the government considering this as constituting an advantage for the Asia Pacific or for Australia.

The Global Strategy could focus on consolidating the following strengths of the EU-Australian relationship and tackling the following challenges.

The first factor is the consolidation of the FA and recent agreements and top-level discussions, including on counter-terrorism and crisis management cooperation. This consolidation will form the bedrock and lynchpin of the relationship in the future, encompassing Presidents of EU institutions, the HRvP, the Australian Prime Minister and members of the Australian government. Senior officials’ dialogue tends to be cordial and frank and is to be further encouraged across all policy areas.

Secondly, the EEAS will need to closely monitor the FTA negotiations and seek to influence them regarding possible opposition among some politicians and the media to conditionality and political dimensions. The legacy of the failure to conclude negotiations of the FA in 1996-7 remains a potential sensitive area.21 The november 2015 declaration of Prime Minister Turnbull and the Commission and European Council Presidents stated:

“We believe that a FTA will support sustainable growth and investment, open up new commercial opportunities and promote innovation and employment in Australia and the EU. We will aim to achieve a comprehensive and balanced outcome that liberalises trade, promotes productive investment flows and enhances the regulatory environment for business.”22

The differences between the EU and Australia regarding multifunctionality and neoliberal regimes, environmental protection and ‘Geographical Indications’ remain a challenge, although these are increasingly confined to a World Trade organization (WTo) context.23

For example, a senior Australian trade diplomat informed the European Parliament committee responsible for trade in December 2015 that “we have had different perspectives and approaches in this area”, and noted that “a bilateral FTA needs to set the conditions for open, fair and equitable trade in food and agriculture products, reflecting our respective comparative advantage”.24

The lack of Australian support – and even opposition to – EU membership of the EAS suggests that a recalibration of the relationship with Australi

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